a “| THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF : WASHINGTON 25, 0.c, | R&lips SE | SUN MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) tt » => ,1: Me Joint chiefs of staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to &request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. i 2, he Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the i proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission : suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there i will be similar submissions from other agencies and that : these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recomended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the Joint Chiefs of staff: RE Bw L. L, LEMNITZER Chairman Joint Chiefs of st ‘SYSTEMATICALLY BY JCS ON |. cot 1 Enclosure : Memo for Chief of Operations, Guba Project — excLupED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM ANTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 * DOES NO? APPLYes ‘i i (Soe, AUS omen 12 March 1962 : Page 2165 NOPE BY THE SECRETARIES te the JOINT CHEERS OF STAFF on )RTHWOODS (8) 4 report on the above subject 1s submitted Tor eonsider- ation by the Joint Chiofs of start. ¥, 3, BLOUIN M. a. TNORETDO Joint Secretariat Viet reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat FRCLUDED FROM ope EXCLUDED FROM AUTONATO ‘ REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOP APPLY TOP smonur Se emerSe namemacemeee 3 mucosnonsssycero ULES REPORT BY THE DEPARTIGNT OP DEDENSE AND JOINT CHIEES OF STARY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARISEEAN SURVEY GROUP to the JOINT OHYERS oF stare on CUBA PROIROT (75) The Chief of Oyerations, Cuba Project, has requestea that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of start on this matter by 13 Merch 1982. XCIUDED FON Gos URGLASSIEDWRC JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (7S) ‘THE PROBLEM 1. As requested” by chief of operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief bub precise description of pretextswhich they consider would provide Justification for US militery intervention in cuba. é RAGTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEN 2, It 48 recognized that any action whieh becomes pretext for US military intervention in Guba will dead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. 3. Gogntzance has been taken of a suggested course of activn proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated Anstanoes in the Guantanano ares. 4, For additional facts see Enclosure B. DISCUSSION > 5. he suagested coursegof ection appended to Enclosure & are based on the prenise that US military intervention will = result from a period of heightened US-cuban tensions which - place the United States in the position of suffering Justat- lable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forun should be favorably affected by developing the inter- national image of the Guban government as fash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemiaphere, 6, While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time 1t will continue to hold good only as long as ‘there oan be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Guba Would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There 1s * Menovandum for General Craig from Chief of operations, Guba Project, subject: "operation MONGOOSE”, dated 5 Naroh 1962, on file in General Craig's offics. { ** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Steff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: “Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (13)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. : 2 UHOLISSED —FOP-SECRET~SPECIAEHANDLANO-—HE FH ——UU uYlt thy as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Goviets established Soviet bases in Guba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe, Therefore, since tine appears to be an important factor in resolution of ‘ho Oude protien, all projects are suggostod within tho tine rane of the next £9" sonths. CONCLUSION é 7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enelosure A satiaeactorily respond 0 the etatenent of tho problem, Hovover, these suegestions should be forwarded ae a proliminary subalsston sustable for planning purposes, and together with sinter inputs ; fron otter agencies, provide a basis for developsent of a sineie, integrated, tmo-shased plan to foous all efforts on tho : objective of Justification for US military intervention in Guba. ecomenDar rons 8.-It is recommended thet: a, Bnelosure A together with ite attachments should bo forwarded to the Gocretary of Defense for approval and trenomittal to the Cher of Operations, Cuba Project. >. The paper NOT bo forvantod to comsandors of untfted : or spoctfiod commands, c+ This paper Hor be Zorvanded to U9 ettieers assigned to NATO activities. 4. This paper NOP be fervanded to the Chatman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Comittee. “piss TOP SEGRET——SPEGHE HAN BEN Go GEOR NemLAHEY NSMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE sub joss JustifLoation for US MI1itary Intervention in Guba’ (8) 1, The Joint Chiefs of staf? have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise Aeseription of protexts watch would provide justification ‘ for US iiitexy intervention in Cuba, 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recomend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. Tb 4s assumed that there will. be Sinilar cubmissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a bosis for developing a time-phased plan, Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basta. > 3. Further, it 1s assumed that a single agency will be sivon the primary responsibility for developing military ana paramilitary aspects of the baste plan, It 1s recomended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operationsbe assigned the Joint Ohiefs of starr. * Wonorandum for den Graig from Chief of Operations, Cube Frojeot, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file.d1 den Craig's office * 4 Enolosure A UHGLASSIED ——FOP~SECRET—-SPECIAEHANDETNO—-NOFORHANULIN. coon) APPENDIX TO ENOLOSURE A : ocr ANGUISH MSVORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT Subject: Justifteation for US Military Intervention 4n Cuba (18) 1, Reference is made to memorandun from Chie? of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: “operation MONGOOSE", j dated 5 Maron 1962, which requested brief but precise desoription of pretexte whieh the Joint Chiefs of stat consider wold provide justificstion for US military inter- vention 4n Cuba, 2, The projects Listed in the enclosure hereto are Forwarded as a preliminary subntasion suitable for planning purposes, It 48 assumed that there will be similar submlesions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used a 2 basis for developing a tine-phesed plan. ‘The individual projects can thon be sonsidered on a case-by-case basis. C8 aa 3. This’plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be . developed to foous all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Suh a plan yopld enable 2 logical ‘build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly ‘ wurelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and Big oveate the necessary impression of Cuban reshness and irresponsibility on a large seale, directed at other countries as voli as the united states. mho'plan vould also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued, The desired resultant from the execution of ‘thie plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and Avresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter- national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. (RUSS * sg:oo 4, Time 18 an anportant factor in rebolut. problem, ‘Therefore, the plan should be so time-phaged that projects would be operable within the next few months. 5. Tnasmich as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it ie recomended that primary responsibility for developing militery and para-military espects of the plan ‘for both overt and covert military operetions be assigned the Joint Ohiets of Staff. Appendix to 6 Enolosure A LASSI TOP-SECRET SPECIAL -HNDEANG—NOFORN—~ VELUIAL HANDLIKG NUFUKN ANNEX 10 APPENDIX 70 ENOLOSURE A CLASS PRETEXTS [0 JUSEISY US MELTPARY INFERVENGTON IN CUBA (ote: ‘the courses of action which follow exe @ preliminary submission suiteble only for planning purposes! ‘They are exvenged neither chronolegieally nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are Amtended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan, Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumlative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate Justification for US military Antervention in Cuba). 1, Sines 4 would seen desirable to use legitinate provooation os the basis for US military antervention n Cuba cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 ¢, could be exeouted es an Anttiel effort to provole Cuban yeactions. Harasenent plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of dnninent "Invasion would be emphasized. our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a repla change from exercise to intervention 1f Cuban response justifies. 2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place an and around quantaneno 9 give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forees. a, Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order): . (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio, (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence" to stage attack on base. (3) Capture Cuben (friendly) saboteurs inside the vase, (4) start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans). Annex to Appendix 7 to Enclosure A UiCLASS ——FAP-SEAR FT SPER Mand AMIN. ALOE ADM.Gee 7 (5) Blow up atmanttdon inside the base; start fires, (6) Burn atrerett on air base (sabotage). (7) Lob mortar shelis fron outside of base into base, Sone donage to installations, (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the see or vicinity of Guantanamo city. (9) Capture militia group which storms the bese. (10) sabotage ship an harbor; lange fires -- nepthalens. (11) Sink ship near harbor entrence. Gonduot funerals for mock-victins (may be 11eu of (20)). D. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortor emplacenents vhich threaten the base. ©, Commence Large seale United states military operation: 3. A "Rowenben the Meine" inoldent could be arranged in several forms: a, We could blow up @ US ship in Guantanano Bay end blame Guba. D. We could blow up @ drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere . in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident tn the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or shtps merely inveiGigating the intent of ‘the Vousel could be Fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. ‘The nearness to Havana or Santiago Would add oveatbinity empeotally to those people that wight hove heard the blast op have seen the ine. the US could follow up with an elz/sea resoue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew, Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation. 4, Wo could develop a Commmist Ouban tervor campaign in ie Mant area, in other Florida cities and even An Vashington, ULES col PSG Biome EGE HINER ONA Een Annex to Appendix 8 to Enelosure Asue SLUNCE OF COTRTWRNB TI NOF ERA f UA) | ‘The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United states. We ould sink a boatloed of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). we could foster attenpts on lives of Cuban wefugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publictzed. Exploding a few plastie bombs in carefiilly chosen spots, the é arrest of Cubsn agents and the release of prepared documents substontisting Cuban involvement also would be helpful 4n projecting the iea of an trvesponsinie goverment. 5. A "Guben-based, Cestro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Oaribbean nation (in the vein ba of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We mow that Casto ig backing subversive efforts olendestinely against fatts, Dondnican Republic, Gusteasia, and Wiearague ot prosont and possible others. ‘these efforts oan be magnified and adaxtional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage ean be token of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to : intrusions within their national air space. “Cuban” B-26 or C-46 type atreratt could make cane-burning raids at. night. : Soviet Bloo tneendiartes eould be found. ‘This could be coupled with "Cuban" mossages to the Communist underground in the Donindean Republic end "Cuban" ahipmonta of ama which vould be found, on intercepted, on the beach.” : 6, Use of MIG type atroraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation, Harassment of otvit air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone airoratt bby HIG type planes vould be useful as oomplenentary actions, An P-€6 properly painted would convince aix passengers that they Saw @ Cuban MIG, espeolally if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fect, ‘the primary drawback to this suggestion eppears to be the security risk inherent An obtaining or modify ing en atreratt, However, reasonable copies of the MIG could ‘be produced fron US resources in sbout three months, Annex to Appendix 9 . to Bnolosure A ULES wc Ef PRR Tom COED MAMTA san =UICLISS: 7. Higeoking attempts ogainst civil air and surface nat shold appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the goverment of Guba, Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface oveft should be encouraged. 8, Tt 4s possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban‘ alroratt has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United states to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venemuela, ‘the destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba, ‘The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a comon interest to support chartering a non-soheduled flight. a, An sirovatt at Eglin ANB would be painted and mumbered as an exact duplicate for a otvil registered atroraf't belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Mant aves, At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil atreraft and would be Joaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases, The actuel registered atroraft would be converted to a drone, b, Take off times of the drone airoraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida, Fron the rendezvous point'the passenger-oarrying atreraft will descend to minimm altitude and go directly anto an suxtitery field at Eglin ABB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aireraft to its original status, ‘the drone atroratt meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will being trananttting on the inter- national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" nessage stating he de under attack by Guban MIG aivorat't. The transmission wil be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal, ‘This will allow IcA0 radio Annex to Appendix to Enélosure A ALESSI: te Ku OLUR Teen i : -— we has happened to the afroratt instead of the US trying to gel" the tmotdent. : 9. Th 4s posatble to create an incident which will make 16 appear that Communist Cuban Mids have destroyed a USAR airerart over international waters in an unprovoked attack, a, Axprextnately 4 op 5 ¥-10L atverate will be aispatoned | An trail from Homestead ANB, Floride, to the vioinity of Guba. Their mission will be to reverse course and similate fakir \ aireratt for an aly defense exercise in southern Florida, | ‘These atroraft would conduct variations of these flights at \ frequent intervals. Grews would be briefed to remain at i least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; hoover, they would be required to carry Live ammunition in the event that hostile | actions were taken by the Cuban Mids.” | b, On one such flight, a pre-priefed pilot would fly tall-end Charley at considerable interval between atroraft. | While near the Ouben Teland this pilot would broadoast that he had been jumped ty MIs and was going dom. Wo other ; calle would be made, ‘The pLlot would then fly éirectiy west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an | Bglin auxiliary. he atreraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a rev tail number. she pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resune his proper Jdentity and retumn to his normal place of business, The pilot end alrerart would then have @teeppeared. ¢. At precisely the seme time that the streraft was presumably shot down a submarine cr small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, ete., at approxinately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart, the pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as ! ‘thoy Imow, Searoh shipa and atrerart could be dispatched and parts of atzerart found, Annex to Appendix UNCLASSIRED . 0 Endlosure Aa. FACTS BRARING ON THE PROBLEM 1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be : undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an Aneddent upon’ which to base overt intervention. 2, he need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indloated** by the Joint chiefs of star? on 7 March 1962, as follows: ~~ determination that © credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United states to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justifieation for 7 positive US military action." . | 3+ Tb is understood that the Departuent of state also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba. ¥ JES 19697 303 we JOS 1969/313, 12 Enclosure B UIRLASSIAE)