Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction
is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the
term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part,
recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme"
under the old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no

haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment
is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the
words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the
felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72
and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable.
This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion:
The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as
long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both
the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp.
234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal
action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be
 called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist.
And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which
solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of
the accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is
as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said
accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal
Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the
case against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the
revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under
Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the
latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter
of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused
herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case
as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that
the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during
the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent
of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim
thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of
such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal,
passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for
the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8,
1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his
death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil
action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs.
Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by
the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of
Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has
no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar
as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator.
Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in
Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of
the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in
Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence
shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in
its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil
liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims
for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the
criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a
separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on
the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does
not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex
delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment
of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is
to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action
that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8,
1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the
basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article
30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court
of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by
the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying
on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can
continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments
subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of
an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of
Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires
to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule
111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall
be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must
be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the
estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations
other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Marivic Genosa, appellant

Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

Panganiban Artemio V., J. Supreme Court of the Philippines EN BANC. "People of the Philippines, appellee,
vs. Marivic Genosa appellant." Manila: 15 January 2004. G.R. No. 135981.

Case Digest

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and
the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and
the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of
treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert
witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by
the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual
-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in
our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and
the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal
Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer
in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of
appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-
spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her
of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result
of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1)
there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing
itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The
acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was
eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of
two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

Metro Manila

Twelfth Congress

Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand and three.
 ___o0o___

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262 ]

AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004".

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harrasment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a. rap, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim’s body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b. acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c. Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing
the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.

(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress.

(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found
in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows the
woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.

(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of
this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of themselves as
defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim and other children
under her care.

SEC. 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children.

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

a. Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

b. Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
c. Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
d. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
e. Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman’s or her child’s freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her child’s movement or
conduct:
1. Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
2. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient financial support;
3. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
4. Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
or controlling the victim’s own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;
f. Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
g. Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
1. Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
2. Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
3. Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
4. Destroying the property and personal belongingness or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
i. Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children of access to the woman’s child/children.

SEC. 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished
according to the following rules:

a. Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those
constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious
 physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be
punished by arresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed
penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than
arresto mayor.

b. Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
c. Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
d. Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
e. Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
f. Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be
applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory
psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

SEC. 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the compliant.

SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any
disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control
over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and
permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all
of the following reliefs:

a. Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the
acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
b. Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with
the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
c. Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights
are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the
residence;
d. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a distance
specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place
frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;
e. Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of personal
belongingness;
f. Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding
other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be
withheld regularly by the respondent’s employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure
to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause
shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;

h. Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to
surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and
disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the
court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on
the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
i. Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
 j. Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and
k. Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the
petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or
household member consents to such relief.

Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the
court from granting a TPO or PPO.

SEC. 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders. – A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:

a. the offended party;

b. parents or guardians of the offended party;
c. ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
d. officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units (LGUs);
e. police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s desks;
f. Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
g. lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;
h. At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and
their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.

SEC. 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. – Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue under Section
409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its implementing rules and regulations. An application for a TPO or PPO
may be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court with
territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the
place of residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court.

SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. – The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and
verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in any civil or criminal
case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A standard protection order
application form, written in English with translation to the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate
applications for protections order, and shall contain, among other, the following information:

a. names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;

b. description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;
c. a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
d. description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;
e. request for counsel and reasons for such;
f. request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and
g. an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.

If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the
circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of
the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the
application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court
has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.

Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law enforcement
agents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention.

SEC. 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. – All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.

SEC. 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order. – If the woman or her child requests in the applications
for a protection order for the appointment of counsel because of lack of economic means to hire a counsel de parte, the
court shall immediately direct the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) to represent the petitioner in the hearing on the
application. If the PAO determines that the applicant can afford to hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate
the legal representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack of access to family or conjugal resources by the
applicant, such as when the same are controlled by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation by
the PAO.

However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from representing the petitioner.

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section
5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.
If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by
the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may
grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall
order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of
law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO.

SEC. 16. Permanent Protection Orders. – Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by the
court after notice and hearing.

Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a lawyer, or the non-availability of his lawyer shall not
be a ground for rescheduling or postponing the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. If the respondents
appears without counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a lawyer for the respondent and
immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the respondent fails to appear despite proper notice, the court shall allow
ex parte presentation of the evidence by the applicant and render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The
court shall allow the introduction of any history of abusive conduct of a respondent even if the same was not directed
against the applicant or the person for whom the applicant is made.

The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Where
the court is unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire, the court shall
continuously extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until final judgment is issued.
The extended or renewed TPO may be modified

by the court as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.

The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be effective until
revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued. The court shall ensure immediate
personal service of the PPO on respondent.

The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the lapse of time between the act of violence and
the filing of the application.

Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court must determine whether or not the PPO shall
become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as there is no clear showing that the act from which the
order might arise did not exist.

Sec. 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. – The following statement must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital
letters on the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay or court:

"Violation of this order is punishable by law."

Sec. 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For Protection Orders – Failure to act on an application for a
protection order within the reglementary period specified in the previous section without justifiable cause shall render the
official or judge administratively liable.

Sec 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article
58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon
as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the
mandatory period specified in this Act.

Sec. 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. – Ex parte and adversarial hearings to determine the basis of
applications for a protection order under this Act shall have priority over all other proceedings. Barangay officials and the
courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a protection order under this Act above all other business
and, if necessary, suspend other proceedings in order to hear applications for a protection order.

Sec. 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act must be filed directly
with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without
prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon judgment, the
trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without need of an application.

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of
the acts committed.

Sec. 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal Cases. – The foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be
applicable in impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence against women and their children.

Sec. 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. – The Court may order any person against whom a protection order is issued to give a
bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the
violence sought to be prevented.

Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed
six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not exceeding thirty
(30) days, if for acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(I).

The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the PPOs issued only by the courts.

Sect. 24. Prescription Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling
under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

Sec. 25. Public Crime. – Violence against women and their children shall be considered a public offense which may be
prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the
commission of the crime.

Sec. 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incure any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of
the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

Sec. 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering substance
shall not be a defense under this Act.

Sec. 28. Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of her
child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given
to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In
no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman
syndrome.

Sec. 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. – Prosecutors and court personnel should observe the following duties
when dealing with victims under this Act:

a. communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or her child; and
b. inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and procedure, and privileges for
indigent litigants.
Sec. 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers. – Barangay officials and law enforcers shall have the following
duties:

a. respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or protection of the victim by entering the
necessary whether or not a protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the victim/s;
b. confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or within plain view;
c. transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a clinic or hospital;
d. assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the house;
e. assist the barangay officials and other government officers and employees who respond to a call for help;
f. ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the Punong Barangy or the courts;
g. arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when any of the acts of violence defined by this Act is
occurring, or when he/she has personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed, and
there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as defined in this Act; and
h. immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DSWD, social Welfare Department of
LGUs or accredited non-government organizations (NGOs).

Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be liable for a fine not exceeding Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or administrative liability.

Sec. 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse – Any healthcare provider, including, but not limited to, an attending
physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed by
the victim of violence shall:

a. properly document any of the victim’s physical, emotional or psychological injuries;

b. properly record any of victim’s suspicions, observations and circumstances of the examination or visit;
c. automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certificate concerning the examination or visit;
d. safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon request at actual cost; and
e. provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and remedies provided under this Act, and
services available to them.

Sec. 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs – Other government agencies and LGUs shall establish
programs such as, but not limited to, education and information campaign and seminars or symposia on the nature,
causes, incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the public on its social impacts.

It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGU’s to ensure the sustained education and training of
their officers and personnel on the prevention of violence against women and their children under the Act.

SEC. 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application for a protection
order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection order to compromise or
abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of
1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where
relief is sought under this Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SEC 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. – In every case of violence against women and their children as
herein defined, any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official who, acting in accordance with law,
responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than necessary to ensure the safety of the victim, shall
not be liable for any criminal, civil or administrative liability resulting therefrom.

SEC. 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence against women and their
children shall have the following rights:

a. to be treated with respect and dignity;

b. to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal assistance office;
c. To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs’
d. To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and
e. To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a protection
order.

SEC. 36. Damages. – Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.

SEC. 37. Hold Departure Order. – The court shall expedite the process of issuance of a hold departure order in cases
prosecuted under this Act.
SEC. 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other Expenses. – If the victim is an indigent or there is an
immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act on an application for a protection order, the court
shall accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of transcript of stenographic notes.

SEC. 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In pursuance of the
abovementioned policy, there is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and their
children, hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of the following agencies:

a. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

b. National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW);
c. Civil Service Commission (CSC);
d. Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
e. Department of Justice (DOJ);
f. Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
g. Philippine National Police (PNP);
h. Department of Health (DOH);
i. Department of Education (DepEd);
j. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and
k. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate VAW based on their mandates as well as
develop capability programs for their employees to become more sensitive to the needs of their clients. The Council will
also serve as the monitoring body as regards to VAW initiatives.

The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall have a rank not lower than an
assistant secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council meetings in their behalf, and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and
regulations.

SEC. 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims. – The DSWD, and LGU’s shall provide the victims temporary
shelters, provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.

The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.

SEC. 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. – The DSWD shall provide rehabilitative counseling and treatment to
perpetrators towards learning constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts and reforming their ways.
When necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit to psychiatric treatment or confinement.

SEC. 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to Violence Against Women and their Children Cases. – All
agencies involved in responding to violence against women and their children cases shall be required to undergo
education and training to acquaint them with:

a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their children;
b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against women and their children;
c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;
d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest and to offer protection and assistance; and
e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their children that minimize the likelihood of
injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim or survivor.

The PNP, in coordination with LGU’s shall establish an education and training program for police officers and barangay
officials to enable them to properly handle cases of violence against women and their children.

SEC. 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in
addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when the
necessity arises as specified in the protection order.

Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall be penalized in accordance with the
provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any
person for assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for discrimination.

SEC. 44. Confidentiality. – All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children including those in
the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics to hospitals shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address,
telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family
member, without the latter’s consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than
Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SEC. 45. –Funding – The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGU’s shall be used to implement services
for victim of violence against women and their children.

SEC. 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months from the approval of this Act, the DOJ, the
NCRFW, the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to be identified by the
NCRFW, shall promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act.

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have
suppletory application.

SEC. 48. Separability Clause. – If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections
or provisions shall not be affected.

SEC. 49. Repealing Clause – All laws, Presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 50. Effectivity – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173876, June 27, 2008]

VALCESAR ESTIOCA Y MACAMAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,[1] petitioner Valcesar Estioca y
Macamay prays for the reversal of the Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036 dated 30
June 2006, affirming with modification the Decision[3] and Order[4] dated 5 April 2004 and 17 August 2004,
respectively, of the Ozamiz City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 3054, finding
him guilty of robbery under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

On 31 July 2001, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC charging petitioner, Marksale Bacus (Bacus),
Kevin Boniao (Boniao) and Emiliano Handoc (Handoc) with robbery, thus:
That on July 28, 2001, at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, in the City of Ozamiz, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, did then and there helping
one another, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously break, destroy, and destroyed the padlock of the main door
of the classroom of MS. SELINA M. PANAL and once inside, the accused took, stole and carried away the
following:

A. One (1) Panasonic Colored TV 14 worth P6,000.00;

 B. One (1) Sharp Karaoke Tower Single Player color black worth P6,000.00; and

C. One (1) 3D Rota Aire Stand Fan color brown worth P3,000.00;

belonging to the Ozamiz City Central School represented herein by MS. SELINA M. PANAL, all valued at
P15,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said school thereof, in the aforementioned sum of P15,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
When arraigned on separate dates with the assistance of their counsels de oficio, petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge.[6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Nico Alforque (Nico) and Mrs. Celina M. Panal (Mrs. Panal). Their
testimonies, woven together, bear the following:

On 28 July 2001 (Saturday), at about 8:00 in the morning, Nico, then eleven years old and a Grade VI student of
Ozamiz City Central School (OCCS), and his cousin, Mark Alforque (Mark), went to the OCCS and cleaned the
classroom of a teacher named Mrs. Myrna Pactolin (Mrs. Pactolin). They received P30.00 each from Mrs.
Pactolin for the chore. Afterwards, Mark went home while Nico stayed inside the OCCS because Mrs. Pactolin
requested him to get some "waya-waya" and "dapna" inside the OCCS's canal to be used as fish food.[7]

While catching waya-waya and dapna inside the OCCS's canal, Nico saw petitioner and Bacus enter the
OCCS's premises by climbing over the OCCS's gate. Petitioner and Bacus then proceeded to the classroom of
another teacher, Mrs. Panal, which was located near the OCCS's canal. Thereupon, petitioner and Bacus
destroyed the padlock of the classroom's door using an iron bar and entered therein. Subsequently, petitioner
and Bacus walked out of the classroom carrying a television, a karaoke and an electric fan, and thereafter
brought them to the school gate. They went over the gate with the items and handed them over to Boniao and
Handoc who were positioned just outside the OCCS's gate. The items were placed inside a tricycle. After
petitioner, Bacus and Boniao boarded the tricycle, Handoc drove the same and they sped away.[8]

On the following day, 29 July 2001, Mrs. Panal went to the OCCS for a dance practice with her students. She
proceeded to her classroom and discovered that it was forcibly opened, and that the karaoke, television and
electric fan therein were missing. She immediately reported the incident to the police. The OCCS principal
informed her that Nico witnessed the incident. Thereafter, petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc were charged
with robbery.[9]

The prosecution also submitted object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) a T-
shaped slightly curved iron bar, which is 10 mm. by 12 inches in size, used in destroying the padlock of Mrs.
Panal's classroom and marked as Exhibit A; and (2) a Yeti brand, colored yellow, padlock used in Mrs. Panal's
classroom, marked as Exhibit B.

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Bacus, Rolly Agapay (Agapay), Boniao and
Handoc to refute the foregoing accusations. Petitioner and his co-accused denied any involvement in the
incident and interposed the defense of alibi.

Petitioner Estioca testified that on 28 July 2001, he cleaned his house located at Laurel Street, Ozamiz City,
from 8:00 in the morning up to 10:00 in the morning. After cleaning the house, he ate lunch and rested. At
around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day, he went to the house of his neighbor/friend, Junjun Ho (Junjun),
to help the latter in cleaning his houseyard. However, Junjun's father arrived, and since the father and son had to
discuss important things, he decided to go home which was about past 3:00 in the afternoon. Upon arriving
home, his aunt, Myrna Macamay, told him that some people had gone to the house looking for him. Later, two
unidentified persons, accompanied by Boniao, came to his house and brought him to the City Hall Police
Station for investigation as regards the incident.[10]

During the interrogation inside the police station, a certain Michael approached him and inquired as to where he
sold the television stolen from the OCCS. He told Michael not to accuse him of stealing as it is not a good joke.
Michael called Bacus and Boniao who were then standing nearby, and the two pointed to him as the one who
sold the television. Afterwards, one of the police officers therein told him to approach a certain Colonel Bation
who was also inside the police station. Upon approaching Colonel Bation, the latter punched him in the stomach
causing him to kneel down in pain. Colonel Bation asked him where he sold the television but he told him he
had nothing to do with it. Colonel Bation took a whip and smacked him with it several times on the body. An
emergency hospital worker named Dennis Fuentes, who was also present, stripped him naked and burned his
scrotum, chest and palm with lighter, cigarette butts and matchsticks. Thereafter, he was jailed.[11]

Bacus, a resident of Barangay Lam-an, Ozamiz City, declared that on the night of 27 July 2001, he slept at the
guardhouse of the Ozamiz City National High School (OCNHS) which is located in front of the OCCS. On the
following day, 28 July 2001, at about 7:00 in the morning, he woke up and helped his mother in selling bananas
beside their house which is situated in front of the OCNHS. At about 11:00 in the morning of the same day,
while on his way to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, to buy chicken feed, a certain Michael Panal and an
unidentified companion blocked his path and asked him if he was the one who robbed the OCCS. He told the
two that he had nothing to do with the incident. The two then brought him to the nearby seashore where they
were met by a group of persons headed by a certain Maning. Thereupon, they tortured and beat him for refusing
to admit involvement in the incident. Subsequently, he was taken to the Ozamiz City Hall for investigation.[12]

Agapay, an OCNHS working student and a resident of the said school, narrated that he knows Bacus because
the latter resided in a house located just in front of the OCNHS; that he and Bacus usually slept at the
guardhouse of the OCNHS; that on the night of 27 July 2001, he and Bacus slept at the guardhouse of the
OCNHS; and that Bacus woke up on the following day, 28 July 2001, at about 8:30 in the morning.[13]

Boniao, 14 years old and resident of Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, testified that on 28 July 2001, at 8:00 in
the morning, he cleaned his parents' house and thereafter watched television. On 30 July 2001, at 7:00 in the
morning, he and Bacus went to the OCCS to pick up plastic bottles scattered therein. After gathering some
plastic bottles, he and Bacus left the OCCS. While on their way home, a certain Leoncio apprehended him and
brought him to his parents' house. Upon arriving home, his mother beat him and forbade him to go out of the
house. Subsequently, several persons went to his parents' house and arrested him. He was taken to a nearby port
where he was asked to identify the persons involved in the robbery of the OCCS. When he could not say
anything about the incident, he was brought to the City Hall Police Station where he was jailed.[14]

Handoc, a pedicab driver residing at Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, stated that he helped his brother-in-law in
quarrying gravel at Panay-ay Diot, Clarin, Misamis Occidental, on the whole morning of 28 July 2001; that he
went back to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, at about 4:00 in the afternoon of 28 July 2001; that Tomas
Medina, the former barangay captain, arrested him and took him to the City Hall; that police officers in the City
Hall inquired as to where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS but he replied that he had nothing to do
with it; that he was repeatedly beaten by police officers for denying any involvement in the incident; and that he
was detained at the City Hall Jail.[15]

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 April 2004 convicting petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc of
robbery under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
imposed on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Since Boniao was a minor (14 years old) when he participated in the heist, he was sentenced to a lower prison
term of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional as
maximum. They were also ordered to pay P15,000.00 as civil liability. Nonetheless, the sentence meted out to
Boniao was suspended and his commitment to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
was ordered pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603.[16] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Valcesar Estioca y Macamay alias "Bango," Marksale Bacus alias "Macoy,"
Emeliano Handoc y Bullares alias "Eming" and minor Kevin Boniao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery defined and penalized under Article 299, subsection (a), paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code and upon applying Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and Indeterminate Sentence Law and
Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for by law (Art. 68, par. 1)
unto Kevin Boniao, a minor, who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, this court hereby
sentences them (a) Valcesar Estioca, Marksale Bacus, Emeliano Handoc to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and (b) Kevin Boniao (minor) to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional as
maximum and all of the accused to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law, to indemnify the civil
liability of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.

With respect to Kevin Boniao, the sentence imposed upon him is hereby suspended pursuant to PD 603 as
amended and he is therefore committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for
reformation, otherwise if he is incorrigible, then the sentence shall be imposed upon him by the court. The
DSWD is hereby ordered to have close surveillance and supervision upon him and to constantly observe the
development of his behavior and to submit to the court a report/recommendation on the matter as prescribed for
by law.

The Order of this court dated August 20, 2001 is hereby cancelled and revoked.

The accused are entitled 4/5 of the time they were placed under preventive imprisonment.

The cash bond in the amount of P24,000 posted by accused Valcesar Estioca is hereby cancelled and the same is
ordered released and returned to the bondsman concerned.[17]
Petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision arguing that
there was no conspiracy among them and that the penalty imposed was erroneous.[18] On 17 August 2004, the
RTC issued an Order partially granting the motion.[19] The trial court lowered the penalty imposed on them but
affirmed its earlier finding of conspiracy and conviction. It also ordered the DSWD to release and turn over
Boniao to his parents. It concluded:
WHEREFORE, as herein modified, the imposable indeterminate penalty meted to accused Valcesar Estioca,
Marksale Bacus and Emeliano Handoc being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of he crime of Robbery, defined
and penalized under paragraph 4 of Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code upon applying Indeterminate Sentence
Law with paragraph 1 of Art. 64, Revised Penal Code, ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum with
accessory penalty provided for by law; and for minor accused Kevin Boniao, the penalty of four (4) months of
arresto mayor upon applying the privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 68, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code with Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the same Code. All of the accused shall indemnify jointly the civil
liability of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.

As aforestated, minor accuser Kevin Boniao is hereby ordered released from DSWD and returned to the custody
of his parents.[20]
Unsatisfied, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Order before the Court of Appeals.[21] Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc did not appeal their conviction anymore. On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision and Order. The appellate court held that Boniao is
exempt from criminal liability but his civil liability remains pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise
known as The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, thus:
On a final note, considering that it is axiomatic that an appeal opens the entire case for review and considering
further that any decision rendered in the appeal does not bind those who did not appeal except if beneficial to
them, We hold that herein accused Kevin Boniao should be acquitted and his criminal liability extinguished
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which
took effect on May 22, 2006. The pertinent provision thereof provides, thus:
"Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
Section 20 of this Act.

xxxx

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws."
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and the August
17, 2004 Order are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that accused KEVIN BONIAO is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344, without prejudice to his civil
liability.[22]
On 21 August 2006, petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ALLEGED ROBBERY
WHICH HAPPENED ON BROAD DAY LIGHT AND IN THE PRESENCE OF ALLEGED TWO (2)
EYEWITNESSES UNDER HUMAN EXPERIENCE CAN POSSIBLY BE PERPETUATED BY THE
ACCUSED;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGED LONE WITNESS NICO ALFORQUE COULD HAVE POSSIBLY
WITNESS[ED] THE ALLEGED ROBBERY INCIDENT.[23]
Simply put, the Court is called upon to determine whether the testimony of Nico is credible given the
surrounding circumstances of the incident.

Petitioner maintains that the testimony of Nico regarding the fact that the robbery was committed in broad
daylight (8:00 in the morning) and in full view of Nico is against human nature. He asserts that no person would
dare commit robbery in broad daylight and in the presence of other people because they would be easily
identified. [24]

Petitioner further claims that it was impossible for Nico to see petitioner and Bacus destroy the door of Mrs.
Panal's classroom because, according to Nico's own Affidavit, Nico was inside the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin
during the incident. He insists that the walls of Mrs. Pactolin's classroom prevented Nico from witnessing the
incident.[25]

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-
settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the
witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.[26]

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing parameters to this case, we find no
cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the RTC that Nico's testimony is credible. As an eyewitness to
the incident, Nico positively identified petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc as those who robbed the OCCS of
an electric fan, television and karaoke on the morning of 28 July 2001. His direct account of how petitioner,
Bacus, Boniao and Handoc helped one another in robbing the OCCS is candid and convincing, thus:

Q: Now, on July 28, 2001 at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, could you be kind enough to tell us
where were you at that time?

A: We were cleaning the room of the school, sir.

Q: What particular school are you referring to?

A: At Ozamis Central School, sir.

Q: Would you be able to tell us the name of the teacher of that particular classroom you were cleaning?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Pactolin, sir.

Q: Why did you clean the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin, were you being paid?

A: Yes sir.

Q: How much?

A: P30.00 sir.
Q: Were you alone in cleaning the classroom of Mts. Pactolin at that time?

A: We were two sir.

Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this honorable court who was your companion at that time?

A: My cousin Mark Alforque sir.

Q: Now, after cleaning the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin together with Mark Alforque, what did you do
next?

A: My cousin went home and I was left in the classroom because I was requested by my teacher to get
fish food.

Q: What fish food are you talking about Mr. Witness?

A: Wayawaya and Dapna sir.

Q: While getting the fishfood for your teacher, did you observed (sic) anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this Court now what did you observed (sic) that time when you
were getting the fishfood?

A: I saw somebody climbed the gate sir.

xxxx

Q: Where were you at that time Mr. Nico Alforque?

A: I was inside the school sir.

Q: What particular place are you referring?

A: Near the canal sir.

Q: And would you be able to tell us also how far were you when you saw these persons climbing the
gate?

A: I was a little bit farther sir.

Q: After you saw the two persons climbing the gate, what happened after that?

A: I saw that the padlock was opened.

Q: What particular padlock are you referring to?

A: I saw a padlock made of iron.

Q: And what particular classroom or place were these persons you saw that they were opening the
padlock?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal sir.

Q: Who is this Mrs. Celina Panal?

A: A teacher sir.

Q: Would you be able to tell us whose classroom these persons you saw opening the padlock?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Panal sir.

Q: Would you be able to tell us how did they opened (sic) the classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal?

A: The room was opened with the used (sic) of an iron bar sir.

Q: I am showing to you this iron bar, what relation has this iron bar to the one you said a while ago?

A: That is the one used by the persons to open the classroom sir.

TO COURT:

We would like to request your honor that this iron bar be marked as our Exh. "A."

COURT:

Mark it.

TO WITNESS:

Q: And what about the padlock, would you be able to identify the padlock that was used (sic) by these
persons?

A: Yes sir.

Q: I am showing to you this padlock, would you kindly tell this Court what relation this padlock to the
one you stated a while ago?

A: That is the padlock used (sic) by them sir.

TO COURT:

For identification purposes your honor, May I respectfully request that this padlock be marked as
Exh. "B."

COURT:

Mark it.

TO WITNESS:

Q: Now Mr. Nico Alforque, you said that there were two persons who opened the classroom of Mrs.
Celina Panal, would you kindly identify these persons if you can see them now in court?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Would you kindly point to them if they are now here in court?

The witness is pointing to a person whom when asked of his name declared that he is Valcesar
Estioca.

A: And would you kindly tell us also the companion of Valcesar Estioca?
 The witness is pointing to a person whose name is Marksale Bacus.

Q: These are the persons who destroyed the padlock of the classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal?

A: Yes sir.

Q: After destroying the padlock Mr. Nico Alforque, what did you observed?

A: I saw that they brought out the colored TV, the Karaoke and the Electric Fan.

Q: You said that these persons after destroying the padlock, took the colored TV, the Karaoke and the
Electric Fan, where did they go?

A: After taking these things, they went out of the classroom sir.

Q: And after going out of the classroom where did they go?

A: They went to the gate sir.

Q: And at the gate, what did you observed (sic) if any?

A: I saw that there was another person sir.

Q: And what was this person doing at the gate?

A: They passed on the things through the person at the gate sir.

Q: To whom did these persons passed these things at the gate?

The witness is pointing to a man whose name is Kevin Boniao.

Q: What else did you observed (sic) at the gate?

A: I saw that there is another person.

Q: Who was that person?

The witness is pointing to accused Emeliano Handoc.

Q: And what was Emeliano Handoc doing at the gate Mr. Nico Alforque?

A: He was waiting at the gate sir.

Q: Now after you saw these persons, what were the two accused doing at the gate when they passed the
things to Kevin Boniao?

A: They were riding the tricycle sir.

Q: Could you be able to tell us who was driving the tricycle?

The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.

Q: And after seeing these persons what did you observed (sic) after that?

A: I did not see anything because I went away sir.

Q: You mean to say that all those persons went away when you went away?
 A: Yes sir.

Q: They went together, is that what you mean?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Are they walking or riding?

A: They were riding in a tricycle sir.

COURT:

Q: Whose tricycle?

The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.[27]

Mrs. Panal corroborated the foregoing testimony of Nico on relevant points. [28]

The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the object evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and
the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Nico and Mrs. Panal to be truthful and unequivocal and, as such,
prevailed over the denial and alibi of petitioner and his cohorts. Both courts also found no ill motive on the part
of Nico and Mrs. Panal.

It is not incredible or against human nature for petitioner and his companions to have committed the robbery in
broad daylight and in full view of Nico. There is no standard behavior of criminals before, during and after the
commission of a crime.[29] Some may be so bold and daring in committing a crime in broad daylight and in full
view of other persons. Others may be so cunning such that they commit crime in the darkness of the night to
avoid detection and arrest by peace officers.[30]

In People v. Toledo, Sr.,[31] we sustained the credibility of the eyewitness and upheld the conviction of the
accused for homicide despite the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight, full view of many
persons inside the school compound, and presence of inhabited houses. It was also ruled that crimes may be
committed in broad daylight and that criminals are not expected to be logical or to act normally in executing
their felonious designs because committing a crime itself is not logical or reasonable, viz :
Appellant [accused] also asserts that the testimony of Ronnie [eyewitness] was inherently improbable. He
insists that the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight, full view of many persons
inside the school compound, presence of inhabited houses around the purok -- were such that a crime could
not be committed.

For a number of reasons, we find no merit in this contention. First, appellant's premise that there were many
persons in the school compound is not supported by the evidence on record. Second, crimes are known to have
been committed in broad daylight within the vicinity of inhabited houses . Third, although it would be
illogical and unreasonable for normal persons in full control of their faculties to commit a crime under
such circumstances, the same does not hold true for all, especially those under the grip of criminal
impulses. We cannot expect the mind of such persons to work within the parameters of what is normal,
logical or reasonable, as the commission of a crime is not normal, logical or reasonable. Hence, the
circumstances present in this case do not rule out appellant's commission of the crime.[32]
Besides, as aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,[33] it is not improbable for petitioner and his
cohorts to have committed the robbery as narrated by Nico because it happened on a Saturday, a non-school day
in the OCCS. Apparently, petitioner and his companions expected that none or only few persons would go to
the OCCS on said date.

A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that Nico was in a canal located inside the OCCS
catching waya-waya and dapna when he saw the incident, and was not inside the enclosed classroom of Mrs.
Pactolin as alleged by petitioner.[34] Nico declared that he clearly saw the incident and that nothing blocked his
vision.[35] Nico remained steadfast and consistent in his foregoing testimony even on cross examination, thus:
 Q: From the place where you were gathering fishfood at that time you cannot clearly see the room of
Mrs. Panal, am I right?

A: I can see it clearly sir.

Q: You have not seen what were those persons doing inside the room of Mrs. Panal?

A: I saw them sir.

Q: You saw them taking away the Colored TV, Karaoke and the Electric Fan?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Who among them took with him the TV?

The witness is pointing to Valcesar Estioca.

Q: Aside from the TV he also carry away with him the Electric Fan and Karaoke?

A: It was his companion sir.

xxxx

Q: Now at the gate you saw how many persons aside from that two who entered the room of Mrs.
Panal?

A: I saw three persons sir.

Q: Was these three persons outside the gate or inside the gate?

A: They were inside the gate sir.

Q: And that was the time you saw the TV, Karaoke and Electric Fan turned over to those persons at the
gate?

A: Yes sir.

Q: After that, those three persons left the place?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What about those two persons you saw entering the room of Mrs. Panal where did they go?

A: They went out sir. [36]

The alleged inconsistency between the affidavit of Nico and his court testimony is inconsequential.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement or affidavit and direct testimony given in open court do not
necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the
fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements,
usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons, at times because of partial and innocent
suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally
not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement;
hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses'
direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their extrajudicial statements.[37]

Since we find no error in the factual finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the testimony
of eyewitness Nico is credible, then the judgment of conviction against petitioner, Bacus, Boniao, and Handoc
should be affirmed. The positive and credible testimony of a lone eyewitness, such as Nico, is sufficient to
support a conviction.[38]

We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties imposed on petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc.

Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for
robbery with use of force upon things where the value of the property taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender
does not carry arms, as in this case, is prision mayor. Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was
alleged and proven in this case, the penalty becomes prision mayor in its medium period in accordance with
Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the
penalty now is prision correccional in any of its periods as minimum to prision mayor medium as its maximum.
Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in imposing on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc, a prison
term of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum, because it is within the aforesaid range of penalty.

With regard to Boniao, who was a minor (14 years old) at the time he committed the robbery, Article 68,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code instructs that the penalty imposable on him, which is prision mayor,
shall be lowered by two degrees. The RTC, therefore, acted accordingly in sentencing him to four months of
arresto mayor.

Nonetheless, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Boniao, who was barely 14 years of age at the time he
committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his
parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as The Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

xxxx

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Sec. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - If it has been determined that the child taken into
custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the
duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the
child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development officer who
will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the
child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child
may be released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a
barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social
welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has
been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his
parents, or in the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 28 July 2001 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May
2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Boniao who was not shown to be a habitual
criminal.[39] This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
However, as Boniao's civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic
Act No. 9344, Boniao should be held jointly liable with petitioner, Bacus, and Handoc for the payment of civil
liability in the amount of P15,000.00 representing the stolen items.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008]

JOEMAR ORTEGA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting
petitioner Joemar Ortega[4] (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both
dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions
thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual
intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or
sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[9] Thus, trial on
the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.[10] Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD,
EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were
close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught
petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in
turn asked AAA.[11] There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different
occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son
BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega[12] (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2)
nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick.[13] During the first night
at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her
daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion
occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner
brought AAA to their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her
vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he
would spank her.[14] AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of AAA
and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was
conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching,
petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which
was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed
AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.[15] AAA described
petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she
saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.[16]

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their
kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their
waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion.
Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the
incident to his mother, MMM.[17]

MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his
fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner molested
AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out
of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to her, petitioner and
Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart,
examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it.
Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM
called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner
did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination.
[18]

MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas[19] (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health
Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested.[20] Refusing to accept
such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of
the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report[21] showing that there were
"abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also
found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were
superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification
that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.

Subsequently, an amicable settlement [22] was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation,
an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from
their house to avoid contact with AAA. [23] As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality.
However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for
laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this
instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the
three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.

Version of the Defense

Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. [24] He is the second
child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against
him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers
to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept
together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to
her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he
merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of
washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his
parents, went to AAA's house; [25] they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the time;
while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB
ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA
were having sexual intercourse;[26] petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could
not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated
AAA like a younger sister;[27] BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did
they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the
evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to
go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to
BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for
examination.[28]

Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the
incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her
siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA
and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a
separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and
conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they
were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the
dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to
MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement,
Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything
unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at
BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor
did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day,
MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor
to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank
BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas
who found no indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the
results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did
Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda
that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they
should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement
wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for
almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring
his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a
rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda.
Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.[29]

The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and
credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a
serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed of
this case in this wise:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the
offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[30]

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal.[31]

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense of
denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother
BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the
respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that the
slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an
element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts.
Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution[33] dated November 7, 2001.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE

AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO

APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE
ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED
VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS
IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE
ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE
SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.[34]
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not
prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of
AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that
assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina,
certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking
into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is
completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a
medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or
molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since
it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case;
thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like
AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As
such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very
dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner
claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the
parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions
that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period
of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after
the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case
after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not
inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the initial
confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB
were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.[35]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of
abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is
relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996;
even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not
have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even
in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a
trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness
and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted
with discernment when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.[36]

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into
law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law establishes a comprehensive system to
manage children in conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and children at risk[40] with child-appropriate procedures and
comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration
and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law,
particularly Section 8[41] thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with
certain duties and functions[42] such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency
and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The
law also provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of
R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.[43]

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title VIII

Transitory Provisions

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. -- Upon effectivity of this
Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the
custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act. Those with
suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released,
unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. -- If the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall
also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives
for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the
transfer of the child to a youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. -- The PNP, the
BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity
of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody.

SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings.
-- If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate
diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in
consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may
be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of
conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the
Probation Law.

SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. -- Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A.
No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged
rape, he was merely 13 years old.

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape,
the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt
AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to
positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw
petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is
enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and
FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial
knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is
not true.[45] We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of
AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner's parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most
cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the
victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of
the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required.[46] Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the
petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or
of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.[47]

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by
the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal
liability arises.[48] Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra
v. Almodovar,[49] we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article
12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has
stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence,
the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal
act.
In its Comment [50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions
of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction
was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG
claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof.
The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38 [51] of R.A. No. 9344
providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a
recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such principle
does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.

We are not persuaded.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. -- A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time
of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate
local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at
the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In
short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. [52]

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia
sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. [53]
This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. -- Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain instances
involving special laws. [54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.

In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the bill in
the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions

Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we
should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:

ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE
CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE
LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS
OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.

The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?

Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the
moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children who do not have
criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal liability, but because
of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.

Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a diversion
program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.

Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that. That is why I
was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except that
apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to just craft it to
ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to
absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.

The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all those children in
conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject
to incarceration under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.

The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for example, for
conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They
do not necessarily have to remain in detention.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of infrastructure,
meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must be a
transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago amendment is
accepted. [55]

xxxx

PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS

xxxx

Senator Pimentel.
xxxx

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would like to suggest
to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make this law apply also
to those who might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as
adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein we
address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this
Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.

Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of
juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment, subject to style.

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to address, otherwise
injustice will really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at the time
of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment. [56]
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the
lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be
enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not
follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative
enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and
to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent
policy and objects of the legislature.[57]

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[58] In this case, the plain meaning of R.A.
No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner.
No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape.
This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his
mother. Furthermore, petitioner's age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA.
Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No.
9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed
against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his
parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded
to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape,
pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the
fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the
odious crime of rape.[59]

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our
children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and
children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major
concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed
Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was
found that:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of
criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment of
children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police,
most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or
below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them
ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children
15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply
because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law.[60]
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a
heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by
the petitioner, and one who deserves the law's greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable
because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court.[61] Any
perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the
Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we
have done so in this case.[62]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner
Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and
development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No
costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.