HOMICIDE

• The defendant’s argument in each of this appeals is that the respective Trial
US v PAICAOAN judges failed to adequately to instruct the jury what constitutes death, the
time wherein criminal liability would attach.
PEOPLE v EULO & PEOPLE v BONILLA
Doctrine : Death is defined as an irreversible cessation of breathing and heartbeat or,
• This is important because death marks the period for which legal actions may
be started, or ended. When orgrans can be donated or when the marriage is
when these functions are artificially maintained, an irreversible cessation of the
dissolved.
functioning of the entire brain including the brain stem.
• Because in the past, in NY death is defined as “irreversible cessation of
breathing and heartbeat”. And not really “brain death” And they define
Facts:
homicide as conduct which causes death of a person.
The two cases are all about killings qualified by circumstances to become murder. And the
• So defendant’s argue that since there is only brain dead and the victim still
bone of contention is, when is the precise moment that death occurs?
breathes, maybe, they are not liable for homicide, yet.
• To prove survivorship, medical and circumstancial evidence is taken in.(ie.
1st case: people vs. Eulo
Asthmatic die first of suffocation in fires)
• July 19, 1981, Defendant and his girlfriend went to the firemen’s fair in King’s
• But since modern medical machines continue the life support, when can we say
Park in Suffolk County. The defendant got jealous when he saw an ex-suitor of
that death occurred? What circumstances do we look for?
his girlfriend. They quarreled. But the defendant drove her home, and after
• So vital signs like breathing and heartbeat are not indicative of life anymore. In
parking for a while right outside of her parent’s house, they continued arguing
fact we transplant organs when there is still breathing and heartbeat to be
until he shot her around midnight. The gun used was unregistered.
viable and intact.
• The victim was rushed to the hospital, and for days a tube was placed in her
• And the movement of law towards recognizing the trend of cessation of the
windpipe to enable artificial respiration and intravenous medication was applied
brain as a measure of death ensued. And this is not going against past
to stabilize her blood pressure. Hours after the shooting, she was tested by
definitions.
painful stimuli and EEG(electroencephalogram-for brain activity) which resulted
• They have accepted that when the brain ceases to show any activity, the person
to negative reaction. For two days she was only breathing by mechanical
can be declared
respirator, and her heartbeat was sustained by medication. Faced with such
odds, the parents consented to organ donations • The court however recognizes that 3rd parties will never be allowed to decline
• July 23, a second opinion resulted in the dame opinion and at 2:20 pm, she was medical assistance for an ill person, whether a relative or stranger. It must be a
pronounced dead. Her kidneys, spleen and lymph nodes were removed. personal choice.
• Then the respirator was removed. And then her breathing immediately stopped • And regarding the defendant’s contention that the juries were not informed of
followed by a cessation of the heartbeat. the definition of death.:
• The defendant was indicted for 2nd degree murder , after a jury trial he was The court can only say that it has no merit, as under the court proceeding, it may be
said that the defendant “caused the death” of the victim. There is causal chain. And
convicted of manslaughter.
if they blame the organ transplants as the cause of death, this too, is not possible,
because this is done only after the person is pronounced dead.
2nd case: people vs. Bonilla
• And the only thing that will relieve the defendants of liability is proof of
• A policeman found a man lying faceup in a Brooklyn street(NY) with a bullet
negligence of doctors in their pronouncement. Only if they didn’t follow proper
wound to the head. The policeman took him to the hospital via the patrol car.
medical practices.
• Shortly after arriving in the hospital, the victim became comatose and was
• AND IN THIS CASE, it is not shown.
unable to breathe spontaneously. He was placed in a respirator and medication
for for his blood pressure.
The other arguments of Defendant Eulo were considered, and found to be unpreserved or
• The neurosurgeon, the next day, tested for reflex (painful stimuli) and brain
without merit.
activity(EEG). No positive response was observed. When the respirator was
removed, no spontaneous breathing ensued.
People v. Fernando Pugay & Benjamin Samson [1988]
• In the physician’s opinion the bullet caused the entire brain to cease
Medialdea, J.
functioning. And the day after the tests were repeated with the same result.
Deceased Bayani Miranda was a 25-yr old retardate. He was friends w/accused Fernando
• \The mother was informed and consented to donate the organs, and soon after,
Pugay. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay & they sometimes slept together.
death was pronounced at 9:25pm. And the kidneys and spleen were
transplanted.
May 19, 1982, Rosario, Cavite
• The defendant was arrested, indicted for 2nd degree murder and criminal • Town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza. Sometime after midnight, Eduardo
possession of a weapon. And he was convicted of 1st degree manslaughter and Gabion was sitting on the ferris wheel, one of the many rides in the plaza, and he
weapons count. was reading a comic book.
• Pugay, Benjamin Samson & several other companions arrived. They were all
Issue: WON death occurs when the person is brain dead. Alternatilvely , When is happy & noisy and they all looked drunk. Miranda passed by & they all started
the precise point at which a person ceases to live. making fun of him. They made him dance by tickling him w/a piece of wood.
YES, when irreversible cessation of breathing and heartbeat or, when these functions • Pugay took a can of gasoline from under the ferris wheel & poured its contents
are artificially maintained, an irreversible cessation of the functioning of the on Miranda’s body. Gabion tried preventing Pugay from doing so. Samson then set
entire brain including the brain stem Miranda on fire.
 • Several people tried to extinguish the fire by wrapping Miranda w/rags or
pouring sand on him. He was later rushed to the hospital where he eventually died.
• Gabion, Pugay, Samson & 2 other accused were brought to the municipal bldg
for interrogation but Gabion was released later on.
Information alleged conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation & superior strength &
means employed was to weaken defense.
Both Pugay & Samson pleaded not guilty.
RTC: Guilty of murder as principals by direct participation. Praeter Intentionem MC
appreciated WRT accused Pugay.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON the RTC erred in finding the accused guilty. – NO.
• Accused tried to put blame on Gabion. However, Pugay admitted in
his statement that he was the one who poured gasoline on Miranda believing that the
can contained water. Samson on the other hand alleged that Pugay did pour gasoline
but he did not know who set Miranda on fire. Their statements did not mention any
participation on Gabion’s part.
• Accused also tried to claim that their written statements were
extracted by force & that the police maltreated them. This would be immaterial
considering that the contents of their statements were not the sole basis for the
court’s decision. Gabion’s testimony would have sufficed even w/o their statements.
• Accused also claim that the prosecution suppressed testimonies of
other eyewitnesses by deliberately not presenting them. Such is also immaterial
considering that these were mere corroborative statements & their non-presentation
doesn’t give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced. This presumption doesn’t apply to corroborative evidence.
Besides, the prosecution decides whom to utilize as witness.
• Accused also tried to attack Gabion’s credibility as a witness claiming
that Miranda’s mom talked to him in exchange for his absolution from liability. They
further allege that it was contrary to human behavior & experience for him to read a
comic book while an unusual event was taking place. Gabion testified that it was his
uncle who asked him to testify. Miranda’s mom likewise testified that she only saw
Gabion for the first time when the case was tried. Even Pugay admitted that Gabion
was his friend & both accused admitted that they had no previous misunderstanding
w/the witness. Thus, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely. No truth either in
allegations that Gabion’s act was contrary to human behavior. He was reading a
comic book but he stopped when Pugay & co. began making fun of Miranda. Also, it
was while Pugay was in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Miranda that
he tried to warn him not to do so.
• Pugay’s criminal responsibility – He failed to exercise necessary
diligence to avoid every undesirable consequence. He should have known that the
can contained gasoline considering the stinging smell of the flammable liquid. Court
held in US v Maleza that man must use common sense & exercise due reflection in
all his acts. It’s his duty to be cautious, careful & prudent if not from instinct then
thru fear of incurring punishment. He’s responsible for results that anyone might
foresee & for acts w/c no one would have performed except thru culpable abandon.
• Samson’s responsibility – His act of setting Miranda on fire cannot be
characterized w/treachery there being absence of proof that he had reason to kill
deceased. Evidence show that they were just making fun of the deceased. For
treachery to be appreciated, attack must be deliberate & means/methods/forms
employed tend to directly & specially insure its execution w/o risk to offender arising
from any defense the offended party might make. No doubt that he knew that
gasoline was poured on Miranda as evidenced by his act of setting victim on fire. But
he only intended to put his clothes on fire as part of their fun-making. But he’s still
liable considering that burning deceased’s clothes would still cause physical injuries &
if his act resulted in a graver offense, he’s still responsible for the consequences as
provided for in Art. 4 of the RPC (criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that w/c he
intended). He’s only liable for homicide w/the MC of praeter intentionem.
2. WON there was conspiracy. – NO
• No proof of previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose & intention bet.the
2 immediately before the commission of the crime. No animosity either between
victim & accused. Meeting was accidental & the accused’s group merely wanted to
make fun of Miranda.
• Thus, their liabilities will be individual & not collective making them liable only
for their own acts.
HOLDING: Affirmed w/modification.
STATE v MINISTER
FACTS:
 On July 8, 1982, Larry Edmund Minster shot Cheryl Dodgson in the neck
 Cheryl became quadriplegic
 Minster was charged and convicted of attempted first degree murder and use of
a handgun in a crime of violence
 On October 3, 1983, 1 year and 87 days after the incident, Cheryl died from
injuries the State contends is the direct result of Minster’s actions
 Thus, the State charged and indicted Minster with first degree murder
 Circuit Court dismissed the indictment because of the rule that bars
prosecution for murder where the death of the victim occurred after 1 year
and 1 day after the blow was struck
 The State (plaintiff) contends that the Court should abrogate the rule because it
is now archaic given medical advances in life-saving techniques
 On the other hand, Minster contends that:
 There remains legitimate justification for the rule’s continues application
 Even if change is warranted, it should be left in the hands of the legislature
and not of the Court
ISSUE: W/N THE COURT SHOULD ABROGATE THE 1YEAR AND 1DAY RULE BARRING
PROSECUTION FOR MURDER
HOLDING: NO. The decision to change is more properly addressed by the legislature
and not by the Court
REASONING:
2. There are a number of sound justifications for retaining the rule:
a. Abrogation may result in an imbalance between the adequate protection of
society and justice for the accused
 Torment and possible persecution of a person who may
have at one time or another injured another
b. There is still a need for a limitation on the causation
 Question of will there ever be a time when the Court may
declare that the bridge between the blow and the death has
now been irreparably broken?
c. Abrogation may lead to injustice:
 “If there is one thing that criminal law must be if it is to be
recognized as just, it must be specific and definitive”
  “In case of life, law ought to be certain

3. A person charged with attempted first degree murder can be sentenced to life
imprisonment, where the judge takes into account the seriousness of the injury to, or
the possible subsequent death of, the victim. The fact that the person may be
sentenced to death for murder is not a sufficient reason to rescind a common law rule
which has existed for over seven years

4. There is a great difference of opinion surrounding the appropriate course of

action:
 People v. Stevenson and State v. Young:
a. Retention
b. Compromise by extending the span of time (e.g. to 3 years
and 1 day)
c. Change the rule from being an irrebuttable
presumption to a rebuttable one with a higher burden of proof
required
d. Simply abolish the rule and leave it to the jury to
decide causation

4. Observable trend is towards an abrogation by the legislature instead of by the judiciary

 Of the 13 jurisdictions that enacted the
rule into statute, only 4 retain the rule today
 The 9 abrogated through legislative
action
 In addition, in 2 more jurisdictions, the
judiciary held that the legislature abrogated the rule by failing to include
it in the comprehensive revision of the state’s Criminal Code
 In contrast, only 5 jurisdictions
abrogated through the judiciary

5. Recent decisions have affirmed the viability of the rule (In re J.N. and
State v. Zerban), and the rule remains extant in 26 states

ALTHOUGH the Court recognizes the cogency of the State’s arguments about
advances in medical technology, it believes that it should be the legislature
which mandates any change in the rule. Judgment affirmed

MURDER

PEOPLE v CAGOCO

United States vs. Burns
Appeal from a judgement of the COFI of Samar
Facts:
♦ COFI of Samar found Frank E. Burns guilty of the crime of arson. He was
sentenced to twenty years of cadena temporal
♦ At about 11 o'clock p.m., on the 5th of September, 1918, a fire broke out in the
basement of the resident of Pedro de la Cruz in the municipality of Pambujan,
Province of Samar
♦ The occupants of the house were able to escape except for a 14 year old
servant named Cipriano jazmin who was burned to death. Aside from the of
Pedro dela Cruz the fire also consumed the houses of Sy Quico, Pedro Tan,
Isidro Morales, Dionisio Mijos, Manuel Merino, Felipe Luca, Pablo Madeja,
Romana Morales, Sergio Soccoro and Paulo Morillo.
♦ Frank E. Burns, stands convicted as the responsible author, being supposedly
moved by resentment towards Pedro de la Cruz as a competitor in the operation
of his automobile for hire.
♦ Principal witness of the prosecution is Casimiro Breva. Burns told Breva to
stand guard in the street. The prosecution also presented Primitivo Balanquit
as their witness. There were some inconsistencies in the statements of Breva
but the court decided to give weight to his testimony because it was delivered
in a straightforward, natural style.
♦ In his defense Burns he presented witnesses that would support his alibi that he
was sleeping and when just awakened by the commotion of the fire.
♦ The complaint charges the accused with the crime of arson, committed in the
night time by setting fire to an automobile in the lower part of an inhabited
house, to with, the resident of Pedro de la Cruz, availing himself of his
knowledge that the inmates were then asleep. As a consequence, it is alleged
that said automobile was consumed as well as the house above it, and in the
burning of this house one of its inmates, to wit, Cipriano Jazmin, perished,
being burned to death by the fire.
WON the accused is guilty of murder or homicide? Murder
♦ Complaint charges facts sufficient to constitute the commission of two grave
and entirely distinct crimes, the perpetration of which has been fully proved,
namely, arson under article 549 of the Penal Code and homicide under article
404 of the same code, both of which crimes resulted from a single act. In this
situation the penalty for the more serious crime must, under article 89 of the
Penal Code, be imposed in its maximum degree
♦ General Rule: complaint shall charge only one offense; Exception: when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various allied offenses.
♦ When the Penal Code declares that homicide committed by means of fire shall
be deemed to be murder, it is intended that there should be an actual design to
kill and that the use of fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder in the absence of design to take life. In the case
before us the accused is not shown to have entertained personal malice against
Cipriano Jazmin, nor did he have designs against the title of any person. It is
true that, according to Casimiro Breva, just before the match was applied the
accused used language which showed that his mind was advertent to the fact
that lives would be endangered by the setting of fire to the automobile, as when
he said "Let those die who ought to die." But those words must be taken as
indicative of a spirit of reckless bravado rather than of a determinate purpose to
take life.
♦ Another reason why the death of Jazmin cannot be considered as a murder is
that the complaint is drawn, the principal offense therein charged is arson, the
homicide being stated merely as one of the incidental consequences thereof.
This is in strict conformity with the facts proved, inasmuch as the immediate
purpose of the accused was to accomplish the destruction of the automobile of
Pedro de la Cruz. Arson, then, is the principal offense of which the accused is
guilty; and arson of necessity involves the use of the element fire as the means
of its consummation. This being admitted, it follows that the use of fire cannot
be treated as a qualifying factor sufficient to raise the offense of homicide to
murder, it being manifestly illegitimate to make use of the same factor in
connection with both crimes.
WON the aggravating circumstances noted by the court can be appreciated? No
♦ The aggravating circumstances are unimportant, inasmuch as the penalty for
arson, under article 549 of the Penal Code, must at nay rate be imposed in the
maximum degree on account of the concurrence of the other crime of homicide.
WON the accused should only be sentenced under article 550, No. 2. NO
♦ The final sentence of the amended complaint, must be examined. It is there
said that the offense which is the subject of the complaint was committed "in
violation of article 550, No. 2, in relation with article 89 . . . of the Penal Code."
♦ Article 550 of the Penal Code punishes the setting of fire to an inhabited house,
without the incendiary knowing whether such house is occupied or not at the
time. The offense committed by Burns does not properly fall under that article
because it clearly appears from the proof that when the fire was set the accused
well knew that the house was the home of Pedro de la Cruz and that his family
were sleeping therein. The offense therefore falls under article 549 which
contemplates a person who sets on fire a building, knowing it to be occupied at
the time by one or more persons. As the offense denounced in article 549 is a
graver offense than that denounced in article 550, No. 2, and carries a much
heavier penalty, the question arises whether the allegation in the complaint, to
the effect that the crime was in violation of article 550, No. 2, constitutes any
impediment to the sentencing of the accused, under article 549, for the form of
the crime which was in fact committed.
♦ The SC has held before that it is not the technical name given by the fiscal in
the title or preliminary part of the information that determines the character of
the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information, and that,
therefore, an accused person may be convicted of a crime which is more serious
than that named in the title or preliminary part, if such crime is covered by the
facts alleged in the body of the information and its commission is established by
the evidence
The judgment of the trial court, in so far as it finds the accused guilty of arson will be
affirmed, but the sentence will be modified by substituting the penalty of cadena
perpetua, with the accessories prescribed in article 54 of the Penal Code, for the penalty
of cadena temporal, with the corresponding accessories.
PEOPLE v PATERNO
 PEOPLE v WHISENHUNT
People vs. Whisenhunt
(The chop chop lady massacre)
Nov. 14, 2001
This is a direct appeal from the decision of the RTC Pasig City which states:
That Stephen Mark Whisenhunt is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined and
penalized under Art. 248 RPC. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with accessory penalty of actual funeral expenses of P100,000, P3m for moral
damages, P1m, for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees of P150,000.
Facts:
• Nov. 19, 1993, Whisenhunt charged with the murder of Elsa Santos Castillo.
• The information reads: Sept. 24, 1993, San Juan, MM, Whisenhunt willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior
strength, attack and assault , and use personal violence against Elsa “Elsie”
Castillo, stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts of the body.
Thereby mortally wounding herto cause her immediate death. Afterwhich
outraged and scoffed at her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and
other body parts.
• The case facts were largely based on prosecution star witness, Demetrio
Ravelo, Whisenhunt’s driver.
• He narrated that the two were estranged from their marriage partners, and that
they were lovers and worked for the Apex Motor Corporation. Up until Elsa had
to quit because of the rumors of illicit affair between the two.
• of all his narration these were proven.: That on Sept 23, he was the one who
fetched Elsa to go to the condominium in San Juan where Whisenhunt was at.
That on Sept. 24 the maid was looking for the missing kitchen knife, which
Whisenhunt actually had in his room all along. He also told of the plea of
Whisenhunt to help him and his actual help to throw the body parts along the
road to Whisenhunt’s family mansion in Bagac.,Bataan on Sept. 25. His help
included the putting od the parts in black garbage bags and stowing them on
the car trunk, and his drive to Laguna and Bataan, stopping occasionally to
throw some parts or things.
• Some of the circumstancial eveidence narrated was not really proven like, the
black garbage bags he delivered to Whisenhunt. And the purchase of the big
traveling bags with rollers to store the body on the way to its disposal, also
gave the circumstances of the facts.
• He reported it to their fiscal, Diaz, who referred them to the NBI.
• He gave his statement to Atty. Sacaguing the head of Anti-organized crime
division of the NBI.
• His story was verified as they traced the body parts and personal effects along
the roads to Laguna and Bataan, which they clooected and was autopsied by
Dr. Mendez of the NBI. And the cause of death is found to be stab wounds. (one
in the right breast puncturing the lung, 2 in the left breast penetrating the
diaphragm.. etc.)
• Atty. Sacaguing also interviewed the appellant(with contusions in some body
parts) and checked the car used for the disposal. The car was smelly,
suspiciously of blood.
• Then the room in the condominium was also checked by Forensic biologist, and
resulted in samples of hair and blood type B f similar to that of Elsa’s.
• The Whisenhunt family corroborated the alibis given by Stephen Whisenhunt. It
ranged from his aunt and mother seeing him alone in his room in the San Juan
condo on the day of the murder. That Elsa wasn’t at the condo at that time.
Their arrival time at Bagac was also negated by the family, saying it was much
earlier. And that Stephen had fun at Bagac, jetskiing(suffering injuries from it
and from falling down the stairs) and being with the family. And lastly, the
blood type b supposedly came from Whisenhunts’ sis-in-law during her
menstruation when she stayed in the condo.
• The defendant argues that he had previously received jealous and threatening
letters from Elsa’a husband, that he didn’t know of her death until the NBI
arrested him.
The defendant appealed assigining errors in the lower court for :
I. convicting accused of the crime charged.
II. that the prosecution was able to present enough circumstantial evidence to
support the conclusion of guilt.
III. In rejecting, disregarding and/ or not giving credence to the defense of the
accused.
Issues:
WON Evidence was enough
• Yes, Demetrio Ravelo’s narrative is both convincing and consistent in all
material points. It bears the ring of truth and sincerity He is considered a
credible witness.
• And the Court has consistently highly respected the factual findings of the Trial
Court.
• Physical evidence damned him: taken to be mute by highly trustworthy more
than a hundred eyewitnesses..
• It proved to be an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence.
• In any case the rule of conviction from circumstantial evidence 1.) that there be
more than one circumstantial evidence 2.)the inference must be proven by facts
3.) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of guilt.
• And in this case the successfully proven facts(stated above) and the
factual evidence of the disposed body parts and things in the roadside
as well as forensic results, all led to the necessary conclusion that Elsa
was last seen at the condo and that the inescapable fact that Elsa was
stabbed in his room and that this was the cause of death.
WON the “bangungot” claim of the defendant as the cause of death can be taken in
• No. Defendant counters that the autopsy did not test for Bangungot.
• His counsel(who used to be the NBI’s medico-legal) took the stand to testify
that the autopsy results were inconclusive.
• But the court did not believe him as he might have been biased for his client.
• They instead believed Dr. Mendez who was the one who actually autopsied the
body.
• And the logical sense that if indeed it was bangungot, why then the need to cut
up the body, if not to hide the evidence
WON the arrest without a warrant would render the arrest void.
No. it is a well taken principle that this objection must be given before his plea. Otherwise
it is waived.
WON the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength as alleged in the
information present
NO. the lower courts were wrong in this. Tthe use of superior strength was not clearly
established in the crime. And the fact that a woman was the victim does not establish
this. And his picture shows that he has a small frame.
And yet, even if he escaped the qualifying circumstance of superior strength he wasn’t
able to escape another qualifying circumstance: that of Outraging and Scoffing at the
corpse.
WON the qualifying circumstance of Outraging and Scoffing at the corpse can be
accepted
• YES, the lower court was right. He not only beheaded Elsa but he also
dismembered her body parts, that a viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for
the sub-human manner of disposing her remains.
• This was alleged and proven in the trial.
• This is in Art 248, par. 6. as qualifying circumstance .

DECISION
• The sentence for murder of Reclusion PErpetua, qualified is affirmed except that
the damages are modified.
• The funeral expenses as testified by Elsa’s sister to be 50,000 is thereby
reduced to 50,000.
• The moral damages although must necessarily be larger from the extraordinary
grief of the family is too much at P3m, thereby reduced to P1m.
• Attorney’s fees affirmed.
• But an additional civil indemnity be given to Elsa’s heirs, fixed by jurisprudence
to be at P50,000.