THE CONCEPT OF GEOPOLITICS By

Mohammed A. Zabarah, Ph.D.

Geopolitics as a poli tical discipline has been relatively dormant for the past three decades. The political undercurrents in the various areas in the globe have rejuvenated an interest in the concept of geopolitics. Communist incursions into states, known to be weak politically, militarily, and economically, have been interpreted by some in terms of geopolitics. The former Secretary of State under the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Henry Kissinger, has recently spoken of a Russian geopolitical strategy in the Middle East and its adjacent areas. He declared that the Russian objective is the dislodgment of the political and military influence of the West and in particular that of the United States from those areas.i

The re-emergence of geopolitics as a concept of political and military strategy need to be fully comprehended in order that we may appreciate its significance. Its impIica tions would, therefore, be more crystelized. Toward this objective, it is imperative to review the concept of geopolitics as postulated by Friedreich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Sir Alfred Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, and Karl Haushofer.

Friedrich Ratzel

In the middle of the Ninteenth Century, Europe was engulfed in many profound events, some political and others sceientific. The two events which had a far reaching influence on the German political and geographic writers were the unification of Germany by Bismarck and the Darwinian theory of Evolution. Friedrich Ratzel (I 844-1904) accepted from Darwin's theory of evolution the concept of the importance of isolation in the production of new species, but emphasised that "largeness of area" was more necessary to the evolution and growth of species capable of spreading abroad. To him the state was an organism with the biological necessity of growth. It must feed to survive, lest it withers and dies. He argued that the "boundaries of a state should never be regarded as fixed nor the state area as something definite.t'r Ratzel viewed culture as a motivational factor in the spread of boundaries. He asserted tha t as cultures develop the urge for expansion also increases.i In his article, "Die Gesetze des raumlichen Wachsturns der Staaten," ("The Laws of the Territorial Growth of Sta te"), published in 1896 in Petermanns Mitteilungen, Ra tzel drew seven laws governing the growth of the state:

1. "The space of states grows with Kultur."

I. Refer to: , .... ewsweek, (December [L 19711). PP 12- P.

2. Norman J.G. Pounds, Polincal Geography. (New York: Mcfiraw-Hill Book Co, 1963), p. 2H.

3. llnd., p, 211.

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2. "The growth of states follows other manifestations of the growth of peoples, which must necessarily precede the growth of the state."

3. "The growth of states proceeds, to the degree of amalgamation, by the addition of smaller units."

4. "The frontier is the peripheric organ of the state."

5. "In their growth, states strive for the absorption of politically valuable sections."

6. "The first impetus for territorial growth come to primitive states from without."

7. "The general tendencey toward territorial annexation and amalgamation transmits the trend from state to state and increases its intensity." 4

Ratzel's theory of space not only had a major influence of future political geographers, but further enriched the scope of the concept of geopolitics. His theory of the state and its need to survive by expansion "brought political geography to a point where geopolitics could easily emerge." 5 The seven laws entailed the emergence of political geography with geopolitics because of their emphasis on "territorial growth" of politically "valuable sections", and on the subterfuged implication conflict between states arising from a conflict of interest. To this notion must be added the hidden interpretation of power-politics. "His seven laws of imperial expansion all tended to rationalize his political conclusion that this planet is too small for more than one great, amalgamated state.",

Rudolf Kjellen

Rudolf Kjellen was a professor of history and government at the University of Goteburg, Sweden. He turned to a study of geography and world problems he believed that geography had an impact on political thingking and on human conduct. He forecasted that several great superstates would rise in Europe, Africa, and Asia. In Europe Germany would become the superstate.

Kjellen's concept of the state is compareble to that of Ratzel. To him the state is a living organism, whose continuance depended upon its people, culture, government, economy, and soil. Power was the determinent factor of the state. In his two books,Staaten som Lifsorm ("The State as a form of Life"), 1916, and Grundriss zu einem System der Politik ("Foundations for a System of Politics"), 1920, Kjellen expressed his theory on the development of geopolitics. He envisioned the passing of the power of maritime empires into the hands of the compact land nations. The land nations would eventually control the sea routes. Sea power would, thereby, become a non-essential force, demanding huge expenditures, but having no strategic or military' significance.

Kjellen's forecast on sea power was manifestly shortsighted. However, to his credit he was the first geographer to use the term geopolitics. In so doing, he ushered in a new political discipline based on power and the desire for growth and expansion.

4. Russel H. Fifield and G. Etzel Pearcy, Geopolitics in Principle and Practice, (Boston: Ginn and Co., (944), p. 10.

5. lbid., p. [0.

6. Edmund A. Walsh, "Geopolitics and International Morais." Taken from: Hans W. Weight and Vilhjalmur Stefanson, Compass of tile World, (New York: McMillan Co., 1944), p. 15.

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Sir Halford MacKinder

A number of ideas basic to German geopolitical thingking were derived from the writings of Sir Haldford MacKinder, a British geographer and professor of Geography at the University of London. Many German geopoliticians were influenced by his writings, includihg Karl Haushauf'er.

In 1904 MacKinder presented to the Geographical Society of London his theory of the "heartland" under the title: "The Geographical Pivot of History." He later expounded his theory in his book, Democratic Ideas and Reality, first published in 1919. MacKinder stated at the outset of his book that "the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth, and in the end of a single world empire.?- Such a statement becomes easily more comprehensible upon closer scrutiny of his theory.

MacKinder noted that three-fourth of the area of the world was water, onefourth land. To him there was a oneness of the oceans and the lands. Thus he termed the two elements as World-Ocean and World-Island. The World-Island consisted of Europe, Asia, and Africa. There was in actuality only one island. Europe was merely a peninsula thrust out from Asia and separated from it by the low Ural Mountains. India, likewise, was a peninsula blocked off from the World-Island by the Himalyas. Eurasia and Africa were one conteinent united at Suez and Gibraltar. Thus, MacKinder said that "there is one ocean covering nine-twelfth of the globe; there is one continent- the World-Island-covering two-twelfth of the globe; and there were many smaller islands, whereof North America and South America are, for effective purposes, two, which together cover the remaining one-twelfth ... When united by overland communications, the World-Island is in fact possessed potentially of the advantages of both insularity and incomparably great resources.", From the point of view of land mass, the World-Island had unity, and throughout history man had attempted to settle along its edges. The World-Island to MacKinder was composed of fourteen-sixteenth of the world population, while the other two-sixteenth lived on the offshore islands. that is, Britain, Japan, Malaya,North and South America, and Australia.

Within the World-Island lied the "Heartland." It included the "Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia. Within it, therefore, were Brandenburg-Prussia and AustriaHungary, as well as Russia- a vast triple base man-power, which was lacking to the horse riders of history ."9 Geographically, the" Heartland" is mostly Russia and is the "first tenant of the Heartland with a really menacing manpower." 10 Although MacKinder feared Russia as the nation to control the Heartland, he believed Germany also to have designs on the Heartland. He asserted that "German Kultur, the 'ways and means' philosophy, has been dangerous to the outer world because it recognizes both realities. geographically and economically, and thinks only in terms of them".11 He

7. Sir Halford MacKinder .Democrotic ldeals and Reality, (New York: Henry Holt and Co .• 1942), p. 2.

8. Ibid., pr· 64-65.

9. Ibid., p. 110.

10. ibid .. p. 140

11. Ibid., p. 140.

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recognized that the Heartland can be pregnated through the European plain. The "Heartland" is a great mass of land that is hard to impregnate because sea power can be refused access.

The "Heartland" is supported by the arc of coastlands, the Inner or Marginal Crescent. It consites of three sections: the costlands of Europe, the Arabian desert lands, and the Monsoon lands of Asia. This area is an intermediate section that lies between the" Heartland" and the waters of the world-ocean. Beyond this area is the World-Ocean and the lands of the Outer or Insular Crescent. It comprises the offshore islands of South and North America, Australia, Malaya, Japan, Britain, and Africa south of Sahara.

According to MacKinder, the process of invading the Heartland from the coastlands could conceivably happen, thus, reversing the past in which the Mongol and Tartar hordes swept out of the Heartland to invade the coastlands. Thus he warns:

Who rules Est Europe commands the Heartland.

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

MacKinder's theory was overpowering to the German geopoliticians. But as time went on, MacKinder realized some discrepencies in his theory. Although he did not consider the United States as a vital power in 1919, he was obliged to recognize that the focus of world power in 1943 rested not only in the World-Island but also in the industrial and technological eminence of the United States. Further, he no longer considered Germany a vital threat to the domination of the World-Island, but rather the Soviet Union. He emphasised in his article, "The World and the Winning of the Peace," that:

All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality. I.'

Although MacKinder was obliged to revaluate his theory of the" Heartland", he, nevertheless, underestimated the significance of air power. Air power has reduced the lines of communication, and its strike capability has increased two-fold over the last four decades. Significantly, Russia can no longer ignore her northern seaboard. Leaving it to the protection of nature, as MacKinder originally assumed. It has become evidently clear that Russia poses a threat to Western Europe, but that its control of the "Heartland" does not give it, in any measure, command of the World-Island. Nontheless, Russia does have overpowering influence of the WorldIsland.

The measure of Russia's influence on the World-Island can be clearly appreciated upon close scrutiny of its political and milirary strategy along the

12. Sir Halfor MacKinder, "The World and the Winning of the Peace," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2[, 4 (July, 1943), p, 601

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southern costland from India west to Turkey. Its long standing military strategy has been to gain access to warm waters. This strategy has gained more relavence in response to global needs for energy.

Oil, the primary source of energy, is abundantly available in the Marginal Crescent, primarily in the Arabian desert lands and its adjacent areas. Control of this area essentially implies a far reaching ramifications on the industrial West whieh depends to a great extent on oil for its industrial growth and technilogical development. The relative importanee of this area is crystal clear to the West. Preserving the area free from Russian or communistic incursions ought to take precedence over other rna tters. The political and military strategy of the Soviet Union is to encircle the Arabian desert lands by political systems, dependent on and in conformity with the communist ideology. In so doing, they would be able to intlitrate those systems considered antangonistic to the Soviet political ideology, thereby, creating new political orders more in conformity with the communist dogma. Such a strategy has been so far successful. Communist political orders have been created in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia. Leftist political systems, dependent economically and militarily on the Soviet Union have been constructed in Somalia, Syria, and Iraq. Thus, a crescent of states ruled by leftist or communist regimes, hovers over the Arabian desert lands, whose objective is to alter the status-quo and bring an end to Western influence in the area.

Although MacKinder's geopolitical theroy did not include the element of energy as a factor in the power-politics of states, it has become evidently clear that any source, whether it is material or moral, which has significant impartance on the developrnnt and growth of states will become a factor in geopolitical undercurrents.

Alfred Mahan

Like the rest of the world, the United States ignored political geography. Only a handful of American wri ters could be said to have thought in terms of political geography. The most prominent American proponent of political geography was Alfred Mahan, an officer of the United States Navy.

Mahan's concept of sea power drew receptive ears from geopolitical theorist in Germany. He interpreted navel history in terms of power, analyzing sea power in terms of the situation of the world of his time. Mahan observed that the great powers of his days were also sea powers, and the greatest power, Britain, had the mightiest naval force. Thus, he concluded that the first requisite of world power was dominance over the seas. In his book, The Influence of Sea Power, Mahan asserted that Britain's supremacy on the seas would last for a long time, and only one country had the potential to supersede Britain in her position of dominance: The United States.

Like Britain, the United States had the advantage of insularity, and possessed more than Great Britain, access to huge deposits of natural resources. He urged the increase of American naval power for overseas expansion, and stressed the need of a canal across the isthmus between North and South America.n He contended that a

13 Alfred T. Mahan. The Influence «[ Sco Power li['OII Ht storv (EO-Ion: J itrlc. Brown and Co., 1(90), p.33.

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canal in Central America would enhance international commerce. By possessing oversea outposts, the United States would be profiting from international economic exchanges. Without the acquisition of overseas outposts the merchant fleet would not be sufficient to increase the wealth of a nation. But the acquisition of foreign outposts enhances the development of war fleets to protect and defend colonial possessions. With the growth of naval power, merchant shipping and wealth would increase correspondingly at a faster rate. On this argument, Mahan reitereted that the United States will not be able "to stand aloof from international complications." 14

Undoubtedly, Mahan's concept of sea power was influential in the political and geographic considerations of President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt not only increased the war fleet of the United States, but began the construction of the Panama Canal. America also became a colonial power upon her acquisition of the Philippines, Guam, and Cuba. She, thus, became a member of the great colonial powers. However, her insularity and her political conservatism compounded by her distaste for international involvement limited her role internationally.

Karl Haushaufer

Karl Haushaufer was clearly the dominant intellectual popularizer of geopolitics, and the successor of Ratzel and Kjellen. He was born in Bavaria. As a young man he enterd the army, and in 1908 he was sent to Japan as an artillery instructor. His sojourn in Japan has a remarkable impression on the young man. He not only learned the Japanese language but acquired knowledge of the Pacific Ocean.

Upon his return to Germany, he entered the University of Munich, and in 1911 he received his doctorate. During the First World War he became a geographic and history professor at the University of Munich, and began to study the causes for the collapse of Germany. Shrotlv after 1920. he founded the Institute fur Geopolitik in Munich, and in 1924 he began the publication of Weitschrift fur Geopolitik. The Institute and the Zeitschri]t became the pulpit for Haushaufer's geopolitical ideas. However, he was not only limited to these two platforms. His ability for articulation and his disciplinary mind led to the publication of Geopolitik des Pazifischen ("The Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean"); Geopolitik der Selbstbestimmung ("Geopolitics of Self-Determination"), 1923; Grenzen ("Frontiers), 1922; Wehr-Geopolitik (Military Geopolitics"), 1932; Wellpofitik von Heute ("World Politics of Today"), 1934; and weltmeer und We/{machte ("World Oceans and World Powers"), 1934. He was also the editor of Fenseits der Grossmachte ("Beyond the Great Powers"), 1932, and Macht und Erde ("Might and Earth"), 1935. To say the least, he was a very influential personality before and after the Third Reich:

Haushaufer's geopolitical theroy is difficult to recognize, because nowhere in his writings does he set forth in clear, concise language his conceptions of geopolitics. Nevertheless, his ideas on geopolitics were greately disseminated by the Institute fur Geopolitik and by the German Academy, of which he headed. Haushaufer's politieal theory can, therefore, be divided into three principal categories: his conception of

14.lbid.,p.J3.

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space and boundary, his population theory, and his theory concerning the importance of states on the earth.

As earlier stated, Haushaufer was greatly intluenced by Ratzel's and Kjellen's theories of the state and space. But he considered their theories to be generally limited and narrow. To him, Kjellen's and Ratzel's theories were merely developing a generally valid law of political behaviour which would not grant Germany living space or make it a world power. According to him, geopolitics affects all spheres of human endeavour whether poli tical, cultureal, or economic. He, however, agreed with Kjellen's concept of power as the most important attribute of the state; and with Ratzel's concept of space. In his article, "Power and Space", Haushaufcr asserted that "space governs mankind's history ... it is the most decisive factor in world politics." 15 Haushaufer asserted that vast space is necessary for the greatness of a state, since it not only solves the problem of over population but also contributesgreatly to the economic prosperity of the state. Furthermore, depth in space is important militarily, because it provides the state with the ability to transfer her industrial and military capabilities beyond the range or reach of foreign attackers. Haushaufer states that Russia was able to frustrate Napoleon's army by utilizing its depth in space effectively. The Russian army was not destroyed. It perserved against the onslought of the French army and came out victorious. On the other hand, Haushaufer emphasised that smallness in space is a liability to power, because it does not grant the state the capability to pursue effectively a long and tenacious war. Such a state would not have access to transfer its war capability, and its industrial, military, and economic complexes would be within range of enemy bombers. The Dutch, despite valiant resistance to German power, were quickly conquered.

Like Ratzel, Haushaufcr considered boundaries as constantly changing - they are an integral part of the organism of the state. "Borders are anything but dead-they are living organisms extending and recoiling like the skin and other protective organs of the human body." 16 To this contention, Haushaufer perceived the. struggle over boundaries as power politics and as the object of an eternal zones for war. German boundary line can be satisfied only when they concur to her political and military boundaries.

Haushaufer asserted that Germany's cultural boundary (Kulturkeisgrerize) does not coincide with a correction of her political boundary; it must be called for. Cultural boundary includes all those regions which belong culturally and linguistically, but not politically to the Reich. Such areas as Austria, Sudeten, Western Poland, Northern France, and Flanders are to be incorporated into the Reich because they are either culturally or linguistically a part of Germany, but have been separated by circumstances from the Reich. The political boundary to be corrected would have to incorporate all those sections which are racially, culturally, and linguistically German. Hushaufer does not, at any time, define an exact line for German Lebensraum (living sapce). He and other German geopoliticians used the boundary issue as an addition to their contentions on space, and to arouse the expansionist ambitions of

15. Taken [rom: Karl Derpalen, The World a/General Karl Haushauier, (New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., l(42). p. 90.

[6. tbid., p. !O7.

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the German people.17 Haushaufer and his German colleagues asserted that the essence of geopolitics is not only to teach the German people of the relevance of the boundary issue, but also to raise the a ttention of the world to the "unjust" dismemberment of the German regions and the alienation of many Germans from the Reich.

Haushaufer and his German associates used the issue of population as a propaganda ploy to effectively pursue their need for space. Although he did not consider Japan as overpopulated, he did believe that space should be mastered. He divided the powers of the world as being, on the one hand, those states that have large space conception they would never be able to master it; and, on the other, those states with small space that they have difficulty in adequately feeding their population.is Germany falls under the latter. Haushaufer as well as his German compatriots were not interested in the complexity of the population explosion. They did not consider the problem of population pressure as involving the size of the area, the natural resources, the economic development, the standard of living, the industrial capacity, and the rate of increase of the people. To permit the development of large power entities, capable of becoming economically self-sufficient and militarily viable, and to decrease the problem of population increase, Haushaufer declared small states as having no right to exist. He asserted that the "survival of small states is a clear sign of world-political stagnation. Absorption, on the other hand, indicates life and development.vi» The German geopoliticians, therefore, were clearly and primarily interested in the propaganda aspect of population pressure as a furtherance to their demands for Lebensraum.

Haushaufer's geopolitical theory can be said to be two-headed: to teach the masses to think in geopolitical terms and to train the leaders to act according to geopolitical knowledge. Therefore, he listed certain geopolitical manometers or symptoms of pressure within a state to indicate probable forthcoming developments. The manometers were capitals, urbanization, power fields, marginal growths, and cultural trends.

Haushaufer asserted that the location of a capital is an indication of a country's inner stability. From a geopolitical view point, Paris. Moscow, and Ankara are ideally located since they are, from the point of view of strategy, centrally located. Culturally, politically, and economically, Paris and Moscow are the center of gravity of their respective nations. The location of Paris is a tremendous psychological factor to all of France. The fate of Paris indicated the fate of France. In 1814,1871, and in 1940 France was defeated because Paris fell to her enemies. During World War 1, France did not collapse because Paris withstood the German onslought.

Urbanization, the second manometer, results in a disproportionate growth of the. city population, in neglecting space, in decreasing rural population, and in a declining rate of birth. To Haushaufer, this results in the decay of nations, and the control of the political machinery by the urban worker. According to him, the increase of the political rights of the urban workers is the gravest danger to urbanization.

17. Ibid., p. 64.

18. Ibid., p. 91

19. lbid., p. 208

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Power fields is the third element of geopolitical manometer. It is the area where the power lines of rival states converge. American and Japanese power lines converge on the Philippine Islands. Their economic, political, and military strategies reflect the rivalry between them. The Philippines, however, utilize the rivalry to gain their objectives. When the Japanese had no designs on the Phil ippines, the Filipinos demanded independence. However, they insisted on U.S. presence.

Marginal growths, the fourth manometer, are small overseas settlements which are important in tha t they can be a soruce of valuabel strategic areas to sea power and to the stability of states. Gibraltar, Singapore, the Suez area, Hong Kong, and Aden are examples of marginal growth areas. According to Haushaufer, exposed to particular external pressures, these areas can have a remarkable inlfuence in the political stability of their metro pol depending on their capacity fo activism and growth.

The last manometer is cultural trends. To Haushaufer, this element is the most importan t. He asserted tha t cultural trends are guided by a much stronger instict than political or economic particualrs. Culture is the best and most successful expansionist force. It is, however, slow in taking root. But once established, it becomes a viable instrument, able to withstand the pressures of other forces.

Hausahufer's geopolitical theory was also concerned with military geopolitics.

He stressed tha t military power depends upon an army, a navy, and an airforce. The infantry, accordimg to him, is still the one force which decides the outcome of wars because it takes over space. As for sea power, Haushaufer considered to vital. All powers are driven toward the sea since the sea commands the necessary military success on a world scale. As to air power, he considered it negligible-a supplement to land and sea power.

It is difficult to assess Haushaufer's influence on the policies of Nazi Germany.

Chapter Xl Von "Orientation or Eastern Policy" of Hitler's book, Mein Kampf, is said to have been inspired by Haushaufer. Irrespective of that, Haushaufer's influence upon the German intellectuals was great and overwhelming. He was the voice and the most astute propagandizer of German geopolitics. The doctrine tha t emerged under him was the product of may minds. Although some of the concepts of that doctrine was immoral, twisted, and perverted, it is still relevant in to days power-political relations. The German geopoliticians attempted to subvert the right of small states to exist, but at the same time they increased the soope and knowledge of the doctrine of geopolitics.

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