STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
STATE OF GEORGIA
TAMARA GORDON,
Appellant,
CASE NO.: 2019-06
v
DECISION
GRIFFIN-SPALDING
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Appellee. 3
This is an appeal by Tamara Gordon (“Appellant”) from the decision of the Griffin-
Spalding County Board of Education (“Local Board”) to terminate her employment contract for
the 2017-2018 school year for willful neglect of duties and other good and sufficient cause. For
the following reasons, the decision of the Local Board is hereby REVERSED.
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
‘The Appellant executed an employment contract with the Griffin-Spalding County Board
of Education for the 2017-2018 school year. She worked as a social studies teacher at Griffin High
School
On February 23, 2018, Darrell Evans, the principal at Griffin High School, was notified
that the Appellant was resigning from her position and that her last day at the school would be
March 2, 2018. Mr. Evans sent the Appellant's notice to the human resources department. Ms.
Dobbins, Executive Director of Human Resources for Griffin-Spalding County Schools
(District”), notified the Appellant that she must meet certain criteria before the school
superintendent would recommend that the Local Board release her from her employment contract.
These criteria included the Appellant showing extenuating circumstances for leaving her position
and the school finding a suitable replacement. The Appellant’s extenuating circumstance was that
she received @ promotion within the field of education. The new position would provide the
Appellant with an inerease in salary and a signing bonus if she reported to the new position by a
certain date, The Appellant and Ms, Dobbins exchanged several communications regarding
information that Ms. Dobbins needed regarding the Appellant’s new position. Ms. Dobbins
notified the Appellant that she would seek a replacement for the Appellant, but that the Appellant
still had to report to work at Griffin High School in the interim. The Appellant did not retum to
work after March 2, 2018, even though the school had not yet found a replacement for her position.
"The Local Board terminated the Appellant's employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year for willful neglect
of duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(3) and for other good and sufficient cause (violation of Standard 9 of
the Code of Ethies for Educators, which prohibits a resignation that equates toa breach of contract). The Local Board
also directed the superintendent to notify the Professional Standards Commission regarding the Appellant's possible
ethical violations.Il. | PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By letter of March 22, 2018, the Griffin-Spalding County Superintendent of Schools
notified the Appellant that her contract of employment had been recommended for termination for
willful neglect of duties and other good and sufficient cause (abandonment of contract in violation
of the Code of Ethies for Educators) as provided by O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(3) and (8). Moreover,
the superintendent intended to report the Appellant to the Professional Standards Commission for
her ethical violation. The letter gave notice that the hearing as to the charges was scheduled for
April 3, 2018 at 5 p.m.
In an emailed letter of April 3, 2018, the Appellant's attorney notified the superintendent
and the Local Board of the legal and factual reasons why the termination proceedings should not
go forward, including the constitutional implications and the legal liability and expenses that the
school district may incur. Additionally, there was one sentence in the letter near the end of page
3 where the attomney stated that the Appellant and she were unavailable to attend the hearing on
April 3. ‘Thereafter, in the early afternoon of April 3, the attorneys for the Appellant and the
District began an email exchange that spanned over approximately a 3-hour period. None on the
email communications addressed the unavailability of the Appellant and her attorney to attend the
hearing or a request for continuance.
A termination hearing took place on April 3, 2018 before the Local Board. Neither the
Appellant nor her attorney was present at the hearing. The Local Board terminated the Appellant’
employment contract for the 2017-2018 school year for willful neglect of duties in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(3) and for other good and sufficient cause (violation of Standard 9 of the
Code of Ethies for Educators, which prohibits a resignation that equates to a breach of contract).
The Local Board also directed the superintendent to notify the Professional Standards Commission
about the Appellant’s possible ethical violations.
The Appellant appealed the decision of the Local Board to the State Board of Education
(State Board”).
mH.
|UMERATIONS OF ERROR
The Local Board erred in affirming the superintendent's recommendation to terminate the
Appellant’s contract on the basis that it violated the Appellant's due process rights.
IV. DECISION
In reviewing this appeal, this Board must apply the “any evidence rule.” Thus, if there is
any evidence to support the Local Board's decision, this Board must affirm it. See Ransum v.
Chattooga County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 783, 242 S.B.2d 374 (1978). See also, Chattooga
County Bd. of Educ. v. Searles, 302 Ga. App. 731, 691 S.E.2d 629 (2010). This Board will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Local Board unless there is clear evidence that the Local
Board’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Dukes-Walton v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 336 Ga.
App. 175, 784 S.E.2d 37 (2016); King v. Worth County Bd. of Educ., 324 Ga. App. 208, 749 S.E.2d
791 (2013).
2A. The Appellant failed to make a request fora continuance to the Local Board.
The termination hearing was scheduled for April 3, 2018 at 5 p.m. On that date, the
Appellant’s attorney emailed a 4-page letter to the school superintendent and the Local Board.
The letter raised legal and factual arguments as to why the District should not proceed with a
termination hearing against the Appellant. On page 3 of the letter at the end of the third full
paragraph, the letter read, “Finally, it would be a due process violation as this letter also serves as
notice that neither myself nor Ms. Gordon are available to participate in such a hearing this short
notice.” Subsequently, that same afternoon, the attorneys for the Appellant and the District
engaged in email communications that spanned a 3-hour time frame. The topics of the emails
included the propriety of the Appellant's attorney communicating directly with the superintendent
and the merits of the termination proceedings against the Appellant. Neither the Appellant and
her attomey’s unavailability to attend the hearing nor a request for continuance was raised in the
emails by either party. The District's attorney indicated in one of his emails that the termination
hearing was going forward that day at 5 p.m., however, his email was not written in response to a
request for continuance or the Appellant and her attorney’s unavailability to attend. The hearing
went forward as scheduled.
“The denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the Local Board, and absent
a showing of clear abuse, it is not grounds for reversal.” Tonya Craft v. Chickamauga City Bd. of
Educ., Case No. 2009-12 (Ga, SBE, Jan. 2009). See also, Talmadge v. Elson Props., 279 Ga. 268,
612 S.E.2d 780 (2005); Haygood v. Tilley, 295 Ga. App. 90, 670 S.E.2d 800 (2008). In the case
at issue, the Appellant did not clearly state a request for a continuance. There was one sentence
that was inconspicuously placed on page 3 of a 4-page document. To the extent that the
Appellant's intention was to request a continuance in her April 3 letter, that request was not made
clear. Moreover, the attomeys for the parties engaged in an email exchange that same afternoon,
The Appellant’s attorney never reiterated her or her client's unavailability to attend the hearing.
She did not inquire about rescheduling the hearing, nor did she request a continuance.
Based on a review of the record, and specifically the written communications between the
altomeys on the day of the hearing, itis clear that the attomeys were focused more on a contentious
exchange regarding the merits of the underlying proceeding and ethical considerations relative to
attorney communications with the opposing party. The lone sentence regarding the Appellant and
her attorney's unavailability to attend the hearing was lost in the fray. The Appellant contends
that Local Board made it clear that it intended to go forward with the hearing as scheduled, and
therefore, it would have been futile to request a continuance. The State Board does not find this,
argument persuasive, ‘The record shows that the focus of the communications between the parties
‘was not the need for a continuance. That issue was not prominent in the Appellant's April 3 letter
and was not subsequently addressed when the Appellant’s attorney had multiple opportunities to
do so.
While the decision to grant or deny a request for continuance rests in the sound discretion
of the Local Board, the State Board finds that the Appellant made no request for a continuance.
‘There appeared to be a miscommunication between the parties. It was, however, the Appellant's
responsibility to clearly convey a request for continuance if she wanted one. ‘The Appellant failed
in this regard