Perceiving God as Being or Activity

This paper is an attempt to analyze Gellman’s argument from perception as it

relates to mystical experience. The examination of the concepts and issues of this

argument is in the light of the context of the relevant philosophy, theology and culture.

The importance of Gellman’s thinking, both positive and negative, in relation to the

contemporary world and my own interests will also receive analysis. I will also compare

and contrast Gellman’s notion of God as object in relation to Bracken’s idea of God as

activity.

The argument from perception begins with the intuition that the phenomena of

mystical experiences throughout history claimed by many are an indication of something

happening which is not mistaken. Ruling out those who are deceived or deranged,

Gellman endorses Swinburne’s epistemic principle for the rationality of God perceptions.

This principle, roughly states, that as far as sense perceptions go, a person is justified in

her perceptual beliefs unless someone raises a reason to doubt those perceptions.1 This

places the weight of proof on the skeptic since a perception of God attains initial

evidential sufficiency. Such an approach begins with the validity of God perceptions and

then addresses any counter evidence or reasons to doubt those perceptions.

Gellman then addresses three counter-arguments to the argument from perception

that provide reasons to doubt the evidence of such experiences. The first problem

concerns the initial evidential sufficiency and that this evidence has a basis in perceptions

1
Jerome Gellman, Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2001), 17.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 1

of physical objects, so the case for mystical experience is lacking in any justifying

evidence. The next problem is that the inter-subjective testing used to verify sense

perceptions is severely limited when applying the tests to perceptions of God. The third

problem, closely related to the second, is that, concerning the crosschecking of

perceptions, we are not capable of even imagining what an inter-subjective test of a God-

perception would look like or confirm.2 These counter-arguments provide enough doubt

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of a mystical experience that one cannot

confirm such evidence.

Now, like any good analytic philosopher, Gellman revises his argument to

strengthen his claim of the initial evidential sufficiency of mystical experience. This

claim is regarding the, “…evidence for God’s being the actual object of mystical

perception.”3 He then considers the four leading epistemological theories, strong

foundationalism, weak foundationalism, coherentism and foundherentism in explaining

how perceptual beliefs are justified by evidence. Since weak foundationalism is

agreeable to the counter-argument against the argument from perception, he now

construes the argument from perception in weak foundationalist terms. While

distinctions are made as to what counts as confirming evidence, Gellman turns to the

evidential support verifying mystical experience of God as true belief. The

epistemological account given by Gellman gives a way to crosscheck the perceptions of

God found in a mystical experience. To support these tests, he considers the examples of

the numbers, diversity and vividness of God perceptions to strengthen his case.4 Further

elaboration on checking procedures, the effects of mystical episodes and

2
Ibid, 19 – 21.
3
Ibid, 22.
4
Jerome Gellman, Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2001), 28 – 30.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 2

neuropsychological research also count in favor of the weak foundationalist argument

from perception.5 Such a conclusion from the argument from perception is possible

within a theistic framework.

The philosophical context for Gellman’s argument from perception has influences

from Swinburne, Alston and Plantinga and the ensuing trends they help to establish in

contemporary (Christian) philosophy of religion. The current trends, though well argued

in the analytic tradition of philosophy of religion lead to certain conclusions of the type

that may cause more harm than good. One must also consider that the assumptions given

in such arguments may be the reasons for such dire conclusions, that is, the argument

started on the wrong foot. This is in part due to the distinction between theism and

Christianity (or monotheistic religion) with theism being a metaphysical construct

whereas Christianity (or monotheistic religion) is a way of life.

Phillips understands such conclusions as reasons to reconsider the direction of

contemporary Christian philosophy of religion in that it does not do justice to the

Christian faith. Phillips states, “Many philosophers who argue in this way seem to be

searching for evidence or reasons for religious belief external to belief itself.”6 The

thought seems to be if one can prove the beliefs of Christianity (or monotheistic religion)

true via evidence or grounds then it must follow that the beliefs of Christianity (or

monotheistic religion) are true. Gellman further reinforces this point in the following:

“We are arguing for the external rationality of belief in God on the basis of the available

evidence of apparent experiences of God, considered within the total relevant available

5
Ibid, 30 – 32.
6
D.Z. Phillips, “Faith, Skepticism and Religious Understanding” in Contemporary Perspectives on
Religious Epistemology, Edited by R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman, 81 – 91, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 91.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 3

evidence.”7 The issue is that the context of religious beliefs is not even an issue of

consideration from the beginning of such arguments. In the following, I will try to

summarize briefly some of these conclusions and the problems they raise.

Alston is another analytic philosopher of religion arguing for similar

epistemological conclusions for mystical experience as that of Gellman. Alston examines

both mystical and religious experience as ways an individual perceives God in his aptly

titled book, Perceiving God. In this book, he builds an argument for epistemological

justification for such experiences as a ground for religious belief. He construes the

existence of God as an independent reality that at diverse times is perceived by various

people, that is, God is present to them in some sort of (sensory or non-sensory)

perception. While Alston speaks of God as “object” in only a logical sense, he states,

“My talk of God as an object of experience does definitely presuppose that God exists as

an objective reality, indeed that He is maximally real.”8 While I am not sure what Alston

means by “maximally real” what is important to note that Alston’s language is of God as

an object and an objective reality. This would seem to indicate that God is available for

some sort of third person investigation. Yet this is not coherent with a theistic conception

of God. If one understands God as omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and so on, then

how could a believer or a non-believer, inquire about God in an objective way.

Plantinga, in a similar way, also argues for the properly basic belief that receives

epistemic justification from immediate sense perceptions. Whether it is of one

perceiving a chair through her visual sense organs or of perceiving God via the sensus

7
Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 1.
8
William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 31.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 4

divinicus,9 both types of perception are equally justified to the formation of a properly

basic belief.10 However, what of those people who do not perceive God? The

implication from Plantinga’s view is that such persons are cognitively defective.11

Another issue with Plantinga’s conclusion is a clear understanding of the sensus

divinicus. Even with a clear understanding of this divine sense how would this relate, if

at all, with one’s ordinary senses. Again, it seems as if someone is trying to make God

out as an object of perception. Even if God is the ultimate or supreme object, can one

apprehend the invisible and spiritual God by ordinary sense or even a divine sense? I

tend to think, no, at least not in the terms of the argument given.

The obvious cultural influence on Gellman’s argument is closely related to the

religious, that of Hasidic Judaism. In the beginning of this movement, this radical and

revolutionary form of Judaism faced opposition from Orthodox Jews. This opposition

was in part due to the divergent approaches between Orthodox and Hasidic Judaism.

This is indicative in the teaching of Hasidism’s founder, Ba’al Shem Tov that “…focused

far more on an individual’s personal relationship with God and with his fellowman than

on the intricacies of Jewish law.”12 Some central themes in Hasidism are developing

purity of spirit in one’s heart, acknowledging that the whole world is filled with God’s

glory and living a joyful life in light of the nearness of God.13 However, as the movement

grew over time the emphasis moved from communion with God to traditional learning

9
Plantinga construes this as sensing God’s disapproval of sin, God’s forgiveness of sin, God’s love for us
and so on. Interestingly, it is the actions of God and not God’s existence that is a properly basic belief.
10
Alvin Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?” in Contemporary Perspectives on Religious
Epistemology, Edited by R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman, 133 – 141, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 137.
11
Although Plantinga refers to Calvin regarding the cognitive defect in the article cited, I believe he does
become more explicit in other articles.
12
Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, Jewish Literacy, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 215.
13
Ibid, 215 – 216.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 5

associated with the Jewish faith. Currently, Hasidism is the conservative stalwart of

Orthodox Judaism with the emphasis now on the joyful performance of the

commandments.14 This movement within Judaism shares a similar kinship with

conservative Protestant Christianity in that it desires the closer relationship with God via

personal piety and devotion. Such an orientation to pursuing God may not necessarily

involve asceticism but purity of heart is essential. This focus on personal piety and

devotion is agreeable to the methods of many mystics seeking communion with God and

one sees certain aspects of this piety in the lives of the prophets and priests of the Hebrew

bible.

The theological context of Gellman’s argument is rooted in a traditional or

orthodox belief system in which God is a (supreme) being or an (ultimate) entity. If

someone states that such a being to exist, then it seems to follow that if an entity is, then

that entity can be an object of perception, in one way or another. This is troublesome

considering Gellman’s knowledge of the Hebrew Bible especially passages such as

Exodus 33:20 which states, “But He said, "You cannot see My face, for no man can see

Me and live!"” While Gellman in terms of not literally seeing God but possibly

metaphorically seeing Him could restate such a notion, the idea still seems to fall close to

such a dangerous understanding of perceiving God. If I perceive God, is it now a matter

of whether it is a literal or metaphorical perception? The place of God as object is a place

many believers would not want to go since God is often understood as spirit, invisible,

infinite and so on. Trying to objectify such properties in relation to God would lead to

incoherence in the conception of God. This is similar to some philosophy of mind

arguments in which one identifies consciousness in terms of brain states being mental
14
Ibid, 218.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 6

states, that is, identifying God with the concepts describing God. Then again, if God as

object could lead one to know God (in some sort of way), then this eliminates the

mystery and awe that is associated with worshipping God. A Jewish proverb from the

Middle Ages points out this problem, namely, “If I knew God, I would be God.”15

Some positive aspects from Gellman’s argument from perception could be

beneficial in understanding mystical experience. The first is that it seeks to provide some

account regarding mystical experience. While William James and others might argue

that such an account faces the limits of language, that is, the experience is ineffable;

Gellman would not dispute this fact. What he would argue is that even within the limits

of language a description of a certain type of mystical experience is much like describing

a chair in front us. This may arise from the notion that perceptual terms arise in many

accounts of mystical experience. Since we can talk about ordinary perceptual experience

then it seems to follow that we could talk, in some limited degree, about mystical

experience. If one can talk about the experience of seeing a chair then it does seem

possible that one could talk about an experience of communion with God in a similar

way. While language has limits along with our concepts and categories, the mystical

experience in all its characteristic forms seems to provide a great deal of inspiration for

the writers of mystical experience.

Though limited, as language is, the notion of perceiving God would seem

agreeable to certain accounts of mystical experience, especially those involving dreams

and visions. This seems to be the case for the Biblical prophets especially the

descriptions given by Isaiah, Ezekiel and John. Not only is the prophet in the position to

speak for God, he is also encountering God in the speaking forth or conversely, the
15
Ibid, 609.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 7

prophet speaks forth after the encounter. These encounters with God (theophanies) find

expression in ways characteristic of mystical experience with the recognition of God, the

recognition of the prophet in relation to God and, in certain instances, passivity before

God. Therefore, it seems in some sense the prophets did perceive God in relation to the

revelation given of God. Gellman’s argument from perception easily supports such a

view of mystical experience.

Such a view as advocated by Gellman would also support the idea of one being

able to relate to and understand God in a personal way. Not just the notion of us as

humans knowing God but that God is personal in such a way that we could know God as

we know a close friend. You could understand this knowledge in various ways. In one

way of understanding, this knowledge of God explains accounts of one drawing close to

God, clinging to God or communing with God. In another way, if God is perceivable in

this personal way, then this could allow one to understand the character of God in detail.

Likewise, if God is perceptible then one could also understand God’s activity in the

world, that is, God’s will and intention.

While these previously mentioned aspects are agreeable to the argument from

perception certain problems do arise on Gellman’s understanding. The first problem is

that of explaining ‘what is it like’ to perceive God. While many people grasp ‘what is it

like’ to perceive a chair, certain issues arise in what it is like to perceive God. Not

everyone is privilege to this experience. So how does one account for the lack of

experience? Maybe some people are deficient in their perceptual capacities. However, if

this is true why are they lacking the capacity? Maybe the perception of God occurs in an

arbitrary way, that is, God only reveals Himself to chosen individuals, then why the

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 8

favoritism in revealing Himself? Even more troubling is that of divergence in mystical

experience with some experiences being personal while others being impersonal in

nature. These other (non-monotheistic) forms of mystical experience would need

explanation. However, this is a difficult task if one embraces an exclusivist view of one’s

religion.

Another problem with holding to the notion of perceiving God is that it leads to a

category mistake. The categories one applies to the perception of a chair are entirely

different from the categories applied to a mystical experience. Even if similar categories

are used, the application of those categories to mystical experience will diverge from

ordinary usage. The conflicting categories are not different in type but in kind. The

categories in relation to a chair are accessible to all people. The categories in relation to

the divine are not accessible to all nor are they the same for all. Even with a table and a

chair, one can compare apples and oranges but with a chair and God, any comparison

reaches a breaking point. A more suitable analogy, which will also break down, could be

the comparison of a person with a stone.

One final problem to address in Gellman’s argument is the eventual treatment of

God as an object. In one sense, this is like God being out there beyond our current

understanding of reality. In another sense, if God is not beyond our reality but our reality

is contained in God this would lead to pantheism since reality is a part of God. In either

sense, God becomes a thing that one can locate. If God can be located, then one places

limits on God, that is, putting God in a box. This would make the concept of God as

transcendent incoherent. On such an account, the idea seems to come very close to

idolatry. The nation of Israel was led astray by idols, away from the worship of God.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 9

The idols were made of wood, stone and metal; objects to perceive. If one then perceives

God he is venturing in dangerous territory because what is perceived could not fully be

God. If what one perceives is not fully God then it must be something else, that is, akin

to an idol whether imagined or mental. Likewise, Biblically speaking, if we perceive

God (fully), we would die and even if we perceive God in part then what would be the

place of faith in seeking God?

Such thinking could also easily lend itself to the dangers of fundamentalism. Not

heeding the words of warning from the mystics can lead to an arrogance that encourages

the thinking behind such statements as the following: “I have seen God.” “I know what

God wants and expects.” “They have not seen (or heard) God and they are therefore

inferior, unbelieving, unlearned heathens.” Such hubris is manifest in elitism,

intolerance and eventually violence. The elitist attitude would claim that because of their

mystical experience they have received all truth. Since they have all truth, then those

without the truth cannot longer tolerated. If conflict arises in the face of intolerance then

violence may be necessary to quell those in opposition to our truth.

While interested in the role of prophetic Christianity and how that would work

itself out in the church and society, I believe a prophetic understanding for such an

experience would not allow for idolatry in the while encouraging justice and mercy. No

matter what experience one has, the prophetic significance would point away from any

object(s) or image(s) and toward a life of faith in God as revealed in Christ. The prophet

though experiencing something significant and even mystical in relation to God does not

demand for himself action from the hearers but only speaks what he sees or hears from

God, that is, what God demands. The context of the experience must find its grounding

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 101

in the religious, social and historical background. The prophet speaks specific words to a

specific people at a specific time.

One other area related to the argument from perception is the language used to

describe mystical experience. The language used to describe a mystical experience has

its roots in a particular social and religious context. The context is not shaped entirely by

the metaphysical, ontological and epistemological concepts of the individual if even at

all. This emphasis on epistemology in Gellman’s case strikes me as a way someone

would not talk about a mystical experience. Why would any mystic want to claim

justification for her experience? The mystic is already in a specific context that such talk

about God is part of the way of life. In addition, why would the mystic count her

experience as evidence and for what would that evidence count? Maybe one should not

understand such experiences as evidence but as signs to give one an orientation or

direction to life. The agenda for such views seems to want an establishment of a

respectable philosophical version (i.e. theism) of a particular (monotheistic) religion. It is

as if the philosopher in proving that God exists has provided grounds or evidence for

belief in God. Would such evidence lead the seeking philosopher then to worship God?

Nevertheless, such metaphysical and epistemological constructions fall short of the way

such a life is lived. In one’s attempt to explain God coherently, one drains away the

mystery and awe of Christian faith.

One other issue related to mystical language is the type of language used. More

often than not, the language used to express mystical experience is often metaphorical in

nature. Though not always written as poetry or some other literary form, the language

used by the mystic is not taken as literal. If the individual interprets the language as

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 111

literal, then this would lead to all sorts of confused notions. The language of the mystic

then shares some qualities with the language of the prophet. In either case, the language

used is pointing away, beyond itself, to a greater reality with the metaphoric language

acting as a sign, as a way of orienting yourself to the world.

Now with the problems of Gellman’s argument examined, I would like to look at

a different method of understanding mystical experience. Bracken elaborates an

approach regarding the problems of thinking about God as a (static) being, as an entity.

The common theistic conception of God is that of omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent

and omnibenevolent. Many theological elucidations state that God is the perfect, eternal

and infinite creator. From such an account, Bracken explains the understanding Aquinas

has, that of God’s essence being equal to being itself. From this justification, Aquinas

clarifies that all other beings take part in existence through the creative work of God.16

Bracken makes it clear that the idea of God as being itself along with God’s perfection

need not be understood as fixed or static. This stems from the notion of perfection as

something to which nothing can be added or taken away. This is a result of

understanding perfection as a characteristic of an entity alone. Bracken endorses a

different understanding of God as being itself, “…namely, that being is an activity rather

than an entity and that the entities which are the subjects of this activity are necessarily

involved in an ongoing transit from potentiality to actuality.”17 In this understanding,

God is not “out there” for one to reach but is active and desires our participation in the

activity of God. So on Bracken’s view God is not transcendent and separate, but

immanent and unified.

16
Joseph A. Bracken, The Divine Matrix: Creativity as Link Between East and West, (Eugene: Wipf &
Stock Publishers, 2006), 26 – 27.
17
Ibid, 37.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 121

 Such an understanding of God lends itself very well to Trinitarian thought. The

Godhead is not some static relation between the Father, Son and Spirit but the dynamic

activity expressed in the Triune God. Bracken states:

Hence, “God” is not the name of an individual entity but rather the name
for the divine community in which “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit” play
constitutive roles. The divine community, in other words, cannot exist
without the interrelated activity of all three persons vis-à-vis one another.
But the individual persons cannot be themselves, namely, “Father,” “Son”
and “Holy Spirit,” except as members of this unique community in which
they each play such specific roles.18

This allows for a better understanding of God as the expression of and the activity of

eternal love. This is the desire of God for us to participate in this eternal love and

community. In one sense, this participation in the eternal love of God stems from the

desire of the mystic for union with God. This pursuit however is not limited to some sort

of Platonic spiritual plane but is present here and now in the concrete expressions of love

in the world. In another way, one could see this activity of God as intruding into

someone’s life leading to transformation and commitment to the activity of God. This is

indicative in the life of the apostle Paul. He is busy persecuting the followers of Jesus

and actively so, when he is encountered by the risen Christ. The transformation is of

Saul, the persecutor to Paul, the follower and eventually an apostle of Christ. In this

example, one could say that God intruded into Saul’s life by giving him a new activity in

which to partake. So on one hand, one seeks the mystical experience by pursuing God

and on the other hand, God gives the experience to reorient the individual to the activity

of God.

This view of being as an activity stands in contrast to the view of being as an

entity. Brackens notion envisions a God who is near, active and desirous of our
18
Ibid, 36.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 131

participation. Gellman’s conception is that of a God who is far off, hidden and desires

for us to pursue Him. On the first account, the mystical experience leads to a

reorientation to the world and God’s activity in the world. On the second account, the

mystical experience leads to perceiving God as an object and in some sense using God as

evidence to justify the mystical experience. I believe a better approach to Gellman’s

argument from perception is an understanding of the activity of God in the world. Such

an approach would not need to portray God as only transcendent but could also

incorporate the idea of God’s immanence as well. By grasping both God’s transcendence

and immanence in terms of holiness and nearness, respectively one could achieve a more

biblical conception of God. Coming to grips with both God’s holiness and love can

provide a prophetic expression of Christianity, in word and deed, which acts as a sign to

the eternal love of a holy God.

Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey W. Roop. All Rights Reserved. 141