John Stuart Mill UTILITARIANISM Second Edition Edited, with an Introduction, by George Sher Rice University Hackett Publishing Company, Inc Indianapolis/Cambridgewi Selected Bibliography Kagan, Shelly. The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Lyons, David. The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Press, 1965). Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). ‘Scheffler, Samuel. The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) ‘Sen, Amartya, and Bernard Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) Smart, J. J. C., and Bemard Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Utilitarianism CHAPTER I GENERAL REMARKS ‘There are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge more unlike what might have been expected, or mote significant of the backward state in which speculation om th mportant subjects still Iingers, than the little progress which has been made in the. decision of the conceming the summum bonum, cc ing the foundation of mor: problem in speculative tho ied the most gifted intellects and divided them into seets and ying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And nore than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banne: and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being, us on the subject than when the youth Socrates. to the old Protagoras and asserted real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular ‘morality of the so- the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the m of them —zather: without impairs those sciences. An apparent anomaly, the explanat that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usu Gepend for their evidence upon, what are . Were it not so, there would be no science or whose conclusions were more insufficiently made out, tha gebra, which derives none of its certainty from what are common! learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some 12 Chapter F of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and ‘of mysteries as theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted as the fist principles ofa science arc realy the last results of metaphysi- cal analysis practiced on the elementary notions with which he rat ‘suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end_ to which they are subservient, When we engage in Jear jand precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the fist thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward A test of right and wrong must be the means, one w of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a conseq having already ascertained it. ss net ‘The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular morality of an individual action is not a question of direct ico jon, but of the application of a law to an individual case. ‘They recognize also, to 2 great extent, the same moral laws, but Jiffer as to their evidence a school affirm as strongly as the inductive that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make the a prior principles which are to serve as the premises of the science; down as the common groundwork of those maxims some ‘obviously authoritative than the maxims them- wet succeeded in gaining popular accep- , ought to be self-evident £7. inquite how far the bad elfect of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of of a standard not recognized. Although the nionéx acknowledged first 5 principle has made ethies not so much a guide as a consecration of men’s actual sentiment both of favor and of aversion, are great they suppos is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness and even pre- unwilling to acknowledge and the source of moral obl = that fo all those a pr4 Chapter I purpose to criticize these thinkers; but I cannot help refersing, for illustration, toa systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Ethics by Kant. This remarkable man, ‘whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in docs, in the treatise in jeas the origin and ground ‘of moral obligation; itis this: “So act that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted asa law by al rational beings.” |But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual |duties of morality, he fails, almost uely, to show that there (not to say physical) impossi- ofthe most outrageously he shows is thatthe consequences of eit universal adoption would be such as no one would choose {ito incur. meaning of the ale-ends are not amenable to direct proof. 2 Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shown fo be.a means to something admitted fo be good without proof. The Tp health; but so as an end but 2s a means, the formula may be accepted or subject of what is commonly acceptance or rej thin the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with itsolely in the way of intuition | tions may be presented capable of determining the int (General Remarks 5 te gv or withhold its asent to the doen; and this is equivalent| to proof. We shall examine presently of what nature are these considera- tions; in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be gi nal accep- tance or rejection that the formula should be correctly understood. 1 believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed ofits the chief obstacle which impedes its reception, and that, could it be cleared even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatly simplified and a large propor it difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utili- tarian standard, | shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine ig, with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing il from wt is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections| ate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken | meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I! afterwards endeavor to throw such light as T can upon the question considered as one of philosophical theory.tility & A passing remark i y'425°"of supposing that those who stand up for ved pone CHAPTER I Waar Urinirarianism Is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder as the test of right and wrong use the term in that restricted and merely collogui ’ is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utiitarimism for even the momentary ne capable af so absurd contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that, too, in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against ufilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, id often the very same persons, denounce precedes the same sort of ably dry when the word “ut the word ‘pleas ly word ‘pleasure’ precedes the word “utility.” Those whe he matter are aware that every writer, from Ey 10 maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not to Bentham, something to be contradistinguished ftom pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing ihe useful to the agreeable or the omamental, have always declared ‘that the useful means these, among other Ww mistake. Having caught up the word “uti knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they express by it the rejection or the neglect of pleasure ot of amusement. Nor is in disparagement, but ity and the mere pl use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion, of its meaning. Those who introduced the word, but who had for 6 What Utilitarianism Is 7 appellation, may well f by doing so they can hope to contribute anything toward rescuing it from this utter degradation. ‘The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals “utility” or HP the “greatest holds that actions are right proportion as ‘wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended plea- "tr sure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain andthe privaton 4 of pleasure, To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be sai in particular, what things ure, and to what extent But these supplementary explai do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure and freedem from paip are the} only. ir ad that all desvable things are as Hutwerous in the ublitarian as in desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to } the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Now such a theory them in some of the mn ate dislike. To suppose th they express it) no higher than pleasure~no beiter and nobler object of desire and pur- suit— they designate as utterly mean and gro worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very eatly period, contemptuously likened; and modem holders itis not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a, |. The author of this esay has reason for adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Galt’s Arma of the Parish, Aer using it as a designation for several yeas, he and athers abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchvvord of sectarian distinction. But as a name for le opinion, not a set of opi senote the recognition of utility asa standard, not any particular way of applying, ‘tthe term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in many eases, a jode of avoiding tiresome cireurmlocutions,ov mcta pleasure, except its being greater in amount 5 Chapter It light, since the accusation supposes human beings to be pable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; fori the sources of pleasure vere precisely the same to human beings and to-suine, the rule of for the one would be good enough for other, The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is precisely because a beast’ pleasures do not satisty gs have made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness wl does not include thei indeed, conside Epicureans to have been by any me: i in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian, require to be included, But there is no known Epicureai life which does not assign to the pleasures of feclings and imagination, and_of the moral, sentin higher yalue.as pleasures than those oF meré sensal thal utilitarian writers in general “principle of utili are more d absurd that, while in estimating as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. defies If Lam asked what T pleasures, kes one pleasure more valuable that another, merely as y difference of qual je answer. Of two pleasures, if there b who have experience of both give a decided preference, ing of moral obligation to prefer it, that is lthe more desirable pI y those who are ‘competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the What Utilitarianism Is 9 that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign itfor any quantity of he other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified to the preferred enjoyment a super an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are witha theirs. ‘They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have i common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cats of unhappiness extreme that 0 etape form it they would exchange their lot for al their own eyes. A being him happy, is capable proba name which some of the | we may refer it to the love an appeal to which was wit means for the n of i of excitement, both of which do rea berty and personal independence, the Stoies one of the most effective love wan beings possess in one form or other, and in y no means in exact, proportion to their higher fac is so essential 2 part of the happiness of those strong that nothing which conflicts with it eould be otherwise than momen- them. Whoever su ce of happiness —10 (Chapter It than the infe- in anything like equal circumstances, is not happi rior—confounds the two very different ideas of ha ten are low has the greatest cl a highly endowed being wi ‘can lear to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good It is bette be a human being dissatisfied than a pig saisfeds better to safe sated. And he it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. it many who ate capable of the higher der the influence Sfteiptation, postpone compatible with a full apprecia- tion of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, o less when is between \dulgences to the injury thi f pleasures in preference levote themselves exclu: lincapable of the other. C: most natures a very tender plant, e: influences, but by mere want of sustenance; ‘young persons it speedily dies away if the oceup: position in life has devoted them, and the s thrown them, are not favorable to keepin exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose th flostes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; they addict themselves to infer rot because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones What Utilitarianism Is n to which they have access or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lover, though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both. From this verdict of the only competent judges I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the Best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart ftom its moral atributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by know!- edge of both, of, if they difer, that of the majoity among them, rust beadiited as final, And there needs be the less hesitation fo accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there isno other tribunal to be referred to even on the q ‘What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two yo! ¢ pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the © aT g rage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains, ==" nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. Thave dwelt on this point as being a necessary part of a perfectly 2 just concey or happiness considered as the directive ispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogellier, and if it may possibly be doubted ‘whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that attain ils end by the general nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is “ were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare2 (Chapter It enunciation of such an absurdity as this last renders refutation superfluous. ‘According to the greatest happiness principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which other things are desirable—whether we are considering our good or that of other people —isan existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quan! ty and the rule of measuring it against quantity being the preference felt by those who, in thei ‘opportunities of expericnce, to which must be added their habits self consciousness and selfobservation, are best furi , being according to the ‘ordingly be defined “the rules and pre~ secured to-all mankind: a \nature of things admits, ta the whole sentient creation, Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at Teast as mankind think fit to live and do not take refuge in the What Utilitarianism Is B by Novalis. When, however, itis thus positively asserted to be impos- sible that human life should be happy, the assertion, ifnot something, like a verbal quibble, is at least an exaggeration. If by happiness be ited pleasure lasts only ‘moments of in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers who have and transitory pains, predominance of the active over the passiv not to expect more from life than itis, capable of bestowing, A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And such an existence is & many during some considerable portion of their lives. The present ‘wretched education and wretched social arrangements are the only real hindrance to its ‘The objectors perhaps may doubt to consider happiness as the end of a moderate share of it. But great satisfied with much less. Th enabling even the mass of so far from bei those in whom indolence amounts to a vice that do not desire excitement after an interval of repose; itis only ‘of excitement is a disease that feel the tranquillity which follows excitement dull and pleasurable in direct proportion to the excitement" Chapter It the cause generally is caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death; while those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fel the collect interests of mankind, retain as lively con the eve of death as in the vigor of youth and health. Next to slfsnes the principal cause which, makes i e_unsatisfactory is ‘Kealtivated mind— \ ‘est in all that surrounds it in the objects of nature, the achievements ‘of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways past and present e indeed, to become without having exhausted thousandth part of one has had from the beginning no moral or human even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. Genuine private affections and a sincere interest in the i late who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual {sequisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable; What Utilitarianism Is 5 worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection. The main stress of the problem lies, therefore, in the contest wi ich it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape; which, as things now are, cannot be obviated, and often cannot be in any disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by moral education and proper control of nos influences, while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe. ‘And every advance in that relieves us from some, not only of the chances wl , but, what concerns us still more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is vwrapt up. As for vicissitudes of fortune and other disappointments connected with wordy creumstanoe, these a principally the nade—yet every mis bear a past, however small and inconspicuous, in the raw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent16 (Chapter I happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one’s own portion of happiness, or chances of it; but, after all, this selfsacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; wwe are Told that its end is not happiness but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not low creatures, but to make their tion they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness r professes to do it for any other tion than the ascetic mounted lar. He may be an inspiring proof of what men eart do, but assuredly not an example of what they should. anyone can best serve th absolute sacrifice of his own, yet, so long as the worl limpet state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness tc Iie by moking hit fel that et fate and feta they have not power to subdue him; w cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration any more than about their inevitable end. Meanwhile, let utlitarians never cease to claim the morality of self devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to themas either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian uman beings the power of sacrificing good of others. Tt only refuses to What Utilitarianism Ie "7 admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not ease or tend to increase the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renuneiation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others, either of mankind collectively or of individuals within the limits posed by the interests of mankind. T must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom the happiness which forms conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that ofall concerned. As between his own hay that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. the golden Of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethies ” and “to love your constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, at laws and social arrangements should ee see Geese escey ecco paeCeoen et geet in harmony pinion, which have so vast a power over hun so use that power as to establish in the mind an indissoluble as of happiness to hi 1 general go als to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of ation, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human tient existence. IF the impugness of the utili sented it to their own minds in this its true charact could possibly affirm to be wanting to it more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical sys-a 8 Chapter Tt ce a just idea of its disinterested them who entertain anything character sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high shall_always_act from promoting the general interesls of society, But this is fo mistake the very meaning of a other motives, and rightly so done if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all thers in affirming that the motive has nothing to do wi morality of the action, thougi much"with tie Worth of the agent, He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty ofa ‘even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is greater obligations.” But to speak only of actions done from the his enemy jumpe imply in order that he might inf ito cleamessto speak oft again, according to one of the stoc ‘man betrayed What Utilitarianism Is 9 motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: itis a misappre~ hension ofthe utilitarian mode of thought to conceive itas implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a general or society at large. The great majority of good actions are benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, ‘most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond recessary to as | them he is not violating the rights, that] ved expectations, of multiplication of happiness is, according to the the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended seale— in other words, to be a public benefactor—ar ‘on these occasions alone is he called on to consider pul in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to sociely in general need co habitually about so Jarge an of deed af things which people the consequences in the us, and that this is the grou ‘The amount of regard for tl is no greater than is wrongness of saving a man from drow ve, but 3, has in this case confounded the very diffe mn. There is no point which ‘Bentham pre- eminent) have taken more pains to ilustate than this. The morality of the action depends entiely upo» (Chapter demanded by every system of moras, for they all enjoin to abstain fiom whatever is manifesly pernicious to society. ‘The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the doctrine of utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose ofa standard of morality and ofthe very meaning of the words and “wrong, men cold and ut towaid individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from whi ¢ assertion means that they do not allow their judgment respecting zhiness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their tes of the person who does rianism, but against any stan ‘good or bad because it is done by a good or bad man, sti because done by an amiable, a brave, contrary. These considerations are relevant, not to the estima ‘of actions, but of persons aiid the theory inconsistent with the fact that interest us in persons be actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language ‘which was part of their system, and by which they strove to raise themselves above of saying that he _blamable often proceed fram 4 is apparent in any particular case, it modifies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. I grant that they are, notwith- tanding, of opinion that er is good a mental disposition as good of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people, butitis an unpopularity which they must share with everyone What Utilitarianism Ie a ion between right and wrong in a serious ht; and the reproach is not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious to repel. Ifno more be meant by the obj look on the morality of actions, as measured by the uti stan- dards, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other beauties of character which go toward human being lovable or admit who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their syrmpat nor their artistic perceptions, do fall into this mistake; and so do other moralists under the same con excuse for other moralists is equally a if there is to be any err side, As a matter of fact, we among adherents of other systems, there is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the application of their standard; some igorous, while others are as indulgent as can possibly be desited by sinner o ntalist. But on the whole,a and prevention of conduct which violates to no other in turning the ing such differences. It may not be superfluot misapprehensions of utilitarian ethics, even those h are so obvi- ‘ous and gross that it might appear impossible for any person of 0 them; since persons, even of ‘rouble to understand the bearings of they entertai ate writings of persons of the greatest pretensions both to high principle and to philosophy. We not uncommonly hear the doctrine