Kosovo knot

Petar Grujic

Preface

I started writing the book some years ago, when the Kosovo crisis was not yet acute, but one
had all reasons to expect it to become in a foreseeable future. This expectation turned out true and
the writing soon took the form of a race between the accelerating series of events and the record
about them. I was not sure that my concept of the approach would withstand the current going on,
but I can now look with comfort back to the recent history in this respect, which made the Kosovo
issue one of the central concerns in the last two decades, not only on Balkan and Europe, but even
of the global extent. Being a naturalist, physicist, my approach was intended to reach the essence of
the issue, which has escaped politicians to my knowledge. Whether this may be considered as a
handicap or an advantage the readers are to judge. To paraphrase a politician – politics is too
serious affair to be left to politicians. In fact, the most appropriate professional status for an author
on Kosovo affair would be an anthropologist, even a biologist, like Richard Dawkins. (A possible
title of the book might have been “Selfish gene – case study of Kosovo issue”).

Besides the attempt to infer the crux of the mater at a deeper level, I have tried to put the entire
affair in a much broader context. I do not consider that anything in Europe may be localized and
isolated from the entire world situation and global politics. The Kosovo issue appears a
paradigmatic case, with so many implications, that any attempt to fathom the essential features of
the dispute over the region without putting it in a broader context would be doomed to failure.

The book appears neither historical, nor political, nor ideological, nor anthropological, nor
religious, nor .., but each of all these aspects. It is certainly not an academic work, since the latter
imposes an analytical approach, which I leave to scholars. As a naturalist I experience the world in
a synthetic way, which leaves no room to formal pedantry and elegance.

I am indebted to a number of people who have helped the book to be written, though some of
them not only were not in favour of my interpretations, but even took the opposite view. I owe
much to Dejan Kosanović for his supplying me with relevant literature and valuable discussions. I
have made extensive use of the original work of Vladislav Sotirović, who kindly provided me with
other important sources. My gratitude goes to Simone Lefebre, who kindly provided me with many
useful refeences and Aleksandar Loma for his valuable book on Serb archaic language and Kosovo
myth.. My principal sources have been, however, public media, both Serbian and from abroad.
They turn out to be a part of the affair and thus equally object of study, and not just a source of
information.

Last, but not the least, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife Ljiljana for her invaluable help,
encouragements, patience and love, without which this book have never been written.

Prologue

In 1912 Kosovo and Metohia became a part of Serbia again, after Ottoman Empire was pushed
from the Balkan by the allied Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian and Montenegrin forces (First Balkan
 2

war). In 1918 Vojvodina, which was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, joined Serbia, which
in her turn joined Yugoslavia, the new state of South Slavs. Kosovo and Metohia (KiM) brought in
a sizeable Albanian population (Shqiptars in the following), whereas in Vojvodina lived an
approximately equal number of ethnic Hungarians. But whereas the latter never caused serious
troubles in the new state, Shqiptars became from the start disturbing element within Serbia and
Yugoslavia. For the last two decades, since disintegration of Yugoslavia, KiM has become a hot
spot on the globe. What makes the region of the size of Corsica and population of something over
million so special that it forced first Serbia, and then half the globe, to engage in extinguishing the
fire which threatens to endanger the entire world order?

Kosovo region, the south-western part of Serbia, has been considered a “disputed land” for the last
two centuries. The traditional western image of the issue has been that two competing populations,
Serb and ethnic- Albanian ones are fighting for the dominance over the region. The actual
argumentation for the present day deadlock is that two sides are claiming their rights according two
distinct sources: Serbs referring to their “historical rights”, ethnic Albanians relying on their actual
numerical preponderance.

We show that the whole issue is set up upside down and that a number misconceptions, which has
been developed and maintained up to the present, are to be rectified before a serious discourse on
the matter can be carried out. We expose historical, political, demographic, ethical, and religious
background of the issue and argue that the latter is predominantly of the anthropological nature,
rather than of political one. We examine a number of possible solutions of the “dispute”, from an
ideal to the realistic one, putting the whole issue in the broader historical and actual worldwide
political perspective.

Introduction
One picture says more than thousands words.

Figure 1. Ethnic Albanian refugees at the Lion airport, April 18, 1999.
 3

A French magazine published a couple of photos from the Lion airport on April 18, 1999, at the
time when NATO bombers were pouring their lethal burden over Serbia (and partly over
Montenegro), in the course of their “preventing humanitarian catastrophe” at Kosovo. One picture
showed the French weaponry ready to be transported to Kosovo, the other presented an ethnic-
Albanian family from Kosovo, refugees just arrived to France. The photo deserves well our
attention, for it speaks very much indeed; it exposes vividly the very crux of the matter. Let us
analyze this picture, presenting the unfortunate family of Kosovars (as the ethnic Albanians call
themselves).

First of all, it is a single family, consisting of three generations. On the left we see grandmother
(with scarf), on the right father and mother of the children posing around. Evidently, it is the
peasant family. Tough the children appear well dressed (probably by a humanitarian agency), the
adults reveal their modest wellbeing. We notice first three daughters, the eldest (somewhat hidden
behind the boy in the centre) and two twin girls next to her. Then we see two daughters in the front
and two boys beside as well.
The central figure appears the young girl, of about 8, who shows the V sign in a Churchill-like
gesture. What is she trying to tell us? The family is hardly in a “victorious position”. Who is going
to defeat whom? Who instructed her to pose before the cameras in that manner? These are the
questions which come to mind when looking at this scene at the Lion airport. We shall come back
to this photo many times later on, but here we need just to bear it in mind.

Kosovo in Serbia

Kosovo is a part of the region on the south-west of Serbia, called Kosovo and Metohija, which was
an autonomous region of Serbia from 1945 to 1989, designated by the postwar Serbian state-
republic by Kosmet, as the short name for Kosovo and Metohija. The very name Kosovo is a short
name of Kosovo Polje, meaning in Serb language Field of blackbirds (kðs – blackbird in the Serb
language). 1 To avoid confusion we adopt the standard rule for the terms we are going to use here
and in the following: Serb(s) will designate the ethnicity and adverb Serb too, like Serb language.
Serbians will mean citizens of Serbia (regardless of their ethnicity), and adverb Serbian also, like
Serbian state etc. Albanians will designate ethnicity (regardless of their citizenship), and Albanian
the adverb, like Albanian language. Ethnic Albanians who are citizens of Serbia will be designated
by Shqiptars (Shqiptare, “sons of eagles”), 2 as they call themselves and were called in Yugoslavia
until recently. Another interpretation of the term has been as stemming from shqipoj, “one who
understands”. This interpretation appears in accordance with similar case of Slav – “one who
speaks (slovi)”, as different from Nemac (German), “one who is mute (nem)”. We must mention,
however, that most Serbian Albanians consider now the term pejorative, if used by Serbs, for
historical reasons. 3 The principal reason is that many designations of the present-day Albanians
throughout the history were, to many Balkan people eponymous to wild people, including Turks. In
particular the name Arnaut, widely used during the Turkish occupation of Balkan, was synonymous
to robber, highwayman, belligerent savage etc. 4 The name Shqiptar was in many respect similarly
used by Slavic population. Modern equivalent to Shqiptar in our usage, Kosovo ethnic Albanians,
is Kosovars, used by Albanians and some foreigners alike. The term appears misleading, however,
for it implies “inhabitants of Kosovo”, what includes other ethnicities in the region, at least in
1
Amselfeld as Germans call it, after Amsel for blackbird...
2
Derived from shqipojnë, which designates eagle, possibly totem of a tribe.
3
We note that Shiptar political leaders at the federal level, used to use this term freely, during Tito’s era...
4
By contemporary Balkan population Arnauts used to be experienced in a similar sense as North-American Indians by
European population in 19-th century.
 4

Slavic ears. It is with regret that we will have to use this term, nevertheless, for the technical clarity
and economy, without any pejorative overtones implied. We just mention that Shqiperia is the
internal official name of the present-day Albania. Likewise, Metohija is a corrupt of Greek μετóχι,
which designates a dependency of a monastery, usually allotted by the local ruler or the king. The
name refers to the monasteries complex of the southwestern part of the region, bordering the
Albania, which is crowded by the medieval Serbian monasteries. The same region is called by
Albanians Dukagjin, Land of Duke. 1 We mention here that it designates generally a border region,
which used to be under the military rule of a duke. The northern Serbian region, which was an
autonomous province in the same period as Kosmet was (1945-1989) is called Vojvodina (the land
of duke), for the same reason, since it was situated between Austria (Austro-Hungary) and the
Ottoman Empire for centuries and was under the military rule as such. (We emphasize here that kos
is a purely Serb name, as duka is corrupted Italian one).
It must be stressed here that these details are not merely of linguistic nature, but bear a heavy
weight when dealing with the essence of the issue, as we shall elaborate later on. Toponyms appear
the most reliable identification of a region and at the same time evidence of the fact as to whom the
region belongs. We shall devote some more space to this point here.
We start with Kosovo again. 2 It is a pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name of the kind of birds, which has
about 300 subspecies, from the family Turdidae, derived from the Greek kopsihos. Kosovo field,
where a number of important battles were fought, is situated northwest from the regional capital
Priština.

1
Another interpretation of this toponym from Albanian side is that it was the land of the medieval family Dukagjini,
but the latter, if ever existed, comprised much larger area than Metohija.
2
In this paragraph we are making use of the linguistic elaboration by Vladan Djordjević, published in the daily
“Politika”, and geographical study by K. N. Kostić, Our New Towns on the South (Naši Novi Gradovi na Jugu, Srpska
Književna Zadruga, Beograd, 1922.)
 5

Figure 2. Map of Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), as before 1999.

Metohija is derived from Greek metohi as mentioned above, from meteho - to take part. It denotes a
monastery estate.
 6

Priština, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic term, derived from prysk, derived in its turn from the Indo-
European (s)per, to become the verb prisnoti, meaning to spurt, to gush. In modern Serb prisht
designates decease, boil (anthrax).
An important trade and mine medieval centre, with a Dubrovnik colony. King Stefan Dečanski
used to stay at Priština, while Tsar Stephan Dushan had his court here for some time. After Dushan
Stephan Priština became the capital of Vuk Branković feud, and retained that position even after
Kosovo battle. His wife Mara lived there with her sons, Grgur (Gregorie) and Djurdje (Georgie), as
well as Prince Lazar’s widow Eugenia (tsarica Milica). Turks took Priština 1439, but Dubrovnik
colony remains there. Priština had its flori in 17th c., as one of the most prominent towns in Serbia.
In 1660 a catholic missionary mentions it as an important post between Novi Pazar and
Constantinople (Carigrad). During Austrian-Turkish war 1689 the former had a small garrison
there. According to their records there were about 360 villages around, some of which were sat to
fire by Turks and Tatars and inhabitants slaughtered. At the beginning of 19th c. Priština appears an
important trade town, with a famous fair, with 12.000 inhabitants. France established her consulate
there 1812. According to some reports Priština had at the time about 7-9.000. inhabitants, mainly
orthodox Serbs, but Arnauts and semi-Islamized Serbs too. In 1852 reports count 12-15.000
inhabitants, one third Serbs and Cincars, the rest Arnauts. After two big fires, 1859 and 1863
Priština suffered a considerable decline.
Prizren, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name, from zreti, to see. Derived from the Indo-European gher,
to flash, participle perfect zren. Prefix pri is the common pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic for besides, at.
“Carigrad of Serbian tsars”, as it used to be called, was mentioned in the Roman time as Teraida.
Turks used to call it Terserin and Perserin.. First mentioned as the episcopate 1019, subordinated
to Ohrid archiepiscopate. St Sava subordinated it to his new Serbian archiepiscopate. Prizren
developed as a trade town in 13th and 14th c., especially during king Milutin and tsars Stephan
Dushan and Stephan Urosh, who had their courts there. Stephan Dushan built a monastery with the
memorial church St Archangels (Michael and Gavril). After falling into Turkish hands monastery
was demolished and no trace of the grave of Dushan has remained. It was an important colony of
Dubrovnik, with two Roman-Catholic churches. Turks took Prizren 1455. During Turkish
occupation Prizren lost most of its trade role. Never-the-less we have reports of a wealthy Turk
Mehmed Hajredin Kukli-beg and his 117 shops (dućans), and 6 watermills and caravanserai.
Arnauts appear there late, in the second half of 17th c. only. In 17th c. trade receives a new impetus
at Prizren, with some 8.600 (1610) and 12.000 (1655) homes. Town was renowned for his
fountains, watermills (600), nice houses and pleasant gardens. Craftsmanship was very developed,
especially guns and sabers productions. Town was the largest Serb town in the region, second only
to Skopje. The overwhelming majority of population was Serb Orthodox. Though there was a
catholic episcope chair, there were 30-40 catholic homes only.
In both 16th and 17th centuries Prizren was victim of ethnic-Albanian highlanders, mainly Mirdites
tribe. Turkish taxes were sometimes extraordinary large and devastating, as a victim complained.
At the end of 18th century many towns were devastated by Arnauts, including Prizren, mainly by
krdžalije and other highwaymen. Father Sava reports how in 1795 Mahmud-pasha Bushatlija and
his Arnauts devastated Prizren that only 7-8.000 homes remained, much less than there were in 17th
c. In 1805 Pukvilj records that Prizren experienced a revival. Inhabitants were partly Muslims
partly Orthodox, but both Serbs, as their (Slavic) language revealed. 19th c. witnessed further
development of Prizren. According to J. Miller (1844) the following statistics was offered; 6.000
homes, with 18.600 Orthodox citizens, 2.150 Catholics, 4.000 Muslims (4/5 Serbs), 600 Tsigans
(Roma). Trade was mainly in hands of Serbs. Town had many mosques (12 big, 42 altogether),
many clock towers, one Orthodox and one Catholic Church. Trade was done mainly with
Thessalonica, since the trade road to Skadar was insecure due to Arnaut highwaymen (kachaks).
 7

Mitrovica, after the Greek saint Demetrios, Serb Dimitrije. Demetrios itself means son of Demetre,
goddess of fertility and agriculture. 1
When king Milutin donated (14th c.) to the St Stephan monastery at Banjska the church “St
Dimitrije under Zvečan”, the new town founded in the vicinity obtained the name D(i)mitrovica, or
Mitrovica. Renown traveler Evlia Čelebija mentions Mitrovica “on the border of Bosnian vilayet”,
with the castle (probably Zvecan) abandoned but the town flourishing Father Jukic mentions
(1852) 300 Muslim and 50 Orthodox houses. Unimpressive until 1871 Mitrovica experiences a fast
development with railway.
Zvečan was a Serbian castle set up in 11th century during fighting Greeks period. The castle served
as a prison (something like London Tower), where many nobleman finished their life, including
king- Stephan Dečanski brother, Constantine, and the king himself. Turkish rule was imposed
already at the end of 14thc.. Certain “Feriz ćefalija (Z)večanski” 2 arranges an agreement with
Dubrovnik 1399 and the latter donated 50 ducats to him in return. Zvecan used to be left empty for
many periods. It suffered the most 1884 when the wall material was used for building casern and
the bridge across Ibar in Mitrovica.
As mentioned before, nearby Banjska was a village, which had a nice monastery, but was ruined
after Kosovo battle. 3 But the place won it celebrity after the beautiful folk poem Strahinjic Bane,
an epic Serb hero from the place. Turks seems to have founded a small town over the ruins of
Banjska, with a mosque and sahat- kula (clock tower). At the hill foot there was a bath, 4 in use long
time afterwards. At the beginning of 20th c. one could still see a remnant of minaret on the ruins of
the old Serb church, converted into mosque in 15th c.
Djakovica, from Greek diakonos, servant, pupil.
The earliest record about the place came from 17th c. Original name Gjakova was given by Turks
and Arnauts, and Serbs turned it into present-day Djakovica. 5 It was a small town, which started to
be populated by Albanians after the Serb migration into Austria in 17th c. It was probably on that
account that Serbs used to call it Arnaut-Pazar. According to Miller (18440 there were 1900
houses, 11 mosques, 640-650 shops. 18.000 were Muslims, 2600 Orthodox, 450 Catholics. As for
the ethnical partition the same record provides: 17.000 Arnauts, 3800 Slavs (Serbs), 180 Turks, and
finally some Cincars and Tsigans. However, statistics greatly differ from author to author and may
be taken as a rough estimate only. Christians were engaged mainly in craftsmanship, with
Catholics as goldsmiths and Orthodox saddle-makers and painters.
Peć, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic, from pekti, to roast. Pekt - peć means furnace. ‘
Cult place of Serbian people, the seat of Peć Patriarchy, in the nearby church, established under
king Milutin (1282-1321). Besides spiritual importance Peć was the town with a lively trade, with
Dubrovnik colony. Turks abolished Patriarchy in 1459, to be re-established in 1557 and ultimately
abolished 1766 and subordinated to Constantinople Patriarchy. In 19th c. there was 2.000 houses
with 7-8.000 inhabitants. Mainly Orthodox (Serbs). Town had 900 shops (dućans). Principal
occupation was silk production and agriculture (fruit and tobacco). Despite its size, Peć was not
able to develop trade, due to insecurity ”from (local) Arnauts”, who were “public highwaymen”.
Uroševac, pra-Church-Slavic from Uroš, derived from ur, master, from Hungarian ursu for lord.
Originally Turkish Ferizović, was a small Gypsy village. The railway made it a town and a trade
centre of the region. Albanians called it Ferizaj, and Serbs ultimately named it Uroševac
Lipljan, old-Serbian, probably from the Roman name for the nearby castrum Ulpijanum.
Orahovac, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name; oreh for nut (orah in the contemporary Serb), derived
from Indo-European ar and reks (to smash), something one eats skinned.

1
According to Robert Graves, Demetre means mother of barley.
2
It was probably after him that Ferizović (later Uroševac) got his name.
3
As we shall see, Slobodan Milošević’s family claims to have the origin from Banjska.
4
Banja in Serb means bath, spa.
5
Other variants are known, like Jakova, or Giacovo.
 8

Drenica, derived from pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic dren, dogwood, from the Indo-European root
dher(e)ghno.
Vučitrn, derived from Serb vuk, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic vlk, for wolf, Indo-European ulkuos 1 and
trn, Teutonic-pra-Slavic term for thorn (Indo-European (s)ter, for thorny plants).
Built probably over the ancient Vicianum, is mentioned for the first time in 14th c. as a place
belonging to Vuk Branković, who had his palace there too. Town was renowned for his trade
activities, with Dubrovnik colony. Djuradj Branković used it as his seat too. In the vicinity there
was a well known trade and mine town Trepča. Vučitrn fell to Turks in 1439 (or 1440) for the first
time, then definitely in 1455. Some travelers mention it as an important trade centre. Evlija
Čelebija counts 2.000 houses, then tekija, 2 schools, Orthodox school (bogoslovia), hamam,
vineyards, orchards. In 18th c. Vučitrn appears an insignificant place, but becomes the seat of a
sandžak. In 1894 one counts about 7-8.000 inhabitants. The main occupation was blacksmith and
leather craftsmanship.
Glogovac, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic name from glog for hawthorn (from Greek glohiis – top of
blade).
Istok, from tok, pra-Slavic noun for flow (from Indo-European teq - to run (away), and iz as the
perfective prefix for the verb teći – to flow, from Indo-European eghs.
Gračanica, pan-Slavic and pra-Slavic diminutive of gord, initially any fenced settlement, later
town, and castle, from Indo-European gherdh, to fence. 3
Kačanik. Turkish name, from kaçak, highwayman.
Kachanik was notorious for its highwaymanship from the beginning of known history, which dates
from 16th century. Situated at the entrance of the gorge Kačanik, made by the river Lepenac, it
controled the passage through the gorge, the only possible between Macedonia and Kosovo. Report
from 1573 warns people to guard themselves well in passing the gorge, for the denger from the
local Arnauts. It was for this denger that Sinan-pasha built the small fortress at the gorge entrance,
which was intended to protect travellers, mainly trademen, from the robbery and slaughter.
Austrians under Piccolomini took the fortress in 1689, but after their retreat in 1690 Turks captured
the fortress and slaughered the Ausrian garrison. It was not until 1807, when Reshid-pasha cleared
Kačanik from highwaymen that the trafic through the gorge was resumed. Around the middle of
19th c. the town consisted of about «hundred miserable Arnaut houses», situated beside the ruined
fortress. Before the Balkan wars town was renamed by Turks as Orhanije and at that time had
about 250 houses.
Names of rivers, mountains and other geographical entities are likewise Slavic. They are easily
recognized by suffixes, like –va for river, -ica for rivers or settlements, We mention rivers Sitnica,
Studenica, etc. Suffix -or for mountains is considered to be of Celtic origin, but mountains with
this ending are scattered all around the Western Balkan. Some toponyms bear Turkish names, as
expected after centuries of the Ottoman rule of this part of Balkan. We emphasize here that since
the Kosmet used to be separated from modern Serbia for two centuries, its development was
considerably retarded concerning the language and folklore generally. It appears today as a sort of
reservation in this respect, as a relict of the ancient times, from the medieval Serbian state and Serb
population in general. This is the case with other mountainous regions of Balkan, in particular
Northern Albania, Montenegro and Herzegovina, who were on the margin of European civilization
and culture. for centuries. We shall come to this point again, later on.
As for the toponyms in Albania, many appear corrupted from of the original Greek or Roman,
whereas some bear purely Slavic names. This applies particularly to the plane regions, which were
settled by ethnic-Albanian montagnars only relatively recently.

1
Ulk has been preserved in contemporary Albanian, as a common name, with the same meaning – wolf. In modern
Serb Vuk appears a common name, too, in particular among Dinaroids.
2
Dervish house, after Turkish tekke (Arab täkyä).
3
Some toponyms Shiptars still call by Albanian names, like Ferizaj for Uroševac.
 9

As pointed out above these details are not merely of linguistic nature, but reveal the essence of the
issue, as we shall elaborate later on. Unfortunately we have to dwell on the linguistic matters more.
It concerns the question of “negative designation”. Ancient Greeks (and Romans as well) used to
call other nations “barbarians”, meaning “non-Greeks”, “neither Romans nor Greeks”. It had
somewhat pejorative overtones, which one could appreciate regarding their superiority over the
surrounding nations, in particular those much less civilized, like Skits. 1 The same point appears
with Israelites, who designate non-Jews as goyim, meaning (other, non-Jewish) nations. 2 Though
no Jew would admit it, it has a pejorative meaning whatsoever, and this overtone can not be
ignored.
As we shall see later on, the Albanian issue (question) involves all nationalities in which ethnic
Albanians are in close contact on Balkan Peninsular. Thus one faces the conflict Albanians versus
non-Albanians, which places inevitably ethnic Albanians at a privileged position. This will sounds
cynical when we compare civilization levels of both sides in conflict, as we shall see soon.
Unfortunately term “non-Albanians” has been widely accepted by the international community,
that even an eventual neologism which would substitute the unfortunate term “non-Albanian”
would not do. In a sense this terminology would correspond to “non-sick” man (as compared to
sick one), meaning “healthy man”. “Non-Albanian” implies inevitably the feeling of “something
wrong” with those singled out so.
Unfortunately, the story does not end here. Serbia used to have, during her recent history, two
regions, which had privileged positions relative to the rest of the state. One was the autonomous
province Vojvodina, the other the autonomous region (later to become province, too) Kosovo and
Metohija (Kosmet, KiM). The problem is that “rest of Serbia”. Some call it “Serbia proper”, some
“Central Serbia”. The first designation appears particularly unsuitable, for it implies that Kosmet is
not ”proper Serbia”, thus concealing in the very name a political message.
Kosovo issue
It is clear from the previous chapter that Kosmet is an autochthonous Slavic, in particular Serb,
land. How this region became the so-called disputed land, and what has it to do with ethnic-
Albanians? In the following chapters we will consider this issue in more details, from the
geographical, (pre)historic, anthropologic, religious and political points of view. We start with the
geography, in particular physical geography of the Western Balkan.

Dinaric region
Physical and mental structures of a particular population are determined by many factors, but
mainly by the genetic inheritance and physical environment. The Western Balkan is characterized
by the mountainous strip which goes from Istria peninsula on the North-West to the Northern
Albania on the South-East, parallel to the Adriatic coast. This high-mountains region goes
gradually into the Pannonic plane towards North, but goes down abruptly to the Adriatic coast, as
seen in the Figure 3. This so-called Dinaric chain derives its name from mountain Dinara, in the
middle of Herzegovina region. It comprises Montenegro and Northern Albania too. Some parts of
the region are still woody, but mainly the wood was cut off many centuries ago and the land is
almost bare, with stony and bushy surface. This fact, as well as the unfavorable geographical
position, made the region cornered, mostly inaccessible and cut from the rest of Balkan and Europe
for that matter. 3 It is cut from the sea and far away from the principal roads, which go along the
Sava river on the North. These geographical features have shaped the mentality and history of the
local population. Their principal occupations have been cattle grazing (sheep and goats) and
plundering the surrounding regions. The latter meant first piracy on the Adriatic sea and second
1
The anecdote on dispute between a bully Greek and philosopher Abaris, of Scythian origin, who exclaimed “My
homeland is shame for me, but you are the shame of your homeland!” illustrates well the issue.
2
In modern parlance it renders gentiles.
3
As the old saying puts it “behind God’s back”
 10

robbing the plane people on the North. First inhabitants known from the historical records (mainly
by Greeks), Illyrians were notorious for piracy, what was the cause of permanent conflicts with
Romans. 1 The first known inhabitants of Dinaric land were Illyrians tribes, of Indo-European
origin. Scattered all around Western Balkan, even in the present day Austria, these illiterate people
left nothing of a historical value and records and appear known via testimonies of Greeks and
Romans only. Whenever other people arrived to the Western Balkan, in particular Slavic tribes,
they used to push the local tribes into the Dinaric chain. Those remaining in the less mountainous
regions mixed with the incoming people, who gradually absorbed them. This process finally
affected almost all Illyrians, except for the most inaccessible mountains, where the assimilation
took the mildest form, as the case of Northern Albania was. Nevertheless, as we shall see later on,
no pure Illyrian people have been preserved on Balkan, except in the nationalistic textbooks.

Figure 3. Balkan peninsular. Dinaric region begins with Dinaric Alps and extends up to Epirus.
State borders refer to the situation before dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Though generally Dinaroids have been known as warlike, violent people, their ethnical content
appears varied, and no uniform form of their behaviour may be expected. In fact, this
anthropological content has been changing for centuries, by the influx of surrounding people. The
principal source for this influx have been those inhabitants of the surrounding states, who sought
refuge in the inaccessible mountains, fleeing from the authorities, for various reasons. The
principal source of those incomers was Bosnia, in particular during the rule of the Ottoman Empire,
and later during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina. Majority of
those incomers fled from the law pursuit and this asocial selection contributed additionally to the
toughness of the Dinaroids. Generally, Dinaric region appears retarded relative to the plane
surroundings and the Adriatic coast for century or so, what has been a permanent cause of conflicts
with the latter. It was for this retardation that Dinaroids were prone to change their religious

1
One of the contemporary Albanian tribes, Hots, derives its name from Dacian hot, highwayman and robber.
 11

believes, as various new religions arrived with new rulers. In particular, it was here only that the
Muslim religion took root when the Turks arrived on the Western Balkan. In particular Western
Herzegovina and Northern Albania adopted quickly new religion from the Turkish rulers. No
autochthonous Serbian population accepted Mohammedism, although Turks used to rule Serbian
regions from three to five centuries. The only Muslim population here are Shqiptars and Bosnian
Muslims (called Boshnjaks) in the western Serbia, called Rashka by Serbs and Sandžak by
Boshnjaks. 1 The rationale for this ”religious mobility” of montagnars was their provisional
acceptance of the Christian faith, which never took roots firmly in those mountainous regions. It
was for this reason that 70% of ethnic Albanians are now Muslims, the rest being Roman Catholics
and Greek Orthodox ones.
Homogeneous (on average) anthropologically, Dinaric region has been split into two principal
areas; Slavo-phonic and Albano-phonic ones. That it often has nothing to do with the ethnical
content is well illustrated by Montenegrin-Albanian tribes, still existing in the area. As the English
traveler and folklorist Edith Durham found early the previous century, while touring around
Northern Albania and Kosmet, four brothers arrived from Bosnia century ago, all of Slavic origin. 2
We quote the testimony she recorded from an old Albanian:
“The tribe of Hoti,” said the old man, “has many relations. Thirteen generations ago, one Gheg
Lazar came to this land with his four sons, and it is from these that we Hoti descend. I cannot tell
the year in which they came. It was soon after the building the church of Gruda, 3 and that is now
380 years age. Gruda came before we did. Gheg was one of four brothers. The other three were
Piper, Vaso and Krasni. 4 From these descend the Piperi and Vasojevichi of Montenegro and
Krasnichi of North Albania. So we are four – all related –the Lazakechi (we of Hoti), the
Piperkechi, the Vasokechi and the Kraskechi. They all came from Bosnia to escape the Turks, but
from what part I do not know. Yes, they are all Christians. Krasnichi only turned Moslem much
later.”
Of these four large tribes, of common origin Piperi and Vasojevići are now Serbophone and
Orthodox. Piperi threw its lot with Montenegro in 1790, but whether or not it was then Serbophone
I have failed to learn. Half of Vasojevich was given to Montenegro after the Treaty of Berlin, the
other portion still remains under Turkish rule. 5 Vasojevich consider itself whole Serb, and is bitter
foe to the Albanophone tribes on its borders. Krasnich is Albanophone and phanatically Moslem; 6
Hoti tribe is Albanophone and Roman Catholic.

Dinaroids
As mentioned above, geographical position and the physical geography of the Dinaric region ha
shaped the anthropological features of this quasi-isolated part of Balkan peninsular. To appreciate
the issue, one may compare this kind of isolation with other similar regions in Europe. One, which
might be taken as the closest to out subject, is the Basque region, shared by Spain and France. We
will come to this parallel later on, when discussing the Albanian question. By probably the best
parallel with the whole Dinaric area would be with Mediterranean islands, like Crete, and in
particular Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Among them, Sardinia comes closest to our issue, in many
respects.

1
Sundžak means a county in Turkish language. Note that Muslims on Western Balkan are of Slavic origin, with Serb
(or Croat) mother tongue.
2
E. Durham, High Albania, Beacon Press, Boston, 1987. Miss Durham testimony will be our principal source for the
Northern Albania anthropology, ethnology and history.
3
Grud(v)a, Serb noun for lump; (of earth), block (of cheese); rodna gruda – native soil.
4
Vaso is the short form of Vasilije, the common pan-Slavic name, from Greek basileus (king); Krasni is pan-Slavic
name. derived from krasan, krasni, meaning handsome, beautiful, common particularly among Czechs
5
It refers to 1908, when the travel took place.
6
Krasić is the common surname among modern Serbs.
 12

In all cases geographical isolations has resulted in forming particular intra-social structures.
Generally, isolation implies conservation, even retardation, as compared with regions which
maintain regular links and communication with the surrounding or neighboring societies. The case
of retardation is, perhaps, the best illustrated by Tasmania, which in the early prehistoric epochs
was a part of the Australian continent. Tasmanians hared with Aborigines the same culture and
possessed the same civilization-technological features. When the Tasmanian peninsular separated
from the rest of the continent, the isolation resulted in conservation and in many respect retardation
of Tasmanian society. When the first Europeans arrived at the island, they found Tasmanians well
retarded compared with Aborigines, in material culture in particular. 1
(In the extreme situations the isolation may result in biological extinction of a species, if the
number of population drops below a critical value. Other undesirable, from the evolutionary
viewpoint, effects are degeneration of the population, by intra-breeding, for instance, or intra-
marriages, as witnessed by many island populations in the Mediterranean region).
From the purely sociological point of view, quasi-isolation results in conserving the ethos of
traditional societies, formed in the prehistoric epochs in Europe. But before we go into these
details, which peculiar features of this kind of society are preserved and how did they come about?
What is the difference between the mountains, quasi-isolated region and plane people with its
civilization? First of all highlander can not develop civilization in its strict sense, for they have no
opportunity to develop cities and live in them. Their settlements appear scattered among mountains,
with large mutual separations and very weak inter connections. What implies that their mutual
communications are rare and feeble. Development of a civilization is based on two pillars: (i)
advanced qualities of individuals and (ii) reasonably strong interactions among them, more
precisely on the optimization of the balance of these two conditions. And it is here that the
difference between the mountains and plane populations arises. The first one appears a collection of
individuals, the second form a social system, with an intricate structure, which is subject to the
social, technological and cultural development. Mountainous regions appear extreme cases of the
rural societies and both owe their technological status to acquiring the achievements of the
civilized, urban society. And, as we shall see later on, it is not only technology but the very living
staff which highlanders “borrow” from the plane people. One may describe the situation in this
respect as coexistence of two weakly coupled subsystems, each with distinct almost opposing
features. 2
These features arise from different physical environments, of course. Plane people live in relatively
fertile areas, which provide sufficient living support. Their principal occupation is agriculture and
cattle cultivation. Highlanders live on cattle grazing and plundering the plane environment. This is
the perennial story of tension between cattle grazing and agricultural societies, as described, albeit
in an allegorical form, in the Books of Genesis, in the story about Cain and Abel. 3
(The story has been repeated thousands of time in Hollywood, of course, with the same “cast of
roles”. Interestingly, the first people who were supposed to cultivate whit were Natufians, who
lived in the present day Palestine, about 10.000 years ago. And if one seeks an equation of
civilization it reads “whit = civilization”. The whit cultivation enabled homo sapiens to produce a
surplus of food and thus open the gates specialization, which turned out to be essential for

1
It was this “underdevelopment” which caused, in part, that newcomers from Europe exterminated Tasmanian
autochthonous population in the second half of 19th century.
2
See, e.g. Dinko Tomašić, Personality and culture in Eastern European Politics, G. W. Steward, New York, 1948. Although the
book is conspicuously biased against Serbs (the author manages not to mention Croat Ustashas, for instance, though the book was
published shortly after WW2), it illustrates the essential difference between the mountainous and plane people.
3
That it is the farmer Cain who slays the shepherd Abel and not vice versa tells us only who wrote the Bible. See, in this context, the
very revealing book by I. Finkelstein and N. A. Silberman, La Bible Devoile, Bayard, 2002, Paris. This episode appears a sort of
“theological justification” of the highlanders’ plundering of lowlanders.
 13

civilization as such. The irony of history is that the present day Israelis are farmers and Palestinians
(post-nomadic) shepherds. We shall not dwell on it here, however, in particular in view that
Palestine will be our principal point of reference later on, throughout the book).
The severe living conditions have shaped the mental and physical structures of highlanders. In
Dinaric regions it means the population tall, slim and bony, as a rule dolichocephalic (To fix an
idea we note that almost all of Yugoslav best tennis players, like Ivanišević, Ljubičić, Djoković,
Karlović etc are typical Dinaric people. In fact, it is due to the preponderance of Dinaroids in some
sports, like basketball, volleyball, handball etc that Yugoslavia has proved so successful in these
sports.) Their psychological construction contains many aggressive features, often combined with
unscrupulous and violent behaviour. The severity of the physical environment has resulted in the
warlike attributes of these people, as described by Dinko Tomašić, the Croat author who lived in
USA from just before the WW2 onwards. 1 Many Yugoslav authors have devoted their attention to
the character of Western Balkan population, as the case with Serbian geographer and
anthropologist Jovan Cvijić, 2 and particular Vladimir Dvorniković in his monumental work,
published just before WW2, Characterology of Yugoslavs. 3 Unlike the plane population, where the
central unit of the society appears village or town, the social unit of highlanders is the extended
family. In the Albanophonic regions it is called fis, in Slavenophonic zadruga. It comprises all
descendants from a couple, sons with their families, and unmarried daughters, and their offspring
too. It may amount up to few tens in the Slavo-phonic and even more in Albano-phonic
populations. The structure within the zadruga appears strictly hierarchic, with pater familias as the
supreme, unquestionable master of the community. The rules within this structure are very strict
and the head of the house may even kill the disobedient. The rationale for this type of organization
is the lack of the institution of state and its jurisdic role. The relationship between zadrugas is
governed by the balance of force each of them can exercise in the case of disputes. The latter
appear frequent and often unavoidable, mainly over pastures and women. The more guns a zadruga
(fis) possesses, the more powerful and authoritative position of the family within the tribe is. The
same holds for interrelations between tribes, which are composed from all families descending
from the same ancestor (historical or mythic).
Internal ethos within a family is composed of the archaic rules, imposed by the tribal, traditional
society. In order to preserve the unity of the family the concept of levirate, 4 is retained. It means
that if an adult member dies, his brother, if single and adult too, marries his widow. In fact, even if
the first brother is still alive, his sibling possesses in part the bride, except for an outright sex.
Contrary to this evidently endogamy rule, marriage is essentially exogamic in this traditional
society, but it rarely extends beyond the tribal boundary. In fact, this exogamic feature has been one
of the principal causes of disputes between families, resulting often on the blood feud.
This typical remnant of the traditional society appears characteristic of the e entire Dinaric region.
It imposes the obligation on the family whose member has been killed by somebody of other
family, or tribe, to revenge the murdered member b killing an appropriate member of the killer’s
family (or tribe).
The duty of revenge falls on the closest relative of the deceased, like son, brother, etc. When the
revenge has been realized, the family of the latest victim feels obliged to revenge itself and the
vicious circle never ends. Some of these blood feud conflicts extend over many generations and
even grand grandsons are not secure from the revenge.
1
Dinko Tomašić “Personality Development of the Dinaric Warriors”, Psychiatry, 8 (1945) 449-493; though his views on the
Serbo-Croat disputes should be taken with a grain of salt, the general description of the “Dinaric paidea” is revealing.
2
J. Cvijić, Speaches and articles, I, Ch. Dinaric Serbs. (in Serb) ; see, also J. Cvijić, “Karst and Man”, Gl. Geogr.
Društ. XI, 1925. (in Serb).
3
V. Dvorniković, Karakterologija Jugoslovena, Prosveta, Beograd, 1990. (in Serb)
4
known from the biblical times
 14

Blood feud has more or less disappeared from the Slavenophonic area, but not entirely, as some
recent case in Montenegro show. On the contrary, in the Albanophonic regions, both in Albania
and KiM, this devastating custom is still, unfortunately, present. Family of the killer (debtor) is
confined to its house and may not appear in public, without consent of the victim’s family.
According to latest polls, about 1.300 families in Albania live in the conditions of internal house
prison. 1 If they manage to realize a public appearance it is due to the institution of besa, a sworn
word that the “outlaw” will be spared for a definite period of time. It concerns walking to a town,
working in the field, special occasions, like weddings and other feasts, etc. Besa is a peculiar
Albanian institution and is strictly obeyed by the besa giver and condemned if the latter is breaking
the word given.
We shall dwell in some more detail on the psychological rationale of the blood feud, for this
reveals the essence of the highlanders’ mentality and their sense of justice. When one reads the first
paragraph of Andersen’s article (see Appendix 13),1 the first impression one gets is that of
unnecessary bestiality from the murderer’s side. But every move he made was a carefully
calculated gesture, and sends important massage to the environment, to the eyewitnesses and via
them to the broader surroundings. The first message was directed towards potential informers “I am
furiously angry and woe to those who try to report this to the police”. The very duration of the
assassination and murder’s calm and slow departure from the spot means “I am not afraid”.
(Incidentally, this appears the typical behaviour of mafia’s paid assassinators, as illustrated in a
scene in now cult movie The Godfather by Copola). This gives to the murder a social character, as
a sort of public execution. The principal aim is to intimidate the surroundings, especially potential
avengers. The murder could have been executed in a less conspicuous manner, like an ambush
around the corner, but the point would have been missed. The public execution means “I have the
right to do this, my act is justified”. This is the message to victim’s family (tribe), otherwise this
could be interpreted as an accident. And as the reporter emphasizes, the immediate witnesses got
the message right.
The parallel with (Sicilian) mafia, both in Sicily (and generally Italy for that matter) and USA is
not accidental. In both cases those clashes reveal a sad fact - that of (co)existence of two states,
one official one, the other hidden, but at the same time well present in the mind of ordinary
citizens. The public murders, as described above, reveal the tip of the iceberg of the organized
crime, or the “law” of the traditional societies. The parallel goes even further. Both institutions,
mafia and blood feud, have arisen from the lack of the state. In Sicily, it was mafia who organized
the resistance to the foreign rule (Spanish). In the case of Dinaric (and other semi-traditional
societies) the absence of state as institution, under foreign rule (like Ottoman and Austrian
Empires), shaped the autochthonous rules of behaviour, like blood feud. When Sicily got rid of
Spanish rule, the clandestine movement, mafia, remained intact and continued to exist and operates,
albeit in different direction. Likewise, when the indigenous people, like Dinaroids, got their
respective ”national states”, they hardly noticed the change.
We should make here a comparison between these traditional customs in Albania and non-Albanian
regions, like Kosmet. In the former, local ethnic Albanians still experience the states they live in as
foreign, even hostile, whereas those living in Albania have no such a resistance to the state, except
to a state as an institution, as such. It makes dealing with “traditional law” even more difficult in
the surrounding countries than in native Albania, as we shall elaborate later on. But even with this
difference in mind, the rationale remains the same – counterpoint between the state and the
traditional society. The message of the assassinator at Shkoder (Skuteri) described above to the
surrounding was ”We are in conflict with each other, but we are “ours” and nobody, even the state
and its law may be allowed to interfere with our own laws”. The victim’s relatives are thus
1
The NATO aggression against Yugoslavia was over by that time, but it is difficult to estimate if an awareness of the
West about the essence of the dispute over Kosmet would have changed the political decisions, had accounts like this
been published before decisions were made.
 15

reminded that they are part of the (traditional) sub state, as opposed to the state they live in.
Testifying at the court against the killer means a betrayal of the “ancient laws” and is strictly
forbidden.
(In a sense, this unwritten law is a counterpart of mafia’s omerta, the rule of silence. Incidentally,
this rule gave rise to naming a branch of mafia, Cosa Nostra. The anecdote of lethally wounded
Mafioso, who revealed to the policeman the identity of assassinator as cosa nostra, 1 reveals the
rationale for the naming. The policeman understood the message as indignant “leave me alone” and
gave up further investigations. 2 )

Before we go on, a few words on a parallel between intre-tribal and inter-tribal implications of
the murders like that at Skoder, described above. While in the former case it just reflects the nature
of the society with such an ethos, since all people involved belong to the same ethnic (and national)
group. Even if the murderer and murdered belong to different tribes, but within the same traditional
society, it is still of local consequences. But if we now move to a society where the murder and the
victim belong to different nationalities, one traditional the other standard, then the incident just
described may have far reaching consequences. If somebody from traditional society revenge to
somebody from his non-traditional environment, this is a signal for the most serious alert. Even if
both persons involved are from the same traditional group, the act appears the most serious
intimidation to the normal environment. The least one would do after witnessing (or hearing of) the
accident is to mediate leaving the region. And that was exactly what non-Shqiptars did on KiM.

Leka Dukagjini’s codex

Since northern Albania was practically beyond the reach of state law, even the state itself, the
traditional ethos had to be subjected to a number of regulations, so that the society retains some
political and social stability. The serious crime, like murders, had to be sanctioned, in particular in
view of the ensuing blood feud, discussed above. This has resulted in the so-called Leka
Dukagjini’s codex. The origin of this collection of rules and regulations remains obscure.
Albanians tend to ascribe it to a local ruler Leka Dukagjini, a contemporary of Skenderbeg.
Albanians ascribe to him the codex known as Leke Dukagjini canun (or simply Canun). Another
interpretation has been that in all probability Italian rulers in the late Middle Age composed the
codex, Lex Ducagin, 3 which has been subsequently corrupted and converted into the name adopted
today. 4
The principal aim of the Codex has been to interrupt the endless chain of blood feud revenges. It
proscribed the procedures for settling the disputes and for preventing further murders. Financial or
natural compensations for killed or wounded were determined and besa was required from the
latest victim’s family that the blood feud is terminated. In modern times blood feud was tackled by
forming so-called village councils, where old men with good reputation and high credibility were
engaged in reconciliating disputed families. It is claimed by Kosmet Shqiptars’ politicians that
these councils have succeeded in eliminating blood feud at Kosmet, but it has more a political
propaganda background than actual facts. 5 It is worth mentioning that the same claim was made by
the Enver Hoxha regime, though with probably more justification. As described in the book

1
Our business in Italian.
2
The incident resembles much the famous affair between Ulysses and Polyphemus, with the former introducing
himself to the latter as Nobody
3
From Latin dux for leader.
4
It illustrates, in passing, how the local (Dinaric) mythology becomes “historical fact”, as we shall see many times in the course of
this book.
5
Sladjana Djurić, Osveta i kazna, Sociološko istraživanje krvne osvete na Kosovu i Metohiji, Prosveta, Niš, 1998. (in Serb). (in
Serbian)
 16

Punishment and avenge,3 Yugoslav jurisdiction had to cope with Shqiptar ethos and adjust its
punishment system to the ruling ethics. Even when the murderer is punished and imprisoned, the
blood feud remains as the real threat. The prisoner has a leave of absence from the prison, when he
is allowed to spend some short period at his place of living. However, the authorities must first
make enquiries at the local village authorities as to the opportunity for letting the prisoner go to his
place. If the local authorities conclude that it would be risky for the prisoner, he would be retained
in prison. Of course, the problem remains what to do after the punishment is over and the convict
must leave the prison. The point is that the Codex does not care about justice and social order.
Blood feud rests on the wounded pride of people, individual or collective. The state punishment is
of no concern of these proud and pathologically sensitive people, it does not relieve them from their
feelings of being humiliated and their self-respect fatally damaged. In fact, the local surrounding
blames the victim’s relatives for not taking steps for avenging the murdered member of the family,
tribe, etc. They experience it as a common humiliation and encourage the relevant relatives “to take
the blood for blood”.
We mention also that the blood feud has been present for centuries at Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica,
as another sign that these islands parallel our Dinaric regions in many respects. Mafia avenges have
been notorious for that matter, even in USA, transferring thus the ethos of traditional societies to
the modern state.
We have dwelled on the blood feud in some detail not because it appears to the modern mind as a
curious remnant of the ancient ethos from the traditional society. 1 It has the most profound effect
on the present-day society in this part of Balkan, and has given rise to the most serious conflicts
and atrocities in the region. In a sense the whole conflict between Shqiptars and Serbians, and
generally between ethnic Albanians and the neighbouring peoples for that matter, may be regarded
as the phenomenon of the collective blood feud. We shall elaborate this point later on, however.
Here we just stress that the vanity pathologically developed within Dinaric region, coupled with an
extreme sense of proudness, appear common both to Slavenophonic Herzegovians and
Montenegrins and Albanophonic populations of Northern Albania, but in the case of ethnic
Albanians it takes the form out of all proportions. It is for this reason that the latter do not mix
with other nations, as we shall see in the following.

Ethos and demography

In remote mountainous areas, far away from law and state control, wealth and security of a family
rests on the number of guns it possesses. Better to say on the number of people they are capable of
shooting and fighting in general. Guns are needed for many purposes, in fact. First, it secures the
house from the neighbours, from plunders, like highwaymen, from wild beasts like wolfs, jackals,
bears, mountain lions etc. It enables the family to plunder its neighbours, plane people, to execute
blood vengeance, etc. Finally, in the case a common threat from outside, like foreign invasion, join
efforts of many families; tribes etc secure the successful defence.
But the principal rationale for keeping the house well armed is imposition of blood vengeance and
protection from the same. Strong family secures its authority and hierarchical position within the
tribe and many guns deter eventual aggression from other fisses. Hence, it is imperative to have as
many sons as possible and also as many guns as the family can afford. This condition sine qua non
has imposed a particular social ethos among highlanders, both with respect to the outside and inside
of the family. The response to this requirement has been simple: women are supposed to give as
many births as possible. As a consequence highlanders’ women spend the best years of their life
giving births and raising children. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced among Muslims,
due to already subordinate position of women in the Islamic society in general. And when this
anthropological affair is combined with political aims, as the case with Albanians is, then the high

1
As recorded, inter alia, in the Bible, as dictum “eye for eye, tooth for tooth”
 17

birthrate passes into the demographic explosion. And here we come to the crux of the “Albanian
question” in general and Kosovo issue in particular.
Under primitive, poor conditions and lack of proper medical care, majority of births are either
abortive or the babies fall victims of an improper care. As testified by Edith Durham, she was
shocked by the treatment of Albanian babies, who were held in their cradles coved by blankets, so
that babies could hardly breathe. All this resulted in a very high proportion of baby mortality. If we
look at Figure 1, and recall that hundred years ago only three or four of those 8 children would
have survived, we can understand the origin of the demographic explosion going on today with
ethnic Albanians. For even under modern medical and other conditions the couple from Figure 1
would not stop at three children, since it was only after three daughters that the boy is born, and it
is only males that matter in the rural traditional society, as explained above. Accidentally, Figure 1
reveals another peculiar feature of the ethnic Albanians breeding attributes – the first children are
usually females, so that males appear minority within Albanians. This has given rise to a peculiar
custom, known exclusively among Albanian Albanians.
If the wife does not stop giving birth to daughters, all siblings consist of female offspring. Te
farther feels humiliated, with grim prospects for his family. In that case one daughter, usually the
eldest or boy-like one, 1 takes over the role of (unborn) son. She dresses as male, carries gun, and
gradually becomes indistinguishable from males. It is her/his duty to protect the family, to exercise
blood vengeance, if necessary. She/he is accepted by the whole community as male, never marries
and dies as man.
It is fair to say that the whole Dinaric region has been notorious for high fertility. This mountainous
area appears the source of surplus population, which moves down to fertile planes and assimilates
gradually into the indigenous people. All regions of Western Balkan are populated by a mixture of
the autochthonous and incoming populations. If the migration is reasonably gradual, the process
takes on acceptable socio-demographic forms. The problem arises in two cases: (i) the migration is
massive, within a short period; (ii) the newcomers are ethnically different, speaking distinctly
different language. The Kosovo issue belongs to the second, case, as we shall see later on.

Highlanders and plain people

As mentioned before, the physical geography conditions have shaped the mental and physical
structures of these two distinct populations. In the fertile plane, which provides easily living goods,
people tend to be mild, industrious, and not very cute. Their social motto is “Takes it easy” and
tensions between members of kuća, the traditional counterpart of Dinaric zadruga (Slavo-phonic)
and fis (Albano-phonic) regions, respectively, or between kuća, are rare and resolved in a
reasonable manner. Though this kind of the old society has been largely disintegrated in modern
times, the tame features of these rural people can still be recognized. On the contrary, harsh and
strict rules governing internal and external relationship among highlanders are still present in
Dinaric regions, especially Albanophonic. The severe living conditions, on the soil largely
devastated by cutting woods, sheep and goats grazing etc, have shaped a tough and violent mental
structure of these inhabitants on mountainous area. The ethos of these people might well be
summarized by Hobbs’ homo homini lupus.
Unlike the plane regions where the division on male and female is very weak and where the head
of the (extended) family, elected regularly yearly, might be a woman, separation between male and
female members of zadruga (fis) appears strong and strict. Generally, women constitute a
subordinated part of the highlanders’ community, both within family and tribe. This is particularly
pronounced among Muslim Albanians, where a female member of fis is regarded almost as
domestic cattle. They live in separate parts of the house, never appear before a stranger, and go out
only on exceptional occasions and even then under an attentive supervision of a male member.

1
In a Muslim society term tomboy would be inappropriate.
 18

Before the WWII women used to wear feredža, a kind of chador of the contemporary
fundamentalist Muslim (Arab) women. The communist governments, both in Yugoslavia and
Albania, managed with great difficulties to remove feredžas from Muslim women faces. Generally,
in the urban areas situation is much more favourable, but in rural regions the old customs still
prevail. Girls are married at an early age, for boy they sometimes never met before, al arranged by
the older male members of the family. If a woman has to go to doctor, she is escorted by a male
member of family, husband and like. The latter ensure that she will be treated by female doctor and
even then the male supervises the examination. Marriage appears a business affair rather than a
social event. Farther of the girl to be married gives to groom’s family a substantial amount of
money and goods (usually in the form of cattle, eventually land). If marriage is to be broken for
husband’s “guilt”, this money must be given back to the girl’s family, together with the girl herself.
But what makes the life of Muslim women in general and ethnic Albanian in particular, often
unbearable, is the pathological jealousy of husbands. It is sufficient to look at somebody’s woman
to provoke a nervous reaction. Such sensitivity to women attraction provokes troubles, including
murder. Almost all disputes and murders among ethnic Albanians are caused by “women affairs”,
which usually triggers crime and the curse of blood vengeance. The same sensitivity prevents the
disputed parties even to mention women at court and the disputes are regularly disguised as
innocent quarrels over borders, trespassing and like. It should be stressed here that women
themselves are never direct victims in these disputes. The common law strictly forbids killing
female members of the society and if it does happen it is strongly condemned.
This situation is further strongly aggravated by the institution of Gastarbeit, going to Western
Europe, particularly to Germany, for work. While some other nations, like Turks, for instance, take
along their family, ethnic Albanians never do that. They live in a foreign country and send home
part of their earnings, visiting the family twice a year, in average. Upon arriving home, first thing to
do is to make another child, leaving then the wife pregnant behind. Besides gaining another
member of family, hopefully male, he secures that his wife will remain faithful during his absence.
From her side, she is satisfied by the course of events, for new child means her bigger security in
the family.
Contrary to what we have described above, plane people suppress maximally their fertility. In order
to preserve the family estate intact, the institution “one family, one child” has been practiced in
modern time at Vojvodina, Slavonija, and even in the intermediate regions, like Shumadija, 1
Zagorje, 2 etc. The outcome of this suicidal practice has been the decrease of populations, at least of
the autochthonous one, in these areas. The phenomenon has been dubbed “white plague”, for good
reasons, for the rural regions of the non-Dinaric Balkan have been in the process of biological
dying for the last century or so. (The process has been slowed down to some extent by the influx
from Dinaric regions, as we shall see later).
In view of what we have described above, no wonder that special relations between the highlanders
and plane people have been developed during the history of Balkan and generally. This relation
may be described by ”predator – pray” correlation, for good reasons. Highlanders have always
looked down to planes as the “fertile soil” for robbing and plundering. It is this outlook that has
prompted Hannibal and Bonaparte, to mention just two examples, to urge their soldiers, while
looking at the reach Lombardi from the high Alps, to descend and “collect the harvest”. In the west
Dinaric, during Ottoman occupation of Bosnia, Herzegovians regularly made guerrilla invasions to
plane people and robbed them. These plunders were called uskoks, 3 and used to be highly valued
by the local epic poets. The reason for the latter was that it was mainly Turks that were attacked
and these exploits were painted by patriotic colours.

1
The central part of Serbia, the core of the modern state, geographically, historically and ethnically.
2
The Croatian counterpart of Šumadija.
3
Raiders, those who jump in.
 19

Two more phenomena of this kind must be mentioned in this context. They belong to the
highwaymen movements and were common to Balkan generally. In Slavo-phonic regions these
highwaymen were called hayduks, in Albano-phonic katchacks (from Turkish kaçak,
highwayman). 1 Their common practice was to make an ambush and rob the trade caravans, usually
killing the tradesmen and escorts. Since these movements were prominent during the Ottoman
Empire, hayduks were considered heroes, almost freedom fighters. The best illustration of the last
point is the epic poem Gorski vijenac, 2 written by Montenegrin theocratic ruler Petar Petrovic-
Njegosh (mid nineteen century). The political motivation for writing this poetic drama was the
acute threat of bishop’s subjects converting into Muslims, under the pressure of economic poverty
and famine. 3 The subject of the poem was “the extermination of poturice 4 ”, a sort of “religious
cleansing”. In fact the event the poet referred to consisted of five families killing their Muslim
neighbours (and relatives for that mater). The event was hardly noticed at the time it occurred. This
point illustrated well another important feature of dinaric mentality – they are prone to the
exaggerations out of all proportions. But it is the silent message of the legalized highwayman-ship
(more precisely of uskoks’ practice) which is of a particular importance to us here. This aspect has
never been exposed in the Serb/Montenegrin exegesis of this poetic drama, though the latter is
extensively worked out at the grammar schools in Serbia and Montenegro. 5 Mountainous wreath
has the reputation among Serbs of Serbian Iliad. (We note here that in all probability Troy was a
pirate city and that this piracy was the cause of all-Greek massive assault on Priam’s town, with
Hellene as an allegorical substitute of robbed goods and money, possibly as a tax. What makes the
parallel mentioned even more appropriate.)
In fact Turks themselves used to use this practice in well organized manner as a means to extend
their state territory. Their bashibozuks, cavalry guerilla, who used to plunder areas across the
borders by brutal and sudden assaults. This practice resulted in empting the ranger territories from
the indigenous inhabitants, what enabled the Ottoman forces to occupy these areas easily when an
official war was initiated. We mention this practice here because it was exactly the same tactics
which Kosmet Albanians exercised after the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo)
occupied Kosmet and the local army control was handed over to ethnic Albanians. We shall return
to this point later on. Here we mention raids made by Albanians from the newly founded state of
Albania, after WWI. These raids into KiM become so annoying that Serbian army was forced to
enter Albanian territory in order to clean the region from the aggressive montagnards. Albanian
government then addressed the newly founded League of Nations for protection and the latter
ordered Serbian forces to withdraw. Serbian government did not take it serious and newspapers
commented the requirements by “Let us see who is stronger – Serbian army or League of Nation?”
In fact, it was the first intervention of new international organization founded to ensure the world’s
peace and it was important that the intervention succeed. Serbia had to comply and withdraw her
forces from Albania.
The practice of haydukship remained on Balkan even after the Ottoman Empire and was uprooted
in Serbia only in late 19th century. On Kosmet this tradition has been alive even to this day. One of
permanent testimonies of the practice of robbery is the gorge Katchanik (Kaçanik), between Serbia
and Macedonia. The name of this unavoidable passage for those traveling between these regions
has been derived from katchak, highwayman in Albanian. Only under a heavy armed escort was it
possible and advisable for caravans to go through the gorge. Serb epic poetry has recorded this

1
We mention here that Greeks had their armatolies, as counterpart of Slavic hayducs, who had reputation of freedom
fighters too.
2
Mountainous wreath, in Serb.
3
A common phenomenon in Dinaric regions, practically absent among plane people.
4
The common (pejorative) name of all Slavo-phonic people who accepted Muslim religion, in particular those who did
it for the opportunistic reasons.
5
Some people even know the poem by hart, as the case with the most famous of all Dinaroids, Nikola Tesla, was.
 20

usage of Katchanik, albeit in an allegorical form, in the poem on duel between Marko Kraljević
(Serb epic hero, otherwise historic ruler) and Mussa 1 Kesedžija (his ethnic-Albanian counterpart). 2
The duel resembles that between Achilles and Hector and the (anonymous) poet showed equal
sympathy for both adversaries, just as its famous Greek counterpart did the same regarding Greek
and Trojan heroes.
A very undesirable consequence of haydukship was that state allowed civilians to keep and carry
guns, as protection from highwaymen. Even Turks tolerated this within Christian provinces. But
state with armed civilians is not a state at all. It is well illustrated by uprisings within Ottoman
Empire, which were successful, at least temporarily, just owing to the armed rebellious populations,
as the case of Serb uprisings in1804 and 1815 shows. When king Milan Obrenović in the newly
independent Serbia tried in 1883 to collect weaponry from peasants in the East Serbia, since he
established the regular army, it resulted in an armed rebellion (Timochka buna), which the
government suppressed only with great efforts. As we shall see later, this phenomenon will be the
cause of many troubles with ethnic Albanian populations, both in Serbia and Albania. If one
realizes that it is the highlanders who are troublemakers in Western Balkan, with their cult of
weaponry, he can appreciate this devastating effect on the weakly civilized societies in the region.
How much the guerrilla tradition is esteemed in modern Yugoslavia testifies the number of soccer
clubs with name Hajduk (highwayman), including the most popular one in Croatia from Split. At
Sinj in Croatia every year there is the festival called Sinjska alka, with competitors in the traditional
military uniforms, trying to pick up a ring by their spears, riding horses, which commemorates the
times of Uskoks and their raids across the Turkish border. An overwhelming majority of military
leaders in the Serb uprisings in 19th century were actual or former hayduks, 3 including the supreme
commander Karadjordje (Karageorgie) 4 .
As we shall see later on, this guerrilla tradition was revived in Yugoslavia, first in Macedonia just
before Balkan wars (1912-1913), during WWII (partisans and chetniks), then in the period of the
civil wars (1991-1999) and finally at Kosmet (1998-1999).

Who are Albanians ?

Une nation est une societe unie par des illusions
sur ses ancestres et par la haine commune de ses voisins.

[Nation is a society unified by the

illusions about its ancestors and common
hatred toward their neighbours].
Ernest Renan

In Europe 19th century has witnesses the rise of (romantic) nationalisms, which forged
contemporary nations Many European states, based on the concept of ethnicity, have been founded
at the time, including Serbia and Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. A number of
contemporary (proto)nations remained without proper states, as the case with Slovenians,
Croatians, Macedonians and ethnic Albanians was. Some of these solved their national aspirations
via common states, like Croatians, Slovenians and Macedonians, at least temporarily. Balkan
Albanians, who never had a national stat before, started their struggle fro national state rather late,
relative to the other nations in the region, for understandable reasons. Unlike other nationalities

1
Turkish transliteration of Moses, commonly used in Serbia for naming bulls.
2
Kesedžija in Serb means purse (bag) cutter, highwayman.
3
Arabic for outlaw (pron. hidouc). Turkish haydud, haydut (highwayman). Hungarian hayduk, plural of haydu
(soldier).
4
Black George in Serb. The nickname speaks about his character for himself. Contrary to popular believe it was Serbs
who gave him this epithet, not Turks.
 21

mentioned, Albanians had first to forge the concept of Albanian nation, before attempting to found
a national state. Since their homeland was much retarded in every respect, the initiative for the first
stage mentioned came from Albanians living outside proper Albania. The first concrete action in
that direction was made at Prizren, which lies on the traditional Serbian ground. The so-called
Prizren League was founded in 1878, 1 the same year when Serbia and Montenegro were definitely
recognized by the European community as sovereign and independent states. Prizren was not only
in Serbia, but was her capital during the reign of Stefan Dushan, Serbian king (later tsar) (1308-
1355). This status of Prizren implies, without checking the maps that it was at the core of Serbian
territory. (We shall consider the ethnic distribution in the area in relevant periods later on.)
While Serbs who lived on the territory of the present day Serbia had already achieved the national
consensus of their identity, other South Slavic ethnicities were still striving for this end. In
particular Slavo-phonic people living in then Austro-Hungary undertook steps to identify
themselves and thus to gain some kind of autonomy or even independence. These efforts were
partly in concordance with aims of Serbs, both Serbian and non-Serbian, but at some points in clash
with them. In particular Croats were very eager to contrive their own nationality, for what they
sometimes used a number of extreme arguments and means. Renowned Serbian linguist,
ethnologist and historian, Vuk Stefanović-Karadžić used to say ironically, within the context, that
Croats had everything, except land, people and language. Present day Croatia was under Austro-
Hungarian rule, with land consisting of Croatia proper, Slavonia and Dalmatia, with a vague
determination of the nationality of people living in these regions. The language was also poorly
determined, and among several dialect option, Croat cultural leaders chose the so-called štocavic
dialect, the variant of the Slavo-phonic language spoken in Serbia. 2 That nationalism often has
nothing to do with anthropology and race shows the case of the most prominent leader of Croat
cultural renewal, so-called Illyric movement. This leader, Ljudevit Gaj (Lyudevit Gay) was of
German origin (both parents were purely Germans). The term Illyric deserves, however, our
particular attention.

Prehistory, history and mythology

In attempting to define, or determine their national identities, the principal aim of nationalistic
leaders is usually to display presumed antiquity of their presumed nation. Leaders of Illyrian
(Croat) movement were no exception.
(We note, in passing, that this passionate striving for antiquity was not the romantic era invention.
Around the New Era, disputes between Jewish community in Alexandria and Greeks and Egyptians
over “cultural supremacy” took the form of Jewish claims of their supreme antiquity. Jewish writer
Joseph Flavius wrote the book entitled Jewish Antiquity (a kind of remake of the Old Testament), 3
and dedicated another treatise specifically devoted to the disputed “Jewish supremacy” regarding
the antiquity of the nations in the region. 4 These claims appear conspicuous attempts to substitute
present (feelings of) inferiority by alleged “past superiority”).
Now, what was “Illyrian” in this Croat claims? It is generally believed that the coinage was aimed
at disguising a genuine political ambition (as a part of a general nationalistic movement) in cultural
clothing. But a more thorough analysis reveals that the matter is far from tactical moves. The
temptations of the “call of remote past” was so appealing, that some historians took the “Illyrian
hypothesis” for serious, claiming that all Slavs are of Illyrian descent. These claims were

1
After a meeting of Albanian leaders in Bajrakli Mosque at Prizren.
2
We shall not dwell on this issue here, but direct interesting readers to the comprehensive article by V. Sotirović,
“National Identity: Who are the Albanians?" The Illyrian Anthroponomy and the Ethnogenesis of the Albanians”,
Liaudies Kultūra, vol. 3, No 84 (2002) pp. 31–43, Vilnius, Lithuania.
3
Flavius Josephus, “The Atiquities of the Jews”, in J. Flavius, Complete works, p. 27, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859.

4
J. Flavius, Against Apion, ibid, p. 784
 22

particularly popular among South Slavs at a time (16th to early 19th centuries), and even some
authors from Poland and Russia accepted them for genuine historical records. According to these
claims, the South Slavs were descendants of Balkan Illyrians and are thus autochthonous
populations in the region. These Slavs were recognized by the surrounding nations. like Greeks, as
Illyrians. In the early Middle Age one group of these Slavs migrated to Central Europe (Western
Slavs), whereas one group moved to Eastern Europe (Eastern Slavs). According to some medieval
authors, South Slavs descend from Illyrians, Thracians and Macedonians. Hence, Alexander,
Constantine, Diocletian and St. Hieronymus were nobody else but Slavs. This line of thought was
particularly popular among Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation South Slavs.
Vinko Priboević from Dubrovnik (Ragusa) wrote that all Slavs speak one common “our”, “Illyric”,
“Slavic” language. 1 Mavro Orbini, a renowned author of his time (De Regno Sclavorum, 1601) and
Bartol Kašić (Institutionem Linguae Illyricae, 1604) also championed the thesis of Illyrian origin of
all South Slavs.
Count Djordje Branković (1645-1711), a Serb nobleman from Transylvania, 2 who was first
accepted by Austria as the hair of Serb despots Branković, but when he tried to found an
independent Serbian state on Austrian territory was dismissed as imposter. 3 Djordje wrote in 1688
a political programme for South Slavs unification into free, independent state he called Illyrian
Kingdom. It is interesting to note that Orbini’s treatise was translated into Russian in 1722. Finally,
as we mentioned above, the Croatian national renewal movement in mid-19th century was launched
under the name “Illyrian movement”. 4
Before we go on with “Illyrization of Balkan” a few words on some features of the “Illyrian
(hypo)thesis” are in order. What is the common characteristic of the claims just mentioned? First,
the efforts to establish the South Slavs not only as autochthonous Balkan population, but also as the
progenitor of all Slavs. Another important point is to be noticed. All authors mentioned did not
belong to the core of the Slavic territories at the time, but came from its margins. All of them, in
fact, were part of the surrounding, more culturally advanced regions, some of them at least partially
foreign to the proper Slavic populations. As we shall see immediately, this pattern of “Illyrization”
will be followed closely by ethnic Albanians, in their endeavor to establish Albanian nation and
endow it with territory and language.

Who were Illyrs?

This Indo-European population inhabited Western Balkan and some regions to the north-west of
Balkan Peninsula. 5 They never developed the letter and thus did not enter the history by their own
means. Almost all we know about them came from Greek and Roman testimonies - names of tribes,
rulers and kings and queens. They were regarded hardy and violent people, engaged mainly in
plundering lowlands and Adriatic Sea piracy. The Romans raised several time massive offensives
in order to suppress piracy. When they conquered Illyrians Roman emperors used to make use of
them as military barrier against other barbarians. Thus the entire Illyricum served as a bulwark
against attacks from Central and Eastern European nations. Because they played prominent role in
the military sector of the Roman Empire (they were employed as praetorian guard, for instance), 6

1
V. Priboević, On Origin and History of the Slavs, 1532, Venice.
2
He claimed to be the heir of the Branković dynasty, the last Serbian (vassal) ruling family, before the final fall of the
Serbian State to Ottoman Empire.
3
It was at this time that Austria launched the false thesis that Vuk Branković, the progenitor of Branković dynasty,
betrayed duke Lazar at the Kosovo battle (1389).
4
V. Sotirović, Liaudies Kultūra, vol. 3, No 84 (2002) pp. 31–43, Vilnius, Lithuania.
5
An Illyrian tribe occupied territory close to the present day Vienna
6
On one of Albanian websites it is proudly (and out of context) stated that Albania provides military support to
Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq.
 23

during turmoil times, when military leaders used to seize power, a number of these emperors, like
Diocletian, were of Illyrian origin. 1
When in 6th and 7th centuries AD Slavs invaded Balkan Peninsular, they pushed local population
into mountainous regions, we call today Dinaric area. Dinaroids, Slavo-phonic and Albano-phonic
alike, are principally of Illyric origin, although it comes mainly by implication rather than by a
direct evidence. In the absence of material artifact which may be attributed to Illyrians with
certainty, what remains in making links with this ancient tribal population appears inevitably of
conjectural nature. In particular the mental structure of modern Dinaroids matches closely the
anthropic features one attributes to Illyrians. As we shall see many times during our considerations,
language and religious differences among Dinaroids are of minor importance, compared with the
principal common attributes we just mentioned. One of these features which are of a particular
concern to us is their notorious stubbornness and inflexibility. As many psychiatrists testify, in
particular those dealing with convicts, it appears practically impossible to “reach their mind”,
unlike other patients. (We shall come to this point again, in particular when dealing with Slobodan
Miloshević and other Dinaroids involved in the «civil wars» in Yugoslavia 1991-1995). 2 We
quotesome additional features of Dinaroids, of importanc efor understanding events which occured
on Balkan inthe last hundred years.
Mixing of reality as it is and as they want tobe (as they fancy). One of ensuingeffects have been
numerous demands in politics and otherwise, based on false images of history or actual political
situation.
The lack of appreciation of state as an institution. This has come as a consequence of their
millennia of living at the margins of existing states, foreign or not. They never experienced states
as their own and always tried to take advantage of its marginal position and profit maximally,
without feeling any responsibility for the common welfare.
An extreme impulse for striving for power. Since the male population of Dinaroids, as the
dominant familiar and social factor, was never engaged in production and used to be engaged in
plundering and steeling, they feel strong repulsion towards manual work and always try to rule the
surroundings instead.
Weaponry cult is strongly present among Dinaroids, and appears particularly prominent with ethnic
Albanians. This cult is, of course, linked with the previous point.

This cult of guns deserves our particular attention, for it will play a decisive role in the events
which are of our further concern. We shall quote a few examples as illustrations of the point.
When Serbian army, in its retreat from Serbia in 1915, 3 before the powerful German army, lead by
marshal Makensen, was crossing Albania, 4 many of them lost their life because they carried guns.
Not only they were killed by Albanians while the exhausted soldiers were crossing Albanian
mountains, but some of them were assassinated while sleeping in Albanian houses. The latter
instance bears particular weight to the point, bearing in mind the Albanian traditional hospitality, in
particular their cult of protecting guests. 5
When receiving guns at the beginning of their military service in Yugoslav army, many ethnic
Albanian conscripts used to kiss the rifle. 6 The rifle is considered by Albanians as a precious tool

1
This situation will repeat many times during Balkan history, in particular during WWII and civil wars in Yugoslavia
(1991-1995).
2
In fact, the persistence of blood feud rests on this feature of Dinaroids.
3
The estimate is that around 350.000 Serbians, soldiers and civil alike, lost their life during this retreat through
Albania; the crossing was dubbed “Serbian Golgotha”.
4
With permission of Essad-pasha, a great friend of Serbs, whom the latter had helped in his political activities.
5
In some cases Serbian soldiers retaliated for these murders, like setting houses to fire.
6
When a captain asked such a conscript why he kissed the gun, he obtained this remarkable answer: “I will need it
some day”.
 24

and almost the best friend. The same tradition was present among Montenegrins, as the many
instances in the dramatic poem Mountainous wreath, mentioned earlier, testify. 1
When the scandal of the so-called pyramidal bank affair took place in Albania in 1997, it caused
such a revolt of the deceived Albanians that the government of Sali Berisha was at the brink to
collapse. The latter then decided to resort to the ultimate means in the attempt to save the
government (and life, for that matter). The government decided to have the army magazines open
and the crowd rushed in and took all the weaponry out. The regime was saved, and majority of the
weaponry found its way to Kosovo. (We shall come to this point again in some more detail later
on). 2
During these riots Albania was practically deprived of state as an institution for several days. After
the riots were over, the state was reinstituted formally, but practically it has never recovered again
Society with armed civilians can not have real state, for the government possesses no control over
her citizens, particularly juristic order. As for the revolt of the gamblers towards their authorities, it
was partly justified. For the latter not only knew what was going on with those “banks”, but in all
probability was directly involved in the “organized robbery” of her greedy subjects. This was
certainly the case with Miloshević's regime in Serbia, which played the role of the partner both to
“Dafinment bank” and Jezda’s bank. The gray eminence behind Mrs Dafina Milanović turned out
to be certain Clara Mandić, an obscure figure, 3 with close relation with Milošević family. She made
company to Marko Milošević, son of Slobodan Milošević, when he was visiting Israel. It was
surely a part of the whole scheme, for both Dafina and Jezda fled from Serbia to Israel, with the
money, of course. 4

Albanians and Illyrs

Ethnic Albanians did not emerge from the historical obscurity until 9th c. AD. Their ethnic origin
remains still very vague and no historical consensus has been reached on the subject until now. As
we mentioned before, Albanians became aware of “the importance of being nation” late, compared
with other Balkan ethnicities. This handicap, however, Albanian nationalist leaders tried to turn
into advantage. Since a number of European historians offered a variety of (hypo)theses on the
subject, they could adopt those which suited their purposes the best.
As we mentioned before regarding similar problems which Croat nationalists from19th century.
Faced with the acute lack of relevant ingredients for forging the nation, what they needed were
land, people and language. Let us consider each of the items separately.
Land. Proto-Albanian populations inhabited unknown land before 9th c. AD. The present day
Albanian land used to be part of many kingdoms during the previous historical periods, from
Roman and Byzantine empires, to Serb dukes, Venetian and Serb kingdoms, Ottoman Empire, until
the independent Albanian state was founded (practically) by Austro-Hungary in 1912, as a barrier
between Serbia and Adriatic coast. Albanian nationalists had thus to resort to acquiring some
historical state as their predecessor. Illyrians and their states seemed to be the best offer on the
market, 5 for good reasons. They vanished from the historical scene long time ago, and thus could
not complain. Second, their language was extinct and could be safely declared as proto-Albanian.
The principal archeological find which is supposed to corroborate the claims about Illyrian-
Albanian continuity is the so-called Koman Culture, which stretches from Skadar (Skoder) to Ohrid
Lake. In order to dismiss claims of Yugoslav archeologists that this culture from 7th-8th c. AD is of
Slavic or Roman-Byzantine character, Albanians wiped out all traces of Slavic presence in the

1
The last chapter of the poem, which concerns the broken gun of Vuk Mandušić, is a true apotheosis of weapons.
2
It has been estimated that about 700.000. weaponry was “taken over” by “revolting civilians”, with about a half of
them sold to Kosovo “civilians”.
3
She turned out to be nymphomaniac.
4
They both returned to Serbia, and were arrested. D. Milanović died of cancer in 2008.
5
For the alternative offers, like Dacian one, see, e.g. V. Sotirović, ibid.
 25

area, mainly by Albanizing Slavic populations and toponyms in the area, during the rule of Enver
Hozha (1945-1985). 1 (As we will argue later, this is what is actually going on in Kosmet, under the
“protection” of UNMIK and KFOR (Kosovo Force).

People: Ethnic Albanians used to present a tiny population, concentrated predominantly on the
northern (high) Albania. The present day number of this population should not deceive modern
historians and demographers, for the following reasons. First, there has been a demographic
explosion of ethnic Albanians, starting at the beginning of 20th century, 2 which has dramatically
changed the relative proportions of the existing ethnic communities in the area. Second, since the
Ottoman Empire rule on Balkan, noticeable Albanization of the Slavo-phonic people has been
carried out. This followed, in fact, extensive conversions of Albano-phonic population to Muslim
religion, partly by force, partly voluntarily. This made Albanians more loyal and trust-worthy
Turkish subjects, what provided the latter with a privileged position with regard to Christian
population, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic alike. Here we quote an instance in point.
At the beginning of 20th century a forced conversion of Kosmet Serbs was started. Serbs
complained to Russian consulate and asked for help from Russia. The latter intervened at Porta in
Istanbul, and the conversion was interrupted immediately. This resulted in situations that, for
instance, half of a village was Serb and half Albanian, though the entire village was Serb in fact.
Even after WWII there were families where grandfathers did not speak Albanian, but Serb only.
The remnants of this shift from Slavic to Albanian ethnicity sometimes show up in strange
phenomena. Many frescoes in Serb (Greek Orthodox) churches and monasteries at Kosmet have
been damaged in a strange way. Namely, the eyes of saints and Serb kings (donators) have been
dug out. The scholars have interpreted this as instances of wildness and vandalism of Shqiptars, but
the explanation is much more subtle. It is widely believed by common people that the plastic from
the saints’ eyes could help cure the blindness. But, at the same time, true believer would never
commit such and act of primitivism in the holy places. Only those who believe the magic power of
the fresco eyes, but are not committed to the relevant church, dare to commit such a superstition,
blasphemous misdeed. These are presumably recent Muslim proselytes, former Greek Orthodox
Serbs. 3
The situation just described resembles much similar one with Croats and their endeavor to form
respectable nation. During the so-called Independent state of Croatia, a puppet fascist construction
during WWII, Fascist nationalists Ustashas had plan as to how to strengthen the nation and state of
Croatia. The plan consisted, as Mile Budak put it, in converting one third of Serbs into Roman
Catholic faith (as the preliminary stage of Croatization), one third would be banished from Croatia
and one third exterminated. The plan has been carried out with considerable success. The politics of
Shqiptars at Kosmet followed closely this tactics, especially during WWII, when Kosmet was
mainly a part of Greater Albania, protected by fascist Italy. 4 The irony of this enterprise was that
majority of Serbs, victims of Ustashas slaughter and violence, were descendants of Serbs fled from
Kosovo and Metohija centuries ago and settled in the western Balkan in Austria. And when in 1995
Croat government banished Krajina Serbs, about 200.000. of them, from Croatia, they arrived again
to Serbia. Overwhelming majority settled in Vojvodina, a smaller number in Central Serbia and a
small part at Kosmet. Reaction of local Shqiptars was so violent , that all refugees were to be
withdrawn from the region and settled somewhere else. (We shall come to this point later, too).

1
This instance resembles much that one from the anecdote about the numerologist, caught “on the spot” while cutting
off the corner of the pyramid, which disturbed his numerical contrivance.
2
Since this point will be the principal subject in our further considerations, we will not dwell on it here.
3
However, the cases of Shiptar involvement can not be excluded. Ethnic Albanians, who were converted from
Christianity centuries ago, still retain the memory of their previous faith, as a sort of archetype.
4
We mention here the case of a political leader from KiM, Ali Shukria, whose mother tongue is Turkish and Turkish
language is spoken at his home, but who considers himself a Shiptar.
 26

Albanian language
Albanian language appears a distinct part of the Indo-European family, as one of the Eastern
branch, together with Indo-Iranian, Armenian and Balto-Slavonic (satem-group). 1 It has two
dialects, Gheg (spoken on the North) and Tosk (practiced in the central and south Albania). It is an
admixture of an authentic language and Italian and Slav (mainly Serb) ones. The claims of
Albanian nationalists that their language is derived directly from the ancient Illyric one has never
been supported by proper linguistic evidence. As the British linguist Potter put it: 1

“Some would associate it with extinct Illirian, but in so doing they proceed from little
known to the unknown. As Andre Martinet has sometimes shrewdly observed,
fashionable researchers into Proto-Indo-European favour either the Illirian or the
laryngeals, and we really know precious little about either. Albanian has two dialects :
Gheg in the north and Tosk in the south. As the result of successive domination by
Venetians and Turks, its vocabulary is mixed. Unfortunately we know little about its
history because, apart from legal documents, no literature survives that is older than the
seventeenth century.
In this respect Albanian presents a marked contrast to Greek or Hellenic which vies with
Hittite and Sanskrit for the place as the most antique of all Indo-European tongues.
Recent decipherment of Linear B Mycenaean script (page 93) has antedated the
beginnings of Greek by three centuries back to a time long before the sack of Troy (1183
B.C.) described by Homer in his Iliad.”

Since ancient Illyrs never left any trace of literacy, their language appears totally unknown. The
claim of modern Albanians to have inherited Illyric language can be neither proved nor disproved.
It can not have a scientific character therefore, for it does not satisfy the basic criterion of
falsificability, in the Popperian sense. We quote another author on the subject:2

The picture which Albanian science makes about the early history of their own
nation is simplified, uncritical and appears contrived. Linguistic proofs about
Illyrian-Albanian kinship are almost absent.

Potter’s comments were provoked by various hypotheses launched by some western authors. Thus,
late 19th century Austrian philologist Gustav Meyer argued that the contemporary Albanian
language was a dialect of Illyrian language, more precisely, its latest development. From a
hypothesis to theory there is but one step, which modern Albanian nationalists were ready to make,
linguists or non-linguists alike. If one may appreciate the motivation of the Albanian nationalists to
project their newly contrived awareness of national Albanian identity, similar claims by non-
Albanian authors can not be considered by intellectual extravagances. Thus, the zealous communist
leader, Montenegrin Milovan Djilas wrote: “The Albanians are the most ancient Balkan people –
older than the Slavs, and even the ancient Greeks”. If these words by one of Montenegrins, who
consider themselves (at least some of them) to be of Illyric origin, may be understood as claims for
their on antiquity, thesis due to Andre Marlaux, who wrote : “Athens was, alas no more than an
Albanian village”, 3 had surely different rationale. The author might have had intentions to chock
readers, as the every title of his book corroborates, but one might think of more serious

1
The western branch consists of Greek, Italic, Celtic and Germanic. (centum-group)
2
P. Bartl, Albanien, von Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg, 1995
3
A. Marlaux, Anti-Memoires, New York, 1968, p. 33.
 27

motivations, albeit subconscious ones. Athens meant something to European (and world) culture
and civilization, what was bothering some Christian intellectuals, especially religious ones. The
idea of an illiterate Balkan tribe to be progenitor of European culture could not be more cynical
(and extravagant for that matter), though one can not exclude the possibility of self-irony. 1
The problem is that in the hands of frustrated intellectuals those extravagances are taken serious. If
Albanians are descendants of Illyrians, why not of some even more ancient inhabitants of Balkan
Peninsular? Since it is generally believed that the most ancient Balkan people were Pelasgians,
some Albanian authors launched the thesis that both Illyrians and modern Albanians descend from
of them. This claim nicely matches the Marlaux’s conjecture (sic) about Athens, since some
scholars believe that Athenians were of the Pelasgian blood, as the latter were the indigenous
population of Attica. 2
The Albanian “retrospective optimism”, as outlined above, is not a unique Albanian phenomenon.
We saw above about the same Croat “project” of the Illyrian movement. In similar vain Serb
nationalistic authors argued for the Serb antiquity. Book entitled as ”Serbs - the most ancient
people” were abundant during Milošević’s era. One author from Chicago, Jovan Deretić, (not to be
confused with professor Jovan Deretić from the Belgrade University) claimed in his book on the
same subject,4 that it was Serbs who were the elite force in the army of Alexander and thus
responsible for his victorious conquering the world (DZIVO GUNDULIC). The rationale of all
those claims was the noticed similarity between modern Serb and ancient lexicons, like Greek,
Sanscrite etc. But all this appears modest compared with fancies of some Albanian authors.
According to them Alexander himself and his Macedonians were Illyrians, and thus Albanians.
Aphrodite was spared neither (her name appears symphonic with Albanian mirdita, Drita etc).
(Generally, the past appears very prosperous for some Albanians in that respect).
The thesis of Illyrian origin has been seriously chalenged by a number of modern authors, in
particular linguists. The most convincing of the alternative hypotheses was that of Dacian ethnical
origin of modern Albanians. According to this theory, ancestors of ethnic Albanians came to the
present day Albania from the Roman Province Moesia Superior (present-day Serbia), situated
around the river Morava, around 1000 BC. At ancient times this region was the zone of Dacian
ethnicity. Hence, modern Albanians can be of Dacian, but not of Illyrian origin. Linguistic support
for this thesis comes from the terminology of Albanian language referning to littoral terms, which
appears borrowed from the surrounding people, testifying that Albanians were not originally
coastal people. 3 The same rationale applies to South Slavs, who borowed more (for sea) from Latin
(mare), vino for wine as well, etc. As for the Greek language, it turns out that surprisingly few
ancient Greek loanwords exist in modern Albanian language. Hence, the original homeland of
Albanians should be searched in present day Romania or Serbia. According to these investigations,
modern Albanian language is a semi-Romanized Dacian-Moesian tangue, just as Romanian
language is Romanized Dacian-Moesian one.

To speak Illyrian and not to speak Illyrian

Why is so important to convince the world that present day Albanian tongue is Illyrian, or at least
derived from it? As we have seen before, the whole Dinaric region appears of Illyrian origin, at
least in part. Since ancient Illyrs were spread over a vast area of the present West Balkan, it is not
only ethnic Albanians who may claim the status of «indigeneous population». There is a
difference, however, between Slavo-phonic and Albano-phonic Diaroids in this respect. In the

1
We note here, in the same context, a statement of a Byzantine author, who claimed “Serbs are the most ancient
people, I am quite certain about that”. Needless to say this statement has been very popular among some Serb scholars
(sic).
2
See, e.g. Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966.
3
As mentioned elsewhere, Dacian term hot designates highwayman.
 28

former the Slavic element prevailed, wereas in the latter Albanian language remains distinct from
the surrounding people. The situation appears similar to the case of Basques, whose language is
unique in Europe (and otherwise), as Gorgian turns out a unique tongue on the Euro-Asiatic
continent. 1
Regarding the very term Illyrian one should note that during the time of Diocletian (284-305) the
whole western Balkanwas organized as Praefectura Illyricum. It is mainly due to this administrtive
name that the term Illyrians was preserved and given to people living tere, including South Slavs
and Albanians. This name disappeared in the 7th century, in the time of Slavic migration to Balkan.
As for the term Albanian it was derived from the name of one of Illyrian tribes Albanoi, which was
subsequently ascribed to all Illyrian tribes. Albanian language, as spoken tangue, was, accordingly
mentioned for the first time in a manuscript from Dubrovnik, as lingua albanesesca, in 1285. Some
Bizantine sources from 13th century called the region between Drim River and Skadar Lake
Arbanon (Arber). Both Turks and Serbs called people settled in Albania Arbanasi, or Arnauti. As
for Albanians they called themselves, before subjugated to Ottoman Empire, Arbërësh/Arbënesh.
Whether Albanian language is linked with IIlyrian or not, the fact that it is completely
noninteligent to other neighbouring (and otherwise) people has resulted in further isolation of this
mountainous community. This isolation has further accentuated the conservation of the traditional
society character of Albano-phonic highlanders. It is worth mentioning here that their dialect,
Gheg, is inteligible to the rest of Albanians, who speak Tosk, but with difficulties.
The uniquness of Albanian language has promoted a number of features of this population which
will prove of great importance to our issue. First, since very few of people outside Albanian
community were ready to learn Albanian language, communication with the external world had to
be made through those Albanians who spoke other languages, like Serb, Greek, Italian, etc. This
gave Albanians an advantage of possesing «a secret code», which in some affairs, like smuggling,
mafia-like activities, political movement etc, proved of crucial importance. It is partly for this effect
that Albanian mafia appears so efficase and almost impossible to break. It compets succesfuly with
Italian mafia, Chanise and other organised crime societies. The other important feature requiried
from mafia to be unbrokable is the blood linkage of the members of a mafia unit. This prerequisit
has been amptly provided by the fis orgnisation of the Albanian community, discussed before. One
fis may comprise a hundered mambers, who can suply tens of guns and drug and weaponry
smugglers, drug dealers etc. They may communicate among themselves freely, without fear that
the business is broken. It is true that similar situation appears among Sicilians of the same trade,
but Italians have been fully incorporated into American society and many FBI members are of the
Italian origin. If we notice that this crimial business is almost inevitably associated with the
political aims, and thus has a fasade of patriotism, then the inwardnes of the mafia organisation of
Albanian diaspora appears quite natural and understandable.

Greater Albania
When at the Berlin Congress in 1878 Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as sovereign states,
Albanian representatives tried to initiate the same for their own state. They founded League of
Albanians at Prizren (Metohija), so-called Prizren League, mentioned earlier. This initiative failed,
with Bismarck’s explicit rejection to speak about Albanian nationality as nonexistent. At the same
time the national movement Rilindja was initiated, as an ideological support for the national
striving. It was not insignificant that Rilindja meant Renaissance (Revival), suggesting that it was
concerned not with forging new nationality, but just reviving an old one. At this instance the
Albanian race for forging their own nation and consequently own state was trigged. With this
justifiable aim came along, however, unjustifiable means, as consequence of insatiable thirst for
acquiring the necessary prerequisites for a sovereign state: land, people and language (as the

1
Japanese language is likewise unique, though it has some resemblance to Korean one.
 29

landmark of an authentic history). Their leaders considered that this legitimate end justified any
available means, as Machiavelli put it. 1 We saw this point when mentioning the case of Greater
Croatia and shall return to it again in the case of Greater Serbia.
As mentioned before, Albania was founded in 1912 after the First Balkan war, fought between
Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire. Majority of Turks in those three
countries left them for Asia Minor, some of them voluntarily, some expelled. A small minority of
those Turks is still extant at Kosmet. Albania was founded on the insistence of Austro-Hungary, as
a barrier between growing Serbia and the Adriatic Sea. As expected, the state borders could not
delimit exactly the ethnical distribution, so that some Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins remained in
Albania and some ethnic Albanians were left in these countries too. When looking at the present
day ethnic distribution one may have impression that these ”ethnic remnants” were unequally
distributed and that too many Albanians were left outside the homeland. But this impression is not
only deceiving, but points into the opposite direction, as we shall see later.
Two decisive phenomena have contributed to this situation. We consider them now.

Migrations. These can be split into two categories: anthropological and political. The first refers to
the common tendency highlanders to move to lowlands, as mentioned in the general case of
Dinaroids. North Albanian mountaineers used to migrate to the Albanian plane (Central Albania),
but equally to Metohija and then Kosovo (proper), during the Turkish rule. Apart form the slow
individual migrations, ever present in such situations, there is what Serb ethnologist and
ethnographer Jovan Cvijić dubbed metanastatic migration. 2 Namely, ever after an abortive uprising
or rebellion within Ottoman Empire (or elsewhere) people from the region used to find their escape
from the certain retaliation by moving to more secure areas.
It happened many time with Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who used to move to Serbia
(independent or occupied alike), with Serbs and Albanians from Kosmet moving to north Serbia or
Austria from Turkey, Serbs from the so-called independent State of Croatia (during the WWII),
Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina during the civil wars in Yugoslavia in 1990-thies,
Albanians and non-Albanians from Kosmet during the NATO raids on Yugoslavia in 1999. In the
case of rebellions on the smaller scale the very government moves forcibly some population, as
many villages in the present-day Turkey, populated by Bosnians, testify.
Political migrations are motivated by governments’ desires to expand its population into
neighbouring areas so as to broaden its control and subsequently its state. Some of these controlled
migrations appear counter-measures against the first ones, in order to balance the demographic
disequilibrium. We shall come to this point when talking about Kosovo and Metohija.
Demographic expansion. This time it concerns the misbalance in the birthrate of two populations in
close contact, sharing the same territory. Ethnic Albanians have by far the biggest birthrate in
Europe, matching those of Central Africa. This phenomenon has resulted in the demographic
explosion, in particular in the non-Albanian regions, where a considerable number of ethnic
Albanians live. It concerns Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece.
(We shall consider the question as to whether this demographic explosion is a natural process only,
or if it is dictated and supported by political means and aims, later on).
Both effects mentioned above have resulted in the misbalance in the demographic content within
the areas bordering Albania, mentioned above. When the borders in 1913 were drawn, ethnic
Albanians were but small part of the contemporary populations in western Macedonia, Kosovo and
Metohija in Serbia, eastern Montenegro and north-west Greece (Epir, which Albanian Albanians
call Cameria, with clear message to Greece).

1
We note here that the meaning of his famous slogan “The aim determines the means” has often been distorted. Into
“The aim justifies the means”.
2
From Greek μέτα (after) and ανάστασις (uprising).
 30

In view of all this claims of Albanian leaders on the territories where ethnic Albanians are majority
now, reminds one of that appeal of a lawyer, who defends man accused of killing his parents,
addressing the jury with “Gentlemen jury, will you really have hart to sentence this orphan?”
To these two points one should add another, important for understanding the Albanian question. It
is tightly linked with the issue of ethnic Albanians outside Albania and the project of Greater
Albania. One of arguments for interpreting the present demographic distribution has always been
the ethnical purity of the proper Albania. Namely it has been always claimed, and supported by
statistical data, that this “purity” testifies the unjust drawing of borders between Albania and the
neighbouring countries. The argument goes like this. Albania is founded on the ground where only
ethnic Albanians live, whereas the bordering areas with mixed populations were delivered to the
adjacent states. The statistic which should corroborate these claims is the following: In the present-
day Albania live 95% ethnic Albanians, 3% Greeks and the rest go to Slavs and other minorities. 1
These data, however, are false. 2 According to Greek records, there are about 400.000. Greeks in
Albania, what constitutes 12% of the overall population. As for the other minorities, situation is
similar – their number is officially suppressed. We know that Slavo-phonic Albanians are not
allowed to speak Slavic language (Serb or Macedonian), as Yugoslav journalist found many times
while visiting Albania. The above estimate is further corroborated by the statistic of confessional
distribution in Albania: 70% Muslim, 20% Greek-Orthodox and 10% Roman Catholics. Those 20%
of orthodox confession are not allowed to declare themselves as non-Albanians, but nevertheless
belong to Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Roman Catholics are ethnic Albanians
from Northern Albania.
But this is not the end of the story. Practically all traces of the presence of non-Albanian elements
have been wiped out in Albania, like toponyms, ethnological staff etc. This instance will be of
utmost importance when considering the state of art at Kosmet and the foreseeable future of the
province.
Hence, we may summarize the stratagem for forming Greater Albania by the following:
(a) The thesis of ancient Illyrian (Pelasgian) origin should provide ethnic Albanians with the right
on any land they are occupying presently (or even in the near future), endowing them with the
unique status as indigenous people on Balkan..
(b) The majorization of the mixed populated areas by migration and fast breeding should provide
the young state with its Lebensraum
(c) All non-Albanians within the projected state must be eliminated, either by expelling or by
assimilation.
These are, of course, harsh statements. We shall argue in the following they are realistic. Our
testing ground is KiM, exactly.

Kosovo and Metohija

We shall not dwell neither on the prehistory nor early history of this region. It used to pass from
one state to the other, until Stephan Nemanja, a nobleman from Zeta (present-day Montenegro),
founded the state of Serbia, whose center was exactly in today’s Kosmet. First a Byzantine vassal
dukedom, Serbia became soon an independent state, to become an empire under the rule of
Stephan Dushan, the first and only tsar of Serbs. 3 Nemanjić dynasty ended with Dushan’s son,
Urosh, disintegrating into a number of kingdoms and fiefdoms. In the epic battle at Kosovo Polje,
just west from the present-day Priština, Serb grand duke (knez) Lazar Hrebeljanović, who led the
joined Christian forces, lost the battle (and life) to Turkish sultan Murad I. Murad I lost his life
himself, killed by Serb nobleman Milosh Kobilić (later Obilić) and his son Bajazid I, who played
1
Data are from 1989.
2
The latest statistics provides: Greeks 1%. We shall comment on the reliability of statistics when Albanians are
concerned later on.
3
Apart from his son Uroš, whose reign was both short and insignificant.
 31

decisive role in the Turkish victory, took over the Ottoman throne at Istanbul. The center of gravity
of Serbian state moved gradually towards north, away from the Turkish controlled lands, and when
the last Serbian despot, Turkish vassal, Djuradj Branković succumbed to Turkish Porta his capital
was Smederevo, at the confluence of river Morava and Danube. The long period of Serbian life in
”Turkish slavery” from 1459 to 1804 ensued. The importance of Kosovo Battle both for Serbs and
Europe will be discussed later on. It could be compared with Battle of Hasting, or better at Poitie.
The wheel of history stopped practically for Serbs in 1459, to be moved up in 19th century again. It
was this subjugation to the Ottoman Empire which resulted in the retardation? of the whole area of
Balkan for a few centuries compared with the Western Europe.
There has been much controversy as to the real importance of Kosovo battle for the subsequent
history of Balkan and Central Europe generally. Its importance is less of factual political history
and more regarding the cultural and spiritual consequences for the Serbian population in the region.
When the “Kosovo crisis” became acute, the myth of Kosovo myth was launched by some circles
in the West, implying that Serbs have become obsessed by this alleged myth and therefore behave
irrationally. We shall come to this point later on. Here we note that to the contemporary Serbia the
lost battle was at the same time the loss of the social elite, Serb aristocracy. In fact, any immediate
final outcome of the Kosovo battle had to be devastating to Serbia. The point is that by entering
into the battle Serbia stretched her power beyond her manpower capacities. In a clash of a small
country, as Serbia was at the time, and a large Empire like the Ottoman one, the larger adversary
can not lose. Even if his army is annihilated in a single battle, with such enormous manpower
resources, the larger partner easily recovers, while the smaller suffers of an irreparable loss.
Kosovo battle annihilated the upper part of Serbian social pyramid, never to be recovered again.
For four centuries Serbia will be a country of peasants and surfs, deprived even of the
autochthonous bourgeoisie. 1
According to the popular opinion among Serbs, Serbia under the rule of Nemanjjic dynasty reached
her apogee. This romantic feeling does not match the historical evidence. Coming from
Montenegro these despotic rulers turned out rather narrow-minded. They relied heavily on the
church, whom they supported lavishly. Their concept of ruling the country was predominantly
theocratic, albeit indirectly. Their principal concern was building monasteries and churches and
keeping strong army. In revenge, the church used to proclaim the kings saints and the principal
duty of clergy was praying for their kings and their place on Heaven. 2 Similar situation was with
duke Lazar, who came from Montenegro too, but his son despot Stephan Lazarević was much more
enlightened. 3
Kosovo Field appears ideal ground for large-scale battles, just as gorges are convenient for
stopping invading armies. The most celebrated case of the latter was the famous Spartan barrier to
Xerxes’ army at Thermopiles, under the legendary leadership of Leonidas. Less known is a similar
episode at the same place, when this time Athenians tried to stop a large Celtic army. 4 The history
repeated and Celtics found the way to circumvent the Athenians via the path revealed to Persians
by Ephialtes. But this time the Greek failure did not turn out as disastrous as with Persians, for
Celts were interested in Delphic treasures, rather than in occupying Greece. There are some
interesting parallels between Thermopile and Kosovo Battles, with moral of duty, sacrifice and
treachery involved.

1
The later will consist mainly of Greeks, Cincars (Vlachs) and Jews in Serbian towns.
2
In that matter Serbian rulers were following the tradition practiced by Byzantine emperors, see e.g. Guglielmo
Cavallo, L'Uomo Bizantino, Gius Laterza & Figli S.P.a., Roma-Bari, 1992.
3
We note in passing that being from Montenegro, both dynasties turned out Dinaroids, and thus “Illyric”. Despotic
tradition was retained in Montenegro until 20th century and was for many generations of rulers theocratic.
4
Pausanias Guide To Greece, Penguin Books, 1979, England
 32

As with Thermopiles, Kosovo Battle 1 was not the only fought at Kosovo Polje. In 1448 Hungarian
duke Janosh (John) Hunyadi was badly defeated by Turks on the same field, which thus turned out
fatal for the Christian world. 2 After this battle many ethnic Albanians moved from Albania to
South Italy and Sicily, where they live still. 3 Another important date for Kosovo and Metohija was
the war between Austria and Ottoman Empire in 1683-99, under the leadership of Austrian
commander Margrave of Baden. He sent a force of 5.000 to KiM, under the command of count
Eneo Piccolomini. Both Serbs and Albanians took part in this war, which turned out disastrous for
the Kosovo inhabitants. 4 The turmoil raised by the Austrian invasion of KiM engaged all
population, Serbs, Arnauts, Turks, Christian and Muslim alike. Piccolomini was initially
successful, taking Novo Brdo and Kachanik. He soon died, from bubonic plague, and was
succeeded by Duke Christian of Holstein. The latter sent a rather small force under the command of
colonel Strasser, to release Katchanik from the Turkish-Tatar siege, despite the advice of the local
Arnaut leaders. His campaign ended in the total disaster and the entire KiM affair came soon to
end.
Both Serb and Arnaut leadership was confused with the complicated situation, which involved not
only Austrians, but Venetians, Crimerian Tatars, Russian court, Orthodox and Catholic churches,
Muslims of all ethnical origin etc.
Expecting a certain Turkish retaliation people from Kosmet (and Serbia generally), fled from the
area, mainly across Sava river, for Austria. Led by the Serb patriarch from the Peć Patriarchia (the
seat of the Serb Orthodox Church), Arsenije Čarnojević, a large part of the Kosmet population left
thier homeland. 5 Much controvesy has arisen concerning the postwar events on kiM. While 19th
century Serb historians tended to exagerate the case of Serb refugees, claiming that it was this
abortive military campain that has depolulated KiM from Serbs, the Albanian modern historian are
trying to minimize the demographc consequences in the region. The rationale behind the claims is
the same: to prove that before the so-called Great Migration KiM was predominantly Serb, or that
the migration did not afect the ethnic distibution noticeably, respectively. According to Serb
sources, it was estimated that about 37.000 Serb families and 5.000. Albanians moved from the
area towards north. Both figures appear overestimated and in all probability reffer to heads instead
to families. Contrary to the popular opinion, this migration did not take place at once and was not
so spectacular as the romantic paintings tend to show. Another wave of migration occured under
the leadership of patriarch Šakabenda, 6 in 1737. The Albanian tribe which moved in part together
with Serbs was Catholic Keljmendi (Klimenti). Some of these Albanians remained in nothern
Central Serbia and there are extant Albanian graveyards in Shumadija, 7 called Arnautska groblja by
the local population. Kelmendis were settledd down by Austrian authorities in two villages in
Srem, Hrtkovci and Nikinci. 8 They gradually were associated into local Croat population and
became indistinguishable by the middle of 20th c. Never-the-less an Albanian researcher from
Kosovo heard an old woman in Hrtkovci reciting lullaby in Albanian.
1
We shall denote the battle in 1389 as Battle, while the other, fought at the same spot, will be designated by lower
case. (We note that Englishmen tend to call Hastings battle simply as Battle and even the very place where William the
Conqueror defeated Anglo-Saxons is designated Battle).
2
We note here that some Albanian authors claim that Skenderbeg was engaged in some way in this battle, contrary to
the historical evidence.
3
These Albanians in Calabria and on Sicily are called Arbanesi, as mentioned above. Their contribution to Albanian
Rilindja movement was instrumental in forging the Albanian ethnicity and national awareness. We note, in passing,
that both areas are strongholds of Mafia.
4
For a detailed account of the events see
5
Jovan Tomić, Srbi u velikoj seobi, Prosveta, Bastina, 1990., Beograd (in Serb)
6
We note that both Arsenije Čarnojević and Šakabenda were Montenegrins, hence of “Illyrian origin”.
7
The core of the Central Serbia, between rivers Danube and Sava on the north, river Big Morava on the East and river
Western Morava on the South.
8
N. Malcolm, ibid.
 33

Both migration waves depopulated Kosovo and Metohija and Turkish authorities settled there
ethnic Albanians from Northern Albania. It was from this period that Albanian ethnicity started to
prevail the Slavic one in the region, to become dominant in 20th century. Some Serbian historians
blame both patriarchs for those migrations, which turned out fatal for the Serb presence at Kosovo
and Metohija.
The rationale for ascribing a particular imortance to Great Migration appears both understandable
and false. Serb historians simply could not explain how from practically purely Serb region in 15th
c. KiM became Shqiptar dominated by the end of 17th c. They simply did not dwelve into the
anthropological and biological layers. It is this neglect, intentional or not, which turned out fatal for
the present-day KiM issue, as we shall see later on. We emphesize here another point concerning
the ethnical content of KiM. Though it was not Serbs only who migrated to the North (Southern
Hungary), the population which replaced those various groups was almost entirelly Muslim, what
could be taken as a first step toward «Albanization» of the region. This pattern of ethnical mixing
and moves will show up many times again in Balkan history, in particlular in the »wars» in
Yugoslavia (1991-5), as we shall see later on. Another miscoception should be rectified here. It has
been alleged that Austrian emperor invited Serbs to come to Austria (Vojvodina) and settle there.In
fact, Austria urged Serbs to stay in Turkey and form the barrier between two empires on the
Ottoman soil, as could be expected. Serbs in Vojvoina were refugees, not imigrants.
It has been frequently argued that migrations into KiM were frequent and involved many different
ethnicities, including Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, etc, as well as it was not just
Serbs who migrated from KiM. But this fact can not be taken as a proof that KiM was always with
the same ethnical content. The argument, though correct in principle, involves, in fatc two different
phenomena. One is qualitative, the other quantitative. The latter has ben operative for centuries and
has turned decisively in favour of ethnical Albanians, as the present-day situation testifies. (As we
have already noted, another factor, operative on large time scale, too, was the birth rate on the local
population, in particular for the last century).
An indicative testimony of the state of afairs from 18th c. came from Roman-Catholic Archibishop
Mazarek, who himself was of ethnic-Albanian origin, from the well-known family Mazrrekus,
imigrants to Kosovo also. In his report from 1760 he writes:

All the time, many Catholic families come from the mountains of Albania; being hot-
natured, arascible and proud, and ver ymuch given to murdering people, they refuse to
be trampled underfoot by the Turks, as the holy Gospel teaches. Not submitting to the
Ottoman taxes, they go around armed all the time, day and night, and indeed killl one
another for the slightest affront in word and deed ...»

These intruders usually convert into Islam, for utilitaristic reasons. As the same Mazarek testifies
thirty years later, they had «filled and taken over» the whole of Serbia, commiting numerous
outrages against Christians, Orthodox and Cathoic alike. Mazarek complained that they were «the
race which breeds fastest», one family procreating «a hundred households» in a few years.
Though this should be taken with a grain of salt, there is a general concensus that there was a
steady flow of Albanians into Kosovo during these years. In his report from 1791 Mazarek ended
that he would like to include into the liturgy an extra prayer: «Ab albanensibus libera nos
Domine».
What was the situation on KiM in the following centuries? We quote here some hisorical instances,
as illustration of the general case. In the early 20th c., Serb historian D. Batakovic emphasized, the
worst situation was at Metohija, at Pec and Djakovica. While Serbs around Priština, Skopje and
Prizen could expect a support from the Serb and Russian consulates, people living in Metohija were
left to the mercy of the local «Arbanas fisses».
 34

The law at Metohija was designed by heads of the local Arbabas fisses, whose will
would determine the fate of the local Turkish officials. With the support of the local
tribal «chetas», 1 they created a sort of the local parallel law, a mixture of the rules of
Sheriat, 2 Arbanas common law and tradition of the highwaymen from the highland
tribes. Such a parallel system of the local order , which in some cases, with «giving
bessa», comprised the protection of life and goods of individuals and even entire
fisses, did not hold for raya. 3 Therefore the Serb emigration was especially the most
pronounced in Metohija. Before the choice to convert into Islam, 4 or to be victimized,
they used to run away, individually or with families, to Serbia. In an application to
Serb representative at Porta, Serb from Peg begged for protection from «the evil,
enraged and lawless Arnauts, to whom we have been left at mercy, without anybody
to take care of us, so that they have started to exterminate us and we have been their
victims since». 5

It has been estimated that betwen 1876 and 1912 some 200.000 to 400.000. Serbs were subjected
to ethnical cleansing (100.000?). When Serbian army liberated Kosmet from the Turkish
occupation in 1912, they found there 40% Serbs and 50% ethnic Albanians. The latter never
accepted the new state as their own and a strong tension between Serbian state and Kosmet
Albanians has never seased since. Kosmet Albanians experienced the liberation from the Ottoman
Empire as a mere change of foreign occupation and never practically recognized the state of Serbia.
In order to remedy this situation Serbian prime minister Nikola Pašić decided to settle a number of
Montenegrins from Montenegro on the deserted lands, left from the migrated Turks, mainly
landlords begs. 6 The offician rationale for choosing Montenegrins was, as Pašić put it «They are
much like Albanians». Whether he had in mind the presumed common (Illyrian) origin of all
Dinaroids and thus counter-attacked anticipated Albanian claims for the unique indigenous status in
the area, is difficult to judge now.
These newcomers were regarded by the local Albanians as undesirable intruders. When in 1941
Kosmet became the part of Great Albania, a puppet fascist state controlled by Italians and Germans
from September 1943, the first thing to do was to expel those Montenegrins from Kosmet. They
mainly moved to the Central Serbia and Belgrade.
During WWII non-Albanian population was subjected to persecutions, aimed at banishing all non-
Albanian elements from the area. Italian occupation forces tried to protect non-Albanians, 7 but
never-the-less many of them fled the region. It has been estimated that in the period 1941-1944
some 70.000. Serbs left Kosmet (100.000-200.000?), with thousands other killed. On the other
hand state border between Yugoslavia and Albania was wiped out and a regime of free crossing
was established. Albanian population, mainly from the North, fully took advantage of this new
opportunity and a massive migration from Albania to Kosmet was going on during the war time.
Situation was not much changed after the war, as we shall see immediately.
Ethnic Albanians at Kosmet readily accepted their new (national) state under the Italian patronage.
They did not border much this kind of “presented independence”. After all, their first, original
mother homeland, Albania, was a present from Austria. While the guerrilla war was going on in

1
Military unit, particularly used in guerilla warfare, comprising 50-100 armed fighters.
2
Muslim juridical order.
3
A pejorative term in the Ottoman Empire, denoting a non-Muslim subject.
4
The actual term was ”to become Turk”, poturčiti se in Serb, what was considered the most shameful act for a
Christian at the time.
5
Dušan Bataković, “Politika”, 29.04.2007., p. 31.
6
This land was distributed among local Shiptars who had been working on the land held by Turkish begs, and
newcomers.
7
As they used to protect Serbs in Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH) from the Nazi Ustashas regime persecutions and
pogroms.
 35

Yugoslavia, especially in NDH, ethnic Albanians fully cooperated with the occupation forces.
True, there were a few of partisan units (odreds), organized by the Albanian communists, under the
Yugoslav communist party supervision, which were the principal target of the ethnic-Albanians
(in)famous division “Skenderbeg”, the striking feast of the occupation forces. Generally, before the
capitulation of fascist Italy in September 1943 the only ethnicity engaged in Yugoslavia in fighting
occupation forces was, practically, Serbs, partisans and chetniks alike. The first were lead by
communists, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The other was organized and lead by colonel
(later general) Dragoljub Mihailovic, who rejected the capitulation of Yugoslav army to German
Wehrmacht and organized guerrilla in Serbia, NDH and Slovenia. When after Mussolini’s Italy
capitulated became clear who was going to win the war, Croats and ethnic Albanians started to join
the existing guerilla forces.
According to a former partisan testimony, Shqiptars in Priština greeted enthusiastically Italians in
1941, with Viva Mussolini, then Germans in 1943, after Italian capitulation, by “Viva Hitler!”, and
finally in 1944 partisans by “Viva Tito!”. 1
There has been a controversy as to the real motivation of ethnic Albanians in Kosmet for changing
side and joining Yugoslav forces. According to some authors Tito promised to Albanians that after
the war Kosmet would be allowed to join Albania. According to some other historians what Tito
had in mind was a kind of Balkan (con)federation, which would consist of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria
and Albania. 2 Most probably both options were on the market. What is of importance to us here
was that until 1948 there was still no border between Yugoslavia and Albania and the free traffic
between two states continued, as it was the case during the war. Yugoslav newspapers were full of
photos showing Albanian peasants, with cattle and oxen-drawn vehicles, crossing the border,
heading towards the “promised land”, Kosovo and Metohija. According to Serbian estimates, some
300.000. Albanian Albanians moved from 1941 to 1948 to Serbia. On the other hand Kosmet
Albanians offer the figure of 326 immigrants. While the first figure appears probably exaggerated,
the latter is surely ridiculously underrated.
Altogether, immigrant waves from 1690-1737 and 1941-1948 radically changed demographic
picture of Kosmet in favour of Albanians.

Kosmet after the WWII

Kosmet Albanian nationalists were disappointed with the final outcome of the war on Kosmet.
They felt deceived by the Yugoslav authorities and adopted the same attitude towards the new
Yugoslavia, as Tito designed it. Even before the war was over, in 1944 fierce fighting in Vojvodina
were still going on (so-called Sremski front), a rebellion at the district of Drenica (which was
notorious for the Albanian nationalism, if not chauvinism) took place. Tito engaged a large force,
some 30.000 soldiers. A fierce fighting ensued and it was only in 1945 that the rebellion was
crashed. The striking core of Drenica rebellion were so-called balists, nationalistic guerilla
movement during the war, who in its turn was a continuation of kachacks, highwaymen mentioned
earlier.
After the war Albanian leaders Enver Hoxha and Koche Dodze came to Belgrade and offer Albania
to join Yugoslavia, as the seventh republic. Yugoslavs turned them down and offer economic help
instead. They dismantled a railway and a sugar plant and presented them to Albania. Moreover,
Tito on his own waived the Albanian debt of $9 million.
When a network of secessionist organization was discovered on KiM in 1956, Serb writer and
politician Dobrica Ćosić suggested requisition of illegal arms in the provinced. He consulted Tito,
who agreed, and the plan was aproved in the Politbirau and the Federal government. Shqiptar

1
We witness similar behaviour in Albania, regarding their commitments, first to Yugoslavia, then to Russia, then to
China and finally (?) to Americans.
2
This plan was shattered by Stalin, who did not like Tito to become so influential and prominent figure within his
empire.
 36

leaders Fadil Hoxha, Dzavid Nimani and others agrreed as well. In the action some 26.000 rifles,
hundreds of machine guns, bazookas, two artillery guns, thousands of pistols and a lot of amunition
were collected from civilians. Of course, Shqiptar leaders did not like it, but they had no choice.
When at the famous Brioni plenum in 1966 Tito decided to get rid of Aleksander Ranković, the
most prominent Serbian political leader and until then the most loyal and devoted Tito's aide and
the chief of the State Security Service, this arms collecting was taken as the crown proof that Serbs
were ferocious with KiM Shqiptars. Arms collecting is, of course, a ferocious business, in paricular
when the population considers weapons as personal property, like pocket watch or pipe.
Situation was somehow settled down, at least temporarily. Serbia was partitioned into two
autonomous provinces, Autonomous Province Vojvodina and autonomous Region Kosovo and
Metohija (Kosmet) and the rest, so-called Central Serbia. In 1963 Kosmet became also
Autonomous Province, to be further promoted in 1974 to a semi-independent entity, with its own
Parliament, police, educational system etc. Formally it became republic, except for the right to
secede. But before we consider further development in Yugoslavia, a brief overview of the
situation in Albania is in order.

Post-war Albania
As in Yugoslavia communist forces, formed by the aid of Yugoslav communists and led by Enver
Hoxha, took over the power in Albania. From 1945 to 1948 Albania was under the strong influence
of Yugoslavia, both counties being under the aegis of Stalin. Yugoslavia lavishly supplied Albania
with deficient material, mainly nutritious one, like whit. As testified by Milovan Djilas, one of the
leading Yugoslav politicians at the time, and a member of Yugoslav delegation to Moscow, both
Stalin and Molotov declared they would approve eventual swallowing up of Albania by
Yugoslavia, at the utmost astonishment by Yugoslavs. 1 But when Stalin decided to get rid of Tito
and strengthen his control over Yugoslavia, he initiated the so-called Informbureau Resolution, 2 by
which Yugoslavia was excommunicated from the ”socialist community” and expose to the strong
pressure. Albania quickly joined USSR block and demonstrated explicit hostility towards
“treacherous Yugoslavia”. Being discarded from the Western Allies as the communist, totalitarian
regime, Yugoslavia found itself a very bad, even disastrous situation. Enver Hoxha’s Albania
turned out the most totalitarian and repressive state within the Soviet block, what could have been
expected, knowing the general backwardness of the “Land of eagles”. In 1976 Hoxha banish
religion and church altogether, Albania becoming thus the only officially atheistic country in the
whole world. (In a sense, Hoxha’s Albania was a precursor of Pol Pot regime). After the split with
Yugoslavia, finding that it was profitable to have a strong patron indeed, the land of proud
montagnards sought the other “Big Brother partners”. After her idyll with USSR terminated in
1961, Albania entered an “asymmetric partnership” with China. Finally, Albania found strong
patronage of USA, which is still extant and prosperous. In the Kosmet affair this patronage turned
out more than paying-off, as we shall see immediately.
In the communist era Albania isolated herself to an extreme degree, displaying xenophobia
unknown in Europe. The whole country was covered with small, personal bunkers, hundreds
thousand of them, called ironically Enver-Hodxa’s mushrooms, forming “everywhere dense set”, as
mathematicians would dub it. A massive invasion on the proud “Land of eagles” was expected at
any moment, and people had to be prepared for it. Today visitors can watch these remnants of the
collective paranoia, abandoned and ruined, starring towards hostile distant horizon, just alike those
mysterious Easter Islands figures are starring at the expected (beneficial) gods, whose arrival was
imminent.

1
In the retrospect of the following Soviet Balkan politics, those unprovoked declarations may have well been
provocations from the Stalin side. (“Politika”, 31 December, 2008, p. 41)
2
The shorthand for Bureau of Information, actually a political organ for transmitting Stalin’s orders.
 37

This paranoid fear from the outlanders was certainly corroborated by the political aims, since it was
the common feature of the communist countries to feel threatened by the external “dark forces”,
what was found very beneficial to the ruling regimes. However, with Albanians we have another
effect, that of the strong montagnard mentality. As we noticed before, the central unit of highlander
society was the extended family, fis with Albanians, zadruga with Herzegovians. In fact, one may
hardly speak of society, since that would imply a system. Highlanders’ society is more a collection
of semi-isolated fisses, mutually weakly interacting, except in case of disputes, like the blood
feuds. Perhaps the best representation of such a “society” would be by African lions, which live in
small herds, with a dominant male (pater familias), young males (well subordinated), females and
cubs. They have their own territory, which they protect by all means from the other herds and
eventual single intruders. Albanian fis dwellings resemble small fortresses rather than resident
houses. They are protected by high walls, with narrow windows adapted for firing. Every such a
house can resist an assault of a brigade or so. It was for this reason that Turks did not border to
control Albanian mountains. 1 In a sense, Hoxha’s Albania was a fis surrounded with hostile fisses,
and the bunkers mentioned above served as loopholes of this gigantic fis-house. 2 This habit of
building fortress-houses has been retained even after moving to lowlands, as we shall see later on,
when considering demographic situation at KiM. It would be fair to note, however, that this
“agoraphobia” phenomenon appears common for Muslim society, which is a paradigm of the
“closed society”. The high-wall fancies are there to “protect” women from the undesirable “male
watching”, even in the urban environments.
But who was supposed to attack Albania? It was Yugoslavia, the same country which provided
economic help after the war, not to mention the “ideological contributions”. Of course, you can not
convince your subjects of somebody’s hostility, unless you convince them they are “bad guys’,
who hate you. It was this infernal rationale which strengthens and cemented the hatred of
Albanians towards Slavs, in particular towards Serbs. It is usually argued that an isolation “from
inside” is dictated by tyrant’s desire to conceal the poverty of his country. The logic appears rather
opposite – isolation comes first and poverty turns out the inevitable outcome. This logic will show
up in an extreme form with Kosmet and its “eternal struggle” with external dark forces. This
applies equally to the humiliating position of Muslim women, especially rural-Albanian ones. They
are not hidden because they are uneducated, non-attractive etc. On the contrary, because they are
kept isolated, they have attained such a state
In 1991 the communist regime was finally overthrown, at least formally (as the case with Serbia
and Montenegro was) and multy-party political system was implemented. The first “democratic”
prime minister was Sali Berisha, from the Northern Albania, that is as healthy Dinaroid, just as
Serbia got Slobodan Milošević, another healthy Dinaric (Montenegrin) element. Ties with Kosmet
were strengthened even before the rise of “democracy” in Albania, but with Berisha’s and other
subsequent governments these ties became particularly strong. The project of Great Albania, which,
in fact, has never been abandoned, became acute and passed from the idealistic to realistic, political
stage. We shall come to this point later on.
New political “democratic regime” had to face even more pronounced “difficulties of transition”
than the surrounding, less retarded societies. The episode of “pyramid system” appears very
revealing fort hat matter.
When the infamous “iron curtain” was finally (hopefully) lifted, East-European population was
eager to benefit from the newly discovered “Western democracy”. Unfortunately, they soon
discovered that along with economical prosperity and political freedom go some other, much less
desirable things. One of them was the dirty capitalist trick of how to exploit the natural greediness

1
Similar situation was with the entire Dinaric region, in particular Montenegro, whose inhabitants never miss the
opportunity to boast with their “eternal freedom and independence”.
2
The shape and colour (white) of these bunkers resemble closely that of the traditional Albanian caps, ketche, what
makes the whole affair even more a sign of the national autism, than a political need.
 38

of human beings. One of the most famous and effective schemes was the so-called pyramid
scheme. It is based on the simple trick, which can be summed as the proposition: “How about
robbing your neighbour?”. No honest human being can resist such a proposition and Serbians are
surely among the most prominent among them.
The scheme appears as simple as ingenious one. You found a “bank”, which keeps deposits of your
fellow citizens, with the enormous interest, say 10% per month, what is for two orders of
magnitudes larger that paid by “ordinary banks” You commitments might doubt about the “purity”
of the business, but as the old saying says “You don’t check the teeth of a gift”. 1 The crucial period
is, of course, the very beginning, say the first month. When the suspicious customers come to
collect their “monthly earning”, they do get the interest they are eligible to. Some of customers are
even so cautious that they take out all their deposits together with the interest. (After few months,
having experienced no collapse of the “bank”, they usually redeposit their money). Then the next
generation enters the business, taking out regularly their monthly gain and the game goes on
indefinitely. Well, not for so long.
The money does not go out of this circulus viciosus, it does not serve as a capital for doing real
business. It is the closed system, which enlarges both the principal of the deposited money and the
amount of money redistributed to the customers. The point is that the latter is part of their own
deposit, not a surplus of the self-breeding capital, as in real banks. When the “mutual
understanding” breaks, and the commitments try to draw their savings, the pyramid collapses and
the fraud is revealed.
Serbia witnessed two pyramid banks, “Dafinment bank” owned by Mrs Dafina Milanović, who
used to call herself Serb mother and Mr Jezdimir Vasiljević (popular gazda-Jezda). 2 (As an
illustration of the intellectual level of the customers engaged in this affair is the explanation of the
“banks” as to the mechanism which provides such a fantastic gain. They are said that their money
is used for drug smuggling and weaponry trade and it is known to be very profitable “business”,
indeed).
When the fraud was detected, they fled the country (with money, of course) for Israel. The good
commitments were very disappointed, but took no action by themselves, expecting the authorities
to take care of their lost money. 3 Their expectations came true and the government decided in
2005 to pay back the money “customers” lost in gambling. 4 The case of Mr Željko Ražnatović
deserves, however, special attention. The «greatest» gangster in Europe in his time, who led his
own paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in KiM, the principal figure of
Serbian organized crime, broke «Dafiment bank» immidiately after Mrs Milanović left Serbia and
took an amount of money he allegidly deposited there. 5
The readers may be suspicious about my dwelling on this issue, but if so then they do not get the
point of pyramide system. We now pass to Albanian counterpart of this business and shall see
that my blaiming Serbia is but an interest as compared with the principal in Albania. Namely the
same pyramidal system was set up in Albania and after sufficiently long time (and sufficiently large
ammount of money robed), the fraud was discovered. Of course, the swindlers fled the country and
the deceived gumblers left alone. At least it was so interpreted by the authorities of Mr Sali
Berisha's government. Up to this point it went the same as in Serbia, but here the parallel stops.
Deceived gumblers took the whole game seriously and got angry indeed. The riots started in Tirana
and other larger towns. We recall that Albania has no proper state, since her citizens are almost all
armed. Hence, these riots were not inocent street demonstrations, but threat to the authorities,

1
It refers to the old habit of testing the age of a horse, by checking how much its teeth are worn out.
2
Gazda – an old term for boss.
3
Both swindlers returned to Serbia after a number of years (and a number of millions presumably spent for bribery)
and are free now.
4
The late prime minister Zoran Djindjić refused to meet their demands, but he was a statesman, not politician.
5
You can be sure, of course, he did not take a penny more than he had invested.
 39

which was not to be ignored. The government was about to collapse and resorted to the ultimate
measure – it opened the army weaponry warhouses and magazines and the furious loosers grabed
everything they reached. As mentioned before, it has been estimated that approximately 700.000
rifles, shortguns etc were taken away. In Albania arms are precious tools and also money. Since at
the time KiM was aleady in turmoil, majority of these weaponry found their way to Serbia. The
principal market for these arms was at Tropoja, in North Albania and near the Yugoslav border,
which happened to be birthplace of Sali Berisha himself. (In fact it was a well organized
requisition of weapponry from Albanian state, dedicated to arming the newly established guerilla
UCK forces). When the unrest started Western journalists flooded the country. One of them, from
Le Mond interviewed citizens of Skoder. One of the latter uttered angrily these remarkable words:
«Nous ne voulons plus de montagnards ignores a la tete du pays», aluding to Sali Berisha and his
(highlanders) government. Le Mond editors estimated this declaration signifficant enough to put
this as tilte of the report. 1 The signifficance of this response of urban environment to the
«Dinarization» of contemporary Albania can not be overestimated. As we shall see later on, it is
exactly this «Dinarization» of Serbocroat-phonic part of Yugoslavia which turned fatal for her
existance.
Another important conclusion may be drawn from those riots in Albania. We mentioned above the
concept of pyramidal system as a sort of gambling game. A bit of explanation seems in order here.
Who are the partners in the game? Comitents are well aware that the system will inevitably
collapse and they are going to be loosers. But what keeps them in the game is the hope (if not
expectation) that they will be able to forsee the moment and thus withdraw their «savings» in time.
Of course, they are equally well aware that those who will not do it in time will loose all their
money. Loose to hom? To those who happen to take out their deposits in time and to the very
owners of the «banks». And it was exactly like that that happened in Serbia and Albania. We saw
what happened in Serbia, when the «banks» collapsed and te swindlers fled the country. In contrast,
Albanians went to streets (and to army magazins) and threatened to devastate the country. The
point is that they were sincerely angry, though they realized they simply lost the gambling game.
This kind of rection speaks tellingly about their behaviour in the neighbouring countries, where the
ethnic Albanians are fighting for their «political rights». The crux of matter has been captured by a
Macedoniian journlist, commenting the ethnic Albanian riots in Western Macedonia, stressing the
rationale for the Albanian demands: «They have taken their political aims for their poitical rights».
That the emotional energy can be converted in political programme and become thus the decisive
factor on a political scene has been masterly demonstrated by Adolf Hitler, indeed. What made him
convincing, at lest for the »ordinary people», was not the content of his speaches, apart from its
demagogy, but the shouting which they took for the proof he was sincere. And right, for that
matter. He might well have argued that Jews were «Chosen people» and were entitled to rule
Germany, with equal success. As a joke about jokes says, it is the way you tell the joke that matter,
not its content,

Autism as the political driving force

Kosmet ethnic Albanians never accepted Yugoslavia as their own state, nor did they ever recognize
Serbia as their homeland. Two points must be emphasized here, however. As we argued before, it
is the common feature of highlander generally. Dinaroids never accepted fully any state as their
own, for which they would feel any responsibility. It concerns Montenegrins and Ottoman Empire
and Yugoslavia, then Herzegovians and Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary and Yugoslavia. Those
nations who have been living in well organized states can not appreciate this facet of montagnards,
but it is the natural consequence of their secular, even millennia long quasi-isolation and
relationship bird of pray – pray, when the lowlands are concerned. It is this misunderstanding

1
«We want no longer ignorant montagnards at the head of country! », L'Mond, xx.
 40

which proved fatal for the Balkan and its disputes for last centuries. One may understand the
inability of Western politicians and sociologists to realize that Albanian question is not a matter of
standard politics, but is more submerged into the anthropology, if not biology. They can not force
themselves to believe they have to deal with traditional society in very Europe.
In his enlightening book an Italian author, journalist Paolo Rumiz, described the stunning feeling
while visiting Dalmatian coast and Herzegovina, in 1990-ies. 1 Dalmatian place he visited turned
out an almost replica of a typical Italian town across Adriatic Sea, in many relevant respects.
Dalmatia is generally an integral part of Mediterranean region and its civilization and culture. Only
dozen of kilometers far away, across the mountainous ridge of Dinaric chain, lies Dalmatinska
Zagora, a typical Dinaric area in the Western Herzegovina. Few kilometers separate these regions
in space, but hundreds years in time, as the journalist from Trieste, an expert of the Western
Balkan, found. Though Dalmatians are of mixed ethnical origin (Roman, Illyric, Slavic, Italian etc),
they belong essentially to the Romanic cultural milieu, whereas Herzegovians have retained much
of the ancient Illyric inheritance, including their belligerent mental structure. It was them who
started those bloody wars in Yugoslavia in 1991-1995, as it has been well described by the same
author, Paolo Rumiz, in his revealing book Mascere per un Massacro. 2 Equally, it was North-
Albania montagnards who settled the Central Albania, Kosmet and West Macedonia, who became
the troublemakers in these regions and made Western Balkan the hot spot on the modern political
global scene.
As mentioned above, Dinaroids have never mixed with the lowlanders easily, but the case of
Shqiptars and non-Albanians at Kosmet appears even more disturbing, in particular concerning
relationship Serbs-ethnic Albanians. The difference between mentality of Slavo-phonic Dinaroids
and Slav population in Yugoslavia has always been well hidden by the common language, but this
façade is absent when considering ethnic Albanians and non-Albanians in the region. Hence, on
the layer of historical memories one has to add another barrier, linguistic one. The latter has always
made the indigenous population to experience ethnic Albanians as alien people, what made the
latter even more reluctant to accept the relevant states as their own. This “conflict of interests’ has
resulted in the rising animosities between Albanian and non-Albanian populations in the
surrounding countries. The latter ended in armed rebellion in Serbia and Macedonia.

Kosmet affairs
As we saw above, the first serious challenge to new Yugoslavia was the rebellion of Shqiptars in
Kosmet in 1944/5, started at Drenica. Next came the famous 1968, marked with students’ unrests
all over Europe. These unrests started in West Europe, in particular France and Germany, and
spread to Eastern Europe, but more as reverberations of the West-European students’ revolts. At
the time I was in London, as the British Council scholar, and could read reportage of a Guardian
journalist, who visited major Yugoslav university centers, including Priština. He was prepared to
see students demanding more liberal way of life and study, liberal society etc, as it was the case in
Europe at the time. Instead he found enormous crowd of young people, rushing through the streets
and shouting for “liberation of Kosovo”, against the Serbian government, etc. He was astonished to
see the (ethnic-Albanian) dean of the University whose appearance differed, as he put it,
completely from faces he met in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. What he witnessed was the
attempt of Shqiptars politician to take advantage of the students’ mood in Europe to advance their
political aims at Kosmet.
The next major rioting took place in1981. The situation on Kosmet was unstable already during
Tito’s authoritative rule, but when he died in1980, Shqiptars felt no further obligations towards

1
P. Rumiz, La Linea dei Mirtilli, Il Piccolo, Trieste, 1993.
2
P. Rumiz, Maschere per un Massacro, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996.
 41

their county. The riots engaged hundreds thousand of Shqiptars, mainly young, students, teenagers,
led by skillful political activists. How that started?
Before we consider the motivations, some elaboration of the demographic situation on Kosmet
must be made. Kosmet populations, consisting predominately of Shqiptars, was undergoing a real
demographic explosion, with the fertility rate about six time bigger than in the rest of Serbia (and
Yugoslavia, for that matter). Incidentally, since the Kosmet population shared 1/6 of the total
Serbian one, it meant that on every non-Albanian newly born child came one Albanian (Shqiptar).
This fast-breeding effect resulted in Kosmet population

Table 1. Demographic picture of Kosmet, from Ref. 1.

_______________________________________________________

Kosmet Rest of Serbia

_______________________________________________________

Age distribution (0-19) 48% 26%

Average age (1991) 25 37
Population density (1991) 180/km2 104/km2
__________________________________________________________________________________

Kosmet Serbia

Illiteracy (1981) 27% (women), 9% (men) 17%(women),5%(men),

_______________________________________________________

becoming ever younger. We present a table from S. Djurić, 1 which illustrates the demographic
situation in Serbia. It is obvious that no state, however rich it may, is able to
absorb such an influx of young people and provide them with jobs, among other things. What
Kosmet politicians did was to let almost all kids who finished the secondary schools to enroll the
university. Thus they created an enormous number of false students and consequently enormous
mass of jobless young bachelors. The nominally poorest region in Europe had by far the largest
percentage of students out of the overall population in Europe
We shall come back to the role of overpopulation at Kosmet later on, but here we just consider
direct causes of the riots in 1981. Those economically passive young people had to be materially
supported, of course. This burden fell formally on Yugoslav federation, but practically on Serbia.
Namely, Yugoslav government established a federal fund for supporting under-developed republics
and Kosmet. Every republic had to contribute to the fund according to her economical strength and
the overall sum is then distributed to the consumers. It happened that the amount allotted to Kosmet
matched exactly the sum Serbia was depositing in the fund. Thus, it was Serbia who provided
economical help to Kosmet alone. This contribution was use for building infrastructure, health
service, educational system and the principal public needs in general. It included the material
support for Kosmet students too.
Well, one day in 1981 a Shqiptar student threw away in a student refractory his tray, shouting that
he was no longer to stand such bad nourishing. Whether it was a spontaneous gesture or well
prepared incident is still unknown, but is of minor importance here. What was important was that
the rest of students accepted the challenge, went out to streets, shouting against the Belgrade
authorities and their exploitation of Kosmet etc, etc. Slogans like “Kosovo republic” expressed the
principal demands by the crowds, which poured into Priština streets as well as in other towns in
1
Sladjana Djurić, Osveta i kazna, Prosveta, Niš, 1998. (in Serbian)
 42

Kosmet. Thus the social frustration of the overpopulated youth has been cunningly channelled into
political demands.
But before we go on, a question as to why 1981 must be addressed. First, it was almost
immediately after Tito’s death and the authority he possessed was no longer present. But one more
acute reason prompted the rebellion, the planned census in Yugoslavia. It used to be carried out
every ten years, first year in decade (1961, 1971). Why Shqiptars were afraid of the census in
Kosmet? As mentioned earlier, the previous ones were practically improvised there and very
unreliable, indeed. It left much room to playing with numbers, which used to be manipulated by
local politicians. Their aim was to prove that Shqiptars constituted the overwhelming majority at
Kosmet, what should provide them with right to rule and ultimately secede. Since the last official
census in 1971 all statistical figures about Kosmet are but rough estimates, and should be taken
with grain of salt.
We must stress here that it concerns not Kosmet only and not ethnic Albanians exclusively. The
same situation appears in Macedonia, where the official figure of ethnic Albanians percentage
(1996) was 23%, whereas the latter claim 40%. Since the Macedonian Roma are estimated by 17%,
if the ethnic-Albanian figure is taken serious, it turns out that Macedonia is populated by any
nationality except ethnic (Slavo-phonic) Macedonians. Similar situation is with Roma in Serbia,
who claim to be as numerous as 800.000, whereas the official figure provides half of that number.
Of course, this “war by numbers” is not innocent as it might seem at the first sight, for behind the
numbers march political demands.
Why “Kosovo republic?” At the time Kosovo had already the status of republic, except for the right
to secede. Hence this demand was interpreted as pushing towards independence via the formal rout.
But there was another, perhaps even stronger motive for demanding republic status. As mentioned
above, the federal fund was dedicated to “under-developed republics and Kosmet”, as it used to be
repeatedly stated by the officials. Which republics it referred to? Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia was, accidentally, within the average, neither developed nor
under-developed, as a whole. It was the case with Central Serbia as well, with rich Vojvodina
making balance for under-developed KiM. Neither of those republics was mentioned explicitly
when referring to the federal fund, but Kosmet was. Kosmet Shqiptars, as all Dinaroids, are
extremely sensitive and proud people (there are other terms, of course, from the sphere of
psychology) and were much offended by being reminded that they depended on the rest of
Yugoslavia. In particular those who were aware that the financial help was provided practically by
Serbia alone, as we explained above. By acquiring the status republic, they would cease to be
singled out explicitly, by name.
Here it is the instance to ask why these riots appear so violent and what are real motivations, or
causes, for being so frequent and insistent? After all Shqiptars are not the only “national minority”
in Serbia. 1 In Vojvodina ethnic Hungarians were almost as numerous as ethnic Albanians at
Kosmet in 1945. Two instances must be addressed here if one wont to make parallel between these
two populations and there behaviour within the state they live. First, while Hungarians in Serbia
diminished their number from about 500.000. in 1945, to around 400.000. at present, Shqiptars
increased at the same period their population up to 1.700.000. (These are just estimates, used by
officials, both Yugoslav and external. As for the reliability of these figures, when dealing with
Shqiptars, we shall address this issue later on). Second, Hungarians appear typical central European
population, civilized and loyal citizens. They are not, of course, quite satisfied by their position
within Serbia and use every occasion to complain, but do it in a civilized, non-violent manner.
Anyway they participate fully in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

1
We note here that even the very term “minority” appears pejorative and humiliating to the sensible Shiptars ears.
Even without referring to the political aims, the fast-breeding politics has the aim to eliminate this feeling, as a
particular instance of inferiority complex.
 43

How did Yugoslav authorities, first of all Serbian ones, cope with this threat to the very state? They
sent federal police forces to calm down the enraged Shqiptar demonstrators. The task turned out
very difficult, indeed. Young people, frustrated and poisoned with terrifying hatred horrified even
the skillful police forces. From central Serbia reserve police forces used to be sent to Kosmet, but
they were able to endure a short time there and were regularly withdrawn to recover, to be sent
back again. It was like sending troops to Eastern front in WWII. Young reservists were traumatized
by the horrifying violence and hatred they witnessed. Long after the riots were surprised they kept
the habit to take a seat in pubs or coffees at the wall, with their backs turned to the wall.
Demonstrators beat everybody they met, journalists (domestic and foreign alike), photo-reporters
etc It was more the expression of xenophobia than political demands. After some time the federal
forces retreated and the battle ground was left to Serbians. 1
Demonstrations were finally brought to rest, but the riots reached their goal. Now, when looking
back in retrospect, riots in 1981 marked the beginning of the end of Tito’s Yugoslavia. For good
reason. Nobody felt comfortable in a state which contains regions like Kosmet. After those riots
many non-Albanians left Kosmet and all republics apart from Serbia and Montenegro started to
meditate of leaving the common state.
If those bloody demonstrations delivered the serious blow to the federal state and Serbia in
particular, coup de grace was carried out a few years later. It was in the army casern at Paraćin, a
town in the middle Serbia, close to the highway E75 (from Belgrade towards Skopje and Athens).
The garrison consisted of conscripts from all over Yugoslavia, as the general practice of Yugoslav
army was. The rationale for this was, first, the intention to move conscripts far away from their
homes, second to mix various nationalities as much s possible and third to enable young people to
get acquainted with remote parts of their country. The second point was the most important, of
course, and it worked well with all ethnicities in the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. All except ethnic-
Albanians. 2
Though Shqiptars shared about 7% of Yugoslav population, their share in Yugoslav army (JNA)
was considerably bigger, probably about 20% (see Table 1), due to the demographic explosion we
discussed above. And while all other conscripts were making company, Shqiptars always kept
apart, mixing only among themselves. They communicated with others only exceptionally and with
great reluctance. In the courtyard of Paraćin garrison, at free time, they used to gather in a corner
and did not mix with the rest of garrison. One night in 1987, while all soldiers were sleeping one
conscript Shqiptar on the corridor night-guard duty, Aziz Kelmendi, broke the weaponry room,
took the machine rifle, rushed into a bedroom at 3 am and started shooting indiscriminately into the
sleeping comrades (sic). He killed four conscripts, wounded very badly 6 other. Then he escaped
from the garrison, running towards the highway, where his farther, a gastarbeiter in Germany, was
supposed to await on him in a car. But the military police was faster and killed him before he
reached the highway. 3
Paraćin massacre sealed the fate of Yugoslavia. In view of the general hostile attitude of Shqiptars
towards Yu2, as illustrated by the fact that, according to the official record, between 1981 and
1988, some 241 illegal cells of Albanian separatists were discovered within the JNA, with some
1.600 members among the enlisted men and officers (Private Aziz Kelmendi was one of them),
Yugoslav army was to be radically changed.
The first step Yugoslav authorities took was to exempt ethnic Albanians from serving Yugoslav
army. Not only for fear that the incident might be repeated, but it was definitely clear to the
authorities that Shqiptars did not feel themselves Yugoslav citizens and moreover were hostile to

1
Slovenians demanded to be paid additionally for taking part in dealing with demonstrations.
2
We note here that the official language in Yugoslavia and the Army was Serbo-Croat, which was mother tongue for
over 70% of the population. To Serbo-phonic population Slovenian and Macedonian languages were practically
uninteligible.
3
According some officials he committed suicide.
 44

the rest of population. 1 Hence, to teach ethnic Albanians how to use weapons would mean the
right-way suicide. But it was the psychological effect which was the most devastating. No
Yugoslav mother would be willing any longer to send her son to serve in Yugoslav army (JNA).
The road to disintegration was widely open, and when the joker in the shape of Slobodan Milošević
appeared, he was readily put to use by other republics. They did not find it enjoyable to live in the
state with the time-bomb ready to blast any minute.
(Aziz Kelmendi was buried in his village with all dignitaries of the national hero. The whole
incident was presented to the Kosmet public as another contrivance of Serbian authorities. The
incident was not exploited in the Yugoslav public media posterior to its occurrence and it is still
unclear to which extent the Serbian authorities were aware of its importance).

The autonomous province Kosovo and Metohija

Unrests which started in 1981 marked the way for secession of Kosmet, but it was clear even
before what was the ultimate goal of Shqiptars’ politicians. When Kosmet became a federal unit,
albeit within the formal status of Serbian province, by the constitution in 1974,
Shqiptars’ concealed no longer their intentions. But the strategy for achieving secession from
Yugoslavia was conceived long time ago. We shall sketch some principal means dedicated to this
final end.
The status of the autonomous province, allotted to KiM was meant to be the ultimate concession
Serbia made to satisfy Shqiptars demands. But it turned out that for the latter it was but another
step towards secession, which was conditio sine qua non for Shqiptar politicians. Europe
experienced this syndrome with Adolph Hitler and his demands for “rectifying the history”. While
West-European politicians, making concessions, expected (or at least hoped) that Hitler will be
satisfied with the latest one, Adolph took every new concession as a sign of European weakness
and encouragement for further pressing for new territories. When Chamberlain realized he was
dealing with an insane person, it was too late and Europe was pushed into another bloody war.
What made Hitler superior to his adversaries was his irrational obsession with his political goals,
which he presented to the world (both in and outside Germany) as political and historical right of
German people. (Whether he was sincere in this respect or not we may never know). But one lesson
Europeans learned from Hitler affair – the driving force for his insane behaviour was his personal
humiliation, which he skillfully projected onto the whole German nation. The Allies eventually
won the war, but the final outcome, with tens million victims and devastated continent, proves that
irrational may win in real terms.

Land, guns and children

Territory, people and army are the inevitable prerequisites for creating a state. Ethnic Albanians
were at the beginning intruders into Kosovo and Metohija, who constituted a small minority there.
How it happened they became the overwhelming majority at KiM?

The promised land

Whose sheep, his [is] meadow.

Folk proverb

As elaborated earlier migration of highlanders to lowlands appears a constant feature from

prehistory to the present day. If both sides belong to the same ethnicity this phenomenon remains
within the socio-anthropological sphere. But if highlanders are of different ethnicity, this otherwise

1
According to the Yugoslav authorities between 1981 and 1988 some 241 illegal Shiptar cells were detected in
Yugoslav Army.
 45

natural phenomenon acquires features of clash between nations. This clash may end in bloody
fighting and state of war.
Albanian presence at KiM during the Middle-age Serbian state, under Nemanjić dynasty, was
virtually zero. In the famous Dushan Stephan juristic code from 14th century, they are not
mentioned at all. A number of paragraphs are dedicated to the right of nomadic herdsmen, who are
allowed to stay in a village for two days at most. These montagnards herdsmen were called Vlachs
(svi stocari su “Vlasi”), who were supposed to be of Dacian (present-day Rumania) origin. Some of
them might be ethnic Albanians, who moved their herds from highlands to lowlands and vice versa,
according to the season. The first recorded presence of Albanians at KiM appeared in 1455, in
Turkish cadastre, which gives the figure of 2% ethnic Albanians in the region . But afterwards
numerous organized migration from the territory of the present-day High-Albania have been
recorded, both towards inner Albania and KiM apart from the Turkish settling Albanians on KiM
after the 1683 uprising, mentioned before, we note the record due to Roman-Catholic Bishop from
Skopje Matija Masarek, who reported in 1764 to Vatican that brand-new colonies of Albanians
from high-Albania were founded around Djakovica in Metohija. Serbian historian Jevrem
Damnjanović finds that during Ottoman Empire members of the following tribes or fisses settled on
KiM: Dukagjini, Bitiqi, Kriezi, Shop, Berisha, Krasniqi, Gashi, Tsaci, Shkrele, Kastrati, Shala,
Hoti and Kelmendi. 1 We noted before the migrations during the WWII, when KiM were the part of
“Greater Albania”, under fascist Italy and nazi Germany. Here is what P. Bartl writes on the
subject: 2

Turkish conquests influenced spreading out Albanian settlements. In Turkish time an

increase of the number of Albanian population was especially considerable at
Kosovo and Metohia.
Already by the end of 13th century begins immigration of Albanians from the
surrounding mountainous regions to Kosovo. Among miners mentioned digging
silver in the rich mines in Kosovo were also Albanians. During Turkish conquest
(1455) Albanians comprised already 4-5 % of the overall population…

This increase of the ethnic Albanian share of the overall population in KiM was followed from the
beginning of 20-th century of the demographic explosion. In Figure 4 we show the birth rates of
Albanian Albanians, KiM Albanians (Shqiptars) and KiM Serbs (including Montenegrins) as
function of (historic) time. Data are taken from the book Serbs and Albanians through centuries, by
Petrit Imami, a Shqiptar author, published in 1998 and transmitted in Belgrade liberal daily
“Danas”, The Figure 4 deserves our close examination.
We first notice that Albanian Albanians and KiM Serbs curves follow the same trend of decreasing,
though they differ in absolute values. 3 The curve for Shqiptars behaves radically differently from
both, however. It reaches maximum around 1960 (dip around 1955 appears probably due to
inaccurate statistics), retains this maximum up to 1980 and starts falling down. Why 1980 was the
“turning point”? Before attempting to answer this puzzle, a few preliminary words are in order.

1
We note that in Albanian “l” is pronounced as “ly”, as in William. Albanian language has no phoneme for “l”. Letter
“q’ is pronounced as “ty”, as in Italian ciao.
2
3
We note that the KiM Serb birth rate is considerably higher than in Central Serbia.
 46

Figure 4. Birth rates at KiM and Albania

Josip Broz Tito was seventh of 13 siblings, in a poor peasant family in Hrvatsko Zagorje, a rich
Pannonic region in North-west Croatia. His youth was marked by poverty and he will suffer from a
number of complexes in his later life. One of them was the lack of good suits. When he was a
metal worker in Zagreb, he saved some money and managed to buy a new suit, he intended to wear
while visiting his birthplace Kumrovec. Unfortunately, just before leaving for his village, he found
his brand new suit stolen and gave up his visit. Upon seizing power after WWII he used to have his
new suits made once a week or so, just to compensate traumatic experience from his youth.
Equally, he was somehow ashamed of his numerous siblings, as a sign of poverty. Therefore he
established the institution of awarding numerous families, by appointing himself godfather to every
tenth and following child in his Yugoslavia. Of course, he delivered the award via his
representatives, usually high rank officers and many families were proud of having Marshal Tito
their godfather.
Who were beneficiaries of this gratitude? By far the most frequent recipients were ethnic Albanians
and Roma. There was some difference between these two groups, however. Roma children suffered
from high mortality, for reasons we do not have to elaborate here. Thus, the enormous birth rate of
Shqiptars not only was not put to a reasonable control, but was encouraged by the very state
authorities. The result can be seen in Figure 4. This figure begs for further explanations too. One
notices that Serbs had higher birth rates than Shqiptars before KiM were recovered by their
motherland, Serbia. With joining Serbia came better medical care and the high mortality rate,
present among all Dinaric highlanders, as we mentioned before, was drastically reduced. The
response of Serb population to these better conditions and to rising level of civilization generally,
was introduction of family planning. With Shqiptars it was the opposite case. They took advantage
of better medical facilities to promote further the breeding rate. Another point to be made concerns
the correlation between the economic conditions and fertility. Generally, high fertility signalizes
 47

the low economic status of a family. 1 Albanian Albanians were definitely below Shqiptars in this
respect, but had lower birth rate than the latter. Obviously, other factors were in game, as we shall
see soon. The same holds for Serbs, too.

Figure 5. Ethnic-Albanian and Serb populations on KiM during last century.

We now turn to the crucial point of the entire “Kosovo issue”, to the ethnicity share on KiM from
the early Serb state, through the Ottoman occupation to the present day. We note here that first
record on the subject stems from 14th century, from the so-called Dechani hrisovulja (1330), 2
which contains a detailed list of houses in Metohia and north-west Albania. Out of 89 vilages 3
were Albanian. There were 2.166 agricultural households and 2.666 hauses in the cattle cultivating
area. Out of this number 44 were Albanian (1.8%). The rest was recorded as Slavonic, that is Serb. 3
In Figure 5 we show the percentage of Shqiptar population in the region. Before discussing the
data, a few words on their reliability are in order. The first point from 1455 was taken from the
Turkish cadastral for tax-census (defter) (Original in Turkish is in an archive in Istambul). 4 The
latter kind of record is notorious for its accuracy and scrupulousness, as Al Capone found to his
misfortune. As for the 20th century data, oddly enough they turn out rather unreliable, for various
reasons. First, when the KiM became “disputed land”, the sides involved started war by numbers”,
producing them as they found convenient to their “just cause”. Second, since this region was

1
We are referring here to the self-supporting families, in the bourgeois society. Cases as Maria Teresia, who had 13
children, who were taken care of by nurses and a host of other relevant servants, are out of scope of this analysis.
2
An official document with golden seal. Here it refers to estates given by kings to monasteries.
3
We owe these data to V. Sotirovic.
4
This is an estimate. According to the record for the Drenica region, where there were 1873 Serb and 10 Albanian
households.
 48

outside civilized state for centuries, administrative control was very weak, if even not absent. As
we mentioned before, Dinaric highlanders had never feeling for the state as an institution, nor felt
they much responsibility towards the state and her authorities. In particular during census many
numerous families, expecting to get help from the state, or at least to get some tax reduction, used
to quote an excessive number of children. It is the notorious fact that Shqiptar population was
greatly overestimated in these censuses. As mentioned above, when the Serbian state undertook the
census in 1981, it was prevented on KiM by the local riots. Hence, every figure offered for the KM
must be taken with grain of salt, indeed.
Bearing the latter in mind, we comment the curve in Figure 5. What was the cause of this steady
rise of the Shqiptar share on KiM? We already mentioned two principal effects; migration from
Albania and the high birthrate, which passed into a demographic explosion in 20th century. This
caused a “demographic pressure” onto the non-Albanian population, practically Serbs (including
Montenegrins), who were forced in one way or other to move from the region, mainly to central
Serbia. All effects combined gave rise to empting KM from non-Albanian populations and a steady
increase of Shqiptar share, as the graph in Figure 5 shows. We devote now more attention to the
demographic explosion on KiM.

Gjep and land

Chauvinist is a person you are having an argument with,

and bloody racist is someone you are losing an argument with.
An Afro-American activist

Before we enter this delicate issue, a preliminary consideration, concerning the rationale of the
whole point, seems in order. Are those phenomena described above from the standard
anthropological lore, or we are dealing with deliberately controlled and channeled processes, with
aims outside socio-historical realm? This is the most important question we must answer. If it turns
out to be the common anthropological issue, we are faced with accusation of being chauvinist, even
racist.
In order to analyze the situation concerning the natality issue on KiM, we have to account for two
parallel processes:
(i) The spontaneous breeding in the population still tied by the traditional way of life.
(ii) The attitude of the political leaders in view of their political aims.

The first phenomenon can not be, in fact, separated from the later, but the link is not direct one.
Albanians found themselves, at the time of their national revival, surrounded by more numerous
nations, like Greeks and Serbs. They felt that a more balanced equilibrium will ensure the existence
and grow of the Albanian state. This can be achieved by two processes: rapid increase of the
ethnic-Albanian population and by collecting all Albanian-populated regions into a single state,
Greater Albania. While these aims were more conceptual long-term project in Albania proper,
ethnic Albanians outside homeland experienced this goal as an acute affair, to be achieved as soon
as possible.
The feeling of ethnic endangering may provoke two opposite responses of the population.
pessimistic outlook – natality drops and the population diminishes in number. This case we have
witnessed with North-American Indians, confined in reservations. 1
Optimistic attitude – natality rises so as to compensate the feeling of national minority, Note that to
Dinaric ear “minority” sounds humiliating indeed.

1
To a much lesser extent we have similar effect with Vojvodina Hungarians.
 49

Albanians, both in Albania and surrounding countries opted for the second alternative. Giving birth
to children has become an obsession. But this choice bears much risk, considering the non-
Albanian environment. It has to ensure an expansion space, both physical and political.
Two stratagems have been adopted to this end: Never talk about natality
Those non-Albanian who raise the issue are proclaimed chauvinists, obsessed by Albanian
birthrate.

The principal targets of the latter point are Serbs and Macedonians, whose populations in their
countries are “losing ground” before the “biological tsunami” of the fast-breeding ethnic Albanians.
Both above points have made the demographic explosion taboo. Anybody who wants to check
what it means does it at his own risk. One should be aware, however, that there is essential
difference between urban and rural areas in this context. Those living in towns are much better
educated and practice family planning, whereas the peasants appear immune to any medical
education. Since the urban population shares approximately 20% of the overall population at KiM
and considering that an outsider is very improbable to meet a peasant (and if she does meet him to
be able to talk to him), the natality syndrome appears well concealed for the “outside world”.
Now we turn to non-Albanians “obsessed with Albanian natality”. Better to say, to those accusing
them of this obsession. Instead of diving into statistics and sociological elaborations, we choose to
quote a number of illustrative examples, aware that the latter are not proofs, of course. Here we
quote testimonies of two Shqiptar families, which moved from KiM to Northern Albania, during
the NATO assaults on KiM in 1999.
First the excerpt from a comprehensive account by Antony DePalma, “From ‘Paradise’ to Horror:
A Family’s Exodus”. 1

Knowing they would eventually arrive, he had loaded his wagon weeks before.
Forced to decide what cherished parts of his life in Kosovo to take with him, and
what to leave behind, Behrami had chosen carefully.
He took what he thought would be useful things, like an axe, a
small stove and a sack of flour to make bread. He took blankets and
cushions for the 21 people in his extended family who would ride on
the rattling wooden wagon.
And Behrami brought along a small wooden cradle, called a
“djep” (pronounced dyep). Not because he expected to need it -
the youngest of his 10 children is 9 years old. But because for
him, as for many Kosovo families, the djep is a symbol of the
future, wherever one might be.
“If we left the djep, the Serbians would end up burning it,
just like they have destroyed everything else,” he said. “Now
they can’t.”
21.04.1999.
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/042199kosovo-family.html

The one-before-the-last paragraph deserves our attention, but the last one even more. Not only it
reveals that Shqiptars experience their rebellion as a clash between two ethnicities (Serb and
Albanian), but see Serbs as preventing their fast-breeding. They consider the whole affair as a
biological warfare, conflict where those who outnumber the others will be victor.
Here is another account, from the same period: 2

1
The full text is given in Appendix 2.
2
Note that the village name Damjan is purely Serb.
 50

And so in Damjan, and the other villages, ethnic Albanians

packed what they could -- wooden baby cradles elaborately painted in
folk patterns were common -- and climbed into carts pulled by farm
tractors.

But can one build the thesis on a few examples? What we need is a public announcement of a
particular political aim, what make distinction between selected cases and massive plans. The
distinction between pogroms and Holocaust, between terror and genocide.
After the abortive rebellion in 1981, majority of Shqiptars, in particular young ones, were very
disappointed. They have realized they have no chance against the organized state. It was then that
they launched the two-line strophe-slogan: 1

What we failed to accomplish by revolution,

we shall achieve by penis!

To someone it might sound as an act of consolation, but it was a political tool for appropriating the
land they have found themselves to live on. That this is not a unique instance of using biological
means for achieving political ends is perhaps the best illustrated by the famous sentence by Yasser
Arafat: 2

“Our atomic bomb is the womb of Arabic woman!”

But does it mean that if a population resort to higher fertility that its collective existence is
endangered? In the case of North-American Indians such an attitude would surely gain support in
South-American and European population. On the other hand Nazi politics of Arian-race fast
breeding was motivated by aggressive attitude towards “lower-race” nations and had nothing to do
with real national and political needs. It was obviously the product of a sick mind, a collective
paranoia, initiated by the paranoid mind of a genius of evil, Adolph Hitler. One can not help
recalling how he started with slogans of humiliated, endangered etc German Nation. The present-
day (hypo) thesis about “Illyric origins” etc nicely match Nazi neo-Paganism. It begs no great
imagination as for the Jewish counterpart in Kosovo issue, as far as the concept of “evil” is
concerned. But we leave pursuing the parallel KiM – Middle-East crisis for the later considerations.
Before we leave the subject of demographic explosion, a few words about the relationship poverty
and education on one side and the fast-breeding phenomenon on the other, are in order. The issue is
well understood and examined as a socio-economic phenomenon and here we shall just quote an
instance from the KiM perspective.
A journalist interviewed an elderly Shqiptar, who was looking after sheep on a high mountain in
Montenegro. Although he was from Metohija, he hired the meadow in Montenegro, during the
summer season, where his sheep were gazing, before going down to Metohija plane before winter.
When asked how many children he had, the old man sighed deeply and said “Only one son”. But
then he added, with greatest proudness: My son is the manager of a primary school at Dečani
(Dechani) and has eleven children! (Dechani is a village in Metohija, famous for his monastery
“High Dechani”, built by the king Stephan Urosh III, called Stephan Dechanski, c 1330. This is the
largest Middle-Age Serb church, with the most abundant collection of the fresco paintings in
Serbia.) 3

1
We note that the last words in two lines happen to rhyme.
2
Note this is not a value judgment with regard to Palestinian cause. We shall have many instances later on of
comparing issues, KiM and Palestinian ones.
3
Dečani was a tribe of Western Slavs, who lived on Laba river.
 51

We can only guess why the old man managed to have a single kid only, but his son evidently took
it a family duty to compensate the father’s “failure”. Note that the son had at least a secondary
school diploma and there is no chance to be an uneducated person.
As mentioned before, the common case of Shqiptars family life since 1965 is the following: 1 The
father (pater familias) works as the gastarbeiter in Germany or elsewhere, sends money home,
visits home twice a year or so, counts the children and then returns to job abroad. The children are
raised by his wife, frequently illiterate woman and children grow practically “in the lane”. An
anecdote describes the situation as follows:
Father visits the family and proudly shows his children to a friend of him, whom he brings from the
host country. He lines all his 11 children and introduces them: “Shpresa, Violeta, Ahmeti, no - he is
Tahiri, Goda, Dushi, no - Latifi, Drita – no she is Goda, but she is Drita, well something like this”,
and gives up naming the offspring. Apocryphal as may be, the anecdote ketches the point of the
fast-breeding population, never-the-less. Deprived of the proper family raising young children
become easy pray to unscrupulous politicians.
It has become obvious since long time ago, both to the domestic political leaders and politicians
abroad that such a demographic explosion will give rise to an unstable situation, politically,
educationally and economically. Within Yugoslavia those republics who used to provide the
contributions to the federal fund became less and less willing to feed KiM gjeps. As we mentioned
before, although KiM population shared les then 7% of the overall Yugoslav one, (33 – 38) % of
the federal fund went to southern Serbian province. It has become clear since long time ago that it
was family planning which could stop this demographic explosion only and balance the rate of
growth and the economic welfare. Why it has not been undertaken?
It has been. In 1970-thies a UN fund donated 100.000. $ to KiM for organizing family planning
education. We note that at the time it was a large sum, equivalent to present-day amount of millions
dollars. What happened to this money? Nothing. Nobody took a dollar from this fund.
Was this an outcome of a deliberate keeping the natality rate as high as possible? Instead of
attempting to answer this crucial question, we mention another instance of “channeled biology”.
During the recent campaign in Serbia for preventing AIDS proliferation among youth, first of all
students, the latter complained that although they had opportunity to make use of automats for
condoms, the latter turned out often inadequate, since those imported from KiM were “too small”.
How one is to interpret this? As a chauvinistic boasting of non-Albanian Serbians? Or somebody’s
deliberate supplying ineffective condoms to Shqiptar youth?
Whatever interpretation of the demographic explosion on KiM may be, it appears compatible with
the political aims of Shqiptar leaders there. It is the common mantra of any international institution,
individual or otherwise, when KiM issue is invoked, to stress from the outset that ethnic Albanians
are overwhelming majority there. All other matters are then automatically subordinated to this
point.

Guns and power

Beside gjeps weaponry is another obsession of Albanians, in particular Shqiptars (and
Montenegrins etc.). As mentioned earlier, weapon smuggling appears one of three principal
“economical branches” at KiM, two others are drug and people smuggling. But the main body of
weaponry remains at KiM. The principal rout of weapon traffic goes from High Albania. Since the
border with Albania is very difficult to control, going along mountain crests, it is very easy to
transfer large quantity of weapons, from rifles, guns, bombs, machine guns, personal rockets etc.
During the peak of fighting at KiM in1998, caravans of horsed used to carry weapons for KLA
across the mountainous border. Yugoslav army use to intercept many of those caravans, but many
managed to get through and deliver the burden to the ultimate destination. Which kind of activity it

1
It was since 1965 that Yugoslavs got the right to possess passports and could travel abroad.
 52

was is the best illustrated by the fact that many of those caravans were without man escort - the
horses knew the rout “by heart”.
As mentioned earlier, majority of Dinaric households are well equipped with guns. The KiM has
been no exception in this regard. This time, however, the situation attains an additional dimension,
apart from the weakening the state control of individuals. If those individual belong to a particular,
distinct subpopulation, like a hostile ethnicity, the sociological disaster becomes political one. It
was for this reason that Yugoslav authorities tried many times to collect the weaponry at KiM, but
with little effect. In fact those attempts provoked even stronger hostility towards Serbia. The
ministry of interior during Tito’s rule was Alexandar Ranković, Tito’s close crony, who was the
most hated man in Yugoslavia among Shqiptars. The latter still deliver touching stories of being
tortured by the Serbian police, under Ranković’s ministry.
It is ironic to note here that the nickname of the minister was Leka, which coincided with name of
Leka Ducagjini, mentioned earlier. The latter was presumably the “legislator” of the “Leke
Ducagjini codex”, which dealt with the blood feud affairs. It was a part of the general common law,
so-called) Canun, which provided rationale for the private possession of the weapons, as a
substitute for juristic rule.
As we mentioned earlier, hundreds of thousands of weaponry looted from the military magazines in
Albania in 1997 we transported to KiM. When in 2005 KFOR ordered all weapons in private
possession were to be surrendered to the authorities, out of estimated about 300.000. pieces only
1.700. were delivered (mainly old and obsolete ones). Here we note that arms collections were
frequent at KiM from Turkish times onwards. Thus in 1910 Sefket Togut pasha collected 147.525
guns and even knives (except bread-knives) were demanded for surrender.
How can a state run if her subjects are fully armed? Here we describe an incident at KiM from mid-
80-thies. We note first that at the time KiM had practically status of a republic within the Yugoslav
federation, except for the right to secede. Among other things police patrols were strictly of mixed
type, with equal share of Shqiptars and non-Albanians (usually Serbs).
A certain Shqiptar from the village Gornji Prekaz committed a crime, 1 but police was unable to
bring him to court. His house was close to the forest and whenever a police patrol came, he was
warned in advance, run into the forest and after the patrol left the village, would return to his house
and continued to enjoy the freedom. One day, however, he failed to run away in time and the police
surrounded his house. As we mentioned before, Shqiptar houses in rural areas resemble small
fortresses rather than dwelling places. Police did not dare to enter the house, surrounded by high
wall and called the outlaw to surrender. After some negotiations the latter agreed, with proviso that
they bring another police inspector, who happened to be Serb. This inspector came and when all
seemed arranged a policeman shot a bullet and a fierce shooting started. The fire from the
neighbouring houses joined that from the surrounded house and the scene looked more from a war
movie than a police intervention. One policeman was killed, the outlaw too, and his father and
daughter (who played an active role in the shooting, too) wounded. Finally, the battlefield was left
with two corps, and two stretches..
Incidentally, we will have to deal with Prekaz a few times more, but here I shall recall my first
acquaintance with this village only, albeit causal. In 1973 I was hospitalized for broken hip. One of
the surgeons in the ward was Dr Neshović, the official doctor of the Red Star soccer club. In my
six-bed room lied Ljuan Prekazi, player from the rival club, Partisan. A nice chap from Priština was
rather worried for his shinbone, with a suspicious wound. He complained about the team coach
demands: “I can not play every Sunday in top form” he told me. I remember his enquiry as to the
kind of meat we were served for lunch, if it was pork or not. I was rather surprised he cared about
nutrition religious regulations, since Muslims in Yugoslavia were generally emancipated about it,
at least those from the urban areas.

1
Gornji means upper in Serb. There is another adjacent village, Donji (lower) Prekaz.
 53

About ten years later I heard on TV news that there was a traffic accident on the road from Pirot to
Nish, with a car driving from Bulgaria to KiM. Among four badly wounded passengers was my
Ljuan Prekazi. I immediately phoned to the Nish hospital where they were reported to be
hospitalized, but the nurse on the phone new nothing about it. It was the last time I heard about
Ljuan. He presumably came from Prekaz village, before joining a soccer club in Priština. 1
KiM from 1981 to 2000
This period was characterized by gradual by permanent alienation of KiM from the rest of Serbia
and parallel making ever stronger bonds with Albania. These bonds were prominent even earlier,
particularly in the educational domain. The reason for this particular kind of links is a radical
disproportion in the economic sphere between KiM and undeveloped (post) Enver Hoxha Albania.

Education and culture

Books, text books and the literature generally used to be imported from Albania extensively. With
them came well designed “Albanization” of Shqiptars, in particular the youth. University
professors from Tirana became the frequent visiting staff at Priština university. The very main
building of the latter was built by the money from the federal fund, which was practically Serbian
donation, as we explained before. University staff from Serbia was gradually removed from KiM.
Two of my classmate from Physics department in Belgrade started their work at Priština
University, but soon learned they were persona non grata. One of them quickly got the message
and moved to the Nish University. The other remained at Priština but not long since committed
suicide.
The political tension and mistrust was used to abuse the educational system. Lecturers from other
universities engaged at Priština had to exam the students, who pretended not to understand Serb, in
Albanian. They would ask a question in Serbo-Croat, then the Shqiptar assistant would translate it
to the student. The latter then talks something in Albanian, the assistant turns to the examiner and
says “He knew” and the student passes. All this made the educational level at KiM very low,
making the university diplomas useless, even at KiM. By implication secondary and primary
education was lowering down too, and the entire educational system practically collapsed. This
passed unnoticed by external factors, but the most indicative sign of the state of art in this context is
practically total absence of KiM science on the international scene, except for the Albanology.
The local authorities resisted the educational curriculum prescribed by the republic institutions, as
an attempt to “dealbanize” Shqiptars. In the literature subject they complained that too many
Yugoslav writers were present in the textbooks at the expense of Shqiptar ones. Since those
programmes were conceived by the federal boards and since Albanian literature appears poor
compared with Croat and Slovenian (understandably), for example, this misbalance was simply a
reflection of the actual situation. Besides, literature appears the best means to homogenize
ethnically and culturally diverse population and provide a feeling of the common state. To be
honest, the vice versa is true too, a greater presence of Albanian writers (particularly from KiM)
would do the same service to the Yugoslav case.
Already in 70-thies Shqiptar students used to prefer Zagreb and Sarajevo universities to Belgrade
one. 2 On the other hand Belgrade used to host tens thousands of Shqiptars employed in the city
public service. When the open hostilities between Belgrade and Priština started, those Shqiptar
gastarbeiters silently disappeared from Belgrade streets.
Some graduates from Priština did come to Belgrade for doing their PhD studies and Serbian
university lecturers were employed at KiM university, as mentioned above, but gradually as the
links with Tirana gained in strength Serbia practically became absent from her southern province.
Students from KiM were very rare indeed in the rest of Serbia, in particular in Belgrade. Part of this

1
Surnames referring to one’s origin are common in Yugoslavia, among Slavs and Shiptars alike.
2
Ljubljana was excluded for the language barrier, though not totally.
 54

absence should be explained by the low standard of the knowledge KiM students acquire at the
local schools and university and were thus unqualified to enroll the Serbian universities. This
absence of “youth intersection” broadened further the gap between Shqiptar and the other Serbian
population.
I remember a case from my study at the faculty of science in Belgrade. At the time (and it is still
like that now) student from the midland use to accommodate either in private hired rooms or they
got a room in the students hostels. The latter were heavily subsided by the state, and the residents
paid a symbolic fee for the room and food there. It was, therefore very profitable, indeed, to get the
room in the hostels. The room is allotted by the students’ organizations at faculties, with a number
of criteria to be satisfied. Party membership was important, of course, but not crucial. The most
important instance was the economic welfare of the student applicant. They had, therefore, to
submit their local authorities certificate about the family income per capita, that it per the member
of family. One conspicuously very wealthy Shqiptar student from KiM, who used to wear elegant
suits, submitted, at he student meeting, his certificate, which was one order of magnitude less that
the next competitor on the list. 1 Not realizing what was the point a female student made a comment
“This is not enough even for hygiene needs” The point was that Shqiptar student had probably ten
or so siblings. He got the place, of course.
Five years later, 1967, I obtained the British council scholarship at the University College London.
In the coffee room (reserved at the time for gentlemen only), saw two gentlemen talking Serb. Glad
to hear my native language I took liberty to come across and introduced myself. One of gentlemen
shacked the hand with me and introduced the other one. We exchanged some information and I
went back to my seat. Next day I met the same gentleman, who happened to be at the department of
history, and spent some time at Belgrade, Zagreb and Priština collecting material for his PhD.
“Who was that gentleman from the other day” I asked. “He did not say a word while I was with
you.” “Ah, fuck him off, responded my acquaintance. He is Shqiptar from Priština university. I am
fed up with them!”. When the next year, 1968, those demonstrations at Priština arose, I realized
better what happened the previous year in the incident I just described.
If mixing of Serbia proper students and those from Priština was stronger such an animosity towards
non-Albanians would have probably been less pronounced. At least the rest of Serbian population
would have been aware of the hatred Shqiptars felt towards the rest of Serbians.

Economy

Statistics is like bikini, it reveals

much, but conceals what is the most important.

In the intense propaganda, skillfully controlled by Shqiptar politicians, KiM have been considered
as very poor region by the international community. Is this picture realistic one, or is it the product
of somebody’s wish to make political profit from this misconception? We shall argue that it is
exactly the latter case, uncritically accepted by the external factors, to say the least.
KiM possesses very fertile soil, almost as fertile as that in the Pannonic plane (Vojvodina and
Slavonia). Since 4/5 of the population lives in rural area, this fact is of no small importance.
However, in assessing the economic welfare of the province, one must account many relevant
items. It is clear in the modern society that the reality is the information. That is why it appears so
important to control public media, both In the liberal and autocratic societies.
Normally all relevant parameters destined to characterize a country or a region, are expressed per
capita. In the standard case (like European region) this parameters appear realistic indicators of the

1
Who happened to be a Montenegrin from Montenegro, later one of Milošević’s (who himself was a Montenegrin)
striking fist and even managed to become dean of Belgrade university. (after October 5 he resigned from the post).
 55

true state of art. But in the situation of demographic explosion, two things must be born in mind.
First, it is the item per family which is more relevant, for the entity per capita may be very
deceiving. Second, in the same situation the temporal dimension must be accounted for. In the case
of large natality rate, the usual quasi-static approximation is quite inadequate, as we shall
demonstrate many times in this book.
Another important distinction must be made in estimating the economic wellbeing of a region. As
in any country there is always, apart from the official, legal economy, the unofficial, illegal one,
usually called gray economy. Every state tries to reduce the latter as much as possible, if for
nothing, then for the taxation purposes. State budget is filed by the legal economy and all public
expenditures, army, education, health, infrastructure etc are taken from the budget. The problem
with the gray economy is the same as with other illegal affairs, like drug smuggling, robbery,
murders, corruption, etc. They may be just estimated, otherwise they are not illegal if a rigorous
account of the money traffic is possible. Every region with a weak state as an institution is
understandably suspect as subjected to illegal activities. This is exactly the case with KiM.
But here we are not interested in the criminal side of the illegal things. The matter we are going to
deal with are legal, but out of control of the fiscal authorities, at least to some extent. As mentioned
earlier, KiM is characterized by a very high percentage of unemployment. The estimate goes to
50%, but the exact figure is of less importance here. This percentage appears a direct outcome of
the youth of KiM population, that is the high percentage of teenage people (see, Table 1). This
large share of unofficial economy makes the standard analysis of the state of art much
inappropriate.
As mentioned above, a large proportion of Shqiptars work in West and Central Europe. These
industrious people save almost all they earn and bring it home. 1 This money is then used for the
private welfare and business, including buying new land. Nothing of this private income goes to the
state funds and is nonexistent for the state or regional budget. If one combines this effect with the
population of Shqiptar rural families, one easily understand the failure of the official statistics to
provide real state of affairs. When the open hostilities on KiM started in1987, London Economist
published an article emphasizing the poverty of Kosovo, as an indication that Belgrade authorities
did not care for this province. I sent a letter to the editor explaining that had they compared the
average income per family in Kosovo and rest of Serbia, they would have found no difference in
the average income. But the politics of the weekly, as it was the politics of other Western public
means (and still is) that the Kosovo issue remains strictly controlled by the “high politics” and was
not on the “public market”, my contribution was not published.
Part of the gastarbeiters’ money is proliferated by financing criminal business. We have first of all
in mind drug smuggling, which from the Middle East goes via KiM to the Western Europe. It is
one of the principal occupations of the young population, for many reasons. Apart from their
unemployment, money earned by this traffic is use for buying weaponry, which has always played
a very prominent role in Shqiptars’ way of life. Shqiptars turn out ideal for playing the role of the
main ring in the chain of smugglers from Middle East to Europe and USA. First of all, since they
belong to the Muslim religion mainly, they have the easiest way to contact the producers and deal
with them. Second, being of “European complexion”, they are much more suitable for smuggling
drug across the Asiatic-European borders, unlike Turks, Afghans, Pakistanis etc, easily
recognizable by the European customs. Generally, as mentioned above, the social structure of the
Shqiptar (and generally Albanian) society, based on fis (or tribal) units, appear ideal for business of
mafia type. A father earning money in Germany can supply his 4-5 sons (for instance) at home with
the initial capital for this kind of business.
Hence, this sort of “private initiative” business provides the KiM society with large capital, which
is out of control and thus out of the public funds. It is never accounted for when estimating the

1
As mentioned earlier, they used to work in the Serbia proper, in particular the metropolis before the political clashes.
 56

regional incomes and when presented as the income per capita the official figures appear miserable
indeed.
As for the weaponry smuggling, guns etc end generally on KiM itself, as explained above. It
therefore provides large earning for some families, but large expenditures for others, so that the
net gain for the region cancels out. We mention also here the small business held by ethnic
Albanians at green markets in Yugoslavia, as in Zagreb, for instance, where they hold monopole in
many branches. Again, the ethnical tights are here of the utmost importance, since the business is
tightly bound with the feeling of belonging to the same nation, “endangered by the hostile
environment”. Generally, Albanian organized crime in Europe and USA has pushed down many
“renowned” adversaries, like Italian, Chinese etc.
We do not want to enter the question of corruption in this context, but can not avoid one issue
relevant to the political problems related to KiM crisis. All wealthy ethnic Albanians, in particular
Shqiptars, are supposed to contribute to the “common case”, that is to the creation of Greater
Albania. While some of the gastarbeiters presumably donate the money voluntarily, it Is not
difficult to imagine the money exhortations, made by criminal groups and organized crime. This
phenomenon appears common to all “patriotic movements” outside the motherland, and evidently
the passing from patriotism to crime requires but small step. Many murders reported among
immigrants from various Balkan and Near-East countries are simply the outcome of clashes
between various criminal gangs.
We shall return to the issue of the organized crime and KiM later on, for this will be the crux of
matter when considering the KiM “independence”

Religion, church and politics

In order to understand better political events in this and following period, we turn our attention
here to the role of religion in Albania and surrounding countries. As mentioned earlier Albanian
population consist of 70% Muslim, 10% Roman-Catholic and 20% Greek-Orthodox (consisting
mainly of ethnic Greeks and some Slavs). Though it has been widely accepted that religious
division are of no importance to Albanians altogether, divisions do exist. In particular regarding
Christians and Muslim. The latter have a specific way of life and a distinct attitude towards women.
Never-the-less Albanian leaders, from the Rilindja movement to the present have persistently tried
to suppress religious differences, in favour of the national unity. One of the most prominent mottos
of Prizren League was :”feja e shqiptarit asht shqiptaria”. 1 This is a remarkable slogan , widely
ignored by the external factors, taking it as a mere rhetorical figure. However, with the present-day
experience with ethnic-Albanian nationalism and its ferocity, parallel with religious phanatism
imposes itself. One can not help recalling early Christianity in this context and the perplexity and
animosity which the Antique world regarding its relentless marching through the Roman-Greek
civilization and culture.
Shqiptars at KiM are overwhelmingly Muslim, with small admixtures of Greek-Orthodox and
Roman-Catholics. Of Muslim they belong almost entirely to Shiite sect, but in almost every village
a family of Sunnites can be found. 2 As we shall see later on, the Muslim church will play crucial
role in KiM issue.
First mosques were built in 16th century, as compared with the earliest extant Christian churches
and monasteries, which date from 9th century. These monasteries are scattered allover KiM. But the
most ancient and valuable examples are concentrated in Metohija region, as one could infer from
the very name Metohija (monastery estate), without further inquiries. The most important among
them are: Visoki Dečani, already mentioned, Bogorodica Ljeviška (Prizren), Pećka Patrijaršija

1
Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism. It should be compared with Golda Meir’s answer to the question if she
believed in God: “I believe in Jews, and Jews believe in God”.
2
Miss Durham was surprised, when managed to visit monastery Devič near Priština that the iguman was in fact a
Shiptar, from a Christian family at Peć
 57

(near Peć) and Gračanica (near Priština). The latter church appears the perl of the Bzyantine'stile
architecture, and is adopted to be one of the World Herritage, protected by UNESCO. It is in this
church that the most (in)famous fresco eye digging occured. It concerns the figure of qween
Jephimia, wife of king Milutin, who was one of monastery donator. Another signifficant
(presumablyunique) figure among the frescoes is Eustahie, the famous gramaticiens and orator at
Constantinopolis, from 12th century, later the archbishop at Thessaloniki.
As a rule Turks did not destroy Christian churches, although there were occasionally exceptions.
Generally, Ottoman Empire was rather tolerant towards ”infidels” and their shrines. Shqiptar
themselves used to respect monasteries and even protected them from their compatriots. This
protection has been widely used as proof that Shqiptars were friendly with Serbs who lived in their
neighborhood, but this protection deserves some scrutinization. It concerns the nearby fis, which
makes a deal with monastery. The latter pays for their protection and proclaims the master of the fis
vojvoda, with meaning of duke, though of the local importance. Moreover, if the fis kills somebody
in the course of “protection”, it is the monastery which “pays the bill”, that is pays to the family of
deceased the amount prescribed by Canun (mentioned earlier). In fact, this kind of protection
resembles very much similar institution widely practiced by Sicilians, in particular in USA.
Obligation to reward the blood feud implies an incorporation of the monastery staff into the
Shqiptar traditional society and its ethos. If we are aware that the said protection is from the same
Shqiptars, the overall picture attains a cynical connotation (with the mild taste of blackmail). .
Religion is tightly bound to “the soul of nation”, even if people happen to be emancipated from
faith. Serbs are mostly identifying themselves with Serb Orthodox Church (SOC), even Gnostics
and atheists. It was SOC which was instrumental in preserving Serb identity under foreign rule, be
it Ottoman Empire, Austrian Empire, Austro-Hungary etc. Though a small number of Serbs have
adopted Roman-Catholic confession, they consider themselves as Serbs, but the rest of their “tribal
compatriots” regard them as ‘outcasts”. On the other hand, those who were converted into Muslim
religion have been written off by the rest of the Slav population and do not consider themselves
Slavs any longer. This concerns particularly Bosnian Slavs (Serb and Croat alike). The curious, if
not tragic position those Slavic Muslims have found themselves after Yugoslavia was
foudedin1918 has been vividly described by Mehmed Mesha Selimović, 1 Muslim Bosnian writer,
presumably of Serb origin, in his highly acclaimed novel “Dervish”. Apart from the Turkish
population on Balkan, Bosnians and Albanians are the only European whose ancestors (were)
converted into Islam. Bosnian Muslims were on their way to return to the Slavic roots, under Tito’s
rule, but this process has been abruptly interrupted by the secession of BiH in1991, and the strong
islamization of the most of this population is evident now. Communist regime did not suppress any
particular confession, but by very separation of church from the state and vigorous efforts to
secularize the society, it uprooted the very rationale for religious fanatism, even ordinary practice.
Most Muslims abandoned nutritious taboos, like no-eating pork etc, and used to name their children
in neutral terms, like flower-like, tree-like etc appellations, instead of Arab, Turkish and Persian
names. Now, the process has been reverted and Bosnia and Herzegovina have become Muslim
springboard (Platzdarm) in Europe. We shall address this issue in more detail later on.
Destruction of religious shrines appears one of the best signs as to the ultimate aims of adversaries
in an armed conflict. Events in Croatia after 1991, but particularly in BiH illustrate very well this
phenomenon. If a shrine in a village, or town is destroyed, this is a clear message to the inhabitants
of the relevant confession – ethnical cleansing. 2 The rationale is obvious, since it is the shrine
which is suppose to be maximally protected against demolition and thus remains as the clear
testimony as to whom the land belongs (or belonged). The situation of KiM monasteries and
churches is the case in point.
1
Diminutive of Mehmed, in its turn corrupted Mahomet.
2
The case in point is destruction of Ferhadia Mosque, a masterpiece of Muslim architecture, in Banja Luka, at present
the capital of the so-called Republika Srpska in BiH.
 58

Here we quote a note in the Belgrade liberal daily “Danas”, by the columnist B. Andrejić, entitled
«Church and Mosque» :

In the “Kosovo indictment” at Hague Tribunal against Slobodan Miloshević there is a

place, at first sight insignificant one, which hounts me for months. Without any wish to
defend him whose, in the Indictment unmentioned sins are bigger than all of those
accounted for, at least as far as I am concerned, I wished if many others give a thought
about it.
Both he and collaborators have been accused as responsible for demolishment of a
mosque in a purely ethnic-Albanian village Bela Crkva. 1
Does it occur to anybody, in particular to those under the title of «international
factors», this condensed history, those destinies placed into the civilization mismatch
between the name of the village and the destruction of the mosque crime. (In other
possible cases – destruction of a church).
Those who do not appreciate this, will solve nothing. These appear to be the majority
(for the time being?). (bold added)

This short note is the essence of the crux of the matter (or the crux of the matter of the essence) of
the “Kosovo issue”. It speaks eloquently more than all Security Council resolutions, all fables on
the “Kosovo mythology”, all syntagmas like “actual reality”, all arguments like “Serb spiritual
vertical”, all mantras like “the right of the majority”, “self-determination”, etc, etc
Bela Crkva is a common toponym among Slavs (there are several other in Yugoslavia). Majority of
newly built churches are white (fresco painted) and some villages or towns are recognized by their
new church and the name is born out. Evidently Bela Crkva once was a purely Serb village. When
ethnic-Albanians became first “the overwhelming majority” the mosque was built up, then as the
time evolved the village was purged from “extraneous elements”, the church destroyed, but the
name remained. (Those who worry about the latter “betrayal” should be calmed down – when KiM
become “independent”, those mismatches will be rectified and no traces of the previous
“extraneous elements” will be preserved. As we mentioned before, this actually has happened with
the traces of Byzantine-Slavic region “Koman Culture” in Albania).
When on March 16, 2004 an accident occurred on the bank of Kosovo river Ibar, next two days 29
orthodox churches were burnt allover KiM (see Figure 6). We shall come back to this “Kosovo
Kristalnicht” later on, but here note the “even distribution” of the destroyed Serb shrines, as evident
from Figure 6, which signals the well planned action of wiping out “non-Albanian elements” from
KiM. That a “spontaneity” concerning these matter appears highly improbable testifies the
“avenge” in the Central Serbia, immediately after the pogrom, when two mosques, one in Belgrade
and one at Nish, were burned the next night. The perpetrators have never been arrested, but it was
not difficult to trace the instigators of these misdeeds, the so-called Serb Radical Party (SRS),
whose supporters come mainly from the refugees from Croatia and BiH, apart from the Serbian
social losers (we shall return to SRS later on). Since SRS expected to be blamed for this crime, they
quickly moved and presented to both Muslim communities in Belgrade and Nish with a PC, with a
theatric manner, characteristic for this subversive social movement, disguised as a political party. 2
The government condemned the misdeeds, but did not pursue the case further.

1
White Church in Serbo-Croat. Mosque in Turkish is called jami, džamija (jamiya) in Serbo-Croat and Muslim-
Bosnian alike.
2
The local Muslim communities were too weak and scared to press for a rigorous investigations and punishment.
 59

Figure 6. Some of 29 Serb churches and monasteries set to fire on March 17, 2004 pogrom.

Unfortunately we still don’t know how many mosques at KiM were really demolished by orthodox
savages. In the course of “Yugoslav wars” (1991-1995) many shrines have been deliberately
destroyed, Roman Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox. It is claimed by KiM Shqiptar leaders that out
of 500 mosques on KiM only 300 survived the fighting (1998-1999). While this figure may be
taken with the grain of salt, it deserves further considerations, as we shall make here.
When “wars” became imminent many “external factors” considered they were entitled to
“extinguish the fire” which was about to burn the unfortunate Yugoslavia. Some Arab countries,
Saudi Arabia in particular were quick to support Muslims, first in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
then in Serbia, especially Shqiptars at KiM. Since they were rather short with water, they started
pouring another liquid (they possessed in abundance) over the fire. Particularly worried for the fate
of mosques in these regions were Wahabites in Saudi Arabia, not only for their destiny in the
unstable region, but generally. Since they were the truest and even the only guardians of
Mahomet’s faith and church, Wahabits strongly condemned the dangerous and treacherous
deviations of some Muslim churches concerning the prohibition of visual decorations of mosques.
Any diversion from the most abstract and decorative figures on walls of mosques were proclaimed
as inappropriate, even blasphemous. Unfortunately, it turns out that many mosques on Balkan were
subject to these distortion of the Prophet’s inheritance. And such spoiling of the pure Islam was
intolerable, of course. There was only one inconvenient circumstance – the local fidels were
reluctant to destroy their mosques, even for the sake of religious orthodoxy. Fortunately, the fate
(or somebody else) showed grace and sent the “wars’ to Yugoslavia. Now the task was much easier
– it was just sufficient that q mosque was damaged and new one was readily built au lieu the old
 60

one (properly destroyed for the purpose). A scratch or hole of a bullet, a crack on the wall (from the
old age or otherwise), damaged decoration or something like that was sufficient to proclaim the
building useless and erect new one, more beautiful and older that the previous one. According to a
Cairo daily, hundreds of mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were thus destroyed and
re-erected according to the strict Wahabite rules.
The profit was multiple. Not only concerning Wahabism as such, but the Islam in general. The
statistics of shrines destroyed by infidels greatly improves, the sympathy for the Muslim cause in
Europe is raised, and the presence of fundamentalist Muslim countries is strengthened. The
demolish-and-build stratagem appears beneficial to both sides. Local fidels get new shrines,
Wahabits new (at least potentially) supporters.
At the present it is not possible to estimate how many of those alleged destroyed mosques were
victims of the “orthodox” savages (Vandals would not be an appropriate term), and how many fell
victim for the “Wahabite cause”. In any case they have been victims of the religious conflicts,
albeit in an indirect way.

Yugoslavia after Tito

In order to appreciate situation and events leading to the KiM upheavals from 1980 onwards, we
must make an overview of the general situation in Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz. He left
no prominent figure on the political scene who would at least partially take over the stir of the
Yugoslav boat. In fact it was not by accident that nobody was capable of ruling the country after a
dictatorship. 1 In 1980-1989 period Yugoslav boat was moving slowly, by the force of inertia,
almost floating. In fact, even before Tito’ s death the state was in a state of sleepy indolence, since
Tito was old and could (would) not care for the domestic affairs, confining his attention to his
international activities. The state economy was ruined, but this fact was not conspicuous since the
state was heavily in foreign debts and lived “on credit’ Tito used to get for his “nonalignment
policy”, but after his death donators started to press their debtors.. After his death the one-man rule
was substituted by “no-man-rule”, by essentially “technical government”, where the principal
concern of Tito’s descendents was to share everything in equal proportion and not allow anybody
to become prominent. Yugoslavia was passing through economic crisis, with notorious shortages
of many goods, like oil, coffee etc. In the period of economic difficulties those republics who used
to donate to underdeveloped regions felt they were exploited by the rest of the state and started
meditating secession. The first was Slovenia, and to a less extent Croatia. The question was mainly
what will turn out to trigger secession. The first motive appeared in the form of KiM, better to say
Shqiptars. The second was the pretext in the person of Slobodan Miloshević.

Slobodan Miloshević. I
What Miloshević is doing no peasant of Shumadia 2 would do.
Only a stubborn Montenigrin can do it.
Marko Vešović, 1996. 3

Son of Montenegrins from Montenegro (Lijeva Rijeka, Tuzi), whose farther was a secondary
school teacher, was allegedly born at Požarevac (1941), 4 in Central Serbia, as the case was with
his wife, Mirjana Marković. Though he grew up in Serbia, his mental structure was a typical

1
Spain turned out an exception, but mainly due to Franco “generosity” before leaving for the “other world” and the fact
the King was accepted by the state and people.
2
The central region in Central Serbia
3
The Montenegrin writer who survived three-year siege of Sarajevo, in an interview to Belgrade weekly, NIN.
4
According to some sources Slobo was born in Lijeva Rijeka, too. According to the family tradition, Miloševic’s
family came originally, like many Montenegrins, from KiM (Banjska).
 61

Dinaroid one. One of the principal features of the latter has been their notorious inflexibility. 1 He
graduated Law at Belgrade University. He met his future wife, Mirjana Marković at the grammar
school at Požarevac, and the romantic love was initiated, to be terminated by Slobo’s death in 2006,
at Hague Tribunal. 2 Mirjana was a daughter of a medium-rang Serbian communist apparatchik,
Moma Marković. Another story has been maintained in Serbia, this time about Mirjana’s
biological father. Namely, when her mother was imprisoned as a communist, she was tortured and,
accordingly, revealed her collaborators, who were caught and executed. Mirjana’s mother was
spared since she became, the story goes, mistress of the commandant of the prison (who happened
to be a Muslim). Mira (as she is called in Serbia) has suffered from these traumatic events her
entire life. In particular, she used to wear a white flower in her hair (wig?), as a memory on her
unfortunate mother.
We are dwelling on these, otherwise bizarre, matters, since they have played an important role in
the life of the couple who used to rule Serbia for 15 years. Mira was a devote communist and both
Slobo and her were great admirers of Marshal Tito. Mira maintained her internationalism and never
entered nationalistic disputes, as they started in Serbia when Slobo took power. We stress here that
Milošević himself, as a good communist, was away from nationalism at the time, see the box. In
fact, strictly speaking, accusing him of Serb nationalism is absurd, since he was neither Serb, nor
chauvinist. 3 .
Mira‘s belonging to the old Communist class (better to say – cast) helped greatly the promotion of
her husband politically, at the beginning of his career. When in power, the couple acted as a
formidable tandem, similar to the other famous Balkan couple, Nikole and Elena Ceausescu.
If Mira secured Slobo’s place in the communist cast, it was his best man, Ivan Stambolić, who
launched him into the highest political orbit. Milošević was first the manager of a big Serbian bank,
then the Party secretary in Belgrade and finally at the Serbian level. As the first step to pay tribute
to Ivan Stambolić, who became the president of Republic of Serbia, was to overthrow him from
this position and wipe him out from the political scene altogether. 4 As the final gesture of
thankfulness, Milošević had his best man and political mentor kidnapped and secretly executed, on
the mountain of Frushka Gora, near Novi Sad.
As the pressure from the other republics of Yugoslavia for democratization grew, Milošević
decided to mock the multi-party concept, playing with formal political diversity. He merged the so-
called Association of Socialist Working People of Serbia and the Association of Communist of
Serbia, forming new party, the Socialist Party of Serbia. How much serious he was about the
democracy is best illustrated that he did not border to consult members of neither merging
associations, but nobody even noticed this illegal procedure. His wife, in revenge, founded her own
party, so-called Yugoslav United Left (YUL), a ridiculous remnant of the former Communist Party.
As Milošević’s party (SPS).was an organ for ensuring the continuation of the communist
dictatorship, Mira’s YUL was a cover of notorious criminal activities, including political one. It
was a group of unscrupulous corrupted people, who took control over state administrative and
financial affairs. Mira’s influence was instrumental in personal promotion/degradation of
prominent members of her husband’s SPS.
The older daughter, Maria, was an irresponsible person, engaged in a number of illegal activities,
including drugs, notorious for making scandals in Serbia, after divorcing. The younger brother,

1
His farther, mother and uncle committed suicides, for various reasons. Milošević own death was practically the
suicide, too.
2
When Milošević seized the power in Serbia, a story circled via Internet about Slobo’s first love, Maria, who after
being abandoned, finally committed suicide. As the story goes, Milošević’s daughter Maria got her name after Slobo’s
first love.
3
This would be as absurd as accusing Herod the Great of Jewish phanatism. Milošević never attacked, and even rarely
mentioned, other nationalities in Yugoslavia, by the way.
4
Rumor was at the time that Milošević was somehow responsible for the death of Stambolić’s daughter.
 62

Marko, turned out a common criminal, who took advantage of father’s political position to develop
many activities which are characteristic of organized crime (car steeling, extortion, etc) .Making
use of state money, the family developed various kind of business. Mira run a pork farm, Maria a
TV station, Marko a chain of duty-free shops, entertainment park (in the Disneyland style) etc. The
whole family Milošević, therefore, turned out criminal one, in one way or other. It was the
rationale for many in Serbia to demand bringing Slobo 1 (and his family) to the court here in Serbia,
before even considering Hague Tribunal. This would not only clean up Serbia from this disastrous
family, but even more importantly, spare Serbia of the International blame and humiliation, which
Milošević put on her shoulders.
We can not dwell here more on Milošević, but must stress one of his principal features of his
mentality – an extreme rigidity (which he shared with majority of Dinaroids). His mind operated in
terms 0 -1, without any shading or effort to compromise. As an elderly economist, Dr Dragoslav
Avramović, (whom Miloshević had engaged to save Serbia from the hyper-inflation in 1993, with a
great success), put it: “Milošević keeps on rejecting any negotiation with resolute NO, and then
suddenly ”takes the pants off””. As we shall see later on, it was this rigidity which leads to the so-
called Kumanovo agreement (sic) in 1999, when he delivered Serbia’s most sacred soil to the
intruders.
As with most Dinaroids Milošević’s mental structure was army-officer-like. He could recognize a
hierarchical relationship only and was unable to communicate “horizontally”, on equal, footing. He
started his professional career first as a bank manager, then as a chair of Party Committee, a chair
of the Central part committee and finally the President of the state, first of Serbia, and then of
Yugoslavia, without much experience with dealing with people. He expected a total obedience of
those from the “lower level” and exercised the same to the upper one. But he always strives to
reach the upper level and did not hesitate to overthrow all above himself, craving for power. His
“political manners” are well illustrated when considering the KiM issue. 2 When he became the
Serbian Communist party secretary, he summoned the local party leaders from allover Serbia,
dictating instructions. A member of the KiM party team, Ms Katjusha Yashari, a robust, driving
person (from the powerful Shqiptar clan Yashari), started criticizing the Belgrade policy towards
KiM, Milošević got up, approached the window, and stared outside, smoking his cigar. “Comrade
Milošević, asked Ms Yashari, you do not seem to be interested in what I am talking?”. “O, yes, I
am very interested”, he replied and left the room. This anecdote illustrates also well his approach
to the very delicate political situation on KiM, as we shall see later on.

Kosovo and Metohija after Tito

KiM has been subject to gradual but permanent change of its demographic content, as illustrated in
Figure 5. As mentioned before, three principal factors were crucial to the demographic change in
this Serbian province.
First and the most important has been the demographic explosion, due to enormous birth rate of
Shqiptars. In the situation when this trend on the global scale was in the opposite direction, with
even African countries diminishing their birth rate, the only European regions with breeding out of
all proportions, have been Albania and Kosovo. In an comprehensive article in Newsweek, 3 entitled
“Demographic bomb is no longer as it used to be”, it has been estimated that by 2050 the only
regions with more than 2 children per woman will be Caribbean Islands, Pakistan, Eastern Guinea,
and African countries (except for northern and South Africa). And one region in Europe.
Analyzing the world situation the author writes:

1
Diminutive of Slobodan, in a typical Dinaric manner.
2
Milošević often acted as a supreme manager, since he did spend many years as the bank manager.
3
Translated from Courrier International, No 149, March 2005, p. 44.
 63

“If the figures are correct, they signify that almost half of the world population lives in
the countries whose demographic regime is situated below the replacement level:
comments Ebershtadt.

Never-the–less there is noticeable exceptions. In Europe, Albania and Kosovo make ever more
children. Asia has the pockets of the large natality, with Mongolia, Pakistan and Philippines…
Saudi Arabia represents the birth rate largest in the world (5.7), after Palestinian Territories (5.9)
and Yemen (7.2). However, some countries have some surprises in store: an Arab state Tunisia has
fallen below the reproduction threshold”

We notice, looking in Figure 4, that the birthrate in Albania is noticeably lower than on KiM. How
to explain this, since in both regions ethnic Albanians constitute the overwhelming majorities?
Albania is an independent state, responsible for her own wellbeing. The uncontrollable rise in
population implies more hungry mouths, more unemployed, more public expenditures for the social
needs, etc. But what is unfavourable for a responsible. sovereign state appears favourable for the
society which relies on the rest of the state it lives in. The more populous the ethnic minority is, the
more convincing demands for the financial and other supports are. The more children in the family,
the less income per capita is, and again the more justifiable demands for the public financial help.
But this can not continue ad infinitum, of course. Once the final goal has been achieved, the
secession realized, the logic takes the opposite direction – family planning. The logic: ‘make
children in the evening and submit the bill to the state in the morning’ does not work any longer,
for this is your own state. That is exactly what is going on in the present-day Albania.

We have already mentioned the influx of ethnic Albanians into KiM, both the migrant slow and
steady and those termed as metanastatic movements. The first immigrant phenomenon appears
slow and has effects which reveal along centuries, just like the high-rate natality effect. The second
is noticeable and has profound psychological effects on the indigenous population, in this case
Serbs. It provokes massive moving out of the autochthonous inhabitants, mainly into the Central
Serbia. The rate of this migration deserves particular attention, for this reveals more than any of the
political and demagogical “explanations”.
It has been noticed, since his phenomenon has been observed and followed statistically that the rate
of outflow migration appears constant in time. What this fact signifies? The Central Serbia
outnumbers the Serb population on KiM by more that an order of magnitude. Equally, the area of
Serbia is almost an order of magnitude larger than KiM. Now, suppose that all Serbs (and non-
Albanians, for that matter) were willing to quit KiM (voting by feet, as some Western political
commentators were eager to emphasize while describing emigration from Milošević’s Serbia),
their number on KiM would diminish exponentially, for the number of emigrants would depend
solely of the number of the existing at the spot. But the number of emigrants depends on the
possibility of the external reservoir to absorb the influx, too. The constant rate of emigration means
that Central Serbia can not absorb the immigrants all at once, but only gradually, since its capacity
is large, but finite. That is, had Serbia been many time larger, the number of non-Albanians on KiM
would have been zero by now.
The question arises naturally, question above questions, as legitimate as forbidden: which kind of
people are those “suppressed” on KiM when the other population flees from them? Or put it in this
way: who is really suppressing whom?
So far we have analyzed the global phenomena, as the general frame for the depopulation of KiM
from non-Albanians and overpopulation of the ethnic-Albanians (Shqiptars). We now turn to the
mechanism which is responsible for this effect. We shall, for the sake of clarity, distinguish two
principal stratagems, as used by the Shqiptars for taking over land and estate from the rest of KiM
population.
 64

We start with quasi-violent tactics. In the villages with mixed population, non-Shqiptar houses, or
families, adjacent to Shqiptar ones, are living under constant pressure, even fear from their
neighbours. Any conflict, however innocent, may easily pass into dangerous one, regarding the
nature of the Shqiptar ethos and their social units, fis or otherwise. Since the members of the latter
outnumber the former, and Shqiptars are, as a rule, well equipped with arms, ready to use them, the
neighbouring houses live in a permanent fear from eventual conflict. The later may arise for
various reasons. Trespassing, livestock damages, “wrong look” at the Shqiptar’s wife or daughter,
etc, as the case in any rural community may arise. Any serious conflict may initiate blood feud, as
we elaborated before, and this may be resolved by leaving the area only. 1 Whatever the surface
outlook may be, the relationship between populations who do not share the same ethos and are
endowed with different mentality, is anything but relaxed. It is the neighbourhood where jokes
have no place, since the sensitivity of Shqiptars, even regarding their own compatriots, is
pathologically pronounced. 2 Many families, finding this environment unsupportable simply sell
the estate and move away.
If we find in the above example no bad intentions, the other causes of emigration are not that
innocent. The most frequent cause of moving away is a combined physical pressure and financial
“encouragement”. As mentioned before, many inhabitants of underdeveloped and even moderately
advanced economically regions in the former Yugoslavia used to work in the Central and Western
Europe, as gastarbeiters. If one is traveling through Serbian countryside, for instance, he will
notice a high percentage of new houses, usually unfinished. They are property of the gastarbeiters,
who plan to complete those constructions when returning definitely to the homeland. The rationale
for this economic mismatch between the homeland and advance Western society is mainly the
disproportion between the nominal and real values of the currencies. One Deutsche mark (now one
Euro), values in Serbia, for instance, as five marks or something like that. This disproportion
appears considerably more pronounced on KiM. Since the most vigorous members of non-
Albanian families have already left their homes, either moving to towns or simply to the Central
Serbia, the remaining Serbs are not in position to compete with Shqiptar ones in financial terms.
The general stratagem for overtaking non-Albanian land appears like this.
Initial phase: If the village appears purely non-Shqiptar, several Shqiptar families join the money
and offer to the most prominent house in the village a considerable amount, exceeding many times
its economic value. The target family resists for some time, but after persistent offerings it usually
gives up and sells the estate, moves to the Central Serbia and buys much bigger estate. The next
target house is offered somewhat smaller amount and the procedure is repeated.
Final stage: As the number of remaining families diminishes, the buyers offer ever less amount and
the price goes below the economic one. In the final stage estates are selling for the symbolic prices
and the village is empted from the “alien peasants”. In such way the larger part of KiM has been
evacuated from the “undesirable inhabitants”.

Needless to say that in the case of places with already mixed population the process is much easier
and faster. In fact, in many cases it was a spontaneous leaving homes and moving away from the
troublesome environment. It is the common case that when talking with Shqiptars, ordinary people
and political activists alike, that the evacuation of KiM by the indigenous population is explained
by the desire of the latter to move to the more prosperous regions, for purely economical reasons.
In this way two aims are achieved. First, it implies the poverty of KiM, and second the free choice
of those who leave the region. Since such an explanation has been on the market for decades, it
obviously sells well among the “international community”. Otherwise such a cynical argument
would be cut off by any serious interlocutor. As far as I know none of the latter has asked those
1
In fact, many families in the Central Serbia have arrived there from Dinaric regions in order to escape blood feud,
especially in the 19th century.
2
I have experienced this myself in a number of occasions.
 65

Shqiptars, who keep on blaming non-Shqiptars in Serbia for suppression, event torture, why don’t
they leave KiM for a better place, like their country of origin, Albania? Of course, none has
illusions that the attitude of the foreign leaders is based on insufficient acquaintance with the actual
situation, but we shall come to this point later on.
This stratagem has been applied not only on KiM, but everywhere in Serbia where Shqiptars are
present in rural areas, including the so-called Preshevo valley (Bujanovac, Preshevo and
Medvedja). All these counties were predominantly inhabited by non-Albanians, in 1945, when
KiM was constituted as the autonomous region, but now only in Medvedja Serbs are still majority.
The state of Serbia tried to prevent this illegitimate taking over of non-Shqiptars land by posing the
law of non-transfer between different ethnic partners, but this measure has had little effect. Many
non-Shqiptars simply take money without recording the transfer before the court. At the moment it
is almost impossible to estimate whose legally is the land on KiM and in the Preshevo valley.
Presumably, this domino effect is operative in other regions where ethnic Albanians live in a
noticeable numbers, as in the Western Macedonia Persistent bargain offers combined with
intimidations, like burning haystacks, killing live stocks, dogs, etc can not fail to produce desired
effect – moving away from wild neighbours.
Moving where to? Living in such an environment, isolated from the rest of world, including Serbia
proper, those unfortunate people have acquired many attributes of Shqiptars themselves. Settling
down in the central Serbia, by buying land, they find themselves apart from the local population,
who treat them as alien elements. The principal effect was the isolation at KiM has been the
conservation of the ethos and folklore. In fact, these Serbs represent the best preserved the
traditional autochthonous Slavic population. KiM has proved the largest enervate of Serbian
folklore and tradition in general. It is presumably this fact which makes local population in Central
Serbia suspicious, concerning the manner of the KiM immigrants. As we mentioned above, this
conservation phenomenon appears common to all Dinaric regions, but KiM is the core of Serbia
and it was not for the physical geography that the retardation took place, but due to the human
extraneous element, as mentioned above.
We should stress here that this effect hits not only Serbs, but any non-Albanian ethnicity. As we
shall see later on, the latter have been moving from KiM continuously, as well as from the Western
Macedonia. Typical example is the village Janjina, very near to Priština and Gračanica, inhabited
entirely by Croats. The later have completely abandoned the village at the beginning of Shqiptar
rebellion in 1988 and have moved to Croatia. The same applies to Roma and other “ethnic
minorities”, like the so-called Egyptians, 1 Ashkalias, Turks and Muslim Bosnians. 2 It is the
xenophobia which is driving force of the Albanians (Albanian and KiM alike) feel uneasy in the
close contact with other nationalities.
Situation in urban areas is technically different, but equally uneasy. The older Shqiptar generations,
aware of the historicity of their non-Shqiptar neighbours and cultural heritage it implies, are
reluctant to mix with the human environment. The young generations, on their part, rising with
meteoric speed in number, experience the rest of the non-Shqiptar urban population as unpleasant
perturbation. It was a stunning impression for European visitors to KiM to see the segregation
between Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar youth walking in the evening streets (so-called corso) in KiM
towns, including very Priština. The same applied to cafes, pubs etc, where “ethnically pure public”
was present only. As the number of non-Shqiptars decreased, the ever smaller communities in
towns found themselves isolated and “stranger at home”. It was this psychological pressure which
prompted non-Shqiptar youth to leave KiM, even before the open hostilities started in 90-thies.

Links with the rest of Serbia

1
What relationship is of this minority with the Egyptians proper is difficult to determine now, but this is of minor
importance to us here.
2
Balkan is not only the melting pot of various ethnicities, but also the rich source of new ones, real and imaginary
 66

It has been the standard mantra of Shqiptar leading figures, political and cultural alike, that
Serbians outside KiM showed little interest in the KiM affairs, despite their proclaimed worries for
the non-Shqiptar population. In a sense they are right, but these claims reveal more the overall
atmosphere on KiM than the real lack of interest from Serbian side. KiM officials, apart from
politicians, did not encourage links with the Central Serbia, for reasons to be realized later, as the
events evolved. Educational, cultural, economic and other links were gradually diminished, while
the same were systematically strengthened with Albania. There were, of course, exceptions. Some
top-rank Shqiptar intellectuals used to encourage cultural links, especially those who were educated
in Belgrade. Theater performances, folklore groups etc were subject to exchange. The situation
was, however, unfavourable in many respects. The KiM – Serbia relationship could be promoted
and maintained via two principal channels. First, via the indigenous non-Shqiptar population, and
second, by direct contact with local Shqiptars. In the first case situation was very unfavourable, due
to the low human standards of the local inhabitants. As mentioned before, the most vital part of
non-Shqiptars had left KiM, looking for the more favourable living conditions. What have
remained are elderly people, in particular in the rural areas, who preferred to remain and die in their
birth homes. They are, as a rule, the least educated people and uninterested for the “higher level
activities”, like cultural ones. The only exception has been the folklore, which appears as real
treasure of the traditional culture. Unfortunately, the officials in Belgrade and other cultural centers
in Serbia did not exploit this possibility, better to say necessity, for the reasons to be explained later
on. We only mention here that the anti-nationalistic mood, promoted by the communist Tito’s
regime, was sufficiently short-sited, not to say primitive, to appreciate the issue.
The KiM non-Shqiptars, in particular Serbs, have lived in isolation for centuries, due to the
Shqiptar environment. The younger, more vital people, used to emigrate from the region, the
elderly people, mostly peasants, were not much mobile and stayed at home, without going out of
KiM. On the other hand, Serbians were reluctant to pay visit to them, abhorring from the dominant
unfriendly Shqiptar surroundings. Situation appears similar to the Dinaric region, but for different
reasons. While Dinaroids are leaving their homelands and migrate to lowlands, there is no move the
other way round, since the region is poor and inhospitable. On the contrary, KiM is fertile and
pleasant for living, but it used to attract the Albanian Albanians only, in particular when the
domestic Shqiptar populations became dominant. With the feedback mechanism this asymmetric
influx and outflow rose to an exponential rate. But the byproduct we are talking about here is the
isolation of the remaining non-Shqiptar population, which has resulted in the preservation and even
degradation of the anthropological features of the KiM population in general, particularly the non-
Shqiptar minorities.
The folklore of KiM Serbs, the music in particular, appears somewhat strange for Belgrade
citizen’s eyes and ears, even to the rural Serbian people, but it is exactly the value of the preserved
national treasure. KiM tradition has been something like the Hellenic tradition for modern Greeks,
or troubadour tradition to western Europeans. As the candle of KiM life is fading away, this
tradition is going to be lost forever.
As for the direct Serbians -Shqiptars channel of communications, situation has been definitely
worsened to the point of extinction. Visits by cultural ensembles to KiM places became very
unpleasant and even risky, as the quasi-independent status of the province continued. Due to
persistent indoctrination of the youth, principally by educational, but mass media means too, the
attitude of young Shqiptars towards anything non-Shqiptar has grown from boycott to outright
hatred. The latter has grown on the trunk of under-education of the fast-breeding population, who
had no time (and means) to shape personalities of kids and adolescents in a socially acceptable
manner. The Shqiptar kids use to stone buses and trains passing through the province, even those
who were carrying Shqiptars themselves. (Those kids will later, as adults, blast into air buses
carrying non-Shqiptars visiting from the refugees camps their home villages and graveyards).
 67

For the majority of Serbians outside KiM the latter has always been the place for pilgrimage, in
particular for the religious and educated people. The oldest and most valuable monasteries lie on
KiM soil, for good reasons, for the present-day province used to be the core of the Serbian state for
centuries, before Turks arrived on Balkan. This pilgrimage was practically stopped when the
Shqiptar movement for secession took conspicuous form. It was exactly for this reason that sacral
objects, like monasteries and churches have been especially chosen for targets of the secessionists,
as we shall elaborate later on.
Before the open secessionist movements local KiM political non-Shqiptar leaders used to be used
as convenient links with the rest of the republic. It was them who used to plead for the ever more
economical and financial help. From the present-day perspective they were, in fact, used as
hostages, with their political career and posts depending on success in exhorting benefits from
Serbian state. Once the “jar has broken”, as an old Serbian saying put it, these “respectable
representatives of the non-Shqiptar population” left the province. There were parallel cases, too.
Some Shqiptar leaders, like Mahmut Bacali, were eagerly promoting “Belgrade policy”, in fact
party line, blaming Shqiptar nationalism etc. When the party U-turn in 1980-ieths occurred, they
changed the tune, multiplying their previous assertions by (-1). 1
Mentioned should be made here of the links of KIM with other regions of Yugoslavia. As the time
from the WWII was elapsing, number of KiM Shqiptar students studying in Belgrade (and other
Serbian educational centers) diminished, with the rise of number of those going to Zagreb (and
eventually Ljubljana). Zagreb was particularly a convenient destination. First, Croats speak the
same language as Serbian Serbs, which KiM population spoke, so there is no language barrier.
Second, the anti-Serb(ian) feeling among Croats was a very good springboard for Shqiptar own
tribal and political aims. When the real troubles in Yugoslavia began in 1990 many Shqiptar will
find pace in Croat military sector. Though the statistics of this kind has never been disclosed,
presumably a great number of young Shqiptars took part in the so-called Domovinski rat (Patriotic
War) during 1991-1995 period. Presumably, those instances when this engagements could not be
concealed, as the case of the so-called Medački Džep will show (to be discussed late on), are just
tip of iceberg. Another effect of these links with Zagreb will show up as Croat moral (and perhaps
not just moral) support of Croatia for the “just case of Shqiptars under the cruel oppression by
Serbs”. To Croat nationalists it was a great opportunity to prove the thesis that Serbia are
oppressors “by nature” and that “Croat sufferings in Yugoslavia” were not the product of a Croat
fancy. Book on KiM issue were published at Zagreb, showing sympathy with ”poor Albanians”.
The case in point was the book by Zagreb economist, Branko Horvat (otherwise a politics adviser
of a leading Croat non-communist leader at the time). Though he was not a historian, or a political
analyst, he found profitable to present his picture of the region he was not familiar with.
One particular link with state of Serbia as a whole was through the Shqiptar politicians engaged in
the ruling structure at Belgrade. Some of them occupied very high positions in the Party (and thus
in the state) hierarchy. The best, though somewhat absurd, example was that of Sinan Hasani, at the
time the head of the state, elected after “the key”. The latter was used, after Tito’s death, to ensure
“equipartition” in the ruling institutions at the federal or republic level. The equipartition aimed at
he regional representatives, not ethnic ones. long after he left the temporary president position, it
was found that he was not the citizen of Yugoslavia at all! This affair illustrates well the problem of
evidence, even when the most important positions are concerned. As is well known a person non
born in USA can not be even a candidate for the president, not to mention non-citizenship. The
question arises: if it happened to the presidency in Yugoslavia, how much one may expect to
control the origin and citizenship of thousands of immigrants from Albania, crossing the
(nonexistent) borders between Serbia and Albania during 1999? This appears a general question of

1
Particularly nasty example was demonstrated by M. Bacali at the Hague Tribunal.
 68

the inference into the KiM situation, which has always been through the local Shqiptar institutions,
never independently. 1
Another prominent case concerning Shqiptar attitude towards the common state has been Adem
Vlasi. When teenager he was chosen to deliver the rally to Marshal Tito, on the occasion of his
birthday, May 25. This ceremonial was taken over from the Old Yugoslavia (between WWI and
WWII), when practiced for the King. 2 Subsequently, Vlasi became the top youth leader in
Yugoslavia, the president of the Youth organization, a sort of Tito-Jugend. He used to be as close
to Tito as possible, both symbolically and literally, buttering him up and securing his aimed highest
rank position for the future. 3 Adem Vlasi will play a prominent role in Shqiptar secessionist
movement, as we shall see later on.

KiM in (1981-1989) – a silent secession

This period was marked by powerless federal government, with all republics making their own
politics and showed little care for the common cause. Non-Shqiptar population on KiM found
themselves in an isolated position, without real political and physical protection. Belgrade Serbian
government used to communicate directly with the local provincial officials, who ignored
complains from the non-Shqiptar side, particularly Serb ones. Attacks on Serbs became ever more
frequent and violent, that the insecure people were moving out at a constant rate. After many
ignored complained peasants from the Serb village, Batuse, decided to move collectively.
Immediately Adem Vlasi, who was at the time the KiM Party secretary, that is at no official state
position, came on the spot and stopped the convoy on its way to Central Serbia. His explanation
was telling even more than necessary: “You may move away, but one by one, not collectively!”.
The president of Serbia, Petar Gračanin?, arrived too, but he was able just to watch indignant and
bitter people returning to their “concentration-camp” village. It was sad indeed watching the
president helpless in the country whose head he was supposed to be. Later on, when Milošević
took power in Serbia, nobody cared to recall this paradigmatic scene as a possible explanation (if
not necessarily justification) of the measures he took concerning KiM affairs.
An unofficial delegation came from KiM to Belgrade, and was given opportunity to talk to the
Federal parliament, presided by the Macedonian Lazar Mojsov. The most touching scene occurred
when a middle-age woman stood in front of the microphone, and asked crying: “Nobody cares
about us on KiM, nobody cares for us in Belgrade! Whom do we belong?!”.
But both the federal and Serbian government could do anything, bound by the Federal and Serbian
constitutions. The president of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić (who promoted his best-man Milošević to
the post of Party secretary), went to Priština to try to settle the situation down, but in vain. Massive
rallies started, with Kosovars gathering on the green area in front of the Belgrade municipal
assembly building, asking for audience and help. But the Belgrade officials restricted themselves
to the formal interventions to Priština official counterparts. Those futile efforts ended as expected –
in blind alley. Then something happened, something that will decide the immediate history of
Yugoslavia and Serbia. Something that will prove fatal for both.
Serb inhabitants from a KiM village Zubin Potok (Zuba’s brook in Serb) invited Slobodan
Milošević to visit them, so that they can complain to him directly about their situation. Why
Milošević? He had no official state position, just like Adem Vlasi, but people knew who were
bosses in the communist countries, like Serbia. Local communists arranged a closed meeting in the
municipal building, to “discuss the issue”. Of course, the presence of the provincial boss, Vlasi,

1
Recall the procedure of the oral examination by non-Shiptar professors at the Priština university, described earlier.
2
A similar sort of ritual was practiced under Hitler’s Germany, for t he Nazi dictator.
3
This kind of entering under the skin behaviour will show up later in Shiptar securing American support, manners
which will, in the case of Bill Clinton, take grotesque dimensions.
 69

was inevitable. An all-night discussion, long and futile (as all party meetings are) was going on,
when deep in the night cries from the outside were heard, calling Milošević out. When he appeared
before the crowd, who was awaiting eagerly the results of the meeting, he saw police pushing away
the inpatient people. Then somebody shouted the fatal words: We are beaten! And Milošević
exclaimed equally fatal sentence, which will become the landmark of his carrier: Nobody may beat
you!
The meeting resulted in no immediate conclusions, but this incident marked the turning point of
Milošević’s political career. If it was to be compared with a historical instance, perhaps the best
point would be that from the Christian mythology, the moment when John Baptist baptized Jesus
on the Jordan River, with Holy Ghost descending from Heaven and entering his body. According to
some interpretations, particularly Gnostic ones, it was then that Jesus of Nazareth became divinity,
transformed from one of many preachers around Palestine at the time into a prophet and Messiah.
Religious fantasy apart, it was well possible that Jesus became aware of his “mission on Earth” and
entered his short, but prolific liturgy in Galilee. 1
Whether Milošević’s “phase transition”, as theoretical physicists would call it, occurred at the very
moment of this incident, or was a result of subsequent “inner working out”, is irrelevant to us
here. 2 But, at any rate, this incident made him aware of the promising opportunity to base his
political career upon the KiM issue, the real problem in real time.
And he seized this opportunity whole-heartedly. For better or worse.
His immediate aim was to lift from KiM the cover of an untouchable province, endowed with all
rights of an independent state, except the right to secede. The decision was not easy to realize, both
from the practical and ideological viewpoints. It is the traditional wisdom that one never deprives
somebody from the rights, privileges etc already possessing, without compelling reasons. 3
Knowing the primitive mind of the KiM population, one could not expect much rational deal. The
young, overcrowded population, unemployed and dissatisfied in every respect, brainwashed from
the early youth with mantras like “Serbs’ hatred” etc, was like a wild animal to be tamed. And the
dog was unlashed already, the movement for secession.
The slogans like KOSOVO REPUBLIC were already in the air. On the other hand local non-
Shqiptar activists were on the move. Visits to the local provincial officials were frequent, with
demands for better living conditions for Serbs and other non-Albanians in KiM. As expected, they
turned out futile, since the Shqiptar leaders knew they possess legal rights, including those to
ignore everything they dislike. More massive movements were planned and realized, with Serb
Kosovars (Serbs from KiM) organizing massive meetings outside KiM, with the tacit approval of
Belgrade party leaders around Milošević. Those who criticized his political promises, characterized
as “easily promised speed’, were recklessly removed from the Party (and thus political) scene. Ivan
Stambolić himself was overthrown on a (in)famous 8th Party meeting in 1987. He resigned his
President position and withdrew to a bank business. 4 The first target was Vojvodina autonomous
province, the northern Serbian counterpart of KiM. If the autonomous province KiM was to be
abolished, it will hit Vojvodina for the sake of balance, though this multiethnic region was not a
source of unrest and troubles. 5 Massive rally at Novi Sad, with Kosovars gaining much of the local
population sympathies resulted in overthrowing province Party committee and establishing
Miloshević decisive influence. Similar rally was planned for Slovenia, but was forbidden by
Slovenian authorities in the last moment, for the big consternation of Serbian population,

1
A more mundane comparison may be that with Robert Kennedy’s visiting to poor suburbs of New Orleans, when he
saw the misery of black compatriots at t he spot.
2
One should not neglect the feeling of humiliation, for which every Dinaroid is especially sensitive.
3
It is this rationale that one rather underpays employees, than overpays them.
4
Before the general elections in 2000 he will be kidnapped and shot on the Fruška Gora Mountain, near Novi Sad.
5
It is to be emphasized that a substantial minority Hungarian population lives there for centuries. In 1945, when
liberated from the German occupation Hungarians were almost as numerous as Shiptars in KiM.
 70

Milošević’s supporters and non-supporters alike. Finally, Milošević managed to pass legally
through the Serbian parliament the abolishment of essential parts of the provinces autonomies and
dismantling their assemblies. Serbia again became a unique compact state. At least it so seemed to
Milošević and his supporters.
The emotions apart, the ideological background for the reunification of Serbia as state was based
on the “theory of conspiracy”. Serbia was divided under the Federal constitution into three parts in
order to be weakened, as the largest and strongest republic in Yugoslavia. Demagogy apart, this
division was not a splendid example of the political logic. By giving Vojvodina and KiM status of
co-federal units, the federal constitution left the so-called Central Serbia with a vague, not to say
incredible state. Serbia was a constitutive element of the Federation, but so were her two provinces
separately. MPs of the latter were entitled to make decisions concerning the affairs of their
provinces, but also of the republic of Serbia as a whole. At the same time, MPs from the Central
Serbia could influence Central Serbia affairs indirectly only, but provincial ones by no means. They
had no their own assembly. Thus, Serbia was not partitioned into three equivalent parts, but had
both vertical and horizontal structure, where the hierarchy could not be established. It was mainly
for this reason that the slogan of the time “O, Serbia of three parts, you will again be the whole!”,
gained much in popularity, not only in Milošević’s quarters. 1 It was widely accepted, rightly or not,
that such a division was a part of Yugoslav republics conspiracy against Serbia.
The same rationale turned out operative in the case of the now famous Memorandum of the Serbian
Academy of Science and Arts (SANU), 2 in 1986. The principal authors were Vasilije Krestić
(HDE 3 ), Antonije Isaković (HDE), Mihailo Marković (HDE), Kosta Mihailović, with the support
of Dobrica Ćosić (a Serb writer) and a number of other academicians of SANU. This Memorandum
was never accepted as an official document of SANU (it was, in fact, unfinished, when revealed
illegally to public), but has been used subsequently as the crown witness of Serbian nationalism.
Memorandum addressed the actual state of Serbia in Yugoslavia, arguing that Serbia has been
endowed with an inferior position, particularly in the economic sphere. The tacit rationale for such
an attitude was the feeling that other republics felt the Serbia too dominant and wanted to suppress
her in every respect. In a sense this rationale was both true and understandable. (It was the
quintessence, by the way, of the British stratagem regarding Continental Europe, which lead to
Napoleon wars and both WWI and WWII wars too). The slogan “Weak Serbia – strong
Yugoslavia!”, though never uttered publicly was in the air since the Yugoslavia was founded in
1918.
When the restrictions on the provinces autonomies became operative, the struggle between the
central government in Belgrade and Priština gained a new impetus. One of the first measures taken
by Belgrade was the suppression of the educational propaganda, which had resulted, as we
mentioned before, in an outright hatred young Shqiptars developed under the pro-Albanian and
anti-Serbian school programmes. The immediate response of the Shqiptar leaders was withdrawal
of the schools and the University from the official buildings. Lessons were held in private houses,
and the whole image was intentionally suggesting the state of a foreign occupation
One affair from the time gives the flavour of the nature of the conflict. Pupils in the primary and
secondary schools used to share classes in the common buildings, irrespective of their ethnicity.
Since the non-Shqiptar kids were tiny minorities in many common schools, 4 they felt uneasy in the
Shqiptar immediate environments, as the latter did not mix with the rest of pupils. Any incident
easily turned into serious one and Belgrade authorities decide that Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar pupils

1
Oj Srbijo iz tri dela,
ponovo ćeš biti cela!
2
Srpska Akademija Nauke i Umetnosti
3
Healthy Dinaric Element
4
Note that the Shiptar kids percentage greatly exceeded the average one for the entire KiM population, since the age
distribution favours Shiptar youth even more, see Table 1.
 71

do not share the schools at the same time. The response of the local Shqiptars was astonishing,
indeed. They declared that the Serbian authorities plan to poison Shqiptar kids, by depositing a
deadly powder into schools (ethnic-discriminative poison, as non-Shqiptars called it ironically).
Once this was announced, the Shqiptar pupils were collected and moved to the nearby hospitals,
where the patients were evacuated for this purpose. The newspapers journalists, TV cameras etc
were invited to witness this onslaught on the innocent kids, who were lying in their hospital beds,
almost dead. When the cameras left the hospitals, kids were ordered to get up and go home.
Many hints as to the real aims of this charade were made in Serbian public media. Apart from the
propaganda motivations some more serious interpretations were offered. One was by an army high
officer who suggested that he whole charade was in fact a dress rehearsal for the envisaged real
situation of an armed rebellion and readiness of the medical institutions to accept and take care of
the wounded rebels. Once the single-day disaster was over, the deadly powder suddenly lost its
power and the innocent Shqiptar kids returned to their classes.
The following charade, however, was much more serious. Shqiptar leaders organized a strike in the
mine “Stari Trg”, 1 near Kosovska Mitrovica. Shqiptar miners descended into their shafts and
refused to get out “Until Kosovo become republic”, announcing ”hunger strike”. Medical teams
were fast to react, journalists invited, etc. Adem Vlasi, whom we met earlier, was quick to descend
into the shafts and announce his moral support for the Shqiptar patriots etc. It lasted for several
days, until the Belgrade government sent a special police unit, which pulled the miners out from
their “striking positions”. Medical teams were ready at the exit and supplied the eye-covers for the
poor miners, deprived of the light and endangered by the blindness, etc. It was amazing watching
miners in obviously good conditions, who were not prepared for the scenario and mainly refused to
take the precocious measures offered by the medical staff at the spot.
After this incident situation on the Serbian political scene further aggravated. Belgrade “working
class”, dissatisfied by their social position and wages, gathered in front of the Federal assembly
building in Belgrade, in a resolute protest. After some negotiations and threats Milošević appeared
at the entrance and addressed the crowd. He skillfully exchanged the thesis, 2 starting with the
workers’ demands and complains, but then turned to the KiM affairs and the miners’ strike,
promising to bring to court all politicians involved. It was a clear allusion to Adem Vlasi.
Continuing along the same lines, Milošević made the workers forget their original complaints and
demands. We note here that what Milošević did in this situation was exactly the same what KiM
Shqiptar leaders did for decades - turning the real social and economic dissatisfaction of the
overcrowded province into ethnical hatred, accusing Serbs and the central government for all
troubles in the province. (Both maneuvers turned out successful).
The worst thing was that he fulfilled the promise. Adem Vlasi was arrested and accused for “high
treason” or something like this. He could not wish more and from a communist apparatchik became
the national hero. Songs about him started circulating around KiM, while he was awaiting the trial.
The latter did occur after a year of so, at Kosovska Mitrovica (inhabited mainly by non-Shqiptars).
The judge was a Shqiptar, who after a long process released the accused as innocent. The whole
charade was a mockery from the start. The point which Milošević had in mind was to remove a
dangerous and popular political enemy from the scene. But the final outcome was
counterproductive, as was expected. Adem Vlasi was made a national martyr, persecuted by evil
Serbs. The whole affair exhibited the best Milošević political incompetence, which will ultimately
cost Serbia her existence. By the time of these events the Shqiptar boycott of Serbia and her
institution was already almost complete. Ordinary people, especially the youth, stopped
communicating with non-Shqiptars, in particular Serbs from the Central Serbia. They refused to
talk to journalists from Belgrade, turned their back to TV cameras, etc. The hatred could almost be
1
The Old Square, in Serb.
2
As a Belgrade university professor put it to a student: “I am asking you what is an elephant, and you say ‘elephant is
not a cow’, and proceed describing a cow”.
 72

smelled in the air. The situation became a surrealistic one, with the actual situation grossly
mismatching official, administrative one. It was in an appealing need for resolving this surrealistic
situation. The resolution came, in two steps. The first was disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The Fall of Titonic (Disintegration of Yu2)

Those who do not regret the fall of Yugoslavia have no heart, and
those who would like Yugoslavia to be restored have no brain.
Zoran Djindjic

In retrospect, one may state that creation of Yugoslavia was trigged by the bloody assassination at
Sarajevo, on June 28th, 1914, when Bosnian nationalists killed Austro-Hungarian archduke
Ferdinand and his wife. The massacre turned out to be a part of the project to annex Bosnia and
Herzegovina to the kingdom of Serbia, designed in heads of a military circle in Belgrade and driven
by desire of Serbs behind the river Drina to live in a Serbian state. The mastermind of the secret
project, “Black hand”, whose slogan was “Unification or death”, was an officer in Serbian army,
Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis, who organized the infamous assassination of Serbian royal couple in
Belgrade, in 1903. 1 This assassination triggered WWI, which costed Serbia half of her male
population, but initiated what Serbian nationalist were up to – unification of all Serbs on Balkan
into a single, common state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, later named
Yugoslavia.
(One of prominent plotters in Bosnian movement was Vase Chubrilović, whom we shall meet
again, later on.)
Yugoslavia lasted 71 years, about the average age of her citizens. As mentioned earlier, her
disintegration was trigged by another bloody massacre, that in the army casern at Paraćin, in 1987,
committed by ethnic-Albanian Aziz Kelmendi.
Contrary to buildings, which are difficult to erect, but easy to destroy, forming a new state appears
easier than to dismantle it. Yugoslavia formed after WWI (Yu1 in the following) was created as an
agreement between Slovenian, Croat and Serb populations, including Montenegrins (who have
always considered themselves Serbs) and Macedonians, who were already absorbed by Serbia after
the Second Balkan war in 1913. This fusion of various Slav parts of the Western Balkan was not an
easy task, but was carried out without many troubles. At least, it seemed so after the constitution
was effectuated. It is important to stress here that the initiative for forming a common state came
from outside Serbia, in particular from Croats, who use to live in the former Austro-Hungary,
having lost their independence as early as 1104. The advantage of the constitutive nations was they
were all Slavs, except for ethnic Albanians at KiM and Western Macedonia, Hungarians in
Vojvodina and some other “minorities”. Disadvantage was the numeric proportion, which was
approximately like this: Serbs: Croats: Slovenians = 4:2:1. This appears the worst proportion, for
the more numerous populations may treat the half numerous one either as “minority”, or “on equal
footing”. Thus, no problems arose between Serbs and Slovenians, but Croat appeared
“sandwiched” between both populations. The tension between Croats and Serbs will turn out a
constant in the new state, both before WWII (Yu1) and after WWII (Yu2). Both king Alexander
Karadjordjevic and Josip Broz tried to forge a new “Yugoslav nation”. The former coined the
notion of “triple-one nation”, whereas Tito pressed for the ”brotherhood and unity” of all Yugoslav
nations. The first approach was defective in the sense that the ethnical approach was obsolete and
illegitimate (considering the presence of non-Slavic populations), whereas the Tito’s brotherhood
was equally out of context, considering the ethnical mixture of the Yugoslavs. With nationalism
one encounters the same problem as with religions. They help the same nationalities, or confession,

1
Apis (who incidentally was a Vlach from East Serbia) will be accused of a plot against Prince Aleksander
Karadjordjevic in 1917 at the Thessalonica front and executed.
 73

become more compact, but on the other hand create the feeling of alienation between different
entities and ultimately bring about animosities and even conflicts.
Yu1 was just about to disintegrate when WWII started, and the division of the occupied Yugoslavia
made heterogeneous structure more than conspicuous. True, Tito succeeded to re-establish
Yugoslavia, but at the cost of dictatorship. More over, he was able to keep his position thanks to his
Croat nationality (and his Serb wife, to some extent), thus balancing the numerical predominance
of the Serb population. Another important balancing factor was the economic strength of the
leading republics, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, which appeared evenly distributed, owing to the
different levels of civilization in these parts of the common state. Namely, the brut national product
per capita was inversely proportional to the number of the respective republic. As mentioned
before, Serbia was an average of the whole state and her contribution to the federal fund for the
under-developed republics and KiM matched the donation from the Fund to KiM. (The other
republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were supported by Slovenia and
Croatia.)
A serous threat to the so-called centrifugal Yugoslav forces appeared in the late 80-thies, in the
form of the Croat Ante Marković, elected for the prime minister of the Federal state. This capable
executive, a manager of a successful Croat enterprise, managed to give a considerable impulse to
the declining Yugoslav economy. He introduced convertible Yugoslav dinar, the first in Yu2 and
the people managed to save a great deal of money in the local banks. He became ever more
popular, at the consternation of the nationalists from Yugoslav republics. Ante Marković founded a
new, so-called Reform Party, which threatened to marginalize all local republican political
organizations, including Communist parties. The response of the latter and local politicians was
quick and unscrupulous. Campaign against Ante Marković was open from all public means, in
particular from Croatia and especially from Serbia. Serbia even did not hesitate to raid the federal
fund and takes money for her own use. Various republics turned against Ante Marković for
different reasons. Milošević saw in him his rival, somebody who would take the leading role on the
federal scene. Croatia and Slovenia were afraid of his eventual successful preservation of the
federal state and thus prolongation of their efforts to secede.
Practical dissolution of Yugoslavia was initiated by Slovenia. It started by a seemingly innocent
incident. A Slovenian journalist wrote an article sympathetic with ”Shqiptar cause”. 1 When he next
day was entering his office, he was intercepted by a Shqiptar, who presented him with a bottle of
“Skenderbeg” brandy, thanking him for the support. After that new articles on the subject issued
and the Slovenian public was “Prepared’ for the Shqiptar cause. Soon a meting was arranged in the
largest hall in Ljubljana, “Cankarjev dom”, when Slovenian and Shqiptar speakers accused Serbia
of suppression o Shqiptars. The response from Serbia was as furious as superfluous, with the
rhetoric of “ wounded national feelings”, “betrayal” etc. But the ghost was released from the
bottle. Slovenia showed she was opting for secession. The lead was followed soon by Croat
nationalists and the process was gaining an impetus.
From the more “ideological side”, the division of Yugoslavian political scene was outlined by the
speed of democratization of the society. In this respect Slovenia took the lead, with Croatia
following. In Serbia it was Slobodan Milošević, and more importantly his Wife, Mirjana Marković,
who obstinately tried to slow down the inevitable development of the Yugoslav society, from the
autocratic to democratic one. They remained chained in their communist mentality, incapable to
adopt a more flexible attitude. There were, moreover, serious indications that they dreamed to
restore Tito’s Yugoslavia, with Milošević taking over the role of Josip Broz. When they realized
the illusory character of their political intentions, the time was lost and Serbia was well behind the
Slovenia and Croatia. As for other republics, their roles appeared marginal, as expected, since they
1
Whether it was motivated by the fear from Shiptar violent political demands, in view of the Paraćin massacre, or was
a genuine sympathy of the by far most advanced republic of Yugoslavia with by far the most retarded region in the
same state, is a question, though interesting in itself, but outside the scope of our topic here.
 74

were even less advanced in that matter than Serbia. In Slovenia and Croatia political parties,
different from the existing “communist party (the Party)” 1 In Slovenia and Croatia oppositional
parties won the first “free elections”, whereas in Serbia newly founded non-communist (and “non-
communist”) attracted much fewer voters and remained marginal on the political scene. Thus, a
serious division in Yugoslavia appeared – democratic west and communist Serbia. When the
practical disintegration moves started, it was obvious who is going to gain sympathies from the
West.
Another important division between East and West Yugoslavia was confessional one. Slovenia and
Croatia are predominantly Roman-Catholic, whereas Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia belong to
the Greek-Orthodox realm. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, their partition was the following:
Muslim (50%) 44%!, Serb-orthodox (32%) and Croat Roman-catholic (18%) 17%! This proportion
will turn out fatal for this republic, as we shall see later on.
We turn now to two important aspects of the Yugoslav disintegration: (i) ethno-sociological
diversity and (ii) formal frame for the dismantling a state which was existing for almost a century.

The principal ethnicities in Yu1 were: 2

Serbs (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia)

Croats (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Slovenians (Slovenia)
Muslims (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Macedonians (Macedonia)
Shqiptars (Serbia, Macedonia)
Hungarians (Serbia)
Germans (Serbia)
Roma (Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia)

Principal languages: Serbo-Croat (Serbs, Croats, Muslims)

Slovenian (Slovenians)
Macedonian (Macedonians)
Albanian (Shqiptars)

Serbo-Croat region: (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro)

In the following we shall designate that part of Yugoslavia with Serbo-Croat native language as
Serbo-Croatia, for the sake of simplicity, without any attempt to harm
ethnic feelings of the people living there. As we shall see immediately, it was there that the most
violent events occurred during the disintegration of Yu2.
But the above division along the formal ethnic lines turned out less important in the issuing
conflicts and massacres in the period (1991-1995). We need, therefore to reformulate the partition
of the Serbo-Croatia, in order to understand properly the way the state disintegrated.
We defined before the Dinaric region, which comprised Croatia south of river Sava, Herzegovina,
Montenegro and Northern Albania. Pannonic region (Vojvodina, Slavonia, Northern Bosnia) were
inhabited predominantly by lowlanders, whereas intermediate areas (Serbia south of river Danube,
Zagorje in Croatia and Central Bosnia) are inhabited by the population whose anthropological
characteristics lie between the hard and violent Dinaric highlanders and mild and civilized
lowlanders. This simplified picture, however, may be misleading. Due to permanent migration

1
Quotation marks are to indicate that the term “party” in a single-party state is contradictio in adjecto.
2
In Yu2 the same ethnic content was retained, with the difference that Germans in Serbia (so-called Volksdeutschers,
Vojvodina) have migrated to Germany, or have been banished there by the new communist regime; also a small Italian
minority in Croatia (Istria and Dalmatia) has been banished, too.
 75

from the highlands towards lowlands, mountainous people have been present all over the Serbo-
Croatia, in particular in towns. Apart from the steady individual/familial influx from the Dinaric
region, plane people have been experiencing waves of migrations after some violent events, like
war or uprisings (so-called metanastatic migrations, mentioned before). One of these waves took
place in 1944/5, after the WWII, when a considerable number of Dinaroids moved to Pannonic
plane and capital towns, like Belgrade and Zagreb. Since it was them who took the principal part in
the partisan guerrilla during the war, these intruders occupied high state positions, both military and
civic. With their pronounced tribal mentality, they took control over the surrounding population,
mainly via Party membership, since they constituted the bulk of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
This situation will prove instrumental in the events which ensued in the disintegration of Yu2.
But before we enter the scene for this disintegration a few words of the organization of power in
the state are in order. Two principal common sectors in Yu2 were the tools which Tito used for
controlling the state (and society in general) and keeping all republics together. One was Yugoslav
Communist Party, the other the Yugoslav Army (YA). The first sector was partitioned, however,
into republican Parties and liable for mutual tensions and disputes, as it happened several times
after the WWII. The Army, on the contrary, was unique and compact, fully devoted to Marshal
Tito, who was considered semi god by the army officers, from corporals to generals. And whenever
the state was in danger to disintegrate and the Party failed to ensure the absolute unity, Tito
resorted to his YA, who was always ready to fulfil his orders. 1
When the multiparty system was introduced in Yu2 in 1990, first in Slovenia and Croatia, and then
in the rest of Yugoslavia, communist parties transformed, at least formally, into other entities,
suitable renamed. New parties were formed, lead as a rule, by the former members of the
communist parties. 2 This turn was to be expected. First anybody with political affinities had to
make a choice during Tito’s rule: either to suppress his ambitions or to join the Party. The former
became apolitical, the latter (in)sincere party members. Some of the latter, unsatisfied with their
position within the party hierarchy, founded their own parties, to satisfy their insentient craving for
power. And in the latter respect Dinaroids had no match on the Yugoslav political scene. Except
from Slovenia and Macedonia (which did not belong to Serbo-Croat region, anyway), almost all
“oppositional parties” followed their Dinaroid leaders. In Croatia these were Tudjman and Mesić,
in Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and Radovan Karadžić, in Montenegro Momir
Bulatović and Milo Djukanović and finally in Serbia Slobodan Milošević, as head of his Socialistic
Party of Serbia (SPS), Vuk Drashković, leader of Serb Movement for Renaissance (SPO) and
Vojislav Šešelj leading the so-called Serb Radical Party (SRS). 3 The only true oppositional party in
Serbia was Democratic Party (DS), lead by Dragoljub Mićunović (spelt Mitjunovitj, who himself
was in his youth a party member) and Zoran Djindjic (spelt Gjingjitj), a young liberal philosopher,
who got his PhD in West Germany.
Since these political leaders will play prominent role both in Y2 disintegration and later on, we
shall devote some space to their personalities.

Slobodan Milošević, II

If you can’t beat them, you join them.

We have already described to some extent his personality. Though of purely Montenegrin origin,
he was, presumably, born in Serbia and was brought up within her cultural milieu. It was this

1
This was the case in 1972, when first Croatian, and then Serbian parties exhibited some rebellious mood and Tito
threatened them by the Army intervention.
2
The only notable exception was the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegović, who started (end ended) his political
career as Muslim fundamentalist, and spent many years in prison.
3
Derived from sheshe – smallpox .
 76

dichotomy which shaped his manners and political career. He used to be rigid and stubborn, but
could show a certain charm in the public appearing and personal contacts. When he became the
president of Serbia, his principal concern was show to preserve this position indefinitely. Ones
deciding to be a dictator, his political stratagem and tactics were determined. He was not ready to
share the power with anybody, and behave as he was going to remain on the top forever. Once a
dictator becomes dictator, he becomes aware, at the same time he will have no room for giving up.
So, the more unpopular he is, the more strongly he sticks to the power. Dictatorship is a “river of
no return”.
His principal tools for preserving the power were the police, army, state banks and state public
media. All four “columns of power” were in the hands of his Montenegrin (and in part
Herzegovian) compatriots. As for the rest of media he did not care for them, making a tacit
agreement in the Frederic II manner. 1 Similar attitude was towards the banks. In fact, those two
pyramid scheme banks, mentioned above, were set up in collaboration with Milošević and it was
this robbery which enabled him, under the cover of his son Marko, to acquire an enormous amount
of money and transfer it to Israel, Cyprus etc. This money was used as an initial capital for starting
private business of his son and later, when fled from the country his family to indulge in a
luxurious life. In his public appearing he used to imitate Marshal Tito and the same ritual was
designed for that matter. He practiced an apodictic style in public and at meetings, again imitating
his political idol - Josip Broz. In fact, it was this ambition of substituting Tito on the Yugoslav
political scene which caused first the animosity of the rest of Yugoslav republics, then open
hostility, ending in disintegration of the state. 2
Formally, single-party system need not be taken as antagonistic relative to many-party states.
Under a single party one may discern (or allow) many fractions, competing for influence,
(ideological, political etc). In a sense such an organization may be considered as a many parties
“under the same roof”. In fact, Tito and other autocrats used to defend their ruling positions by such
a democracy, where antagonistic conflicts are suppressed. The idea of many parties in a single
organisation was reflected in logic of federal state, like Tito’s Yugoslavia. In this respect, any Party
member in a Yugoslav state who would complain about unitarism etc appears a hypocrite, for the
very membership in a single party implies unitaristic inclination. Milošević’s unitarism was,
therefore, nothing to be surprised (and objected, for that matter). The fact that, except for Croatia
and partly in BiH, after elections in 1990 it was party bosses who won the elections, proves that the
single-party mentality was well entrenched in the minds of Yugoslavs. In Serbia, it will take 10
years the non-communist parties to won the elections.
Milošević was under a fatal influence of his ambitious wife, Mira Marković, 3 who founded her
own political party, so-called Yugoslav United Left (YUL), with symbolic number of members, but
with a strong influence, particularly in matters of personal politics. It was a counter example of the
infamous Romanian ruling couple Nikolae and Elena Ceausescu, as popular in Serbia as the latter
was in Romania. YUL was, in fact, a political cover for a number of illegal activities, like
privatization of state money, blackmail, bribery etc. With SPS and YUL the organized crime
entered the Serbian political scene, to step back never since.

Vuk Drašković
This graduated lawyer, was born in Vojvodina, in 1946, in the family of Herzegovian (partisan)
settlers, but the family moved back to Herzegovina and it was there he was brought up as a
dedicated communist. He graduated law and was employed as secretary to Mika Shpiljak, later to
become the prime minister of Yugoslav government. Later he became a journalist, and was
recruited for the state security service. He married an ambitious Montenegrin, Danica, from the
1
“I have made a deal with my subjects – they may say whatever they want and I am doing what I want”.
2
Ironically, in a sense, it was Tito who both rescued Yugoslavia and who dismembered it.
3
The very fact she retained her maiden surname speaks of her vanity and ambition.
 77

royalist (Chetnik) family, who soon converted him to a royalist too. Vuk founded a political party,
Serb-nationalistic royalist Serb Revival Movement (SRM), strongly opposed to Milošević regime,
better to say very eager to overthrow Milošević and take over the power. He adopted a traditional
Serb image of a pious person, imitating first long-haired monk, then the duke Mikhailo (Obrenović
dynasty), while opting for the restoration of the rival Karadjordjević royal house. His public style
resembled much that of Hitler and his followers used to imitate fascist manners. He was under the
influence of his tough wife Danica, even more than it was Milošević under his Mira. Unlike
Milošević, Drašković was a person of modest capabilities, disguised behind an emphatic rhetoric in
the prophetic manners.

Vojislav Šešelj (Sheshely)

If you can’t join them, you beat them.

An extraordinary personality rarely met in European recent history. Coming from a humble social
status, endowed with an infinite vanity and ambitions, intelligent, cunning, perfidy, primitive,
imposing, treacherous, cynical, this Satanic character was a mixture of Athenian Kleon (as
described by Aristotle in his Athenian constitution) and Roman Katilina (Šešelj was of enormous
size), but with extremely base mental structure. He graduated law in his natal town Sarajevo, 1
where he got his doctorate too. He joined Party early in his youth, became an assistant at the
faculty of law, but was soon expelled from the Party. He wrote an (17 page) appeal for
reacceptance, but was rejected. Soon he was arrested and sentenced for 8 year hard-labour prison.
His behaviour was of such manners that the prison authorities considered it better to get rid of him
and he was released after two years and banished from Bosnia to Serbia. 2 Since his father was a
Croat and mother Serb, he was at choice which nationality (and republic) to adopt. He opted for
Serbian one and became a “great Serb”, learning first how to make an orthodox crossing. Members
of his extended family, Šešeljs, all live in Zagreb and other Croatian towns. (His brother renounced
him publicly as the family shame).
Not willing to do any useful work in the new environment, Šešelj opted for the political career.
Having nothing to offer, he based his political activities and ambitions on two main pillars; (i)
anonymity and (ii) Serb nationalism. The first point was very advantageous, since nobody in Serbia
new his previous CV and he was free to invent whatever suited him. As for the second point, this
insistence, which grew to the point of chauvinism, was enforced to great extent by his Croat
nationality, which he rightly considered as hindrance to his political ambitions. He joined first Vuk
Drašković party, making Drašković his godfather at the same time.
Since Drašković was a pro-Chetnik agitator, Šešelj engaged himself in playing role of a Serb
chetnik nationalist. He used to visit North America, delivering talks to the local Serb immigrant
population (charging each talk, of course). In Serbia Šešelj had him photographed for newspapers
in Chetnik uniforms, with rifle or gun in hand. Seduced by such vigorous ”pro-Chetnik” activities,
the old chetnik vojvoda (commandant in Serb tradition), a USA immigrant Momčilo Djujić,
bestowed to Šešelj the rank of vojvoda. The honeymoon did not last for long, however, for when
the old warrior realized whom he was dealing with, when Šešelj joined Milošević in 1998, he
renounced Šešelj and publicly deprived him from his chetnik membership and vojvoda rank (Djujic
je umro 1995. g.!): “[because] Šešelj has become the devoted collaborator and accomplice in all
crimes and treachery which Slobodan Milošević is committing against Serb people”. As for the link
with Drašković, Šešelj long ago concluded he needed Vuk any longer. He established his own
party, Serb Radical Party (SRP), adopting the name of an ancient Serbian party (“Narodna RS”),
1
His father, a railway worker, came from a Herzegovian village Orahov Do.
2
There is another interpretation of this sudden release from prison, as a deal for ruining Serbia in return. This thesis has
been widely corroborated by subsequent behaviour of Šešelj.
 78

who was very influential before WWII in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Cunningly engaging local Serbs
as the cover, and with the help of his Herzegovian compatriots, Šešelj started his march for
conquering and subduing Serbia.
Free from any ethics, human or political, this unscrupulous creature uses any means to exterminate
his opponents, political or otherwise. He managed to attract a number of Serbian populations,
which consisted from three social sectors of Serbia: (i) Dinaric immigrants, either from the
previous metanastatic migrations or recent ones, (ii) Roma and (iii) social outcasts and losers, the
very bottom of the social pyramid. Each of those three sectors had its particular reason to join this
party, which soon was recognized as a social movement rather than a party in a strict sense.
But apart from the socio-psychological explanation of Šešelj’s behaviour, one must take serious the
hidden project which lies behind the seemingly foolish rhetoric. His noisy announcement that his
radicals strive to founder a Serb state, with the western borders along the now famous line: Ogulin,
Karlobag, Virovitica (straight across the Croatia) nobody took serious, except for the propaganda
reasons (from Croatian side particularly). Does Šešelj really believe in such a project? In no
occasion he was willing to explicate what exactly he is going to do in order to achieve this goal.
For good reason. His aim is not to start war, even less to do some thing himself for that matter.
Then what’s the point?
Those areas he is claiming to belong to Serbs are populated by Serbs, mainly as dispersed orthodox
population. Two points enter the issue here. First, those Serbs should be instigated to rebel or
become trouble makers anyway. Second, even without disturbances, the rest of the Croat (and
Bosnian) non-Serbs citizens would feel insecure in the presence of the population which might start
rebellion or other perturbation. In such situation a tension between the Serb and the other
autochthonous population will be sustained, as Damocles sword. And when in 1991 the political
turmoil in Yugoslavia started, it was Serbs in Croatia and BiH who were first engaged in rebelling,
instigated by Šešelj. If one accounts that Milošević had similar project in head, the realization was
ensured. The rationale of both leaders was simple: we can not control Serbs outside Serbia and they
can not support us from there. We shall bring tem here to Serbia, what will be multiply profitable
for us. These immigrants would be thankful to u for “saving” them and would be our political
supporters. By these numerous intruders we will be able to keep our control over the local Serbian
population (Serb or other alike). In fact it was the real (and realistic) content of Milošević’s slogan
”All Serbs in a single state”. The only difference between these two leaders was that each of them
meant the newcomers to be his supporters, not of his adversary. As the subsequent events proved,
Šešelj appeared more cunning and base rival and his demagogy turned out more effective. It should
be noted here that those plans were at the same time at least wishful thinking of the Croat and non-
Serb BiH local politicians, for such an evacuation of the potentially disloyal population would
solve their problem, too. This point makes another interpretation concerning Šešelj activities
plausible – a (tacit or secret) agreement between Šešelj and these leaders to carry out the migration
project. (At this point Milošević’ and Šešelj’s tactics separate).
Everyone who is familiar with Zionist movement must feel she has already learned this kind of
reasoning and tactics. It has been most vividly explained by Ariel Sharon (see Appendix 1)
The rising popularity of the SRP can be explained by the very social structure of the followers.
Normally, a political party is lead by the most capable members of the society, who guarantee to
the followers the prosperity of the state. The followers of Šešelj were well aware he was a scum,
but it was just the rationale for following him. The logic was simple and devastating one: I am the
social loser, but if we ketches the power, we shall compensate for all our humiliations. Our leader
is spiting at the elite of the society and I enjoy it, as a revenge for my low social status. This elite is
no better than I am, for we are humiliating them, covered by the facade of the freedom of speech.
In fact, the stratagem and tactics of Šešelj and his followers resemble much those of early
Christians, the social losers as they were. They could not be beaten, for they were already at the
very bottom. The Romans and Greeks despised them, for good reason, but lost the war at the end.
 79

For they did not recognize the nature of their movement, just as today Serbian population does not
recognize the nature and aims of SRP. We stress here, however, that whatever the stratagem of the
“party” was, the leadership of the movement was Dinaric one and the whole affair took over tribal
form.
Being of a Satanic nature, Šešelj’s stratagem was complementary (better to say orthogonal) to the
normal one, as expected in a civilized society. He is making use of a truly “inverse logic”, which to
an outsider seems foolish and wrong. We shall not dwell here on it, but shall expose those parts of
this logic as used in the ensuing “wars” in YU2.
The main concern of Šešelj and his followers was the publicity. To this end they have adopted the
same stratagem as used by Adolf Hitler at the beginning of his political career in early twenties. 1

“It makes no difference whatever they laugh at us or revile us, whether they represent
us as clowns or criminals; the main thing is that they mention us, that they concern
themselves with us again and again...”.
Mein Kampf

Publicity, publicity at any rate, no matter of which quality, political or ethical. When Yugoslav
“wars” started Šešelj was eager to incite anybody to engage in atrocities, making sure not to be
involved directly himself. Many atrocities perpetuated by his men in Croatia and Bosnia were not
only publicized by his media, but even exaggerated (some even completely invented). The rationale
for this kind of self-promotion propaganda was weird, but very cunning and effective. Those
engagements, real and fictive, even if carried out by other paramilitaries, nobody would like to
claim for himself, for obvious reason. Thus, by claiming atrocities for themselves Šešeljoids
achieve at least two things:
By systematically stressing they are Serbs, they demonize Serbia and thus promote her isolation
from the international community.
They promote their political presence and “patriotism” within Serbia herself, attracting further the
low-level social strata people, mainly frustrated social losers, both autochthonous, from Serbia, and
newcomers (refugees, immigrants, etc) from over-Drina regions.

The long-term goal is to lower down the general civilization level of Serbian society, so that they
can take over the power, making use of violent and illegal means. We shall meet many occasions in
the following, where this stratagem is explicitly exposed. Another possibility, taken seriously by
some Serbians, is that Šešelj is a foreign provocateur (probably of Ustashas, Croat Nazis). As we
shall see later concerning KiM, this suspicion becomes very real, indeed.
One particular distasteful and annoying face of this weird personality is his infinite thirst for
publicity. The whole Serbia has been flooded by posters with his portrait, with “patriotic” slogans.
His name is always mentioned by his followers with title Prof. Dr, though he does not hold any
professorship at any faculty. Tens of books have been published under his name (with his portrait
on the cover), although he has nothing to do with their content. Weekly magazine of his party
contains tens of his pictures per issue (the record has been 57). His inferiority complex has no mach
in any country for sure.
According to the latest elections (2004) 30 % of voters found him Serb saviour (17 % of the total
electoral body), 70 % experience him as a nuisance. 2 (We note that 50 % of the electoral body
abstains from voting since 2000, but Šešelj’s followers vote 100 %).

Politics and obsession

1
See, e.g. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, Penguin Books, 1998, p. 147.
2
Note that Hitler collected 30 % of votes in 1932.
 80

What makes a common divisor for these three is their frustration, mental hindrance which guides,
better to say channels, their behaviour on the public scene. Milošević’s alleged nationalism
appeared a mere compensation of his communist internationalism, particularly supported by his
wife, Mira Marković. They were both raised within the communist regime. When Milošević
became a local party activist, he was known to fight “Serb nationalism”, showing contempt for
those who were “Serbing”. When he found, after “Kosovo experience” in 1987 that riding a “Serb
tiger” could be very profitable, he abandoned internationalism, Tito’s “brotherhood and unity”, for
fighting for “Serb interest”. He had to compensate for another “handicap” – his Montenegrin
origin. Thus, he became “bigger Catholic than Pope”. One thing can not be imputed to him,
however, chauvinism. In fact Milošević never mentioned other nationalities in his public appearing.
His primary goal was acquiring dominant position within Yu2, as Tito, his idol, held.
Vuk Drašković is similar story, though written in different language. Being a Party member,
coming from a communist family, he was obsessed by getting rid of this phase of his life (mostly
due to his wife of Chetnik provenience). As somebody said all communists are divided into two
categories: communist and anti-communist. It was for this reason Drašković found it easy to pass
from one camp to the other. In time when communism was falling apart, first in USSR and then in
all satellite states, it was not difficult to Drašković to realize on which side of bread the butter was.
The same holds for his sudden piety and devotion to the Serb Orthodox church, after his vigorous
atheism as the Party member. These misgivings turned out driving force for his political career.
Vojislav Šešelj appears particularly clear example of the interplay of psychological disturbances
and public behaviour. If the two previous cases belong to the realm of psychology, his case is a
pure psychiatric one. Born in a humble Bosnian family, rejected and punished by his immediate
environment, he developed a conspicuous syndrome of misanthropy. When banished to Serbia and
found himself rejected and despised by the new environment as well, his misanthropy turned into
sadism, which he even has not tried to conceal. At meetings and mass relies, in the Parliament, at
court (both domestic and at Hague Tribunal) he enjoys spitting at everybody and everything he
considers the others value and respect. It was this kind of behaviour which has been attracting the
bottom of the society, social losers and the like. He and his party have been ignored by Serbian
society what makes them even more aggressive and imposing. His mental maturity corresponds to
pre-school kids. Apart from these mental defects, his character appears a caricature of the Dinaric
mentality and (anti) social attitude. Coupled with his intelligence, unscrupulousness and personal
charisma, this creature turns out to be the enemy No 1 of Serbia, a truly national disaster.
The political scene in Serbia (1990-2000)
This tribal aspect of the formally political rivalry was the most prominent feature of the Milošević’s
era (and is still present in the current affairs) in Serbia. Before we turn to this part of the modern
Serbian history, we mention that some other parties were engaged in the struggle for the political
influence on the newly acquired political space. In fact, when the first free elections after WWII
were announced, numerous parties were formed, but the overwhelming majority of them was not
serious political business, but rather irresponsible affair, even a mockery. Apart from the three
Dinaroid parties mentioned, there was Democratic party (DP), led by the university professor
Dragoljub Mićunović, a philosopher who spent some time abroad before engaging on the Serbian
political scene. Another prominent figure, a young philosopher Dr Zoran Djindjic, was instrumental
in strengthening the party, together with a number of leading Serbian intellectuals. Unfortunately,
some of them were of Dinaric origin and they soon started seceding from the party, founding new
branches, like Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) lead by Vojislav Koshtunica, of a recent Dinaric
descend. While DP was the party of the centre, DPS positioned itself on the right, conservative and
nationalistic wing. Another party, Association of Serbian Citizens (ASC), lead by the sociologist
Vesna Peshić, attracted the very top of the Serbian intellectual, liberal elite, but had a modest
membership and little direct political influence on the current politics.
 81

Practically, the Serbian political scene at this period was marked by the antagonistic rivalry within
the triangle SPS – SRP – SRM, three Dinaroid quasi-political organizations. The first, Milošević’s
party was controlled predominantly by Montenegrins, the second, Šešelj’s party by Herzegovians
and SRM by both Herzegovians and Montenegrins (following the leaders’ origins). SPS was tightly
holding the power, ready to do everything physically possible to retain it. The other two players
fought Miloshević in order to overthrow him (or at least join him). The difference in political
programmes of all these rivals was of little importance, for it changed as the situation required. The
only permanent motive force of their activities was the craving for power. Even their loud
nationalistic rhetoric could not conceal the only driving force of their ambitions – a pathological
power obsession.
(Civilized people, in particular Westerners, appear incapable to understand this mental feature of
Dinaroids, though some historians have not failed to recognize that almost all dictators in history
were montagnards, from Pisistratus, to Vespasian, Bonaparte, Stalin and Hitler. In fact, highlanders
have never been used to turn to industrious work, since they for millennia were engaged in
plundering the lowlands or mutual robbery).
Since they split, SRP and SRM entered an antagonistic struggle, with SRP ready to eliminate the
rival at all expense, including assassinations. As for other parties mentioned, they cooperated
occasionally among themselves and with SRM, but their influence in the Parliament was inversely
proportional to the quality of their political programmes, that is meagre.

Kosovo (meta)mythology

In the struggle for gaining an international support or at least sympathy for their cause Albanians,
Albanian and Kosovars 1 alike, have made an extensive use of the so-called Serb Kosovo myth.
This insisting on the Serb obsession about Kosovo battle and its consequences have resulted in
creating another mythology, myth about Kosovo myth, what may be called Kosovo meta-
mythology. The rationale for creating this meta-mythology is simple. If they can demonstrate that
Serbs look at their history in an irrational way, as the case with Kosovo myth shows, all other
historical claims made from Serb side concerning Kosovo are equally mere constructs of Serb
imagination, devoid of a real historical content. In particular Serb claims for the historical rights on
Kosovo have no factual support. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to consider “Kosovo myth”
in more details and then analyze the ideological background and political aims of the meta-
mythology we mentioned above.
Though many details on Kosovo Battle in 1389 are missing, the essential facts concerning this
decisive battle between Turks and Serbs on Kosovo Field are well established. 2 Serb united forces
were led by grand duke Lazar, 3 the most prominent Serb ruler at the time, while sultan Murat was
at the head of the Turkish army. A military unit from Bosnia, under the leadership of nobleman
Vlatko Vuković was engaged too, but it left the battlefield before the battle was over. Despite the
claims of some Albanian authors no evidence for Albanian engagement on the Christian side has
been recorded. As for the strengths of the clashing forces records disagree about numbers, but it has
been generally agreed that Turks outnumbered Christians, though probably not so much as Serb
romantic authors claimed, and certainly not as the folk poetry implied. According to Turkish
records Murat lead about 37.000, whereas a rough estimate of Christian army was ten to fifteen
thousands soldiers, including those from Bosnia. Bosnian king Tvrtko, who otherwise had a title of

1
Terms frequently used for inhabitants of KiM.
2
See, e.g. Noel Malcolm, KOSOVO, a short history, Harper Perennial, 1999, for the detailed historiography of the
Battle.
3
Knez Lazar in Serb. In the folk poetry Lazar was called invariably emperor Lazar, for reasons to be explained later
on.
 82

king of Bosnia and Serbia, did not send a large army, since he was engaged in a dispute with local
Dalmatian cities and fiefdoms. It was, presumably, due to this fact that he withdrew his unit before
the Battle was over, saving it for his domestic needs.
Army centres were lead by Murat and Lazar. Serb left wing was under the command of Vlatko
Vuković and the right wing by Vuk Branković. Turkish right wing was under the command of the
elder Murat’s son Bajazit (Pajazit), while the younger brother, Jacub led the left wing. Vuk
Branković overpowered the Turkish left wing, but Bajazid pushed Vlatko’s forces back. Majority
of the latter retreated and left the battle and Bayazit crashed the Serb centre and presumably
ultimately defeated the Christian army.
Important role in the battle outcome was played by Yanichars, the elite Turk infantry, composed
from the non-Turkish subject youth. Decisive move at the end of battle was made by Murat’s son
Bayazid, who led the light cavalry charged at Gazimestan. Duke Lazar was captured and
decapitated during the battle. Sultan Murat lost his life, too, but the historians disagree about the
event. Both sides, Turkish and Serb, agreed that it was a Serb nobleman, Milosh Obilić (Kobilić)
who assassinated Turkish sultan, but they disagree on the way it was done. 1 While Serb tradition
maintains that Milosh Obilic approached the sultan during (or before) the battle, under the pretence
of joining Turkish side and then slaughtered him in his tent, the Turkish interpretation greatly
differs from this. According to the latter, it was after the battle was over, when Murat was
inspecting the field covered with dead bodies, when Milosh Obilic, who was pretending to be dead,
jumped suddenly up and fatally wounded the sultan. There was another tradition of twelve “sworn
nights”, lead by Milosh Obilic, 2 who paved their way through the Turkish lines, broke the camels
circle around the Murat’s tent and slaughtered the sultan. All variants appear rather suspect. In any
case, Milosh Obilic has been regarded by Serbs as the greatest hero, comparable with Leonidas and
Mucie Scevola.
It is interesting at this point to mention that Albanian historians used to claim that Milosh Obilic
was an Albanian, in fact. It is even more interesting, in this context, to note that after NATO and
Albanian forces occupied KiM, one of the first demonstration of the new situation was to remove
the Monument erected to Milosh Obilic at the Priština centre and to replace it with the monument
of Skenderbeg. 3 (Myths come and go, as the needs require.)
As for the real historical importance of the battle, or its consequences, historians disagree.
According to the traditional interpretations, in particular Serb ones, it was a battle for Christian
Europe, whose positive outcome might have saved the latter from Turkish invasion. Modern
historians prefer to give much less importance to the significance of Kosovo battle, arguing that
even the Christian victory would be of a transient consequence and would not change the history in
the long terms. 4 The truth lies, probably, somewhere in-between. Eventual Christian victory might
have triggered a coherent response of the European states to the Turkish threat. The very fact that
the immediate response of the Christian Europe to the (false) news that Christians prevailed, was
the ringing the bells across the Continent in celebration proves that the contemporary Europe put
much weight on the Battle.
Turks did not exploit immediately their military success, since the new sultan, Bayazid, after
having had his brother Jacub killed, 5 hurried to Anatolia in order to secure his new position in the

1
See, e.g. A. Loma, Prakosovo, Slovenski i Indoevropski koreni srpske epike, SANU, Balkanoloski Institut, Beograd,
2002 (in Serb). (Prekosovo, Slavonic and Indoeuropean roots of Serb epic)
2
The story resembles too much the famous “Theban sacred regiment’, which was broken by Alexander at the Cheronea
battle, to be taken seriously.
3
As mentioned before, Skenderbeg never stepped on Kosovo Polje soil.
4
This view is supported in a sense by the possibility that Turks were really defeated on Kosovo Field, but if it did
happen, it was a Pyrrhic victory, judging from the consequences. This outcome might explain the king’s assertion that
he won the Battle, since he was the only king who survived it (though he did not take part in it).
5
This custom was practiced in Ottoman Empire, for obvious practical reasons, thus avoiding struggles over the throne
between the sultan’s sons.
 83

state. Serbian lands east from river Drina continued to exist as Turkish vassal states, until they were
totally subjugated with the fall of the new capital Smederevo in 1459, six years after the fall of
Constantinople. From then on, Serbs were to live in the “Turkish slavery” for the next four
centuries.
Turkish occupation put an end of the development of Serbia in all respects and isolated her from
the rest of Europe until the middle of 19th century. The aristocracy was extinguished, the middle
class, which hardly existed before the occupation, was annihilated too. The only national institution
which remained, though in a very restricted extent, was Serb Orthodox church, which was
identified with Serb nation and was instrumental in preserving national identity. One may think of
the present-day Serbian Orthodox Church, (and the Greek Orthodox Church in general, for that
matter), obsolete as she is, whatever she likes, but her role in preserving the European civilization
on Balkan during the Ottoman rule, can not be overestimated. It is important to note that during
almost half millennium life under the rule of the Muslim empire not a single Orthodox Serb was
converted into Islam. This fact should be paralleled with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania,
where the convertites have made the majority of the overall population. What the latter fact has
been giving rise can be judged when comparing the civilization levels of these Muslim regions with
the surrounding Christian population.
Among other things, clergyman was the only literary sector of the entire Serb society, which was
restricted to rural area only. Towns were populated almost exclusively by Turks, Greeks, Jews and
Cincars. 1 The lack of laic educational system and schools has resulted in developing an oral poetry,
which turned out to achieve an unprecedented value, both in the extent and quality, almost
comparable to that of Homeric Greek. And as with Homer the Troy episode became the central
point of Hellenic tradition and ethos, so the Kosovo battle occupied the most essential part of the
Serb literary tradition. The so-called Kosovo cycle became Serb Iliad, though it was a collection of
poems composed by various folk poets. 2
It is of interest here to point out hat no poetry dealing with events before Kosovo battle have been
recorded. The explanation by Vuk Karadzic, the leading Serb linguist and folklorist, was that
Kosovo battle so much perturbed the national memory, that this traumatic experience wiped out
everything that was done in the field before.
Now, we come to the “Kosovo myth” proper. But before doing that, a word of comparison with
Homer’s Iliad is in order. Whatever we know today about siege of Troy is based on Iliad solely,
since no historical records on the event have been preserved. Contrary to that Kosovo battle is a
historical event, despite the differences concerning details of the battle. We are, therefore, in
position to compare the poetic tradition and the historical facts and examine the way the myths are
created. Indeed, the Serb poetry has been used as an instructive tool for studying mythology in
coming into being. And as in the case of Iliad one may reconstruct real events from the poetic
presentation, so we could pull out actual (or at least probable) facts from the Kosovo cycle, even
without resorting to historical records. Of course, as the case with Iliad (and the Bible, for that
matter) is, the poetic evidence appears a resourceful, though not reliable, record.

Kosovo Myth
Trauma which Serbs after the fall of Serbian state and Turkish occupation experienced can be
compared with that felt by Palestinian Jews after the fall of Jerusalem and destruction of Temple in
70 AD. Since Serbia soon found herself well within the Ottoman Empire and the European
Christian states were on defence from the victorious Turks, no light at the end of the historical
tunnel was seen and the whole nation sank into a deep despair. In a sense, nation may be regarded

1
Cincars (Vlachs) appear a specific Balkan ethnicity, of rather obscure origin, speaking an original language, as an
amalgam of various Balkan tongues.
2
We mention here that Iliad and Odyssey were, in all probability, a collective work and Homer only made a final
touch, albeit a genial one, to the already existing oral tradition. (As it was the case with the Gospels, by the way.).
 84

as an extended individual, with similar suffering of the wounds and defeats. And as an individual
compensate for its personal defeats by pushing her traumatic memories into the subconscious, so a
nation builds up a fictitious history, trying to justify her failures and construct a fictitious world
without unpleasant reality. Subjugated Serbs were no exception (as Jews, Germans etc were
neither). This is evidenced mostly from the folk epic poetry.
The latter was resting, as far as the Kosovo battle was concerned, on two principal pillars, one
ideological, the other quasi-historical. The essence of the Kosovo cycle centres on the so-called
“Prince (Lazar)’s supper”. This is composed, in its turn, mainly on the New Testament myth of the
“Last Supper”, with an admixture of the Homeric plot from Iliad.
On the ideological side the whole Kosovo issue is presented as a collective Crucifixion. Being
aware of the superiority of the Turkish army, duke Lazar was put before two alternatives: (i)
surrender and the “Earthly kingdom” or (i) fighting and “Heavenly Kingdom”, with the obvious
allusion to the Jesus’ choice. Of course, the Christian prince chose the second alternative. Hence, it
was just God’s will, an inevitable outcome of the choice, which resulted in the bloody defeat. As
for the very plot, the scenario at the “Prince’s supper” had Jesus in the image of Lazar, while the
role of Judah was allotted to the nobleman Vuk Branković. 1 . The latter accused Milosh Obilic of
treacherous intentions, and it was for that reason that the latter decided to kill Murat as the proof of
his loyalty. (The parallel with Achilles before the Troy is conspicuous). Hence, even ignoring the
ideological religious background mentioned, it was this treacherous behaviour of Vuk Branković,
who allegedly passed during the very battle on Turkish side, which turned out fatal for the Christian
cause. This betrayal has never been corroborated by historical records and was in all probability
invented later on, for a number of political reasons. Never-the-less, Vuk Branković has remained in
the popular Serb memory as an epitome of a traitor.
Apart from the folk epic cycle mentioned, many Serb poets used to make use of the Kosovo battle
as a poetic inspiration. A cycle by poet Dragoljub Filipović about Serb Kosovo heroes can move
anybody but serbophobs. A renown Serb poet from the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century,
Milan Rakic, wrote a poem entitled “On Gazimestan”. 2 When in 1912 Serbian army reached
Kosovo Field, a commander lined up his unit at the spot on Gazimestan and asked if somebody
could recite the poem before the line. A soldier stepped ahead and did it, in a solemn silence of
moved comrades. Then another soldier stepped ahead and asked commander if he is aware that the
author of the poem is present in the line. Surprised commander then asked Milan Rakić to step
ahead, but the latter was so timid that he did not obey the order. The commander then ordered the
unit to salute their comrade, what they did proudly.
Gazimestan means to Serbs the same as Golgotha to Christians, and West Wall to Jews. There is
no Serb kid who has not red the entire collection of the Kosovo cycle poetry, folk or otherwise.
KiM may be torn out from Serbia (and Serbs), just as the Temple has been destroyed and Jews
banished from Palestine. But just as after every feast meal Jews hit glasses after a toast onto floor
and cry : “Jerusalem, let my right arm dry up if I forget you!”, so Serbs will yearn for the lost
homeland.
Jews have returned to Israel and recover Jerusalem and West Wall.
.
Kosovo meta-mythology
Kosovo-battle memory, both historical and poetic has been used by those Serbian politicians who
referred to national sentiments, as an easy means to achieve Serbian collective support for their
running politics. In fact this refers mainly to Serbian quasi-intellectuals, who were educated in the
traditional manners. This instance has been vastly exploited by those who found their interests in
tearing KiM from Serbia. It concerns both Albanians (from Albania and KiM) and their patrons.

1
The very battle was fought on his land, in fact.
2
Where the decisive Turkish cavalry charge took place, as mentioned before.
 85

Since this instance appears of great importance for the propaganda war going on about KiM, it
deserves our particular attention here.
One of main stratagem in winning a case has always been to attack an adversary at the point one
feels to be the weakest with himself. We saw how the mythology about Illyrian origin has been
developed by Albanian historians and politicians, what should lend support for their claims on
almost any West-Balkan territory, including that a the present-day Austria. Hence, the principal
target of the same circles has been to convince the world public opinion that Serbs’ claims on KiM
are a product of pure phantasm, an irrational construction of Serb history regarding their presence
on KiM. If they prove that a part of this construction is false one, a pure myth, then it should be
much easier to convince people that the rest is false altogether. The stratagem is like this: Serbs
claims regarding KiM history are as realistic as their poetry is historically supported.
In order to illustrate the point, let us turn for the moment to Israel, his ancient and recent history.
We know from the Old Testament Jewish clergy has claimed the historicity of the ancient fables.
Including Exodus, pastes sent on Egypt by Jehovah, parting the Red see, slaughter by Joshua of
Canaanites, etc. Since we are aware these are but irrational fancies, it follows that nothing in the
Bible has historical support. Hence, the claims of Jews that they used to live in the present-day
Israel, including Palestine, are mere fictions, not worthy serious considerations. And, as the logical
consequence, the existence of the state of Israel is the result of European colonization of the Arabic
national territory, a pure act of aggression and violence.
Likewise, due to Zeus’s interventions at Troy, Trojan War never took place, since we know that
Olympian gods were Greek inventions.
The Kosovo meta-mythology has been, therefore, contrived like this: Serbs claim that their poetic
memory is history, and since it is untrue, any further claims from their side appear likewise false.
The trouble with this construct is that Albanian patrons, like USA, have accepted this meta-
mythology and do not hesitate to express this in public. It is the background of their frequently
repeated demands that Serbs should be realistic, to accept the reality etc. It never occurred to them
that it is exactly one may have expected from them to give the advise to Albanians, Albanian and
non-Albanian likewise, to accept the reality that not all Albanians live in the same state, as not all
Kurds, Serbs, Roma, Armenians, Jews, Basques etc do. But, of course, it is no the matter of logic,
but of interests and power.
If one may forgive those involved who are trying to secure their interests, national or otherwise, by
referring to irrationality of their adversaries, as ethnic-Albanians do, behaviour of some others self-
appointed advisers and/or referees can provoke dismay only. Indeed, those who go around and talk
about somebody’s obsessions at microphones or in front of TV cameras, and then go to church and
listen to Judeo-Christian myths, (not to mention those of Islamic provenience) deserve nothing but
compassion (and there are other terms too). To call historical facts myths and kneel at the same
time before religious effigies deserve attention of a particular branch of human professions, indeed.
Here it is interesting to note that the Vidovdan cult was introduced much later from the time of
Battle. Even more interesting is the fact it came from the west, albeit in an indirect way. Namely,
the original cult was that of the Roman Catholic saint St. Vit (Vitus), who was executed on 28
June, 303 AD. His day was celebrated on that date, together with the seer Amos. Vit’s name
entered the Serbian Orthodox ecclesiastic books via Roman Catholic and Russian sources and he
was never considered a Serb saint. On the other hand, the Old-Slavic god Vid (Svevid) 1 was
venerated by ancient Slavs as the god of light and welfare, but a god of war as well. Sacrifices to
Vid were carried out at the end of the yearly harvest, in shrines dedicated to him, all over the Slavic
world. Only after the famous Kumanovo battle in 1912, when Serbian Army decidedly defeated
Turkish one, at the beginning of the First Balkan war, the slogan was launched FOR KOSOVO

1
One who sees everything.
 86

KUMANOVO, and Vidovdan (The Day of Vid) came into prominence and entered the Serbian
church calendar by red letters, as one of nine most important state official festivities. 1
The irony of history is that the visit of the Prince Ferdinand to Sarajevo was scheduled for
Vidovdan and was experienced by Serb part of the organization Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) as a
provocation to Serbs and their Kosovo cult. Whether the conspirators were aware that it could have
been interpreted in another way, as linked with St Vit, is not known. Whether the occurrence of the
Great War depended on the (wrong) interpretation of the significance of June 28 could be a matter
of speculations, but the historical reality remains the only certain fact at present.
The collective memory on Kosovo battle has produced some other side effects, which will play a
remarkable role in the subsequent Balkan history. Two points are to be made her, as two sides of
the same coin: first, the frustrating feeling of the (national) defeat and second, the heroic
assassination of sultan Murat by Milosh Obilic. The first element of the memory has resulted in the
impulse for retaliation, as mentioned in connection to the abovementioned slogan. The second
aspect is an almost archetypal link of the Vidovdan day to the ”heroic assassination” within the
patriotic impulse in Serbian nation. The assassination in Sarajevo was but one instance of the
”Vidovdan mythologema”. When in 1921 regent Alexandar Karadjordjević (practically the
absolute ruler of Yugoslavia at the time) declared the so-called ”Vidovdan constitution”, on
Vidovdan day, the same day an attempt was made to assassinate him and the prime minister Nikola
Pashić (who was accompanying the regent in a coach). Nikola Pashić was the target of another
attempt of assassination in 1923 (on Vidovdan, of course).

The myth of Great Serbia

Much space has been devoted in the recent history of Western Balkan, and in particular in the latest
political upheavals, about the alleged project of Great Serbia. The issue must be, however,
considered together with its counterparts from Croatia (Great Croatia) and Albania (Greater
Albania). Were all these projects serious and what was the origin of this maximalist concept of
forming national states in the otherwise ethnically mixed area? Whose interests were involved and
to which extent the interested were ready and capable of realizing such megalomaniac ambitions?
We shall argue here that these projects were devised (better to say dreamt) not in Belgrade, Zagreb
or Tirana, but somewhere else.
Of course, neither of the latter capitals would mind if somebody offered the “Greater Entity”on a
tray. But reasonable politicians normally take into account the price for such gains, which would be
high indeed. In fact, Serbia and Croatia did achieve the desired goals, but as collateral gains.
Yugoslavia after WWI gathered together all (except those in Albania and Rumania) Serbs living on
Balkan peninsular. But the state was devised after the wishes of Slovenians and Croats, as well as
by Serbs. Similarly, Croatia obtained all desired regions from former Yugoslavia during the WWII,
under the name of Independent State of Croatia (ISC), which was, in fact, a puppet state, under the
patronates of Germany and Italy. It acquired Srem from the present day Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In a sense, this state had a formal ethnical justification, since Croats constituted the
simple not absolute majority there??? (ima statistike koja kaze da su Srbi bili prosta vecina!). The
latter was further consolidated by the Croat claims that Muslims were in fact Croats. 2
An interesting episode in this context was the appearance of the book Greater Serbia, 3 by a Serb
historian Vladimir Ćorović, (needless to say he was Dinaroid). Despite the title, there is nothing
about Greater Serbia in the book, which appears a concise, historiography account of the Serbian
state, from Nemanjić dynasty to the present. But why then such a title? Was the project concealed
in the very title, as a hint for others, to think on the subject (in a testimonial sense)? The author
1
We note that there is a confusion in the literature with Slavic god Vid and Catholic saint Vit.
2
As a high-rank Ustasha stated, Muslims were “flower of Croatism”.
3
Vladimir Ćorović, Velika Srbija, Kultura, Beograd, 1990.
 87

lived in Serbia and it was possibly meant as a memorandum for the future generations, but we have
no clear indications in the book itself. The case illustrates how the hot topics may be complex and
vague, and if taken for granted, ideas may become the cause of conflicts. One may imagine an
Albanian author quoting the book as an evidence for Serb expansionism etc.
(The case illustrates well the general symptom of “Serbing” and Serb nationalism
expounded by Dinaric newcomers. The rationale for such inclination has been twofold. First, they
come from the regions with mixed population, where the nationalistic feelings are strong and serve
as a dividing line between nationalities (which reduces, in fact, to the confessional divisions).
Second, when arriving to Serbia, Serbing has become an entrance ticket for those newcomers. It
holds for politics, history, science, literature etc. Serbia and her history appear the most frequent
topic of Dinaric scholars, unlike the autochthonous cultural milieu, which is oriented towards more
cosmopolitan subjects and the future.)
As for the Greater Albania the idea came from Prizren in KiM (the so-called Prizren League,
1878), hence outside Albania. Generally, all three ”projects” originated from the regions of mixed
population. The centres for Greater Serbia projects should be searched at Knin (Croatia) and Pale
(near Sarajevo in BiH) and Priština (KiM). For good reasons.
Serbs living in Shumadija, for instance, had no compelling reasons to fight for a Greater Serbia, as
those Croats living in (Slavonian) Zagorje felt no need for a larger Croatia. Similarly, Albanians in
Albania had no particular need to join KiM Shqiptars, in particular in view they were physically
disconnected from the area across the massive mountains like Prokletije. But those living outside
the main body of their nations, mixed with the people of different religion, race or culture, felt it
would be better for them to live in a common state with their akin people. And it was them who
initiated the disintegration of Yugoslavia (with exception of Slovenia, but this was a particular case
of running away from a country facing an unpredictable turmoil and disaster).
The situation was a phantasmagorical one, since the burden of the trouble makers was transferred
from those retarded regions, populated by belligerent montagnards, to the mother states. And the
trick has proved very successful indeed. In order to detect the trouble makers, one first looked at
the capitals of the existing states, Belgrade, Zagreb (Tirana is still hardly suspected). In Belgrade,
it was Šešelj who stirred the interference into Croat and BiH affairs, not Milošević. Similarly, it
was gen. Gojko Shushak, minister of defence, a notorious Ustasha from Herzegovina, who was the
principal dog of war in Croatia. We still do not know many details concerning the links Tirana-
Priština, but the rationale for the connection should not be much different from those mentioned
above.
As we know, the project of Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, has been to integrate Serb
regions into Serbian state. In such an enlarged state they would not feel national minority and
would even be dominating population, considering the difference of mentalities between Serbian
and over-Drina Serbs. In order to prepare the fusion, Karadzic initiated passing from the local,
ijekavian dialect to the Serbian ekavian one. The official dialect of Bosnian Serbs radio and TV
stations (identical with the Croat and Muslim in BiH) became ekavic. The uniform of Republika
Srpska army has been a copy of the traditional Serbian one, as used in the WWI and abandoned in
Tito’s Yugoslavia. The army, whose commandants used to be Tito’s officers, that is atheists,
became of the sudden devoted Christians, good members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The
overall stratagem has been standing on three pillars: 1. ”Serbing”, 2. ”Serbing” and 3. “Serbing”. It
is this term which the political (sic) tool of those former ijekavians in Serbia (Šešelj’s radicals)
keep on repeating like parrots: ”We Serbs”, ”Our Serbia”, etc. Vuk Drašković and his followers
started with the same slogans, but reversed the tactics when rupturing with Šešelj and adopted the
politics of a moderate conservative nationalism.
As for Milošević, his principal concerns were staying in power, and all other issues were
subordinated to this objective. He did not support the extremist politics of Croatian and Bosnian
Serbs, and at the end of the wars of (1991-5) adopted a critical attitude towards the maximalistic
 88

demands of the local leaders over Drina. When he was in a straight conflict with Radovan Karadzic
and Ratko Mladic, there was even a feeling among some observers, particularly from abroad, that
Karadzic was up to replacing Milošević as the “leader of all Serbs”. (That neither of them was
actually Serb, but Montenegrin, nobody cared) dakle Crnogorci nisu Srbi!?.
Hence, although the decisions were proclaimed from Belgrade and Zagreb, the real initiative and
control came from the ”disputed lands”, where the time for settling the old scores was felt coming.
Only people living side by side can feel such a mutual hatred. The trouble has been that they were
able to pull in the rest of their kins into the “final clash” (one of many).

Disintegration of Yugoslavia and KiM

As mentioned above, there is no “natural” procedure for dismantling state, particularly multi-
ethnical one, as Yugoslavia was. When Milošević exposed himself as the candidate for new Tito,
with all his rigidity, to other party leaders from Yugoslav republics were not difficult to make up
their minds concerning the common state. Apart from Slovenia and Macedonia (non-Serbo-Croat
regions), it was again the Dinaroid sectors in Serbia, Croatia and Bosna and Herzegovina, who took
the initiative in the ensuing struggle for the political influence, first within Yugoslavia, and then
their respective republics.
The beginning of end started at the All-Yugoslav Party Congress in Belgrade, 1989, when first
Slovenians and then Croats angrily left the Congress. The only chance to save something was the
possibility Serbian communist to get rid of Milošević, but they failed to do that. The rout for state
disintegration was traced. What follows was a mere technique. But this technique was simple by
now means.
As we saw before KiM played a decisive role in destabilizing Yugoslav federal state. To
understand this fact, we must go into some details of the processes going on in Yu2, following the
fall of the communist dictatorship and introduction of the multi-party system. The latter took
different forms in Yugoslav republics. In Slovenia and Macedonia, who, as we argued before, had
rational rationale to separate from Yu2, this process turned out peaceful, though not without
internal political conflicts.
Slovenia was first to separate, taking over the border from the Yugoslav Army. Ante Marković,
Croat prime minister of Yugoslav Government sent some army units to recover the border posts,
but they were badly beaten and majority of new conscripts surrendered to Slovenian Territorial
Defence (practically Slovenian army). Rumours have been heard in Serbia that this dispatcher of
weak and unskilful unit was deliberate, to humiliate YPA, but this has never been proved. YPA
was subsequently withdrawn from Slovenia under an agreement between Slovenian and Federal
governments and Slovenia continued its existence as an independent state and Serbia took it as a
reality.
Not so peaceful and smooth was separation of Croatia. YPA had there her garrisons, as in other
parts of Yugoslavia. Following the call from Croat government Croat officers and conscripts left
the army and the rest was put to siege. How the situation was weird concerning the ”rules for
separation” is best illustrated by the now famous case of Varaždin garrison, in Slavonia, which was
under the command of Serb general Trifunović. Left with large amount of weaponry, but with the
decimated manpower, who deserted, he tried to hold, demanding the help from Belgrade. But units
ordered to reach Varaždin and defend the garrison (and eventually rescue the staff), refused to do
so. Found himself in a desperate situation general ultimately Trifunović surrendered. Later he was
sentenced in a Croat court (in his absence) for “war crimes” etc. But it was not the end of the story.
Yugoslav authorities accused him for treachery and sentence him to prison. It was after a long and
hard struggle for justice that the unfortunate general was released from the accusation. 1

1
Unfortunately, he had no courage to surrender, after being accused in Serbia, to Croat authorities and serve his
sentence there, in defiance of his stupid compatriots.
 89

In Montenegro, which was predominantly with Slavic population, these conflicts were mainly of
political nature, since one half of the population was procommunist, the other anti-communist (as
the situation during the WWII was). Since the old communist regime did not support Milošević’s
politics regarding KiM, the latter initiated its substitution with pro-Serbian factors, even before the
founding new political parties.
Political scene of Serbia after the formal introduction of multi-party system was characterized by
fierce struggle for power between Dinaric factors, Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Serbian
Renewal Party (SRP) and Serbian Radical Party (SRP), with an admixture of weak democratic
parties, like Democratic Party (DP) and later Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS), which was derived
from DP, and a number of small parties. Since the rivalry between Dinaric parties reflected their
leaders’ craving for power, the political fighting assumed antagonistic characteristics, what
included physical violence itself. Hence, a political triangle formed, with SPS holding power and
SRP and SRP trying to overthrow it, fighting between themselves, with occasional collaboration. It
had nothing to do with political programmes, which remained on the rhetoric level anyway, but a
pure struggling for power. It provided Milošević an opportunity to play with the other two parties
separately and take advantage of their mutual antagonism. As we saw before, SPS was more or less
continuation of the former Communist party of Serbia, SRP played on the Royalist card, whereas
SRP adopted fascist strategy and tactics, combining demagogy with physical violence.
As we saw earlier, in Serbo-Croat part of Yugoslavia disintegration did not work, not in a peaceful
manner. In Croatia Serb rural population, supported by the former Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA),
rejected the declaration of independence of Croatia, partly fearing from the fascist rhetoric of
Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Unity (CDU), partly encouraged by quasi-nationalistic
rhetoric from Dinaric sector in Serbia. Commander-in-chief of the General Staff of YPA, General
B. Adžić made public this remarkable announcement: “As long as I am in this position not a single
hair will be missing to any Serb in Croatia”. The point was that Nazi Ustashas during so-called
Independent State of Croatia, have slaughtered 32 members of his family. A comment from a
publicist from Sarajevo was: ”We appreciate his tragedy, but people like him simply can not hold
decisive posts”. Cynical as this comment was, it never-the-less reflected how much the situation
weird was in the process of Yugoslav disintegration. Following this and having the support of YPA
rural Serbs declared their own state in Croatia, so-called Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), with the
Knin as capital (Kninska Krajina). The new state territory divided the Croatia into three regions
which were hardly connected mutually. If nothing else, this “topological defect” was the sufficient
reason not to accept the new ”state”.
New state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was even in a more weird situation. Serb population opted
for remaining in Yugoslavia, while Muslims and Croats voted for the independence. But even
before the referendum it as clear that the political scene in BiH was determined not by political
programmes of the parties involved, but by mere ethnical division, better to say confessional one.
With the tacit support from Serbia and Croatia for their “compatriots”, the struggle for tearing BiH
apart and attaching Serb-Orthodox part to Serbia and Roman-Catholic to Croatia began. The central
problem in this game was, of course, the region inhabited by Muslims. In fact the population was
so much mutually entangled, that even with eventual consent of all parties involved, division of the
territory would be Heracles’s task. (It is believed that Milošević and Tudjman made a “gentleman
agreement” to divide among themselves Muslim territories). But the drama in BiH in 90-ies was
much more complicate that these “political” projects. The interplay between “cabinet high politics”
and the actual happening at the spot made the whole affair complex beyond any imagination. We
turn therefore to this point, which will turn out very important for understanding KiM issue in
general and particular events in particular.
We begin with “high politics” level. Many interpretations of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and
particular of bloody fighting in BiH, have been on the market, from “civil wars” to “forming
national states” on the Yugoslav soil. Projects like “Greater Serbia”, “Greater Croatia” have been
 90

invoked to describe possible rationale for the ensuing wars within Serbo-Croat regions (as defined
before). Bur whatever interpretation one adopts, it can not explain the bloody atrocities committed
by all sides involved. We must, therefore, turn to a deeper level of explanation, the ethno-historical
one.
But this level has not been reached at once and we go from the formal-political down to the
anthropological levels. Incidentally, this approach follows more or less the historical order of
events.

YPA versus federal republics

As we mentioned above, it was the Army which represented the state of Yugoslavia 2 at the
beginning of its disintegration. It found itself in an awkward position to fulfill its reason d’ etre,
which was according to Yugoslav constitution to protect the state borders and the institutional
order. The trouble with borders was that it did not specify protection from whom – external or
internal danger? As for the constitution it was not clear whether the right of federal units to secede
was already consumed by the republics (as federalists claimed) or they were entitled to make use of
that right whenever they want, irrespective of the will of the rest of the state. The issue was an old
(Aristotelian) dilemma: is the whole merely a collection of its parts? Hence, at the beginning
separatist republics confronted the federal army as an external enemy. Since the army was the only
remnant of the federal state, there was nobody to decide on the juridical matters and everything was
reduced to the level of the political will. The fierce fighting then inevitably issued.
But the juridical aspects aside, what was the real position of YPA with respect to the federal and
subsequently republic states? The command was carefully controlled, during Tito’s time (and even
before WWII) as to ensure the ethnical balance. Although majority of conscripts were ethnical
Serbs, the command staff was gradually composed ever on the representative base, so that at the
highest level, general staff, no ethnical dominance was possible. As we saw, the real dominating
factor was the Party, and when the federal Party disintegrated, Amy was left to politicians at
Belgrade. And here Milošević was the boss. The struggle with YPA was conceived, thus, as
fighting against Milošević, who himself was experienced as a Serb (though he was a typical
Montenegrin, as we used to emphasize frequently before).
Apart from this ethnical distinction, command staff, particular low- and medium-level was
composed mainly by Dinaroids, especially Montenegrins, for the reasons elaborated above. So it
will turn out after the civil wars (1991-1995), as well as during the rebellion war on KiM, it will be
those Dinaroid factors involved in the bloody atrocities from all sides. As for the paramilitary
aspects, situation was even clearer from this viewpoint.
Hence a tragic-comic situation arose: YPA considered the republics eager to separate as “internal
aggressors”, while the republics in questions treated the army as an external danger.

External factors
The so-called international community responded at first cautiously to the first demands for
seceding from the rest of Yugoslavia, by Slovenia, Croatia and then BiH. It concerns first of all
European states, like France, Britain, Germany, Italy etc. They were aware, from the previous
experience that the Balkan affairs may be tricky and of the danger to be pulled in into internal
quarrels in the region. Their primary concern was their own interests, of course. And the latter
demanded that the less the state of affairs is secure, the better. They did not bother about such
things as historical rights, political justice, genuine feelings of the people etc. Hence, their first
reaction was the request for status quo. But when some republics pushed the matter further from
mere demands and started separating from the rest, European countries accepted the logic of fait
acomplie. This was an overall picture, but certain states took active, though not conspicuous role,
encouraging some republics to secede. It refers, first of all, to Germany, whose minister of foreign
affairs, Hans Genscher, played decisive role in the affair. This role was acknowledged, albeit
 91

implicitly, when the secession was finally accomplished. Mobs in Croatia, particularly in Zagreb,
danced in the streets, singing newly composed song with leitmotiv Danke Deutschland. 1 But apart
from the jubilant Croats, many Yugoslavs, in particular Serbs in Croatia, this scene reminded of
another similar one, that of April 1941. After bombing Belgrade and thousands dead, April 6,
Zagreb citizens made ovations to Germans entering Zagreb on tanks, greeting them as liberators.
(That the same crowd did the same when partisans entered the city in 1945 speaks about the
anthropological quality of the people involved, but it is of little relevance to our subject here).
With Franjo Tudjman’s jubilant declaration about “the fulfilment of the thousand-year Croat
dream”, and the role of Germans who helped that dream to come true, the parallel with the
“Independent state of Croatia” and Ante Pavelić, was more than conspicuous. After that it will not
be hard to encourage the local Serbs in the new “independent state” to try to separate from it.
Put into the situation of fait acomplie, other European states and USA accepted the new state of
affairs and recognized all newly formed states. Their rationale was as simple as wrong – they
expected that the new borders will be recognized by all former Yugoslav republics as state borders.
In other words, they took the division of Yugoslavia, made in 1943 at Jajce, by Tito and his
communist cronies, 2 as definite solution on the matter. In other words, they implicitly took that
formal administrative division was superior to ethnical composition and striving of the people
within these states. What turned fatal in the ensuing series of events. As we shall see later on, some
of these states, especially USA, will be directly involved in the coming events.
Before we proceed with disintegration of the state which lasted for 71 years (an average span of
life of her citizens), we mention an incident, which shows clearly both the logical impasse of the
process and the hypocrisy of some of the principal players in the event.
In March 1991, when the disintegration of Yugoslavia was in the air, Serbian opposition, led by
Vuk Drašković and other parties, organized demonstrations in Belgrade against Milošević’s regime
and his misuse of the state-owned public media. Unable to deal with a crowd of about 100.000
demonstrators, Milošević called the Army to intervene. For this he needed the approval of the
Presidency of Yugoslavia, whose chairman at the time was Stipe Mesić (HDE), Croat from Lika
region. 3 Since the consent on the matter was urgent, members of the Presidency were consulted by
phone. S. Mesić gave his approval Army to intervene, tanks flooded Belgrade streets and the revolt
was broken. (Vuk Drašković was arrested, together with other protest leaders, but was soon
released under the students’ pressure).
When the final act of disintegration was accomplished, S. Mesić proudly declared that his role as
destroyer of Yugoslavia has been fulfilled completely. At the time of this declaration he was still
formally the president of Yugoslavia. 4 But the point to be made is the appealing discrepancy in the
logic behind the disintegration. When the interest of Croatia was to support Milošević in Serbia, 5
Army could be employed within the state, to protect the “constitutional order”. But when the same
Army was used to prevent the disintegration of the state, it became an alien, hostile element,
without right to interfere affairs in Croatia and elsewhere.

Topology versus ideology

That the up-down and down-up “cosmologies” are not equivalent is well illustrated by the
interplay between “right” and “feasibility”. The case in point is the very disintegration of Yu2.
Suppose Croatia decides to secede, but Slovenia wants to remain as an apart of Yugoslavia. As a
glimpse at the map shows Slovenia would thus be cut off from the rest and the new state would

1
Thanks Germany.
2
So-called Anti-fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). By the way, no Serbian
representatives were present at that meeting, considered as constitutional for the new state of Yugoslavia.
3
Born in Stajnica, near Velebit (Dinaric) mountain.
4
Stipe Mesić turned out the most unscrupulous politician on the Yugoslav scene, second only to Šešelj.
5
The logic was simple: the stronger (communist) Milošević, the weaker Serbia.
 92

consist of two separate parts, as it was the case with Pakistan, before the separation into present-
day Pakistan and Bangladesh. Another possibility appears even more warning.
When the federal state was formed after WWII BiH was without access to sea. In order to remedy
this handicappe, Yugoslav authorities decided to allot to BiH a narrow strip at the Adriatic coast,
with a single, small port, as a symbolic friendly gesture. This had little practical importance and
one may well imagine the situation that BiH was left without the access to sea, since it was a
friendly republic (Croatia) who would provide the exit. Now, suppose BiH decides to secede, but
none of the other republics would follow. In a supposedly tense atmosphere BiH would find herself
surrounded by hostile neighbours and thus would be prevented to exercise her right to become an
independent state.
In a similar situation was Croatia during 1991-1995, when her territory was torn apart into three
quasi-separated regions, by the so-called Krajina Republic. It was clear that even without
appealing to any state right, such a situation was not sustainable. Right is right, but topology is a
brute fact, in this situation.

Beginning of armed conflicts

Much has been written about the military activities during the “wars’ in 1991-5 period in Yu2. We
are not going to describe all those activities, but shall confine ourselves to a few cases, which will
illustrate our point of view concerning the deeper level of describing and understanding the nature
of conflicts and its anthropological background. We shall make, to this end, a few case studies.
Borovo Selo
This village on Danube River, in Eastern Slavonia, near the border with Serbia, witnessed the first
armed clash between Croat and Serb population in the newly proclaimed Croat state. When Croat
police unit was sent to the town to settle some unrest, it was ambushed by Serbs, who killed
majority of this regular police force. This was done presumably by the local Serbs, organized
around Territorial Defence, we described before. (The claim of Šešelj that it was his men that did
this “heroic exploit” should be taken with a big grain of salt, as usual, as we argued above).
Between Borovo Selo and Vukovar is situated small town Borovo, with a plant for tires and
footwear. (Before WWII the plant was named “Bata”, a famous shoes factory).

Vukovar
This town on Danube was destined to play a prominent role in disintegration of Yu2, which fell
victim of the savage animosities and insanity of the ensuing armed conflict. Its guilt was that it was
situated between the southern and northern parts of the so-called Eastern Slavonia, which was the
most eastern part of the self-proclaimed Serb state (sic) Republic Serb Krajina (RSK). As the town
controlled by Zagreb, it prevented communication between those parts mentioned and Belgrade
decided it was to be captured by all means. The town was surrounded and besieged by Yugoslav
Army and heavily bombarded. But before we go into some detail, a few words of the town are in
order.
The town consisted of the old centre, surrounded by newly built residential buildings. The centre
was densely packed with old private, single-floor houses, whereas the suburbs consisted of large,
many-floors buildings. The downtown was inhabited by Croats and Serbs, approximately by equal
proportions. To stress that both populations lived in peace and with normal communications
should appear unnecessary and it is indeed. Unlike this autochthonous population, the outer
suburban circle was populated by newcomers, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were
employed at ”Borovo” plant at Borovo. The proportion of Serb-Orthodox and Croat Roman-
Catholic was again approximately fifty-fifty. But the similarity with the downtown stops here.
When the bombardments of the town started, it was only the autochthonous centre which was the
target, whereas the surrounding huge buildings, though easy targets, were spared, as noticed by
 93

Paolo Rumiz. 1 What was the point? The suburbans were all Dinaroids, as the commanders of
Yugoslav Army were, too. The latter spared their com-tribesmen, but were eager to destroy the
downtown, as a bad example of “peaceful coexistence” of Croats and Serbs. At the same time, it
was destruction of a city, polis, by the rural population, a paradigm of the “civilization clash”. We
shall see in the following that Vukovar siege could be taken as a paradigm of the anthropic
background which lied behind the political, ethnical, ideological etc façade, painted by officials,
nationalists, cabinet-intellectuals, nationalists, patriots etc, etc. It was the clash of the uncivilized,
frustrated, violent highlanders, with the lowland civilization. A number of foreign observers, first
of all Paolo Rumiz, have already noticed this point, but it has never been presented to the Yugoslav
public explicitly. Even now, it is a taboo, at least in Serbia. For reasons which will come to light
gradually, as we progress with our story.
Vukovar has been not only a paradigm of the above mentioned phenomenon, but deserves our
attention for a number of other points to be pointed out.
First, it was a conspicuous case of the Serbia envolvment in the armed conflict outside its proper
boundaries. Zagreb authorities made devastating propaganda of this point. First, although it was
obvious from the start that the town could not be defended and was doomed to be destroyed, the
order was that the local defenders fight to the last survived. Highly motivated local defenders
resisted fiercely the attacks of the much more powerful forces, fighting for every house, cellar, etc.
On the other hand Yugoslav Army proved shamefully inefficient and corrupt. For good reasons,
which we are going to discuss in more detail now.
Apart from some short-term episodes in her history, Serbia never fought on foreign soil. When the
conflict became imminent in 1991, and Belgrade authorities ordered (concealed) conscription,
majority of the conscripts avoided it, hiding, leaving the country, etc. Those recruited were
confused, lacking any motivation for fighting, since the war they were going to fight was never
proclaimed, even defined. Young conscripts found themselves in a schizophrenic situation, split
between the feeling of being aggressors and patriots at the same time. Many touching situations
have been recorded, from comic to tragic. Since the fighting prolonged much more than envisaged
by the military leaders (sic), solders became frustrated to nervous breaks. One took a tank and
drove it from Vukovar to the Federal Assembly building in Belgrade, without being stopped by the
police or the like. But the case of a young conscript we are going to describe was not that funny,
indeed.
Many of conscripts were not willing to fight and command decided to let them go home. A unit
was lined and the captain ordered that those who want to go home step forward, the rest to step
backwards. When it was done, a soldier who could not make his mind remained in-between. In the
tense situation of waiting his next move he drew the gun and shot himself.
The Army command turned out drastically incompetent. According to testimonies of the conscripts,
80 % of the soldiers killed around Vukovar fell victims of their own artillery fire. Although part of
this mesh could be ascribed to inexperience, normal for the beginning of any war after a long peace
period, and to the disturbance made by non-Serb deserters, the lack of motivation was surely the
most decisive factor.
The latter did not lack Vukovar defenders, who fought heroically, though in vain. As turned out
later, they were sacrificed to Zagreb need to get world’s sympathy for Croat cause. During the
prolonged siege a petition signed by hundred world’s top intellectuals, including Nobel-prize
winners, condemned the Serbian aggression. This petition has remained unknown to the wide
Serbian public, even among the most vigorous Milošević’s adversaries within Serbian opposition.
Now we come to the most dramatic and tragic episode in this infamous siege of unfortunate
Slavonian town. When Yugoslav Army finally occupied the entire town, after a fierce fighting for

1
P. Rumiz, Maschere per un Massacro, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996.
 94

every house, those of defenders who survived took refuge to the town hospital. Army forces took
200 civilians (more precisely, men in civil clothes) from the hospital, despite the fierce opposition
of the hospital staff, as prisoners of war. And here they made a fatal error. One of the officers,
major Veselin Šljivančanin (Shljivanchanin), Montenegrin, 1 handed the prisoners over to the local
Territorial Defense forces. The latter took them to a nearby state farm, Ovčara (Ovchara), and shot
them all. Šljivančanin was taken to court in Serbia in connection to the massacre at Borovo, but
released as innocent. However, at the request of Hague Tribunal he was processed at the Tribunal
and sentenced to 5 years of prison in 2007.
An attentive reader might have a feeling she has already learned something very similar to this
misdeed. Yes, it happened 9 years before this event, in Lebanon. When Israeli forces occupied the
southern part of Lebanon in 1982, in the pursuit of Palestinian freedom-fighters, they occupied two
principal Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatilla, at the outskirts of Beirut. The commander,
Ariel Sharon, handed the camps over to the Lebanon Christian militia (a sort of the local Territorial
defence), who killed between 300 and 2.000 civilians, depending of the source of information. The
parallel, however, stops here.
When Ariel Sharon was accused before the Hague Court (not to be confused with the Hague
Tribunal) few years ago, the lawsuit was withdrawn after the hard pressure from USA. (All
criminals are equal before the international justice, but some are more equal than others).

Dubrovnik
This medieval Mediterranean town in Croat Dalmatia (former Ragusa) is arguably the most famous
place in Yugoslavia (Yugoslav Athens), at least to the tourist part of the world. When hostilities
started in 1991, Yugoslav Army put a siege on the town from the inland side. The army consisted
mainly of Montenegrins, who started bombing the centre of t town, which happened to be under the
UNESCO protection, as a part of the world cultural heritage of special importance. Among the
most valuable buildings
Is the International University centre, where each year many international meetings, symposia,
conferences etc are held, gathering international elite from all over the world. Naturally, it was
chosen as the principal target for Yugoslav artillery, which will promote the most the military glory
of Serbo-Montenegrin nation. Other valuable building were damaged or burnt too, but the Centre
bombing rang the bells all over the intellectual world. And it was not the end of the story.
The hinterland of Dubrovnik, Konavlje, was occupied by Montenegrin Territorial Defense forces.
This region of Herzegovina has been famous as inhabited by the “anthropic elite” of the South
Slavs. In particular its women are notorious for their grace and beauty. 2 Montenegrin “patriots”,
eager to protect Montenegro from Ustashas (sic), devastated Konavlje, plundering everything of
value, including household technique (refrigerators, TV sets, washing machines, etc). To modern
European ear it might sound strange, but in fact what those highlanders did was just a continuation
of the centuries’ long practice, when lowlands used to be plundered, as a part of the montagnards’
“economy”. Actual Montenegro politicians, like Milo Djukanović, took active role in organizing
those “patriotic forces” and sending them to “Dubrovnik front”. (Recently, negotiations between
Croatia and Montenegro have been arranged in order to settle those robberies and Montenegro has
agreed in principle to compensate the damage made by its citizens at Konavlje).
Some of Yugoslav army commanders have been brought to Hague Tribunal for their activities in
this infamous siege of Dubrovnik and some of them have been already sentenced for their
command responsibility.

1
HDE, born at Žabljak (Montenegro),
2
Though born in Belgrade, Serb tennis player Ana Ivanović appears a splendid illustration of the beauty of
“Konavoke”, as they are called..
 95

Sarajevo
We have seen in the cases of Vukovar and Dubrovnik the pattern of the clash of the highlanders
with plane people, of mountains with polis. The siege of Sarajevo (1991-1995) has nothing to do
with Serbia, strictly speaking, but we can’t avoid mentioning it, if nothing but for the sake of
completeness concerning the pattern mentioned.
The principal “heroes” of this infamous affair were Radovan Karadzic and especially general Ratko
Mladic. Karadzic was the president of the so-called Republika Srpska, self-proclaimed Serb state in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus the most responsible for what was going at “the front”, at least
formally. Born in Montenegro (HIDE), on Durmitor mountain, in the same tribe as Milošević’s one
(they were relatives, in fact), this psychiatrist was a proud Montenegrin in Sarajevo, until the
disintegration of Yugoslavia started and political parties were found in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Finding that being Montenegrin in the region with few compatriots, Karadzic decided to become
Serb, moreover a “great Serb”, like his compatriot Milošević in Serbia. He founded Serb party and
became the president of the newly established Serb entity Republika Srpska (RS), as the new state
within the state was called by the international community, not being able to contrive a better term
for this bastard state. General Ratko Mladic, the chief commander of the RS military forces. Born
at Kalinovik, the central part of the “Old Herzegovina”, this highlander appears the extreme case of
the Dinaric type – stubborn, violent, intelligent, and unscrupulous. He laid siege on Sarajevo for
several reasons. First, being the largest city in BiH, Sarajevo was the most powerful potential
resource of Muslim soldiers (city was initially populated mainly by Muslims and Serbs). By
encircling them Mladic made the city an enormous “prisoner of war camp”. The city quickly found
itself divided into Muslim and Orthodox parts and both were objects of artillery fires from the
respective adversaries. During the siege Sarajevo lost about 10.000 inhabitants, mainly civilians.
Another rationale for keeping Sarajevo under the siege was of a tactical nature. While world public
attention was concentrated onto the unfortunate city, Mladic felt free to fight Muslims all over
Bosnia (Herzegovina was the “department of Croats” under Tudjman’s “supervision”.) As it was
the case with Vukovar, Muslims and Serbs use to live together in the downtown for centuries.
When the disintegration started, both sides suddenly realized they are different and should become
even more so. And bloody animosities and fighting began. Again, politics apart, the siege was a
clash of montagnards against city. During the siege a great deal of the autochthonous downtown
inhabitants escaped from the hell of bombing and starving, not to return ever since. Their place has
been taken over by highlanders from all over BiH, changing drastically the demographic content of
the old city, with much of the oriental spirit. The ferocity of fighting among Muslims, Serbs and
Croats, 1 illustrate the best the warlike character of Dinaroids, for here one witnesses a pure internal
struggle. (If there was interference from outside, it was done by montagnards again, be it from
Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Afghanistan, etc).
One of the most conspicuous outcomes of war in BiH has been the revival of the Muslim way of
life in this unique region of Europe. Muslim population under Tito’s rule was gradually losing its
religious designation, becoming atheistic, or at least less and less interested in religious matters. 2
With war starting and under the strong influence of Arabic countries, Muslim religion has come
back fully to BiH, and now Islam has got a very prominent stronghold in Europe. As a collateral
gain (or damage, depending on the perspective of looking), Muslims have won a wide support from
the Western states, in particular USA. The reason for this, at first sight strange, sympathy lies
outside Bosnia, even outside Europe – at the Middle East. We shall elaborate this point later on in
more details, when considering the international outlook of Kosovo case, but here we just draw
readers’ attention to the role of religious aspect of the whole Balkan affair.

1
The percentage before the war was: 50 % - 32 % - 18 % respectively.
2
It concerns, primarily, urban population.
 96

Military and para-military forces

In previous considerations we have seen how the warlike mentality of Dinaroids has shaped the
local history of the region. In particular, we saw how the patriotism and the like were used as cover
for plundering the nearby lowlands, what was the core of the economy of the highlanders for
centuries. We now consider what was the role of these regions and their people (including those
settled down at lowlands) during the Yugoslav crisis. We are going to show how this transient
regime, without proper control of state, has unleashed the old demons of killing and robbery,
irrespective of the formal status of the armed conflicts on the Yugoslav soil.
As expected, at the beginning of conflicts YPA was confronted by local, republic armies, organized
around the so-called Territorial Defence (TD), established during Tito’s era. Though one might call
the ensuing conflicts as “continuation of politics by armed means”, and even talk about frontlines,
the conflicts soon rose to clashes across dispersed regions, with TD playing the roles of ”national
forces” fighting for freedom etc. This feeling of “just cause” gave them the sense of vast liberty
concerning the means and manners used to achieve their “patriotic aims”. This factor showed up
even before the large-scale clashes started, when Yugoslavia was still kept together, as the case of
the so-called Split strangler illustrates well. 1
As the conflicts spread out and the fighting advanced, paramilitary units started to appear. They
were led, as a rule, by Dinaroids, mainly Montenegrins (Serbia) and Herzegovians (Croatia and
BiH). These units were tolerated by army officials, partly because the latter had no other choice,
partly because these para-militaries were employed in carrying out most risky and dirty actions. 2
The paradigm of this species was Zheljko Raznatovic-Arkan, a Montenegrin from a Priština
Montenegro family, son of an army officer, born at Maribor (Slovenia). Natural born leader, he
would surely have become a harambasha, 3 three/four centuries ago. First rank criminal, employed
occasionally by the state security, for dirty work abroad, Arkan founded his own private army, so-
called Tigers, consisting of a few thousand men, artillery, armed transporters etc. The selection of
the conscript was severe, with psychologists and other experts in the jury. His unites used to travel
across Serbia, bringing fear and terror wherever they passed. In particular, their principal terrain
was KiM, the restless southern province, and Arkan was supposed to “keep rebellious Shqiptars
calm”. When the Yugoslav wars started, Tigers’ role had the following principal aspects: (i) to
help the YPA “liberating’ Bosnian towns (with a considerable rewards in cash); (ii) to plunder the
same towns, after “liberations”; tracks and lorries were following Tigers and after an occupation of
the town “white technique” etc was collected and transferred to Serbia; (iii) collecting young
people from the refugees camps in Serbia and forcing them to engage in fighting on their (former)
native soil; (iv) forcing the military units in Bosnia to withstand the pressure from the other side,
even killing those who tried to retreat and abandon fighting. (After a serious incident of this kind,
the government of Republika Srpska banished Tigers from their territory.)
By these activities and the common crime in Serbia Arkan accumulated considerable wealth and
used to behave as a real ruler of the state. He even founded a political party (sic), so-called Party of
Serb Unity (PSU), and used the Serbian Parliament as the cover for his criminal activities. 4
Interestingly, Arkan’s activities at KiM after Shqiptars’ rebellion in 1998 are little known. The
stories go of his selling the arms to KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), but these rumours have not
1
It concerns the Croat nationalist strangling a conscript on the tank in a Split street. Another case from the same town
concerns a Macedonian conscript shot before the military barrack, while he was guarding the building.
2
USA hypocrites should not be consternated by this kind of fighters, since they used to employ their militia in similar
situation, along with the regular army. Thus, in 1832 during the war against Black Hawk chieftain, 300 children, old
men and women were slaughtered at the Mississippi River, by the militia squadron, with 7 militias lost. Abraham
Lincoln was one of the militia staff.
3
Turkish term for a leader of a highwayman unit.
4
In fact it was not his “party” only which is using the Parliament as this sort of cover, which provides them with MP
immunity, badly needed by any decent criminal.
 97

yet been confirmed. Arkan was ultimately assassinated at a Belgrade hotel in autumn 1999
(January 2000), presumably by a rival criminal group. 1 Arkan has committed grave war crimes. In
a case some of his men were killed during a “liberation action”, he would have killed a number of
local civilians, with women and children sent across Drina to Serbia. 2 These civilians were used
later for exchange for his captured men. In practice many of these intended hostages joined
refugees’ camps in Serbia, to be dispatched later to refugees’ centres abroad.
Te case of Arkan, though the most prominent, is by no means unique. Before we continue in that
direction, we shall use the shorthand HDE (healthy Dinaric element) to mark Dinaric persons, both
Montenegrins and Herzegovians. SRP of Vuk Drašković (HDE) organized so-called Serb Guard,
lead by certain Smajlović (HDE), who was operating in Krajina. Smajlović was killed in an action,
but Drašković accused Milošević to have ordered this killing “from the back”. (Drašković has been
notorious for such “conspiracy accusations”.). Vojislav Šešelj (HDE) organized his supporters to
engage in this “marauding war”. He himself used to pose before cameras in mask uniform,
threatening Croats to be “pushed up to Zagreb”. But he was wise enough not to form distinct units
under his name and his men usually followed other paramilitaries, mainly Arkan’s Tigers. When
the latter collected the loots in a place and left the scene, Šešeljoids would come from behind and
pick up the fall out, just as hyenas follow tigers. (Boasting of some of his “warriors” to have
“skinned a balija” 3 should be taken with a big grain of salt). Another prominent paramilitary was
that of Bokan (HDE), so-called White Eagles.
Other engaged sides were doing similar things, as expected. From Muslim side the most prominent
was certain Juka Prazina, but many of these leaders were incorporated into seemingly regular
forces, as the case with Naser Orić was. Similarly Croats had their paramilitaries tightly linked with
regular troops. This was to be expected since “national armies” were themselves “irregular forces”,
at least from the point of view of Belgrade authorities. In both cases it was Dinaroids who lead
those units and who committed war crimes in the name of their “just cause”. We mention here a
number of cases, less prominent in the media abroad, for the reason to be detailed later on.
In Sarajevo, after an agreement between YPA authorities and Bosnian Muslim leaders, the YPA
garrison was leaving Sarajevo, when the paramilitaries attacked it in the very town and killed a
number of soldiers. Even worst case happened in Tuzla, mainly Muslim town in the north-east
Bosnia. Yugoslav Army 92 brigade (disarmed under an agreement with local authorities) retreating
from the town was ambushed and at least 92 (200) conscripts were killed and at least 33 wounded
and a number of ambulance vehicles.4 But the gravest massacre was done from the side of Croat
forces in Lika, a midland Croat region. Since it had serious consequences on the Kosmet affairs, we
shall dwell on it in somewhat more details.
It is the famous “Medački džep” affair, 5 which took place in September 1993. This UNPROFOR
protected area was approximately 5X6 km and consisted of three Serb villages. The assault was
lead by brigadier Rahim Ademi (born at Karač, near Vučitrn, KiM), Shqiptar who deserted YPA in
1991, and joined Croat forces. Ademi was accused in 1986 for forming an illegal Shqiptar group
within YPA engaged against the state and sentenced to 3.5 years of prison (the sentence was
reduced later to 10 months). He was engaged in many battles in Croatia and BiH and was promoted
to the rank of general for his activities. During the operation 74 (72) civilians were killed (mostly
women, children and old people), 14 were counted as «missing», many wounded. Although the

1
Another interpretation on the market was that it was done by Milošević, eager to remove an inconvenient actor in the
previous wars, just accused by the Hague Tribunal for his misdeeds. If true this would parallel the story of Apis, who
organized Ferdinand’s assassination in Sarajevo, liquidated by Serbian government in 1917.
2
Particularly infamous are massacres at Bijeljina (north-east Bosnia) and at Zvornik (on the river Drina).
3
A pejorative name of Muslims.
4
Iliija Jurišić, who ordered the umbush, was arrested at the Belgrade airport in May, 2007 and charged by Serbian
authorities for war crime.
5
“Medački pocket», like that at Kursk, where the famous battle in 1943 was fought.
 98

trust was signed, Canadian forces were prevented to enter the incriminated area. In a clash with UN
forces 27 Croates were killed or wounded (unofficial reports quote even higher figure). 1 (At the
later trial at Zagreb, a protected witness will testify that among the dead bodies of the civilian
victims, those without traces of mutilation were separated and delivered to Serbs, whereas the rest
were distroyed).
All houses in the area were set to fire and leveled to the ground, lifestock killed. About thousand
Serbs fled to Serbia and BiH. Colonel Mirko Norac, the chief responsible for the operation and
Rahim Ademy, the immediate executor, have been charged at Hague Tribunal for war crimes, but
the case has been passed to Croat justice. The operation has been described as exceptionally fierce
and Ademy particularly blamed for the cruelty exercised. (It is not clear whether Ademi was the
only Shqiptar involved in this infamous operation).
Now, we proceed with a brief analisys of the event. Why there and why then? We note first that
that the so-called Republic Serb Krajina was proclaimed in 1991, hence about two years before.
We recall that the final asault of Croat forces onto the Serb «state» was well planned, with a full
collaboration with USA and took place almost two years afterwards, in August 1995. 2 Hence, the
«kill and burn» operation was not a planned start of a wider operation. It was obviously a message
to the local Serb population what they should expect when «the moment arrives». This massage
was fully undestood by the Croat Serbs and when the so-called Operation Flash in West Slavonia
started in 1995, the resistance there was very weak and the population was quickly moved to the
southern parts of Krajina, south of river Sava. 3 This will repeat again with the so-called »Storm»
operation of the final assault onto the entire Serb creation, 4 on a wider scale.
Hence, if Serbs are to get the message, it will be by a scene of outmost cruelty. And the choice of
Shqiptar Ademi could not be made better for that purpose. His soldiers were ordered to kill
everything which moves, and set to fire everything which remains after the fleeing of the local
populaion, which started immediately after the operation, leaving the area for Bosnia and Serbia.
Not all of them were «inocent civilians» and many of them were subsequently recruited by Serbian
authorities for military service. If we notice that this reqruitment started even before establishing
Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and that the entire region south of Sava was populated by
Dinaroids, we shall better appreciate what was to happen 9 years later on KiM. If one reads the
testimonies of those involved in the Medački Džep afair, 5 from very Croat perpetuaters, Canadian
soldiers and civil victims, one gets feeling he has already read such stories. Yes, we shall meet the
same patern on KiM, 9 years later. This time with roles interchanged. (Except that in both cases
perpetrators have been HDE people).
As an appendix to the main indictment Hague Tribunal quotes 29 civilians and 5 soldiers and the
nature of wounds. Victims were first beaten, and then shot, stubbed, slaughtered or burnt alive.
Some of them were found castrated, some with three fingers cut off. 6 Besides killing civilians in
such a cruel manner, Croat forces robbed all three Serb villages and some smaller groups of houses
and levelled them by mines. Later evidence from Croat sources quotes 76 victims. In the same year
51 corps were delivered to Serb side.2
We note here that most of those atrocities were committed after the trust has been achieved and
before the Canadian battalion, from UNPROFOR, arrived on the scene. As we shall see later on, it
was exactly the same “arrangement” at KiM after signing ”Kumanovo agreement” in 1999.

1
Later at the trial in Zagreb, Ademi and Norac tried to deny their direct responsibilities, by claiming that there were
two parallel commanding lines and each of them was alternatively avoided during the operation.
2
In fact, NATO bombed air-defense posts in Krajina immediately before the assault of the Croatian land forces.
3
As a revenge for this operation Milan Martić will rocket Zagreb, when 9 civilians were killed.
4
We note in passing the “inventiveness” of Croat authorities concerning the dubbing of their operations, mere
imitations of USA nicknames of their operations in Iraq.
5
See, e.g. Zagreb weekly Globus, No 872, 22.08.2007.
6
Serb Orthodox make cross with three fingers, unlike Croat Catholics who do it with the palm.
 99

Shocked by what they saw when arriving on the spot, officials of UNPROFOR sent a report to UN
Security Council, who set up a commission to examine the affair
Canadian monthly Saturday Night described the situation as this:
When Canadian light infantry pushed Croats from this region, it found that the Shushak’s 1 military
unites blasted 300 houses, poisoned wells, and killed the livestock and at least 80 civilians. Some
of them found beneath the burnt cattle, with a number of corps removed. It was not evidently done
by enraged soldiers: destructions of this kind must have been planned in advance. It required
engineers to destroy houses by anti-tank mines, so that nothing remained. Afterwards they
removed the evidence by rubber gloves; gloves of this sort were found by Canadians all around”.
The Croat authorities tried hard to conceal the atrocities. Minister of defense deputy Drago Krpina
(HDE) even after 5 days did not allow reporters to visit Medački džep, allegedly “for security
reasons”…. Tadeusz Mazowiecki was explained that the reports about atrocities were not based on
facts, that all executed were in fact “killed in battle” etc.
Urged by the publicity given to the affair Croat government carried out an investigation. The head
of the general staff, gen. Janko Bobetko, who presumably designed the whole operation, turned out
not to have signed any of the orders. It was gen. Rahim Ademi who did it. Under the public
pressure the latter was dismissed, but subsequently “rehabilitated” and taken back to the Croat
Army (HV). When departing to Hague Tribunal for his engagement in Medački Džep operation, he
complained that he will no longer take responsibility for war crimes and that it was because of his
Albanian origin he has been chosen as scapegoat. 2 The latter statement should be remembered, for
it has been the rationale of all Shqiptars accused for various crimes and illegal activities under
Milošević and even after him, in Serbia.
Before we leave Medački Džep operation, a few words on the role of Rahim Ademi seems in order.
The operation was publicized later as a notorious case of cruelty and war crime. What Ademi’s real
role in that affair was is surely important to the Hague Tribunal, but is much more relevant to the
later events to unroll at KiM. What mattered was that the story, when publicized, that a Shqiptar
was massacring Serbs in Croatia could not pass unnoticed to Serb ears, in particular those coming
from those regions to Serbia, as refugees, immigrants etc. Many of the latter will be engaged in
KiM operations in 1998/9, as parts of the Army, or the police forces, but especially in paramilitary
units. And when we learn of atrocities committed by Serbian side, both by legal forces and
paramilitaries (including civilians as well), we should recall the prehistory.

Serbia and the fall of RSK

As noted before the existence of Republika Srpska Krajina was incompatible with the normal
functioning of Croatia, irrespective of other implications and conequences, if nothing then for the
topological reasons. Croatian economy was badly damaged, in particular tourism, one of the
principal resources of national income. 3
4
The Croat state started preparations for recovering the lost territory, with help of some states, in
particular USA. The latter provide help in the training instructors (usually retire officers), survey of
the occupied territory, etc. When the final assault on RSK started in August 1995, USA provided
the air support and other necessary assistance. The Serb state (sic) collapsed within 48 hours, like a
card tower. The population was on move as soon as the offensive started, and within few days the

1
Gojko Šušak (HDE), ministry of defense, the chief hawk in the in the Tudjman’s government.
2
Another interpretation comes to mind here. Ademi might have realized it was because he was Shiptar he was chosen
to do dirty work for Croat Army.
3
We quote the cynical remark by Milan Martić, one of the leading politicians of the self-proclaimed state in the state:
“I am the minister of tourism of Croatia”, referring to the absence of foreign tourists on Dalmatian coast. Internal
transport was practically blocked up, etc. Martić will be sentenced to 35 years in prison by Hague Tribunal in 2007.
4
NATO air forces bombed Serb AD locations before the start of the Croat offensive,
 100

Krajina was emptied from its belligerent citizens. What happened? In order to understand this we
have to go back to the prehistory of these events.
Political ambitions of Slobodan Milošević underwent a gradual, but steady decline. His first project
was to replace Josip Broz at the head of Yu2. Whether he was a person entitled, or capable to do
that is the matter of opinion. Anyway, this initial project of Belgrade communist leader badly
failed. When the state he was supposed to rule started falling apart, he reduced his project to a
more modest one, which could be the best illustrated by the slogan proclaimed (unofficially, of
course) within the political elite in Belgrade: “All Serbs in one state”. The slogan was, in fact, a
brief description of the Serbs’ desire when the WWI started (initiated by Bosnian Serbs, by the
Sarajevo assassination). 1 Although the formal initiative for founding Yu1 came from Croats and
Slovenians from Austro-Hungary, the realization of the project was carried out by Serbia, which
paid for that by one quarter of her population (50 % of mail citizens). With Yu1 Serbs did achieve
this goal. After WWII Tito remade Yugoslav state (Yu2) and Serbs found themselves in a single,
though federal, state, again. With disintegration of Yu2, Serbs found themselves scattered all
around former Yu2 territory, living in four stated predominantly: Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and
BiH. Milošević’s next stage of the initial project reduced to assuring to all Serbs living in these
states to form their own “sub-states”, like RSK, RS, with the help, or guidance at least, of the
mother-state – Serbia. But he was aware that the project was unlikely to realize. His next phase was
to collect all Serbs who could not (or would not) live in their newly proclaimed states, to move to
Serbia. Cynically, this solution could by covered by the same slogan (All Serbs in a single state),
but this time this unique state was Serbia. Whether Serbians would like it or not, he neither asked
them nor cared about it at all.
On August 19, 1994, Milošević addresses representatives from Banija, Lika and Kordun, 2 with
this remarkable offer: “After all, there is room for all of you here”. 3
Hence, there are serious indications that he made a tacit agreement with Franjo Tudjman that the
troublesome Krajišniks (inhabitants of Krajina) leave Croatia and move to Serbia. 4 This operation
was carefully planned (and well hidden from the Serbian citizens). Since the prime minister in
Milošević government, Mirko Marjanović (HDE), was from Krajina himself, he took care that the
move was going on smoothly. But before going on with this operation, we must sketch the
demographic situation in Serbia and the consequent distribution of power in the Republic.

Dinarization of Serbia
Serbia has been the attractor for Serbs living in other parts of Western Balkan for centuries, for
many reasons. Generally, as we saw it earlier, highlanders move gradually to lowlands, with a
steady rate. Serbia proper (south from rivers Sava and Danube) appears a hilly land, a sort of
transient region between mountainous dinaric and plane Pannonic areas. It appears a convenient
refuge for highlanders from Herzegovina and Montenegro. After WWI Vojvodina was joined to the
rest of Serbia (and Yu1) and thus became a target for the incomers from Dinaric regions too. Apart
from steady drift, metanastatic (Greek meta-anastasis, after-uprising) migrations populated Serbia
by massive immigrations. These newcomers joined as a rule police and army, what was to be
expected, considering their tradition and belligerent mental structure. Usually, Montenegrins used
to join army, whereas Herzegovians preferred police.
(As mentioned earlier, it was their inclination to police which made them so unpopular among
Croatians. In particular in Yu2, when the state and its institutions were identified with the

1
In fact, organization which was behind the assassination, Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) comprised Serbs, Muslims
and Croats.
2
Counties in Croatia, then within RSK.
3
V. Djurić Misina, Republika Srpska Krajina, Dobra Volja, 2005, Beograd (in Serb), p. 40.
4
We stress again, it concerned Serbs from the rural compact regions where Serbs were the dominant population. Those
living in urban areas were left practically untouched and still live there as the loyal Croatian citizens.
 101

communist repression, whose principal tools were police and army, Serb Dinaroids had a very bad
reputation indeed among Croatian citizens. Similarly, ethnic Albanians, Arnauts, were synonymous
with Turkish repression on Balkan during the Ottoman Empire).
The infiltration of Dinaroids into Serbia was intensified particularly from 1991 onwards, as the
turmoil of forming new states started in Yu2. Many young people moved to Serbia in order to
escape the draft. On the other hand Serbian youth was engaged across river Drina, either as Serbian
conscripts in YNA, or as members of paramilitaries. When Arkan’s Tigers started forcibly
collecting those immigrants from RSK and RS and brought them forcibly to their region of origin,
to fight themselves for their homeland, situation turned from absurd to tragic. Here, two points are
to be made. First, the overwhelming majority of these immigrants are supporters of Šešelj and his
SRP. They usually fall for his demagogy and boasting with being “great Serb”, who would make of
all regions west from Drina a part of “Greater Serbia” and thus enable refugees (sic) to return to
their land of origin. Second, irrespective of these promises (and other wishful thinking), sticking to
their co-tribal well established in Serbia, they have been expecting their share when Šešelj finally
takes power in Serbia and establishes his dictatorship there.
Hence, the professional army forces in Serbia have been populated by Dinaroid radicals. 1 Apart
from this, when a member of Milošević government Šešelj ensured that these followers infiltrate
police, secret police, juridical web, local county offices, educational system, etc. And when the war
criminals, like Ratko Mladic, find refuge (sic) in Serbia, they will come to the land already
occupied by their “avant-guard”. And when the armed conflicts at KiM start in 1998, it will be
Dinaroids from both sides, who will initiate and carry out bloody fighting, as we shall see later on.
Now, we go back to Croatia again.

Refugees, immigrants, invaders

When the final assault on RSK started on August 4, 1995, political leaders of Krajina, like Milan
Babić, then the President of RSK, 2 were already with families safely in Serbia. Town Serb
inhabitants were ready with their cars (mainly Mercedes), while peasants had already put their most
necessary household staff on tractor trailers, and the “exile” could begin. But before we go on, we
quote an interrupted conversation between Milan Martić, mentioned before and Vojislav Šešelj: 3

Šešelj: You know, Zagreb must be bombarded, but not as before, but by Lunas.
Martić: Yes, yes, by atomic bombs.
Šešelj: There is no place for mercy here.
Martić: Yes, yes, Vojkane, you send volunteers.

(If there will ever be a trial to Šešelj for all damage he made to Serbia, this testimony of his almost
explicit role as an Ustasha provocateur ill be one of principal proofs).
In the armed clashes about 130.000 Croatian soldiers were engaged, against 30.000. Krajina Serbs.
The resistance was symbolic, in fact fictive. On the same day of the attack, August 4, Milan Martić
proclaims the overall retreat. During few days “fighting” about 100 soldiers were killed altogether

1
At this moment (2007) the head of the general staff in Serbia is gen. Zdravko Ponoš (HDE), born at Knin (1962), who
graduated military academy at Zagreb. His immediate predecessor was gen. Krga (HDE too). We have already
mentioned gen. Adžić (HDE himself)
2
Former dentist; he was sentenced to 13 years in prison by Hague Tribunal, after he confessed (sic) majority of
indictments. Expecting further reduction of the sentence he testified against Milošević in 2006. Despised by other
prisoners (including Croat ones) he committed suicide.
3
V. Djurić Misina, Republika Srpska Krajina, Dobra Volja, 2005, Beograd (in Serb)
 102

(mainly on Serb side). Considering the overall number of engaged forces, it corresponds to
casualties in massive military maneuvers.
To the real civilians many soldiers dressed in civilian clothes joined the “refugee” columns (in the
following, we drop the quotation marks on refugees, for the sake of economy). Both parts of
refugees carried out weapons with them. Few of them settled in RS, but the overwhelming majority
came to mother-Serbia. The movements of those columns were well organized and controlled.
Regardless of that whether they moved through Croatia (Slavonia) or Bosnia, they were well
supplied at gas stations with water, fuel etc. Croatians were eager to assist the exile of the disloyal,
rebellious citizens and were very helpful indeed. 1
We note here that both mock-states collaborated closely while fighting their central government
state forces. Thus, the premier of Krajina Republic, Milan Martić, was commanding the forces
which were instrumental conquering Brčko region, the narrow strip of land separating eastern from
western parts of Republica Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, populated predominantly by
Muslims. When this task was accomplished, he was met at a triumphal parade at Banja Luka, as the
war hero. Never-the-less, when those fugitives from Krajina came to Republica Srpska, they were
just forwarded further east, to “the mother of all Serbs”, Serbia, who has been supposed to receive
everybody who declares himself a Serb, irrespective of his (mis)deeds made in his homeland. And
Serbian tax payers are obliged to support any such refugee, as long as he is crying “I am a Serb
martyr!!
The same scenario repeated in the case of BiH. Joined Muslim-Croat forces pushed Mladic forces
all over BiH, and approached Banja Luka, the capital of the Serb mock-state. They stopped before
the town, at the insistence of the Western Allies. Another wave of refugees followed, who poured
into mother-Serbia. The latter used to support their fighting for four years, supplying those
rebellious regions with 30 % of their “needs’ in arms, ammunition, food, etc. After the collapse of
both “states” situation considerably improved for both sides: Serbians did not have to send support
to the remote regions, but could to do that at Serbian soil. The incomers were released of fear of the
non-Serb hostile environment, since they were now “among their kinsmen”, who were supposed to
continue to feed them, provide with refugee camps, flats, etc. With three-year long life under severe
international sanctions, because of her support of «brother-rebels» in Croatia and BiH, Serbia had
now to withstand additional burden of about 500.000. incomers. When in 1999 the latter were
joined with about 200.000. «resettled people» from KiM, it will add up to700.000. incomers to
settle and feed. Apart from KiM region population, this figures amounted to almost 10 % of the
overall autochtoneous population of Serbia, the burden a much richer and bigger state could hardly
withstand. But the biggest gain went to Dinaroid politicians in Serbia, who got at hand a
considerable number of devoted voters. If we note that majority of them were well equiped with
arms, the picture of Serbia occupied by Serbs (sic) is complete. (The latter fact will prove fatal for
Serbia when the cases of war criminals at Hague Tribunal from over-Drina regions become actual,
as the case of Ratko Mladic illustrates.)
At the beginning, the overall support of those refugees was covered by the international
humanitarian organizations by 15 %, whereas the rest of 85 % was deposited on the shoulders of
Serbian citizens. Gradually the international help faded away to zero and Serbia remained on her
own. With her «brotherly burden».
But let us go back to those imigrant columns. They were met at Serbian borders and escorted to the
previously determined spots. They were not allowed to stop in Belgrade, for instance, or any other
Serbian town. Media reporters were not allowed to talk to them, or take pictures of the unfortunate
people. They were distributed all over Sebia, so that their presence could be conceiled from the
public attention as much as possible. If we note that the same «conspiracy of silence» was practiced

1
In fact they rightly experienced this move as the completion of the ethnic cleansing carried out by Ustasha regime
during WWII.
 103

in Croatia and BiH, as well as in the world public media, the overall ignoring of the massive
movements within former Yu2 was almost complete. 1
But the most interesting and important response to the massive imigration into Serbia came from
KiM. A part of those incomers was destined by Belgrafe authorities to KiM. The reaction of
Shqiptar leaders was severe, even histeric. They raised such noisy protests against «changing the
ethnical content» of the province, that the Serbian government stoped the settling in the region.
Majority of those who were settled on KiM never-the-less moved from KiM to the rest of Serbia,
mainly illegally.
The Shqiptar reaction to the refugee problem deserves some special consideration here. In general,
when refugees are concerned, as a part of humanitarian question, anybody who can help the
unfortunate people is supposed to do that, irrespective of their nationality, political and other
«colours». But when non-Albanians are concerned, this kind of logic stops at Shqiptar thresholds.
Everything that is hindrance to their long-term project of ethnically clear KiM has been regarded as
an outrigt assault on their natural right «to be alone». (When the ethnical cleansing starts in 1999
from »both sides», 2 the ugly face of nationalism and chauvinism will appear in «ful glory», as we
shall see in the following.)
The other point to be made concerning the Shqiptar reaction was the outright cynism. In the light
of what we have seen regarding the permanent influx of incomers from Albania into KiM, which
ocasionally took form of massive invasion, this reaction proved that the local leaders were deprived
of minimum sense of ethical as such. Or, the supremacy of ethnical over ethical, to put it into more
general terms, has been confirmed once again.
The final irony of the whole situation was that many of those to be settled on KiM were
descendants of ancient refugees from KiM who took refuge in Austria during the Ottoman rule, and
were settled down at today Krajina region in modern Croatia. With their attempt to settle down
finally on the land of their ancestres
the full circle of Balkan migrations has been closed. Or almost so.

Serbia Occupied
The political disturbancies and military conflicts in Yu2 have resulted in massive moves and
migrations witin the Serbo-Croat regions. Serbia (and partly Montenegro) were the only (former)
republics which suffered not only net influx, but no emigration into other Yugoslav regions took
place from Serbia. (We do not consider her emigration abroad, which was caused first directly by
Milošević dictatorship and indirectly by the same but due to the influx of refugees and others into
Serbia). Since the incomeres were (or at least decleared themselves) Serbs (Orthodox) situation in
which the autochtoneous Serbian population found itself has been most unusual and weird, to sy
the least. The incomers, mainly Dinaroids, differed greatly from the indigeneous Serbian
population, both Serb and others (Hungarians, Slovaks, Rumenians etc). First they came from rural
regions far away from Serbia, carryng with themselves distinct sense of ethics, different folklore,
tradition etc. Even their language was different, though inteligible by local Serbs. In fact, apart
from the (Orthodox) church confession, these peope from Croatia and BiH were more akin to
Croats than to Serbian Serbs. 3 Retarded in all aspect of civilisation these incomers brought with
them the spirit of 18th – 19th century. Coupled with their violent and stuborn mentality, their
presence in Serbia has been experienced by the local population (Serb and non-Serb alike) as a sort
of occupation. Insisting all the time on their Serb ethnicity, many of them behave as Ottoman
Turks. A sort of predator-pray relationship has been established in Serbia now. Since this situation

1
The attentive reader might have noticed I avoid making use of the term ethnical cleansing, as inappropriate in this
context. It will be different with events in BiH and KiM, at the local level, as we shall see later on.
2
Quotation marks refer to as yet undefined term “side”.
3
An overwhelming majority of over-Drina Serbs and Croats speak the so-called ijekavic (pronounced iyecavic) dialect,
unlike Serbian Serb who speak ekavic one. A tiny minority of over-Drina population speaks icavic, mostly in Dalmatia.
 104

has proved essential for understanding and monitoring the ongoing events regarding KiM, we
devote next chapter to the prehistory of Serbian demography.

Colonization of Serbia
In the last century the first wave of Dinaroids came after the WWI, when moving within the same
state was easy and over-Drina population took advantage of it to settle in Serbia. In the following,
to avoid possible misunderstanding, we shall call this population Ijecavians, bearing in mind that it
will refer almost exclusively to the Orthodox part of the Serbo-Croats. 1 This sort of imigration took
the form of a drift and the indigeneous population was able to absorb the influx and the newcomers
were assimilated gradually into the new environment. The quality of these imigrants was resonably
high and they contributed considerably to the overall economic and cultural life in Serbia.
At the beginning of WWII on Balkan and the founding of the Nazi state Nezavisna Drzava
Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia, ISC in the following) and the ensuing pogroms of Serbs,
Jews and Roma, many Serbs crossed river Drina to find refuge in Serbia. The latter was under the
protectorat of Third Reich, with a quisling government and soon after the German occupation two
independent guerilla movements were formed: royalist Chetniks of Dragoljub (Draza) Mihajlovic
and partizans under the communist leadership, headed by Josip Broz, known as Tito. Those
partizans were mainly newcomers from ISC and they constituted the core of partizan forces. Both
movements started fighting German forces, jointly or separatelly, making umbushes, what was a
sort of continuation of hayduk tradition. Germans responded quickly to this theat and imposed the
occupational law that 100 hostages were to be killed for every German soldier killed and 50 for a
wounded. Chetniks therefore stopped fightening Germans, restricting themseves to sabotaging
German transport and similar actions, under the aproval of the Yugoslav government in exile in
London and the help of British diversants. Partizans continued to kill German soldiers, for they did
not feel themselves as Serbian citizens and did not care much about the civilian victims. Never-the-
less they were finally pushed across Drina into ISC, where the cruel occupational rule was not
introduced, so that Serbia was left with Germans and Chetnicks, in a sort of tacit seasefire. Though
Germans continued to chase and fight Chetnicks, no serious battles have been fought in Serbia until
1944. In the spring of 1944 Tito's forces started invading Serbia, expecting the near arrival of Red
Army, preparing the ground for the final take over of power and communist dictatorship. Those
invading communist forces consisted entirely from Ijekviens. Thus the communism has been
brought to Serbia on the bayonets of Ijekavians, predominantely Dinaroids.
When the war was over, these Ijekavians stayed in Serbia, mainly as army officers. It was on them
that Tito and his communists relied on during the following decades of communist rule. Moreover,
the new regime settled down hundreds thousands of Ijekavians, mainly in Vojvodina, having
banished German population from the region (about 400.000, so-called Volksdeutschers). Since the
newcomers took all dominant positions in politics, army, police etc, Serbia was faced with a true
collonization, not to say occupation. But it was not the end of the story. 2
Of the former Yugolav army, which capitualed in April 18, 1941, all Serbs in the army were taken
to Germany and Austria as prisoners of war. Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Albanians,
Hungarians etc were exampt from this. Since a great deal of those prisoners of war did not return to
Serbia under the communist rule, Serbia thus was deprived of her most vital part of population.
And even this was not the end of the story. Those eminent citizens who did not join the Communist
party, or simply were considered as unrelible, were persecuted. All these effects turned out fatal

1
Three dialects are defined according to pronunciation of some vowels. As an illustration, for the English milk, one has
mleko (ekavian), mlijeko (ijekavian, pronounced iyekavian) and mliko (ikavian). This situation resembles very much
division of Albanians into Gegs (Northern Albanian highlanders) and Tosks (central and south Albania, with
lowlanders) and the corresponding dialects. KiM Shiptars are Gegs, of course.
2
See P. Grujic, Boromejski Čvor, ATC, Belgrade, 2006 (in Serb).
 105

for Serbian demographic picture after the War. The overall level of civilisation was lowered down
bellow a level of tolerance, never to be recovered since. And it is not yet the end of the story.
As we mentioned before, the influx of Ijekavians started with disintegration of Yu2. Not only
refugees (real or fictive), but many simply for convenience, flooded Serbia, as a sort of Promised
land, obliged to accept everybody who finds it conveniant to settle down here. Was there any
reistance to this colonization? Not at all, for good reasons. First, the ruling class (better to say
rulling cast) was already Dinaric in Serbia. 1 Since all public media are in their hands, there is even
hardly the awareness of the autochtoneous Serbians concerning the extent and seriousness of the
colonization phenomenon. Second, the international community appears very sympathetic with the
refugees as such, for understandable reasons. Third, as the experiance has proved, it turns out
impossible to explain the difference between Dinaric refugees in Sweden and Serbia, for instance.
Among other differences, Serbs in Sweden, for instance, try to conceal their ethnicity (for good
reason, Serbs being demonized for the last two decades or so), whereas their principal argument in
favour of their privilegies in Serbia has been that they are Serbs, what they never fail to emphasize
in public or in private. In fact, if one hears somebody «Serbing» in Serbia, he can be prety sure he
is listening to a Dinaric person. Every two sentence from Šešelj and his followers, in the
Parliament, before TV camera etc starts with «We Serbian Radicals ...». Any unexperienced
listener would interpret it as a sign of «ethnical obsession», and that is exactly what Šešeljoids
want to achieve.
Where exactly these newcomers settle in Serbia, more precisely what are their social targets in the
new land? Before considering that, we first turn to the political environment in Yu2 when the
disintegration crisis started around 1990.
One of the first steps international community took in the Yugoslav issue was an embargo on arms
import into belligerent republics. The principal benefactor of this embargo was Serbia, since it was
her who inherited Yugoslav Army and its weaponry. This initial advantage was the main cause of
the Serb military successes in Croatia and BiH. Of course, other republics used to import the arms
illegally, what was tacitly tolerated by the international community, for obvious reason. 2 But it was
not the end of the story. In order to prevent or at least reduce the armed conflicts, restrictions on the
size of the republican armies was imposed, by limiting the number of soldiers etc. This was as
much reasonable move by the outside world, as naïve one. The response of Milošević, for instance,
was an enlargement of the police forces, both in number and equipment. In fact he set up his
private army, which he controlled and which formally was not comprised by the international
restrictions. The gain was multiple. First, since at the time he was not president of Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY, Yu3 in the following), he was not thus the supreme commander of the Army.
As president of Serbia, however he was in a position to control the police, and thus he enlarged its
forces which were in fact a para-military army. Second, he was now in a position to choose
(recruit) new policemen. The best choice for him would be to have loyal men, who were not
engaged in the internal political conflicts. His choice was, you guess, to take Ijekaviens. For many
reasons. First, they are “born policemen” ,considering their employment in the regions of origin.
Second, they are supposed to be grateful to Milošević for receiving them in Serbia. In a sense, it
was Milošević’s “Praetorian guard”, or “League of foreigners”. Third, they were not supposed to
feel sympathies for Milošević’s adversaries in Serbia, even not for the Serbian citizens.
Since two previous points should be obvious, we pay attention to the third one. When the massive
demonstrations and rallies started in Serbia from 1990 on, Milošević engaged his riot police,
which showed such ruthlessness in dealing with demonstrators, that Belgrade citizens, for instance,

1
Term Ijekavians would be inappropriate here, for these newcomers accept the local ekavic dialect and are hardly
distinguishable from the indigenous population for that matter.
2
It was revealed recently that Slovenians were selling weaponry to Croatia and BiH in 1991, under the guidance of
Janez Janša, then the minister of interior.
 106

could not believe they belonged to the same nation. A Belgrade university professor 1 came across
to the lined heavily armed police units, which was placed in front of the National Theatre building,
situated at the very beginning of Vasa Čarapić street at the very core of the Belgrade centre (with
the University centre, where a number of faculties, including that of the professor’s mentioned, and
the central university building, like London Senate House) are placed, and asked “naively’ where
that street might be, he got this remarkable reply “I don’t know it”. 2 And that is not the end of the
story. When the non-Shqiptar police forces were withdrawn from KiM in 1999, they joined the
Milošević’s police, and were engaged in beating Serbian citizens all over Serbia. (This remarkable
behaviour explains in retrospective a lot of things when we come back to the KiM fighting in
1998/9).
Before we go on with the arrivists’ settling in Serbia, we stress it started even before Dayton
agreement and ceasefire in 1995. After Dayton, Serbia experienced a proper invasion of Ijekavians.
Entire para-military units moved in and were accepted as parts of regular police forces. When we
talk about atrocities in 1999, in particular those committed by the infamous Scorpions, we shall
devote more attention to this aspect of armed fighting in Serbia. We now spend a few words on the
“nonmilitary sector” of the incomers.
Majority of these immigrants were poor people, who were accepted as refugees, and supported by
Serbian state, as mentioned earlier. Some of them found it very convenient to have the refugee
status, as a case with Mile from Benkovac illustrates. 3 When in 1996 Belgrade journalist visited a
refugee camp near Niš (south-east Serbia), this healthy young man in his 30-ies complained (as
many others did) about the food, with these remarkable words: “How they will feed us in five
years, when they are feeding us like this now(!?)”. Many of the refugees turned down offer to do
some season work, like agricultural one, preferring to live bad without labouring. Those who
brought considerable amounts of money engaged in various business enterprises, from legal to
criminal ones. Some of them opened small firms, usually mini-markets, cafés, restaurants, etc,
non-productive, servicing enterprises in general. They employ, as a rule, their compatriots as
“black market”, without registering them to the state administration and without paying the social,
health and other insurances, and tax of course. The so-called grey economy is held in Serbia mainly
by these newcomers. Needles to say that people employed illegally are paid miserably by their
“compatriotic” bosses.
Those with large amount of money invested it in the most profitable business – drug smuggling and
dealing. Around large towns, in particular Belgrade and it outskirts, new satellite quarters have
been built by these “refugees”, with luxurious parts which appear to be the centres for criminal
business. When Šešelj’s radicals took over Zemun and other towns and villages in Serbia, they
started distributing the municipal land to the refugees, as part of their colonization project. The
price was symbolic, of course, but the “internal division” was the most interesting, indeed.
Those from BiH had to pay double price compared to those who came from Croatia. The rationale
for this discrimination is simple. People from RSK have been moved to Serbia, by a planned
operation, as explained before, whereas those from BiH have been considered as “civic deserters”.
In the long run they are supposed to return to BiH and strengthen the “Serb element” there, so that
the area could be easily joined to Serbia (or vice versa). In any case looking at hose new
settlements at the outskirts of Serbian towns and as new villages, one witnesses “kasabization” of

1
Late Milan Kurepa, one of the fierce adversaries of Milošević’s regime, who retired prematurely because of that and
died after a heart attack a few days after the October 2000 dismantling of Milošević’s regime, as a consequence of his
political engagement.
2
“Ne znaam ti ja!”, with the best Montenegrin’s accent.
3
A town in Western Herzegovina, to be mentioned again later on, on a different occasion.
 107

Serbia in real terms. 1 These settlements have been dubbed by (autochthonous) Serbians
“Šešeljugas”, for obvious reasons.
In 2002 there were 450.000. Ijekavian refugees in Serbia (apart from 200.000 from KiM). Out of
them 170.000 gained SRJ (Yu3) citizenship, with 60.000 - 80.000 with right to vote. 2 The latter
are sure Šešelj’s supporters. Generally, these newcomers made a tremendous pressure on the
Serbian labour market, which already was saturated (with 22 % officially unemployed, as a very
conservative figure). These newcomers are ready to take any job on the market, regardless of the
economic logic and labour ethos. They appear sure strike-breakers, as primary and secondary
school teachers have experienced many times in their struggle for better working conditions and
higher salaries. As a rule these people are reluctant to return to their homeland in Croatia, partly for
understandable reason, but mainly for convenience. Those who do return are elderly people, who
want to end their earthly live “at their-home threshold”. Of course, Croatian authorities have
already managed to discourage return, otherwise the whole project of cleansing the state of the
disloyal, rebellious population would have been in vain. Serb house were either burned or levelled
to the ground, as we saw in the case of Medački Džep, or occupied by Croat refugees from other
parts of Croatia.
All these problems appear common instances with refugees as such, but now we come to the most
serious of problem Serbia has been facing since 1991, and especially after Dayton agreement in
1995 – the war criminals. Many of those Ijekavians engaged in war atrocities, Serbs and Croats
alike, started finding refuge in their “mother-states”, Serbia and Croatia, respectively, even before
Dayton agreement and ceasefire. In Serbia those started arriving ever since 1991, but after the
agreement signed by Izetbegović, Milošević and Tudjman, majority of these criminals moved out
of BiH. Since Croatia was in the same situation as Serbia concerning occupation by Dinaroids, we
shall not dwell on Croatian affairs and turn our attention to demonized Serbia. Why demonized?
We shall se it even more clearly after considering the question of war crimes, both in BiH and
Serbia (including KiM). But before go on, we emphasize once again the generic case of Dinaroids.
One important point concerning Dinaroids must be stressed here. It is not the overall number they
appear in the new environment, not even the percentage within the over all population. They have a
tremendous impulse to stick together and form a sort of personal union within each community. 3
They concentrate geographically in selected areas, as the case of numerous settlements in Serbia
show. In particular we mention the case of Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, the town with the
most advanced culture in Serbia (Serbian Athens). When the influx of Ijekavians started in 1991,
the population of Novi Sad rose in 15 years from 210.000 to 340.000. As the first consequence, the
town renown for his liberal atmosphere and democratic orientation, turned into the bastion of
Šešelj’s radicals, who rule the town now (2007). In fact, all places where radical have won
elections are populated mainly either by Ijekavians or Roma.
The same applies when we come to employment, sport, entertainment places etc, where the “call of
the blood and homeland” gather Ijekavians, making of some firms and organization impenetrable
fortresses. In the family life they do not mix with the local population, including inter-marriages,
mainly because of their complex of inferiority, often disguised in the clothes of arrogance. In fact
the principal obstacle for the latter is that they have different ethos, that of a traditional society,
what makes common life with the modern environment very difficult indeed. (The case of Mirko
Marjanović, the prime minister in Milošević government, mentioned earlier illustrates the best the
sort of ethos one meets in Dinaric regions. He was a best man in a wedding, what did not prevent to

1
Kasaba, Turkish name for a provincial town or small city, after Arab qasaba. It appears eponymous for the oriental,
disordered, dirty place, with poor logistic.
2
At present (2007) these figures have raised, of course.
3
This appears, of course, a common case with people in diaspora, but here we have the peculiar case of “diaspora in
the akin people”, what makes the situation very weird indeed.
 108

grab the bride and run away with her. In Serbia, the status of best man appears very respected and
dignified, indeed, even higher than the status of brother, for instance).
The recent cruelty and fierce fighting in the 1991-1995 period have demonstrated what sociologists
and historians have noticed long time ago, the fact that Dinaroids appear neither Serb nor Croats
(and even Slavs). As one picture says more than thousand words, so one graphite speaks better than
elaborate analyses. In 1992 one such graphite appeared on the walls of the Slavonian capital Osijek,
populated by Croats and Serbs before the “war”, but emptied from Serbs when fighting started:
GIVE US BACK OUR SERBS, TAKE BACK YOUR HERZEGOVIANS.
Common people have better understood the crux of the matter than majority of professionals. 1
When the autochthonous local politician Kir, Croat, started visiting Slavonian places arguing for
tolerance and peaceful coexistence, he was assassinated, on the order of higher rank politicians,
probably from Zagreb. Highlanders from both sides were on the same task – divide et impera.
When Sarajevo writer (who happened to be Montenegrin himself) in the interview to Belgrade
weekly expresses the same point (see page 50 xx), it could appear in Serbian press as a part of the
interview of a stranger only, since in Serbia opinion on the subject are absolute taboo. Zagreb
citizens, just like Belgrade ones, look with contempt at those violent and rough intruders, but the
latter have successfully manage to settle down the issue, like young Bonaparte promised to that
French general on the Italian front. 2 When the first immigrants from RSK started arriving to
Vojvodina in Serbia, by car with the plates KNN (designating Knin, the capital of the self-
proclaimed republic), feelings of the local, autochthonous population was the best illustrated by
their comments of the acronym as “Kanda Nisu Naši” (They seem not to be of ours).
An episode from the NATO aggression in 1999 illustrates well the crux of matter. As soon as the
raids began, the window of the USA Cultural centre, situated in the very centre of the Belgrade
centre, in Knez Mihailova Street, was crushed by angry demonstrators. Instead of the posters
usually found in the window, the (framed) portrait of Radovan Karadzic was deposited there. Who
did it? Surely not autochthonous Belgrade inhabitants, but Dinaroids from those regions. The
message was twofold. One was aimed at Allies, to irritate them, the other directed towards
Serbians: We are here! 3
A few years ago I was invited to attend a PhD oral defence at the faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade
University. The candidate was a colleague of mine, who is taking part in the seminar on the
epistemology and history of science, I am running at my Institute of Physics. He came from Bosnia
and graduated philosophy (and chemical physics) at Belgrade University. His brother was a general
in Republika Srpska, who died there. On the blackboard , in the left upper corner, we could read
СВЕ ЗА СРПСТВО, СРПСТВО НИЗАШТА (Everything for Serbism, 4 Serbism for nothing). (I
could not help asking if it was a part of the defence or a slogan, but restrained myself.) The
chairman of the jury emphasized at the opening of the defence he was glad to learn that the
candidate was his compatriot from Bosnia. When on our way out after the defence my wife and I
entered the escalator, we saw a large poster of Radovan Karadzic in the cabin, reading СВАКИ
СРБИН ЈЕ РАДОВАН (every Serb is Radovan). I couldn’t help writing on the poster А СВАКИ
РАДОВАН ЦРНОГОРАЦ (and every Radovan is Montenegrin), but it would not be technically
feasible. We knew that this department was infiltrated by Dinaroids, but never-the-less were
chocked by the aggressive Dinaric nationalism. The point was to persuade Serbians to accept
Radovan Karadzic, wanted by Hague Tribunal, as a national hero, by accepting him as a Serb, and
thus as a Serbian. The message was: Serbia must stand behind him (and all other accused).

1
Or at least they were more sincere, like that kid in Emperor’s new clothes.
2
“General, you are for the head taller than me, but if you are not obeying my orders, I shall deprive you of this
advantage!”
3
We shall meet this fellow Karadzic many times in this book.
4
Like Judaism, Germanism etc
 109

Dinaric saga
The relationship Dinaric highlanders – plane population has many aspects, which show up in
various socio-political situations in different forms. These aspects have been described by a number
of authors, but have never become a topic significant enough to draw attention of the sociologists
as a principal target of investigations. This fact reflects more the positions Dinaroids hold in the
society (and their control over public media), but also within the cultural sector, then the genuine
neglect by the leading intellectuals. Never-the-less, when one focuses the attention on the issue, she
will find a lot of relevant material, which illustrates, albeit indirectly, the essence of the ”Dinaric
question”.
Some two decades ago Zagreb TV released a series entitled ”Beggars and sons”. TV spectators
enjoyed the plot, but few realized the point was less in the events as much as in the review of the
mentality of the heroes. The story evolves in the western Herzegovina, with the Catholic and
Muslim population, still under the Turkish rule.. The principal hero is a sort of montagnard Jeff
Peters, a boy living in a mountainous village, whose inhabitants live mainly from begging in the
lowland surrounding areas. They gather regularly and organize ”legal plundering” of the naive
peasants in the plane. Simulating cripples, suffering debility, mental disability etc, these “beggars”
appear a sort of tax collectors, taking advantage of the naivety of the religious compassion. They do
not make difference between Christians and Muslims, diving as birds of prey on the industrious
plane people victims. Our young hero accompanies his grand father, the leader of the ”plundering
squadron” and learns the “craft”. When he grows up and his grandfather dies, he takes over the
”business” , but this time within the Austro-Hungarian society. He organizes a group of small
dealers, selling smuggled stuff, like lighter flints and similar small goods, in Croatia,
Czechoslovakia etc. The audience did enjoy exploits of our hero, who even succeeds to outwit the
local usurer, by not paying his debt.
The latter episode resembles much a folk story of west-Serbian peasant, eponymous Era, who
cheats a Turkish couple engaged in ploughing and robes them for money and the horse. Yugoslav
readers (the story aims at the school children) enjoy the plot, of course, since they experience it as a
Slav serf outwitting Turkish masters. The point staying in the hind-side has never been discussed in
the school, for obvious reason. The story appears an allegory of the relationship montagnards
lowlanders, just as the famous biblical narrative of Cain and Abel does. In a sense, the TV series
appears an extensive elaboration of the sociological issue we discuss here.
As we mentioned, the series comprised two periods, marked by the beggars and smugglers. While
enjoying the plot no one of us could foresee that the third-generation episode was about to arrive.
And it did arrive in 1991. This time without begging, without smuggling, but with a rightway
armed plundering and killing, from all sides, Serb Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim (Slav
and Albanian alike). New heroes now are named Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, Ante Gotovina, Naser
Orić, Ramush Haradinaj, etc, etc. All disguised by the most sacred patriotism, freedom fighting etc.
In fact, our TV series might well have started from the precursors of those beggars, the Medieval
highwaymen (zero phase), who came to light once again in 1991, when ”ideological preconditions”
(in Marxists’ parlance) were realized.

Serbia before Shqiptar rebellion in 1998

With the ethno-social silent colonization of Serbia in the hind-side, Serbian political scene in late
1990-ieths was the subject of severe political and social turmoil. Two Dinaroid political Parties,
Those of Šešelj and Drašković, struggling for power, were engaged in fierce mutual fighting, but at
the same time used to make “seasonal agreements” with Milošević, when he found advantageous
for him to offer them a piece of power. The proper political, bourgeois parties, like Democratic
Party, (lead by Zoran Djindjic), Democratic Party of Serbia, (lead by Vojislav Kostunica, of the
Montenegrin origin), Association of Serbian Citizens (lead by Vesna Peshić), were engaged in
overthrowing Milošević’s dictatorship. Unfortunately, the latter had to make deal with Drašković
 110

party, otherwise being too weak they had no power to achieve their political goals alone. This
spoiled, of course, the ethos of their policy, but those compromises appeared inevitable, never-the-
less, at the time. On the other hand Šešelj’s stratagem for quenching his pathological thirst for
power was different. 1 He used to sling mud at the opposition altogether, and accusing Milošević
and his regime for dictatorship and crime. By doing the first, he let Milošević know he is not part
of the real opposition, and by the second he was blackmailing the regime. How the later looked like
we illustrate with debate at the Federal Parliament within the period 1991-1995, when fighting in
BiH was going on, with Serbia explicitly accused by the external factors for interfering BiH affairs.
Serbian authorities, of course, were denying it, for obvious reason. Then a Radical MP stands
before the parliament microphone and TV cameras, during a debate which had nothing to do with
BiH, and reads certificates, issued allegedly by YPA, that Šešelj’s paramilitaries were given a
particular amount of weaponry and ammunition and that the former were given back later on to the
same military magazine. The massage was multiple. To the followers it said “We are patriots,
fighting for Serbian cause!”. To the external world: Serbia has been engaged in interfering Bosnian
fighting. To Milošević: we are compromising Serbia and your regime, and we shall be doing that
until you accepts as partners in dictatorship.
After a long resistance, Milošević gave in. He accepted Šešelj into the government, allotting to him
the position of deputy prime minister and a number of other minister chairs in the government.
With the tacit agreement, which might be formulated like this:

You are scum, but I am unable to resist you.

You will be in my government and may proceed with slinging mud at the opposition
(which, you scum, used to belong to until recently).
You may lie, steal and do other things like this, but not more than us.
And don’t you ever fancy you have been accepted as a true partner, for I am a gangster,
and you are the scoundrel.

It was for the last point that Šešeljoids continued to be after Milošević, but with more sophisticated
means. For their explicit and final goal was an absolute power. 2
Those readers who happen to be familiar with Hitler’s rise to power may feel they have already
read these points. Yes, it was exactly Hitler’s stratagem for taking power in Germany. I happen to
be unaware of anybody who has realized that it was the same tactics of blackmailing German
government (and official authorities in general) which was instrumental in forcing Hindenburg to
give the mandate to that lunatic, as Ludendorf described Hitler in his famous letter to the president
of Reich 3 . Hindenburg naively thought lunatic will stop blackmailing and will behave himself
when attaining his goal. He mistrusted, unfortunately, Hitler’s sincerity in those matters, (as the
entire Europe did, for her misfortune). This parallel with Hitler career is not accidental. For Šešelj
has studied Hitler’s stratagem in details, as part of his MSc and PhD studies, as his behaviour
clearly reveals. He has been following Mein Kampf scenario meticulously, including his well
planned visit to the Hague Tribunal. Both Hitler and Šešelj were outcasts of their respective
societies, both took refuge to the neighbouring “brother-land”, coming from highlands. Both started
their political careers fighting communists. But while Hitler copied Mussolini’s fascistic rituals in
stabilizing and promoting his movement, Šešelj has been very careful not to reveal any sign of his
fascistic strategy, being well aware of the anti-fascist feelings both in Serbia and Europe. We shall
come back to this point later on.

1
Which, in its turn, is but one of remedies for his inferiority complex, greatly enhanced in Serbia, which first rejected
him and then ignored him and his followers completely.
2
It is for these points that the set of those who realize it was Šešelj who put Milošević at the Hague Tribunal is
virtually empty.
3
See the excellent and detailed account in I. Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, Penguin Books, 1998.
 111

Milošević was eager to come to terms with Shqiptar leaders, for many reason. First of all, he was a
president of the state and was careful in maintaining the country running as smoothly as possible. It
is true Serbia was under an international pressure to come to terms with Shqiptars and their
demands, but it would be a gross simplification to ascribe to Milošević deal with KiM affairs as a
simple consequence of the international pressure. He did offer to KiM political leaders talks on the
province problems, but this offer badly failed. A high-rank delegation was sent o Priština to
arrange a meeting with regional leaders, but after three-day stay no Shqiptar representative
appeared. The only representatives (true or self-appointed) came from the so-called national
minorities: Roma, Muslims, Egyptians and Ashkalias. It was this failure which has finally
convinced Milošević and everybody else that Shqiptar boycott of Serbia (not Milošević) was total
and final.
KiM is not the only province in the world which has difficulties in the relation with the metropolis.
As well as miners are not the only branch of the society who have difficulties in relation with the
government. But in either case, it is one who complains who approach the relevant source of
trouble (real or alleged), not vice versa. Everybody who wants an amelioration of the situation tries
to cooperate on the matter. On the contrary, once one decides to cut off the relations with
somebody or something chooses the option of making things worse. In the long run it presents the
situation nonamenable to any improvement and the demands for the total cut -off seem justified to
any uninformed, but interested observer. And it has been just the stratagem of KiM Shqiptars – the
worse, the better.
By sending government representatives to rebellious Priština, Milošević put all cards on the table.
Shqiptars’ rejection to play showed Milošević that his risk did not pay off. He was humiliated
(together with the rest of Serbia) and when he thought it was his move, this humiliation played a
role in the way he chose to deal with rebels. This does not justify, of course, many of his actions in
1998-1999, but it does explain them, albeit not in political-opportunistic terms.
From Shqiptar side, the stage for the final clash has been ready. Now, we come to the “rest of
world” in this context.
But before we consider the “world stage”, we analyze briefly the meaning and nature of KiM
boycott.

KiM and world

KiM and boycott of Serbia

During the post-war period (that is in Yu2), KiM put itself in an ambiguous position concerning its
relationship with the rest of Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia. From one side Shqiptar leaders joined
the rest of communist dictatorship within the federal state, and played the same role as the leaders
of other republics, stressing the ideological and social supremacy over nationality. On the other
hand they used to stress the particular situation of KiM, demanding the federal help in all respects
(except in family planning, of course). They did not bother with the conflict between the bad
economic and all other aspects of human life in the region and the cause of it - the demographic
explosion. That is why family planning has always been taboo on KiM.
Direct consequence of the enormous birth rate at KiM has been the increase of the young
nonproductive population. It was this non-productivity which has been the real side of the political
and ethnical boycott regarding the rest of Serbia. When the Shqiptar leadership decided to press for
political independence and separation, it still stuck to the federal budget and fund for undeveloped
republics and KiM. When the separatist move became explicit and put on the table, one of many
cynical justifications for their demand was the claim of being economically exploited. The financial
help from the rest of Serbia was explained as a mean of further exploitation of Kim. In particular,
this claim asserts that the investment was into KiM mines, and other primary resources, so as to
exploit them and use them as resource of welfare of the rest of Serbia. One of slogans current
 112

during the peak of the crises in1980-thies was TREPCHA RADI – BEOGRAD SE GRADI
(Trepcha works, Belgrade is built). 1 But in reality, what was the contribution of KiM to Yugoslavia
and Serbia?
As mentioned before, the principal income of KiM has been the earnings of their workers in
Western Europe (Geistarbeiters). These earnings were private income and the state did not benefit
from it, neither by taxation, nor by any other gain. The money has been spent on private welfare,
not on any public need, like infrastructure, hospitals, schools etc. But the economic relation does
not exhaust the overall relationship between the whole and its parts. What’s about the cultural,
scientific and other sectors?
Being a relatively small community, with poor tradition in the cultural field, KiM could but poorly
contribute to the Yugoslav culture, not to mention European one. Their cinema production, theater
performances etc were very dependent on the rest of Yugoslavia, especially Serbia. The overall
artistic production, anyway, was confined to the regional, better to say national compartment,
which was of little interest to other cultural centers in Yugoslavia. The language barrier was
another formidable obstacle of any serious impact on Yugoslav cultural scene.
The science has been a theme for itself. KiM contribution to hard science has been virtually naught,
though number of Shqiptar students did study at Belgrade and other universities at the postgraduate
level and some even got their PhD degrees there. We mentioned before the educational situation
there, with the enormous influx of young people to the university, which produced thousands of
diplomas and nothing substantially useful concerning the final outcome. As for the humanitarian
sciences, the overwhelming majority of scientific work has been concentrated on the national
history, prehistory, linguistic and folklore, what has been of interest to these disciplines in a wider
context of European milieu. Researchers from the latter did not have to travel far away from
Europe to study traditional societies, since they could benefit from the Albanian region on Balkan.
(In this context, it is fair to say that much of Serbo-Croat and Macedonian region artistic and
humanities output deserves world attention mainly due to the exotic nature of these traditions. In
particular, the most acclaimed films from Serbia deal with Roma and highlanders).
Hence, when making statistical analysis of the artistic and scientific production of Serbia, KiM
appears black hole for that matter too. It contributes almost 20 % of the overall population, but
essentially less in the cultural output in general sense. Therefore, when speaking about boycott, the
terms assume somewhat cynical overtones, from a general viewpoint.
KiM and world
A glance on the Globe reveals a striking contrast between the size of this troubling region and the
troubles it has been causing on the global world scene. What makes KiM so important that much of
the global political energy has been investing into such a small area on Balkan? What interests
world has in dealing with the KiM issue and what makes the latter so unique, as many politicians
involved claim to be the case?
In trying to answer these questions, we shall first make an inventory of the KiM surrounding, local
and global, geographical and political alike. We start with the close environment, that of Serbia.

Vojvodina
We try first to answer the “uniqueness question” by putting it in the concrete context: Why KiM
and not Vojvodina? This northern province of Serbia has about twice larger surface area than KiM,
but the same number of inhabitance (about 2 M). It appears richer in the quality of soil than that in
KiM, but KiM is still a very fertile land. Vojvodina was a part of Hungary (Austro-Hungary) since
early Middle Age, and has joined Serbia in1918, at the end of WWI, and thus became a part of
Yu1. Her main population was Hungarian?, with the substantial share of Germans and Serbs. Other
“national minorities”, as shall be called later, are Romanians, Slovaks, Rusins, Roma, Croats, etc.

1
Trepča is the biggest lead mine in Yugoslavia, one of the biggest in Europe.
 113

After the WWI the demographic picture has been changed drastically. First, German population
(Volks-Deutschers) has been expelled (in fact, half of them has moved from Serbia voluntarily),
and a large number of Orthodox Serbs from the western part of Yugoslavia (Ijekavians) has been
moved into the province. When constituting the new Yugoslavia, Vojvodina was allotted the status
of Autonomous province while KiM obtained the status of the Autonomous region. (Later, these
two statuses will be equated and both regions had the status of autonomous provinces within
Serbia).
What has been the attitude of Vojvodina inhabitance with regard to the republic of Serbia? Her
politicians has always claimed that Vojvodina deserves better position in Serbia, that she has been
exploited by Belgrade government etc, as one could well expect from the local leaders with respect
to the state. It is of interest here to note that those accusations came usually from the incomers from
western Yugoslavia, not from the autochthonous population, like Hungarians and Serb aborigines, 1
who both were of the gentle Pannonian type. 2 The animosity toward the central authorities was
particularly pronounced during Milošević’s rule, as a response to his authoritarian centralism. The
latter, in its turn, was his response to KiM Shqiptar leaders request for secession, so that Milošević
abolished Vojvodina autonomy for the sake of “symmetry’, and thus it was Vojvodina who will
become the first to suffer from KiM rebellion. But the point to be stressed here is that despite their
endemic dissatisfaction, which has been partly justified, people of Vojvodina never reached for
violent, uncivilized means to attain their political demands.
As we elaborated before, Serbia contributed to the Federal fund almost exactly the same amount as
the same fund returned it to KiM. Since the Central Serbia was with an average national income per
capita as the entire republic (much as Serbia was on average typical for the entire Yugoslavia), it
was Vojvodina who financed KiM via the Federal fund for “undeveloped” regions of Yugoslavia.
In the light of this brute fact, the comparison between the real positions of the two provinces in
Serbia and their demand and behaviour in general appears more than of cynical nature. It will
turnout even more cynical if we recall that Vojvodina is demographically on her decline (both
autochthonous Serbs and Hungarians undergoing the so-called ”white plague”, with the rule “one
family, one child”).
But this is not the end of the story. Vojvodina fertile soil has always made it the breadbasket of
Yugoslavia, later of Serbia. After the communist take-over in 1945, the Yugoslav government
adopted the Soviet stratagem for reaching the ”Paradise on Earth” – Industrialization (urban area)
and robber (rural regions). That is, the industrial products were expensive, while the agricultural
were cheap, almost symbolic. In particular, bread and milk, the principal food of poor people, have
always been subsided by the communist regimes, so as to satisfy the “broad people’s masses”.
Therefore, those families with a single child used to feed those with numerous family members, as
the case with KiM was. Hence, Vojvodina fell victim of Serbian state in two ways. First as a
province and second as an agricultural region. Never-the-less her inhabitants never reached for
guns to rectify the injustice they felt.
Before we leave Vojvodina, a few words on the historical aspects regarding this province are in
order.
Hungary has always felt, after WWI to be robbed by Serbia, by taking over Vojvodina. The
agreement between Allies at Versailles which allotted Vojvodina to Serbia, as a compensation for
her enormous suffering and contribution to Allies’ final victory, has always been called by
Hungarians Trianon shame. 3 Never-the-less the state of Hungary has never made irredentist claims
for recovering the lost territory and has never interfered with Yugoslav, or Serbian, internal affairs

1
We recall that the latter came from the Southern and Central Serbia, especially from KiM, within meta-nastasian
movements.
2
There has been no bigger contrast in Yugoslavian population than that between the autochthonous Serbs and the
Dinaric incomers, so-called dodjoši (arrivists) in Vojvodina.
3
After the name of hotel at Versailles, where the agreement has been signed.
 114

regarding Hungarian “minority”, 1 apart from general care and attention for Hungarians in
Yugoslavia. And we come to the case of the state of Albania, in this context, we shall see what the
“political cynicism” can be.

Albania
The state of Albania appears one of taboos in the context of KiM crisis. For good reason. While the
interference of Serbia into Croatian and Serbia and Croatia into BiH affairs has been the subject of
thorough investigations of the international community, in particular at the Hague Tribunal, the
interference of Albania into the affairs of Serbia and Macedonia (and Greece for that matter, but we
shall not learn the lesson in advance here) has not drawn any particular attention of the “external
factors”. The reason for this “lack of interest” appears manifold.
First, Serbia has been already demonized for her activities in Croatia and BiH and it has been taken
just to punish her by the same means.
Second, it has been assumed that Albania has the right, at least moral, to help her compatriots in
other surrounding regions.
The last but not the least, many factors on the global political scene have been involved in directed
KiM affairs toward pro-Albanian solution, as we are going to demonstrate later on.

We shall divide the issue of Albanian interference into several parts, for the sake of clearness.

The Greater Albania

This project has never been announced officially by Tirana authorities, but has been the subject of
interest of many Albanians, in particular those living outside Balkan. The maps of “Greater
Albania” do appear on various web-sites, but this very fact should not be taken too seriously, at
least in practical terms. If one looks at one of those maps, it becomes obvious that they represent
more wishful thinking than serious planes. Some of them include areas where not a single ethnic-
Albanian lives and has never lived. As we have already seen, whence imagination takes over the
common sense, the victims are not only the history, but geography, too.
This game with “creating the world” is not unknown in recent history of the Balkan. Serbs used to
draw their “optimal solution” for Serbs on Balkan, Croats too. Te latter almost realized it during
WWII, but as the very name Independent State of Croatia indicates, it was nether state nor
independent, but a puppet construction for the immediate needs of Third Reich. In this sense KiM
will never be independent, for the independence is conquered, not served on a tray. Serbs
contemplated on the subject of “purely Serb state” during WWII, as ideas of some politicians close
to gen. Dragoljub Mihailovic did, but it never took a serious form. (Tito had other plans in store for
Serbs).
In passing to the Albanian case, a few words of terminology are in order. We have been reading
and listening all the time about negotiations between Belgrade and Priština, where both capitals are
invoked as metaphors. Technically, however, it is nonsense. There can be no negotiations between
a whole and its part. One may talk about talks of the central government and representatives of a
province, but not about negotiations. The latter presuppose two sovereign states, what in this
context would be “jumping the secession”. We now come back to Albania.
It will sound absurd, but the problem with Albania has been not for interfering with Serbian (or
Macedonian) affairs, but for not interfering with the internal affairs of her neighbours. More
precisely, for Tirana not be engaged in external business. The point is that the state of Albania
appears more a fiction than the real entity. What makes the entire Balkan situation even more
complex and unmanageable. The crux of matter is the fact that Tirana has no control over Northern
Albania, where highlanders have been living in their state-independent region for millennia, before,

1
Quotation marks allude to the cynical connotation of the term in this particular context.
 115

during and after Ottoman Empire. The central and southern parts of Albania have been victims of
the belligerent Albanian Dinaroids themselves. That the highlanders have taken control over the
rest of Albania, just as Yugoslav Dinaroids have done over Serbia, BiH and Croatia, makes the
whole situation even more weird. When the highlander Sali Berisha took control over Albania after
the “democratic election”, the crime followed (as the case with Yugoslav regions was), and the
state became the region deprived of law and civilization. When the most conspicuous crime in the
form of pyramidal banks caused the state to collapse in few days, it signaled the absence of a state
itself. The foreign journalists reported that the state “had a lacuna” for some time, but the
implication that it recovered should be taken with the grain of salt. State is like a building. It takes
few minutes to destroy, but months or years to rebuild. 1

The immediate consequence of this situation has been that Tirana does not have to worry about
KiM and Serbian Albanians, since it is the compartment of her northern highlanders. In other
words, the interference with Serbian business appears automatic, spontaneous. Even if wanted,
Tirana could not stop that interference (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. From wishful thinking to reality.

1
We refer to the very institution of state, of course..
 116

What was actual involvement of Tirana government in the KiM affairs is to be revealed by history,
if ever, as we witness the Yugoslav affairs revealed at Hague and elsewhere. What is evident is the
moral support and encouragement which Tirana provides Shqiptars at KiM with. But it does not
restrict the overall Albanian support of KiM rebels. The military training camps have been
organized in Albania, with the material and training support from the external factors, primarily
USA. The extent of this activity is still to be estimated, but some causal evidence is indicative of
this international involvement in Balkan affairs. It is known that at one of those camps near Drach
about 11.000. Albanian voluntaries have passed their training. The president of Democratic Party
of Kosovo at KiM, Hashim Tachi, 1 (HDE from Drenica, the core of the Shqiptar nationalistic
upheavals) is known to have spent two years 1991/2 in such a camp in Albania. As we shall see
later on, during the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia 1998/1999 the entire territory of Albania has
been turned into a military camp, with USA military bases and recruiting centers. When the
refugees (including “refugees”) from KiM started crossing the Albanian border, KLA activists
exerted big pressure to recruit people from the unfortunate refugees for KLA. 2 (In fact, many of
civilians in the columns passing to Albania were members of KLA, moving to Albania, to military
camps).
(All said refers to pre-war situation, before 1998 open rebellion at KiM. We shall come back to this
when the war starts. As for the cultural influence which Tirana exercised during the full KiM
autonomy, we have already discussed it previously).
Before we leave Albania we mention one of the frequently expressed views in the West that Tirana
has no interest in accepting KiM (after an eventual secession), since KiM appears definitely richer
than Albania and would become dominant factor in the new, greater Albania. This view, even if
taken sincere, “does not keep water”. It assumes the real Tirana control over the affairs and
standard logic which guides European affairs. KiM has always been out of control of any state, as
we already mentioned, and so Northern Albania was neither. What the near future has in store for
KiM inhabitants is risky to predict, for the standard logic of historical society does not apply.

Macedonia

The easiest way to get rid of a temptation

is to succumb to it
An elderly actress.

The former republic of Yugoslavia Macedonia (Macedonia in the following, for the sake of
brevity), appears in double position concerning KiM issue. From one side she is the victim of
ethnic Albanians demographic explosion, like Serbia. From other side she will certainly, just
because of this fact, play a remarkable role in resolving KiM crisis. The latest census has recorded
23 % of ethnic Albanians, and 17 % of Roma. Separating from Yugoslavia Macedonia has found
herself in an even more difficult position than Serbia, squeezed between advancing Albanians and
Bulgaria, who has always claimed that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians. As always with
statistics when Albanians and Roma are involved, any figure should be taken with a grain of salt.
Albanians in Macedonia claim to comprise as much as 40 % of the overall population. 3 If this turn
out to be true, then the Slav element in Macedonia has already succumbed to the fast-breeding
ethnicities, as Albanians and Roma are.

1
Who has just won the elections for the KiM parliament (November 2007).
2
See the report from Kathimerini, in Appendix 5.
3
This refers to the latest census. Meanwhile, this percentage has surly risen up, in view of the birth of rate of ethnic
Albanians generally.
 117

When the NATO assault on Yugoslavia was over, and KiM occupied, and the ethnic Albanian
rebels started another armed rebellion in the western Macedonia, as a reprise of 1988 in Serbia, the
intimidated Slav Macedonians succumbed to the internal threats and external (mainly USA)
pressure and agreed with almost everything ethnic Albanians demanded. 1 Waiting another, but
massive reprise of the rebellion Macedonia is flooded by influx from Albania, with Skopje
becoming the largest concentration of ethnic Albanians, second only to Tirana. Macedonians are
well aware that they will not have to wait for long after an eventual KiM secession from Serbia, for
the secession of north-western Macedonia, already heavily populated by ethnic Albanians, of
whichever origin.

USA
The involvement of USA in KiM affairs appears complex and heavily burdened by the ambiguous
status of USA herself. From one side, USA appears the superpower, the last remnant of the Cold
war and Great powers from the time. On the one hand, USA is actually a vassal state, whose
politics, both internal and external, is tightly bound with her patron state, Israel. We shall,
therefore, consider USA role within both contexts separately.

Israel and Serbia

Why Israel? This state does not appear an explicit player on the KiM playground on which many
other states have been involved, either explicitly or less directly. This fact requires, therefore,
much more elaborate and subtle approach, than one would expect from a small state from Near East
to deserve.
In making parallel between these two states, we are aware, of course, that comparison with other
states and Israel may be invoked, in particular those which belong to the Judeo-Christian world.
The present parallel appears acute one and deserves therefore our particular attention. We start with
a comparison with the Old Testament fable and Middle Age Serbian state, that of the progenitor of
the Nemanjic dynasty – Nemanja. 2 His son Sava, 3 took refuge from the father’s court to join the
Hilandar Monastery on Athos, in Greece, to become later on the first Serb archbishop and founder
of the independent Serbian church (now the Serb Orthodox Church). If Nemanja was the first of
his dynasty, Sava, who was later canonized as St Sava, has been rightly regarded as the founder of
the Middle Age Serbian state. Not only by founding the state church, an indispensable prerequisite
of a sovereign state at the time, but by stabilizing the very state, via diplomatic actions and personal
influence in the courts in Serbia and abroad alike, as well by reconciliating two brother of him,
Stephan and Vukan, who competed for the throne. He crowned Stephan for the first Serbian king,
what gave to the latter the title “First crowned” (Prvovenchani). As a monk he wrote the monastery
canon, so-called Krmchia, which set the rules for the monastic life and liturgy at Hilandar
monastery and otherwise. It was mainly for this document St Sava has been regarded as Serbian
law giver. 4 He setup a number of hospitals, mainly at monasteries, which his father, who after
retiring joined his son at Hilandar as a monk, built in great number in Serbia. Since the monasteries
were the only place for literacy, St Sava has been regarded as the founder of Serbian educational
system and venerated in the contemporary school system in Serbia as the school saint.
St Sava has been regarded by Serbs as the greatest personality in the Serbian nation. His cult was so
influential among Serbs under the Ottoman rule, that the local ruler, Sinan Pasha, had his remains
dug up from Mileševo monastery (West Serbia) and burnt on a hill Vračar, now in the Belgrade
centre. Of course, this act only further promoted the cult, just as the alleged crucifixion set up the
cult of Jesus from Nazareth.

1
After the so-called Ohrid agreement, a milder kind of Kumanovo “agreement”, which we shall consider later on.
2
Slavic version of the Jewish Neeman.
3
Old wise man in Hebrew.
4
The canon was not original, but mainly rewritten Greek one, but Moses’ Commandments were original neither.
 118

We dwelled in some detail on the case of Sava Nemanjic for he evidently has been playing the role
of Serbian Moses. Now, we proceed with another parallel, that of the so-called Kosovo Myth and
the New Testament fable.
As elaborated before, Kosovo Myth has been devised on the Last Supper fable. But unlike the St
Sava case, which rests on the historical evidence, Kosovo Myth has been derived on the myth-
poetic cycle on Kosovo Battle. It has as much to do with historical reality as Homer’s Iliad with
Trojan War, or New Testament fable with historical Jesus. But it remains in the field of literacy and
any attempt to explain actual Serbian politics by this myth as an ideological guide or otherwise can
be described as fancy at best.
Now we come to the crux of the matter and compare the relationships (Jewish) Israelis –
Palestinians from one side and Serbs – Shqiptars from the other. We shall see that the parallel runs
very close, up to the point of resolving the conflict, when the parallel becomes anti-parallel, as we
shall see now.

Israelis and Palestinians

If one wanted to follow the logic of Kosovo Meta-mythology, as elaborated earlier, one could
equally justly ascribe the present-day conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as a continuation of
the biblical struggle of Hebrews with Philistines. (Who in the contemporary history is playing the
role of David and who of Goliath will be seen later on).
When Theodore Herzl initiated so-called Zionist movement, Jews from Europe started drifting
towards “the Promised Land”. By financial support of wealthy Jews all over the world, in particular
from USA, they started buying land from the local population, Palestinians, as the soil for the
future state of Israel. During the Hitler’s time and after WWII this drift became migration, massive
settling on the new land where Palestinians have been living for millennia. Many pre-State Jewish
settlements (kibitzes), so-called Yishuvs, were founded. In 1945 newly founded UN became
protectorate of the Palestine, with Great Britain playing the role of a direct protector. Zionist
activists were impatient to establish the state of Israel and started their terrorist activities against the
UN and GB officials. The crown of these was the blasting of the Jerusalem hotel King David,
where GB authorities had their head quarters, with 91 officials killed. 1 After that, realizing they
could not prevent the Zionist from achieving their goal, GB announced her Balfour Declaration,
arguing for establishing two separate states, Israel and Palestine. Israelis were not prepared to wait
to the UN plan to be realized, but started armed intervention, shaping their envisaged state
according to their plans and wishes, enlarged grossly the initially allotted territory and declared
their state. UN complied with the fait accompli, and the newly formed state of Israel was born
One of the co-founder of UN was Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was one of the first states to recognize
Israel. Serbia was the principal republic of Yugoslavia at the time and equally deserved the role of
co-founder of Israel.
But the story does not stop here. The final aim of Zionists was the restoration of the biblical Israel,
as Old Testament prophets required, Eretz Yisrael. It should include the entire present-day West
Bank, so-called Occupied Territories, 2 at present “occupied” by Palestinians. Hence, the conflict
between the arrivists and the aborigines has continued, with Palestinians rejecting to fulfill the
Holy Scriptures prophesies. In 1967 Israelis provoked another war, with well planned military
operations and occupied West Bank, and Golan Heights (strategic highlands between Israel and
Syria. During this so-called Six-day war, 3 entire Sinai was occupied, too, but later it was returned
to Egypt, under a bilateral agreement between Golda Emir and Anvar el Sadat, after an abortive
Egyptian attempt to retake the lost territories in the so-called Yom Kippur war.

1
The leader of the action was Menachem Begin, later Prime Mnister of Israel.
2
Territories, as Israeli dub it euphemistically.
3
Note the “biblical connotation” of God’s six-day creation enterprise.
 119

During these wars, heavily supported by USA, both in money, weaponry, manpower, intelligence,
etc, and in-between, Israelis have managed to enlarge their ownership over the Palestinian soil, by
buying the land, forced banishments, terror, etc. According to Palestinian sources, this
enhancement of Jewish property over the Palestine land can be illustrated by the map, as shown in
Figure 1 in Apendix 7. 1 According to the latest estimate (June 2009) about 280.000 Jewish
“settlers””, live in the West Bank territory, dispersed over 121 settlements, with another 200.000
inhabiting East Jerusalem.

(In his latest offer prime minister Netanyahu suggested that the future Palestinian state can not have
army, air-space control and possibility to smuggle weaponry. And for the settlements, no further
increase in number, but a natural growth of population within them would be allowed. As for the
refugees, he was clear – their problem can be solved outside Israeli borders only. 2 )

Readers might ask themselves what all this has to do with KiM? We shall come to this later on, but
here we just mention that similar maps can be made for the occupation of Serb land by Shqiptars,
within last two centuries, by similar means. Now we turn to the role of Yugoslavia in all these
events unrolling at Near East. Since the 1967 war Yugoslavia was engaged in full support of Arab
cause. It was within Tito’s Non-alignment project, in which Egypt (and some other Arab countries)
played prominent roles. Yugoslav Jews were not happy about that, but did not dare to raise their
voice in complaint. Here we note that Yugoslav Jews have been reduced to a small community,
after the Nazi extermination program during WWII. Those who survived mainly moved to Israel,
still keeping close connections with their first homeland. It includes those who emigrated to the
West, mainly from Serbia during the crisis under Milošević’s rule in1990-thies. During the 1991-
1995 period of open armed conflicts, Jews in the troubled regions were supported by the
international Jewry, materially or otherwise. Jews in the besieged Sarajevo were quickly rescued.
Of all Serbian Jews only the intellectual elite has chosen to stay in Serbia. Their contribution to the
cultural life in Serbia can not be overestimated and greatly exceeds their numerical presence.
Serbian travel agencies organize frequent tours to Israel, in collaboration with the Israeli ones.
These tours comprise both Judaist and Christian sightseeing’s and are very popular among Serbian
tourists. 3 But the relationship between Serbia and Israel has had dark side too. As mentioned
before, both pyramid schemes in Serbia were organized by Israelis and the money stolen from the
naive (and there are other, less euphemistic terms) has found its end in Israel.
Comments by pro-Israel Jewish authors in Serbian press and media generally appear frequent, with
Palestinian response rarely published. Some of the former regularly argue in favour of abandoning
the KiM issue and let the province secede. They never venture to parallel the case of Palestine and
KiM, which impose itself to anybody familiar with the contemporary world political scene. It is
interesting here to mention the “promise” of a Serb (more precisely Serbian Montenegrin) Aleksa
Djilas, 4 quoted in the preface of Noel Malcolm monograph Kosovo : “We shall give to Shqiptars
everything that Israelis have given to Palestinians”. The interesting thing here is that the author of
otherwise excellent book, made no comment on the “promise”, as if it was utterly nonsense.
Now we pass to the most delicate part of out intended comparison – that of the treatment of
Palestinians by Israelis, both within and outside the present borders of the Jewish state. In fact, we
have to consider three categories of Palestinians: (i) those who have remained in the Israel proper

1
A word of caution is appropriate here when making use of the Internet data.
2
That USA and EU promptly supported Netanyahu’s proposals (better to say plan) is not to wonder, considering
respective status of these entities vis-à-vis Israel. We already discussed the status of USA, whereas the flag of EU with
12 stars designating 12 tribes speaks for itself.
3
Marxists would surely consider this as a (mis)use of religion to the tourist end, or tourism for ideological aims.
4
Son of the later Tito’s collaborator and later dissident Milovan Djilas.
 120

(that is not including Occupied Territories); (ii) Palestinians in the West Bank and strip of Gaza;
(iii) refugees in the neighbouring countries, mostly in Lebanon.
They constitute 20 % of the overall population and are formally citizens of Israel, with
representatives in Knesset. They are considered as nuisance, and the latest pool among Israelis
proper, that is Jewish ones (in the following, simply Israelis) shows that majority of the latter
would like Israel to get rid of them. The principal concern of Israelis in this context is Palestinian
high birth rate, which greatly exceeds the Jewish one. It is for this reason that Israeli authorities
invite all Jews from the world, except from USA, to settle in Israel, in order to improve the
demographic picture of Jewish state. It is for this reason that thousands of Soviet Jews have been
accepted in Israel for the last two decades, including those who just pretended to be Jewish, taking
advantage of the opportunity to get out of USSR (and move to the “West”). We have seen earlier
how the KiM Shqiptars reacted to the Serbian intention to settle some of refugees from Croatia on
KiM, not to mention the case of “colonization” of KiM between two World wars, discussed before.
The point here is that the “world opinion” (whatever it means) remained silent on the issue, or
simply blamed Belgrade for “changing demographic picture” of the province by “illegal means”.

It is clear that the final target (set up by Zionists already) of Israeli authorities is the all-Jewish state
(or ethnically pure state). As it is clear that the final aim of Shqiptar authorities is a pure Shqiptar
KiM, independent or not. That the later project is not a fiction is testified by the fact it the project is
closed to its final end, already now, and will be sealed by the day of “independence”.
That the Palestinians in Israel 1 are treated as second-rank citizens is admitted by the very Israelis,
including the authorities. Everything is arranged that they should feel as “surplus” on ”Jewish soil”
and are encouraged to leave the country. Before we pass to the next category of Palestinians, we
mention here that there is no evidence, up to now, that these Arabs have been engaged in “terrorist
acts”. What could not be said, of course, for the West bank Palestinians.
As a glance on the map and distribution of the so-called Israeli settlements in West bank shows, 2
this occupied territory has been turned into enormous concentration camp. The “settlements” have
been distributed in such a manner, that they form a sort of “everywhere dense set”, as
mathematicians would call it (see Figure 8 from 2007).

1
Euphemistically called Arabs by Israelis, for reasons to be explained later on.
2
These are, actually, military strong-holds, Israeli garrisons.
 121

Figure 8. Jewish settlements in Occupied territories, with Palestinians inhabited lands in green.
Lands west from the Wall have been practically annexed.

With those aligned along the river Jordan, and the recently erected Wall (not Berlin one, but
another wall), the territory appears a gigantic prison. But who are the prisoners? As Israelis admit
themselves, Palestinians in occupied territories have been treated as cattle, or prisoners of war, at
best (see Appendix 2). They are subjects of frequent raids by the so-called IDF (Israeli Defence
Forces), they must ask for permission for moving inside the country, even for reaching their land
for cultivating, annoyed at every check points, densely distributed all over the country, humiliated,
intimidated, in a word, treated worse that animals. Any expression of revolt, as during the latest
two uprisings (Intifada), has been crashed with utmost cruelty. Abandoned by the international
community, including UN and even their own Arabic countries, Palestinian shave resorted to
individual acts of terrorism. The latest version of the so-called suicide bombers has been accepted
from the Palestinian side as the last resort of freedom fighting, while the USA guided part of the
world has cursed it as insane terrorism, or l’terrorism pour l’terrorism. But even inside the latter,
individual voices of contempt have been rising, including the liberal press in the very Israel (but not
in USA). Generally, elite intellectual Jews all over the world condemn the Israeli policy concerning
Palestinians, but majority of them confine their criticism to USA authorities, as if USA are patron
of Israel, and not the vassal state of the latter. We shall come to this essential point soon.
Before we consider the terrorism in the current context, a word on the very concept of terrorism
seems in order, unfortunately, since to a sane mind this issue should be clear without much
elaboration. Every terrorism is an act of violence, but the opposite is not true. Only those violent
acts, which cause deaths of civilians (we avoid terms like “innocent” etc, since they imply value of
 122

judgment), and even soldiers, which are not done for the sake of achievement of a well defined
political aim, may be designated as terrorism, or as made for the sake of hurting people only. There
is no way to prevent the “pure terrorism”, for there is no demand to satisfy in return for the
“ceasefire”. But politically motivated acts of violence are something quite different. To fix the idea,
we make here a brief regression, and consider briefly the notion of genocide, much exploited after
WWII and Nazi regimes.
What is the difference between persecution, pogrom, massacre and genocide? The first is an
isolated, or irregular maltreating a definite group of people. Pogrom appears a stronger form of the
latter, with killing or banishing. Massacre is a massive killing, usually accidental, in the sense not
preconceived. And finally genocide is a systematic extermination of a well defined subpopulation
in a wider region, for the reasons which are not under control of the subjects of persecution. To fix
idea we consider the violence exercised by Ustashas in Croatia during the WWII, under the puppet
regime of Ante Pavelic. As part of Third Reich, Croatia was the subject of racial persecution, as
required by Nazi regime at Berlin. Three categories of persecution targets must be distinguished
here. (i) Serbs. They are racially identical to Croats, differing only by their church (Greek
Orthodox, instead of Roman Catholics). As Croatian nationalists were eager to enhance their
population, and thus strengthen the Croat state, they decided to force a conversion of Serbs into
Croats. This was not to be expected achievable 100 %, of course. As Mile Budak put it (that is
foresaw it) “We shall convert one third, banish one third and kill the rest”. 1 Hence, Croatian Serbs
had a chance to remain alive, accepting the requirement of the oppressive regime. This chance Jews
and Roma did not have. Being racially distinct, they were to be exterminated for this difference and
it was beyond their power to escape. Hence, in Ustashas’ Croatia, only Roma and Jews suffered
from a pure genocide. 2 The same applies, by the same token, to Europeans during the Nazi rule,
including Germany herself.
We go back to the “Palestinian terrorists”. The question is whether they are proper terrorists or
freedom fighters? In other words, are there any political demands behind their activities and if there
are, are they achievable by the civilized standards? What Palestinians really demand from Israel
and world community?
Or, is there any way out from this Palestinian knot?
So far two principal alternative demands from the Palestinian side have been crystallized:
Israelis to evacuate all Palestinian territories, West Bank and Gaza strip, Eastern Jerusalem and let
Palestinian people decide their national destiny by themselves.
Israelis accept Palestinians as equal-rights citizens of the joint territory with Israel proper and both
Jews and Palestinians live together in a democratic state. (After all, they all happen to belong to the
same, Semitic race).
So far, Israelis have rejected both propositions. They have left Palestinians to the only choice –
fighting for freedom. The means they are choosing to this end depend on many factors. From
diversions, bombing, suicidal bombing, killing, rioting, demonstrations, appeals to the
international community, UN, humanitarian organizations, political struggle, together with friendly
counties, like some Arab and Muslim states, etc, etc. So far they have achieved very little, next to
nothing. Why?
A superfluous reader will have, certainly, an immediate answer – Israel has been protected by
USA. And she is damned wrong! USA is not in a position to do anything for that matter, for they
are not an independent state, but Israel vassal. And that is the beginning and end of the story.
Proof? After founding UN in 1945, many vetoes in Security Councils (SC) have been made. The
only vetoes made by USA concerned Israel, better to say preventing SC from blaming Israel for its
politics concerning Palestinians. Since 1982 USA vetoed 32 SC resolutions critical of Israel, more
1
Mainly realized during the Pavelić regime.
2
We are aware that our definition of a genocide (that is pure genocide) differs from the widely accepted, which in our
opinion appears inadequate and subject to numerous misuse.
 123

than all other members together. It is out of question it had anything to do with opinion of
Washington on the matter. It was as if it was Jerusalem voted in SC, not Washington. And
practically it has been the case indeed.
But the story does not stop here. UN charter allows that even SC decisions may be overruled, in
particularly grave and important situations. And it did happen that Palestinians, helpless before SC,
put their cause before General Assembly. The latter decided by an overwhelming majority in
favour of the oppressed Palestinians. What happened then? Nothing. USA (sic) prevented any
action on the matter. Rules are for weak, choice for strong. (That already Charles Darwin knew).
We go now to the third category of Palestinians:
(iii) During and after formation of Jewish state, particularly after six-day war, more than million
Palestinians left their homes and fled outside Palestine, 1 what makes about one quarter of the
overall population. They have settled in the concentration camps, euphemistically called refugee
camps, mainly in Lebanon. From there they continue their struggle for homeland, making raids to
Israel and provoking ruthless retaliation from the Israelis. Since the local population suffers these
counter-actions from Israel, Palestinians are not welcome in any of these states, except in those
remote from Near East, like Magreb countries. It was for this reason Lebanon military Christian
police massacred those refugees in Sabra and Shatilla in 1982, after Ariel Sharon handed the camps
over to the local paramilitaries, as mentioned before when talking about Vukovar massacre.
Generations of Palestinians have been born in tents of the refugee camps. Palestinian youth has
found itself hostage of the “high politics”, between the cruel Israelis and corrupt Arab
governments, which find it convenient for their long-term strategy not to allow the refugees to
settle down in the Arab countries and assimilate themselves into the local population. Thus,
unfortunate Palestinians have been awarded the status of “professional refugees”.
Particularly appealing is the case of the Gaza strip. According the data from 2006, in the area of
365 km2, live 1.3 milion Palestinians, 3.376/km2 , what makes the strip the most densily populated
in the region. It comprises 8 refugee camps, with 471.555. refugees. In 2007 Israelis have
evacuated the strip, but the latter is stil heavily dependent on Israel, which supplies it with water
and electricity. The popualtion lives mainly on the international humanitarian help, in the state of
an enormous concentration camp.
With the split of the local authorities between Hamas and less belligerent Al Fattah, heavily raided
by Israeli forces, Gaza appears a sore on the Palestinian body.

***
The freedom fighting of the Palestinians may be divided into three categories. First are the raids,
mainly by rockets, on Israeli military points and settlements close to its borders. Second are the
terrorist acts within Israel proper, lately exclusively by suicide bombers. Third are attacks on the
Israeli occupation forces in the West Bank. We first discuss briefly the second way of fighting for
freedom.
The rationale for terrorizing Israelis is obvious – to draw attention of the world community on the
Palestinian issue. If the placing and activating bombs in public places may be designated as
terrorism in its proper sense, the suicidal bombing has shifted the issue to the more profound sphere
of the political struggle. If those who activate mines from the distance, killing people (civilians and
non civilians alike) can be considered fighters who want to achieve a political goal, young people
blasting themselves together with their enemies are doing it because they have nothing to lose. The
first kind of terrorism may be classified as insane or heroic act, depending on the side which
interprets it, but the second appears evidently acts of desperation, pure heroism. Those youth sees
no perspective in the further life as Palestinians. By blasting themselves they send message to the
world that they defy it, for its indifference to their destiny. (It holds for private suicides, too). But

1
About 900.000 in 1948.
 124

before we pass to the third category of fighting, a word on the “heart-tearing” terms like “innocent
civilians”, women, children etc. There is no difference between civilians and non-civilians in Israel.
Civilians are just soldiers temporarily not on service. It comprises women as well as men. (If the
Occupied Territories are a concentration camp, Israel appears a military camp). As for the children,
they are future adults, future soldiers and occupiers. Cruel logic, as it is, but the life and death in
Palestinian camps and Occupied Territories are cruel too.
Many words in the West have been spent in ”explaining” the fanatics of suicide bombers, in
particular via the Muslim faith. What one chooses to overlook is the earthly part of the issue.
Young people, who are satisfied with their life, in particular those who see its improvement in the
foreseeable future, would not opt for the life in “other world”, on the contrary. Religion appears
here a compensation, not an option. The latter has been dictated by Israelis, not by Al Fattah or
Hamas. In judging the role of religious fanatics one should bare in mind that the Palestinians appear
to be the best educated people among the entire Arab world, perhaps among all Muslim countries.
As for the attacks on the Israelis occupying forces in the West bank, they appear more frequent for
two orders of magnitude than terrorist acts within Israel. Although they consume considerably
more victims, mainly Palestinian ones, these clashes are hardly publicized by Israelis and hence by
the world media. The retaliations of the Occupation forces appear cruel, as expected, and we shall
compare these with similar clashes on KiM, later on. By erecting “Israel wall” between Occupied
Territories and Israel the number of suicide bombing has considerably decreased, as well as reports
on the clashes within Occupied territories. No doubt, by empting West bank (as well as Israel
proper) from Palestinians these incidents will further decline, though perhaps not to zero.

United States of America

In the following we will make use of USA, not of Americans, for at least two reasons. First of all,
Americans are inhabitants of the continents of America, both Northern, Central and Southern ones.
Second, we shall refer to the USA administration exclusively, not to the ordinary USA citizens. If
the first restriction concerns the formal designation, the second bear the full weight of the
relationship between the internal and external USA policy, better to say between the Washington
policy and the feelings of the ordinary citizens.
Regarding the relationship with the present day Israel and Jewry in general, USA history may be
divided into two distinct periods; after WWII and the previous one. By founding the Jewish state
on the Palestinian soil, status of world Jewry has undergone radical change. After the Shoah and
subsequent Israel foundation, every Jew in the world has gained a double citizenship – domestic
and Israeli, though not in an official sense. In a sense, Israel has become the largest state in the
world, with metropolis at Israel proper and Jerusalem as the capital. The distribution of these
Israelites (to make distinction from Israelis) appears roughly like this: 5 M in Israel, 5 M in USA
and the rest (approximately 3 M) all over the world.
Our distinction between pre-war and post-war USA may be contested, but before going into further
elaboration, a few words on the religious status of USA seem in order. It is widely accepted that
USA are the Christian state. Really, the overwhelming majority of her citizens are Christians, but
of particular kind. As we know from the history of Christianity, Christians rely almost exclusively
on the New Testament, as the source of their faith. In their mind the Old Testament appears just
historical (sic) support of their faith, ideological background. It is not so in USA. Christianity there
is based on the Old Testament, at least on the public scene. From the “all-seeing eye” on the dollar
banknotes, 1 to the public prayers in the White House, only Jewish part of the Bible has been
invoked. At Hollywood, prayers are always directed to the God (that is Yahweh), never to Jesus

1
That the pyramid with the eye is a symbol of Free Masonry does not make difference here, since the latter appears
irrevocably a Jewish societe initiatique, though not exclusively, of course.
 125

Christ. Presidents of the states where more than 90 % of the population are allegedly Christians are
very careful in public appearance not to mention Jesus Christ. Why?
Jews share 1.7 % of USA population. The latest pool reveals that 34 % of the citizens hate Jews
(Jews-haters), 1 what amounts to 20 people on a single Jew. Before we go on on the matter, a few
word on semantics are in order. We shall not use the term anti-Semites, for it is both misleading
and even wrong. It has been derived from anti-Semitism, which has been used inappropriately since
it appearance in the second half of 19th century. First, Semites are all Arabs and some other nations,
including Pharaohs’ Egyptians. Second, anti-Semitism can be derived from Semitism only,
otherwise it appears an etymologically (but not historically) empty notion. Is there such an entity
like Semitism, in the current context? Jews deny it vehemently, at least those who have never read
Holy Bible. The first Semitic book has been written in 7th BC and is called Torah. In the 19th
century Semitism has been defined as a cultural notion. It would be an utter injustice to such
proponents of anti-Semitism, like Karl Marx and Richard Wagner, to identify their ideology on the
matter with the notion of Judenfeind. 2
Now, we age going to see how these figures reflect on the intellectual, economic and political
sector. The intellectual elite in USA appears almost exclusively Jewish one. 3 As for the other two,
we illustrate both by a single fact. When Bill Clinton started his campaign for the first term
presidency, 30 % of financial donation came from the Jewish circles. No wander that his
government consisted almost exclusively of Jewish members (not to mention Monica Lewinski). It
is the rationale for the candidates and presidents strongly support Israel policy, to the extent of
making USA Israeli vassal state. This makes the political situation in USA weird indeed. From one
side the anti-Jewish sentiment appears strong indeed, so strong that no Jewish candidate has ever
won the presidency race, as the case with A. Stevenson was. On the other hand USA has been
pursuing pro-Israeli policy since WWII. It shed a very strange light on the meaning of the much
promoting “American democracy”, indeed. It is this schizophrenic state of Washington policy,
which makes the Palestinian issue so complex and hopeless (for the time being).
But it concerns not the USA external policy. Everything related directly or indirectly to the Israel
has been put under government control. In the press, any critics of Israel has been banished,
revealing the state of the much advertised “American freedom of press”. The same applies to other
media, first of all to TV. Even the educational system has been put under control, for that matter.
Few years ago a circular has been sent to all USA colleges, requiring that any critics of Israel
should be treated as a disguised anti-Semitism and must be duly suppressed (by withdrawing
research grants etc). The information on this circular has never seen “public light”, but has been
revealed by Internet.
It is true that some USA Jewish intellectuals, like Noam Chomsky, do criticize Washington policy
towards Israel, by accusing it to provide unconditional support to Jerusalem. Such pleads make
impression that USA is a patron of Israel, concealing the fact that USA are the vassal state, which
has no other choice for that matter. Indirectly, they are blaming USA taxi payers for the cruel
policy of Jerusalem towards Palestinians. And that is the cynics par excellence. We can not help
drawing a parallel between Israeli intellectuals and those in USA. While the latter remain silent on
Israeli policy concerning Palestinians, the former frequently venture to criticize severally Israeli
government, proving the real democracy in Israel. One further remark on the Jewish attitude in
Diaspora with regard to Palestinians. Many of critical assessments to the Near East crisis appear
genuine feeling on humanitarian grounds, but one can not help feeling that the rationale for this
criticism lies in the concern that Israeli policy will further enhance anti-Semitism in the world. That

1
Judenfeind, in German, where the modern anti-Semitism started.
2
Marx turned to be a descendant of a long-term rabbi family, while Wagner (possibly of Jewish origin himself) used to
collaborate with Jews in promoting his music)
3
It is sufficient to count the Nobel Prize winners, for that matter.
 126

this concern is not groundless, is shown a few years ago, when European Union made a pool on the
states who represent the greatest danger for the World peace. On the top of the list found USA and
Israel. But it was not the end of the story. After the pool followed a harsh intervention from USA,
who objected to the pool itself. EU authority pleaded guilty and promised never to do similar
things. The incident revealed what we already know – that Europe was still the USA vassal
continent. Hence, the vassal of the vassal.
Another interesting point is to be made here. It has been constantly argued that the number of stars
on the EU flag does not correspond to the number of member states (27 at the moment), but has
been kept 12 for the special significance of the latter number. The latter is explained as the number
of months, the number of Heracles exploits (sic), the number of Israeli tribes, the number of
constellations of Zodiac, 12 Apostles, etc. All explanations are “for the laughing of chicken”, as a
Russian saying says. All, except one – the Number of Israelis tribes. For some of the European
states (or their governments) EU is supposed to incarnate the Old Testament mythology, as a super-
Israel state, or at least her dominion. That this guess is not a fancy, testifies the weird fact that
Israel is member of European zone in all sports, despite the fact being in Asia.

USA and World

We now pass to some other relevant aspects of USA foreign policy, which are not coupled
straightway with USA-Israel relationship, but are indirectly to Israel and KiM.
One of great myth concerning the so-called Cold War has been that USA fought the oppressive
communism in USSR in order to promote freedom and humanitarian aspects in their principal rival
after WWII. To this end USA encircled Soviet Union with her satellite states, from Western
European states, to Turkey, Iran, South Korea, South Vietnam, Japan, etc. The principal ally in this
chain has been Turkey, for strategic reasons. USSR has been the largest country in the world, with
the longest seacoast, but has remained the isolated continental state, owing to his r very
inconvenient geographical position. Its access to Atlantic Ocean has been controlled by the Baltic
straights, Skaggerat and Kattegat, to the most important world sea, Mediterranean, by Bosporus
and Dardanelles. 1 How important the latter strategic straights are is the best illustrated by that
infamous Allies failure to capture them in 1915, what cost the Allies and Turkey more than
300.000. causalities.
When Turkey joined the NATO, she became the principal USA ally in this part of world, holding
the key of Mediterranean sea vis-à-vis USSR. Believing the wide spread myth of the ideological
content of the cold war, one might expect that after the fall of Berlin wall and “Soviet Empire”,
there would be no more reason to confront Russia any longer. The role of Turkey in USA world
strategy proves the opposite. We enumerate a few instances as illustration.
(i) Armenian massacre in 1915, which has been designated by the world jurisdiction as
genocide (about 1.500.000 victims). USA never condemned officially Turkey for this
crime.(ii) Sacrificing of Asia Minor Greeks to Turkish slaughter and expulsion, in 1922.
The blame was to all Western Allies, of course, but USA never showed signs of
remorse. (iii) Invasion of the Northern Cyprus by Turkish Army, what followed by
establishing a mock-state of Northern Cyprus. 2
Kurds. These people live in the mountainous area at the triple border between Turkey (15 M), Iran
(506.5 M) and Iraq (4-6 M). Autochthonous population, with their own language, folklore, history,
never had state on their own. They constitute about 20 % of the overall Turkish population, but are
not allowed even to express their national identity. Between 1984 and 1999 there was a massive

1
How important the latter strategic straights are is the best illustrated by that infamous Allies failure to capture them in
1915, what cost the Allies by hundreds thousand lives.

2
I don’t know which nation hates USA the most, but I believe on any list Greeks would not be at the bottom.
 127

uprising against Turkish rule, and the army retaliated severally, wiping out about 3.000. villages,
with 380.000 people displaced (“Armenian case”) and 30.000. missing (“Argentinean syndrome”).
USA and Western Europe never raised voice against this violence.
Similar situation has been in Iran and Iraq. When Sadam Husein was sentenced to death, it was not
for his suppression of Arab subjects, but for Kurds. It is “interesting” that USA never tried to make
use of Kurds to “destabilized” their arch-enemies, Iran and Iraq, although they had all reasons for
that . Except one – Turkey. Better to say – Bosporus and Dardanelles. They could not support
Iranian and Iraqian Kurds, without threatening their most precious ally – Turkey.

Two myths
The Turkish case demonstrates the best the nature of the USA animosity toward USSR – state
rivalry, or the struggle for the world supremacy. All ideological, humanitarian and other
connotations go to the second plane. This myth has been shattered already by not dismantling
NATO, after the Warsaw pact has fallen apart. We now pass to the other myth – that of the world
terrorism.
We have seen how the terrorism was used by Jews in order to establish Israel. This was not the
precedence in the area, since terrorism was the principal means of Israelis under Roman occupation
to get rid of the occupiers. As many analysts from the time testify, 1 the extremist Zealots called
sikarii, 2 used to carry knifes hidden under clothes and stub the Romans (or Jewish collaborators)
and disappear in the street crowd. As we mentioned above, when the British governor stopped the
illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine, the office was blasted with 91 killed and the hotel King
David destroyed. 3 The terrorist act proved very successful, indeed, since Great Britain gave up and
the green light for the Jewish state o Palestinian soil was given.
Both kinds of violence described above can be taken as a pure terrorism. As we argued before,
suicide bombing does not belong to the same basket. But before we dwell in some detail on it, we
mention here two other famous kind of terrorism: assassins and thugs. First were Muslim boys,
persuaded to commit murders (politically motivated). They used to be given a small dose of
hashish, just to get an idea how nice it would be for them when, after doing their duty, they reach
the Paradise. On the other hand, thugs were Indian religious fanatics who worshiped the goddess
Kali and in her name used to kill and rob caravans. The case of suicide bombers resembles that of
assassins, whereas sikarii have much in common with thugs. All four have a religious background.
Terrorism has bemused for achieving political or other goals by millennia. The negative
connotation which has been develop in human mind concerning violence in general, and terrorism
in particular, has been misused by those opposing those political or other goals, for millennia too.
Taliban fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan were freedom fighters for the West, including USA,
but the same Taliban fighting the present-day puppet government are terrorists, by the current
Western vocabulary. As we shall see later on, main Shqiptar guerrilla forced were designated as
terrorist by USA officials, but have been adopted meanwhile as parts of the current security forced
at KiM.
Of course, not all political, religious or otherwise goals are acceptable by humanity. Some of them
appear just set by insane people, lunatics and fanatics. Moreover, in extreme cases violence has
become both the means and goal, in which case one speaks about l’violence-pour-l’violence, or
pure terrorism. And here we come to the latest twist in the Palestinian fight for freedom: any
violence from their part has been characterized by terrorism. What is tantamount to say that any
violence from Israeli side is just counter-terrorism, justified by the right of Israel to exist etc, etc.
At this point we reach a situation which Karl Popper has characterized as non-falsifyability, in the

1
See, for instance, J. Flavius, Jewish war, in Complete works, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859.
2
From Greek sikari for knife.
3
When I stayed at the hotel in 1989, (enjoying kosher meals), I was unaware of the event.
 128

domain of science. Once the political goals are pushed behind and the very struggle for achieving
them is declared terrorism, anything appears justifiable. That is unjustifiable. That is beyond the
good and evil, in Nitschenian sense.
What are the consequences of this attitude, adopted by the “ruling states”? Which kind of the
counter-terrorism measures have been adopted? The precaution measures within the traffic all over
the world, in the air, trains, buses, etc appear such a nuisance that travel has become a martyrdom,
rather than necessity or pleasure. In fact, the world has been put under the permanent terror, has
become the victim of Israeli terrorism. As soon as you decide to travel, you are reminded that
Palestinians are terrorists and you are obliged to suffer from that. An insane, inverted logic? Not so
insane or not more insane than the decision to rob Palestinians of their land. Too harsh statement?
May be, but shared by the overwhelming majority of the present-day world community. Including
USA, y compris their governments, what those 32 vetoes in SC testify. There is no
misunderstanding on that matter, only a mismatch in military power. And when we come back to
KiM issue, we encounter the same logic of the omnipotence.

Israel-USA-Serbia – a Boromean triangle.

Though vastly separated, geographically, demographically, historically and politically, these three
state have something in common, what will turn out to be of utmost importance for our KiM issue
here. We shall first enumerate differences and similarities between Israel and Serbia.

Israel vs Serbia : Two untypical states, in many respects.

Borders: Neither has well defined borders. Israel consists of Israel proper plus Occupied
Territories, including Golan Heights. Serbia has no definite borders, not only concerning NATO-
occupied territory (KiM), but so-called Republika Srpska (RS) and Montenegro. The latter has
about 600.000 inhabitants, but the same number of Montenegrins live in Serbia. Majority of the
latter occupy ruling positions in Serbia. Traffic across the border is practically free, with illegal
carriage, tobacco and other smuggling practically undisturbed. Many vehicles in Serbia have
Montenegro license plates, although own by Serbians, for the benefits of low tax in Montenegro. In
many Serbian newspapers weather broadcasts maps include Montenegro. Montenegrin students
study in Serbia with all benefits of the domestic students, practically free of charge. Similar
situation is with RS, where the border is river Drina. Though RS is officially a part of BiH, it is
tightly bound (better to say, the opposite is true) with Serbia, in every respect. Serbia has become
the refuge for many Bosnian Serbs, including war criminals, as mentioned before. She continues to
support RS to such an extent that one may well consider two entities as a single state. Bosnian
Serbs occupy a great deal of military and police position in Serbia, that they share with
Montenegrins the overall occupation of Serbia. The traffic across Drina is also practically free, with
a massive smuggling of all sorts of goods, including weaponry etc. Visas are not needed for passing
from Montenegro and RS in Serbia.
Border with KiM is a special story. There are checkpoints for traffic and passengers, but they must
apply for permission to enter the province from the rest of Serbia. On the other hand border
between KiM and Albania is practically nonexistent and hundreds thousands of Albanians have
settled down in KiM since the NATO occupation. 1 Plan has been made for constructing electric
power line from “Kosovo” energy plant to Tirana, since Albania appears in a bad need for the
electric energy. KiM possesses coal reserves (mainly lignite) for centuries to go, and it has been
one of the principal motives from Tirana to support KiM independence (sic). Although according to
Kumanovo agreement (sic) in 1999, to be considered later on, Serbia was entitled to keep a
contingent of police and army on KiM this has been never realized, and Belgrade has no control
whatsoever over her border with Albania. As for the administrative border with the rest of Serbia, it

1
For the last eight years the population of Priština has increased from 230.000 to 500.000/600.000, for instance.
 129

appears semi susceptible, allowing relatively easy access from KiM to the rest of Serbia, but not
vice versa. Evidently, there is no problem for non-Albanians to leave KiM, but the other way round
is practically impossible.

Population: Israel proper has about 6 million inhabitants (20 % Palestinians), and 3.5 million
Palestinians in Occupied territories. Serbia without KiM has approximately 8 million population,
6.5 million Serbs (not including “refugees” and “displaced people”). Serbian diaspora consists of
4.5.-5.5 million people. They are bound with homeland by weakly bonds, mainly via folklore and
national tradition. There is a strong tendency to strengthen these bonds recently, including the
citizenship for everybody outside who declares to be Serb. This comes mainly from the Serbian
nationalistic political (sic) parties, like Šešelj’s SRS and Vuk Drašković’s SPO, for the sake of
internal political gains. Since the propaganda from the two among diasporas was very intensive
during Milošević era, diaspora is considered to be predominantly SRS supporters, since they had no
idea who was talking to them at hundreds meetings in USA, Canada, Australia etc. Serbian
diaspora appears of very mixed quality, from those descendents of former prisoners of war, to the
recent émigrés leaving the country suffering from “Yugoslav wars” in 1990-thies. The later
population is predominantly young and promising, whereas the former appears very conservative
and retarded in many respects, including the strong nationalistic feelings. Their financial
engagement in Serbia and other former Yugoslavia regions appear meager, despite the efforts of
Serbian governments, from Milošević on to attract their capital here. Many of the young émigrés
are army deserters and are facing punishments if they appear in Serbia, but this will likely change
soon for better or worse.
As mentioned before, out of 13 million Jews, 5 million live in Israel, 5 in USA, and the rest all over
the world, mainly in Russia, Western Europe and Argentina. About 650.000 Israelis live outside
Israel and the latte makes considerable efforts to bring them back. 1 As for the rest of Diaspora,
Israel runs a differentiated politics. USA citizens are encouraged to stay there, for it is them who
provide the overwhelming support to Israel state, regardless of their personal (dis)approval of the
current politics of Jerusalem. This support spans from political, moral, propaganda, financial, etc.
On the contrary Jews outside USA are encouraged to move to Israel, so as to strengthen its efforts
to survive and prosper. To this end, Israelis have managed to convince USA Evangelists that the
only prerequisite to the ancient announcement about Jesus’ return to this world is that all Jews in
the world have to return to the Holy Land. Hence, these good Christians have been collecting
hundreds million dollars for this sacrosanct purpose and have already financed many Jews to return
to the Promised Land (Promised Return for the Promised Land), mainly from Argentine. Recently
Israeli government has allotted a piece of land in the Holy Land to USA Evangelists, who are going
to build a church there, so that their pilgrims will have their own shrine, when visiting Israel (and
leaving there money to Israeli tourist agencies). 2
If the first half of the 20ieth century has witnessed the Jewish “Reconquesta” of the Holy Land, as a
remake of Joshua’s invasion of Palestine, according to Bible, 3 the call for returning to Palestine of
the world Jewelry may be considered as a repetition of the Exodus, this time not from a particular
country, but from the Diaspora, as announced in Isaiah, 32-XII, 6. This appears a final Exodus,
Exodus, as a “final solution” of the “Jewish question” (whatever it means).
Jews represent the intellectual elite in USA, financial and mass media upper class, deeply
entrenched in every pore of the USA society, including military, intelligence, academic, research,
industry ( in particular informatics sector), etc. Their influence on the government can not be

1
The recent estimate is that 18-21.000 Jews leave the country yearly.
2
Jesus was a fake, but dollars are genuine.
3
We ignore here the question of the veracity of this particular biblical story, see, e.g. Israël Finkelstein, Neil Asher Silberman, La
Bible Devoile, Bayard, 2002, Paris; The Bible Unearthed, The Free Press, New York, 2001.
.
 130

overrated, both by a direct membership or via financial and mass media sectors. Many of the top
rank intellectuals are very critical about USA Middle East policy, as mentioned before, but not to
the extent to recognize USA as Israeli vassal state. Similar situation appears in the case of Europe,
including Eastern one, but to a much lesser extent.
To summarize, both Serbia and Israel suffer from emigration, but are subjects of intensive
immigration too. The reasons for that are different in two cases. Israel serves as a racial and
religious focus, an attractor par excellence for the Jewish Diaspora, whereas Serbia is a victim of a
true invasion of the Dinaroids, who find her a convenient land to exercise their militant impulses
and pathological craving for power. Those who are poor and inferior in every respect expect to be
fed and supported at any rate by the autochthonous population. Israeli newcomers become militant
by the requirements of the Israeli government, whereas Serbian immigrants impose their militant
impulses to the local population. Equally, Israeli émigrés are fed up living in the state of a besieged
country, in a gigantic military camp, with everyday threats by “terrorists” Israel is producing itself,
whereas Serbia autochthonous population is leaving the country in a state of a permanent
deterioration in every respect. In both cases it concerns young people, seeking the better life
conditions in the West, particularly USA. Equally, in both cases these émigrés are substituted by
immigrants, so that a steady turnover is going on in Serbia and Israel. The essential difference is
that in the case of Serbia the deterioration mentioned is caused primarily by the newcomers, from
Trans-Drina region. The latter has a devastating effect in both direct and indirect ways. First, it is
the pressure they are exercising in very Serbia on the local population, even by their mere presence.
Second, it is the ‘’exploits” of these Dinaroids in their native regions which made Serbia suffer
from Sanctions, which have never been lifted completely, despite the reassurance of the
international community and very Serbian officials. As we will see later on the notorious affair of
Ratko Mladic is the case in point

USA and Israel

This is a strange story, in many respects. The story began long before modern Israel came to being.
The prehistory of this relation is coloured by the Jewish settling down in the New World. This
starts with Spanish Reconquista in 1492. Two remarkable events marked this year, of utmost
importance for the Western World: expulsion of the Jewish population from Spain and discovery of
America by Christifor Columbus. Though these two events were not directly related in the causal
sense, they appear strongly correlated, as we shall see immediately.
As we know, Southern Spain, under the Mavars’ rule was a Muslim-Christian-Jewish
commonwealth, prosperous in many respects. After the Reconquista not all Jews were subject to
banishment, since a great deal of them wee converted into Christiana, at least formally (that is
superficially). The latter continued to live in Spain as crypto-Jews, and one of the first and principal
aims of the Inquisition under Ignacio Loyola’s supervision was to detect those crypto-Jews. The
irony of the situation was not that too few Jews converted into Christian faith, but too many. To
find those who pretended to be converted, like certain Miguel Cervantes, and punish them, was a
sure mean to prevent too massive mock conversion. From that moment on Jews continue to exist in
Spain as a race, not as a religion. Those who left Spain settled down in the rest of Europe, including
Eastern one, y compris the Ottoman Empire. This Sephardic branch of European Jewelry will play
a very prominent role in the later European history, in particular cultural one.
Now we come to the person of Christifor Columbus. Little appears certain about his origin and
early life. According to the prevailing view, he was born in a Genovian family, and later moved to
Spain. Many data point to his Jewish origin. The fact that at the end of his life Columbus
bequeathed large amount of money for rebuilding the Temple at Jerusalem, indicates that he was a
crypto Jew. Thus, a most comic situation arose.
 131

A Jew, with cynically sounding first name, Christifor, and an indicative surname, Columbus
(dove), 1 sails on the board of the caravel Santa Maria, with another, el Nino, 2 trailing behind
(together with Pinta). In retrospective, on may imagine a Jew from Spain heading for the Promised
Land. Indeed, though Columbus’ expectations (real or pretentious) to reach the rich India were
dispersed upon arriving to Caribbean, his efforts were awarded even better, by a virgin land of
American continent. True, this land was inhabited, not by Indians (as expected), but by some other
(red skin) Indians. And just as Joshua slaughtered (as the Bible claims) Canaanites so as to gain the
Promised Land, so Columbus’ followers, from Pyrenean Peninsula and the rest of Europe
devastated the indigenous population (less by the mere gun powder but more by deceases and
reservations).
Climate conditions arranged the partition of the newly discovered (sic) continent, allotting the
central and southern parts to Spanish and Portuguese (Latin America) and north part to Western
and North Europeans. It is the latter which will play the dominant role in the story which follows.
Eastern cost of the North America (simply America in the following) became fast an urban region
with many Jews to attract, as notorious for enterprising people. New York will in the course of time
become the city with the largest Jewish population in the world (1.7 M at present). But the inland,
the “most virgin land of all”, will witness the arrival of Jews in a more organized form. The
arrangement for acquiring new virgin (sic) land was via “run for land” races. Usually, about 20
wagon cars were competing for the parcels for farming, with one wagon for the local traders and
shop keepers. The later were, as a rule, Jewish ones. Thus, Jews were scattered al around the new
territory in “an everywhere dense set” manner, as mathematicians would designate it, 3 forming a
sort of a continent-bound Diaspora.
But prior to this occupation of arable and pasture soils, a military control over the Indian lands was
imposed by the European newcomers. Strongholds in the form of military garrisons were
established well inside the traditional Indian lands. As the massive moves towards West
progressed, the pattern of military bases develop all over present day USA territory, making
“everywhere dense set”, we met before. This sort of European enclaves, surrounded by
autochthonous Indian population will in the course of time develop into an inverse picture –
enclaves of the reservations for Indians, surrounded by “white” environment. It is this pattern
which will show up in the process of creation of new Israel on the Palestinian soil. Is it by
accident?
The Judeo-Christian archetype has surely played an important role in conquering the new Promised
Land. It can not escape to an attentive history reader the analogy between American Indians and
present day Palestinians from one side and USA state and Israel from the other. Evidently, a
mechanism governing the same pattern of behaviour appears operative in both cases. As we shall
see later on, it is the same pattern which governs USA behaviour on the global world scene. In
words of James Carroll: 4

So Jerusalem would feed the fantasies of English settlers in the New World. When
John Winthrop decreed in 1630, from the deck of a ship in what would become Boston
harbour, “that we shall be a City upon Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us,” he
was envisioning the American self-image as a New Jerusalem. As history shows, that

1
Which reminds us of the Baptism scene on the river Jordan, with the Holy Spirit descending from the Heaven on the
Son of God.
2
Infant in Spanish.
3
On Balkan, it was Vlachs (Cincars) who would play the same role, as the traditional shop keepers, besides Jews and
Greeks.
4
James Caroll, Constantine's Sword, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 2001, p. 254.
 132

has, in turn, been overshadowed by the image of America as, in Walter McDougall’s
phrase, the “crusader state”.

Crusaders fought Muslims, not Jews (accused to be responsible for Jesus’ crucifixion), accepting
thus the ideology of Old Testament as the source of the Christian faith, and consequently Jews as
Christian progenitors. The present day Middle East situation shows a further development of the
pattern of religious hierarchy – Israelis fight Muslims via their vassal state, USA, in order to
preserve their modern resurrection of the Old Testament Jewish community on the Palestine soil.
Christian played active roles in both cases, but unaware of the real significance of their
involvements. This blindness will show up in its most remarkable (though not conspicuous) aspect
of the entire Kosovo issue, as we shall elaborate later on.

USA and Serbia

We have already considered some aspects of the relationship between these countries, but this time
we restrict ourselves to the Boromean knot pattern. USA have a strong particular interest in the
Middle East, if for nothing else, than for the presence of the world richest oil resources. This
aspect could provide an independent interest of USA in the region, regardless of the Israelis ones.
But once one accepts the patron-vassal relationship, there is no room for the independent interest
interpretation. Never-the-less the richness of the Arab states can not be ignored when dealing with
the Middle East crisis (whatever one means by that).
Arab states have found them in an awkward situation, to say the least, concerning the Palestinian
issue. They are rich, but military weak, in many aspects. Apart from Syria, Egypt and Magreb
states, oil rich Arab states can hardly be considered true states at all. Excluding the exceptional case
of Lebanon, all Arab oil-states have been drawn into corruption with medieval social structures,
including juristic aspects. These despotic societies, wit half of population (female one) kept in
slavery, by European standards, appear artifacts, fairy-tales mushrooms growing on the oil
(underground) lakes. They hate Israel, mainly for the religious reasons, but are incapable to do
anything on the subject of Palestinian cause. They provide financial support to the Palestinian
refugees and Occupied Territories, but refuse to settle them down in their states for good, since it
would close the Palestinian issue for ever. The most persistent opponents to Israel have been Syria,
but she achieved almost nothing in practical terms. The other opponent was Iraq, under Sadam
Husein, who use to donate 20.000 $ to the families who lost their members as suicide bombers.
Saudi Arabia turned into USA ally, more precisely vassal, for the sake of keeping alive under most
disgusting yoke of Sheriat law, a fossil remnant from the dark Middle Age. Smaller oil-rich states
and emirates have given up interfering with the regional affairs, satisfied with 1001 night luxury.
The most serious opponent to USA-Israel axis has been, of course, Iran, under ayatollahs’ rule, but
her military capacity has never a real threat to Israel, at least up to know. Jordan has long ago
renounced her Palestinian subjects, leaving them to their own destiny. Lebanon, after the long,
bloody civil war, has remained a quasi state, incapable to settle down her own domestic affairs.
Besides, with militant Hezbollah Palestinian paramilitaries, Lebanon has been the subject to both
Palestinian nuisance and Israelis terror. As for Egypt, after concluding her conflict with Israel, after
three humiliating defeats, she has played a role of a moderator in the Middle East affairs, for good
or worse.
The long-term USA strategy in the Middle East has by now shaped into two principal pillars: (i)
fight the Palestinian freedom fighters all around the globe, as terrorists (guerrilla affairs) (ii) form
concentric protection rings around Israel (frontal defense). We first comment the former pillar.
(i) Since Palestinians and their Arab sympathizers appear Muslims, bombing (suicidal or not) has
been invariable linked by USA propaganda as an intrinsic feature of the Islam as a religion. But this
propaganda has never been raised to the official level, on the contrary. White House never fail to
emphasize her respect for Muslims and their religion, supporting her claims by experts’ opinion
 133

about the intrinsically peaceful character of Islam, in agreement with the same claims by Muslim
scholars and politicians. Never-the-less the mass media in USA, and some in Western Europe, keep
on asserting the public with claims of the opposite. This schizophrenic attitude has resulted in
blocking the USA citizens of considering seriously the policy of White House. This situation
appears very beneficial for the latter, and Israel too. The president can always claim that he is
running pro-Muslims politics, despite the opposite feelings of his subjects, thus pretending to be
wise and benevolent.
The terrorism has been raised to the level of a sin, a pestilence or like, a decease the world should
uproot etc. What is worse, after a long period of the misuse of the term, terrorism has been accepted
as a mean for achieving their political goals by other freedom fighters, like those within Kurd
population in Turkey. What is even worse, many irresponsible, even insane people have started
exercising it almost “for fun”. A serious analysis would probably reveal a social component in this
outburst of dissatisfaction, like the feeling of being marginalized etc. Suicidal bombings appear a
specific kind of suicide, a message to the environment that the society has been guilty with regard
to the victim. But in the case of suicides politically motivated, as the case with Jan Palach was, this
message has a clear aim – to make the world aware of the burning problem and force the former to
take some action in this respect. And here we come to the crux of the matter when speaking about
Palestinian freedom fighters.
The crucial question is: has the World acknowledged their message? The answer is: yes and no.
Ordinary people all around the world have shown sympathy with their fighting for freedom and
desperate attempts to get rid of Israelis and their occupation. Proof? When European Union (EU)
organized a pool a few years ago with the question who was the country which threatened world
peace the most, on the top of the list two countries appeared: USA and Israel. And then a
remarkable action from the USA side followed quickly: they criticized strongly the pool and EU
official immediately subordinated and begged for excuse, promising never to do similar thing
again. And this affair answers the second part of the answer to our question. European
governments, under the pressure from Washington dare not to follow the attitude of their citizens.
They have joined the USA position of accusing suicidal bombing as a pure terrorism, as le
terrorism-pour-le terrorism, despite the obvious fact which points to the opposite direction: the
Israeli’s terrorism. The latter has two aspects, strongly connected. One part of this terrorism
concerns Israelis’ action within occupied Territories, the other cover the entire Glob. The former
has been well documented to be repeated here, but it is the later which deserves out attention.
In order to prevent high jacking, the strict precautions have been introduced by Israelis in their
ELAL air company. These measured have been subsequently adopted by all air companies in the
world. Passengers are subjected to a number of humiliating and most inconvenient searches and
checks, which comprise their baggage, including hand baggage itself. Every passenger is made feel
as a potential criminal, or assassin. What is even the worse bus, railway etc wardrobes have ceased
to function, for fear of hidden bombs. The entire mankind has been put on alert, because Israel does
not want to renounce her Occupied Territories.
The issue has a significant point in itself, that of the logic of ethos as such. If two violent actions,
causally connected, follow each other, which one should play the role of a reference point? In the
particular case, should Intifada be blamed, without considering what initiated it, or should it be
regarded as a mere response to the Israeli occupation? If any terrorism is striped of its causes, then
any kind of violence would gain the “civic right”. This issue will show up in the KiM case, as we
shall elaborate later on. We mention here only that one usually define state violence as state
terrorism, but we shall distinguish between terrorism as a mean for achieving political goals “from
below”, from the state organized violence. By terrorism we mean indiscriminate killing of people,
in the no-war situation.
Now we come to the second pillar of USA (read - Israel) strategy concerning the security of the
state of Israel. Apart of direct military help, Washington has been trying to form successive rings
 134

around Israel, subordinating the surrounding states in one or other way. As mentioned before,
Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt have been neutralized. Syria is under permanent threat to be
“neutralized” too, as well as Iran. Iraq has been attacked and practically destroyed, so that it
presents no real threat to Israel. It is other Muslim states, both Arab and non-Arab, which are at
stake now. And here we come to the crux of matter, when the USA attitude towards Serbia (and
Serbs in Yu2) is considered. But the issue was open before the KiM crises entered it most acute
state, that from 1998 on.

When Yu2 disintegration started in 1990, the first military conflicts began in Croatia, but quickly
ceased, to be finished in 1995, by Dayton agreement. The real fighting was initiated by Serbia and
Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), to be finished by Dayton agreement too. Unlike the
Croatia case, when two opposing sides were engaged, Croats and Serbs, in BiH we had three sides
in the mutual conflict: Muslims (44 %), Serbs (32 %) and Croats (17 %). Although Muslims and
Croats (Roman Catholics) were forced later by the external factors to join their forces in fighting
Serbs (Greek-Orthodox), their mutual animosities could not be concealed by diplomatic cover.
From the very beginning Muslims have been favourites of the Western community, although all
logical reasoning should point in the opposite direction. They were compact Muslim population in
the middle of Balkan, not far away from the centre of Christian Europe. Many Muslim militant
fundamentalists, like Mujahedins, joined the Bosnian Muslims, from Arabic countries, Afghanistan
etc. Also, massive weaponry traffic from the Arab country has been present during the conflict,
although a strict embargo has been imposed by the Western countries, who showed a blind eye
concerning this violation. Yet the sympathies of the Western governments and media were on the
Muslim side, against Croats and particularly Serbs. Why? The answer lies not at the spot, but far
away in the Middle East, in the outer protection ring, mentioned above, Arabic peninsular states,
Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia etc. The rationale is as simple as cunning: we don’t hate
Muslims, to the contrary, we protect Muslims everywhere in the world (provided it does not
endanger Israel security).
In the case of KiM this attitude has been exposed to the utmost clarity, except for those who do not
want to see it. The overwhelming majority of KiM population is Shqiptar (exact figures have never
been known, and will be never, perhaps). About 95 % of them are Muslims, with a tiny Roman
Catholic minority and symbolic number of Greek Orthodox. Expecting support both from the
Western Christian world and Eastern Islamic communities, Shqiptars’ politics has adopted two
principal stratagems:
Turning to the Western broad public, they expose their Christian, Roman-Catholic face. Arguing
via public means, newspapers, TV, INTERNET, etc, they have always been good Catholics, despite
the fact they happen to be Muslims (for historical and other reasons). When they present visually
their politicians, for example Ibrahim Rugova, there is as a rule a Catholic church shown in the
background.
As for the Western governments, being aware of the “Israel syndrome” elaborated above, they
stress their Muslim identity, as a warning (with a mild taste of blackmail). The same goes, of
course, when turning to the Islamic world, expecting a generous help of the religious brothers, in
their fight with the unfaithfuls. In the context of the latter, one point must be stressed here.

Bosnian and KiM Muslims are not the only Islamic people in Europe, but their position differs
greatly from that of Muslims in France, Germany, Great Britain etc. These latter are dispersed
geographically, with eventual ghetto settlements, but have never formed a vast compact society.
They speak different languages and the only matter of concern regarding their position within the
Western society is the Muslim religion versus the prevailing (still) Christian environment. It is true
that Muslim religion does not recognize nationality, or at most consider it a secondary aspect
compared with the faith, but nevertheless there is nothing compared with the fanatic nationalism of
 135

Albanians, both in Albania and in neighbouring regions. The case of Bosnian Muslims falls in-
between, since they are a part of the Slavic tribe and can communicate easily with the Christian
environment.
The difference between European Muslims and Bosnian and particularly Shqiptar ones is very
remarkable, when we come to the external interference, in particular from the Arabic countries.
Supporting French Muslims, for instance, means interfering into the internal affairs of a sovereign
state. On the other hand, the interference into Serbian internal affairs when Shqiptars are concerned
appears motivate by the same rationale – denying the right of Serbia for instance, to consider
Shqiptar issue internal one. To the contrary: by defying Serbia the right to control her own territory,
they press for making the political demand their political right. It is, of course, a bluff, but a
gigantic one. As we know, gigantic bluffs have a large probability to succeed, as the case with
Sudetian Germans show, for instance. 1
Why such a difference in the Muslim distribution in Western Europe and Balkan? Muslim came to
France by boats, trains, airplanes, gradually and individually. Albanians came to Serbia on foot,
crossing the border. It was a clear case of migration, followed by the demographic explosion.
Magreb Arabs sought the permission from the French authorities to enter the country, whereas
Albanians did not ask Serbian state to come and settle on her soil. They have no feeling to be
guests, but rather conquerors, occupying their Promised Land.

Albanians and the World

In the previous chapters we have seen how the politics of USA concerned with Israel security has
been trying to make an image of USA protecting Balkan Muslims, especially Albanians in Albania
and particularly in the disputed neoghbouring regions, like KiM. Now we turn to a broader issue,
that of the relationship of the world, in particular the West, when the KiM issue is concerned.
It is generally believed that the world opinion is sympathetic with Shqiptars demands for secession
from Serbia (and possibly from the neighbouring countries, like Macedonia and Greece). Although
this belief appears justified, it is neither completely true, nor is easy to comprehend. We shall try to
elaborate this issue in some detail here.
If the political support from USA is base on the Muslim faith of Albanians, this rationale does not
hold for the world in general. There must be something else, or something more, which stirs world
sympathy for the Albanian cause. But before we enter this issue, a word of caution seems in order
here.
We must distinguish between the feeling of general public and the politics of governments and
relevant authorities in general. As we shall see later on, governments and senates etc tend to shape
their policies according to the reports of their envoys who are in contacts with the regions in
question and prominent people there. The latter tend to support their demands by both legal and
illegal means, including bribery etc. KiM Shqiptars are no exception from the rule, as USA
senators and government officers are neither. We shall come to particular cases, like that of senator
Bob Doll, for instance, later on, but here we just mention this dark side of the international
diplomacy and politics in general. Besides, many prominent actors in KiM issue, like UN officials,
tend to differ greatly in their estimate of the nature of KiM crisis and the situation on the spot when
thy leave the official post and express their genuine opinion without constraints, as the case of the
Canadian general Mackenzie was, for instance. The corruption linked with the international
interventions in various world regions is well known and it is, unfortunately, an inevitable part of
external interventions, but we must be aware of this fact when trying to pass a judgment on the
KiM issue.

1
If Serbia is to sign an agreement with the international community on the KiM issue, she should insist to do it at
Munich.
 136

Now we come to the “popular feelings” concerning Albanians and KiM issue. There are two
competing images which world general public has about Albanians. One is the image provided by
very Albanians, both from Albania and neighbouring countries, the image of a normal civilized
people, well immersed into the modern, advanced society, within the European standards. This is
the picture which official propaganda offers, supported partly justly by the picture of the urban
population at Tirana, Skodra, Priština etc. The other image concerns the rural population and their
way of life, in particular their folklore, ethos, mentality etc. This picture has been provided by
ethnologists, journalists, and generally by unofficial researchers and observers. And this picture
differs grossly from the former one. It is the picture of a predominantly traditional society, retarded
from the rest of Europe, and even rest of Balkan, by centuries, if not millennia. It appears as a
reservation, a tribal society conserved in the heart of Europe. Is this an advantageous fact to
Albanians or a handicap? And we come here to the crux of matter.
If one comes to the issue of accepting Albania and Albanians into the contemporary Europe, this
backwardness appears surely a clear disadvantage. After all, many Balkan states which want to join
European Union have been kept before the gate for the reason of incompatibility with the Union,
for good reasons. It is the famous issue of standards. And these countries are well ahead of Albania
and KiM in particular. On the other hand, this disadvantage turns surprisingly into an advantage,
when the more profound level of the modern society is dug up. It concerns the ecological issue,
which to some circles in the West constitutes the essence of the modern society. Saving the species,
the environment in general, adoring the virginal nature, vastly spoiled by the modern industrial
society, has been the credo of an influential section of the Western world. But is it the matter of
flora and fauna only? And here we come to the crux of matter.
Many tribes of traditional society have been “discovered” by Europeans, including vast populations
of the Northern and South America. These have been decimated by the “civilized intruders”,
intentionally or by diseases, alcohol etc 1 . As the welfare of the industrial society has grown,
intellectual elite, in particular scientific and humanistic ones, has been occupied by protecting and
preserving the Nature. At first, it concerned flora and fauna, but gradually the scope has broadened
and human species have been included into the general agenda of “save the Nature”. Hence,
“retarded” humans have become the concern of the ”advanced” part of the civilized society, which
has been making great effort to study, protect and preserve these “homo sapiense relicts”. Even the
USA and Canadian Indians may be grateful to this new move in their environment for the renewed
care of the people who used to slaughter and confine them into reservations, just as animals were
confined and protected in ”national parks” all over the world now.
The case is a particular instance of a broader issue, that of small and large differences. Rivalry and
even antagonism starts with a threshold difference, then rises as the difference rises, but not
indefinitely. After some ”critical value” antagonism disappears and distinctly different species can
coexist. More advanced society feels sympathy, even compassion, with the “retarded” one. As the
overall world civilization advances this effect becomes ever more conspicuous. The case with
Australian Aborigines from one side and Tasmanians from the other, illustrates well the difference
in treating “traditional society” 150 years ago and now. But probably the best example of the
syndrome of small difference has been the case of Israelis and Palestinians. It is the most advanced
part of Israel which is concerned with the fate of people in the Occupied Territories, who press the
government to ease the terror on the subordinate Palestinians. They consider them as an endangered
human species, just as USA treats now their Indians, Eskimos etc. But let us go back to our KiM
issue.
One of the features which distinguishes advanced European societies and less advanced ones, like
those on Balkan, is the comparative difference between the rural and urban populations. In
England, for instance, this difference appears hardly noticeable, whereas in Bosnia this is very

1
It has been estimated that about 20 million of North-Americal Indians have fallen victims to these disasters.
 137

pronounced, for instance. In general, all towns in the world appear similar, but it is the village
which determines a country, as distinct ethnical and cultural entity. The greatest difference between
peasants and citizens in Europe is present on KiM. One of the best instances which illustrates this
enormous gap is the rate of birth. In the urban areas it is 2.7 per family, whereas in the rural area it
amounts as much as 6.7. The point is that more than 80 % of KiM people live in villages. What
makes the KiM issue unique, very distinct from the general case we considered above, is that the
traditional society there is not an “exotic minority”, but the overwhelming majority within the
overall population. Hence, no “ecological syndrome”. To the contrary, an inverse situation appears
present, which has no precedent in Europe. Similar situation was present in colonial Africa, but
with an important difference: Europeans, who were “civilized minority”, were newcomers there,
whereas on KiM the situation appears the opposite: Shqiptar population has grown in couple of
centuries from a small minority to the overwhelming majority, in one way or another.
Thus we come to something we call Christian syndrome: the more the KiM population appear
remote from the present-day cultural standards, the more sympathy it gains from the Western
World public. The political issue thus has turned into ecological one. But the issue is not that
simple nevertheless. The indifference of the West as to the actual situation in situ stems from the
comfortable fact that Europeans are not going to live in KIM. The only trouble they are, or should
be, concerned with is that KiM is coming to them (in fact it has already arrived there). Drug
smuggling, arms traffic, human traffic etc have become the standard feature of the move “KiM
meeting Europe” (and USA too, for that matter). Based on the “blood ties”, much more that it is the
case of Mafia, Albanians appear ideal for criminal activities, much more so than any other
population in the world, in particular concerning their unique language spoken by themselves only.
The movement for the national independence, quite legitimate, otherwise, gave the decisive
impetus to the illegal activities, like dealing with drugs, but this has escaped from the political
motives and has grown into an independent sector of the KiM economy. 1
The ecological syndrome may be considered a special case of a wider issue, that of compassion. In
this context the attitude of the world public towards Serbia (and Serbs to some extent), must be
considered. For it is the comparative behaviour in respect to two conflicting parts which matters.
Serbia under Milošević’s rule was condemned and even demonized, partly for good reasons. This
has been skillfully used by Albanian leaders as the trump card in dealing with the international
society. It is here that he public feeling with regard to Serbia enters the game. As in the case of
Albanians just discussed, these feelings appear dichotomy too. Governments of some countries, not
favouring Serbia for various reasons, still treat Serbia as Milošević’s state, although Serbia has
managed to get rid of a great deal of Milošević’s heritage. As for the feelings of the general public
towards Serbian population, it acquires a schizophrenic character. A part of world public opinion
has accepted that it was primarily Serbian Serbs (and non-Serbs) who suffered from Milošević
communist dictatorship, and therefore should deserve compassion themselves. The other part, to
the contrary, considers all Serbian Serbs as guilty for what Serbia has been accused of, rightly or
not. 2 And here we come to the point which might, at first sight seem absurd, that both parts
mentioned above feel compassion for Serbian Serbs. If for the former, who do not blame general
population for what the leaders did, this sounds reasonable, for the latter, who consider Serbs
guilty, this appears unexpected. But here the Christian syndrome pops in. Serbs are guilty, they
have sinned, and world should forgive them, just as that biblical father forgave his sinful son. Both
syndromes, however, are operative at different levels of the world collective consciousness, but the
practical finale effects appear the same. Although this might seem favourable to Serbs, but the
overall outcome appears to put Serbia in an inferior position, just as the healed patient, suffering

1
We recall that Mafia started as a nationalistic movement in Sicily, too.
2
That this attitude has been present outside Serbia was confirmed by the propaganda of Montenegrin nationalist
separatists, during their campaign for the “independent Montenegro”, who claimed that all Serbs were pro-Milošević,
even those who fought to overthrow him.
 138

from a mental decease finds himself, after a successful treatment, at a more comfortable, but
inferior level within the immediate environment (no free lunch in this world).
Another phenomenon must be invoked here, when considering the Western response to the
Yugoslav crisis in general and that concerning KiM issue in particular. It concerns religious
similarities and differences. Though never recognized as important, even as present, the sympathy
of the West has been shaped to a large extent according to the religious similarities and vice versa.
Serbs are Greek Orthodox, Croats Roman Catholics. Linked with the fact that Russians, still
considered by the West its archenemy, are Greek Orthodox too. On the other hand, in Bosnia and in
KiM Serbs were in conflict with Muslims, who appear of a benign (neutral) importance to the
Christian world here in Europe. This twofold effect will play also role in shaping the sympathy of
the West with regard to the conflicting sides on Balkan.
In summary, the general attitude of the international public has been determined by the interplay of
the syndromes of small and large differences. The advantage of Albanians in this context has
proved evident. With this backstage, the violence on KiM may start.

Shqiptar rebellion
We have analyzed above the general background of the KiM crisis in the acute form, namely at the
dawn of the armed rebellion. We shall divide, in the following, the crisis periods into three stages:
(i) preparatory (1995-1998), (ii) NATO intervention (1999), (iii) KiM occupation.

Preparing the rebellion (1995-1998)

During the “wars” in Yu2 (1991-1995) nothing exceptionally happen in KiM. This fact came as
surprise to many Yugoslavs, who remember the unrests from 1968, 1981, 1988. One of reasons of
this calm was the presence of the paramilitary forces of Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, who used to
wander around the province threatening and intimidating the local population. (Arkan himself came
from KiM, from a colonist family in Priština???). But it would be naive to assume that nothing was
going on beneath the KiM political surface. The later events would corroborate fears of many
Serbians that his calm surface was the bonanza before the storm.
After Dayton agreement Serbia came out drastically weakened, both materially and morally, in
both principal senses of the latter notion (ethos and self-confidence). She was demonized as a
whole, although her own autochthonous population was the first victim of the repressive Dinaric
rule. But in understanding actual, practical moves of the International community (IC), some other
elements of shaping the practical measures are to be accounted for. The rationale for IC
interventions all around the world can be divided into two distinct parts. One concerns European
affairs, the other the rest of the world. The former has always been shaped by one imperative: peace
and order, the latter by justice and humanity. The latter have never been considered as a direct
threat to world peace and all sorts of interventions have been envisaged for settling down local
disputes, without much pressing for the quick solution(as the cases of Rwanda and Sudan
illustrate). Some of these unrests have been even simply ignored, as the case with Algeria was. In
the latter case, when the KiM crisis was progressing in 1996/7, atrocities done by the frustrated
Muslim extremists (who, by the way, were formally right in that particular case) achieved such a
level, that in a single massacre more victims (men, women, children) were slaughtered than were
the overall causalities at KiM for a year. Yet, Europe, France in particular, did virtually nothing to
stop atrocities, for the simple reason: these were internal, local affairs, which did not threaten
European security. It was different with KiM. First of all, because the issue has been tightly linked
with the international politics, in particular that concerning Middle East, as we elaborated above.
Second, the stage for violent conflict was set up almost in the middle of Europe, and armed fighting
could be easily spread to the rest of Europe, which has always been considered the most civilized
continent (with the most uncivilized atrocities committed in the last century). Western Europe
 139

could not afford armed conflicts before the door. At least, it has been offered as an explanation of
the proclaimed attitude: We care. But the practical steps were a bit the opposite ones.
After Dayton Serbia was recovering from the (partial) lifting of IC sanctions, for her engagements
in Croatia and BiH affairs. Parallelly, the political scene was burdened by fierce struggle for power
between Milošević and then oppositional Dinaric parties, SPO and SRS, lead by Vuk Drašković
and Vojislav Šešelj, respectively. In 1997 oppositional front made of SPO, Democratic Party (lead
by Zoran Djindjic) and Association of Citizens of Serbia (lead by Vesna Peshić), won the elections
for the municipal governments, but Milošević regime denied it and did not allow the results to be
realized. For thee months that frosty winter one to two hundred thousand Belgrade citizens
demonstrated along the city streets, demanding the local governments. Police used tear gas, fire
brigade hose-pipes, buttons, etc but the revolt would not stop. EU sent an envoy, the former
Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales to mediate, who finally persuaded the dictator to give up.
Milošević ordered the Parliament to issue lex specialis so as to provide a formal cover for admitting
the falsifying the elections. Opposition in Belgrade and tens of other Serbian towns took over the
municipal governments and it was the first victory of the democratic part of the Serbian society
over the despotic rule of the Montenegrin from Lijeva Rijeka in Montenegro and his criminal
family and cronies. The very evening of the Supreme Court decision that the Belgrade (and other
cities) local government were to take over the municipal offices, Zoran Djindjic took down the
communist star from the city municipality roof in the Belgrade centre, with the wild joy of the
supporters. The communist dictatorship was beginning to crack. Signs of Serbia resurrection were
appearing and the citizens felt the brighter future was smiling at them. But it turned out to be an
illusion.
During all this time of turmoil in Serbia, when Milošević attention and police were turned towards
the political opponents, an underground Shqiptar state was being taking shape at KiM. A
clandestine army was formed, under the name of UÇK (Kosovo Liberation Army).

Preparing the secession

Parallel to the political demands and unrest, KiM leadership was preparing the aimed rebellion. Of
course, not all political parties opted for violence, as the case of Ibrahim Rugova Democratic Party
illustrates, but the common denominator of all party politics has been secession at all costs. This
political platform has never been questioned and all activities, including “negotiations” were a
mere cover for the stratagem adopted by the most militant sectors of the Shqiptar political
organizations. Hence, one could see two parallel movements, aimed at the same ultimate goals –
secession from Serbia.
Military preparations have been organized with the help of various external factors: (i) Albania, (ii)
USA and Germany, (iii) Islamic counties. Albania provided the platzdarm for the external
interventions, as well as the weaponry and other facilities. As mentioned before, a number of USA
organized training camps have been set up in Albania, like that near Drach. The collapse of the
state in 1997, mentioned before, resulted in an enormous traffic of weaponry from Albania into
KiM. But surely these instances of Albanian interference into Serbia internal affairs are tips of an
iceberg. The real extent of this interference will be disclosed probably only after the KiM affair has
been “settled down”, as the actual events taking pace in Bosnia, for instance, are being revealed
after Dayton and at Hague Tribunal. For the time being, we may just make guesses as from the real
development behind the scene.
The significance of the military supports goes, of course, beyond its face value. It implied the
political support, insurance that USA will advance and protect Shqiptar cause. On the other hand
Milošević politics (sic) has been burdened by the lack of initiative. In fact, it may sound absurd, but
even in dealing with the internal opponents, within Yu2 and later within Serbia, Milošević exposed
such a passivity and indolence, that no wonder he found himself the ultimate loser. The trouble is
that Serbia found herself the loser, following willingly or not his “leadership”.
 140

Te Shqiptar question was not a fictive one, it was a genuine move for the independence (whatever
it meant or implied). By reducing Serbia’s response to mere defense, Milošević was doomed to
failure. No fortress can be defended for indefinite time. The old wisdom has always advised that
attack is the best defence. In this case the former implied an initiative concerning Shqiptar
demands, within Serbia and IC. The tragedy of Milošević and Serbia has been that they always
were late for one step or more. Serbian state has made a number of failures, which have turned out
disastrous to the KiM issue. We shall number them in the following.
Milošević failed to detect the clandestine preparation of forming Shqiptar state at KiM. When he
finally moved in, Serbian police found a state in the state, with bunkers, training centers,
propaganda offices, hospitals, military magazines, logistic, heavy weaponry (except for tanks),
uniform producing plants, schools, even faculties. Two latter institutions were known, in fact, to
the state and IC. In fact it has been negotiated, with the mediation of an Italian official, that
Shqiptar pupils and students should move back to the previous buildings, but this agreement has
never been fully realized, for various reasons. The Shqiptar side has always claimed that the
Serbian authorities prevented that, but within the overall context, this claim should be taken with
the grain of salt, knowing the long-term strategy of the KiM leadership. Any sign of improvement
of Shqiptar conditions would push them further from their ultimate goal.
Milošević should not have used paramilitaries in dealing with rebels. This use provided quick
results, but in a longer run it was counterproductive and gave an impression of a clash between two
savage sides.
Serbia should have avoided at any cost internationalizing KiM issue and allowing external
institutions to interfere with her internal business. 1
Serbia should not have engaged in negotiating with rebels, particularly outside her territory.
Serbia should not have allowed the KiM issue to be dealt with outside UN, whose member she was.
Any envoy outside UN should have been rejected.
At first sight one might claim that these steps were inevitable, but we shall argue in the following
that this was not the case.
Which state forces have been used in dealing with rebels? The official state which Serbia was a part
of was Union of Yugoslav Republics (UYR), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. The army of
UYR (Army in the following) was engaged in safeguarding the border with Albania, the supply of
the border staff, and the principal roads and crossroads in the province. The latter included the use
of heavy weaponry, like tanks. The rest of forces were Serbian police and paramilitaries. As we
mentioned Milošević has managed to form large police forces, well equipped with armed vehicles,
and other military equipment, like personal mortars and the like. Air forces have not been used
from Yugoslav side in KiM operations, unlike NATO engagements in the area.
Although the hard times from 1992-5 of the IC sanctions on URY were over in 1998, the shortage
of many goods in Serbia was still actual. In particular gasoline was a deficient item and steeling
from parked cars was a common practice at the time. When two empting of the reservoir of our car,
parked before our building, occurred in a fortnight, my wife went to the police station at Zemun,
asking the police to protect us. My wife explained to the officer in charge that it concerned a
handicapped person car, and that she had to drive me to my job, since I am using a wheelchair. The
policeman was kind, but he made my wife understand the police was not going to engage on the
matter. My wife went out of the building, furious for such an attitude, when she accidentally had a
look at the official panel besides the entrance. It was densely packed by portraits of the staff
officers from the station, who lost their life at KiM. My wife suddenly realized what was going on
and felt ashamed for her petty complaints and requirements, in view of the tragedy of the state
police which was going on at the time.

1
True, the government organized a referendum in April 1998, with 97% of votes against an involvement of the
international community into Serbian internal affairs.
 141

Killing a policeman has been considered an utmost crime in all states, for good reasons. In fact, the
only crime in Great Britain for which a death penalty was prescribed was killing a bobby, who at
the time I was in England did not carry weapons. Forces of order are not only representative of
state, they are state. When the Serbian communists, the future partisans, killed two kvisling
policemen in 1941, what was proclaimed subsequently as the beginning of the resurrection in
Serbia against German occupying forces, it was an act against the state as such, not just against a
particular regime, as the communist propaganda used to assert.
Somewhen at the same time we were attending a private commemoration at a Belgrade cemetery,
when a funeral of an army conscript took place. The young soldier was at his military service and
was killed by KLA at KiM (probably in an ambush on an army vehicle carrying supplies to the
border guards). I tried to image the feelings of his parents, who send (probably the only) 1 child to
the military service, killed by a young Shqiptar rebel (probably one of three or four sons of the
local family), shooting him into his back.
Fighting for village after village Serbian police forces discovered that almost half of the province
was in the hands of rebels. The fighting was running with the following pattern: a police patrol is
passing a village, when a sudden fire is open and some policemen killed and wounded. The police
returns the fire and the further development depends on the strength of the rebellious unit engaged.
If the village appears well protected and risky to attack by the ordinary units, the latter stops
fighting and calls for additional support. It arrives usually as a paramilitary unit, which launches a
fierce onslaught. But before we go on, a few words about paramilitaries are in order.
Ordinary police forces consisted of the standard policemen and reservists, 2 called to reinforce the
permanent staff. The former could be considered second-rank forces, not much capable of fighting
guerrilla forces. In fact, KLA was not an ordinary guerrilla. Balkan wars, particularly in the WWII
were mostly fought by guerrilla attacking occupying forces, Germans in particular, so that this kind
of military actions was well known in the area. But there was a substantial difference between
guerrilla of Draža Mihailović (so-called Chetniks) and KLA tactics. The former used, particularly
in 1941, to ambush Germans from woods or outside inhabited areas, otherwise the nearby villages
or towns would suffer terrible retribution from the occupying forces. As is well known the
occupation rule in Serbia (and in Serbia only in the whole Europe) was hundred of hostages for a
killed soldier and 50 for wounded. It was for that reason Chetniks ceased to kill Germans in an
organized manner, after the first few months of resurrection in 1941 (unlike Tito’s partisans, for the
reasons to be understood immediately). 3 Chetnics’ tactics (approved by the Allies), was to reduce
their activities to sabotages and diversions, until the Allies begin their final offensive against the
Axes, and thus spare the civilians of the massive massacres. The rationale for this tactics was
simple. Yugoslavia (and Serbia for that meter) was one of many countries involved in military
activities in Europe, tightly controlled by the occupying forces (German, Italian, Hungarian,
Bulgarian etc), both in the military and informational sense. News about civil victims could only
discourage both local population and Allies.
On KiM logic of the Shqiptar rebels was the opposite one. In order to win world sympathy for their
cause, massacres were more than welcome. 4 This tactics rested on two principal facts. First, KiM
was in the focus of IC attention, due to extensive Shqiptar propaganda. Second, KiM provided a
massive human resource for victims of the war KLO started, due to the overpopulation of the area.
Hence, the tactics of KLA was to provoke fighting within the inhabited places, like villages and
towns, making use of the civilians as a shield and their corps as a proof of “Serb brutality”. The

1
Families with single child are the most frequent in Serbian towns, especially in Belgrade.
2
We note that the lower-rank commanders of those reservist forces were mainly immigrants from Dinaric regions, who
joined the Army as professionals, in an old good, centuries-long tradition.
3
See. e.g. P. Grujic, Boromejski Čvor (Boromean Knot), ATC, Belgrade, 2006 (in Serb).
4
To paraphrase the famous Voltaire’s dictum, if massacres of the Shiptar population were absent, they should be
invented.
 142

insistence on the adjective “Serb” was both intensive and consistent. The whole affair was to be
presented as a clash between two nations, not between a rebellious subpopulation of a state and the
state herself. How effective this approach has been the best proof is that it has been adopted by the
very Serbian officials, what we are going to discuss later on.
Another point is to be made here. Not all of KLA consisted of the indigenous population, but many
came from outside, mainly from Albania. Those had no particular feelings towards the
autochthonous people in KiM, in particular those who were engaged as mercenaries. Suffering of
civilians meant little to them, as it is generally with all “dogs of war”. By the same token those
Serbian paramilitaries which consisted of Ijekavians, felt no compassion with the KiM civilians
either. We note here an interesting parallel with the guerrilla fighting in Western Serbia during the
early days of the resurrection against the German occupation in 1941. Majority of the partisans,
members of Tito’s communist controlled forces, came from across Drina, as immigrants from
Bosnia who escaped Ustasha terror and massacres over Serbs. They used to kill Germans, mostly
by ambushing military convoys, irrespective of the expected reprisals of German forces over the
civilians, either from nearby villages and towns, or hostages. It was this ruthless tactics employed
by partisans which caused the final split between Chetniks of Drazha Mihailovic (besides the
ideological motives) and Tito’s forces, after a few months of joined actions against the occupying
forces.
In the following we are not going to describe and interpret numerous clashes between the state
police, paramilitaries and army reservists from one side and KLA and Shqiptar civilians from the
other. Rather, we shall concentrate on a few paradigmatic cases in order to illustrate the complexity
of the situation, from both factual and information-propaganda aspects. But before we do that, a
few words about the state forces engaged are in order.
As mentioned before, Army was not directly engaged, for the reasons explained, except for the
reservists, called to help the police forces. The most important issue here is that of the infamous
paramilitaries. Rumour was going on in Serbia that they consisted of common criminals, released
from prisons. This allegation has never been confirmed officially, but the very fact it was
considered possible, speaks for itself. We mentioned before how dangerous and traumatic was
engagement of ordinary police, especially reservists, on KiM, when we discussed the earlier unrests
on KiM, like that from 1981. It is reasonable to take that only rough people like criminals would be
willing and capable to match the determined Shqiptar rebels. Arkan’s “Tigers” mentioned earlier
were ones of those paramilitaries, but not the only one. Among the other one deserves our
particular attention, the so-called Scorpions. Founded in BiH at the start of “Bosnian war”, its
original role was to protect state electrical installations (power stations, electric cables etc). But
only when the “war” was over and the Hague Tribunal started processing the war crimes, it has
become obvious what the real purpose of this paramilitary was, or at least one of the most
important. The movie showing shooting 6 Muslim civilians from Srebrenica (Trnovo, 1995) was
shown at the Tribunal, which shocked the world for its brutality. We can not dwell on the
interesting questions as to who and why made this movie and how it reached a NGO to be passed
to the Tribunal, especially since nothing appears clear and definitive, when these bloody events are
concerned. Here we just note (and repeat once again) that the unit consisted exclusively of the local
Bosnians, more precisely Herzegovians (HDE) and had nothing to do with Serbians (except that the
latter has been forced to accept the guilt for Ijekavians crimes, as we shall elaborate later on). This
unit will play a prominent role in KiM affairs, as we shall see immediately. We mention here that
four members of the incriminated group were sentenced by the court for the war criminal in Serbia
for 53 years of prison. (Why they were brought to a Serbian court for crime which they committed
outside Serbia, as citizens of BiH and why they were not transferred to a Bosnian court, is the most
crucial question, but we shall not dwell on it here).
It is of an utmost importance here to stress that the regular police forces contained a large portion
of newcomers from across Drina, that is of the first generation of Dinaroids. It is of the equal
 143

importance to note that the majority of KLA consisted of Albanian Albanians, specially trained for
the “job”, as mentioned before. Since those Albanians (not Serbian Shqiptars) are mainly from
Northern Albania, that is are belligerent Dinaroids themselves, we have a clash of Slavophonic and
Albanophonic Dinaroids over the “disputed land”, the unfortunate KiM and their autochthonous
population. Besides, many Shqiptar warlords, like Agim Cheku, 1 a prominent politician in KiM
today, were engaged in other parts of Yu2 during 1991-5 “wars”, exclusively against Serbs, what
testifies the amount of hatred toward Serbs as a nation. Agim Ceku was the leading warlord during
Croatian offensive against Republica Srpska Krajina in 1995, which resulted in expulsion of
250.000 Serbs from Croatia (see Appendix 3). When the offensive against KLA started in 1998,
many of Serbian warlords certainly had in mind what happened to their kin during the
“Oluja”operation in Croatia, what could, at least partly, explain a number of cruelties seen on KIM
at the time.

Internationalization of KiM affairs

We enumerated earlier a number of flagrant mistakes made by Yugoslav authorities (mainly by
Milošević) concerning KiM issue. Internationalization of a Serbian internal affairs has been the
most fatal for Serbia. Why and how it happened? Two principal reasons stood behind this blatant
error.
Milošević underestimated the role of IC and overestimated his own reputation with the latter. He
played prominent role in shaping Dayton agreement, what made him believe IC accepted him as a
partner on equal footing. In fact, he was used (as Franjo Tudjman too), to help settle down the BiH
knot and stop the bloody, senseless fighting among the local parties. Both foreigners were engaged
as men of influence on the local leaders rather than as men of respect and honest reputations.
When their roles in that respect were over, both Milošević and Tudjman became candidates for
Hague Tribunals. Tudjman’s death saved him from this humiliation, but Milošević (better to say
Serbia) was less lucky in that respect. Second, as elaborated before, the mental structure of
Dinaroids appears very rigid indeed. Milošević demonstrated this peculiar feature many times in
his political career. He rejected any correspondence with IC on Serbian matters and then
succumbed to the threat of NATO intervention and allowed the so-called verifiers to supervise
events going on in KiM, after UN resolution from 23 September, 1998. It was exactly what KLA
and Shqiptar political leaders hoped for. The stage for drama, in both senses, as a tragedy of people
and as a theater performance before IC, was set up. The performance could start.
In April 1998 EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) started
exerting a strong pressure on Serbia to accept their mediation in Belgrade – Priština negotiations.
Miloševićć first resisted these demands, but finally gave in. In October 1998 Milošević agreed for
the partial withdrawal of forces of the FRY and Serbia from KiM and that NATO and (OSCE)
deploy and the Milošević-Holbrooke agreement stipulated the deployment of 2.000 OSCE verifiers
in the province. (By the end of 1998, 1.400 of them were deployed), under the command of
Ambassador William Walker, USA general. We note here that FRY was not at the time (and is still
not) a member of NATO. The role of Richard Holbrooke in the whole KiM affair appears more
than interesting. This member of Bill Clinton’s administration has exhibited remarkable activity,
siding KiM rebels in the most arrogant and ruthless manners. He used to wonder freely through the
“liberated territory”, meeting armed rebels as if it was a USA territory. The picture of Holbrook in
a Shqiptar house, seating on a carpet in sockets (complying with the Muslim rules not to enter
house, or mosque, in shoes), with armed KLA soldiers in uniform siding him, has circulated around
the world. Holbrook’s personal recollections on that trip, how he was not aware where he was
brought along and whom he was going to meet etc, appears as cynical as naïve, in view that it was
USA who took an active role in organizing KLA. In fact, it was when USA appointed Ambassadors

1
We met Rahim Ademi before when considering the “Medački Džep massacre”.
 144

Holbrooke and Gelbride as special envoys for the southern Serbian province, their direct contact
with “KLA” headquarters started. Encouraged by this U.S. behaviour, Klaus Kinkel, German
foreign minister at the time, called “all European countries to follow the American example and
make contact with the KLA”.
Meanwhile extensive clashes between KLA and the state police were going on. According to the
state records (see Appendix 4), at the time (mid-July, 1998), the KLA controlled over 50% of
Kosovo-Metohija territory, including all the routes from Kosovo into Metohija, except for the
Uroševac-Štrpce-Prizren highway. The size of KLA forces was estimated at some 25,000 well-
armed rebels, 1 concentrated around Drenica, Mališevo and Jablanica. The highest concentration of
rebels was in: Shalja (ca. 2,500 armed rebels), EService (2,000), Drenica (3,500), Suva Reka
(3.000) 2 , Orahovac, (1,500), Glodjane (3,000), Junik, (2,000), Zur (1,500), Jablanica (3,000) and
Rugovo (1,500). In each one of those towns the “KLA” had a headquarters that directed terrorist
actions and the arming of local villages. There were three regional HQs (Drenica, Jablanica and
Malisevo), and the KLA general HQ was in Malisevo. In all areas under its control, the “KLA” had
(a) territorial units, mostly village watches and village militia that would control villages and hold
conquered territory, numbering some 15,000 men and (b) mobile forces, organized in companies,
numbering about 10,000 men. The mission of mobile forces was to attack police checkpoints, VIE
units, strategic buildings and government officials. This component of the KLA also had squads of
raiders, military police, and other specialized units.
Following the decision of the Supreme Defence Council, the Pristina Corps launched
comprehensive counter-terrorist operations, which lasted a total of 65 days (July 25 - September
29, 1998). Battle action reports estimated that over 20,000 rebels were neutralized during the
operation, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Casualties of KLA, according to the official Serbian reports.

Killed 3,500;
Wounded 5.000-6.000,
Escaped from Kosovo- 4.000-5.000,
Metohija
Surrendered or disarmed 6.000-6.500,
Killed at the border 666,
Wounded at the border 856,
Captured at the border 822.

Generally, the media cover of the fighting in KiM in FRY was very poor, and under the strict
censure. Details of the fighting were missing in the world media too, although for different reasons.
In the former case, one could estimate a rough number of the police casualties, what would be
discouraging information for the Serbian public and revolt against Milošević regime. As for the IC
cover, these numbers would signal the character of the whole situation and divert the attention from
the much publicized civilian casualties. Those who spent some time at KiM at the time, like police
reservists, were no willing to talk about the details of the operations either, what made the KiM as
mysterious as ever, considering the overall information cut-off of the province, as described earlier.
In the mind of the Serbian population KiM resounded always in a tragic way, from Kosovo battle
up to the present day. One may compare this psychosis with the Eastern Front fear in German
1
Term “rebels” is inappropriate in this context, since many of KLA members were not from KiM, but came from
outside Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the official terminology “terrorists” appears appropriate neither, in particular in
view of the misuse of the term in the Palestinian and other cases.
2
We shall meet this village again later on.
 145

minds during the WWII, or with the trauma of Auschwitz in Jewish hearts. Generally, KiM in
1998 appears a black box, as physicists would call it. Only tips of iceberg, like that panel in front
of the police station at Zemun, mentioned above, signalled something morbid was going on inside
the cursed KiM region.
If the general public was not informed (or was ill informed), there were, of course people who did
not suffer from this handicap. First of all, these were Yugoslav intelligence service, but those
”verifiers” should not be underrated either in this context. Majority of them were in all probability,
members of various intelligence services too, in particular of CIA. The latter used to send reports
of military importance to their centres, what will prove to be of invaluable importance when the
NATO raids start in 1999.

The logic of guerrilla fighting

The most “mysterious” of events which were going on during the undeclared war between Serbia
and a part of the world, were atrocities and massacres which all sides involved committed in the
fighting. There were no “front lines”, semi-guerrilla warfare only. Paramilitaries from the state
side, KLA from the rebel side, used to behave against the international war regulations and good
manners, what appears an inherent feature of all guerrilla warfare. On the top of this came the low
level of civilization pandemic for this part of Balkan, and the individual consciousness of the moral
which coloured majority of the clashes between semi-regular and irregular forces. KLA controlled
at the beginning a rather compact territory, but as the fighting advanced, this compactness gave
grounds to the dispersed, irregular points of control. In the absence of regular juristic organisation,
prisons, etc the notion of prisoner of war loses sense. All state fighters captured were executed for
this reason, some of them after a cruel questioning and torture. Some of atrocities committed by
KLA saw day-light at the Hague Tribunal, in particular those attributed to Ramush Haradinaj, later
the KiM prime minister. Generally, all candidates for Hague Tribunal will take prominent political
positions after NATO occupation in 1999, thus gaining the protection of the political immunity. 1
Majority of the atrocities reported were committed by paramilitaries from both sides, if we accept
that KLA was paramilitary organization itself. Irregular units, as mobile ones, are practically
impossible to control at the spot. Their behaviour depends on the civilisation background from one
side and the circumstances at the spot on the other. In the absence of a hierarchical command
structure and well established communication and logistic network, individual qualities and
behaviour appear crucial. If the civilisation background is high, the factor of the accidental
situation need not be crucial. The case in point was that famous episode from Xenophon’s account
in Anabasis, when Persians treacherously murdered the complete command staff of the Greek
10.000 men unit, in the very middle of Persia. Xenophon took over the command and succeeded to
bring safely Greeks to their homeland. If we have in mind that the paramilitary leaders were mostly
gangsters and even common criminals, we should not wonder about the atrocities which took place
at KiM fighting from 1997 onwards. If we accept that the clashes started with ambushes of KLA,
one would not expect a cavalier combat afterwards. This sort of fighting was common on Balkan
for centuries. Highwaymen did it to trade caravans, Dinaroids to the Ottoman tax collecting or
other regular state forces. Serbian Chetniks and Bulgarian units did it on the (Skopje) Macedonian
soil, which was before Balkan wars another “disputed land” in the region. During the WWII it was
a common practice of Yugoslav guerrillas, Mihailović’s Četniks and Tito’s partisans alike. And
finally, the recent fighting in BiH exposed the best the ugly face of the “warfare” of the loosely
controlled (or uncontrolled) mobile units. It was one of atrocities, that committed at Sarajevo street
Vase Miskina, which was decisive in deciding to end the “war” at any cost, what brought the sides

1
This was not a Shiptar invention, however. After “wars’ in Croatia and BiH many of paramilitaries from Serbia
became MP at the Serbian Assembly, gaining thus MP immunity, as the case of the gangster and war criminal Arkan
illustrates.
 146

involved, better to say their leaders, from the inside and outside alike, to Dayton in 1995. Since the
later incident proved paradigmatic, we describe it in some more detail.
In fact, we can not do it properly, and that’s the crux of matter in affairs like this. The fact
everybody acknowledges was that a shall fell on a crowd queuing for bread in the Sarajevo street
Vase Miskina. Many people were killed and wounded. Muslims claimed that the shell was fired
from the Bosnian Serbs’ side (who kept the unfortunate city besieged for three years), whereas
Serbs 1 denied it claiming in their turn that it were Muslims themselves who did it as a provocation.
The latter assertions have been accepted even by some international observers (or commentators),
but generally Muslim claims have gained the international support. This point illustrates how much
the propaganda interferes with the facts, when the sides in clash do not enjoy the trust of the
external world. The KiM affairs will expose this point even more clearly, as we are going to see.
The accident helped the IC concerned to decide to intervene, and this has been the only matter
which really matters. It was obvious that the details, as to who did the misdeed, were of no crucial
value concerning the decision to stop the fighting, though the ethos involved remains to be
clarified.
Another point to be made concerns the question of the completeness of evidence, not only from the
facts details, but the general setting for the accidents considered. More precisely, we refer to the
prehistory of the atrocities reported. As revealed at Hague Tribunal, the indictments have been
concentrated on the very atrocities, without going into the question what provoked them. Here we
encounter a “hidden conspiracy” between the prosecution and the accused. Namely, the latter never
raise the question of prehistory of the alleged massacres. Why? Their strategy for defending
themselves has always been to deny their direct involvements in the event. This stratagem rests on
the “0 – 1” logic: defendant hopes to be relieved completely from the guilt, unless he is sentenced
maximally. The logic is simple: by introducing extenuating circumstances, he admits implicitly his
involvement in the affair. On the other hand, patriotic (sic) supporters, usually state background
sectors, do discuss these “extenuating circumstances”, but the latter are aimed at the “patriotic
supporters”, rather than at the IC and the Tribunal. This “all or nothing” stratagem will appear very
much present when the picture of the KiM fighting emerges on the IC scene.
Another paradigmatic case for illustrating the “undeclared wars” is that of (in)famous massacre at
Srebrenica in 1995. It illustrates several important points to be made. First, the prehistory effect.
The Srebrenica enclave was considered untenable by the military experts and gen. Morion, whose
headquarters were at Zagreb, was explicit on that point. Second, encircled Muslims used to go out
from the besieged town and plunder the neighbouring Serb villages,2 killing many people in these
raids. Third, while the military unit situated at the town was a numerous and very strong, when gen.
Mladic entered the town not a single Muslim soldier in uniform was found. The last point bears the
most profound consequences: by replacing the uniforms by the civil cloths the soldiers saved
themselves (better to say hoped to do that), but exposed their civil compatriots to the enemy’s
retaliation. As it did happen with the Srebrenica civilians, unfortunately.
Generally, no accident of the kind we just considered has proved fully cleared and understood,
neither in BiH nor on KiM. We now pass to the actual warfare on KiM in 1997/1998.

1997-1998 armed conflict

Preparations for the secession started long time before the open outbreak of the armed rebellion in
1997, 3 but in the latter years they took an explicit rebellion character. Before we follow the gradual
increase of the violence, we first make distinction between the urban and rural areas guerrilla
tactics.

1
We note we are using commonly accepted terminology that militaries engaged in BiH fighting were Muslims, Serbs
and Croats, but in fact many of “Serbs” were ethnic Montenegrins, as the case with Radovan Karadzic was.
2
This instance is, of course, linked with the first point.
3
USA was engaged in preparing it from 1993.
 147

In towns, armed actions used to be undertaken mainly during the nights. Members of KLA or
otherwise take hidden arms and go out for attacking police stations or other state institutions. In
the first phase of rebellion these guerrillas wore no uniforms and their actions had purely terrorist
character. When the NATO actions in 1999 ended and reportages on the guerrilla warfare were
made by the western journalist, one could get some taste of the character of these actions. In one of
these reports a boy of some 16/17 years described his action in Priština. He took a bomb at
midnight, sneaked to the window of a café where Serb (more precisely, from the boy’s viewpoint
non-Albanian) young people were seating and threw the bomb through the window. Then, narrates
the boy with a “mischievous smile”, after the detonation he run around the corner, bought a
hamburger at the kiosk, and when the police car arrived he calmly passed by eating his hamburger.
What one strikes the most with this exploit is the “naughty innocence” of the boy’s narrative, as if
he was watering somebody or like. It will be such an innocent behaviour of his elders in the
following demands and “negotiations” with Serbian officials which will seduce the mediators
dealing with KiM issue, as we shall see later on.
In the rural area tactics was similar at the beginning, but later, when the more massive engagements
started, KLA fighters wore uniforms. They started with night actions, and when the action was
over, before the dawn they would return home and change the uniform by the civilian one and
behaved as innocent civilians. In towns they used to go to work in the morning, after night actions.
A case in point was that of Adem Jashari, the strongman and gangster from Drenica village
Prekaz. 1 We recall that Drenica region has always been the core of Shqiptar rebellions against
Yugoslav state. Known as gangster, Jashari’s house was under the police surveillance for six
months, watching how cars depart during night and return at dawn. Tomorrow a terrorist action was
reported from the direction of the night journey.
Here is the official report about clashes with Jashari’s men: 2

Terrorist attacks in the region of Srbica, which for many months have endangered the
security of several roads, led to numerous civilian casualties, and jeopardized the
safety of citizens of all ethnicities, created a need to re-establish full control of the
roads in this area through the use of police outposts. Adem Jashari’s terrorist group
tried to interfere with this operation on February 28, attacking police patrols and
killing four, while wounding two officers. Sixteen terrorists were killed in a battle with
this group. In the early morning hours of March 5, a terrorist group attacked another
police patrol near the village of Donje Prekaze. After police returned fire, the terrorists
retreated to their base and dug in at the Jashari family farm in that village...
engagement with the terrorists lasted for 27 hours, with a total of 51 casualties.
Unfortunately, it was later established that Jashari family members were among them.
Terrorists physically prevented them from leaving the farm, despite the police
invitation. The Interior Ministry expresses regret and bitterness that these victims were
a direct consequence of cruelty and ruthlessness of Albanian terrorists. The police
could not have known how many, if any, civilians were detained by the terrorists, since
dozens of civilians did respond to the police invitation to evacuate the village. The fact
that he personally shot his nephew to prevent him from surrendering testifies to Adem
Jashari’s cruelty. Two officers lost their lives in this action, and seven were seriously
injured.
March 5: At dawn, in the village of Lausa, a group of terrorists attacks a police patrol,
wounding two officers. Reinforcements arrive and the battle moves towards Donje
Prekaze and Gornje Prekaze. Women, children and the elderly villagers are evacuated.

1
Readers may recall the episode from 70-ies which occurred in that village, as described earlier.
2
See Appendix 12.
 148

Terrorists are forced to scatter, carrying off their dead and wounded into the nearby
woods. Two officers are killed and four injured. Twenty terrorists are killed. Eight
terrorists surrender, emerging from a well-camouflaged bunker. Three large bunkers
are discovered overall, two with medical equipment and one filled with ammunition,
weapons and demolition explosives, which also served as the command center. Among
the terrorists killed in Donji Prekaz are terrorist leader Adem Jashari (age 43) and
Rexhep Sellami (age 29). Both had been sentenced in absentia to 29 years
imprisonment.

Year 1998 was crucial for the KiM fate. It was this year when Milošević agreed to allow the
international surveyors to come to KiM, as verifiers. This mistake will prove fatal for Serbia. First,
in letting the foreign inspectors to enter the Serbian soil Milošević internationalized Serbian
internal affairs. We note here that Serbia was not for the first time in such a humiliating position in
her history. After the Sarajevo assassination in 1914, when the Austro-Hungarian prince Ferdinand
and his wife were assassinated by BiH nationalist Gavril Principe, Austro-Hungary delivered an
ultimatum to Serbia. Belgrade accepted all demands, except that the Austro-Hungarian police runs
the investigations in Serbia, since this would imply a lost of sovereignty of Serbia. As the result
Austro-Hungary attacked Serbia and the Great War started. (Serbia lost a quarter of her population
in the ensuing war.)
Before we go on with KiM issue, a parallel between 1914 and 1998 situations seems in order here.
In 1914 it was an act of terrorism committed in a foreign country, by a foreign citizen, who
happened to be a Serb. 1 Knowing now what the outcome of this Serbian refusal was, it is easy now
to be wise and consider that it would have been much better if Serbia had forgotten her national
pride and fulfilled all demands. But such a subsequent wisdom is of little help, of course. In 1998
the state of Serbia (as an institution) struggled with the internal unrests and armed violence. True,
many of those rebels were not rebels at all, by mercenaries from abroad, mainly from Albania,
USA and Germany. If one had to internationalize the KiM issue, she should have accused the
external factors for interfering Serbian internal affairs, just as Serbia herself was accused (and
sentenced) for her engagements in Croatia and BiH. Letting foreign verifiers into Serbian soil,
Belgrade have made the first step towards losing KiM. Was Milošević aware of this?
Yes and no. First, he was an optimistic politician, always expecting the most favourable (for him or
Serbia) outcome of his political acts. As a Dinaroid, his mind was sclerotic one, working on the
principle “all or nothing”. He would not bend before reality, but somehow expected that the latter
complies with his wishes. If the reality turns out different from his imagination, he would simply
turn away from it, better to say from this sector of the real world and ignore it. Second, Milošević
was not in an easy situation. He was well aware of the reputation he had before IC, after Vukovar,
Serbian Krajina Republic, Republic Serbian and nasty events ascribed to him and Serbia, rightly or
not. By allowing the IC to interfere into Serbian domestic affairs, he (semiconsciously) wanted to
compensate for the previous misdeed. Unfortunately for Serbia, his influence on the Serbian
domestic political scene was so strong that his personal misgivings were imposed as an unbearable
burden to the entire state.
What was really the purpose of those verifiers? When one sets up a commission, for example, he
prescribes the rules the latter employees, then the way the findings are verified and put into
operation and finally the possible verdicts concerning the faults when they are detected. The
official explanations have been that the verifier should observe the clashes between the state forces
and the rebels and see that the state response to the guerrilla violence is not “unproportional”. What
the latter meant was left to the judgments of the verifiers at the spot. Further, which extent of
violence exerted by rebels was tolerable from the verifiers and what would be the measures to be

1
Though the organization which organized the assassination was multiethnic, comprising Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
 149

taken if these were “unproportional” or simply intolerable? From the present day perspective, one
can contrive a model which has been designed for Serbia, doomed to be accused for violence and
inhuman behaviour.
In the situation of fighting against guerrilla forces which nobody controlled or accepted political
and humanistic responsibility, one could expect any kind and any magnitude of atrocities
committed on the spot. Within any realistic distribution of these atrocities one can always expect to
single out at least one, which fulfils the demands of “unproportional response”, as it turned out to
happen soon after the verifiers were distributed over KiM area. The Shqiptar rebels were, of course,
aware of that. What they needed was just one case of an “unproportional response”, and it was not
hard to produce among hundreds of clashes with the state forces, regular or paramilitary ones.
Hence, one would not wait long for Račak.

The martyrdom syndrome

Martyrdom as a stratagem of overpowering a superior adversary has been used by many nations,
movements, especially religious ones, etc. The most prominent case in the western world has been
that of Israelis in Palestine during the Roman rule, as described by Joseph Flavius in his capital
work Jewish War. 1 This stratagem was subsequently widely used by early Christians all over the
Roman Empire, until the final victory under the Constantine’s rule. The same tactics will prove a
very successful means for attaining prominence within the Christendom, by the so-called heretics,
many of whom became saints later on. 2 In a somewhat milder form the martyrdom stratagem has
been used by many political and social leaders, like Mahatma Ghandi. Shqiptar moderate political
leader, Ibrahim Rugova, arguing for purely political, peaceful means in attaining the secession of
KiM, appears another example of the logic: victory via suffering. He used to wear kerchief around
his neck, as a token of the “Serb strangling Shqiptars”, declaring he would take it off once the
secession has been achieved. Unfortunately his approach was overpowered by the militant rebels,
like Hashim Tachi, Haradinaj, Cheku etc. 3 He died before he would witness the victory of the rival
approach in 2008.
Before we go back to the KiM situation in 1997/8, a few words and insightful inspections into the
Flavius’ account of the Jewish martyrdom are in order.
Herod the Great, Joseph’s hero, took great efforts to uproot the criminal activities in Israel, in
particular that of the robbers. Here is an account of one of his expeditions on the matter: 4

[so] Herod willingly dismissed Silo to go to Ventidius; but he made an expedition

himself against those that lay in the caves. (310) Now these caves were in the precipices
of craggy mountains, and could not be come at from any side, since they had only some
winding pathways, very narrow, by which they got up to them; but the rock that lay on
their front had beneath valleys of a vast depth, and of an almost perpendicular declivity;
insomuch that the king was doubtful for a long time what to do, by reason of a kind of
impossibility there was of attacking the place. Yet did he at length make use of a
contrivance that was subject to the utmost hazard; (311) for he let down the most hardy
of his men in chests, and set them at the mouths of the dens. Now these men slew the
robbers and their families, and when they made resistance, they sent in fire upon them,
1
Joseph Flavius, The Jewish War, Dorset Press, New York, 1985.
2
Walter Nigg, Das Buch der Ketzer, Atremis-Verlag, Zürich
3
At Hague Tribunal process against Milošević, a Shiptar serving in the State Security Service at the time, claimed as the protected
witness K6 that KLA planned to assassinate Rugova.
4
Flavius Josephus, Complete Works, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859, p. 567.
 150

[and burned them]; and as Herod was desirous of saving some of them, he had
proclamation made, that they should come and deliver themselves up to him; but not one
of them came willingly to him; and of those that were compelled to come, many
preferred death to captivity. (312) And here a certain old man, the farther of seven
children, together with their mother, desired him to give them leave to go out, upon the
assurance an right hand that was offered them, slew them after the following manner: -
He ordered every one of them to go out, while he stood himself at the cave’s mouth, and
slew that son of his perpetually who went out. Herod was near enough to see this sight,
and his bowels of compassion were moved at it, and he stretched out his right hand to
the old man, and besought him to spare his children; (313) yet did not he relent at all
upon what he said; but over and above reproached Herod on the lowness of his descent,
and slew his wife as well as his children, and when he had thrown their dead bodies
down the precipice, he at last threw himself down after them.

As we will see this episode of the Herod’s doing “ethical cleansing” of his state, bear a strong
resemblance of the Milošević’s “ethnical cleansing” of KiM (alleged or real). We note some
characterising features of the case. First, the rabid defiance of the robbers of the highest stat
authority need not necessarily be motivated by august feelings, but the criminals may make use of
the latter as a cover. In the case of the old man just described above, his ideological, no to say
ethical, justification was the fact that the king was not a pure Jew, 1 what made the robber superior
to him. This nationalistic argument will turn decisive in the KiM disputes between the claims over
territory. Incidentally, just as Herod was quasi-Jew, Milošević was quasi-Serb (being a
Montenegrin). Incidentally also, Serbs in Serbia never used the nationalistic arguments in fighting
Milošević and his autocracy in 90-ies (see page xx Vešović).
Our hero Herod the Great is a paradigm for our next example concerning the use of the nationalistic
pathos, albeit implicitly. It concerns the myth of Massada. 2 This fortress was built by the Israeli
king as palace, close to the Dead Sea, well equipped and fortified, on a practically inaccessible top
of a mountain. At the end of the revolt against Romans (Jewish war), 73 AD, a group of the
militant wing of Zealots, sikarii, mentioned earlier, occupied the place and used it as their
stronghold. They used to make raids to the surrounding areas and rob local people, Jews and non-
Jews alike. Vespasian sent a legion there to conquer the fortress at any price. The siege lasted for
three months and after an extensive preparation to make the access to the fortress, Romans entered
the place. According to Joseph Flavius (the only source of information on the matter) they found all
defenders dead and two women with children alive. These women testified that the men
slaughtered the women and children and then committed suicide themselves, after a moving speech
of their leader Elazar Ben-Yair, on the Passover eve. 3 Those two women hid themselves and
managed to survive. In the period of founding the new state of Israel, both within the preparatory
ideological (mythological) period and during the forming of the actual state, this episode was made
a nationalistic myth, were the event was described as a paradigm of a heroic exploit, of the national
martyrdom etc. The new conscript unites used to swear on Massada their devotion to Israel and
readiness to sacrifice their life, with words: “Massada will never fall again!” When the state has
been fully established and consolidated and no real threat for her existence was imminent, the
bright side of the story was forgotten and the fact that the event referred to robbers, not to heroes,
has been let apparent. New state ideology required the sense of strength and vigour, not of passive
martyrdom. It was in this direction that some modern Israeli commentators express doubts about
Josephus’ veracity. According to them, what really happened was that Romans, upon conquering
1
His father was an Idumaean, his mother Nabatean.
2
See, e.g. http://www.dudi.tripod.com/massada.html, for a brief overview.
3
Obviously the date (real or invented) was meant to provide the act a sacrificial nature, just as 19 centuries later the
same will be ascribed to Shoah (Holocaust) by some modern interpreters.
 151

the fortress, slaughtered all inside it, and then contrived the story of the collective suicide. Joseph,
according to this interpretation, was eager to conceal the cruelty of Romans, who were his patrons
and protectors at the time he wrote his Jewish War. 1
Interestingly, when reading Massada story with the mix of heroic and criminal, one can not help
recalling the Gospels account of Jesus from Nazareth suffering and martyrdom. In fact both
accounts were written at about the same time, in 70-ies AD. But the parallel goes even further.
Massada robbers were proclaimed, though temporarily, national heroes. Jesus was, presumably,
crucified together with robbers, who flanked him on crosses at Golgotha. True, these fellow-
sufferers were described as thieves, but if anything appears realistic with this story, it is highly
improbable that common thieves would be punished in such a cruel manner.
We have dwelled in some details on these instances from Palestine history, 2 for KiM issue abounds
with the myths and martyrdom syndrome. In fact, any movement of the national emancipation, or
liberation, involves inevitably the martyrdom syndrom. On KiM we have seen how Serb and
Shqiptar martydom impulses alternating in time, depending on the circumstances. When the region
was under the Ottoman rule, it was Serbs (and Christians generally) who considered themselves
victims, while ethnic Albanians were considered the privileged people and tools of the oppressive
Muslim regime. When KiM was liberated from the Turkish occupation, the parties exchanged
sides.
From 1912 onwards, Shqiptars claimed to be oppressed by Serbian authorities, but when from 1974
KiM became practically republic, that is semi-state, it was non-Shqiptar inhabitants who felt
underrated and complained for suppression. After Milošević banished much of the KiM (and
Vojvodina) autonomy in 1989, Shqiptar population resumed their complaining against Serbian rule,
forgetting that what Milošević did was nothing but a response to the previous misuse of the KiM
autonomy. Finally, after NATO occupied KiM in 1999, under the reluctant cover of UN (sic), both
parties exchanged the sides once again. 3
How KiM region has been somehow bound to resort to the martyrdom, we saw already in the Serb
mythopoetic image of the Kosovo-battle issue and the imitatio Christi syndrome. In fact many of
the Serb allegations against Shqiptars during the KiM autonomy were at least expressed in the form
of victim-oppressor relationship, that is as martydom. As we shall see later on, Serbian politicians
continued with this trump of “eternal victims”, unlike Israelis, who finally got rid of this
humiliating approach to their political destiny. The episode with Adem Jashari resembles much the
Palestinian robbers’ issues, as mentioned above. 4

Kosovo Roshomon – the Račak case

As mentioned before, whence the KiMisue was internationalized, the case was lost for Serbia. In a
multitude of clashes and incidents, real or fictive, one inevitable encounters «crucial one», needed
for making radical decisions concerning further treatment of the issue. This case occured at the
village of Račak. The incident served for the verifier Walker as the crown proof that the Serbian
forces employed «disproportional response» to the rebels' actions. As in the »crown case» of
Markale at Sarajevo, mentioned before, the incident served as a turning point, beter to say point of
no return for deciding onfurther actioons by IC. In the Serbian oficial file one reads:

1
The original text of the book was in Greek (as other Flavius’ works were) and the influence of the Stoic philosophy on
the martyrdom interpretation of the event can not be overestimated, in this context.
2
We take the meaning of the term in its original, Herodotian sense.

3
How easy is to pass from a victim to an oppressor we witness these last decades at the Middle East.

4
The protected witness K6, mentioned above, confirmed at the Hague Tribunal the official story about Adem Jashari. In particular,
he threatened his family with killing all who try to surrender. Never-the-less K6 considered Jashari hero.
 152

Expert reports on the Markale massacre were thus hidden in the files of the UN Security
Council, just as the Finnish forensic experts’ report on Racak was hidden in the vaults of
ICTY. European Commissioner for foreign relations Chris Patten thinks that the Finnish
autopsy report according to which the “Serb forces did not commit a massacre in that
Kosovo village,” should not be made available to the public, in order to “avoid direct
interference in the ICTY’s investigation”!

So what really happened in Račak on January 15, 1999? We quote again the official report:

A routine police patrol was ambushed by the “KLA” terrorists on January 14, killing
officer Svetislav Prsic. The following day, January 15, 1999, a reinforced unit of the
Serbian police followed the terrorists’ trail and launched a successful operation that
inflicted great casualties on the terrorists. The unit had previously infiltrated the empty
KLA fortifications (capturing the terrorist guard and obtaining from him all the warning
signals), thus establishing a great advantage over the terrorists. Firing from up close,
from the well-prepared entrenchments, they prevented a group of some 40 armed
terrorists from deploying into the trenches from a nearby farmhouse, where they had
slept to avoid the cold night temperatures. However, the police could not remain in the
village due to heavy fire from terrorist positions on the nearby hills. William Walker
and Pristina district attorney Danica Maksimovic came to the village the following day.
Walker immediately made a statement (January 16, 1999): “From what I personally
saw, I do not hesitate to describe the crime as a massacre, a crime against humanity, nor
do I hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility.” This “verdict,”
before any of the experts could investigate the scene, was followed by the decision of the
U.S. government and NATO to attack the FRY.
Maksimovic’s report was completely different. However, none of the world leaders paid
it any heed. She said that a massacre of civilians in Račak was out of the question. At
first, she was not even allowed to survey the scene.
Following Walker’s scenario, the dead terrorists were not buried the same day (as
Moslem custom calls for) but were dressed in civilian clothing and set on display in the
nearby mosque, in order to send the images of “massacred civilians” to the world.
Still, because of the obvious discrepancies between reports on what happened in Račak,
a “neutral” group of Finnish forensic experts was formed to conduct autopsies on the
bodies and establish if they were civilians or “KLA” combat casualties. Though the
Finnish experts’ report denies any massacre in Račak, Walker and his superiors
managed to extort a statement from their leader, Dr. Helena Ranta (probably with a
sizeable payoff), that the victims were “probably” civilians. A full report was classified –
just like the one about Markale in Sarajevo – and stored in the vaults of Secretary
Solana and General Clark. Those who ordered the criminal bombardment of Yugoslavia
made the fabricated massacre in Račak into a pretext for their already planned
aggression.
Only in early February 2001 did the Finnish experts’ report reach the ICTY. Its
conclusions were printed in Forensic Science International, (quoted by the Berliner
Zeitung of February 16, 2001), saying, among other things, that one cannot make a
conclusion that security forces massacred Albanian civilians in Račak, as Walker had
claimed.
If, at the tie the Indictment was put together, its authors could possibly have believed
Walker’s statements, they cannot continue to treat them as key evidence now that the
entire fabrication has been exposed. Cannot, that is, if they care for their reputation and
 153

integrity. Also exposed was the criminal character of U.S. Ambassador/General William
Walker.

The weak point of the report is the “lacuna” in the form of the night between January 15 and
January 16, when the dead were left without control. The explanation for withdrawing the police
units from the village because of the intense fire of KLA from nearby hills appears plausible, but
other explanations come to mind too. Could the policemen retaliate for their dead and wounded,
killing civilians? On the other hand why would they leave unprotected these corps, as proofs of the
massacre, since the arrival of verifiers was to be expected as imminent? Did KLA take advantage
of the absence of the police to gather all those killed in action and deposit them into that gully?
Were all those exposed bodies civilian victims or KLA fighters reclothed into civilians? If all those
killed were villagers from Račak, how that happened that no local villager was witness of the
alleged massacre?
At Hague Tribunal Milošević skillfully exposed the weak points of the prosecutor’s model of the
event and demonstrated the unreliable nature of the testifiers brought to Court by the prosecutor. In
particular he pointed out the unnatural positions of many of corps, which could not be attained if
the victims were executed on the spot. On the other hand, no proof has been offered that the victims
were killed first, and then reclothed into civilian clothes. But equally strange was the fact that
almost no cartridge shells were found on the spot, making the case for massacre very improbable.
It is very strange also that no testimony from the side of the police unit has been asked and offered.
It seems that the syndrome “all of nothing”, described earlier concerning the testimonies of the
accused at various courts, local and Hague alike, has been adopted. In the absence of reliable
records, we take liberty to offer a plausible explanation of the event.
The fighting which developed that day engaged not only KLA (who probably had nothing to do
with Račak, as usually those KLA units came from afar, possibly from Albania), but the local
villagers. We encountered similar case in that episode at village Prekazi (Drenica), when a Shqiptar
criminal was to be arrested in 1970-ies. Another case was that concerning Adem Jashari, mentioned
above, too. As stressed many times, in the affairs concerning guerilla fighting, there is no essential
difference between fighters in uniforms and in civilian clothes. Civilians at KiM, Shqiptar and non-
Shqiptar alike, are well equipped with arms. In fact, Shqiptar villages needed no support from KLA
to resist police actions. Hence, when the police unite withdraw, all villagers killed were collected
and deposited, whereas the KLA dead were taken along outside Račak.
We have dwelled on this case more in order to show how difficult it was to get a reliable record in
general and in this particular case especially. But it was on this case that William Walker contrived
his accusations, with the far reaching consequences. On the other hand it appears obvious from the
above details that the general decision concerning KiM issue was already made and the Račak was
just waited to corroborate the USA political attitude. The prompt verdict William Walker made
after a glimpse at the corps corroborates the feelings of a prefabricated verdict.1
According to statistics of the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP), between February and June 1998
there were 409 registered KLA attacks in KiM – over 80 attacks per month, an average of about
three per day. It is worth pointing out that of those attacks, 261 of them targeted civilians and
civilian buildings. In this period, the rebels killed 35 and injured 50 non-Albanians (29 seriously);
143 of their victims were non-Serbs (among them 26 killed and 43 injured Albanians). Serbian
police forces were targets of 148 attacks, suffering 18 dead and 67 injured. An eye-opener is that
the KLA killed more Albanians (26) than Serbian police (18), with a similar proportion among the
injured.

From Rambouillet to Paris

1
The case of the Anglo-American aggression on Iraq amply illustrates the point.
 154

When the Serbian authorities realized what was the real role of the “verifiers”, they decided to
banish them from SRJ. But the damage was done and it will prove an unrepearable one. The
invitation of the external surveyors was a bad mistake, but banishing them even worse. From then
on, the road to national disaster was paved up. Before we go on, a few words more about the logic
of rebellion seems in order. Depending on the overall situation, the tactics adopted by rebels varies
from one extreme to the other. In the case of Slovenia and Croatia secession, women and children
were used as living shield against the state army. The later consisted of all Yugoslav nationalities,
including regional ones, so that it was not expected that the soldiers would shoot the civilians, thus
protecting the rebels behind them. Situations like this used to occur during the “Alicia-like” sieges
in Croatia. Usually a local army garrison was besieged by the secessionist fighters, and the
Yugoslav army besieging them. With the powerful artillery Army could easily destroy the towns,
but declined to do that and the besieged army garrison surrendered to the rebels instead. 1 At KiM
one should distinguish two phases of the KLA tactics. The first one, before the external verifiers
were employed, the tactics was to use the civilians as shields, but in a restricted, passive manner.
Too many civilian victims would discourage the people and loose their support for the rebellion.
Contrary to that, when “verifiers” appeared, civilian victims not only were of no importance for the
domestic scene, but very “convenient” concerning the IC public. In fact, if somebody was to blame
for civilian casualties it was the very verifiers, ready to expose any civilian victim as a proof of the
Serbian cruelty etc, inviting the public media to call for the world sympathy. And it was just this
point which happened. We note in passing that Shqiptar sources and propaganda in general never
talk about Serbia and Serbian forces, but exclusively about Serbs. Interestingly, the world public
media accepted this denomination generally, depicting the whole case as an inter-national clash
(between Shqiptars and Serbs). It appears as adequate as if one would call the Falkland issue in
1982 as a clash between Englishmen (not Britons) and Argentineans.
In fact it has become clear what was in store for Serbia in a retrospective only. In view what was
going to happen in 1999 it is obvious that Serbian government could play better cards at the time,
but of course, it is a subsequent wisdom, when everybody may be a general after the battle. Never-
the-less a lesson from history would not harm Milošević, when making political decisions
concerning the relationship with the “external factors”.
At the Hague trial to Milan Milutinovic, former President of Serbia during the NATO aggression,
British military attaché John Crosland stated that the principal concern of western Allies, first of all
USA, was an overthrow of Milošević. According to him, President Bill Clinton, state secretary
Mad lain Albright and the chief negotiator Richard Holbrook made decision that the best way to
remove Milošević would be by making use of KLA. Thus, the organization which was proclaimed
terrorist at the time, was adopted as an ally under the circumstances.
In the early 1941 Yugoslavia was subjected to enormous pressure from the Hitler’s side, to sign an
alliance with Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. All responsible politicians in Yugoslavia, except the
fascist Ustashas in Croatia, were against the signing that humiliating alliance, with the consent of
the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav population. But the situation was very difficult, indeed.
Western Allies were on defense, Britain fighting her battle for survival, France defeated and
divided, USSR was a formal ally of Germany and much in the same situation as Yugoslavia,
expecting Hitler’s assault any time. All Yugoslav neighbours, except Greece, of course, were
already under the Hitler’s control, ready to join German assault. Regent Paul was trying to get the
time and postpone the crucial decision as long as possible, but had to succumb finally and
Yugoslav government signed the Triple Alliance on March 25. Next day majority of Yugoslavs
went to streets to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the move of the government. The following
night a group of high rank officers made coup d’etat and formed a new government. The new
government incorporated many of the old members, in order to convince Hitler in her good
1
What would happen in the opposite case was demonstrated at Vukovar battle, which started as fighting for the besieged army
garrison.
 155

intentions and in sticking to the signed Alliance. But alea iacta est was done. Hitler attacked
Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, without formal declaration of war, and crashed the Yugoslav army,
with the help of his vassal states around Yugoslavia and his fifth column inside the state, in 10
days.
Here we note a point which will gain its full significance very soon as the Balkan drama was
evolving. It has become evident that it was the British government who stood behind both
Yugoslav moves, that of signing the Alliance and of breaking it. It was designed as the best means
to involve Yugoslavia into the European conflict and thus ease the pressure on the Western Allies,
in particular Great Britain. In passing a value judgment on moves like that one must account for the
historical and global context of the entire situation. Great Britain was a true ally of Serbia in the
Great War, and helped much in liberating Balkan from the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, what
resulted in founding Yugoslav state. The sacrifice which was expected from Yugoslavia turned out
decisive for the final outcome of the WWII. Couple of months Hitler lost for his action against
Yugoslavia turned out instrumental for German defeat before Moscow in1941, because of the
overall delay of the planned “Barbarosa” plan.1
We have dwelled upon this instance because a similar situation arouse in 1998, with Serbia playing
the role of the former Yugoslavia, USA of Hitler’s Germany and USSR of Great Britain, mutatis
mutandis. Just as Hitler required Yugoslavia to surrender her sovereignty by signing a humiliating
alliance, which obliged Yugoslavia to allow for the unrestricted and uncontrolled transport of army
and military equipment through Yugoslavia, needed for fighting Greece and Allies in Northern
Africa, USA put Serbia before a choice: either the restricted loss of sovereignty and practically
complete loss of KiM, or the complete loss of KiM. The plan was as follows: Demanding from
Serbia the first alternative, expecting her rejection, and then taking KiM from her by force. In order
to simulate the just and formally correct procedure, they needed Shqiptar as a mock negotiating
side. Hence, a meeting was arranged at Rambouillet, with Serbians and Shqiptars participating in
mock negotiations, under the strict supervision of the Western states.
What really western allies expected from these negotiations (sic)? They were well aware that
Shqiptars rejected any negotiations with Belgrade, as the recent history clearly demonstrated.
Hence, formally, both sides were put before the choice “take or leave it”. But the choice for Serbia
was of the sort “You can’t lose more than everything”. As for Shqiptar side, they were offered with
a sure outcome, (provided they play appropriately): You don’t get everything you want at the first
instance, but since Belgrade will surely reject the agreement, you will get the rest you demand for.
When I visited in1997 the official summer residence of the French president, it was a high summer
and Rambouillet palace was bathing in July son. The very palace was closed for the visitors, but the
“tourist hordes” as Steven Hawking would term it, were all around the well maintained park. My
wheel chair could hardly move over the loose gravel and I stayed in a lane, while my wife walked
around with a couple of friends. I was watching the palace not knowing that the place will in a year
be the stage of meeting as important for Serbia as it was that at Trianon palace in 1918.
How the meeting was envisaged by the Western Allies? It is interesting to compare the
arrangement with that at Dayton in 1995. There all sides involved were gathered together, but only
Bosnian Muslims, Serbia and Croatia were taking active parts in negotiations. These sides were
represented by the actual political leaders, Alija Izetbegović from the Muslim, Slobodan Milošević
from Serbian and Franjo Tudjman from Croat sides, respectively. All sides were convinced by the
USA hosts that they are not going out from the summit before signing an agreement. Muslims,
Serbs and Croats from Bosnia were consulted, but excluded from direct negotiations. The final
agreement was imposed by the Allies and the Bosnian war was finally stopped.
Rambouillet was preceded by a meeting of the so-called Contact Group in London, (January 29,
1999), which had previously discussed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, though lacking any

1
There have been some other interpretations concerning the real cause of that delay, but we can not dwell here on it.
 156

mandate to do so. Acting on behalf of the IC, this soi-disant organization created the list of ten
principles for resolving the crisis in Kosovo-Metohija:

Contact Group Non-negotiable Principles/Basic Elements, 30 January 1999

General elements
• Necessity of immediate end of violence and respect for a cease-fire
• Peaceful solution through dialogue
• Interim agreement: a mechanism for a final settlement after an interim period of three years
• No unilateral change of interim status
• Territorial integrity of the FRY and neighbouring countries
• Protection of the rights of members of all national communities (preservation of identity,
language and education; special protection for their religious institutions)
• Free and fair elections in Kosovo (municipal and Kosovo-wide) under supervision of the
OSCE
• Neither party shall prosecute anyone for crimes related to the Kosovo conflict (exceptions:
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international law)
• Amnesty and release of political prisoners
• International involvement and full co-operation by the parties concerning implementation

Governance in Kosovo
• People of Kosovo to be self-governed by democratically accountable Kosovo institutions
• High degree of self-governance realized through own legislative, executive and judiciary
bodies (with authority over, inter alia, taxes, financing, police, economic development, judicial
system, health care, education and culture (subject to the rights of the members of national
communities), communications, roads and transport, protection of the environment
• Legislative: Assembly
• Executive: President of Kosovo, Government, Administrative bodies
• Judiciary: Kosovo court system
• Clear definition of competencies at communal level
• Members of all national communities to be fairly represented at all levels of administration
and elected government
• Local police representative of ethnic make-up with coordination on Kosovo level
• Harmonisation of Serbian and Federal legal frameworks with Kosovo interim agreement
• Kosovo consent required inter alia for changes to borders and declaration of martial law.

The formulation of the above non-negotiable points deserves serious attention. The very term non-
negotiable puts formally both sides into a passive, even humiliating position. But in fact this
arrogant attitude refers only to Belgrade side. The very fact that both sides are treated on equal
footing indicates that the final solution will favour the rebellious province. It has the form of an
arbitrage between two states in war, not a help to solving problems a sovereign state has with a part
of her territory. Even by mere considering such an ultimatum-like propositions Serbia would
renounce her sovereignty. And she not only did it, but accepted the ultimatum. Why?
The tacit official explanation was that the government wanted to save the nation from the
threatening NATO aggression. If it was a real rationale, it was wrong. It was obvious that Serbia
had no choice, as Czecko-Slovakia had no choice before the Hitler’s demands. By accepting
humiliating conditions, one anticipates his total defeat. As after Ruhr and Anschluss it was obvious
that Sudetian Germans were a mere excuse for further aggression. After General Walker and
Račak, Contact group was just another step towards the final solution – KiM secession.
Chamberlain did not (want to) realize that (unlike Churchill), Milošević perhaps had no illusions,
but under the pressure of the previous misdeeds, both inside and outside Serbia, we mentioned
 157

above, he thought such an gesture would provide him with good excuse for the following
anticipated disasters for Serbia.
Majority of the above points were already part of the KiM autonomy before Milošević abolished it.
But some points are just unacceptable, even disgusting. Consider the two last above.
• Harmonisation of Serbian and Federal legal frameworks with Kosovo interim agreement
It amounts to dictating to SRY her legal system, via imposing the rules through KiM legal
structure. Even worse – KiM now appears superior entity relative to the entire state. Normally a
part of a state adjusts its legal system to that of the hole, not vice versa.
• Kosovo consent required inter alia for changes to borders and declaration of martial law.
KiM obtains the right to block any step taken by SRY concerning the security, even her existence.
Martial law is imposed under well defined circumstances, like an attempted coup d’ etat. In
principle, KiM authorities might plan such a coup d’ etat and could prevent the state to protect
herself. When after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister of Serbia in March
2003, government declared the martial law, it prevented the coup d’ etat planed by assassins and
their political patrons, as it clearly turned out to be the case.
As we shall see in the following, the so-called Kumanovo agreement (capitulation in fact) was a
direct outcome of this fatal mistake by the SRY government. Succumbing to humiliating demands
invites for the final execution.
At Rambouillet, Shqiptar delegation included the principal political and military leaders from KiM,
including Ibrahim Rugova, but the actual chief was the KLA leader Hashim Thachi (Taqi). From
Serbian side delegation was lead by the president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, Milošević’s crony,
though the official head was Professor Ratko Marković (another Milošević crony). Te rule has been
imposed on both sides that nobody would leave the place during the negotiations, so as to prevent
both sides to consult the ”base” at home. Specifically, the intention was to prevent Milošević from
influencing the negotiations. Neither side complied strictly with the requirement and Milutinovic
visited secretly Belgrade during the meeting.
Looking in retrospect now, it seems incredible that Serbian side agreed on these humiliating
conditions. Taking an unofficial delegation (as the Shqiptar representatives were) for irresponsible
interlocutors could be somehow swallowed, but to treat representatives of a sovereign state as SRY
was, as hostages, was a sign of arrogance par excellence. And it worked. After that, everything was
possible to impose. Why Serbians from Belgrade allowed this kind of treatment? They felt well the
prehistory of the “Yugoslav wars” and bad conscious about misdeeds attributed to Serbian actors,
rightly or not. KiM was lost for Serbia not at Rabouillet, but at Vukovar, Zvornik, Knin, etc.
Though it had little to do with Serbia, the shadow of Dubrovnik, Srebrenica etc was over Serbian
heads all the time. At Rambouillet KiM rebels won the psychological war even before the
negotiations (sic) started.
One might be tempted to conclude that had the meeting taken place two years later, after
overthrowing Milošević, the final outcome would have been different. But Milošević was
overthrown by Rambouillet and NATO aggression in 1999 exactly. New political leaders who
emerged after October 5, 2000, were still in opposition, without influence on the political course of
Serbia. As for the Priština delegation, this consisted solely from Shqiptars, though the principal
claims from Priština have always been that KiM will be multiethnic, with all citizens with equal
right etc. In order to emphasize the mockery of this sort Belgrade incorporated in his delegation
”national minorities” from KiM (Roma, Muslims, Egyptians, Gorans etc). It was the same mixture
as it was contrived for the abortive negotiation at Priština a few years ago and in both cases it
turned out pathetically naïve. In fact, even worse than that – it was counter-productive. By trying to
play on the all-ethnicity state, Belgrade even more exposed the entire issue as inter-ethnical
conflict. This was an expected outcome of the structure of Belgrade ruling establishment, which
reflected well in the content of the Belgrade delegation (apart from the mock minorities members)
– all members, except Milan Milutinovic, were Milošević’s Dinaroids.
 158

In fact one could hardly call this meeting negotiation at all. Both delegations were separated all the
time at two rooms and their requirements, wishes and proposals used to be transmitted by the host
administration. The irrational fear of Shqiptars to face other Serbians at the table has proved
stronger than demands for the normal negotiations. But there was another, more rational, rationale
for evading facing the other side. The only chance for Shqiptar side to get what they demanded was
to avoid any argumentations. For good reasons. It would be an easy task to expose their demands to
a devastating critics, since their only argument was their hard resolution to make use of their
political claims as their political rights, as a Macedonian commentator put it (in another context).
In fact they left the entire job to their patrons, USA, more specifically to the USA state secretary,
Madeleine Albright, 1 who even did not bother to conceal her Serbophobia. 2 Serbian delegation
offered the return of the former KiM autonomy, abolished foolishly by Milošević, whereas
Shqiptars did not want to consider anything less than the secession. Since the gap turned out
unbridgeable, Western allies contrived a resolution which practically guaranteed Shqiptar demands,
but in a foreseeable perspective. Even that did not satisfy their delegation, in particular in view that
they were under great pressure from Priština not to give in to the western allies. Madeleine Albright
was furious about that and she resorted to the ultimate trump: You sign and we shall start bombing
Serbia! This was an offer which no decent Shqiptar could turn down.
At the next Paris meeting Shqiptars finally signed the agreement proposal, Belgrade did not, and
the USA steamroller was charged with fuel. USA envoys demanded from FRY practically to
surrender to NATO (that is to USA). As their envoy Nicolas Burns recalls, when he put his
demands to the Serbian president Milan Milutinović, the latter did not take it serious and suggested
that if this is what is required from FRY “then we better join NATO” . ”Look Milan, replied
Nicolas, you don’t understand – we age going to attack you!” And they did attack. But before we
begin with NATO humanitarian bombing, we first set the stage and describe the principal players.

Hostile sides
Washington
These are led by USA, who first tried to instrumentalize (with a restricted success) UN for their
political aims, and then NATO. We have discussed some of the possible motives for this American
attitude towards Serbia and Albania, including the delicate question of the Israel-USA
entanglement. As the time evolved from Rambouillet on, it has become increasingly clear that USA
have already made decision to deprive Serbia from her southern province and deliver it to
Shqiptars. This decision meant automatically the complete ethnical cleansing of KiM from all non-
Shqiptar population. From Shqiptar side it was the only ultimate solution to their problem, which
was more of the anthropo-psychological than a political nature. For Americans achieving this
Shqiptars’ goal meant that the permanent peace (sic) in the region was ensured. This assumption,
however arrogant was, was a paradigm of unrealistic optimism, as we shall see and elaborate later
on. But it fitted the (unproclaimed) slogan of USA global strategy: Better peace than justice! The
eventual awareness of Serbia that USA themselves were but a vassal state (not present in Serbia)
would not help the Serbian case, in all practical matters. The only change that would arise out of
this awareness would the exchange of the hatred towards USA for the feeling of compassion 3
Though never mentioned in the world public media, this plan will turn out to be a dress rehearsal
for the principal USA (sic) occupation – that of the absolute ethnical cleansing of Palestine from
non-Jewish element, as we shall elaborate later on. The shadow of Israel security has been over
Balkan for a long time, but nobody mentions it (at least not in public). Two points must be stressed
here in this regard. First, the complete Washington administration at the time, from Madeleine

1
Alias Marie Jana Korbelová
2
As a middle-European Jew she spent her youth in Serbia, what might explain her animosity towards Serbs.
3
The same situation will repeat with now the notorious case of Iraq, cleary revealing the pattern of the strategy of the
global military dominance, as a prerequisite for the ideological one.
 159

Albright, Richard Holbrooke, Gen. Wesley Clark, down to the Monika Lewinsky, was Jewish.
Second, not unrelated with the first point, the entire “ideological” background of the American
politics has been based on the ethnical rationale. USA officials keep on talking about Serbs and
Albanians, never of Serbia and Albania, pretending all the time the issue to be of ethnical nature,
not of political one. This is the same logic as applied to the Middle East crisis, where one keeps on
talking about Jews and Palestinians, pretending the issue to be of an intertribal conflict, thus
reducing it to the Biblical background (where Israelis enjoy an archetypal advantage).
With not too much imagination one may view the American-Jewish involvement into the Kosovo
issue as a sort of an echo from the biblical times. One may even define a Biblical Background
Radiation (BBR), as a counterpart of the well known Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation
(CMBR). Phenomenon of a people of unknown origin, unique language, stepping down from a
mountainous wild regions into fertile lowlands, which they claim to be their ancestral soil has
surely resounded in ears of Madeleine Albright and Wesley Clark as familiar biblical myth, with
Northern Albania as Judah and KiM as Israel. The entire NATO campaign was experienced by
some as an imitation of the conquest of the Promised Land by Hebrews. When Wesley Clark
boasts, after devastating raids by NATO airplanes from the 10 km height of the night sky: “They
must have felt that it was God who struck them”, 1 he was more than explicite on whom he was
imagining to represent. And when P.S.V. Blacket referred to the “Jupiter Complex, the nation of
the Allies as righteous god’s retributive thunderbolts on their wicked enemies”, 2 he almost directly
alluded to Wesley Clark’s boasting.
In fact, the entire affair resembles much the biblical narrative of Exodus. But if Clark imagined
himself God and his guided missiles and bombs as thunderbolts, who was Moses and who
Pharaoh? Those roles were assigned to Holbrook and Milošević, of course. The analogy runs up to
the final point, when the parallel fails: Hebrews did not return to the Egypt, whereas Shqiptars were
back almost immediately after their exodus to Albania and partly Macedonia. Te full analogy
would be if Hebrews returned to Egypt and then seceded with a part of Pharaoh’s land, say Nile
delta. For their troubles with Egypt, according to the biblical story, was caused by the same effect
as Shqiptars’ troubles with Serbia: due to enormous birth rate and the resulting demographic
explosion. We note that, according to Bible, Hebrew women were notorious for their easy giving
birth, without help of midwifes. Albanian women are also famous with this faculty, which appears
extraordinary with respect to the surrounding European nations. 3
Thus the KiM crisis in its most acute form, beginning with the NATO bombing Yugoslavia up to
now, appears an integral part of the application of Middle East mythology, better to say Biblical
one. Here we just recall the Shqiptar remake of the Zionist syndrome, which surely has resonated
with Israeli ideology and the corresponding feelings of their kinship at Washington and New York.
Just as Hebrews’ regained of the ancestral land, after Exodus, which was a Promised land
according to the biblical narrative, so Albanians felt entitled to regain their land, occupied by their
ancestors, Illyrs, according to their recent national mythology. And just as in the first case there is
no archeological, historical or any other record of the presence of Hebrew ancestors in Palestine
before the time of Saul, 4 there is not a single artifact which would testify a presence of Albanian
ancestors on KiM (or any other Balkan region) before the Slavs arrived in 7th century.
In a recent TV reportage from Georgia Michael Wood tells us that prior to his visit to this
mountainous Caucasus country, he was advised to observe strictly some local rules, otherwise he

1
See the citation on page 125 xx, from J. Caroll, Constantine’s Sword, p. 254.
2
Ibid
3
This peculiarity may be taken as another proof that the ancestors of Albanians came to South Europe from a remote
region
4
See, e.g. I. Finkelstein, N. A. Silberman, The Bible Unearthed, The Free Press, New York, 2001.
.
 160

would run into troubles. First, he was advised not to look at his interlocutor’s eyes too long. And
not to look at women at all. And not to display a gun or any other weapon, for this would be
considered a straight threat to the others. He then observes that the region has been densely
populated by private towers/castles, which were built up to protect, not the region from the
outsiders, but the neighbours from each other. When one listens to this story, one immediately
recalls the North-Albanian Dinaric people and their customs. Indeed, as some anthropologists,
linguists and historians claim, the modern Balkan Albanians came from Caucasus.

Belgrade
Yes, the role of Belgrade politicians (sic) in ruining the Serbia, especially concerning KiM issue,
can not be overestimated. These contributions to the devastation of Serbia can be divided into two
principal categories: Intentional and naïve (and there are other terms).

The curse of naivety. Belgrade officials keep on claiming two main stands about KiM: First, it is an
integral part of the state of Serbia, and second, Serbia will do everything to protect Serbs on KiM.
That these two claims stand in appalling contradiction never occurred in the heads of these people.
They first announce their devotion to the right of all citizens, irrespective of …, and then ignore all
except Serbs. How is it possible? The answer lies in the ethnical origin of Belgrade contemporary
politicians, better to say rulers. They come predominantly from the Dinaric highlands, where the
social structure and ethos still retains the principal features of the traditional society. To them, KiM
issue is not an internal affair of Serbia, but the clash between Serbs and the rest of Serbian
population. It should be noted that this applies not only to KiM, but to other regions of Serbia, in
particular to Vojvodina, an ethnical mix par excellence. A notorious case was that of the Vojislav
Šešelj, the leader of the nationalistic (sic) party (sic) Serb (not Serbian!) Radical Party (SRP).
When visiting a town Kovačica in Banat (Vojvodina), populated almost entirely by Slovaks (who
settled down there two centuries ago), he sent a message from the local radio station: “We shall
give Hungarians a sandwich and to Slovaks two sandwiches …!” 1 Enraged local people surrounded
the radio station ready to lynch the rogue, and he managed to escape by the extensive use of his
numerous bodyguard suites. Reader might wonder who is here naïve, politicians or the author, but
we shall not dwell on it here.
If the above classification may be put to question, the following is surely an outstanding example
of stupidity. It has been the rule since the first unrests on KiM started, with Shqiptar demands for
the republic, to term these demands as irredentist ones. It took a long time before somebody
explained the essence of the term. KiM has never been a part of Albania and the term irredentism,
originating from the Italian struggle for unification in 19th century, under the leading role of
Piemont, was shear nonsense. Unfortunately, even more than that. Calling the rebellious population
irredentists was clear playing cards into their hands. 2
That the stupidity of some politicians has no limits we witness even today, listening to the fierce
opposition of Belgrade to the Shqiptar drive for independence. Instead to term the move as a clear
case of secession, what it actually is, they accuse the secessionists of having a wrong impulse for
independence. Serbians themselves strove for independence for centuries, until they fought it up in
19th century. Independence sounds sympathetically to any ear, unlike secession. In particular, to
USA citizens, who are well aware of the civil war in 18-thies (Secessionist war), secession will
well resonate with their patriotic feelings.
Belgrade officials never raised the issue of the KiM overpopulation as the real cause of the
rebellious feelings of the local population. In particular the problem of the demographic explosion
has been considered as a taboo, exactly what Shqiptar politicians wanted. With these failures and
1
The difference in numbers makes allusion to the distance from Vojvodina to Hungary and Slovakia, respectively.
2
True, this term was used by Shiptar political leaders in 1970-thies, like Mahmut Bacali, while criticizing (sic) the
movement behind the term.
 161

guffs one justly wonders whose interests those politicians are really protecting. In fact if the term
naivety is to be applied, it should refer to the ordinary Serbian citizens, who do not see what is
going on around them.

Obstruction.
If the above considerations of the failures of Belgrade officials to appreciate the nature of the KiM
issue and apply proper means to protect the interests of the state they are supposed to lead, the
following instances clearly point to the case of deliberate destruction of Serbia. In 1998 Serb
Radical Party (SRP) joined Milošević government. After the fierce fighting with Milošević and his
regime, Šešelj finally succeeded in his efforts to come to power at any rate. The tactic was as
simple as follows. By compromising Serbia within the Yugoslav decay affairs, he forced Milošević
to reconsider his attitude toward SRS. When the Bosnian war was going on and Serbia was accused
of interfering with their internal affairs, SRS Federal MPs would demonstrate their own
engagements in Bosnia, as volunteers from Serbia, armed and equipped by the official army
sectors. All in front of the TV cameras, so that the entire world can see that Serbia is involved in
the affair. Since those interventions of SRS MPs were mostly out of the context of the current
parliament discussions, it was clear they were deliberate compromises of the state and thus a sheer
blackmail. Attacking at the same time unscrupulously his former oppositional partners, like
Democratic Party, lead by Zoran Djindjic, he offered to Milošević a tacit deal: You let me share
with you the power (that is your dictatorship) and I shall stop attacking you and compromising
Serbia, and I shall in addition help you to cope with the opposition. The pressure on Milošević was
not rhetorical, even not political one, but it was literary a series of brutal, primitive physical attacks.
SRS leading MPs used to pour water on heads of the Federal assembly chairmen, or to spit at him
during meetings, etc. Finally, Milošević gave in and let the SRS enter the government. The deal
was something like this: “OK, I will let you join us, but you should not fancy you will share really
the power. You may insult, you may steal, and you may cheat (but not as much as we are doing it).
You may spit at your former oppositional partners and you will be tolerated for the time being.”1
For the time being. But Šešelj wanted the power just for himself and not just for the time being.
The first thing he did as the vice-premier was to silent the public media, by imposing severe
penalties for articles which criticized the government and ruling parties officials. Next move was to
abolish the University autonomy, the fist such a case in the one-and-half century history of
Belgrade University, by abolishing the right of the University to elect the dean and the right of
faculties to elect deans and their stuff by themselves. The reason for this move was that Šešelj tried
desperately to be elected at a number of the Belgrade faculties, for the full professorship, although
he did not have a single scientific paper published in his field. The first outcome of this abolition
was that Milošević’s crony Jagoš Purić, who himself tried two times unsuccessfully to become
dean, was appointed to this position by the government. Then Šešelj quickly followed by
appointing himself to the full professor position at the faculty of law. 2
While the tension about the imminent NATO attack was rising and Serbian citizens waited
frustrated before the approaching the danger they could not avert, Šešelj, in the capacity of the
vice-premier, called, in front of TV cameras, president of USA, Bill Clinton, “that perverse
maniac”, referring to the infamous affair with Monika Lewinsky. We now turn to this issue, not
because it is of a great importance by itself, but since it sheds some light on the entire entanglement
around the Kosovo issue.

1
An attentive reader will notice the similarity of Šešelj’s tactics with that used by Hitler before coming to power.
Indeed, Šešelj studied Hitler’s carrier carefully (unlike his adversaries, in Serbia and elsewhere), and his MSc thesis
was dedicated to the fascist tactics.
2
When Milošević was overthrown in October 2000, Purić resigned, and Šešelj’s election was canceled, as unlawful.
(Šešelj threatened the minister of education, Professor Gašo Knežević, to have him killed.)
 162

In assessing the meaning and importance of the case, we go back to the infamous Nixon affair,
which resulted in his impeachment, the only one in the history of USA. Frankly speaking,
Europeans never appreciated fully the point and wondered why the president had to be dismissed.
The only positive aspect of the entire affair was the demonstration of the working of the mutual
independence of the three pillars of the modern democratic states: legislative, juridical and
executive sectors. The case of Bill Clinton turned equally unfathomable for the European watchers,
for many reasons. President first declined to admit his affair with a low-rank White House
secretary, Monica Lewinsky, than admitted he had sex with her, and finally found it convenient to
reduce the affair to an oral sex. If the first two instances were unacceptable, the third one appeared
abominable. After the confession, one rightly expected Clinton to abdicate. Since he did not, the
next step expected was that the impeachment would follow. It failed to happen. Why?
The answer lies in the structure of the USA electoral system and the distribution of the financial
power in the state. Jewish community in USA constitutes 1.7 % of the overall population, but
provides 30 % of the financial support to the Democratic Party, for instance. That is why Clinton
administration turned out almost completely Jewish. Of course, the president can not be Jewish, for
the reason one need not explain. This is not a handicap to the Jewish community, on the contrary.
President must rely on the government members, and thus has little choice to make by himself. He
takes, on the other hand, full responsibility for the government decisions. In fact, the president
appears little but a puppet in the hands of powerful financial and military lobbies. By passing
through that humiliating affair, Bill Clinton was even more vulnerable and put in a really inferior
position. His cooperativeness after that affair was expected to be absolute. And it was. Having in
mind what has been just said, it is tempting to consider the possibility that the entire affair was a set
up, in particular considering the race of Monika Lewinsky. But we shall not dwell on it here, and
we return to our hero, Vojislav Šešelj.
His cynical comment, made at “the right place, at the right time” could not fail to invite the most
powerful (and most arrogant) power in the world to smash Yugoslavia, that is Serbia. And it did
not. But just as Clinton affair called for an explanation, so does this Shehelj’s scandalous
behaviour. What was the point?
Šešelj has come as an intruder from Bosnia, and has never been accepted by the Serbian society, for
his primitive manners and scandalous behaviour, his demagogy and “Serbing” aggressively, his
treacherous character and unscrupulous attacks ad hominem on everybody whom he considers a
convenient target at the moment. Since the most prosperous targets appear the people from the
middle and higher class of Serbian society, this continuous series of raids could not fail to attract
the bottom of the Serbian society pyramid. The latter consists mainly from the society losers,
including Roma, ijekavic immigrants/refugees, grey economy criminals, etc. The latter find it
convenient to have political criminals at the head of the state, whereas the society losers find an
emotive satisfaction in watching how SRP people spit at the upper part of the society. However,
with supporters like these Šešelj could not hope to achieve his goal – the total power, by legal
means. His only chance has been to destroy Serbia sufficiently, so that in the social turmoil, when
the cards are shuffled again, he seizes the power by a brutal force. Hence, what he needed was a
devastated state, as the principal prerequisite to his ascend. His slogan has been therefore: The
worse, the better. It was exactly the rationale for Hitler’s stratagem in Germany, devastated and
frustrated after the Great War. Šešelj has copiously studied Hitler’s career and fascism in general.
But, unlike his great hero, Šešelj had to create postwar situation himself, that is to initiate the war
in Yugoslavia. Fortunately for him, he was not alone with this problem and he found very
convenient that Milošević undertook the same task. After the Dayton agreement Serbia came out
devastated indeed, but not sufficiently for Šešelj’s purpose. First of all, Milošević survived and was
still a formidable adversary. As we saw above, Šešelj managed to force Milošević to accept him as
 163

a partner, at least formally. But fortune has something more in store for the imposter from
Batajnica, 1 KiM. Soon, an informal axes Priština-Batajnica will become operative, as we shall see.
Engagement of Serbia, under Milošević rule in other Yugoslav republics affairs, was a very
convenient rout to gaining power by Šešelj and his cronies. KiM issue was the other opportunity to
dismantle Milošević, as his principal adversary in the race for the absolute power. Both affairs
resulted in the indictment against Milošević and removing him from the Serbian political scene.
Šešelj found not only profitable to send Milošević to Hague, but even followed him there in order
to prevent him to make use of the Tribunal for raising his political influence in Serbia. His
testifying “in favour of Milošević” was a clear case of disservice. In fact, both Milošević and
Šešelj did not address the Court at all, but made use of the process for strengthening their political
influence in Serbia. To an uninformed watcher, Šešelj’s behaviour while testifying ”in favour of
Milošević” looked suicidal indeed. Whenever Indictment charged Milošević for some misdeed in
Croatia or BiH, Šešelj would declare that Milošević was innocent in that matter and it was his
followers who did it in fact. Keeping on mentioning he was Serb, concerned with the fate of Serbia
etc, he would send message to Serbian Serbs: I am the true Serb, ready to scarify myself for your
good. At the same time he would ridicule the Court, in particular the prosecutors, making his
followers in Serbia enjoying in watching what he was doing abroad, that is the same what he used
to do in Serbia on the public scene. Cheap tricks like this: We announced we had 30.000 our men in
BiH, but it was only for the propaganda reason, for we had only 10.000 volunteers. In fact, they
hardly had 1.000 men, but the trick served its purpose at home at Serbia, contributing to the feeling
of his supporters about the power of SRP and the superhuman ability of their Führer.
With all experience with Šešelj one could bet if one imagines at a moment the most devastating
move concerning the welfare of Serbia, Šešelj will not fail to do that. Cheap insults as the
Lewinsky affair mention was, it was not sufficient to Šešelj to stir the storm against Serbia. In the
eve of the NATO raids, while Serbia was in the state of the worst expectations, the vice-premier
appears before TV cameras and made this remarkable declaration, at the party rally at Zemun, on
February 28, 1999:

I am warning them that if NATO bombs us or if American aggression is made,

we Serbs will suffer, but there will be no Albanians on Kosovo!

Empty rhetoric? Yes, but not futile. It is this declaration which will provide the meaning of a state
project of ethnical cleansing, when the numerous atrocities take place on KiM. The curse of Serbia
was that Albanian side had no their Šešeljs.
On the same occasion the leader of SRP declared that any neighbouring country allowing attacks
from its territory will find her in a war with Serb people. In particular he warned Macedonia that if
this happens from Macedonian territory “nothing will remain of the Macedonian state”.
In fact Šešelj is not addressing his formal addressees, but the domestic audience. The point is in the
syntagm “we Serbs”, meaning “I am Serb”. The significance of this declaration will be appreciated
soon, as we shall see later on. But here, we make a digression, which will put the entire affair in a
wider historical and political context. We return, therefore to the Vaso Čubrilović affair. Who was
Vaso Čubrilović?

Vaso Čubrilović affair

Majority of the members of the Bosnian patriotic organization ”Mlada Bosna” (Young Bosnia)
were adolescents. One of them Vaso Čubrilović (1897-1990) was 17 when Gavrilo Princip
assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June, 1914 (Vidovdan, the day of Vid, an
ancient Slavic god). Čubrilović was sentenced to 16 years of hard prison, but was released in 1918

1
A town close to Belgrade, where Šešelj lives and has his headquarters.
 164

with the collapse of Austro-Hungary and then he passed to Belgrade. He became member of the
Serbian Cultural Club, a nationalistic club acting in favour of Serbs living across river Drina (that
is supporting interests of Serbs ijekavians). In 1937 Vaso wrote a memorandum entitled “Expulsion
of Shqiptars from KiM” (see Appendix 4). Memorandum was offered to Yugoslav government,
but the text has never been used as an official document. Never-the-less, Albanian propaganda
made an extensive use of the Memorandum as the crown proof of a plan to banish Shqiptars from
KiM. Memorandum can be found on almost every Albanian web-site, with comments like: Serbian
plans for the “Final Solution of the Albanian question”, with obvious allusion on Holocaust.
Vaso Čubrilović attained a prominent position within Belgrade establishment, as a university
professor and member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art (SANU). In view of the latter,
one is entitled to wonder what was the point of Memorandum. But before we dwell on the
Memorandum, a few words of recalling some facts are in order. First, Vaso Čubrilović was a
newcomer from Bosnia, eager to establish himself into the new environment. As we have been
seeing it in many occasions, the best way to achieve this goal has always been to promote oneself
as “Great Serb”, i.e. to ”become greater Catholic than pope”. Second, as a typical Dinaroid from
Herzegovina, Vaso was ready to turn the inter-tribal disputes into the fighting for extermination.
Third, he considered Serbia Promised Land which is destined to accept his country-fellows from
across Drina River. Hence, he found it of a vital importance to clear the ground in Serbia for this
purpose. As we shall see immediately, it was exactly the same rationale for Vojislav Šešelj and his
“Serbing”.
As one could expect, the Memorandum has found it place in many other web-sites of western
Balkan countries. Croatian anti-Serbian propaganda reproduced their own version of the translation
from Serbo-Croat into English. An interested reader may find it instructive to compare both
translations, but we shall analyze briefly one from an Albanian source (see Appendix 4). We first
note that the original term Shqiptar never appears in the text, but Albanian has been used instead.
As we emphasized before, Albanians use this term, Shqiptar, by themselves, but consider it a
pejorative expression in Serbs’ mouths. This frustration has been so strong that the very veracity of
a document must be sacrificed to it. But if this can be taken as a matter of psychology, the
following systematic transliteration of the KiM homonyms appears less innocent, indeed. Namely,
all names on KiM have been quoted first in Albanian, and then in the original, Serb lettering. As if
Memorandum was offered to Tirana government, not to Belgrade one. But these are points of little
material value. We now turn to the actual content and aim of the Memorandum.
The text appears complex and multilayered. The author offers an interesting analysis of the sides
involved (better to say he would like to involve). It concerns first of all the anthropological
characteristics of Shqiptars from one side and Montenegrins and Herzegovians from the other.
Vaso does not conceal that the common characteristics of all sides are tribal features of the
traditional society. The only difference to him is that Albano-phonic and Slavo-phonic people
belong to different nations. Since Shqiptar appear disloyal to Yugoslavia and are troublemakers,
they should be eliminated from the Slav State (as simple as that!). The sincerity of the analysis and
the ensuing proposals appear chocking, indeed. (Those hypocrites who find it disgusting, rightly,
should bear in mind the present-day Palestine!). 1 Never-the-less one can hardly believe that in a
European country like Yugoslavia, such projects could be even considered. But it demonstrates the
best the difference between the Dinaric ethos and the civilization standards of the rest of
Yugoslavia. The pattern we are going to meet soon with regard to the Šešelj’s party appears like
this: one vigorous Dinaroid attains a prominent position in the Serbian state and then initiates inter-
Dinaroid clash, at the expense of the host population and country. The latter proved to be unable to
resist this kind of the imposed situation, as the recent history has testified.

1
North-American Indians should not be forgotten in this context, either.
 165

But this is not the end of the story. Vaso Čubrilović wrote a similar memorandum for the new
communist authorities in Belgrade, dated 3 November 1944. We note here that Belgrade was
liberated from German occupation on October 20, 1944, so Vaso submitted his ”Solution for the
problem of the national minorities in Serbia” only a fortnight after the liberation. We note also that
the war in Yugoslavia was still going on and was terminated in June 1945 only. Evidently, Vaso
Čubrilović had already his Memorandum ready for the new state and new communist regime. 1 He
was obviously obsessed by the ethnical cleansing, as his Dinaric ”descendant” Šešelj has been. But
one can learn something from those Memorandums.
As we know, Tito’s new communist regime pretended to be free of the nationalistic animosities and
based on the internationalism and brotherhood. In fact, this was Tito’s principal weapon against the
Royalist movement of Draža Mihailović, allegedly Serb-nationalistic. It was the principal point
used to cut off the Allies from Chetniks and thus to seize the power at the end of war. How, then,
one explains the appearance of the second Memorandum and the later career of Vaso Čubrilović?
His initiative was simply ignored, nobody took it serious. Exactly as the government of
Stojadinovic did it in 1937. It was considered as an extravagant suggestion of a Dinaric intruder,
alien to the civilized state. And they all were wrong! The impulse behind the Dinaric aggressively
appears a part of the general syndrome of xenophobia, which is but an expression of the inferiority
complex. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was motivated by a patriotic feeling, but the
common background for all the conspirators, Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim alike, was
xenophobia. It was a common response to a civilized state, with conspicuously higher cultural and
technological level. This contributed to the feeling of the external aggression to Bosnian people,
civilizational attack on a country retarded for centuries with regard to the immediate environment,
like Dalmatian coast and Croatia. In the Shqiptar case one can not speak of the feeling of inferiority
from Dinaroid side, but the general syndrome of xenophobia remains. In addition, the exposed
aggressively of Vaso Čubrilović rests on the subconscious awareness of guiltiness. Being aware he
came from the same retarded, traditional society, Vaso tried to get rid of this by getting rid of the
population with the same traditional ethos, that of KiM Shqiptars. By doing this he felt renouncing
his original background, playing role of a member of an advanced society, that of Serbia. In a
sense, this was his ticket for the new homeland. And by saying that, we come back to

Šešelj affair
The announcement of vice-premier of expulsion of Shqiptars was not an impulsive rhetoric of an
irresponsible Milošević crony. Šešelj has based his entrenchment into Serbia on “Serbing” since he
stepped onto the Serbian soil. In an interview to the state TV in 1990 (shown at his Hague trial on
April 24, 2008), he described vividly what one should do with KiM Shqiptars in order to make
their lives unsupportable in Serbia, cynically offering them emigration to Croatia and Slovenia,
since the latter expressed concerns about Shqiptars’ position in Serbia. Among other measures
Šešelj envisaged constructing coal-based energy plants on KiM in the midst of the Shqiptar densely
populated regions, 2 so that the ecological pollution makes the life there unsustainable. He also
suggested that all public buildings, like the University and schools, which were built up by the
federal (mainly Serbian) fund, should be empted from Shqiptar students and pupils and the latter
should be left to build their institutions by their own means. This proposal will acquire a real
meaning later on, when Milošević did realize them. With a difference that Government required
that Shqiptars accept the educational programmes conceived in collaboration with the relevant
institutions in Belgrade. The point was to reduce as much as possible the anti-Serbian propaganda
(alleged or real) , by which the regional educational system was contaminated. Since the local KiM
authorities refused that, they moved students and pupils out of the state buildings and continued
1
Vaso Čubrilović will hold high positions in the new regime, including the ministry of forest in the Serbian
government.
2
KiM possesses in abundance (low-quality) coal reserves to be exploited for centuries to go.
 166

their educational activities in private houses. This conditional demand for the Shqiptar use of the
state facilities makes the borderline between Šešelj’s proposals mentioned above and Milošević’s
political moves. Never-the-less Shqiptar politicians cleverly ignored this difference and claimed
that Milošević simply followed Šešelj’s plans. The latter were thus realized, albeit in an implicit
manner, as a nice disservice to the Serbian actual political rulers, with irrevocable damage to
Serbia. Šešelj’s plans were advancing well. (We recall the ”sandwich offers” to Hungarians and
Slovaks by Šešelj a few years later, mentioned earlier, which might be taken as a continuation of
ethnical cleansing threats ”by metaphorical means”).
That Shqiptars were not the only Šešelj’s target testifies his initiation and organization of banishing
citizens of Vojvodina of the Croat origin. This is known as the (in) famous Hrtkovci affair,
mentioned briefly earlier. On 7 May, 1992, Šešelj organized a rally at Hrtkovci, inhabited almost
exclusively by Croats, as autochthonous population. In his presence a local party activist red the
name of those to be banished as ”Ustashas”. From that moment on, intimidations, beatings, even
murders, began all over Vojvodina. As the results some 35-40.000 Croats left Serbia for Croatia,
fearing for their life. The most active in this persecution were the refugees/immigrants from Croatia
and BiH, who wanted to usurp Croat houses and land.
We shall come back to this demonic character many times more, but here we point out the crux of
the matter regarding his activities. Neither he nor his close followers take real actions. They simply
incite others, usually set one against the other, without ever involving themselves in risky
operations. That is why Šešelj felt comfortable by surrendering himself to the Hague Tribunal,
claiming he could be blamed for verbal offenses only. But in 1998 and 1999 Šešelj (and some other
paramilitary leaders, like Arkan), were running a parallel war on KiM. While the Belgrade
government and Army tried to suppress the rebellion and re-establish the previous state of affair,
those Dinaroids were aiming at ethnical cleansing and making room for their compatriots from
over-Drina regions. It was this parallel war that made the entire affair out of control of the central
government. Particularly so since Šešelj was the vice prime minister! In fact, his tactics resembles
more that adopted by Israelis when dealing with local Palestinians (see Appendix 1). In this respect
one may talk about axis Tudjman-Šešelj, which turned out very efficase in moving Serbs from the
over-Drina regions into Serbia.

In the eve of NATO raids

As the USA ultimatum deadline approached, the political activities became more and more hectic
and many players were engaged in resolving the imminent conflict before it starts. All relevant and
irrelevant institutions were engaged, all except UN, the only one eligible for the case at hand. USA
was aware that Security Council was not a proper instrument to carry their political demands,
because of Russian (and possibly Chinese) veto. 1 Instead, American officials pressed Russians to
stay aside and not interfere with their own duties (at least within the ethical sphere). So Madleine
Albright paid a visit to Moscow and Russian minister for foreign affairs Igor Ivanov to give up
protecting Serbian interests. The crucial “meeting” took place in a loge at Bolshoy Theatre. As the
story goes, Ivanov became very annoyed by Mrs Albright’s insistence and gave up his resistance,
exchanging the fate of Serbia for the enjoying the performance. 2
After the last attempt by Russian envoy Chernomidin to persuade Milošević to give in failed,
NATO attacks seemed inevitable. After Milošević refusal to succumb to American demands for
capitulation the war machine was put on alert. In his latest meeting with western envoys,
Milošević pledged for sympathy, making pathetic declarations like “We are small country, but we
do not want to humiliate ourselves and are ready to suffer unjust actions …”. How much the
archetypical ”mage of Serbs fighting on Kosovo Field for ”Heavenly Kingdom” played the role

1
The same USA used veto 38 times to avert UN sanctions against Israel, as we noted before.
2
Some cynic noted that it was not the first instance that matters of political importance were settled down in lo(d)ge.
 167

while Milošević made his decisions (and declarations) is hard to judge, but Kosovo myth surely
influenced the “heroic choice” between the profitable kneeling and unreasonable defying NATO
threats. (That the role of Ottoman Empire was played here by NATO might seem exaggerated, but
the parallel appears more than formal). Looking backward from the present-day situation,
declarations like this seem pathetically naïve. But Milošević’s stratagem was not irrational, as it
might look at the first sight. He relied on the world sympathy for the small weak country, as victim
of the powerful alliance, in particular USA, as the most unpopular state at the time. His
misjudgment was not of the logical, but technical nature. He imagined air raids with vast
demolition of the populated areas, thousands of dead and wounded, pictures of the innocent
civilians going around the world etc. But he turned out wrong, better to say uninformed. The
technical reality will disprove him tragically.

The Merciful Angel

A terrorist is someone who has a bomb,
but doesn’t have an airplane.
Anon.

March 23, 1999, evening I was in a taxi heading from “Beogradjanka” palace in the Belgrade
centre, to my home at Zemun, the adjoining town north from Belgrade. I delivered my last lecture
at the Alternative Academic Educational Network (AAEN), within the course” Cosmology and
Mythology”, as a part of the set of courses under the common title” History and Epistemology of
Science” I conceived for the Network. The latter was set up as a liberal college, alternative to the
state university. As mentioned above, when Šešelj abolished the university autonomy, many of the
University staff left their positions, in response to the humiliating rules imposed on the highest
academic institutions in Serbia. One of them was an obligation of signing the paper of loyalty to the
state, practically to the ruling parties. 1 One of those who chose to retire instead was professor
Milan Kurepa, from the Faculty of physics, who was very active in fighting Milošević’s regime, in
particular within the youth movement “Otpor” (Resistance), whose activities turned out
instrumental in overthrowing Milošević. It was Milan Kurepa who engaged me for participating in
AAEM. (Although my Institute of Physics was formally a part of the Belgrade University, we were
not obliged, fortunately, to sign the loyalty contract). 2 This was the last day of the AAEM activity,
for the next day the NATO ultimatum deadline expired. 3
While crossing the Belgrade largest bridge “Gazela” the driver said ”My brother in law, a colonel,
told me we have so powerful antiaircraft defence that only one of 100 airplanes will break
through”. I could not help commenting that such a confidence was based on the knowledge of our
own technical capabilities, but the advance of the other side in that matter might prove it too
optimistic. My reservation was wrong however – we turned out completely and tragically inferior
before the latest sophisticated war machine of our adversaries beyond any reasonable fear.
Tomorrow evening, at 20.00 exactly our building trembled and then the air chock from a nearby
blast followed. Our next door lady neighbour rushes into our flat very excited and proposes us to
spend the night together on alert. We did not accept the suggestion and went to bed as usually. 4 I
just did not want to believe that in the middle of the Europe, in 20th century, we had to hide and
fear, as if there was a Third World war going on. From that day on, for 78 days, every evening at
21.00 h. air-strike alarm used to warn Yugoslav citizens on the imminent attacks from the air. We

1
Rules known from the fascist dictatorship, in Italy for example, when many professors, like the famous
mathematician Vito Voltera, resigned from their posts.
2
Sadly M. Kurepa died 10 days after Milošević’s regime was wiped out from the political scene, October 5, 2000, after
a successful heart operation.
3
At 8 h p.m. exactly.
4
I could not stay in my wheelchair the whole night anyway.
 168

got used on it that when these failed to sound, we just could not get asleep. From time to time we
heard explosions of the bombs, teleguided from the height of 10 km or so, from close vicinity or far
away, reading the next day which objects were the targets and what damage was done.
Large residential buildings in the towns were supplied with the air-raid shelters, usually in the form
of cellars, but majority of them were unusable. People used to bring along improvised beds and
would spend the nights in cellars and the like shelters. In the neighbouring building there was a true
shelter, but its residents refused to share it with the residents of other buildings, included our one.
One resident from the latter, a former police worker, threatened them with the rifle, but in vain. 1
Majority of our building residents used to stay in their cellars regularly in the beginning, but
encouraged by the example of my wife and me, many of them ignored the warnings and stayed in
their flats. Unexpectedly, air raids were confined to night attacks. This was the case of the WWII
bombing, but there was a striking difference in the defence tactics of the country subjected to
bombing. Unlike WWII war rules, when there was a strict blackout, Yugoslavia in night was fully
enlightened. The reason has become clear soon.
NATO tactics for forcing Yugoslavia to surrender was based on the technological capabilities of
their war machine and on the international political situation, which had two main components: a)
USA military dominance, b) Serbia as demonized country and Serbs under Milošević as demonized
people. In retrospect, one sees that the overall stratagem was conceived in three stages:

(i) Devastation of the country by destroying the industrial, logistic and communicational system.
(ii) Occupation of the country by land forces, mainly from Albania, employing Albanian and KiM
Albanians as the infantry forces.
(iii) Forcing Yugoslavia to accept whatever she will be required of.

The first stage was conceived to be carried out with the minimum of civilian causalities. That it was
possible to achieve Yugoslavs became aware after first several days of the intensive air strikes. It
was exactly what Milošević and Yugoslav army did not expect. Who was to blame for this tragic
miscalculation has never been reveled afterwards, but this failure to appreciate the technological
advances in military affairs turned out to be instrumental for the political stubbornness of the
Yugoslav authorities, whoever these were at the time of decisions.
The laser or otherwise guided bombs and missiles were capable to hit the target with an incredible
precision. Milošević’s residence was hit into the bedroom (he was absent of course), and the private
wing of the Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, at the hotel “Yugoslavia” across the river Sava, were hit too,
with the rest of the hotel intact. Soon when this was realized, the authority decided not to impose
the blackout, since the enlightened inhabited areas were better protected from the bombs in that
way.
In order to prevent windows breaking by the air shocks, people paced the ribbons across their
windows, usually in the form of Andrea cross X, what inspired some people to call those windows
“Yugoslav Windows X”. Immediately after bombing started we start to receive e-mail letters of
compassion from our relatives and friends from abroad, who were concerned for our life. Many
colleagues physicists from allover the world sent their messages of sympathy, and consternations
regarding the brutal attacks of NATO on Yugoslavia. A young friend of us from Greece phones to
us and offers her hospitality at Aeginion, a village near Thessalonica, we visited several times on
our way to Athens. (My wife’s voice trembled while conveying the conversation). A colleague of
mine from Athens University sends his letter of sympathy with his Serbian colleagues which we
post on the poster board in the Institute. Soon a journalist from Corriere dela Sera, Mara Gergolet
sends her letter of sympathy and proposes to people in Yugoslavia to write letter of their personal
experience during the raids, since she has set up a column in the daily dedicated to NATO raids. I

1
Our building, like the other in the entire quarter, is inhabited by lower-class (second generation) Dinaroids.
 169

wrote a number of letters, as some other people here did. But we shall come back to this subject
again when talking to the war propaganda later on.

Free world media

We shall come to the Western propaganda machine later on, but here we shall mention an example
of the highly acclaimed freedom of press in the western democratic societies. Few days after
NATO aggression started, I wrote a note about the ethos lying behind the official justification of
the military action against Yugoslavia. I sent it to London Times, but it even did not border to
acknowledge the receipt of the note. Sine I forwarded the letter to friends of mine abroad, a
colleague of mine from Athens University forwarded it to Greek daily Kathimerini, which has a
part published in English, distributed together with the International Herald Tribune in Greece.
They published it immediately (see Appendix 5). Obviously, Serbia was put in an informational
vacuum, a sort of black hole, with informations going in, but not out. (As we shall see, one of the
first victims of the “free information exchange world”, will be TV tower emitter on Avala
mountain, near Belgrade, destroyed in order to prevent “Milošević’s propaganda”.)

Destruction of Yugoslavia

As mentioned above, the NATO plans were to start gradually destroying the country, starting from
military and industrial targets. Army headquarters and other buildings in towns and otherwise,
radar and anti-air defense posts, garrisons and similar targets were under attacks from the
beginning. Oil refineries and plants, strategic military objects, command posts, police stations etc
were subjected to severe raids too. The official explanations run as follows: these are objects which
have served Milošević to suppress Albanians on Kosovo and therefore must be destroyed. Ridicule
as those explanations were, it seemed they served the purpose. At least with a particular ”TV
population” of some parts of the globe. It was with the same “rationale” that many bridges were
destroyed, so as to prevent Yugoslav army to concentrate and deliver supplies to KiM forces. Thus
bridges over river Danube at Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina province, were destroyed soon
after the raids started. Rumour were spread that NATO planned to destroy Belgrade bridges too,
but the French president Jacque Chirac was strongly against and the connection of Central Serbia
with Vojvodina was not cut off. Never-the-less my wife never crossed river Sava from our Zemun
during the aggression, fearing that the bridges might be destroyed in her absence and I would be let
alone at home. Bridges were indiscriminately destroyed, without paying attention if vehicles were
crossing them or not. As we shall se later on, many trains and vehicles which happened to be
moving over bridges were hit, with much causality.

Milošević organized countermeasures so as to prevent destruction of Belgrade bridges, gathering

his supporters on the bridges during the nights. This had more a propaganda effect than practical
values, but never-the-less exposed the weird nature of the war against Serbia. Normally, one makes
use of artifacts, like shelters, to protect ”live force”, whereas here one puts people as a shield of the
material structures. Of course, since these political demonstrations of the Serbian patriotism did
not prolong during the entire bombing period, and the bridges were spared from destruction, NATO
demonstrated that he did not plan the raids. In view of the overall unreal atmosphere around the
aggression on Yugoslavia, it is the matter of taste and political attitude to interpret those “human
sacrifice” offers as a mere propaganda, defiance of the powerful enemy, or a suicidal impulse. We
mention that frequently some demonstrators during the aggression used to carry large panels with
marks of targets drawn on them, as invitations for NATO airplanes to bomb them. These
demonstrations might be considered as pathetic surrogates of those graphite’s in the ruined Berlin
 170

streets with inscriptions like: “You may kill us, but not our souls”. But as Bonaparte remarked after
his (in)famous return from Russia in 1812, “[from] grandiose to silly there is but a single step”.
Plants, military and others were systematically destroyed, but the worst situation was with oil
refineries. The largest one at Pančevo near Belgrade was bombed seven times and was burning
continuously during the raids period. With those at Novi Sad and other places, the whole Serbia
was in flames, causing an enormous ecological catastrophe. The fear was present al the time that
chemical plants might be the target too, what would results in such an ecological disaster similar to
that at Bhopal in India, since many of the plants were situated around Belgrade.
But though the Central Serbia was the target of daily raids and was burning, the principal target of
NATO bombers was KiM, where the strongest concentration of Yugoslav forces was present, for
the reasons explained earlier. Yugoslav Army (JNA) was exposed to fierce attacks from the air,
unable to protect herself from the high-technology raids. Tanks and armed vehicles were stuck to
the woods, since every appearance on the open ground was followed by an air attack in 20 minutes.
JNA managed to a great extent to mock the aggressors by making use of pneumatic tanks, 1 logs
stretching out of haystacks, mimicking concealed artillery guns, used to attract the fire from the air,
too. Generally, JNA preserved the overall majority of the weaponry and the losses of the manpower
were relatively small considering the amount of ammunitions and the number of air raids employed
during the 78 day aggression.

Reality and surreality

NATO aggression on Yugoslavia was a new experience not only for Serbia, but for the entire
world. New, hitherto unknown technology, coupled with an irrational rationale for the aggression,
produced new unprecedented psychological effects. Reality of everyday bombing going on almost
around every citizen and the confidence one will be spared from the worst, produced a surrealistic
feeling that what was going was somewhere else, on TV or like. This impression was strengthened
by the detailed TV cover of the bombing and devastations of the country at the face of the world
community. That the latter did not take any action to stop the aggression, as UN did not, further
strengthen the feeling of the overall unreality of the aggression.
The air strikes were made from the NATO air base at Avian,2 in a traditionally friendly country
Italy, what further contributed to the sense of unreality. The taking off of the airplanes heading for
Yugoslavia was shown on TV, so that Serbian citizens knew when the planes would arrive here and
discharge their “merciful burden”. 3 In order to let the Serbians became aware it was not a
manoeuvre, but real war, NATO command decided to cut off the energy supplies to the ordinary
citizens. To this end airplanes used to drop tinfoil strips on the transformation stations, which
would make shortcuts. When the local workers remove the bands, and made the station operative
again, the later were destroyed by bombs. Obviously it was better not to remove the staff and loose
the electricity supply (without loosing the ”hardware’), but it took the authorities some time to
realize the new logic of war, which the new sophisticated technology advanced.
When the Novi Sad bridges 4 were destroyed and that part of Vojvodina Bačka was cut off from
Srem and Belgrade, a joke was spread about Lala, 5 asked how he would reach from Srem to Novi
Sad.

1
Supplied from Italy before the raids, according to some officials.
2
The name curiously matches the French (as well as Serb) term for an airplane – avion, which is, in fact an
international term.
3
This refers to those who had access to the satellite or cable TV net.
4
One of them was constructed by a firm which employed Hans Albert, the elder son of Albert Einstein, whose first
wife Mileva was from Novi Sad.
5
Common nickame of the local inhabitants of Srem region, notorious for his wit and naivety.
 171

Well, I would take a bus to Belgrade, then a train from Belgrade to Bar, then a
ferryboat to Bari, then a train to Avian, and from Avian there is a plane to Novi Sad
every fifteen minutes.

The overall weird and surreal situation is best illustrated by the response of Yugoslav, in particular
Serbian population, to the aggression on their country. Those responses varied greatly according to
the ethnical designation of the Yugoslav population. Citizens of Montenegro were somewhat apart
from the rest of Yugoslavia, for understandable reason. Montenegro had already taken a distance
from Milošević and his “nationalistic great-Serb” politics. Although it was Milošević who put the
actual rulers in Montenegro into power, when he was demonized and his politics did not sell any
longer, majority of his Montenegro compatriots turned their back to him and his politics. Majority
of Montenegro Montenegrins considered the KiM issue as a purely Serbian one and tried not to be
involved into the conflict. In fact, Montenegro was at the time mainly out of Milošević control and
some of adversaries of the latter took refuge in Montenegro, like Zoran Djindjic, Vuk Drašković
and others, to save their lives, as we shall see later on. As for the common people, one should bear
in mind that out of all Montenegrins in the former Yugoslavia, one half lives in Serbia.
Montenegro came under fire never-the-less, and airfields, garrisons, infrastructure etc were subjects
to air raids. When citizens of Nikšić, an inland town, noticed that their place was spared,
complained, shouting “We are not pestilent! “ and, the story goes, Nikšić was bombed next day. In
fact, one of the most spectacular actions against the aggressors was carried out from Montenegro.
An escadrille of fighter bombers took off from a Montenegro airfield and flying at a low-level
height attacked from the sea an USA air base in Albania and destroyed a number of Apache
helicopters on the ground. 1
Now we come to the Serb part of the Serbian population at the time of NATO aggression. Their
feelings may be best described as mixed and confused. Those supporting Milošević and Šešelj
experienced the aggression as an unprovoked attack of a military organization on a sovereign
country, because the latter dared to defy the external pressure on Serbia in favour of Shqiptars. In
fact, practically only Milošević supporters took active part in the political activities corroborating
the official attitude, while those Šešelj’s followers restricted their role to making much noise and
joining paramilitaries on KiM. The internal activities of Milošević’s followers consisted in
participating in those rallies mentioned above, but the police took advantage of the war to liquidate
some of the most prominent opponents of the regime. A renowned newspaper owner and journalist,
Slavko Ćuruvija, was assassinated at the very beginning of the aggression. (Though it was clear
that it was done by the State Security service, the actual perpetrators have never been disclosed and
sentenced for that murder). One of the opposition leaders, Vuk Drashković, was the target for
assassination twice, ones in Serbia and when he found refuge in Montenegro (where his wife comes
from) he was almost killed once again. But in the most complex, indeed weird situation found
themselves those who used to fight Milošević and his regime before the Aggression. The official
propaganda made by Western Allies was that they fought Milošević, not Yugoslavia and hence the
internal opposition should have considered NATO raids as a part of a common struggle against a
dictatorship. But it was Yugoslavia which was subject to destruction, not Milošević. The NATO
logic was like killing an animal in order to relieve it from its parasites. (This weird logic will be
exposed to the extreme in the later aggression on Iraq.) In fact, the internal opposition was forced to
feel more and more patriotic than opposition, contrary to the external expectations. But the help to
those put unwillingly in such a schizophrenic state came from (whom else) Milošević.
What the dictator did during the NATO raids? He took refuge in the military shelters and never
visited spots subjected to the fierce bombing. In particular he never visited KiM, where the attacks
were the most numerous and devastating. Nor he paid visits to wounded in the hospitals, not to

1
The operation resembled much that of Israelis sudden attack on Egyptian airfields in the Six-day war in 1967.
 172

mentioned families of the aggression victims, civilian and army alike. But what made the Serbian
citizens furious was the misbehaviour of Milošević family. The latter was engaged in all sorts of
illegal activities, like smuggling, bank transactions etc, that it offended the taste of every ordinary
citizen. The behaviour of Milošević son, Marko, was particularly disgusting. Although physically
fit, he avoided serving military service. While his young compatriots were fighting at KiM,
subjected to deadly attacks from a powerful enemy, he was parading in his town Požarevac in a
camouflage uniform. As his mother Mira used to stress it before TV cameras, or to journalists, her
son was ”protecting his young family”. (Marko was recently unofficially married and had a son
with a girl of dubious previous profession.) In fact his family left Yugoslavia soon after the
beginning of the Aggression, and spent most the time abroad. But the affair with the Moscow
patriarch exceeded the worst expectation of the domestic public. Milošević invited him to visit
Belgrade during the bombing and then put Marko and his family on the same plane for Moscow
with the patriarch, using him as a live shield for his son-criminal. It was the scene in the White
Palace in Belgrade (formally the residence of Yugoslav Royal family), the official Milošević
residence, when Marko was introduced to the Patriarch which was shocking the Yugoslav public
the most, with its banality and diabolic overtones.
One may have various attitudes towards dictatorship and dictators, for there are all sorts of the
latter. Stalin had nothing with state belongings and lived by his official earnings. When his son
Jacob was the prisoner of war Josip Visarionovich did nothing to rescue him. He turned down
German official offer for release Jacob for the exchange of a number of German generals, with
words : “I do not change privates for generals!”. That is why Soviet citizens trusted Stalin despite
his cruel dictatorship and finally won the war.
Generally, situation in which Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia found herself during the NATO
aggression resembled much that described by Joseph Flavius in his Jewish Wars, 1 , more precisely
the siege of Jerusalem by Vespasian and Titus. 2 The overcrowded Jerusalem was under the brutal
control of Jewish criminals, who used to torture the unfortunate citizens, robbing their food etc.
The latter were dying of starvation and deceases, but were not allowed to leave the city. Finally
Titus conquered Jerusalem, what was interpreted by our writer as liberation from the cruel phanatic
criminal defenders. NATO was likewise ”helping liberating Yugoslavia” from Milošević, under
the formal justification of protecting KiM Shqiptars from ”Serbian oppression”. This instance
deserves further considerations, for it bears very much the burden of the current international
affairs and the international law (whatever the latter means).

The logic of foreign intervention

Whatever proclaimed aims of the external intervention, the latter must be carefully analyzed, before
passing judgments on the justifiability of the interfering into domestic affairs of a sovereign state.
In most cases these interventions were provoked, at least formally, by one of two (or both) reasons:
(i) liberation of the people from an oppressive dictators, (ii) protection of a minority of the
population from the oppression from the rest of the population. In the case of KiM crisis, it was
mainly the latter rationale, while the former was use as an additional excuse for NATO
intervention. But before we pass the judgment on the NATO intervention on Yugoslavia, a few
fords on the logic of an intervention as such seems in order.
Whether there is an oppression of the people in a country is the matter of opinion, or estimate from
an outside community or organization. Contrary to that, a military attack on a sovereign country is
a fact. This leaves plenty of room for misuse of the foreign intervention for the sake of gaining

1
J. Flavius, The Wars of the Jews in Flavius Josephus Complete works, Nelson & Sons, London, 1859, p. 543.

2
We do not take Flavius’ testifying for granted, given the circumstances of his writing about the War, but refer to the
situation as a model paradigm.
 173

control over a state, for various reasons. The Iraq case clearly illustrates the point. The same applies
for the point (ii), with the famous Hitler’s misuse of the Sudetian Germans as an excuse for
subduing Czechoslovakia. As we have seen similar paradigm was conspicuous in attempts to do the
same with Yugoslavia, specifically with Serbia.
Formally, when the conflict between the sovereignty of an independent state and the human rights
(individual or collective alike) arises, it is the interest of the stronger partner which gains the upper
hand. Formally also, if the state in question is a part of an international organization, which obliges
its members to a particular sort of behaviour in the relation with the rest of the organization, the
state must subdue itself to the common rules. In the case of FSY, the only organization which
should be invoked to interfere was UN. However, after the dissolution of YU2, the formal position
of FSY was unclear at least, since it claimed to be the legitimate successor of YU2 and thus an
automatic member of UN. The latter never denied this claim officially, tough occasionally
questioned the Yugoslav interpretation regarding the formal position on that matter. Anyway, UN
did nothing to prevent the NATO aggression on FSY, but accepted a posteriori the role of NATO
as approved by UN.
All these circumstances caught the anti-Milošević Serb population in Serbia in a schizophrenic
situation of the hatred towards the autocrat and the patriotic feeling of citizens whose county was
the subject of an unprovoked attack. The combination of these opposing feelings caused apathy of
this subpopulation, which was forced to wait that the events resolve the conflict by themselves.
The only reasonable attitude was to expose the devastating effects of the destruction of the
Yugoslavia on the particular sectors of the Yugoslav country.

The state in an undeclared war

Yugoslavia had already the tradition to be attacked without declaration of war. It happened in April
1941 when Third Reich launched a devastating assault of Yugoslavia, declaring the state of war
during the very attack, by the radio. 1 In fact, after the experience of the so-called Gulf war, when
USA attacked Iraq, and after the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq again, by the same states (with
some other states involved on the attacker’s side) it has become clear that an attacker will find
unnecessary to declare the war at all. All military operations will be considered as “preemptive
strikes”, “restricted operations”, ”humanitarian actions” etc. The world has been deprived of the
wars, but not of the ” war criminals”, as the Hague Tribunal has been demonstrating after the
”nonwars” in Yu2.
The modern military operations allow for this hypocritical interpretation of the armed attacks on
sovereign countries. No “carpet-bombs” as practiced in WW2, no nuclear bombs like those over
Japan in 1945, no massive killings and no world compassion. If a massive killing does happen, it
will be considered as “collateral damage” (whatever it may mean). We quote here some of planned
or unplanned incidents, which happened during the “humanitarian actions” by war “heroes from 10
km altitude” or like.

Cassette bombs.
On the soil of Yu2 first used by Milan Martić from Krajina republic, against Zagreb (as a
“retaliation” for Zagreb conquering the part of Krajina in the Western Slavonia), this weapon,
forbidden by the international law as targeting exclusively ”living forces”, was employed during
the NATO aggression a number of times. As we mentioned before NATO planes used to fly over
Yugoslav territory feeling safe against the air defence. But occasionally some of them were shot
down, and immediately attacks by cassette bombs were launched as retaliation against the nearby
town, as the case with market at Niš was, with many civilian victims. 2 According to NATO 1.080

1
It was the first time in history to make use of radio for such a purpose.
2
Incidentally, in an undeclared war, there is no distinction between civilians and non-civilians.
 174

cassette bombs were dropped altogether on 218 points in Serbia. What was the most humiliating
(and disgusting at the same time) was the feeling of the attacked population that they were regarded
as the clay pigeons (sitting ducks), who are supposed to remain passive and wait their fate,
determined either by the “merciful angels” or by the ”general chance”. Obviously the “life sparing
ideology” was designed for the propaganda reasons only, and if the situation requires, humans
appear as legitimate targets as any other .
To illustrate the point, we quote reports from April 6, 1999. 1 In the NATO raid on the town
Aleksinac (near Niš) 7 people were killed and 26 wounded by cassette bombs, with one quarter of
the town destroyed. Two days earlier Vranje was bombed and two people killed and a number of
them wounded. The same town was attacked a day later. At the same time rockets hit Prizren and
Gnjilane (both on KiM). During night between Monday and Tuesday many TV emitters and relays
have been rocketed, so that to a number of regions TV signals can not reach TV audience. Priština
airport “Slatina” was rocketed again, as well as caserns “Car Dušan”at Prizren. Niš, Kraljevo
environments, Kragujevac, Loznica, Jagodina, Zlatibor region etc were rocketed as well …
On April 27, 1999, casern in the centre of the town Surdulica was bombed, with 17 people
killed, 11 wounded and 300 buildings destroyed or damaged. (Thanks for asking, caserne remained
intact). Casualties like these were not much publicized at the time, either from Belgrade or NATO
sides, for different reasons. Milošević did not wont the people to be fully aware of the scale of
destruction going on , so as not to be put under pressure to succumb to the aggression, whereas to
NATO civilian casualties would spoil the image of a “pure bombing”, without people suffering.
The axis Belgrade –Washington was running nicely, with Yugoslav citizens as spectators (those
who survived, of course).

Surdulica, like many other towns in Serbia, is accustomed to massacres. Under the Bulgarian
occupation during WW1, a few thousands people were killed and thrown into a pit Duboka Dolina
(Deep Valley). When Bulgarian troupes occupied the town again, during the WW2, they
demolished the monument dedicated to the previous victims, with another contingent of civilian
victims at the suburb Masurica. On May 31, 1999 NATO finally finished the job at Surdulica, what
cost the unfortunate town another 15 dead, mainly in the local hospital.

Depleted Uranium

This substance, widely used by USA in several conflicts she was engaged in recently (Gulf War,
BiH), is strictly forbidden by the international law. It is, in fact, U238, the principal raw material
for extracting U235, used for the nuclear bombs and nuclear reactors. Since it is radioactive, this
nuclear waist appears dangerous contaminating material, not easy to get rid of. But when it was
found convenient for the military purposes, it found its way into the war arsenal. Since almost
twice as heavy as lead, it makes the bullets pass through the tank shields as a knife through butter.
During the last 60 years about 700.000 tons have been accumulated in USA. Bullets and grenades
made of this material appear cheap and the very convenient way to discard this dangerous waist to
non-American recipients.
According to NATO sources at least 10 tons of DU has been dispatched on 95 locations in Serbia
by 112 air strikes in 1999. This amount corresponds to 437 atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima.
The damaging effects on the population have been undeniably demonstrated not only on Shqiptar
and non-Shqiptar inhabitants in KiM, but in all staff which was engaged in the military presence
after the NATO occupation of KiM (mainly Italians and Germans). In 2004 an increase of 40 % of
the cancer cases has been recorded in Serbia compared with 1999. In Prizren and the surroundings
1
Incidentally, on that day in 1941 German Luftwaffe attacked Belgrade (an “open city”) early in the morning, starting
the (undeclared) war against Yugoslavia. More than 2.000 citizens were killed and about 12.000 wounded, with entire
quarters destroyed, including the National Library with hundreds thousand books and documents of invaluable value.
 175

a noticeable increase of deaths within Shqiptar population (mainly children) caused by malign
deceases has been reported too. In particular, cases with osteocancer at children below age 11 have
been recorded, undetected hitherto. The principal means of exposing to the contaminated powder is
by inhalating this radioactive dust. Since the half-life time of U238 is 4.5 billion years, those areas
in Iraq, Kuwait, BiH and KiM have been contaminated “for life”. The latent carcinogenic period
goes from 5 to 50 years. What is worst, the damaging effect affects the progeny as well and an
increase of children with body handicaps has been reported among American soldiers’ families, as
well as among other NATO staff engaged in the areas where DU was used.
We note that an Italian soldier, who was employed in Somalia and suffered from carcinoma
afterwards, charged his state for sending him to the region known to be contaminated by DU,
without proper uniform. It is interesting to note, also, that DU was never used at the KiM region
later to be used for constructing USA base, Bondsteel. Further, during their stay on KiM USA
troops are supplied by food and drinks (including water) directly from USA, never from the local
sources..
Many Shqiptars from Peć and Djakovica have fallen sick after bombardments,2 and they
appear the most frequent victims of DU, after the Italian soldiers, (who stayed at KiM the longest).
A number of the international commissions were engaged to assess the damage due to DU mainly
via UN organizations, but their reports appear either poorly publicized, or mainly formal with
evident political overtones. (We shall return to this point when talking about the propaganda war).

Collateral accidences
Understandably, KiM was the principal target of NATO air strikes in 1999. Though theoretically
the aims were strictly army and police targets, the rest of populations fell inevitably victim,
understandably too, to the ”discriminate” bombing. It has been estimated that 47% Albanians and
59% Serbs fled Kosovo in 1999. The main Shqiptar destinations were Albania and Macedonia,
from the geographical and ethnical reasons, while non-Albanian citizens fled to the rest of Serbia:
about 200.000 Serbs and 20.000 Roma (unofficially 40-50.000), 1 and Montenegro (20.000). The
estimate for the Shqiptars goes up to 640.000, but these figures should be taken with a grain of salt.
According to Vladimir Putin this figure should be reduced to 25.000 – 40.000 refugees. But
whichever figures one prefers, the massive exodus during NATO airstrikes was both evident and
understandable. The fleeng on non-Shqiptars was caused by the people desire to move out of the
war zone, whereas the rationale for Shqiptar exodus was more complex and varied. Majority of
them wanted to move out of the NATO reach too, but a part was banished by force, as we
announced before. This was done mainly by the paramilitaries, Arkan's and Šešelj's (Dinaric) units,
but local militia was not innocent in many cases. Testimonies by Shqiptar families maltreated in
some case have been recorded and widely publicised by the world media during the NATO
agression. As in the case of BiH what the public could learn about these attrocities was just the half
of the story, with the prehistory involved missing.
A part of the exile population was forced for the exodus by very KLA, for various reasons. First,
every refugee column was recorded by the world media, justifying NATO attacks and a posteriori
KLA actions in 1997/8. Second, with the civilian refugees many KLA fighters smuggled into
Albania. Third, when passing the border, male refugees capable for fighting were recruited, by
force or otherwise, to join KLA.
There was another less conspicuous motive for entering refugee columns. This motive was also
present in Croatia and BiH among Serb, Muslim and Croat population displaced or banished from
their homelands. Namely, emigration impuls has always been present among poor population in
Balkan and drifts towards the more prosperous regions have always been part of the Balkan

1
Officially, out of all those ”displaced people” 16.000 would later return to KiM, but this figure should be taken with
the grain of salt too.
 176

folklore. In the case of uprisings, rebelions or like, so called metanastatic movements, mentioned
before, have moved a large proportion of the local population towards more prosperous, secure etc
regions. In the case of Serb population, the point of attraction has always been Serbia, as discussed
earlier. The same aplies to moves from KiM into the rest of Serbia. In the cae of KiM Roma
situation appears even more transparent. Coming to Belgrade or other large urban places, the status
of refugee (or displaced) person, has been very promissing to Roma people, for they expect to be
taken care of by the state even more radically than in the normal situations. In fact a great deal of
the so-called Roma refugees from KiM are not from KiM at all, but pretend to be victims of the
NATO and Shqiptar violence. 1 Never-the-less Roma case illustrates the best the faulcity of
Shqiptar claims that they expelled non-Shqiptars as the oppresors, what in the Roma case appears
not false, but ridiculous. But for many Bosnians and Shqiptars, the status of refugee meant the
possibility their dreams to come true. The latter moved from KiM to Albania and Macedonia, and
from these countries to the West Europe, Canada, USA etc. True, refugee status is far from ideal
state somebody would like, but graually they are assimilated into the new society, which is by all
standards infinitely more desirable than their homeland. It would be certainly cynical to call this
syndrom »a collateral gain», but this effect illustrats perhaps the best the famous Bismarck's remark
at the Berlin Congress in 1878, that Balkan people produce more history than they can swallow.
After the above general remarks, some particular instances of the KiM events in 1999 will illustrate
the complexity and horrifying aspects of the time of disorder and violence.
We start with a proper colateral damage (beter to say attrocity), which drew attention of the public
media. A column of Shqiptar refugees was moving toward Albania, when an Alliance airplane
attacked it from the usual safe altitude of 10 km. Acording to the (British) pilote, he saw a couple
of vehicles in the column, what was suspicious to him and dropped guided bombs, causing a
havock on the ground. TV equipes quickly arrived and the refugees masacre was duly recorded.
The case was firmly confirmed, with the running report by the pilote (recorded by the military
reconnaissance) what was going on during the incident. The response to the incident by the
officials and victims were more than revealing the local mental complexity of the situation. While
the case was fully publicized by the Serbian media as another proof of the lack of care of Allies for
the human liifes, Shqiptars from the column (those who survived, of course) denied it was due to
an attack from the air and accused the Serbian forces for the massacre. The point was not the
misunderstanding but a deep psychological selfdenying. Those people did not want to believe
inconvenient facts, which went against the prevailing thesis that it was Serbia which was the only
cause of their misfortune. In fact, no Shqiptar ever admited that they moved from KiM because of
bombing.
Before we move to other instances of collateral damages, a few words on the war incidents seem in
order. During WW2 Allies used to bomb Yugoslav territory many times, in particular in 1943 and
1944, mainly at he request of Tito. Thus Belgrade was bombed twice, once on the very (Orthodox)
Easter day. The overall number of victims turned out to be larger than the number of Belgrade
citizens killed during the Luftwaffe airstrickes on April 6, 1941. No aimed military target was
struck during those two «friendly bombing», but this is the logic of «bombing from the sky». 2 In
fact, Tito's requests for bombing Yugoslav towns (not only Serbian ones) was multiply motivated.
Beside convincing Allies he was military strong and cooperative and the domestic public that he
was an integral part of the Alliance, another psychological point must not be ignored. It was the
western Allies who killed innocent Yugoslav civilians, what should those who survived take into
account when after the war was over, where their sympathies should go - to the West or to the
Soviet Union (that is to Tito and his partizans). Although in 1999 in the majority of cases the
Serbians fell victims of the nonintentional accidents, Milošević and his propaganda machine did
1
What explains partly the difference in number of Roma refugees quoted above.
2
My later wife with her family made a narrow escape, but the house was destroyed and the grandmother killed on the
occasion.
 177

not fail to accuse Allies for inhumanity. The next incident will illustrate the logic of war
propaganda even better.

Who killed these people? - The case of RTS station

TV media appear the most influental means for information and formation of the public opinion.
They are threfore the most important tool for supporting the oficial politics, particularly in the
situation of a state of war. The principal Serbian TV tower, situated on the top of Avala mountain
near Belgrade was one of the first targets of NATO airstrikes and was destroyed after several
attacks. Yugoslav government, of course, had auxiliary emiters available in the extraoridnary
situations and state programmes continued to present offical image of the state in an undeclared
war. The ministry of information was in hands of Šešelj's party, for good reson. Šešelj and his
close cronies were very skilful in propaganda and demagogy and it was their unscrupuulous attacks
on their adversaries, including Milošević and his party at the time, which earned them the place in
the Serbian government, as described earlier. The most agressive and cunning among them, (after
Sheshlj, of course), was the young general secretary of SRP, Alexandar Vučić, who was appointed
to be minister for information in the government. His capacity to lie has been unsurpassed until
now in Yu2, and thus in Serbia, what earned him the title of Yugoslav Goebels. Except for the very
SRP supporters he was the most hated politician in FSY (second only to Šešelj). He was able to
incite hatred towards innocent people, and as for the Yugoslav enemies like NATO, it was a piece
of cake for this demagogue, of course. Hence, no wonder Allies decided to get rid of him. The
following plan was contrived for that end. CNN arranged an interview with Serbian minister for
information, at 02.00 h local time (that is at 08.00 h pm New York time). The plan was to bomb the
Belgrade TV station during the interview. The plan was as simple as naive. Vučić did not appear in
the TV station and when at 02.15 h the spot was hit, he was awaiting around the next corner. What
was the point? When the ”war” started government gave orders that all official governmental
institutions were to be evacuated, expecting them to be the targets. The same applied to the TV
stations, in particular official ones, like RTS. But for that particular night the TV staff was ordered
to be present in the building. When the station was hit, 14 staffs were killed and many other
injured. Immediately after the attack minister Vučić appeared and TV equips recorded the
demolition of the building and suffering of the staff. But the story does not end here.
After the fall of Milošević and his regime in 2000, relatives of the staff victims raised their voices
against the TV management, who evidently disobeyed the war regulations concerning work of the
official services. The manager managed to flee away, but was finally caught hiding in Montenegro
(he was, of course, a Montenegrin) and sentenced to 10 years in prison. But interestingly enough
nobody even mentions the plot designed by Vučić and his cronies. A journalist even wrote a book
describing meticulously all details of the case, but the role of the minister in the entire affairs has
been ignored completely, though he was mentioned several times. How much cunning the entire
plan was contrived is the best illustrated by the story which was released by Šešelj’s cronies.
Namely, mother of minister Vučić Angelina was employed in the same TV station 1 and allegedly
was present in the building at the time of the air strike. Allegedly, immediately after the attack,
people started shouting ”Where is Angelina?”. The story resembles much the standard trick from
detective stories, when the suspect at the time of the murder asks his immediate surrounding what
the time was, so that he gets a perfect alibi. Hence, whenever one raises the question of the
deliberate set up, he gets the answer that Vučić would never sacrifice his own mother etc. Do
people believe it? You would not believe, but they do!
The picture of killed and wounded TV staff has gone around the world, as it was planned. Every
year on the day of the accident relatives and friends of those killed gather before the memorial plate

1
Not uncommon case of corruption in Yugoslavia
 178

in front of the TV building and protest against the Milošević regime. Nobody mentions Vučić and
nobody explains whom the title inscription on the plate WHY? is addressed to.

Strikes and counter strikes

Principal targets of NATO air strikes were command points, air defence stations and radar
equipments, garrisons, military plants and similar strategic objects. In fact any significant plant was
bombed, as of a potential military use, like the car factory at Kragujevac, metal plant at Čačak etc.
One of the most attacked targets was the central command underground headquarters at Straževica,
near Belgrade. Entrenched deeply into the hill, the centre resisted successfully systematic bombing
almost every night. Finally, Allies succeeded in destroying the command. Namely, when the
Russian envoy Victor Chernomyrdin came to Belgrade on April 22, Yugoslav anti-air defence was
switched off for the security reason. Expecting this NATO sent an F-16 fighter to follow the
Russian plane and use it as an antiradar shield. Dropping a 3 tone bomb on Straževica the airplane
destroyed finally the command place. 1
Yugoslav response was both quick and unexpected. Three days later, pilots from the airfield
Golubovci, near Podgorica (Montenegro), without knowledge and approval from the Belgrade
central command, carried out a sudden air strike on the airfield Ramas near Tirana (Albania).
American combat group “Hawk” with 24 Apache helicopters was stationed there, as well as parts
of 82 parachute division from Fort Brag, Northern Caroline. Early morning on April 26 six fighters
F-4, from the acrobatic group ”Flying stars”, flying about 3 m above the sea surface, reached the
airfield Ramas in 20 minutes. Their first concern was the training camp for KLA, destroyed by
bombs and rockets, and then American helicopters were hit. Nine “Apaches” were destroyed and
three seriously damaged.
Italian state TV reported the raid, but only once and the news was not repeated any longer. Never-
the-less Italian air force brigade general Giusepe Marani did mention the raid and praised Yugoslav
pilots. Next day, April 27, NATO ferociously attacked airfield Golubovci and destroyed all G-4
fighters. The mission was never publicized from either side, for understandable, though different
reasons. Never-the-less one of the pilots said at the decoration ceremony he was awarded for an
action in a secret mission.
The story appears as a good scenario for a war action movie, but to us here another aspect is
interesting to point out. To those acquainted with the military affairs it seems incredible such an
action could be carried out without approval of the highest authorities. It illustrates, however,
another side of the Balkan affairs. An immediate question which comes to mind is: If a regular
army may behave like this, what is to be expected from the paramilitary units, widely operating in
Yugoslavia after the beginning of her disintegration? And thus we come to the infamous ”Podujevo
incident”.

Scorpions in action – Podujevo massacre

This paramilitary unit we mentioned before was formed in BiH, and after the ”Bosnian wars” were
over, moved to Serbia (where else to?). It was incorporated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MIA) forces as an antiterrorist (sic) unit, under the command of Slobodan Medić. On March 28,
1999, four days after the NATO aggression started, five members of the unit (30-40 members),
immediately upon arriving at KiM, shot from automatic rifles 14 Shqiptar civilians (families
Bogujevci, Durici and Lugaliju), mostly women and children (five children survived), in a
courtyard of family Gashi at Podujevo, a town on the north-east of KiM, close to the KiM
administrative border. Commander of the unit Spasoje Vulević testified at the court that he arrived
upon hearing the fire and helped the wounded children to be transferred to a Priština hospital. The
unit was the same day withdrawn from KiM. One member of the incriminated group, Saša

1
M. Lazanski, “Politika”, March 24, 2007, p. 11.
 179

Cvjetan, 1 was brought to Serbian court for taking part in this crime and sentenced for a mild
sentence. The process was renewed later on and in 2007 the sentence was raised to the maximum
period of 20 years. Upon hearing the sentence, Cvjetan kicked by leg the desk of the (female)
judge, with the words “You are dead!”. 2 Incredible as it sounds, but this sort of behaviour appears
common to all ijekavian paramilitaries (and not only paramilitaries). They behave as if they did not
come to Serbia for shelter or as immigrants, but as occupiers, what they in fact are, indeed. In 2007
four other members of the group were arrested and brought to court, too. A year later the first
accused Željko Djukić was brought to court, but he denied any involvement in the massacre, as
expected. (At a trial at Belgrade court in June 2009 three members of the Scorpions unit were
sentenced to the maximum punishment of 20 year prison and one to 15 years.)
As in other cases we met before, all members of the group denied their taking part in the event. We
thus do not know what provoked such a bestial behaviour, for it is hard to imagine that it “just
happened”. The system “0/1” , without details of the story, appears universally operative when this
sort of crime is involved.
We mentioned the massacre done by a British jetfighter on a moving column of Shqiptars. One
may interpret such an assault as a collateral damage, as it has been adopted by the Allies media.
But one may go beyond the obvious picture and contemplate the possibility that it was a planned
operation, aimed at giving publicity to the case of the refugees, as part of an alleged ethnical
cleansing project. The touching scenes of massacred civilians, with the ”collateral damage”
explanation, testify the cruelty of the conflict, with ensured “Ideological background” that it all
was caused by Milošević regime and, albeit indirectly, by (Serbian) Serbs. But even if one adopts
the official Western interpretation in that particular case, how one can explain the “accident” which
happened with (international) train, passing through the Grdelička Gorge, along the South Morava
river, by plane daylight. It was attacked by NATO airplanes, destroyed while crossing the river by a
bridge with many passengers killed and wounded.. The only explanation might be the possibility
that it was the bridge which was the target and that the train found itself at the wrong place at the
wrong time. Unfortunately, even with such an explanation those killed victims would not feel better
indeed.

On May 5, 1999 a bus liner between Djakovica and Podgorica, was attacked by NATO bombers,
between Peć and Rožaje, around 11.50 am. At least 17 passengers lost their life after two hours
bombardment by rockets and cassette bombs. Twenty-three passengers were wounded, 23 badly,
including women and children. Two policemen who arrived to help were wounded two, during the
second wave of raid. A car which was moving in front of the bus was hit and burnt together with
the passengers. How to explain such an attack? By a disinformation? Or as a military exercise, with
vehicles as a suitable moving sitting ducks?

The following accident bears much the mixture of the politics and warfare. One night the Chinese
embassy at Belgrade quarters New Belgrade, was rocketed and the building badly damaged with a
number of the Chinese staff killed and wounded. Rumour went through the Belgrade that the
building was hiding TV station “Košava” (owned by Milošević’s daughter, detested even by
Milošević’s supporters) and that it was the reason the embassy was hit. Chinese government was
furious and made a severe protest to USA, who apologized, with the “explanation” that it was done
by mistake. Allegedly, the pilots had an obsolete map of the city, so that they were unaware of the
function of the hit building (sic). Of course, it was clear that nobody would swallow such a lie, but
this was just another exercise of the supremacy of the superpower. USA compensated the material
damage, of course, but the exact deal was never revealed, just as the case with the Kennedy –
1
Born at Benkovac in western Herzegovina.
2
Incidentally, this episode explains the best why almost all judges presiding criminal courts in Serbia happen to be
female.
 180

Hruschtchov deal during the Cuban crisis in 1962 was. The massage sent to China was to show
who was the boss on this globe, whereas Milošević was expected to realize there was nobody in
the world he could rely on.
Of course FRY was densely packed by NATO, more precisely USA, informers. Even the slightest
move of military vehicles, for instance, was reported and the air attack followed immediately. The
markers for locating the air strikes targets were dropped from the air, and these were removed after
the raids were over. (Rumours were spread in Serbia it was Serbs from Republica Srpska who
collected those markers for USA forces.)

The massacre at Suva Reka 1

This village near Prizren town at Metohija was the place where a massacre of 48 Shqiptar civilians
took place in March 1999. According to a witness from the Special unit from Nil, at the trial at
Belgrade in February, 2007, the whole area of the Prizren region was after the beginning of NATO
raids full of military units and a chaotic situation prevented a strict control of what was going on in
this area. According to him a large number of UKL fighters were present within the region Suva
Reka-Orahovac-Mališevo-Prizren. The witness declared he heard about massacre for the first time
following the Milošević trial at Hague. At the time he saw long columns of Shqiptars moving from
Djakovica, Suva Reka and Prizren. When asked why they were moving, some of the refugees did
not respond, some said it was because of bombardments, and some because they were ordered to do
so. At the trial at Belgrade (April 2009) seven members of a “special police unit” are being
prosecuted for that massacre)

Propaganda and meta-propaganda

Traditional truth is that it is the truth which is the first victim in a war. NATO aggression on
Yugoslavia was no exception in this respect. The propaganda war follows its own logic and it is
necessary to make a few preliminary remarks before starting the actual situation in 1999.
Milošević and his regime were notorious for making use of propaganda for his own use. At least it
was the image of Serbian regime at the time. But this image was grossly simplified. In fact,
whatever was said for his propaganda refers to the state-owned media, in particular TV. But in
Serbia there were numerous private and local TV stations which were out of the state control. The
situation with press was even more favourable, since there was no official paper, except for the
party-owned ones. Radio stations were spared from daily politics and they could be ignored in this
context. Generally, there was a freedom of expression during Milošević era, in particular
comparing with the time of Josip Broz Tito, when the control was absolute and strict. In fact,
Milošević adopted the famous dictum of Frederick the Great ” I have made a deal with my subjects
- they may say whatever they want and I do whatever I want”. As a result, many papers used to
misuse the situation and to publish such a rubbish of articles directed against the regime, that it was
counterproductive. Moreover, this freedom of expression resulted in the undermining the
importance of written word. What was even worst, it lowered the level of the professional written
word, with the strength of the expressions (including curses) tending to compensate the lack of
persuasive power.
The situation changed when Šešelj’s radicals joined Milošević’s government, with Aleksandar
Vučić taking over the official propaganda via the Ministry for information. Regime started to
pursuit the newspapers and their managers for the articles critical to the regime. The managers used
to be charged for articles similar to those published in Šešelj’s media before he joined Milošević’s
regime. This restriction of the free speech was one of the first signs that the fascization of the
Serbian society was going on. But globally, the logic of the political propaganda was not that

1
Dry River in Serb.
 181

simple, in the ”western movies manners”, like ”good guys” versus ”bad guys”. We discuss now the
western side of the coin.
That the propaganda preparation for war is as important as military one, has been clear since
Adolph Hitler started to liberate Europe in 1936. The quintessence of any propaganda may be put
into the traditional cry “Catch the thief!”. Preparing the ground for attacking Yugoslavia, western
Allies made first a loud propaganda about Serbian propaganda (what might be called meta-
propaganda). It runs in two stages. Fist demonization of the Serbian public media, as a sheer
propaganda and then suppressing the latter as much as possible, both at home and at the
international level. Hence, those attempts in Serbia to defend publicly Serbian national interests
were qualified as a part of Milošević propaganda machinery. At the (western) international level
all news found inadequate for demonizing Serbia were suppressed.
Of course, when a state is in state of war, many regular rules might be suppressed, including the
freedom of press. It refers to both sides of the military conflicts, in this particular case NATO allies
and Yugoslavia (Serbia). But one can not overlook the asymmetry of the situation. Serbia was
attacked by a mighty power, which was determined to achieve his political aims by military
actions. Though the final aims of USA were well publicized, nobody in Serbia was sure what the
ultimate purpose of the aggression would be, and this uncertainty still holds. To Serbia the attack
threatened the very national existence and her propaganda means were justified. On the other
hand USA was not endangered by Yugoslavia in any respect and the military actions were just
“continuation of the politics by armed means”, as Klauzewitz would put it. But the most important
lesson to learn from the NATO intervention was of a more general nature.
The Western, as geographically-ideological metaphor, keeps on boasting with the freedom of
expression and liberal public media. With the suppression of that freedom at the time of NATO
intervention it has proved that this freedom has been of a provisional nature. Freedom with
exceptions is not freedom, but opportunism. One can not help recalling the famous episode from
Hruschtchov’s visit to USA in 60-ies. At the end of his tour he had a meeting with USA
businessmen in California. The atmosphere was friendly, even cheerful, when a businessman stood
up and asked the Soviet prime minister: “Mr. Premier, why Soviet authorities prevent broadcasting
of The Voice of America over Soviet Union?”. The silence issued and then Nikita Hruschtchov
replied by a counter question: ”Mr., what is your favourite dish?”. ”I don’t see the relevance of the
question, but my answer is beefsteak”. “Well, replied Hruschtchov, you see, my favourite dish is
schtche, and soviet people will eat schtche!”. 1
Hence, the first step to be taken against Serbia was to put it under an information siege. It
comprised the following measures: (i) suppression of the newspaper articles from Serbia in the
western press: 2 (ii) selection of the reports from the “war zone”, including falsifying some of them;
(iii) suppression of the INTERNET connections of Serbia; (iv) Destruction of the principal Serbian
TV relays, including that on Avala mountain near Belgrade (200 m high) . We shall comment these
points one by one.
The old dictum says Audiatur et altera pars. By depriving the other side of his right of expression,
the first side acknowledges, albeit implicitly, she is wrong, or at least incapable to fight on an open
arena. We mention here that the USA press did publish articles of American origin critical to the
USA government on the matter, as the example of The Boston Globe illustrates.
A queue at CNN quarters in New York waiting to be called and deliver their information from the
KiM area and the vicinity. One of witnesses listens how his predecessor testifies how in a column
of Shqiptar refuges before the crossing to Macedonia a young woman feels bad and a Yugoslav
soldier come across and helps her to reach the ambulance car. The translator (sic) renders the story
as a Yugoslav soldier maltreating the unfortunate Shqiptar victim. 3
1
Schtche is the traditional Russian dish, with various vegetables and meet.
2
I happen to have personal experience on that matter.
3
Italians have the dictum tradutore – tratore (translator – betrayer).
 182

USA government ordered 11 May, 1999 all owners of the satellite relays of INTERNET to
disconnect Yugoslavia. On May 26 European consortium of the EUTELSAT satellite cut off all
transmissions of the Serbian state TV, as a “powerful media weapon” of the Serbian government. 1
After an initiative of the German minister Schröder many European countries strongly
recommended the operators of the Consortium to cut off transitions of the Yugoslav TV, what
included France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia and British Telecom.
Later, after the destruction of the WTC towers on 11 September, the joke was running around
Yugoslavia concerning the Avala exploit of NATO air forces. In the Underworld the Avala tower
meets Sabra tower (one of the twin World Trade Centre towers in New York) and asks her ”Where
is Shatilla [the other twin tower]”? ”Forget about that, says Sabra, the plane was late”.
Thus by eliminating the adversary from the propaganda arena USA lost the propaganda war, what
might be considered the only Serbian victory in the entire conflict. As another example how the so-
called great countries appear not just as great as they pretend, illustrates the case of much praised
stealth fighter F-117A, which was shot down by the 250 rocket brigade (equipped by Russian
rockets Kub and Neva) over the Srem region (Budjanovci). The pilot was rescued by USA rescue
unit, but the wreckage was collected by Yugoslav forces. Rumour was running around Yugoslavia
that the latter was delivered to Russians for inspections, but it has never been proved. Anyway,
these remains have been exposed at the casern of Brigade at Belgrade, where they can be seen now.
USA never reported this lost of the “invisible fighter”, the pride of their air forces. In a series of
documentaries on the military aviation on the Discovery channel, much room was devoted to the
stealth “super fighter”, but it’s shooting down during the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia was not
mentioned at all. 2 (This exploit was paid by a loss of 28 staff of Brigade, that 27 March 1999, but
this loss was publicized in Serbian media neither).

Figure 9. Wreckage of F-117A at Budjanovci, shot down on March 27, 1999.

In order to counter the ”Serbian propaganda” Allies arranged to install an emitter on board the
airplane C-130 Hercules, baptized ”commando solo”, which broadcasted programmes in Serb,
within the Serbian official bands of wavelengths. Also, NATO airplanes used to disseminate
millions of leaflets in Serb Cyrillic over the Serbia, appealing to the Serbian population to renounce

1
P. Lasalle, “Kosovo: la propaganda aux multiples frappes”, June 16, 1999. (In the following of this section we shall
make an extensive use of this article. (Unfortunately, we can not quote the source).
2
Milošević’s supporters organized a public performance at the Belgrade square, with a transparency SORRY
“INVISIBLE”, WE DID NOT KNOW YOU WERE INVISIBLE”
 183

their president Slobodan Milošević, announcing an intensification of the air strikes if the latter does
not succumb to the demands of Allies. These leaflets were particularly densely distributed over
KiM, inciting Serbian soldiers to desert. But the crown of this propaganda offensive came in the
form of a leaflet with the photo of an Apache helicopter ready to destroy an armoured vehicle, with
a remarkable subtitle YOU REMAIN ON KOSOVO AND YOU FACE A CERTAIN DEATH.
Though this massage was addressed to the military presence of the state of Serbia on the soil of
Serbia, the ultimate goal can not be overlooked – we are going to deprive Serbia from her southern
province. (We shall return to this point later on).
In order to direct the public opinion towards proper conclusions, Alliance founded immediately
after the beginning of NATO campaign an information bureau (one can not help recalling the
famous INFORMBUREAU, used by Stalin against Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1948), headed by Jamy
Shea, an American expert for the propaganda war. The attempt badly failed, for the product of
this propaganda unit turn out to be a mixture of transparent lies, nonsense and counterdictions.
Irritated by such an amateurism British premier decided to constitute another propaganda unit,
equipped by British experts, like Alastair Campbell and the editor of Bill Clinton speeches
Jonathan Prince. The point was to include the propaganda into the current electoral campaigns and
to account for the proper approach regarding each of the western target population, which requires
specific kind of argumentation (and facts, for that matter). In particular, it was important to meet
the Green opposition in Germany, whose slogan ”Never more Auschwitz” was particularly
devastating to Schröder’s role in the affair. One of particular targets were NGO in the relevant
western countries (and in Yugoslavia, for that matter), as relays for the Allies’ propaganda. 1 As M.
Lasalle noted, many journalists accepted the role of forging the evidence, in particular the fact that
it was NATO intervention which provoked the violence of Serbian police at KiM and which
silenced Serbian opposition after the aggression started.
The principal tool for demonizing Serbia vis-à-vis KiM affair was to make use of the terms which
provoke in European ears (and minds) well entrenched adversities. Thus German minister for
defence, Rudolf Scharping and Joschka Fischer, minister for the foreign affairs, made extensive
use, when talking about Kosovo, of terms like genocide, camps of concentration and deportations.
This misuse of the historical facts for the immediate political benefits was relayed in France by
Daniel Cohn-Bendit and media. Generally one meets the situation here when the internal needs
dictate a distorted picture of events going on in another region, with latter being of the profound
importance for the existence of a state, Serbia in this case. What illustrates the thesis there is no
regional problem in the modern world, but each perturbation in one region bears consequences to
others and vice versa. (As we shall see later on, this effect will show up in all its grandeur when
reflecting the Middle East problems and its European, more precisely Balkan, reverberations).
Besides organizing their ”Ministry for truth” in an Orwellian sense, western allies did not spare
efforts to silence voices of dissidence. Thus, the BBC correspondent from Belgrade, John Simpson,
was accused by Tony Blair’s cronies for “lacking objectivity” and by Robin Cook for offering to
British citizens ”pro-Serb viewpoint” of the current events. 2 Similarly, Ennio Remondino, from
RAI, was accused to be philoserb, for his critics of bombing TV Belgrade. Contrary to this attitude

1
Spanish daily El Mundo and French weekly Marrianne published excerpts from NATO reports concerning the use of NGO and
journalists for the propaganda purpose.

2
One can not help making parallel between the European trio Cook – Cohn-Bendit – Fischer from one side and the American one
Rubin – Albright – Holbrook from the other.
 184

those reporters who were operating under the control of KLA were never mentioned as controlled,
unlike those from Belgrade, who were accused to be under Serb control. Also, testimonies made by
Kosovo Shqiptars were transmitted without verifications, unlike non-Shqiptars from KiM, whose
voices were never heard in the West. Maltreatments by the Serbian police were well publicized, all
300 % of them, whereas those committed by KLA were absent from the western reports. The later
failed to mention forced recruitment of the young refugees for KLA, or the kidnapping young
Shqiptar girls for prostitution.
According to M. Lasalle, Albanians writers, immigrants in France, like Ismail Kadare, never failed
to accuse the collective responsibility of Serbian nation concerning the KiM issue, following the
demonization of Serbs from 1991. At an instant death of the chief editor of the Priština daily Koha
Ditore, Baton Haxhiu, was reported, while the latter was collecting donations for his journal in
Paris. (We shall meet this gentleman again later on).
Before we leave the subject, a question: ”How much the Serbian public was informed with the
events going on on KiM and around?” seems in order. Generally, those who had an INTERNET
access were in a better position from one side, but handicapped from the other. Namely, they were
more informed about the details the official Belgrade media avoided to describe, but many of those
reports were a part of the propaganda we considered above. Some of those reports, however, were
evidently favourable to ”Serbian cause”, of course and one was able to get a more or less balanced
picture about the overall situation by making his own inference into different, even conflicting,
views and news. Generally, those opposing Milošević’s regime were more inclined to accept the
western viewpoint and vice versa. To some of them, on the other hand, Milošević and Allies were
two sides of the same coin, acting against the interest or even the existence of the Serbian state. In
any case, any particular viewpoint could find a support in the flood of ”news and views ” from the
INTERNET or otherwise. Those supporters of Milošević were either cut off from the external
informations, or unwilling to listen to the opposite news and views. But generally the patriotic
feelings prevailed, as expected. Milošević was a dictator, but he spoke Serb, unlike Bill Clinton and
Tony Blair. This rationale will find an a posteriori justification, when many of the cards are sorted
out, in particular after Afghanistan and Iraq USA interventions. The power of propaganda has been
exposed in such a vivid light in those cases, that retrospective reinterpretations concerning the
KiM news and views appear inevitable.

Incidents, coincidences and accidents

To superficial eye historical situations appear a set of accidental events. The other extreme would
be to consider every event as a part of a scheme or long term project. For the precedent events the
first way of looking at what is going on on the spot appears natural one, but if a precedent can be
found, one may contrive a scheme lying presumably behind the apparently random happening. KiM
issue appears full of examples of both kinds. We consider some of them here.
The university professor Dr Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006), the leader of the moderate Democratic
League of Kosovo, was a respectful interlocutor of Belgrade. His Gandhi-like strategy for attaining
KiM independence was in such a contrast to other political movements of KiM, that no wonder he
was the target of KLA, who tried to kill him at several occasions. When NATO intervention started
Rugova was put into home confinement, for the sake of protection. But during a transfer to another
place, his political adviser, academician Fehmi Agani, was kidnapped and presumably murdered by
Serbian police. After NATO occupation, Rugova will play a secondary role on KiM political stage
and will die two years before the Kosovo independence declaration in 2008.
During the 78 day NATO campaign several thousand KiM people were reported missing. What
happened to them? As with all cases like this, one may just make a guess on the final destiny of
these people. Some of them surely were genuinely missed in the turmoil, like accidental deaths
without record and something like that. Some of them presumably chose to vanish and live
 185

incognito for one or other reason. But two categories of missing people are of a particular interest
to us here, and we shall devote some space to consider them in more detail.
Kidnapping has been found a very convenient way to get rid of persona non grata in modern
society. This has been amply practiced by Argentinean Junta, though it was not surely their
invention. A straightforward murdering of a caught adversary or like appears rather inconvenient,
for many reasons. Murdering may be promoting the victim into a martyr, with all accompanying
consequences. That the very execution does not solve the relevant issue is the best illustrated by the
(alleged or real) crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth. Contrary to that a kidnapped person appears
neither dead nor alive – she is just a “pending case”. Nobody is accused for murder (habeas
corpus) and all one has to do is to wait until the case is forgotten The victim is in the meantime
executed and the body destroyed in one way or other. Family of the victim is, of course, still
hoping the missing relative to appear and is not pressing for charging the officials or others for
doing justice to the victim’s close relatives, friends etc, for the missing person is alive and dead at
the same time, like the famous Schrödinger’s cat.
Bitici brothers’ affair is not just the case in point, but illustrates the complexity of the KiM issue.
Those three ethnic Albanians, American citizens, were members of the so-called Atlantic Brigade,
which had a few hundred Americans of Albanian origin. It is not clear yet whether this brigade was
involved in the actual fighting on KiM, or was just prepared to join the other infantry forces when
the ground invasion from Albania should have started. Anyway, after the Kumanovo ”agreement”,
they crossed the line dividing the KiM territory from the rest of Serbia and were arrested by
Serbian police. Since they possessed no visa (USA citizens must have it for Serbia), they were
sentenced for 15 days imprisonment. After the sentence was over and presumably after the pressure
from USA authorities, these Americans were released and a police patrol was in charged to deliver
them to UNPROFOR at KiM. But they never appeared there and were declared missing persons.
Later, when a number of mass graves were revealed in Serbia, with hundreds corps of civilians,
presumably Shqiptars, bodies of Bitici brothers were identified. Those policemen in charge of
delivering the brothers were taken to court and sentenced. The case of Bitici brothers illustrates
many aspects of the KiM affairs. Firstly, the direct involvement of USA in interfering the Serbian
internal affairs, by organizing American units for fighting in Serbia. Second, the mass graves found
later in Serbia (mainly near Belgrade, but also in refrigerator trucks drowned in Danube River),
testified that some civilians killed during the fighting were collected and buried secretly outside
KiM. Those people were recorded as missing too, for obvious reason.
Both kinds of the missing people syndrome appear particularly grave from the purely ethical
reasons. It is the fundamental human right to be able to burry a dead person, regardless of the
eventual crime ascribed to him. Every human being has the right to have a grave, if it is feasible.
The mass grave (or no grave) deprives the dead of this fundamental aspect of the social life. It also
deprives the kinship of his right to pay a tribute to dead and express their appreciation for the bad
luck and misfortune. The relatives and friends are even deprived of the genuine feelings, since for
them missing persons are simply outside their emotional horizon (what the point of kidnapping is, o
course).
Now we come to the third case of KiM missing people, which appears as much incredible as
horrifying. This is the case of the alleged kidnapping people for the sake of selling their
(according to some sources it concerns Yugoslav soldiers, see Appendix 8). This affair was first
mentioned by Karla del Ponte in the book The Hunt (in Italian), published after her retirement
from the position of the chief prosecutor of Hague Tribunal. According to her testimony, hundreds
of Serb civilians were kidnapped, brought to Northern Albania and there used as living sources of
human organs, to be sold for transplantations to some foreign clinics. Del Ponte even points to a
building near the border with Serbia, which was presumably equipped with instrumentation
necessary for extracting human organs. The investigations of the affair were initiated, but the final
outcome is still to appear. It is interesting here to note that a similar affair happened in 1992 in
 186

Bosnia, when Croatian forces intercepted in Bosanski Brod four buses with Roma refugees from
Srebrenica. Together with Bosnian Muslim forces they took the refuges out, liquidated them.
Victims from one of buses were burred in a nearby village Sijekovac. The mass grave was
unearthed in 2004 and 59 skeletons, 19 of them children from 6 months to 14 years are dug out.
Rumours went around that the organs were taken from the dead bodies and sold for 20.000 to
25.000 DM. These accusations, however, have never been confirmed. The Serb Bosnian forensic
experts testified that it was not possible to state whether or not the organs were taken.
After every large action of the Yugoslav army and police (including, presumably the paramilitaries)
the terrain was cleared up from the dead bodies. State causalities were collected and buried
appropriately, whereas Shqiptar victims (both military and civilian) were either buried on the spot
or move from the KiM, depending on the circumstances. Later it will turn out that some of the
latter were put into refrigerator tracks and moved to the Central Serbia, where they wee thrown into
rivers or possibly lakes. One of these trucks will be recovered from the Danube river near Djerdap
dam, whereas other buried under soil will be unearthed during the beginning of Djindjić
government mandate in 2001, as we shall see later on.

Epilogue ?

NATO campaign lasted 78 days (24 March – 9 June). During the campaign alliance of 19 states,
with population of 700 million, were attacking the state of 10 million people. Making use of almost
all types of weapons available, including atomic ones (DU bullets and shells), testing new
weapons, etc NATO killed about 2.500 civilians (89 children). Altogether 1.002 soldiers and
policemen lost their life, with about 12.500 wounded. The overall material damage has been
estimated to be $30 billion.
Before we go on, a few questions seem in order. First, why it lasted for such a long time? NATO
expected that Yugoslavia will be on her knees a few days after the beginning of the attacks. This
expectation was natural one, considering the relative strengths of the sides in conflict. 1 The attack
was planned just to warn Yugoslavia they meant their threat serious. Once started, the campaign
was expected to end quickly and Yugoslavia to succumb to a powerful adversary. Yugoslav
authorities, first of all Slobodan Milošević and Serbian government, expected that the world would
not tolerate the campaign and UN would intervene. Both sides turned out wrong. The campaign
turned quickly into the war of nerves. Awaiting the other side to stop (NATO the campaign, Serbia
to defy), Yugoslavia suffered losses and damages unprecedented in the time of peace. With UN
kicked out of game, Russia and China passive, Yugoslavia found herself isolated and left to the
mercy of the powerful adversary, determined to achieve its ultimate goal.
With human losses steadily increasing and expecting the ground troops attack from Albania any
minute to start, Serbia finally decided to give up. On June 9 an “agreement” was signed at
Kumanovo between Yugoslav and NATO military forces. The capitulation (for it is the right term)
was operative from June 10. Why Kumanovo?
We mentioned before that in 1912 a decisive battle was fought at that Macedonian town near the
present Serbian border. Serbian army defeated Turkish one and from that battle on the final
outcome of the First Balkan war was ensured. Hence the slogan, mentioned above FOR KOSOVO
KUMANOVO. The Kumanovo choice for signing the capitulation was not chosen by chance. It
was meant to additionally humiliate Serbia and Serbs. The same slogan gained again its
importance, but this time with a reverse meaning. In the first instance Kosovo meant defeat and
Kumanovo victory. This time both places implied defeats. Should one really believe it was done by

1
An additional hope, if not expectation, was that Serbians will get rid of Milošević, as the principal actor in
confronting USA and her allies
 187

Americans on purpose? The only thing one can say now is that if it was not done intentionally,
Serbian adversaries appeared more stupid than fearsome.
What was the reaction of Yugoslav, particularly Serbian population? The general response was a
feeling of relieve. In Serbian towns, in particular those with a noticeable immigrant population, the
news about the agreement were met with firing guns and all weaponry available. In fact, it was the
reaction of the Serbian youth, who was afraid during the whole campaign, of being engaged in
deadly affairs. But the very shooting revealed the presence of the ijekavic (immigrant) population,
for they all came to Serbia well equipped with weaponry. (Possessing arms without authorization is
strictly forbidden in Yugoslavia, as in any other state, of course). The additional argument in favour
of this interpretation is the fact that those over-Drina immigrants mainly joined Yugoslav Army
and police and were thus the principal actors in the military operations.
 188

Figure 7a. NATO devastation of KiM in 1999 campain. (courtesy of V. Sotirović)

Kumanovo “agreement” and SC resolution 1244

As always when Milošević is involved in defending Serbia, the final outcome was the worst
possible for Serbia. She was badly damaged materially and military emotionally and nationally
humiliated and yet forced to succumb. The terms for the agreement were now worse than at the
beginning, for this time Allies dealt with a defeated state. Hence, the agreement meant surrender, a
 189

capitulation. True, even an early giving up would not be a true agreement, for the latter would be
signed ”under the pressure”, what makes any agreement euphemism only.
On June 6, 1999 a meeting of western allies and Russian authorities took place at Moscow, when
the ceasefire agreement was outlined. The agreement envisaged three principal points; (i) NATO
will stop air raids; (ii) Serbian forces will evacuate KiM to be replaced by Allies, including Russian
troupes; (iii) Russian forces will guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty. On the same day of
signing Kumanovo agreement (sic), June 10, 1999, UN Security Council issued resolution No 1244
(Resolution). The resolution provided, first of all, UN cover for the actions of NATO, carried out
without UN approval. It adopted NATO forces as UN ones, while providing UN administration for
KiM, until a final status of the province is negotiated. Resolution demanded that KLA forces are
“demilitarized” (whatever it meant). The sovereignty of Yugoslavia (Serbia) over KiM was
recognized explicitly, what will make Resolution the pivotal point in Serbian claims in the later
negotiations and demands.
Under the terms of Kumanovo Agreement (KA) Yugoslavia was obliged to remove all her military,
paramilitary and police forces from KiM. It was envisaged that later he could implement a
symbolic army force (counted in hundreds, not thousands), but it has never be realized, even never
tried from Yugoslav side. KiM would be put under the protection of UN (UNMIK), with NATO
troops in charge of implementing UN decisions (KFOR). A demilitarized zone was set up along the
administrative border between KiM and the rest of Serbia, 5 km wide, and 25 km “air protected
zone” which was not to be flied over by Yugoslav air forces. But the worst element of KA, which
was not even mentioned explicitly, was that Yugoslavia lost control over her border wit Albania.
True, a control over principal check points was envisaged, but even that was never implemented.
After that KiM became a part of the Albanian state, better to say the first annexed region for the
planned Great Albania state. The first direct outcome of this consequence will show up soon. Why
Yugoslav authorities gave up control over her borders appears a mystery. It was this failure to
protect her borders which meant the surrender KiM to Albania, not the acceptance of the foreign
forces on the Serbian soil. As long as a state has definite borders, it is a state; otherwise it dissolves
into a vague geographical entity. The border control need not necessarily imply the right to rule,
but if one loses the right to record what is going on on the borders, the notion of a state become
devoid of any realistic meaning. NATO could have decided and implemented to settle ten million
of foreign people on KiM, but one would at least know 10 million intruders are imported by known
agent into Serbia. One might be subject to a mock court process, but as long as there is a proper
record of what was going on on the trial, elementary human and civilization rights are preserved.
Reality is information – no record, no event, and no history.
Obviously behaviour of Yugoslav delegation at the Kumanovo “negotiations” was in the stile ”No,
No, and then taking off the underwear”, as somebody put it, describing Milošević’s ”tough”
manners in negotiations. It is hard to believe that the delegation with high rank officers could not
negotiate out this minimal interest of Yugoslavia. Another failure to make KA as precise as
possible will result soon in disastrous situation. Namely, the timing of NATO taking over the
control of KiM was not worked out. This failure will turn out fatal for the non-Shqiptar part of KiM
population, as we shall see immediately. We mention here that SC resolution 1244 did envisage
(Point 2 of Annexe B) Yugoslav presence on main border checkpoints, but this has never been
implemented.

KA envisaged demilitarization of KLA and other armed forces on KiM. In annex B it was
envisaged that KFOR will secure fulfilment of the duties after the return of allowed FSY staff on
KiM. Resolution 1244 envisaged security for the return of refugees and displaced people. As it
turned out, the latter was fulfilled, but only for Shqiptars, not for the rest of the KiM population. As
for the KLA disarmament, it never happened. It was estimated that there was about half million
weapons with KiM Shqiptar population. When later KLA was transformed into Kim security force,
 190

the farce with the KA was completed. The situation greatly resembled that at the end of WW2 on
Yugoslav soil, when Nazi Croat Ustasha forces, responsible for the genocide of NDH Serbs, Jews
and Roma, was joined to the so-called Domobran army (a benign quisling forces), and thus escaped
the punishment for the war crimes.

Parallel with KA a secret KFOR agreement with KLA was made. Also a common commission,
comprising representatives of Yugoslav Army and Ministry for the Internal Affairs of Serbia and
KFOR and UNMIK was formed.

Beginning of KiM occupation

Yugoslav surrender KiM to NATO did not mean automatically an absolute surrender. Any force
occupying KIM would by taking over control would at the same time take responsibility for the
region, including the safety of the inhabitants. What happened to the latter after the KA became
operative, on June 10, 1999? Did NATO forces enter the Occupied Territory (OT)? 1 Yes, they did,
but not in hurry. Between Yugoslav forces leaving the OT and NATO coming in, there was a gap
of three days. What happened in the interregnum? KLA from Albania and Macedonia, as well as
local one at KiM entered the scene and started immediately ethnical cleansing, banishing non-
Shqiptar population form KiM. When NATO forces came in this task of KLA was more or less
completed. More than 200.000 non-Shqiptars, Serbs, Roma, Croats, etc found shelter in the rest of
Yugoslavia. At the same time those refugee who found themselves in Albania and Macedonia,
started their return to KiM. (See Figure 10). After that first wave of proper refugees came a
constant influx of Albanian Albanians into OT, to be continued up to the present. The lack of
border control, discussed above, made it not only possible, but desirable. Both instances mentioned
(lack of border control and banishing the autochthonous population from KiM) reveals the best the
entire rationale for NATO engagement, better to say for USA intervention. But before we go on
with the NATO occupation, a brief digression concerning the role of Russia in the entire affair
seems in order.

Russia and FRY

Serbs and particularly Montenegrins have always considered Russia as their principal friend and
protector. Russia did help Serbs on many historical occasions, in particular when Serbs and
Montenegrins were engaged in liberating themselves from the foreign occupations, like those of
Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarians and Germans. It was Russia who declared the war to Austro-
Hungary in 1914, siding Serbia, what resulted in Great War. Russia has always been interested in
Balkan affairs, since, except for Greeks, Rumanians and Albanians, the peninsula was inhabited by
Slavic population. Beside, since the continental Russia was cut off from Mediterranean Sea by
Bosporus and Dardanelle straights, it had an indirect access to Adriatic Sea via Bulgaria, Serbia and
Montenegro. The traditional pan Slavic sentiment was another strong link with Balkan, in particular
with the Greek-Orthodox population. Under the rule of Slobodan Milošević FRY relied heavily on
Russian support in many respects. One particularly strong link was the ideological on, since it was
Serbia (with Montenegro) which was the last to accept the linearization in Eastern Europe. This
fact proved to be the most disastrous to Serbian state when the dissolution of Yugoslavia started.
Not only the communist character of Serbia was used as a pretext for separating from Yugoslavia,
but it was this ideological colour which made the West to side Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and
support their secession. (The role of Catholicism in the latter states was not to be underestimated
either, of course).
Slobodan Milošević was a good communist, but even a better opportunist. But his wife, who came
from a prominent communist family, did believe in the communist ideology and being capable to

1
Not to be confused with Palestinian land.
 191

exercise a strong influence on her husband, influenced the state politics to a considerable extent. It
was probably her who instigated Milošević to make a blunder in 1990, which will prove badly
damaging to Serbian cause later on. Namely, when Russian colonels attempted a military coup
d’etat in Moscow against Gorbachov and the new liberal Soviet government, Milošević sent a
message of his support to the old communist guard. The attempt badly failed, thanks to the
Yeltsin’s brave intervention, and Serbia found herself isolated from her principal foreign friend.
Later on the relationship improved, but Yeljtsin, who became the president of the new Russian
state, after dissolution of Soviet Union, never forgave Milošević his blunder.
When KA became operative, somebody from the Russian military quarters gave order to a Russian
military unit in Bosnia, who was engaged there as a part of the UN security forces, to move to
KiM. The unit arrived quickly to Kosovo Polje, a town right to the north of Priština and was met
enthusiastically by the local Serbs, who expected to be protected in the ongoing turmoil. But the
attempt badly failed. First, Russians had no food supplies and found themselves in an awkward
position. It was British forces who intervened and provided them with food, unlike local Serbs who
did not managed to meet properly their presumed friends and protectors. Meanwhile Yeljtsin
intervened and the unit was withdrawn to Bosnia quickly. This instance in KiM turmoil was the
best illustration of several important aspects of the Serb community there – their naivety, their
despair and their incompetence to deal with their own interests. Later on Russia turned down the
offer to send a unit to KiM as a part of the international security forces. One may meditate on
possible reasons for this rejection, but the abovementioned Milošević’s blunder must have been at
least a part of the reason. Generally, Russian position and behaviour regarding KiM crisis has been
ambiguous from the beginning, for various reasons. In this particular instance, she did not want to
join the western occupation forces and thus provide an additional legitimacy to the NATO
intervention. In addition, since Russia was not a member of NATO she had to support herself the
costs of the peace operation, what she was not willing to do. Never-the-less Russia felt double-
crossed byte West, and from now on, Yeljtsin will be considered as the culprit, what will turn out
the beginning of his political decline and the rise of Vladimir Putin.

Figure 10. The zero-sum game. Non-Shqiptars move to the rest of Serbia, while Shqiptar refugees
return home. Note the ”victory sign” one of Shqiptars shows to the outgoing former compatriots.

Hence, it was from the beginning clear what the final aim of NATO intervention was. We discuss it
now in some detail.
 192

Kosovo - the final solution

As demonstrated before and after Kosovo affair, the ultimate aim of USA has been to establish the
maximum stability in all world regions where they can do it. The issue of ethics, justice, rightness
etc appears to Americans of secondary importance. This has resulted in the international policy
which is hard to understand on any of instances mentioned, except for the request for the stability.
USA supported Sadam Hussein when he attacked Iran, but intervened when Iraq occupied Kuwait.
They supported Talibans in Afghanistan when fighting Russians, but smashed them for there
support of Bin Laden and the Palestinian cause. USA was very cooperative with Slobodan
Milošević when they needed him to settle the Bosnian issue, but took him to Hague Tribunal when
the former affair was over and the new one KiM was to be settled down.
It has been obvious to all world politicians that KiM Shqiptars are resolute to secede from Serbia,
at any price. This resolution was sufficient to USA to side their request. It has become clear to the
world, at least after the NATO occupation that the only arrangement with Albanians, all over the
Balkan, is to let them live on an ethnically pure land, without mixing with non-Albanian
population. It concerns Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Greece. The only stable KiM is KiM without
Serbs, Roma, Croats, Muslims etc. All arrangements which have been made since the beginning of
KiM crisis, better to say since that crisis took on an acute form, have been made in view of the
“final Albanian solution”. The ultimate solution will be, of course, founding of Great Albania, with
purely Albanian population.
All actions of Shqiptars become immediately transparent, when viewed through the Great Albania
project. The principal goal for achieving the latter has been via defining the Albanian archenemy,
the already demonized Serbs and Slobodan Milošević in particular. That this stratagem can take on
a comic form was demonstrated during the ethnic Albanian rebellion against Macedonian state,
right after the KiM was occupied. While Macedonian government accused KiM Shqiptars for
inciting the Macedonian Albanians, the latter accused the same government that her actions were
monitored from Serbia, that is by Milošević. The point was not just an immediate gain, but it
concerns the entire rationale for Albanian troublemaking on Balkan. If it turns out that Albanians
have troubles with everybody they come in contact with, the logical question would be which is the
source of trouble? If it is a single villain, Serbia, all accusation against Albanians would be covered
by a single response: we are victims of the Serb conspiracy against Albanians. No doubt when the
final step in forming Great Albania is taken, with the rebellion of ethnic Albanians in North-West
Greece, Epir (Cameria, as Albanians call this region, “which has always been a purely Albanian
land …”), Serbs and Milošević will be invoked again.
The immediate goal at KiM is now to banish from it as much as possible non-Shqiptar population
and to wipe out any trace of their former presence in the region. All events from the beginning of
occupation have been envisaged through this final goal, as we shall see in the following.

KiM as occupied territory

The administrative side of the occupation was supposed to be run by UNMIK (United Nations
Mission in Kosovo), until the ”final solution” has been reached (whatever it meant). The purpose of
introducing Kosovo Forces (KFOR) has been manifold. First, they were sent there to prevent any
military intervention from Yugoslav side. Second, they are supposed to protect non-Shqiptar
population who remained there from eventual Shqiptar massacre.
The occupation personnel, both military and civilian, were supposed to run the province on a
temporary basis. They had no police forces, no juridical system, no courts etc. KLA was
transformed into the local police, so that the abovementioned ”demilitarization” of the rebellious
forces meant merely their changing uniforms. This “solution” reminds one of the similar
transformations of Tito’s partisans into Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) after the civil war in
Yugoslavia was over by the end of 1945. This turnover was recognized by Allies just as the latter
recognized KLA as the regular force. Thus Shqiptar rebellion has been recognized as a regular
 193

movement, though in the beginning of the rebellion USA proclaimed KLA to be terrorist force.
Another parallel to be made here seems in order. At the end of the civil war between Royal forces
of Mihailovic and communist Tito’s forces, Allies sided Tito and helped him materially decisively
to win the war. Likewise USA helped KLA to organize and equipped it with arms, making
themselves not only patrons to one of sides in conflict, but a direct accomplice in the rebellion at
KiM.
There was a juridical vacuum, since the Serbian laws were not abolished and new ones did not
exist. The population, both Shqiptar and non-Shqiptar, was left without juridical protection.
Though formally in the same position, those two populations were in radically different situations.
Shqiptars continued to live as before the occupation (liberation from their point of view), whereas
the rest of inhabitants found themselves left in a vacuum of all kinds.
As we mentioned before majority of non-Shqiptar population left KiM in hurry while the
occupation forces advanced. But there was a marked difference in the character and extent of these
movements. Roma left KiM almost completely, while one third of Serbs (c. 120.000) remained
there. The reason for this difference is manifold. First, Roma are generally easily movable,
considering their nomadic character, though they usually adopt the sedentary way of life of their
surrounding. Second, turmoil like that was a good opportunity to move to the rest of Serbia,
practically towards Belgrade and larger towns. In fact after the occupation the number of Roma
wild settlements in and around Belgrade has been increased by an order of magnitude. It has been
estimated that about 20.000 (40-50.000 unofficially) Roma fled from KiM to the rest of Serbia. By
acquiring the status of refugees (more precisely of the displaced people) paradoxically their
material status improved. Contrary to this, Serb refugees found themselves in a desperate position.
They were distributed in concentration centres all over Serbia, waiting their destiny to be shaped
by someone else. But first we move back to those who remained at KiM.
These KiM inhabitants faced their destiny according to the size of the group they belonged to.
Three categories of ”Serb remnants” can be distinguished here. The first, and the largest, inhabits
the northern part of KiM, mainly north from the Ibar River (northern part of the town Kosovska
Mitrovica and the adjacent rural area). They found themselves cut off from the rest of KiM, but
being close to the Central Serbia managed to continue more or less supportable way of life. The
second category was formed by larger concentrations of Slavic population within the rest of KiM,
the so-called Serb enclaves. These rural regions are also cut off from the surrounding areas,
populated by Shqiptars and are put under KFOR protection. But in the worst situation are small
communities, consisting of a village or a group of houses. They have been encircled by barbed wire
and are not allowed to go out of their ”village confinement”. Better to say, they dare not to leave
their confinement. If the second category may be considered to be “Serb reservation”, the third
groups of people are practically imprisoned in their own homes (house confinement).
Generally, non-Shqiptar urban population has been completely banished from KiM. For instance,
out of 40.000 Serbs in Priština only some tens former inhabitants remained. In Kosovo Polje, while
before 1999 intervention 90 % of the population was Serbs and 10% Shqiptars, now 100% are
Shqiptars. Etc. In the enclaves, population could still work on land, but is confined to the enclave
and only guarded visits to or from enclaves are possible (or allowed). As for the third category,
those imprisoned peasants can not reach their fields and are bound to live on the humanitarian help
and support from Central Serbia. They are unemployed, but those who had an employment before
the occupation receive from Belgrade government their salaries. In order to keep them remain at
KiM these salaries are twice as large as in the rest of Serbia. The same applies to the northern
KiM, although they live more or less under supportable conditions.
What happens to those unfortunate hostages if (or when) they leave the confinement on their own?
They are shot by the first armed Shqiptar. Serbs are considered by the latter as free targets, which
are free to kill outside their confinements. The following incident illustrates the point.
 194

In 2000 a crowd is cueing for bus in a Priština street. A Bulgarian civil officer from UNMIK had a
look at his wrist watch, when the neighbour in the queue asked him in Serb what was the time. Of
course, all UNMIK personnel from Slavonic countries were strongly advised not to speak their
mother tongue, so as not to be confused for Serbs. But the poor Bulgarian responded a tempo in
Bulgarian, which is almost identical with Serb. 1 The Shqiptar chap drew the gun, shot him on the
spot and then calmly disappeared in the crowd.
If, on the other hand, they are killed while within confinements, the Shqiptar KiM police intervenes
and pursues the killers. Interestingly, so far no murder of this kind has been resolved by the local
police, what means a clear message to the remaining Serbs: they are persona non grata on KiM
soil. But before we proceed with particular instances illustrating the situation, a comment
concerning the global rationale for the overall attitude toward non-Shqiptars is in order.
Why the IC allows such repression in the middle of Europe? We have seen that during NATO
intervention there was a massive exodus from KiM, and numerous refugee columns were reported
moving towards Albania and Macedonia. We discussed the veracity of those reports, as well as
motivation for people moving from their homes. Despite the massive character of the exile, it does
not prove to be a deliberate ethnical cleansing. One need a clear case of a deliberate official policy
which provides the rationale for making such a strong interpretation. And it is here that Vojislav
Šešelj jumps in!. Whenever you need a support for ruining Serbia, you may rely on this ”great-Serb
politician”. When he announced at the dawn of NATO intervention that ”no Shqiptar will remain
on KiM if NATO comes”, this could be interpreted as a mere demagogical deterrent to the possible
threat to the state he was a vice-premier of. But when the Shqiptar columns started heading to
Albania, Albanian politicians obtained the trump card in their hands. Threat without refugees, or
refugees without threats, are coincidences. But taken together, they are parts of a deliberate scheme
for banishing Shqiptar population from KiM. Coupled with two previous schemes by Vaso
Čubrilović (Šešelj’s compatriot from Herzegovina, discussed before), the plan for the ethnical
cleansing, even genocide, was in hands of Albanian (not only Shqiptar) politicians. And they used
it abundantly. The axis Batajnica (where headquarters of Šešelj’s party SRP are) - Tirana
functioned marvellously. And world followed the pattern. With the record of those atrocities
committed by over-Drina Serbs, it was not an impossible task to make picture of “genocide-prone
Serbs (this time in very Serbia)”. From now on, anything what happens to them will be justified.
To be a free target appears now “God’s punishment”. But who are those “clay pigeons” in KiM?

Peasantry and the country

All luxurious hotels in the world are the same, as all cities are. Country – that’s countryside. The
nature of state is determined by her rural areas. This fact is well known to politicians and they are
eager to keep the rural areas prospering and ethnically proper. The latter means that it is the
ethnical content of the countryside which determines “whose land it is”, or more precisely, which
nationality determines the state and nation. Citizens come and go, but peasants stay. At least under
normal circumstances. As mentioned before, during the Turkish occupation Serbian towns were
inhabited by any nationality, except Serb. After Ottoman Empire left Serbia (and Balkan), majority
of those Vlachs (Cincars), Turks, Greeks, Jews, etc vanished from towns and Serbs returned to their
urban centres. True, Cincar population remained numerous, including those shop keepers in
villages, while Jewish population was a prominent part of the Serbian urban population until WW2.
In Serbia still peasantry comprises half of the overall population, despite the extensive urbanization
after WW2.
As we described earlier the process of leaving KiM countryside by Serbs was steady and selective.
Those young and vital used to move towards the Central Serbia, usually finding jobs in the towns,
while elderly people remained at home. They are unable to accommodate themselves in new

1
Contrary to common belief, even among Serbs, Bulgarian language appears closer to Serb than Macedonian.
 195

situations and are unwilling to leave their ancestral habitats, inhabited for millennium or so. This
selection has further accentuated the asymmetry in the average age of two populations, Shqiptar
and Serb, owing to the demographic explosion of the former and advance age of the latter
population. When the conflicts due to the demographic, and ensuing political pressure, from the
Shqiptar side became acute, the misbalance in the strengths of two ethnicities will prove fatal for
the Serbs on KiM. Majority of homes in Serb villages appear more like retirements of the old
people, than normal habitats. In many villages schools have a handful of pupils, often one or two.
Helpless as they appear, all these people have been protected by KFOR, at least in principle.
Protected from whom? This is the question not to be posed to UNMIK, or NATO, or European
Union. It is, in fact, a taboo question. Even posing it would endanger the UN mission on KiM. To
admit the protection of old women and men from the local Shqiptar population would be
tantamount to confess the utterly senseless operation, hiding behind the facade of humanitarian
action. This would be an almost explicit recognition that the rationale for NATO (better to say
USA) intervention was misdirected. As a Canadian general admitted after he left the KFOR post on
KiM, “we attacked wrong people”.
The village population in the Serb enclaves has been kept as hostages by both sides. Priština is
determined to make their life unbearable there and so encourage them to leave for the Central
Serbia (or otherwise). Serbian government insists they should stay there and thus symbolize a
presence of Serbia on KiM, thus attributing to them a status of ”national prisoners”, living under
prison conditions. They have no choice but to accept the situation as inevitable. No more Milošević
to come and shout ”Nobody will dare to beat you!”. Occasionally, Serbian TV reporters come,
make interview and release it on Belgrade TV. People feel compassion and do nothing. But the
situation of these “prisoners of politics” is even more tragic than one can imagine. Poorly educated,
ill informed, scared, they are forced like a drawing man to “grasp at any straw”, as the Serb proverb
says. When voting they unmistakably used to choose the worst option. When Milošević was in
power, voting for him had some sense, for majority of Serbian population, much better informed,
did the same. But when other political parties appeared on the scene, except in the one before the
last election (in 2007), KiM Serb gave their votes nationalistic parties: to Šešelj’s and Kostunica
parties, and to the Socialist Party of Serbia as well (the only parties which contain the adverb Serb
in their titles). The only criterion for these miserable KiM remnants of Serbs appears the ”Serbing”
rhetoric, what those parties used to take advantage of abundantly. To vote for the party whose
leader has been accused for war crimes, for the party whose boss announced the ethnical cleansing
just before the NATO intervention and at the same time to expect compassion from the IC, it can be
done by infinitely naïve people. Their political (sic) rationale appears like shooting their own leg.
In the latest elections (2008) Democratic party won a tiny percentage of votes, which went
exclusively to SRP, DPS and SSP. The irony is that it was SRP and SSP who delivered KiM to the
project of Greater Albania, whose first stage has been the so-called independence of Kosovo. The
only excuse for these miserable Serbs at KiM is that they have not been the only Serbs in Serbia
who have fallen for this demagogic rhetoric (as the latest elections in Serbia showed).
Situation in the northern KiM with the Serb majority is somewhat different, but not better for the
Serbian cause. The political leaders there are unscrupulous careerists, who are taking advantage of
the situation. They are direct exponents of the Belgrade politicians, who rely on their electorate
votes. In the situation of the electorate body levelled, even a small percentage of votes can move
the balance. In one of elections during Milošević’s rule, Vojislav Šešelj beat Milošević’s candidate
Milan Milutinovic by a marginal majority, with the decisive contribution coming from KiM.
Milošević proclaimed false results, which meant his crony won. Šešelj proclaimed his victory, but
for some reason gave up further defying Milošević and Milutinovic served as Serbia’s president
until 2001, well after the fall of Milošević. (He surrendered to Hague Tribunal as soon as he lost
 196

the “presidential immunity”). The reasons for such Šešelj’s behaviour were unclear, but in all
probability he made a deal with Milošević. 1
Generally living in the compact Serb region at KiM, these Serbs exert a noticeable influence on the
KiM political situation. This shows up as an obstruction of the Priština politics, in a manner known
at Belgrade from Šešelj’s troublemakers. Lacking the national strategy concerning KiM in general,
what will be our subject later, Northern KiM appears partly a nuisance to Belgrade, but also an
object of manipulation, in particular by those ”Serbing” parties, in their struggle for power.
We now pass to other players on KiM ground. Which kind of IC personnel, military or otherwise,
has been engaged in ”bringing stability” (if not peace) to KiM? Are they representative, in a sense
of typical civil servants and soldiers, of the countries they come from? We start with KFOR. These
army units from various countries appear a pendant of the French League of Foreigners,
mercenaries who serve for money. It is clear which kind of young people choose to serve in
military organizations like this. In fact all those soldiers collected under the NATO cover, are
hardly more than paramilitaries. They are unwilling to fight in a risky situation, as the case with
infamous Dutch unit supposed to protect Srebrenica in 1995. But generally, under more or less
secure conditions, these units do protect Serb enclaves, especially those around the monasteries.
(We shall come to this later on, when describing the ”KiM crystal night”.) People serving under
the UN banner appear mainly unemployed youth, prone to adventurism. They are poorly educated
and ignorant of the local situation, apart from conspicuous staff. As for the civil part, UNMIK,
much of that said for KFOR applies to this administrative body. Ina sense, it consists at higher
levels of responsibility of ”political losers” in their own states. It includes the chief administrators
appointed by UN, who are in charge of running the entire KiM business. It is believed that many of
those officers, in particular at lower levels, are prone to corruption, what has been abundantly used
by the local Shqiptar politicians. This can be evidenced (what is not a proof, of course) by their
behaviour in contact with Shqiptar officials, which appears as a rule a rather tasteless charade. With
incompetent Serb counterpart , non-Shqiptar population (those who remained on KiM) appears a
predestined victim of the nationalistic phanatics and unscrupulosity. And of their own political
misery. (see Appendix 10)
Serbs living (sic) in the enclaves are deprived of the most standard rights and needs. They are not
allowed to visit their graveyards, which are usually outside the protected zones. During religious
feasts they may visit graves of their relatives under KFOR protection only. This means they are
supposed to apply for this in advance, making of a normal civilization custom a project. Those
graveyards outside the enclaves are demolished by the local Shqiptar population. The reason for
this vandalism of a kind is obvious. Graveyards are witnesses of somebody’s long term presence
and are therefore to be wiped out as such. This rationale applies even more to churches and
monasteries. Being built up by Serbs centuries before any Shqiptar appeared on KiM soil, they
present a formidable burden to the newcomers’ conscience, making them feel intruders. Principal
churches and monasteries have been protected as well, but in the long run they have been doomed
to perish.

Life on the edge of sword

As we mentioned before the medium-term goal of Shqiptars is to get red of any non-Shqiptar
population on KiM. Since this appears the only way to stabilize KiM, 2 Allies, and Americans in
particular have been supporting this politics, either actively or just by passive attitude concerning
the violence exerted on the non-Shqiptars. We shall describe number of illustrative cases.
After evacuation of KiM by Yugoslav armed forces, Shqiptar took immediate measure to ensure
that the remaining Serbs and other non-Shqiptars realize they were undesirable at KiM. Many
1
There is another interpretation. Namely that he was afraid of taking over the responsibility, what would involve a
more serious psychological-anthropological analysis, but this would lead us beyond the scope of the book.
2
We shall discuss other motives later on.
 197

massacres were reported later, some of them surely still unrevealed. The case of Gnjilane illustrates
well the case in point. A dead squadron of Shqiptars of some 100 OVK fighters from the South-
East Serbia (Preshevo and Bujanovac) and from outside Yugoslavia (mainly from Macedonia) was
formed, who collected 159 non-Shqiptars and confined them in the building of the local pupil
hostel, where KLA headquarters were placed. Fifty-one of the prisoners were tortured, raped and
finally killed, in front of the other detainees. Some of the victims were tied by their legs or arms to
two vehicles, which would then separate and torn the victims apart. Some of them were chopped to
pieces and the parts buried at various places. The survived detainees were then released so as to
spread the message to other non-Shqiptar inhabitants in the areas of what they may expect if remain
in KiM. Nine years after the crime (December 2008) 9 of the perpetrators visited their homes at
Preshevo for Christmas holiday and were arrested by Serbian police. In 17 houses searched a large
quantity of weaponry was found, including Kalashnikovs, rifles, bombs, explosive etc. Three of the
leaders of the group remained outside the reach of Serbian police, since they live at Gnjilane, in
KiM. After the arrest a large crowd of Shqiptars started gathering at Preshevo, demanding an
immediate release of the arrested.
Gnjilane massacre was a sort of “KiM Medački Džep” we described before, which happened in
Croatia in 1992. It is very probable that some from Gnjilane group took part in that massacre too.
Some of them took part in March pogrom in 2004, what makes them a sort of dead squadron. It is
interesting to follow the response of the Shqiptar media to the arrests. KiM newspapers expressed a
harsh protest against Belgrade action, accusing Serbia to follow Milošević’s politics of suppressing
Shqiptars. Not a ward of caution, not to say taking distance from the crimes involved. KiM
authorities consider Shqiptars to be at war with Serbia, what makes the prospects of any peaceful
settlement dubious indeed. But even more discouraging is the response of common people, both at
KiM and at Preshevo. They sincerely expect any crime from Shqiptar side to be forgotten, or
ignored. Their representative at the Serbian Assembly, Riza Halimi, rejected all accusation in
general, accusing the police for action out of all proportions and demanding the international forces
to take over the control of the Preshevo valley. What would be, of course, a first step to joining the
region to Kosovo newly proclaimed state.
In the village Staro Gracko (Old Gracko 1 ) near the town Lipljan 2 a group of Serbs is harvesting,
when suddenly a group of people in KFOR uniforms comes out of the wood and starts shooting.
All 14 harvesters are shot down, including a 14 years boy. The perpetrators have never been
identified. The point here is not so much the atrocity itself, but the fact that the murderers worn
KFOR uniforms. Since it is highly unlikely that the killers were from KFOR personnel, it was
Shqiptars disguised in those uniforms. Presumably, somebody from KFOR provided them with
these masks, which enabled them to approach the victims freely and commit the collective murder.
The moral of the story, which non-Shqiptars are supposed to learn, is evident: nothing can protect
you on KiM. And this massage is not a mere bluff. 3
KFOR forces number 40.000 men and are well equipped with weaponry and auxiliary equipment.
But they are well aware they are very vulnerable on KiM. Shqiptars can easily raise an army of an
order of magnitude more numerous than KFOR. They would be equipped mainly by light weapons,
but in the situation like that on KiM, heavy weaponry provides no easy advantage, as Serbian army
found to her misfortune. Of course, if one does not discriminate between civilians and armed
adversary, heavy arms provide an advantage, but in the KiM case, such a fighting would annulated
the very reason for engaging on a sovereign state territory, as NATO did. In case of an
dissatisfaction by UN presence, KFOR would be able to protect itself for a limited period, but
nothing more. Hence, their passivity is more a necessity than matter of choice.

1
Gracko is derived from Serb grad (city), but it refers to town at this particular occasion.
2
Derived from Serb lipa (lime tree).
3
The village had 500 inhabitants at that time, while now (April 2009) only 250 have remained.
 198

Those Serbs who escaped from KiM occasionally visit their deserted homes and grave yards,
usually on special religious occasions. The same procedure prescribed for going out from enclaves,
applies to collective visits to KiM. In principle KFOR provides armed escorts as protection. One
such convoy, consisting of a bus with Serb refugees, with KFOR cars ahead and after the bus, was
moving on February 16, 2001 for Gračanica. When passing over bridge on a municipal road near
Podujevo, the bridge was blasted and 11 people inside the bus were killed and more than 10
wounded. 1 The massage to non-Shqiptars was clear: don’t try to return to KiM. The massage was
well understood: the number of returnees appears symbolic. Technically, it is Serbs to blame. They
should have insisted that KFOR personnel join them in the bus. The incident proves that the
terrorist acts are planned in cooperation with KFOR. This does not necessarily mean that the latter
sides the Shqiptars, but that escorting Serbs is risky and hence appears nuisance to KFOR.
Generally, the sooner the KiM region is ethnically cleansed thoroughly, KFOR and IC will relax
and leave the troubled area. And that is exactly what Albanians, Albanian and KiM Shqiptars
alike, want.
The international court at UNMIK found Shqiptar Fijorim Ejupi guilty for this crime in 2008 and
sentenced him for 40 years of prison. In March 2009 the same court found Ejupi not guilty and
relieved him from the sentence.
On August 13, 2003, a group of Serb youth was bathing in the Bistrica River, 2 at the village
Goraždevac, 3 near the town Peć, in Metohia. Suddenly, a machinegun fire came from the nearby
wood, from the direction of a Shqiptar nearby village. Two boys (12 and 19 years old) were killed
and four wounded 4 (12, 13, 14, 20). The perpetrator has never been revealed by KiM police,
although both UNMIK and the local police were engaged. A 5 million € reward was offered for the
information, but it was done merely “for the sake of completeness”” of the investigation. Nobody
really expected that anybody from Shqiptar side would “betray” his people for any amount of
money, and thus expose himself and his family to the many generation long avenge. Whether the
murderer was not detected, or was identified but not persecuted, or was persecuted but not publicly,
one may just make conjectures. All variants appear equally probable, particularly first two. The
local Shqiptar police would have no motivation to search for the killer, on the contrary. The
UNMIK administration, if willing, would not be able to do the job, for it would require a close and
sincere assistance of the local police, what brings us back to square one. Even if caught and
punished, nobody among Shqiptars would dare to disclose it, for it would trigger an avalanche of
violence among the Shqiptar population. That this is not just a mere conjecture illustrates the
following “incident”, which we are going to describe now.

KiM crystal night

All those terrorist acts mentioned above appear but small incidents, compared with “KiM crystal
night”, trigged by an incident on March 17, 2004. Since it is the pogrom which illustrates the best
the nature of the conflict and the overall atmosphere in the Occupied Territory, we shall devote
some space to this violent irruption the Shqiptar hatred towards non-Shqiptars on KiM.
River Ibar flows in Northern Kosovo from the West to East, and after a sudden bend is heading
towards North and joins West Morava River near the town Kraljevo. Passing through Kosovska
Mitrovica, it divides this town into the Southern (inhabited almost exclusively by Shqiptars) and
Northern Mitrovica (populated by Serbs). Upon imposing the UNMIK control, the bridge on Ibar
becomes the division line, controlled by KFOR. Ibar separates generally the Northern Kosovo,
populated by Serbs, from the rest of KiM.

1
The number of wounded varies from 12 to 45, depending on the source.
2
Clear (transparent) river, in Serb.
3
Forest village, in Serb.
 199

On March 17, 2004 near village Čabra, 1 three Shqiptar boys drowned in Ibar. Other boys of the
group accused Serb boys to have set their dogs on them and it was accordingly this incident which
caused the death of the other members of the group.
Upon learning about the incident the entire KiM was on alert and the massive assaults on Serb
population took form of a real pogrom. Number of recorded dead was 19 (11 Shqiptars, fighting
KFOR, and 8 Serbs), wounded (Serbs, Shqiptars, KFOR) 954, 4.012 Serbs banished from KiM.
Serb houses were set to fire (561), with additional 218 heavily damaged, 35 churches and
monasteries burnt up, including Bogoslovia (theological school) and Episkopat (bishop seat) at
Prizren. Pogrom lasted for three days - (17-19) March. It covered evenly the entire area of KiM
(see Figure 6), what shows that it was well organized and coordinated. The estimate was that about
50.000 Shqiptars participated in it. Since it has been dubbed Kosovo Kristalnicht (crystal night), we
describe briefly the latter, so as to make parallel.

Kristalnicht.
Early 20th century Germany witnessed rising prosperity of her Jewish population in every respect.
From the cultural and scientific point of view Germany was undergoing a noticeable
“semitization”, but this process was particularly evident in the economic sector. The presence of a
tiny minority (about 0.8 %) was particularly conspicuous by numerous synagogues, scattered all
over the country, which by their huge dimensions and peculiar architecture became annoyingly
prominent, particularly in eyes of “good Christians”. This general background, coupled with the
prominent role German politicians of Jewish origin played, after the German debacle in the Great
War, in the Weimar Republic, enable Adolf Hitler to play successfully with the anti-Semitic mood
in Germany, while building up his political career. 2 His anti-Semitic propaganda took am
unprecedented intensity and form in already long European anti-Semitic tradition. Jews were
subjected to various forms of suppression, with an open aim to be banished from Germany. The
tension was gradually rising and Germany reached what physicist call a metastable state, when
even a small incident can trigger a massive disaster. And it happened.
On November 9, 1938, a Jewish student from Poland, Herschel Grynszpan, dissatisfied with the
German treatment of Jews, assassinated German ambassador Ernst von Rath. The response of non-
Jewish German population was horrifying. All over the country synagogues were set to fire (over
1000 were burnt), 7.500 Jewish houses looted, 91 Jews killed and 30.000 Jews arrested. Later
evidence revealed that those actions were well coordinated by the Nazi regime, but the truth
remains that without the widespread anti-Jewish feelings the pogrom would not attain such a
massive scale.
The message sent to German Jews was clear: you are not welcome here. Many took it seriously and
left Germany, but many remained, to end at Auschwitz or elsewhere. As for the evidence of
Kosovo pogrom coordination this has never been revealed, as expected. The difference between the
German and Kosovo pogroms lies mainly in the technical possibilities to prevent the “spontaneous
revolt” of the majoritarian population. In Germany, the police could have prevented synagogue
burnings, at least, whereas at KiM KFOR was obviously unprepared and unable to do much in this
respect. There were some exceptions, as the case with Gračanica monastery shows.

1
Derived from the noun čabar (chabar), used in Serbia for a kind of barrel. Interestingly, this English term has been
abandoned in moden English.
2
More precisely Judenfeind, the hatred towards Jews.
 200

Figure 11. Monastery Gračanica, near Priština, memorial church of king Milutin (1283-1321).

This masterpiece of Serbian medieval ecclesiastic architecture, see Figure 11, situated near Priština
city, is under the UNESCO protection. Expecting the worst Serbs alerted KFOR forces, who set up
a three-line defence in front of the village Chaglavica, situated 2 km south from Priština and
inhabited by about 200 Serb and 10 Roma families. On March 17, according the KFOR report, (see
Appendix 11):

[more] than a 1,000 Albanians, many of them students, broke through KFOR lines,
overturning and burning seven jeeps, and marched on Čaglavica. Before KFOR
reinforcements could stop them, the Albanians chanting “KFOR GO HOME” burned ten
Serbian homes, and forced many inhabitants to evacuate to other nearby villages.

“The battle eased off about 1:30 this morning,” the CO said. “But we lost one armored
personnel carrier and had about 30 soldiers injured.”

The last defence line was held by the Swedish unit. Their commander was well aware of the
importance of the task and the possible consequences if the defence failed. He new that Gračanica
church was to Serbs as important as the Western Wall was to Jews and that the failure to protect the
monastery would mean the beginning of a large scale war in the region, possibly even the WW3.
The defence stood up and the worst was avoided.
Now we come to the most important part of the Pogrom. On March 21, 2004, the burial of drowned
boys was organized at Čabra. A large crowd of Shqiptars attended the funeral, giving to the event a
 201

national importance. Two remarkable declarations were made on the occasion, so remarkable that
they deserve our utmost attention.
Mother Sevdija Deliju declared:

”I gave birth to him after seven daughters. He was the greatest joy in my life.”

Her cousin Sail Deliju gave even more remarkable declaration:

“Serbs have killed Egzon, but the Deliju family won’t revenge for that. We leave it to the
authorities to impose the law.”

Both declarations deserve our comments. Egzon was born after seven “unsuccessful births”. It is
the rule with Shqiptars that their women give birth to several daughters before delivering boys
(see, e.g. Figure 1). It explains, among other things, the high birthrate in this patriarchal, traditional
society, where male children are the only to count. (We mention in passing here the case of a
Bosnian Muslim of Albanian origin, whose wife gave birth to seven daughters. Suspicious that his
wife was unable to produce boys, he tried with another girl. But when the latter delivered a girl too,
he realized it was his fault and gave up further attempts to get a male hair.) To declare in the
presence of her daughters that it was her son she loved the most might sound cruel to European
ears, but not to those acquainted with the local ethos on KiM. Those girls were already aware they
owe their lives to the late appearance of their brother. Their role of secondary members of the
society has been deeply rooted into their mind, after centuries, even millennia of the social practice.

Comments
What the story of 16/3 (we designate the event by the date, just as 11/9 designates the destruction
of the twin Towers in New York.)
(i) First, we try to answer the question as of the actual content of the incident, which triggered the
pogrom. The possibilities go from the story the boys delivered to the investigators (at least as the
official statement goes), to an invention of the incident. The latter would imply that the group was
swimming in the river, and three members drowned, as it sometimes happens with bathing in a
river. Fearing of the blaming from the elders’ side, the rest of the group invented the story of Serb
boys setting their dogs on them. (We recall here similar story recorded in Sweden during the time
of witch hunting, when a boy invented the appearance of devil, who helped the girl, who was
looking after sheep with him, to return the run-away herd across the river.)
Before we proceed, an answer to the question of the official report and the subsequent investigation
seems in order. Why the final outcome of the investigation has never been revealed? But, in fact,
this was exactly what was expected (not) to happen. For whichever alternative was found true, an
official pronunciation would cause further disasters. In the case of confirming boys’ story, this
would provoke further riots and massacres. Not only as an immediate consequence, but in the
eventual future accidents of similar nature. In the case of the invention, however, the official would
not now what to do. The damage was done, and the response of the Serb (and Serbian) part would
only further deteriorate the already disastrous situation. The best response, hence, has been to
forget the incident. But the story for us is far from finished.
The incident and the subsequent pogrom signal clearly the metastable state of the “multiethnic KiM
community”, the IC advocates, with the Shqiptar authorities joining in. But if the peace depends on
the absence of accidents like this, real or invented, this means that the coexistence of Shqiptar and
non-Shqiptar population turns out impossible. With the Shqiptar finger on the trigger, this kind of
disaster will be pending all the time and fear of its happening won’t surely encourage non-Shqiptar
population to stay on this “barrel of powder”. The pogrom demonstrates that no investigation could
 202

ensure the peace, since the response to the “news” appears instantaneous, and has nothing to do
with a “posteriori truth”.

Sail Deliju’s declaration: “Serbs have killed Egzon, …” deserves further comments. Let us suppose
that the first news, which triggered the pogrom, was a correct account of what really happened in
the incident. Further, let us assume that it was not children accused for murder, but adult Serbs.
How many Serbs? Let us assume there were dozen of them who took part in the murder.
Technically Deliju would have been right (those who allegedly killed Egzon were Serbs). Let us go
a little back in time and space, to the first century Palestine, under Roman occupation. According
to the New Testament those who instigated Jesus‘ death and were therefore responsible for his
crucifixion, were Jews. Which Jews and how many Jews? Let us assume there were hundreds of
them in Jerusalem streets on that fatal day. 1 We recall now the millennia long reverberations of the
account of the alleged event, in the minds of faithful Christians “Jews have killed Jesus”. Though
not stated explicitly, but reading at it stands, it reads “All Jews have participated in killing Jesus
Christ”. The message was clear: “All Jews are guilty”. And the European history has witnessed the
fatal consequences of this seemingly innocent paralogism.

Čaglavica battle demonstrates many things to consider with an utmost seriousness.

First, why the Shqiptar police did not intervene? We know it consists mainly of the former KLA
fighters. This does not inevitably imply they are not reliable security service, even when the Serb
interests are involved. Unfortunately, the situation is much worse. Though they are under the
formal control of the central authorities, the factual control comes from the rest of the patriarchal
population, bound by the Leka Dukagjini cannon (The Cannun), we considered before. An
involvement of Shqiptar forces would imply killing Shqiptars by Shqiptars. In the atmosphere of
the ”national resurrection” out of the ”Serbian repression” etc, such killing would be interpreted as
antinational crime. It would provoke the most disastrous response – that of blood feud. In fact, the
entire pogrom was the collective blood feud.
The slogan KFOR GO HOME launched during the assault on the Gračanica defenders, speak by
itself about the real relationship on KiM, and what would happen if KFOR fails to fulfil Shqiptars’
expectations. Equally, it reveals clearly what will happen when Shqiptars conclude they do not
need KFOR and any other international protection or control. Better to say when they start
experiencing the presence of the international personnel as another occupation, as many do already.
Now we make a test for not much attentive readers. By reading the report on the clash between
Shqiptars and KFOR forces, what provoked in you the most astonishing feeling? I suggest the
readers to pause before attempting to answer (to themselves) this question.
Those thousands attackers were all armed. Is it expecting in a civilized state that civilians possess
arms? Are you already recognizing the right of KiM population to possess arms, as their “natural
tools”? We discussed before the various sources of Shqiptar weaponry. True, other Dinaric regions
after the former Yugoslavia dissolution were will equipped with arms, but those arms came from
the arsenals of the Yugoslav Army, in particular when Serbs in those regions are considered. Since
many of them passed to Serbia with the armament and retained it, Serbia has been occupied by
those incomers. The consequence of this “arms to people” syndrome has been disastrous. Neither
of the ensuing states, except Slovenia and Macedonia may be regarded as states. This includes also
Albania, as discussed before. This applies particularly to KiM, as an extreme case of the Balkan
stateless conditions. Country where the central government does not control her population is not
state at all.
This “armed country” syndromes not a specialty of Balkan region, but it is within the European
community. In the Middle East it concerns Lebanon and Israel, but in the later case situation

1
We emphasize again, we are considering the nonhistorical account here, not real events.
 203

appears unique and opposite to what e have just said. Israel owes her existence to the armed
population, what makes it the fourth military power in the world. Lebanon civil war was the best,
(and most horrible) example of the ”armed state” without state. We mention here, in passing, the
case of Afghanistan, which may be considered the closest case to that of KiM before occupation.
The position of the rebellious Taliban’s vis-à-vis USA administration was changed several times,
depending on the political interests of USA (at least as judged from the White House). They were
first fanatical Muslims, then freedom fighters (against Soviet supported central government), then
terrorists while fighting USA puppet government at Kabul. Similarly, KLA was proclaimed by
White House first terrorists and fanatical communists, and then the freedom fighters, when
realized they can be used to overthrow Milošević at Belgrade.
That the White House politics has little (if any) to do with justice and ethos is well illustrated by
the cases of Iraq and Serbia. While Sadam Hussein was attacking Iran, he was a good guy, but
when he was threatening Israel, he was to be smashed as a satanic figure. Equally, while Milošević
was cooperative over Bosnian wars, restraining Serbs there and trying to bring them to their minds,
he was an acceptable partner, until he lost control over Bosnian Serbs and thus became useless and
bad guy.
(iii) Though formally expressions of understandable grief, declarations from the family of one of
drowned boy are more of a political appeal than private sorrow. The message of those two
declarations mentioned can not be misunderstood: out with Serbs who are doing to us things like
this. We notice the formal correctness of the Egzon’s uncle: the boys who allegedly caused the
death of thee boys were Serbs, hence “Serbs have done that”. The ”Christian” forgiveness to his
enemy, Serbs, further strengthens his cause, contrasting his generosity (and sticking to the law)
against Serb cruelties.
We recall here that episode with Aziz Kelmendi killing his army mates at Paraćin caserne in 1987.
Now imagine burial of those four victims at their home places, with family declarations like:
“Shqiptars have killed my son …!”. At the time many Shqiptars were working all over Yugoslavia,
particularly at large cities, like Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, etc. Imagine the similar response to the
Paraćin massacre, with Shqiptar shops set to fire, their owners killed. In Belgrade almost the entire
low-rank personnel in a number of municipal services, like the city cleaning service, consisted of
Shqiptar (and Roma) ethnicity. And while nobody tried the raise the tension on that occasion, Aziz
Kelmendi had a massive burial at his home village on KiM, as a national hero (with slogans like
“Serbs have killed our Aziz!”). Just as the unfortunate Egzon had at Čabra.
This incident (or accident) illustrates well the situation when there exists an ethnical tension in a
society. Those who are eager to make use of any kind of dissatisfaction among a population against
a particular institution (like the very state) or a particular nation, can always turn a social
dissatisfaction, or some other cause of it, into their political goals. KiM Shqiptars never even tried
to explain the bad economic situation on KiM by the enormous birth rate, but persistently
channeled the dissatisfaction towards Belgrade (Serb) “suppression” etc. It was infinitely easier and
more profitable, while the family planning has always been among Albanians a taboo theme.

Serbia after Kumanovo capitulation

As mentioned before, the place to sign Serbia’s capitulation was not chosen by accident. The
decision to humiliate Serbia maximally followed Hitler’s logic: Kumanovo became Serb
Compiegne Forest. The rationale was the following. By humiliating Serbia, we humiliate Milošević
(or vice versa) and Serbians will stick guts and get rid of their loser-leader. Next period of a year
or so was critical for Milošević indeed. Although he tried to present the Kumanovo “agreement” as
an agreement, the coffins of those killed by Allies in Serbia and particularly o KiM were pointing
in different direction. But, to the surprise of many, Milošević announced elections for September
2000. What was the reason for this gambling is still unclear. This autocrat did take some measures
to ensure a favourable outcome of the elections. He had the opposition leader Vuk Drašković killed
 204

(twice, but the assassinations badly failed). The most dangerous journalist Slavko Ćuruvija was
killed at the start of NATO intervention, Zoran Djindjic frightened (at least thought to have been).
Not long before the election the principal political opponent, Ivan Stambolić, was kidnapped (his
remains will be excavated in 2003, after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic). The irony was that it
was Ivan Stambolić who was Milošević’s political patron, who launched him into “political obit” in
1987 (the move which will prove to be most fatal to Serbia). But the most probable source of this
miscalculation should be looked for in Šešelj’s quarters. Here is how the master-mind of ”the
greatest of all Serbs” (second only to Ante Pavelic) 1 does it.
We saw how Šešelj invited USA (via Bill Clinton) to attack Serbia, and how he provided trumps to
those claiming Serbia planned a massive ethnical cleansing by declaring, in the capacity of the
Vice-premier, that after the NATO intervention there will be no Shqiptars on KiM. When the
Kumanovo capitulation was signed, Šešelj withdraw his ministers from the government, as a sign
of his “strongest disproval” of this “treachery act”. But, what a misfortune, Milošević did not
accept the resignation and Šešelj and his cronies remained in the government, as a proof of their
patriotic sentiment, in the time of the national disaster etc. Thus, as the Serb proverb says, the wolf
was fed up and sheep were in full numbers. This theatrical performance was aimed at keeping the
control over the government, without compromising himself with the losers. Šešelj’s expectation
was that with the loss of KiM Milošević will lose the power, and there will be no further obstacles
to his gaining the upper hand.
Two questions concerning Šešelj’s announcement of KiM ethnical cleansing come to mind. First,
what was his real intention and second – was he capable of realizing his threats?
We mentioned many times before that those Dinaroids often mix their wishful thinking with
reality. If the latter does not conform to their fancies, so worse for it. This weird sense of real world
has produced some of best Serbo-Croat epic poetry, with meager events becoming happening of
global importance. In the realm of politics such a sense of reality has often lead to megalomaniac
projects. (We already mentioned Vaso Čubrilović “projects” for “cleaning” Serbia.) In fact
something similar did happen in Serbia in 1944/5, when German population in Vojvodina was
expelled to Germany. About 200.000 went there voluntarily, while 200.000 were banished from
Serbia. All of them were replaced by Dinaroids from over Drina River. Ethnical feelings apart,
from an anthropological viewpoint, 400.000 high quality population was replaced by poor, low-
quality (and low productivity) people from the western part of Yugoslavia.
As for the feasibility of the alleged project, the example of Folksdeutschers is of little help. They
were civilized inhabitants of the rich Pannonian Plane, whereas Shqiptars are a paradigm of
warmongers, explicitly supported by USA and Germany, among other western Allies. Even if
successful in carrying out the alleged project at the start, nobody could expect such a massive
forced migration would end in a stable, from IC accepted, status of KiM. But this does not make
the alleged Šešelj’s intentions improbable. Here is the report from a press conference, held in
Belgrade on August 8, 1998, on the occasion of the promotion of a book entitled EXODUS,
dedicated to the fate of Serb refugees (entitled “Serbs are paid to commit atrocities on Kosovo”): 2

Bishop Zahumsko-Herzegovian Atanasije declared:” Now on Kosovo fight tramps, and

the most numerous are refugees from Krajina”, who - as the bishop said – ”are paid by
one thousand DM, and they commit crimes and whatever else …”. ”What is going on on
Kosovo is a disaster and I fear that another national shame will come out of that”, said
bishop Atanasije, taking part in a conversation about the book “Izgon” [Banishment],

1
The infamous Croat fascist leader (Poglavnik), who was at the head of the equally infamous Nazi puppet state
Independent (sic) State (sic) of Croats (1941-1945), responsible for exterminating hundreds thousand of Serbs, Roma
and Jews.
2
“Danas”, August 8, 2008.
 205

which describes the exodus of Serbs from Krajina. As ”Pobjeda” 1 reports, bishop
Atanasije said that ”Serb people in Croatia and BiH appear victims of a big treachery”,
pointing out that the suffering of Serbs there in the latest years is the consequence of the
politics which – as he stressed – “run criminal and irresponsible people at the alienated
Belgrade”. Making remark that the wife of the president of FRY is “a psychopath” and
”of an evil blood”, bishop Atanasije added: “While Kosovo is bleeding, she holds the
congress”.

We note here that the bishop Atanasije is a high-rank cleric and his diocese is the core of the
Dinaric region. The report appears significant in many respects, but we have quoted it here to
illustrates the thesis that the atrocities committed as a means to realize the ethnical cleansing were
done mostly by people alien to Serbia, brought in as mercenaries to accomplish the political goals
of the same intruders, but who came before and acquired high political, military, police and other
relevant positions, as the case with Šešelj was. 2
One of his favourite political (sic) project has been extending Serbia towards western regions, with
the famous border line Karlobag-Ogulin-Virovitica, passing through the Croatian mainland. The
rationale (sic) for such a project has been the claim that all Croats are in fact Serbs, although
unaware of this. This thesis is not original, in fact, and such claims used to be announced by Serb
nationalistic linguists, for instance, particularly those from Dinaric regions. 3 But the more mundane
reason for playing with such a phantasmagoric plan is that Šešelj’s farther was a Croat, and Šešelj
himself has been expelled from his homeland. Thus, his Great Serbia would serve a double
purpose: his ethnical origin would become irrelevant and his banishing revenged. Nobody sane
would support such a project, except, of course, his Dinaroids. Since his alleged victims should be
ethnic-Albanians this time does not change much the original rationale – they were supposed to be
replaced by Dinaric population, just as the original suggestion by Vaso Čubrilović was. Thus we
have the complete picture of the ”anti-Shqiptar conspiracy” – the prehistory, and the almost official
announcement which fits the alleged plans. The additional burden is, of course, the recent ethnical
cleansing in Croatia and BiH, with number of displaced and banished (or at least transferred)
people of the order of million. Within this context, any proclamation like that made by “Great
Serb” Šešelj, sounds realistic.
Šešelj’s plans could not fail, at least he thought so. If his phantasmagoric project of replacing
Shqiptars by his Dinaroids comes true, he will have a sufficient number of supporters and thus the
absolute power in Serbia. On the other hand, if this fails, KiM will be lost, and so will be
Milošević, his principal adversary in the long run. Hence, as a Croat peasant said to his sons, whom
he sent one to Ustashas, the other to Domobrans 4 : My sons, this war we can not lose!
General feeling of Serbians (at least those who were Serbs) after Kumanovo capitulation was
similar to that of Germany’s Germans after the capitulation in 1918. Humiliated, with the economy
and infrastructure badly damaged, and isolated again from the IC, a sense of despair was in the air.
It was exactly what the Allies expected by NATO intervention. As already mentioned Milošević
felt it was just the right moment to check his popularity in Serbia. It was a risky move from his
side, but presumably encouraged by Šešelj, for the reasons mentioned. The latter played on the
feeling of the humiliation and his ”taking distance” from the Kumanovo capitulation.
The opposition formed a unique front (without Vuk Drašković, who thought by his Dinaric
optimism he could win the race alone). The principal oppositional figure, Zoran Djindjic, had been
the target of a most brutal campaign from Milošević’s side, that he was demonized to such an

1
Daily at Podgorica, Montenegro.
2
We shall meet those tramps when discussing attrocities on KiM, in particular the Podujevo massacre by the so-
called Skorpions unit from Bosnia.
3
Needless to say those Croat nationalists did not fail to proclaim similar theses, with the subjects interchanged.
4
Nazi and nationalistic Quislings, respectively, during the WW II.
 206

extent that he felt his unpopularity would be the obstacle for winning the election. He thus
proposed that the campaign, which the opposition was to carry out under the name of Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS), should be lead by Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the conservative
nationalistic Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS). The electoral campaign was fierce. Milošević
played with the cards of patriotism, accusing DOS of treachery. But he overcalculated himself,
since it was not difficult to Kostunica to prove his patriotism expounded during the NATO
aggression. With the coffins of those killed in fighting the overpowerful enemies at hinder mind,
the electoral body gave a clear preference to Kostunica for the president of Serbia. The next
fortnight or so revealed the essence of Milošević’s image of democracy.
Up to this moment Milošević’s SPS used to win all elections since 1990, when the formal many-
party system was inaugurated in Serbia. It took some time the former members of the Communist
Party of Serbia (so-called Association of Serbian Communists), who voted for the same party under
the new name (SPS), realized that there were new options to try and started to join newly formed
parties, like democratic Party (DS) under the professor Dragoljub Mićunović leadership, and right-
wing parties like those lead by Vuk Drašković and Dr Vojislav Šešelj. As a result, the number of
SPS used to decline gradually, but remained still the largest in Serbia. As long he enjoyed the
majority support, Milošević did not bother about the election results and played comfortably with
the formal democracy. The problem arose in 1996, when the opposition won the local municipal
elections. Faced with losing control over local institutions, like public media and services in
Belgrade, with powerful propaganda capabilities, Milošević resorted to forgery, declaring that his
SPS candidates won in those towns, including Belgrade, instead of the oppositional ones. Massive
demonstrations, lead by DS, Serbian Movement of Restoration (SMR) lead by Drašković and
Association of Serbian Citizens (lead by Dr Vesna Pešić), organized massive demonstrations all
over Serbia. Lasting for three months, they forced Milošević, under the international pressure, to
give in and the opposition took over the municipal administration in almost all larger towns in
Serbia, including Belgrade. The elections in 1996 revealed that Milošević recognized the many-
party system as long as he has the majority support. When he lost it, he forgot the rules and simply
grabbed the votes.
This time the active resistance to the autocratic regime was well organized and persistent. A student
organization “Otpor” (the resistance) was founded and active all over Serbia. Rumours were going
around that it was supported by ”foreign agencies”, but it has never been proved. Nevertheless the
regime took brutal measures against the movement, which gathered not only students, but youth in
general. Members of the movement were arrested, interrogated, beaten and intimidated, but they
withstood the persecution. The activity of ”Otpor” was instrumental in raising and keeping the anti-
regime atmosphere and feelings. Many university professors, like Srbijanka Turajlić (Faculty of
Electrical Engineering), academician Milan Kurepa (Faculty of Physics and Institute of Physics),
Belgrade, were active within the movement and otherwise.
We note here that, since his autocratic regime provoked much of the antagonism within the Serbian
political scene and he was aware of the hatred toward him, Milošević’s staying in power was no
longer a political choice, but the matter of survival, not only political, but physical as well. It is the
fate of dictators to have no choice but to remain dictators. Losing the elections was too much to
him to allow to be overthrown by voting ballots. And he grabbed the straw.
The elections on September 24, 2000 put Milošević in a position similar to that in 1996, but this
time even more serious, for now it concerned his own reputation of the national leader. The
elections marginally passed the minimum census and Milošević declared that the elections failed
and new ones were to be run. But the opposition did not give in. Next fortnight turned out to be
decisive to Milošević and Serbia. This time the initiative was in Djindjic’s hands. This middle aged
philosopher who did his PhD in Germany, where he spent a number of years working there, turned
out to be an exceptionally brilliant politician, one that appears in a state once in a century or so. He
 207

first ensured that the police and Milošević shock force, the Red Berets, 1 lead by the former member
of League of Foreigners, Milorad Ulemek-Legia (HDE), 2 promised not to interfere with the
political struggle. On October 5, a massive rally was organized on the square in front of the
National Assembly building. It gathered around half of million people, from all over Serbia. The
police tried to disperse the protesters by the tear gas, but the people withstood the attacks. 3 The
principal propaganda centre of the regime, Radio TV Belgrade in the nearby street, was
successfully attacked and occupied, as well as the municipal TV Studio B, with the help of a certain
captain Dragan, a former military instructor at the Republica Srpska Krajina (otherwise a citizen of
Australia). 4 A number of armored vehicles from Red Berets squadron did appear on the stage, but
did not take action. The crowd crashed into the Assembly Building and the police forces gave in.
Upon crashing into the building a number of young demonstrators set some offices to fire. More
over, they took a number of paintings from the walls as well as a few pieces of furniture and carried
them away. Considering the nature of demonstration and the cultural profile of the demonstrators, it
was highly unlikely that those misdeeds were done by the authentic protesters, but rather by
external provocateurs. This assumption was further corroborated at the first (improvised) meeting
of the new Federal assembly, in another building at Belgrade. The first sentence uttered by Šešelj
against the overturn of the old (including his own) regime, was directed towards “vandalism” of the
new rulers etc. One of the principal tricks used by Šešelj and his supporters is the slogan “Catch the
thief!”. (This method was applied during the Vuk Drašković’s demonstration in front of Federal
Assembly building in 1990-ies, after Šešelj’s MP, a former boxer, badly hurt SMR MP, Mihajilo
Marković, at the very entrance of the assembly hall. One of ”protesters” drew the gun and shot at
the spot a policeman on the Assembly staircase. This was taken as a pretext to arrest Vuk
Drašković and his wife, although they had MP immunities and they were released later, under the
international pressure, in particular from the side of president Chirac and his wife. In all probability
the incident was designed by Šešelj and his party, to remove Vuk Drašković and his party from the
political scene. (The project will turn out successful).
Milošević asked the head of the Army General quarters, general Pavković to intervene, but the
latter turned him down. Pushed to the wall Milošević gave in and made a solemn declaration he
lost the elections. The power passed to the opposition, tough it still had to be verified by the state
administration. Next day general Pavković, brought Koštunica to Milošević’s residence, where the
autocratic leader presumably recognized his defeat, in a closed meeting, without witnesses. It has
never been revealed what happened at the meeting, but after the opposition took over the power,
many things started to reveal themselves. Presumably, the conversations run like this.

I can prevent you taking over power, but I shall not do that. You will rule formally the
country, but do not fancy you will be the boss. I shall retain the control over police,
army and secret services and you shall run the finances. I know I have no credit with
west, but you will get financial support from them…. You will take care that I am not
persecuted …
.
After taking over control at the federal level, Djindjic pressed further for the Serbian sector and
very soon the elections at the Serbian level were carried out, with the expected result: DOD won
comfortably and new republican government, headed by Djindjic, was formed. Two things were
surprising in the event: (i) why Milošević supporters, who were still holding power in Serbia

1
In fact Milošević’s praetorian guard, consisting of mercenaries from Dinaric regions.
2
His surname Ulemek points to his Muslim origin, whereas the nickname Legija refers to his former service at the
League of Foreigners (Legija Stranaca in Serb parlance)
3
My wife and I found the shelter, together with a number of other protesters, in a nearby building of Belgrade
municipal assembly.
4
He will be accused by the Hague Tribunal later on, but managed to avoid the suit.
 208

agreed so readily for new elections, which were not imminent according to the constitution and (ii)
why the old regime lost catastrophically the elections. The only explanation of both points may be
found in the above mentioned presumed agreement Milošević-Kostunica.
The general public was perplexed by Kostunica’s retaining Milošević’s administration, which runs
in fact the state. In particular NGO were very loud in demanding a total dismantling of the old
regime. It seems that nobody understood the real significance of the turnover. We go back,
therefore, to the Rumanian overthrowing Ceausescu, in 1989.
The couple Nikolae & Elena run Romania as efficiently and brutally as Serbian tandem Slobodan
& Mira did Serbia. But the state was in a very bad condition, especially since Ceausescu chose to
pay off all state foreign debts and thus emptied the state coffins. He was not able any longer to pay
Army and, especially, the police, including Securitatea (the secret service). It was the later who let
him downstream, as foreign reporters, who were there at the moment of the coup d’état, noticed.
Without Securitatea’s consent, the opposition would have never seceded in getting rid of the
dictator. Generally, dictator who is kicked of by voting bullets is not a true dictator, but even a coup
d’ etat can not be carried out without support “from within”. In the case of October 5, the restrained
behaviour of the Army and Red Berets was instrumental for the success. Djindjic contribution to
the coup d’ etat by neutralizing Red Berets, via Ulemek-Legija, can not be overestimated. It was a
gambling, of course, but it paid off. In a sense, Djindjic’s coup d’ etat resembled much that of
Dimitrijević-Apis in 1903, when the army got rid of the incapable king and his ambitious and
pretentious wife Draga Mašin (the couple corresponding to those two in Rumania and later Serbia).
The state, run by incompetent people, simply could not pay the army.

Post-October Serbia
In a sense October 5 marked the Serbian history in almost as significant way as the so-called
October Revolution was the turning point n Russian modern history. There have been, however,
some important differences. First, Russian October revolution was a misnomer, much exploited by
the Bolsheviks, for obvious reasons. In fact it was not a revolution, but counter-revolution. The
revolution was carried out by Kerensky and others in March, 1917, when Tsar Nicolas II abdicated
and the Russian middle class took over the power. What happened in October the same year was
that tsarist autocratic regime was replaced by Bolshevik dictatorship, led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin.
After October 5, Djindjic was facing a number of big tasks to carry out. He had:
(i) To ensure an essential control over the state after the turn-over.
(ii) To get rid of Milošević and his remnants in the state services and administration.
(iii) To get support of the international community, particularly of the West.
(iv) To protect the state from the Dinaric menace, that Damocles’ sword hung over the head of
Serbia since late 1980ies.
As we have seen there were in fact two Octobers in 2000: October 5 and October 6. The following
year in Serbia will witness the struggle between these two landmarks, epitomized by Djindjic and
Kostunica, respectively. In a sense, this rivalry resembled much the struggle between Karageorgie
Petrovic and Milos Obrenovic, leaders of the First and Second Serbian Uprising, respectively. (In
fact some people call October turnover Third Serbian Uprising.) Karageorgie was an extraordinary
charismatic man, very capable military leader, a remarkably honest man, but a hot blood
personality. Contrary to him, Milos was a cunning person, calm and calculated, a brave military
leader but always ready to negotiate and gain a profit via agreements, even humiliating ones. His
craving for power and money was notorious. He crowned his political career by having beheaded
Karageorgie and sending his head to the Sultan in Istanbul. As we shall see, the Djindjic-Kostunica
rivalry will end in a similar way.

Soon after October 6 it became clear that Kostunica wanted to get rid of Djindjic and remain alone
on the top of power. Djindjic put Kostunica before the choice: he will become the Serbian prime
 209

minister or he will leave the scene to Kostunica and retire. Since the presidency was just a first step
towards taking over the power and he was aware that without Djindjic he would never make it,
Kostunica receded and the republican election, scheduled for the beginning of 2001 was led by
Djindjic, as the prime minister candidate. The overall atmosphere was very favourable for the
opposition side, that it won the election comfortably. Not only Milošević disappointed supporters
deserted, him but even the Šešelj’s party lost many votes. It was rather surprising phenomenon, but
can be explained by the following ”radical formula”:

Lunatic Bosnian fukara 1 + confused Serbian bagra 2 = SRP 3

Fukara voted for Šešelj, of course, since they experience him as their Dinaric leader, hence more as
a racial protector than a political option. On the other hand, bagra (as such) voted for the winning
side, of course. But Šešelj will turn out the ultimate winner, as we shall se later on. His principal
rival at the time, Milošević, was removed from power, his party practically destroyed not to recover
any longer. Djindjic and his DP were gaining power, but he had something in store for them, too,
as we shall see later on.
Even before the elections were carried out, the victorious democratic opposition entered informally
the Serbian government, with deputies in all ministries. After the elections the new Serbian
government was formed, with Djindjic as prime minister and Goran Svilanović as minister for
foreign affairs. The latter was a brilliant young man, from the Association of Citizens of Serbia
party, led by Vesna Pešić. Kostunica provided the government with few ministers, but it soon
became clear that his intentions were more of a destructive than constrictive nature. One of his
ministers started soon to obstruct the government and was removed from it.
Generally the government gathered the most capable, mostly young, people available in Serbia.
Djindjic also invited a young financial expert, well affirmed at the international financial
organizations, Božidar Djelic, who made an extensive use of his connections with those
organizations to ensure the influx of capital from abroad. The president of Serbia, Milan
Milutinovic, kept his position until the end of his mandate. His was a rather harmless Milošević
crony, who did not interfere into his own affairs even during Milošević era. Being accused by the
Hague Tribunal for ”KiM crimes”, he will surrender voluntarily to the Tribunal after his mandate
was over.
This task was anything but easy. In fact, majority of these communist services and administrative
personnel stemmed even from Tito’s time and were deeply entrenched into the state body. One part
of those structures was those who helped Djindjic in overthrowing Milošević, or simply did not
interfere during the October turnover. Djindjic felt obliged to retain them, at east for the time being.
Other segments of the old state sectors, like the army, police, security services etc remained almost
intact too, for it would be unadvisable to try to turn over the entire state sector within a short time
period. But this tolerance will prove fatal for Djindjic and Serbia, as we shall see late on.
Before we continue to discuss the political scene of Serbia, a few words on the character of the
political parties involved are in order.
Milošević’s SPS was a direct heir of the former Association of Communists of Serbia. It comprised
almost all layers of the social and professional structure of Serbia. Contrary to general opinion,
shared even by majority of Serbians, it was not a nationalistic party and Milošević himself was not
a nationalist (at least not Serb one). His sticking to the nationalistic sentiment was provoked by
Shqiptar nationalism (better to say chauvinism) and was used consequently as a vehicle for the
political promotion. Many members of the high ranks were, nevertheless engaged in criminal
activities, especially during the sanctions (1992-1995). His wife and her mock party United Left of

1
Scoundrels in Bosnian/Turkish parlance.
2
Scums in Serbian colloquial parlance.
3
The formula alludes to a Sebian proverb, not to be quoted here.
 210

Yugoslavia, were particularly notorious in this respect and made considerable damage to
Milošević’s party and himself, concerning public opinion, domestic and abroad. The leading
members of SPS were Dinaroids, including Milošević himself.
Djindjic’s DP gathered Serbian intellectuals, gaining support at the upper middle class. It has been
the party of the centre, with democratic internal functioning and structure (it was the only
significant party who changed her leaders by voting!). Her nationalism has been confined within
the stable patriotism.
Vesna Pešic’s ACS was a small but highly intellectualized party, situated somewhat to the left from
the centre. It gathered mainly leftist intellectuals and may be considered to be the party of the
upper class .
Kostunica’s DPS may be located at the lower middle class and has been strongly and genuinely
nationalistic and conservative. Their members, following the leader, did not suffer from any
genuine idea, nor exhibited any political initiative. Lacking the latter, their political activities
consisted, first, in obstructing not their own initiatives, and secondly in manoeuvring within the
current political disputes to make profit of these at any rate. Kostunica’s attitude towards DP and
their leaders, especially Djindjic, could be described by an obsession, carried out by pathological
vanity and envy. Although he was Serbian by several generations, his character could not conceal
his recent Dinaric origin. (His proper surname has never been revealed to the Serbian public, for his
current surname Kostunica came from the village Kostunica, in the west Shumadija, where his
grandfather moved from Montenegro).
There were some small parties, organized by war criminals, to cover their activities and enjoy the
MP immunity, like Arkan’s Party of Serb Unity, 1 but they usually lasted for a short time. This is a
brief overview of the Serbian political scene when new democratic regime took the power at the
beginning of 2000.
The attentive reader will be perplexed by my not presenting Šešelj’s SRP, and will ask ”What’s
about that Party?”. And it is a wrong question. Since it is the crux of the matter concerning Serbia’s
troubles, we shall dwell on it with some details.

Serb Radical Party

SRP is like the English horn: it is neither Serb, nor radical, nor party. As we emphasized before,
Šešelj’s ”Serbing” has been aimed at two targets: first, since he is (half) Croat, the best way to
conceal such a handicap is to attack Croats as frequently as possible, while keep on Serbing.
Second, since he came to Serbia from outside, Serbing was the best ticket for intruding deeply into
Serbia, by buttering Serbian Serbs up. Hence, his Serbing was a compulsory reflex of an intruder,
rather than a nationalistic sentiment. 2 Further, by calling his newly formed movement «radical» he
refered to the Radical party of the pre-war Serbia, one of two most significant parties between two
World wars. 3 The most prominent leader of the original party was Nikola Pašić, probably the best
Serbian politician of all times. He was prime minister many times, both during the Obrenovic and
Karageorgievich dynasties, what testifies for his extraordinary political capabilities. In order to
intrude into the former Radical party image it had in Serbian memory, Šešelj chose to found his
mock party at Kragujevac, at the same spot where the original Radical party was founded. This
trick, naïve as one might think, did not fail to attract many naïve Serbians, who did believe the
newly found party was a genuine continuation of the old one. We note, in passing, that the new
Democratic Party of Dragoljub Mićunović was built up on the same political programme, mutatis

1
Zeljko Ražnatović – Arcan was a paradigm of the Montenegrin highwayman criminal, a late remnant of the medieval highway
robbers. He will be killed at the end of 1999 and will not play any role in the October turnover.
2
How much "Serbing" has been instrumental for his ”political strategy” illustrates his demand to Serbian Academy of
Science and Arts (SASA) to ”provide a proof” of his purely Serb origin. Since SASA has been well occupied by
Dinaroids, it was not difficult to get such an outstanding historical document.
3
The other was Democratic Party.
 211

mutandis, of the pre-war DP of Pašić and his heirs. The only radical thing in the behaviour of
Šešelj’s new party has been the extreme violence and permittivity in the most ordinary sense. As
for the party, this new organization, though registered as a political party, has very little to do with
ordinary political organization and her methods of promoting her ideas. It has been rather a social
movement, movement of the social losers, at all strata of the social pyramid, but mostly the lowest
ones, lower and lower-middle class. As we mentioned above, majority of those losers came from
the West, after WW and as refugees in 1995. Majority of the latter were from rural areas, which
formed the lowest stratum in Croatia and BiH. It is interesting to note that although Šešelj made
every effort to attract Roma (general ”professional losers”) into his party, this he achieved with a
limited success only.
SRP appears more a satanic sect than an ordinary political organization. Two points must be
emphasized here. First, the structure and strategy of Šešelj’s sect resembles very much that of
Hitler and his NSP. For good reason, since Šešelj did study Hitler and his political career and
follows closely his hero in almost every detail. Of course, considering that Nazi and Hitler have
been demonized in European history, and especially in Yugoslavia, he has been very careful not to
reveal any resemblance, in whatever manner, with Nazi ideology. There is, however, one important
distinction. Whatever we think of Hitler and his party, they were sincere nationalists and patriots.
Unlike them, Šešelj’s only ideology has been personal frustration and ensuing misanthropy. Not
only that he is not a nationalist, but he could not be even if he wanted, for he is half-Croat half-
Serb.
Šešelj’s strategy before NATO aggression was to devastate Serbia as much as possible, so that it
matches him and his followers in their primitivism and incompetence. Only maximally degraded
Serbia could be occupied by the most primitive population. Sociologically speaking, Šešelj was
aiming at kakocratia, the rule of the worsts. The help which NATO aggression provided him
inadvertently can not be overestimated. As we know, the principal carrier of Hitler’s stratagem was
German frustration after the defeat in the Great War. True, to Serbian nationalists, particularly
those from the non-Serbian regions, dissolution of Yugoslavia was a sort of national defeat. But
after NATO aggression, the parallel with post-war (both WW1, WW2) Germany appears almost
perfect. It is that situation which SRP will have made use of maximally. Not just it was a good
opportunity to play with nationalistic cards, but above all to conceal the fact that it was SRP which
contributed the most to the NATO aggression and the loss of KiM, as we described above. Once
again, we have the operative tactics ”catch the thief!”, which has been used so successfully by
Šešelj and his followers. The rationale for such a choice is simple. Šešelj could not expect to
control KiM (as nobody from Serbia could either). On the other hand, loosing KiM would cause
further frustration among Serbians (outside KiM), what would further advance the cause of SRP,
the best described by the slogan “The worse the better” (provided that their own contribution to
this loss is well hidden). The first victim of this strategy should be Milošević, as the head of the
defeated state and the principal rival to SRP for the absolute power over Serbia. As the immediate
events will show, this strategy turned out fertile indeed.
The West was eager to show his support to the new government, for various reasons. First, they
helped democratic opposition to get rid of Milošević and considered partly responsible for the
prosperity of the new government and the state of Serbia. Second, members of NATO, who took
part in the Aggression felt misgivings concerning their role and tried to compensate it by pouring
financial investments and loans into the devastated country. This financial input was in a sense
“war reparations” to the exhausted state. If the former rulers and present opposition considered this
help as kind of ”retrospective bribery”, they had much of the arguments in favour of such an
interpretation.

Majority of ruined objects, which NATO raids either leveled to the ground, or damaged beyond
repair, were intentionally left intact and can be still seen in Belgrade and other cities and towns.
 212

Nobody ever dared to demand NATO or USA to compensate for the devastations. Unlike post-war
Germany, NATO had no Marshal plan for Yugoslavia. Instead West showed a generous readiness
to help by financial aid, through the international funds, like International Monetary Fund etc.
These loans and other financial facilities helped from one side Serbia to recover partly from the
suffering of NATO aggression, but on the other side gave Serbian population a wrong feeling that
they could live on loans, just as it happened during the last decades of Tito’s rule. This artificial
situation helped the reality to be concealed and people to live beyond their productivity and real
earnings. In a sense, it was a counterproductive service, which new authority accepted in the lack of
better choice.
But the story does not end here. West expected the new regime to fulfill its obligations, first of all
concerning those towards Hague Tribunal. They expected, rightly, that the resistance among the
Serbian population would be strong in that respect, and the bribery interpretation was not far from
the reality. Besides, ”bringing war criminals to justice” was not only a matter of ethos, but a
retrospective justification of the military interventions and general involvement into the Yugoslav
affairs during the process of her dissolution. The more war criminals at Hague, the more justified
the West interference would have been. Since it was Serbia who was considered the most
responsible for the Yugoslav ”wars”, it was expected that Serbs should be the most represented
population at the International Court.

But beyond this “reasonable expectation” stood the hidden reality of the West Balkan state of
affairs, which West never understood. Their expectations were based on the false notion they were
dealing with normal ordinary states, with government which controlled their respective territories,
with or without “foreign help”, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was. Their superfluous
political logic, which could be applied in the initial phase of dissolution of Yugoslavia, turned out
futile in the ensuing armed conflicts within Serbo-Croat regions, as explained before. Just as the
belligerent montagnards controlling republics involved could not manage to reach a reasonable
political agreement on the future of their common state, they were the leaders of the military
actions which followed the political failure. It concerns both regular army and actions and
paramilitary and straightway criminal units and armed groups. And after the armed fighting
stopped in 1995, their control over the newly established stated was instrumental to the ensuing
political conflicts, both within the republics and between them. We now examine this issue in
more detail in Serbia.

Governments and state control

One whom man has not yet got to know.
The answer of a gymnosophist to Alexander’s
question as to the most cunning animal.

A state is defined as a geographic unit with definite borders, and a government which controls the
territory within these borders. The control appears rarely absolute and majority of state
governments share their control with other, formal or informal partners. The most common of those
partners is the so-called organized crime. The most eclatant case of this “partnership” is Sicily, and
to some extent Italy as a whole. Even USA can not escape this dichotomy of state within state, as
far as the mafia is concerned. But the story with USA does not end here. There is another informal
structure within USA which controls the society at all levels, controlled by a specific ethnic
population, which forms the third sector. If the organized crime infiltrates the state administration
and political institutions, like government, Supreme Court, Senate and Congress, one speaks of a
corrupted state of state. But in the case of the third sector we mentioned situation appears much
more subtle and evasive. This subpopulation controls all the institutions, governmental and non-
governmental, like financial, military, economic, scientific etc sectors. The only attribute which
 213

links the members of this subpopulation is the awareness of belonging to racially distinct ethnicity.
That some of them believe in the special mission they have in USA (and in the entire world) is of
no mean significance, but this is of no primary importance to us here.
We have dwelled in some details over USA for several reasons. First, the control issue in USA
appears relevant to the relationship of the state with other countries all over the globe, and in
particular when Serbia is concerned. Second, the situation there parallels well that we meet in
Serbia. Parallel, of course, does not mean equality, even not necessarily similarity. In fact situation
in Serbia appears much more involved and considerably less apprehendable, as we shall see
immediately. First, both informal sectors in Serbia are coupled mutually, for they are determined by
the same ethnicity. As for the latter, unlike those two subpopulations which are easily discernable,
both mutually and vis a vis the rest of the (Anglo-Saxon) population, which is to be considered the
core of the USA society. To make the Serbian issue even more perplexing, it appears that the
controlling sectors consist of the ethnicity which at the first sight appears indistinguishable from
the autochthonous Serbian population. At the first sight only, but upon a more close observation
one finds a striking difference in the anthropological, mental and cultural attributes. The situation is
further complicated by the resolute denial of this intruding population to be different from the
autochthonous citizens in Serbia. To the contrary, any attempt even to speak on the subject they
experience as directed towards cleaving an edge between Serbian (ekavic) and non-Serbian
(ijekavic) Serbs.
After reading the above assertions readers might pose a question of the syndrome of a ”conspiracy
theory?”. Instead of discussing it, I shall mention an instance from my correspondence with Ms
Mara Gergolet, the editor of Corriere dela Sera (Milan). She asked Serbians to communicate their
experience during the NATO raids in 1999 and I responded to her appeal. She was much suspicious
about my claims that Serbia was, in fact, an occupied country. Instead of arguing with her, I asked
her a simple question:
”Suppose Mafia takes over all control in Italy? Would one recognize it?” For the complete control
means control over public media, which are supposed to alarm the situation. Similar situation was
in the countries under totalitarian systems, dictatorship, for instance. Yugoslavs under Tito’s rule
were not aware they lived in a totalitarian state, for no public media even discussed the issue, no
mention stated the actual state of affairs. No news, no event. The occupation of Serbia by Dinaroids
is a taboo theme and no newspaper would publish any comment on the subject, as I have
experienced myself many times. The (private) comments by those who come to Serbia and expel
(or try to do it) non-Serbs from their own native country, like Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks etc has
been that I am a chauvinist!
But what’s about other (autochthonous) Serbians? When the multy-party system was introduced in
1990 an Association of Autochthones Serbians (AAS) was founded. The founder of the AAS was
invited once on TV, subjected to derision and no further news about the Association has ever
appeared in the public media, both governmental (Milošević’s) and oppositional. The movement
has been sentenced to damnatio historiae. When somewhen in 1992 a local activist from
Democratic Party (whose members were my wife and myself at the time) visited me at home, I
mentioned with sympathy AAS. He never visited us again. 1
Those ijekavians have infiltrated the Serbian society at all levels. This phenomenon has been
present continually for centuries, since Serbia, even under Turkish rule herself, was a permanent
attractor for the Serbs (and to a less extent to other ethnicities). Politically Serbia was considered
”mother country”, and after liberation from the Ottoman Empire, a sort of Serb Piemont.
Economically Serbia was attractive as well, first of all as a fertile land, with a favourable
geographical position, unlike Bosnia and particularly Herzegovina. Both circumstances have

1
He turned out to be Dinaroid himself. Later he became during Djindji’s mandate the Belgrade major (very good, in
this respect) and died, unfortunately, a year ago.
 214

resulted in a considerable retardation of those ”over-Drina regions”, relative to Serbia. This very
fact, apart from the other mentioned, has been sufficient to maintain a steady influx into Serbia,
particularly from the Dinaric regions: Montenegro, Herzegovina, and from Croatia (Banija, Lika,
Kordun etc). One should distinguish, however, two kinds of those migrations: (a) the spontaneous
(gradual) and metanastatic 1 (massive moves). 2 Two latest of the latter occurred in 1991 (at the
beginning of falling apart of Yugoslavia) and in 1995 (after Dayton agreement). It is those two
massive influxes which have changed the demographic (and social) structure of the host country.
Serbia was not prepared to withstand such extensive perturbations. To make the situation even
worse, the incomers tend to infiltrate in particular sectors of the host society: army, police, politics
and organized crime. First two sectors are understandably attractive, considering the belligerent
mentality of Dinaroids, who served in these services in Austro-Hungary for centuries, except for
Montenegrins. The latter, however, lived to a large extent from plundering neigbouring regions
and are thus equally prone to fighting. (We should mention, however, that Montenegrins from
Montenegro did not join metanastatic migrations, but came from other regions, where they settled
before, like Bosnia and Herzegovina). Hence, this particular occupation of the army and police did
not come from an intentional project, but rather as a ”natural” consequence of the status those
populations had in the regions of origin.
The case of the organized crime appears founded on the same grounds (affinity towards arms and
nonproductive jobs), but stems also from another circumstance. Many of the so-called refugees
from the western regions came with a significant amount of money. Some of them invested it in
small or medium size private business (mainly restaurants, cafés etc), but some preferred to invest
their capital in the most profitable business: drug dealing and weapons trade. They did not find, of
course, the host country free of these crimes, but considering their “common origin” links and
affinities, together with pronounced ability to make use of violent means, they quickly acquired top
positions within the organized crime. The very ”political party” Šešelj’s SRP has been designed as
the “political cover” for the criminal activities and even on the very political scene makes use of
criminal violence and other crimes. We shall return to this point soon.

Paramilitaries in Serbia
We have already signaled the presence of Dinaroid paramilitaries in Serbia, like those of Zeljko
Raznatovic-Arkan (”Tigers”), Milorad Ulemek-Legija (“Red Berets”), “Scorpions” etc. In 1999
Arkan was killed, and ”Scorpions” dismantled (after that massacre at Podujevo, we described
earlier). But the role of ”Red Berets” gained in importance, to become the principal obstacle for
normalization in Serbia.
Formed in “Krajina Republic” as a special police unit, it passed after Dayton agreement to Serbia,
to be proclaimed anti-terrorist unit. The overwhelming majority of its staff was Dinaroids, many of
them having served in League of Foreigners, like their leader Legija (League in Serb parlance).
(Their first commandant was Simatović, a Croat). Equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry
and other military means, with heavy arms like artillery guns, helicopters etc, the unit represented a
formidable military force. In fact, it was this unit Milošević relied on during his autocratic rule.
Cynically enough, the designation ”anti-terrorist” was only partially wrong – the unit turned out to
be a terrorist force, for the personal Milošević use.
There was only one military unit in the Army which could cope with Red Berets, the 73 parachute
brigade, stationed at Niš. To understand further events, we stress again that the tops of both army
and police pyramids were occupied by Dinaroids. (From 1990 out of 5 chefs of the General Staff
only one was not a Dinaroid). Similar situation was in police, where, unlike army, Montenegrins
were the dominant staff. When Zoran Djindjic was preparing Milošević overthrow he was aware

1
Migrations after (abortive) uprisings.
2
One should add two massive influxes from 1941 and 1945.
 215

that without help of the Army and Police he could not make it. Legija himself invited Djindjic and
offered a deal, which was accepted. General Pavković, chief of the General Staff (a Serbian) gave
signal Army would not interfere. Thus, the green light was given.
After October 5, Red Berets remained as Damocles’ sword over Dindjic’s head. We do not know
exactly what the deal was, but the striking hammer of Slobodan Milošević was not dismantled.
When Djindjic arrested Milošević at his residence in Belgrade, he did not dare to make use of the
unit, not even of a police, but engaged his own bodyguard and similar unofficial people. The whole
operation looked more like a kidnapping, than an official legal arrest. The delivery of the former
president to Hague Tribunal was approved by the government, but it seems that the delivery was
carried out a few hours before the official decision. President Vojislav Kostunica was reluctant to
admit the delivery, but gave in under the pressure, both from Djindjic’s side and the foreign
insistence. The opposition claimed that the delivery was an act of national treachery. Formally, it
was. Ina sense, this episode resembles strikingly that of the Georgie Petrovic (Karageorgie) murder
in 1817, when he was decapitated treacherously by Serbian ruler Milosh Obrenovic and his head
was sent to Porta at Constantinople (Istanbul) as token of Serbia’s submission to the supreme
Turkish authority. 1
The impression of the injustice towards Serbia was particularly pronounced in view that Milošević
was a partner to the West when he was used to settle the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
although it was just there he interfered with internal affairs of an internationally recognized
country. The cynicism was that he was accused for his dealing with KiM rebellion, that is for his
interfering his own business, as the president of state. Shortly before the arrest and (immediate)
delivery to Hague, a part of Serbian media revealed the discovery and excavations of a few massive
graves in Serbia, where bodies of Shqiptars were buried. This step was taken by Djindjic as a
preparation for arrest of Milošević. Although one may argue that it was a humane gesture, from the
point of view of the state interests, it could be considered as a short term pragmatic move of a
politician, not a statesman. (As we shall see later on, when talking about the kidnapping of non-
Shqiptars by Albanians and killing them in northern Albania for selling organs to (western)
hospitals, Albanians both from KiM and Albania demonstrated the absolute solidarity in concealing
the affair, not bothering much about humanitarian aspects).
Said as above, it would be fair to note that expounding the misdeeds of the overthrown autocrat
Djindjic opted for a moral gain in the eyes of IC. The latter would be much helpful in defending
interests of Serbia, from the standpoint of a fair politician, who disproved the behaviour of his
predecessor. With such an ethical capital Djindjic thought to be in a much stronger position.
Unfortunately, he was not given opportunity to exploit this advantage, as we shall see later on.
Generally speaking, the fate of overthrown dictator is sealed by his own dictatorship. Dictators
never abdicate by there own, for good reasons. Even with good will, the state does not know what
to do with him. He will be a permanent threat to the state, as a potential claimer for restoring the
previous state of affair. In a sense, this situation resembles, mutatis mutandis, that of the biblical
figure of Jesus from Nazareth, after being arrested. Having turned down his claims to be son of
God, he had to be eliminated from the society, otherwise the state would not know what to do with
him. 2

Milošević at Hague
It was for the first time that a former head of state id brought to court for his political activities. As
w mentioned above, the perverse aspect of the case was that he was not accused fro interfering
foreign affairs, but for state activities within its own borders. The ideological background of the

1
A Montenegrin bishop-ruler, poet Petar Petrovic-Njegoš, put it: ”Your head was doomed to be sold for its wreath”,
with wreath symbolizing Serbia’s (restricted) freedom.
2
Such an outcome appears independent of the case whether Sanhedrin believed his claims or not. Even a son of god
has nothing to do on earth, among mortals.
 216

indictment was a humanitarian aspects of the operations against the rebels in KiM, including not
complying the rules of war, ethnical cleansing, disproportional us e of response to rebellious
misdeed by excessive force etc. Milošević insisted to defend himself, what was accepted after a
strong resistance by the Court. It gave to the process more a political than a criminal motivation,
what was exactly what Milošević wonted. Milošević’s position was very strong, within this
framework, for he was well acquainted with the situation, both on the spot and around. Being an
able lawyer and politician, he had no difficultly in demonstrating the weak points of his indictment.
Since his trial was public, and the audience in Yugoslavia was much interested for various reasons
in the trial, Milošević defence was more a political tribunal directed to Yugoslavs, than a defence
of a war criminal. Paradoxically, his political, but even more human image rose day after day as
the trial proceeded. He skillfully made many of the prosecutor’s witnesses to look miserable, even
when they did appear victims of violence. On the other hand the trial exposed vividly the mental
structure of a Dinaroid, self-confident, emotionless, stubborn, intelligent, nonflexible, and
emotionally untouchable. To those unacquainted with this ethnicity, trial should have helped to
appreciate the problems Serbia is having under the rule of those montagnards and why the
autochthonous population has been helpless on that matter.
The trial was a unique opportunity to see the details of the KiM drama in 1997-1999 period, with
details never revealed before in Serbian media. 1 The picture has been, of course, one-sided, for the
complete inference into the nature of the conflict and the atrocities committed would have been
obtained after a counterpart trials of Shqiptars involved in similar activities. The opportunity
aroused when the then prime minister of Kosovo provisional government, Ramush Haradinaj, was
brought to Tribunal, but this attempt badly failed, as we shall see later on. Finally Milošević died
before the verdict was reached and the entire business turned out abortive. Of course, all sides
involved, directly or indirectly, claimed victory. Milošević’s sympathizers claimed even that he
was murdered, whereas some who new his mental structure believe he committed a kind of suicide,
by failing to take drugs. Milošević did submit an appealing letter to Russian embassy in Hague,
claiming that he was going to be liquidated by the Tribunal authorities, day before he died. We
recall that his family already had a rich record on the matter: his parents and uncle all ended their
lives by their own hands. Anyway, Milošević was exposed to such a pressure for six years that it
was an exploit from his side he even managed to survive that long. He was buried in the courtyard
of his house at his birthplace Požarevac, thus imitating the eternal home of his great predecessor,
Josip Broz Tito, whom he admired very much. 2 In many respects such an end turns out be the best
outcome of an extraordinary trial, unprecedented in modern history. Any verdict would have
provoked violent responses, from all sides involved. To his followers Milošević remained martyr, a
victim of the international anti-Serb conspiracy. As for the serbofobian side, like Shqiptar, Croat,
American etc they pretend to be disappointed by the unexpected end of their demonized enemy,
convincing themselves he would have been, otherwise, sentenced to the most severe punishment.
To majority of Serbians, including some of his victims, Milošević remains a martyr. To those who
are true Christian believers, the entire case, from the arrest in Belgrade, to the trial and the sudden
death resembles much the Christ’s passion, with Djindjic playing the role of Judah and the Tribunal
of Sanhedrin.
Milošević’s trial was a complex enterprise, with many aspects deserving to be analyzed separately
in details. Since the trial was never brought to its end, final political conclusions would be
superfluous at least. In particular it did not resolve the principal issue as to the guilt of Belgrade
side, since the Priština side has not been put to the equal examination and a possibility of an
eventual verdict. What the trial did achieve was to reveal the nature of the conflict and the character
of the actors involved. It exposed vividly the inhuman character of the modern warfare, where these
1
Though, of course, widely publicized by the western media, the press particularly.
2
As it is known, Tito’s grave is in Belgrade, in the courtyard of the so-called House of Flowers, visited by a vast
number of people, both from Yugoslavia and abroad (not necessarily all admires).
 217

are civilians who suffer. The testifying of ordinary people subjected to brutal force of armed
adversaries reveals the truth we know from many wars in the last centuries, from World wars to
Vietnam, Iraq etc - the safest way to survive is to take a gun and join an army. Modern wars are
not fought between armed adversaries, but between army and civilians, with the obvious outcome.
The trial exposed the low civilization level of the local KiM population, who behaved at the Court
as coming from another planet. But the most distasteful behaviour was that of the local politicians,
from all sides. It was sad to watch how Milošević forced Shqiptar politicians, like Mahmut Bacali,
to compromise themselves on the open scene. The same communist activists who were good
members of the political forums, both Serbian and federal and very active in running the common
politics on KiM during Tito’s time and later, made a U-turn when they found more profitable to
become Shqiptar nationalists and defy their entire former political credo. Even citing from the press
their own speeches could not make them admit that their former political activities were contrary to
the latest one. They obviously considered their just cause was a just justification of self-denials, lies
and denials. But one may find an excuse for such a behaviour, for it was done for the sake of
achieving national political gains, and Machiavelli’s logic allows for making blind eye on the
ethics.
But by far the most disgusting scene were played by ijekavic Serb witnesses against Milošević.
Their strategy was to present their own roles as of victims of Serbia’s aggression, hegemony, etc,
which they had to comply reluctantly. They wanted to shift the entire burden to Serbia, as if they
were prisoners in their own countries, Republika Srpska and Srpska Krajina. The case in point as
the testifying of Milan Babić, former prime minister of Republika Srpska Krajina (in Croatia). He
moved with his family to Belgrade one week before the operation “Storm” was launched, evidently
being informed about the action about to take place. That he did not take any measure to help the
defence of the ”state” he was the head of corroborates well the fact that the entire operation was
well planned by Zagreb and Belgrade, with the agreement of the Serb leaders in Republika Srpska
Krajina. It was a massive migration of rebellious Serbs form Croatia to Serbia, plan which may be
considered good or bad, but plan which had nothing to do with Serbian citizens, who have not
been 1 aware of the agreement and the nature of the ensuing massive transfer.
(According to the testimony of the chief of the UN civil mission in Croatia at the time, Hussein al-
Alfi, Knin authorities asked UN representatives on August 4, 1995 (that is a day before the
”Storm” started, for the help in evacuating people from Krajina to Bosnia. They informed the
Mission they had imposed marshal law in Krajina, so that civilians were removed from the streets
before the expected onslaught from Zagreb side. Serbs demanded 70.000 l of gasoline, and 500
trucks for the evacuation. The report was forwarded to UN headquarters at Zagreb, with the
demands for the help in evacuating 32.000 civilians from Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac and Gračac,
towards Petrovac and Banja Luka in Bosnia.)
Milan Babić was sentenced by The Hague Court to a long term prison, even though he expressed
his ”deepest repents” for what he did to non-Serbs during his reign. Obviously he expected much
milder sentence, for his ”cooperation” with the prosecution, for when he was invited to testify
against Milošević, he accepted it eagerly, hoping to improve his position by supporting the
prosecution as much as possible. He appeared at court as a protected witness, whose identity was
concealed. His testifying was a paradigm of cowardness, dishonesty and treachery. Of course, it
was not difficult to Milošević to reveal the true identity of the “witness” and expose his human
misery, what made Babić to reveal his identity himself. Being defied on the open scene in all his
bare misery, despised even by his prison mates (both Serb and Croat), he chose the only way-out of
his selfhumiliation – a suicide. (Later, in the Serbian Parliament, the Šešelj’s MP scum would count
both Milošević and Babić as martyrs, “murdered by the Tribunal”).

1
The present perfect tense is not used by mistake here.
 218

With the arrest of Milošević and particularly after his death, his Socialist Party of Serbia declined
rapidly, to become marginalized on the political scene, hardly achieving the census for the
Parliament. Among other things, this lost of the supporters exposed clearly the fact that under
communist dictators election results had no realistic content. Parallel to this dissolution of his party,
his family dispersed too. A few days after loosing the MP immunity hi wife, Mirjana Marković,
fled to Russia. His daughter Marija fled to Montenegro, with nasty comments about Serbs and
Serbia. His son, Marko, who had an unmarried wife and a son, a common criminal, fled to Russia
too. Rumours spread that the family got hold of an enormous amount of money, which Milošević
had it transferred from Serbia to foreign banks, mainly Cyprus ones, as a measure of countering
sanctions in 1992. Since Milošević’s brother, Borivoje Milošević, a former Yugoslav ambassador
at Moscow remained in Russia, it was not difficult to ensure the wellbeing of Milošević family
there. All attempts to bring Marko and his mother to court, accused of criminal activities in Serbia
have failed, since the Russian government turned the demands down.
As for the so-called United Yugoslav Leftists, mock party of Mirjana Marković, it disappeared
without trace, since it was a fictive quasipolitical organization, which gathered hard line
communists (sic), ready to engage in any sort of political criminal, that is in criminal activities
corroborated by their political positions in the state high-level structure.
Members of the Socialist Party of Serbia dispersed into all other parties available on the political
market of Serbia, testifying that the membership in the ruling party was just an opportunist attitude,
without any ideological or political content. In fact many of the present day leading politicians in
various parties used to be good communists, who took advantage of the unique position of the
Party to build their career.
The political changes on the Serbian scene just described do not mean that Milošević (and
communist in general) heritage vanish from the Serbian society. As mentioned before, the second
state level, that of the administration, professional services like the state security organizations,
police, army, etc, remained still full of the ”old guard” people, devoted to the interest of their
former bosses and politics. With the subsequent infiltration of the ijekavic newcomers, this
structure gradually turned into a parallel state, what has had a devastating effect on the Serbian
society, as we are gong to describe now.

Two Serbias

Raping of Serbia
After Dayton agreement in 1995 almost all those among Serb population, who committed crimes
during the armed conflict in those regions, took shelter in Serbia. 1 Many of them already had a
double citizenship, and many obtained upon arriving to Serbia. Those who feared of the hand of
justice, like those already accused by The Hague Tribunal, managed to get hold the forged identity
and started their illegal life in Serbia. Since their compatriots from the region of origin already took
influential posts in Serbia, it was not difficult to establish a parallel state within state, ruled by the
old and new newcomers. As we shall see immediately this hidden state turned out not only to be
stronger than the official one but has been able and ready to exercise a real terror over the Serbia.
The principal causa efficiencis of this terror has been the Hague Tribunal and his demands to
Serbia to deliver all those accused for war crimes or misconduct of any sort during the fighting in
(1991-1995) and (1998-1999) periods.
This situation resembles much that of the post-war Germany, when people from one of the allies
occupied zone moved to another, expecting to hide there more successfully. In the same vain
Hague Tribunal was a copy of the Nürnberg Process and the other subsequent trials, carried out in
the occupied Germany, as a part of the denazification of Hitler’s state. After Dayton agreement

1
The same happened to Croatia and Montenegro, where the corresponding perpetrators found shelters.
 219

those with bad conscious from Bosnia and Herzegovina flew to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro.
But the similarity with the post-war Germany stops here. In addition to those individual escapees,
there were two massive migrations from Croatia and BiH to Serbia, as metanastatic movements.
Altogether Serbia and Montenegro were the only regions which were only recipients of migrants
and escapees. In particular, Serbia has become a refuge for the war criminals. But what sort of
refuge? Unlike post-war Germany which was occupied and controlled by Allies, the newcomers to
Serbia were both fugitives and occupiers. Not only many of them occupied high-level positions in
the state, but majority of those 400.000 were well equipped with weaponry, with the four-year
training in using them in the regions of origin. They were ready to make use of them in the host
country as they were in their original areas.
The Serbia thus became a victim of a hidden occupation, unknown in the modern history. Her
citizens are partly aware of the new state of their state, but nobody fully understood the extent of
the control which the Dinaroids got hold in the host country. But the coming events spoke for
themselves.

Red Berets are riding again

He, who plants gourds with Devil,

got them at his head.
Serbian folk saying

Serbia was obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal, under an agreement signed by Milošević
himself. It meant that every person accused for war crimes and similar misdeeds was to be arrested
and delivered to the Tribunal. When police got information in 2001 that two brothers from Bosnia
were seen on a market in the western Serbia (that is close to BiH), they sent a unit from Red Berets
brigade to arrest them, expecting an armed resistance. Brothers were arrested, but soon the
government had good reasons to regret her action. Red Berets brigade came in November 2001
from their base in Kula, northern Vojvodina and blocked the traffic on the highway through
Belgrade, fully armed. Their chiefs declared the protest for making use of the Unite in arresting
Hague accused, as a misuse of their patriotic duties. They convinced the rest of the unit and
relevant circles in Serbia that government was preparing sending all of them to Hague. It was not
difficult to be convincing on the matter, since, as we mentioned before, majority of the brigade staff
were good candidates for Hague. All eyes were turned towards the heads of the state. And what
followed revealed to those who do not mind making use of their minds who the bosses of Serbia
were.
President Vojislav Kostunica declared, when asked by journalists at the briefing, that it was all
right for rebels to block the traffic, since ”everybody strikes in his uniform” (like medicines etc). It
was clear that the move was supported (if even not initiated) by the president of state, as a part of
his fighting for the state control. Prime Minister Djindjic summoned the government and asked the
heads of the army if the state had a force which could cope with Red Berets. The answer was as
discouraging, as illustrative – NO. This response deserves some comments. First, it is hard to
believe that the Army could not overcome the rebellion, since it was rebellion indeed. There was
the elite 63 parashoot division, which is supposed to be capable of a decisive strike in such a
situation. The fact, further, that army people even did not consider any kind of response to the
challenge, was very indicative indeed. Djindjic became aware of the situation and had to make
important decisions, similar to that president Kennedy was facing at the beginning of Cuban crises.
It was the question of the sovereignty of the state of Serbia. Succumbing to the challenge would
have far reaching consequences. An opposite decision would initiate, presumably, a civil war, with
unpredictable consequences. And Djindjic made his mind – he succumbed.
 220

He went to the Red Beret base at Kula, with his right hand man, Čedomir Jovanović, whose
assistance in overthrowing Milošević (as well as in arresting him) was instrumental. When they
arrived, the hosts separated them and Djindjic was left alone to negotiate. It became immediately
clear the he was not treated as the premier, but as a prisoner. We do not know what exactly the
agreement was, but a couple of points did emerge after the “negotiations”. Djindjic had to renounce
making use of the Unit in arresting Hague fugitives. Second he promised to post a number of
Legia’s men on important places in the police and army. The latter will play a decisive role in
Djindjic’s assassinations, as we shall see later on. But here we shall dwell somewhat more on the
event which turned out to be a turning point in the Serbia’s life.
The interpretation of the response of the authorities to the Red Berets and their demonstration of
power has been only partly correct. We first note that Red Berets was a sort of ”League of
foreigners”, as existed during the colonial France. With the difference that Dinaric members of the
unit possessed no feeling of duty and honesty, unlike standard members of the League. We must,
however, make an important distinction between Montenegrins and Herzegovians in this respect.
The former did have a feeling of honesty, despite their highwayman “job”. The case in point was
Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, mentioned before, who did hold his word and kept his promises. With
those highwaymen coming from Herzegovina (especially western one) one could never trust them,
since they had no respect towards their own self-respect. When Milošević planned to make use of
Red Berets as his praetorian guard, he was “riding the tiger”. Legia turned his back to his employee
during the 5 October 2000, as well as at the arrest in June 2001. Now he turns his back to Djindjic,
this time not for a profit, but from the fear. If Djindjic was ready to deliver Milošević to Hague, he
would not hesitate to do the same with him and his comrades. But even this is just a part of the
story. The rest (the principal part) is called Ratko Mladic.

Ratko Mladić & com

The former general and chief commandant of Republica Srpska army, Ratko Mladic, comes from
Kalinovik, the core region of Herzegovina (as he used to state proudly). In 1995 his army
surrounded the UN protected enclave Srebrenica, which lies within the Serb controlled Eastern
Bosnia, connected by a corridor to the rest of the Muslim territory. Encircled by Serb forces the
town Muslim forces, under the command of Naser Orić, made frequent raids into the neighbouring
Serb vilages, plundering and killing the local population. When general Mladic occupied the town,
he found there a Dutch unit in charge of protecting the town. But the Dutch colonel did not find it
possible (or convenient) and gave up any resistence to the Serb forces. All male inhabitants (both
those who were soldiers and were wearing civilian clothes) and true civilians were taken away,
some 7.000 men, and shot not far away from Srebrenica. It was this massacre which urged the
Bosnian war to be stopped and provoked Dayton agreement, signed by Alia Izetbegovic (Muslim),
Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman (Croatia).
When the Hague Tribunal for Yugoslavia was set up, Mladic appeared the principal accused to be
brought to trial, beside the former president of the so-called Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic.
The latter was a Montnegrin, born on mountain Durmitor in Montenegro (from the same tribe as
Milošević), a psyhiatrist and the leaderof the Serb political party. He was imprisoned before the
war for embezzlement. 1 When the war atrocities became intolerable, Milošević took him to Athens,
where he was forced tosign a seasefire agreement. But when the Serb assembly was to endorse the
agreement, Karadzic distancezed himself from this and neither Milošević, who attended the
meeting with the Greek prime minister, was able to convince the assembly to aprove the act, which
was thus rejected.

1
It was in the prison where he met Momčílo Krajišnik, another later Serb political leader, who would become the
prime minister and sentenced to a long prison by Hague Tribunal.
 221

When Allied forces tried to inforce Serb cooperation concerning the settlement of disputes, making
raids on the Serb positions around besieged Sarajevo, Mladic orderd that soldiers of the
international forces, in charge of monitoring the seasefire, to be tied to electricity posts along road,
as the living shields against the air strikes. Milošević sent immediately his envoz, Stanišić, who
succeeded to persuade Bosnian Serbs to release the foreign soldiers. Episodes like these illustrate
both the character of the people involved in the armed conflict and the relationship between Serbia
and Bosnian Serbs. Near the end of military actions in Bosnia, enraged by Bosnian Serb
treacherous and stuborn beahaviour, Miloseic closed the border of Bosnia and stopped every aid,
except the humanitarian one, what provoked a wild reaction from Bosnian side. Seselj and his
followers in Serbia and Bosnia proclaimed Milošević a traitor. At Dayton, Milošević showed
sympathy with Bosnia Muslims, particularlz those in the besieged Sarajevo. As is known now,
about 10.000 citizens (including 1.500 children) were killed during the siege, mainly by mortars
and snipers. (Serbs in their part of Sarajevo fell victims of fighting too.)
Even before the Dayton agreement Mladic sent his family to Serbia. His daugter committed
suicide during a touristic trip to Russia (she presumably was a drug consumer). His son founded a
firm in Serbia, which will turn out to be instrumental in securing the financial support for hiding
general Mladic. The latter became a Serbian citizen by illegal registration.
While Radovan Karadzic was supposed to hide somewhere in Montenegro or/and Bosnia, it has
been a general belief that Ratko Mladić found the shelter in Serbia. He obtained a pension as army
general, under a previous agreement that all officers of the former Yugoslav army (Serb, of course)
be payed by Serbian military funds (better to say by Serbian taxi payers). Needless to say Serbian
citizens (Serb or non-Serb) have never been asked if they aproved such an arangement. Anyway,
family of Mladic has been receiving the pension regularly in Serbia, despite the fact that it
was(officially) unknown where he is, or even if he is alive at all.
According to unofficial statements by Serbian officials, Mladic used to hide (sic) in the Serbian
military objects, like army garrisons etc. He would threat to uproot families of eventual «»traitors»
up to the fourth generation (an obvious allusion to the biblical Fourth Commandment). Since he
had a vast military support by his compatriots from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who, as elaborated
before, held the top positions within Serbian establishment, this threat has not been taken as a mere
bluff, to the contrary. Serbia and her citizens have been scared to death. Man who slaughtered
7.000 unarmed men, can be expected to do any crime for sure. And a number of causal incidents
remind the Serbians of their slavery in their own country.
On 5 October, 2004 two conscripts went out to the guarding duty at a casern at Topcider, in
Belgrade. As soon as they went out, they were shot. The army ivestigation was quick and gave this
astonishing conclusion: The guards killed each other!. Just like that. 1 There was a clear indication
that somebody from the building appeared in the courtyard, somebody who was not supposed to be
seen at all and that his body guards killed the undesirable witnesses. At the demands of conscripts
families and the public media, an independent invtigation was carried out, who found the incident
a clear case of murder by third person(s). This finding have been ignored by the army jurisdiction
however. The only thing they did was to transfer the case to civil court, washing the hands like
Pontie Pilat. The case is still in process, without any prospect to finish in a forseable time.
This was not the only incident of this kind. A guard in a casern at Nish was similarly found dead
on duty. The official explanation was - suicide. By tracing these incidents one may follow with
certainity the «hiding rout» of Ratko Mladic in Serbia. But he was not he only fugitive to be caught
and deliverd to Hague. The latter put on the list some 45 people suspected for war crimes. Except
for 5 high rank officers from Serbian army, almost all the rest were from over-Drina regions. Up to
now, almost all have been arrested in Serbia and delivered to Hague. All except Ratko Mladic and
Goran Hadzic, former prime minister of Republika Srpska. He was under surveyence of the

1
Later, the findings were obliterated, by stating that one guard killed the other, and then committed suicide.
 222

Tribunal and when spotted, the Serbian government was alarmed on Friday and the hiding house
indicated. Immedaitely afterwards the surveyance watched how Goran Hadzic was packing into car
and flew away. When on Monday officials arrived there, the flat was empty. The film was shown to
Serbian authorities, but in vain. The game of hind and find continued.
When Vojilav Kostunica forme his government in 2003, he declared that no one will be arrested
and delivered to Hague, unless he volontarily surrended himself. After a long persuasions, those
five officials from the Army did surrende themselves and went to Hague. They were all accused for
the trocities committed in KiM, during 1998/9 campain. They are regularly released for a temprary
freedom and taken back again. 1
When this spring (2008) a new Serbian government was formed, a coalition betwen the Democratic
Party and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was made, since it was the only way to prevent Šešelj's
radicals to siese the power. Ivica Dačić from SPS was appointed the new minister of the intrnal
affairs (police). It was certain he would not have those fugitive arrested and Boris Tadic, 2 the
president of Serbia, had Radovan Karadzic arrested during «ïnterregnum», before the new ministry
was settled down.
The arrest of Radovan Karadzic contains some interesting instances, both comic and tragic. He was
cought during night on his way from New Belgrade quorters to Batajnica town, near Belgrade. 3 He
presumably was warned about the imminent arrest and tried to escape, moving to the strongold of
SRP. With a big beard and coloured long hair he was unrecognizable. The investigations revealed
he was living in a flat in New Belgrade suburb, under the fauls name of David Dabic, with the
regular identity card. 4 He was employed in a small medical firm, as an expert for alterntive
psychiatry and was a regular contributor to a journal of a similar profile. He used to take part i
numeous round tables, book promotions etc. Karadzic frequently visited the nearby cafe, held by a
Dinaroid, where he would enjoy playing gusle, a primitive Dinaric istrument with a single string
and bow, which is used to accompany oral presentation of the folk epic poetry. On the walls of the
cafe posters of Milošević, Mladic and Karadzic are to be seen. Under investigations no one of those
who contacted allias David Dabic, admitted they recognized him as Radovan Karadzic.
During his stay in castody in Belgrade large crowds of his supporters demonstrated in front of the
prison. SRP organized after his delivery to Hague a protest meeting, which turned out illegal and a
mere provocation, in order to incite radicals to make havock and thus draw attention to the SRP and
their «patriotism». Many policmen and young demonstrators were injured, with one of the latter
dying a fourtnight after the unrest.
At the first hearning at the Tribunal Karadzic protested the arrest and complained he was arrested
three days before the official date. At the place of the arrest police found a laptop, where
presumably Karadzic held files with his preparations for the eventual trial. At the hearing Karadzic
complained that many files were destroyed etc. Equally, he stated that Richard Holbrrok promised
him in 1996 he would not be persequted provided he withdraw from any political activity.
According to him, it was his fear from USA, who were after him, he had to hide. The trial is still in
due course.
The Karadzic case reveled what one has always suspected – the centre of the fugitives is at New
Belgrade, a huge modern suburb of Belgrade across River Sava, built in 1950-thies for the Tito's
partizan officers, now inhabited by their ofspring. It has a distinct mixture of nouvaurich and
Montenegrins and Herzegovians, a kind of highlanders colony. Many fugitives found shelter there,
since former Ijekavians have established a state in a state there. Being well off, with enormous
»war pensions» and salaries deserving the descenders of partisans' colonels and generals, who
have well paid posts in the state administration and equivalent jobs, these people do not mix with

1
Their trial has not yet started. They are all autochthonous Serbians.
2
Montenegrin, born in Sarajevo.
3
It is the town where Šešelj’s headquarters are situated.
4
A person with this identity did exist, in a town in Srem (Vojvodina).
 223

the rest of Serbian population. Inside this communist ghetto, Karadzic & com do not have to hide,
in fact. If Ratko Mladic is ever arrested, it would probably happen at New Belgrade, among some
200.000 compatriots.
Many explanations conserning the unseccesful hunting Mladic have been offered on the Serbian
and international market. It has been suggested from the Tribunal that Serbian government is
reluctant to arrest and deliver him, since he would reveal at the Court how Serbia was involved
intoBosnian afairs, particularly into Srebrenica masacre. Interestingly, the same rumour is circling
around Serbia, whose sources are not difficult to locate. If the Hague strategem is to force Serbia
to do what they demand, Mladic and his cronies are blackmailing Serbia straitway not to touch
fugatives for her own benefit. The interesting point is that the Tribunal took for granted that
Mladic would betray his host country and expose her to the international condamnation to save his
own skin. What further implies they are aware which kind of scum they are dealing with. We note
here that «to reveal» may well imply «to invent», for the same purpose of getting rid of the guilt
«in favour of others».

Hague Tribunal and Serbia

As mentioned before, many sectors of the Serbian society were against delivering those accused by
Hague Tribunal (HT). But motivations for such an attitude differ greatly. We divide all accused
into two large groups. One consists of Serbian autochtoneous citizens, the other of Ijekavian
fugitives, who found illegal (sic) refuge in Serbia. But there is another important dividing line
among all of them. This separates those who committet presumed crimes outside Serbia and those
who are accused for their improper behaviour within their own state (including those who came
from across Drina River too). The latter category refers mainly to those engaged in the military
actions at KiM, but not exclusively there. For instance, Vojislav Šešelj has been engaged in
intimidating and even maltreating non-Serbs in Vojvodina, not to mentioned those announcements
of banning Shqiptars from KiM.
HG demanded that all accused should be delivered to the court there, but this requirement can
hardly stand a reasonable justification. We shall discuss the issue in more detail.
Citizens of Serbia, accused for misdeeds perpetrated in Serbia should be persecuted at the
domestic courts. This is important for many reasons. First, it is the duty of a state to bring justice to
hercitizens, exibiting at the same time her sense of justice and moral responsibility. It should at the
same time raise the selfrespect in the eyes of the IC, and compensate as much as possible the lost of
respect before the public abroad. Finally, it would strengthen considerably her sovreignity. In this
respect, a few words of comparison with the case of Gavrilo Princip and the assassination of
Archduke Ferdinand and his wife seems in order. Gavrilo Princip was not Serbian citizen, and what
he did that tragic day happened outside Serbia. It was duty of Serbian side to help maximally the
investigation, but to allow for foreign investigtors would mean loss of sovreignity. (Of course, had
the Serbian political leaders known what would follow, thay should have allowed such a
humiliation). On the other hand, had the perpetrator been located in Serbia, he should have been
delivered to Austro-Hungary without hasitation.
Those non-Serbians (Serbs or non-Serbs alike) who are accused for cimes in Serbia should be
persecuted in Serbia and banished after serving the sentence.
Finally, those fugitives who were not Serbian citizens and were accused for crimes commited
outside Serbia should have been delivered, but not to HT, but to the state where they parpetrated
the crimes. Which way they are to be further treated there was the responsibility of their county of
origin. Whether they meanwhile got hold of Serbian citiznship is of no value, for the crimes
committed are of such a weight, that formal shields should not be recognized as a protection. The
only thing which should be of importance is the legality of these registrations, which displays well
the cowardnes of the perpetrators, at the expence of the refuge-country. Those cowards should be
accused for damaging the host country, brought to trial and sentenced according to the domestic
 224

law, but the sentence should be made operative only after the accused, prosecuted by HT, serves
his/her eventual sentence from HT. Otherwise, one may expect mock trials, which would serve as a
protection by smaller crimes at the expence of more serious ones. For instance, Radovan Karadzic
would be sentenced for indefinite prison, where he would spend his life in arbitrary comfortable
conditions, not much different from the free life. Here we can not avoid mentioning the case of
Biljana Plavšić, former president of Republica Srpska, one of the most arrogant and militant
political leaders during the Bosnian wars. Prior to being arrested she used to live in Serbia, were
she took refuge before HT accusations. Promised to get mild sentence if she is cooperative, she
read at the HT a heart-breaking repent, admitting her unreasonable persecuting non-Serbs etc. She
got, never-the-less a severe sentence of 11 years in prison. She then asked if she could serve the
sentence in Serbia – nota bene not in Bosnia, the country of origin, where she committed the crimes
and where she was the boss!. Why? For the same reason she flew to Serbia. It was important first of
all to link Serbia as much as possible to Bosnian affairs, as an accomplice, if even not the only
perpetrator! By accepting to provide her the prison Serbia would, albeit implicitely, admit her
active role in interfering the Bosnian afairs, if not even as an instigator. From this there would be
just a single step to claiming that it was all Serbia's business and they were but innocent tools used
in building the project of Great Serbia Empire. Besides, all those criminals from over-Drina regions
would be much safer in Serbia than in Bosnia. There they would be watched closely by the
international authorities and by the families of their victims. Last but not the least, the wishful
thinking that their compatriotes, like Šešelj, will some day take over the power in Serbia, and they
be released from prison, can not be overestimated. Of course, the expences for keeping the alliens
in Serbian prisons would be put on Serbian tax payers shoulders (the same holds for the trials to
those intruders held at Serbian courts).
We note, in passing, that according to Carla del Ponte, Jeffrey Nice try to convince the Tribunal in
2002 that it had no valuable proofs that Milošević was responsible for the genocide and crimes at
Srebrenica and Sarajevo.

Assassination of Zoran Djindjić

When a badger wants to get rid of fleas, it adopts the following tactics: bites clump of lawn and
enters slowly backwards a pool, first by trail, then by rear legs etc, until only the clump remains
above the surface. Fleas move meanwhile from the rear parts towards the nose and gather
ultimately on the clump. Badger then discards the clump and moves away clean.
While the Third Balkan war was approaching the end (sic) all those Serbs (sic) from over-Drina
regions who had bad conscious moved to Serbia and after Dayton remained there hiding (sic) from
the authorities (sic). Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina turned out thus a big badger, with Serbia
playing an honorable role of lawn clump. And when the Hague Tribunal was set up, a tragic-comic
drama started.
Some of those criminals came individually before the ceasefire, some mixed with the refugees, but
the process has never stopped. With their compatriots already settled down in Serbia, some of them
occupying high positions in all sectors of Serbian society, as we mentioned before, and with
400.000 immigrants well equipped by weaponry, these fugitives felt secure in the Serbia as the
“promised land”. Hence, when HT officers, like the chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte, started
pressing the Serbian authorities for delivering the wanted, they faced a conspiracy of silence. True,
out of 45 wanted, some small fishes were arrested and delivered, but the main perpetrators
remained well hidden. The incident with those two brothers mentioned before has clearly shown
who the boss in Serbia was. It is hard to believe that HT was not aware of the actual situation, but it
was itself under the pressure, first of all from USA, to collect as many wanted as possible,
particularly from Serb side. As mentioned before, the Serbian president Kostunica was reluctant to
cooperate, for good reasons. The hot potatoes were in Djindjic’s hands.
 225

(On February 4, 2003, Yugoslavia changed her constitution and became the federal state “Serbia
and Montenegro”. Vojislav Kostunica lost his post of the president of the state).
The prime minister, presumably, tried to convince madam del Ponte that he was not the boss, but in
vain. Finally, he lost the nerves and put at one of meetings with her the cards on the table, declaring
something like this: “I can not arrest Ratko Mladic, since there are 200.000 Bosnian refugees here,
and they are well armed!” Whether this appeal fell on deaf ears or not is not easy to infer, for very
prosecutor was not the boss and the drama took form of two fighting puppets. The only difference
was that del Ponte was playing for career and honour, whereas Djindjic’s stake was his life. He was
many times warned from various sides about the risks, but he decided to retain the image of a boss,
thus bluffing the potential murderers. This situation continued for a year or so, but Serbian March
Ides were approaching. It is still unclear when the decision was made to assassinate Zoran Djindjic,
or what trigged the ultimate decision, but in retrospect, by the end of 2002 somebody (in all
probability Ratko Mladic himself) said Alea iacta est. But before the final stage was reached, a few
words on the preliminary setting the stage seem in order.

Serbian Kennedy

[Therefore] don’t ask the state what she can do

for you, but ask yourself what you can do for her.
J. F. Kennedy
I can work for me, I can work for you,
but I can’t work instead of you.
Z. Djindjic

After Djindjic was assassinated, majority of Serbians called him Serbian Kennedy, with good
reason. Djindjic was a handsome, charismatic, brilliant, well educated person, well devoted to
politics as a vehicle for his political ideas. He was particularly popular with Serbian middle class,
which was eager to regain the previous status of the driving force of the society, the role it used to
play before the war and which role they were deprived of by the communist regime. During 1990-
iest the latter was epitomized by Slobodan Milošević and this autocrat was aware of the danger
Djindjic and his DP to his rule over Serbia. The state controlled media did not spare time in
demonizing Djindjic. Their dirty slander did not hesitate in accusing him of treachery, “western
puppet” etc. In the latest electoral campaign they even accused him to be from an Ustasha family,
although his family (from his mother side) turned out to be victim of Ustasha regime in Bosnia. But
while those accusations came from the side of his adversaries, some of his political rivals “from the
same side of the barricade” filled the press pages with subtle or less subtle allusions to the alleged
links with the criminal underground etc. Djindjic was well aware of the weird situation he found
himself after gaining power in 2001 – he had yet to gain popularity. Apart from the purely
politically enforced moves, like that of corroborating the Church (the same as Tito did just after the
war), tolerating the Milošević’s infrastructure in the state administration, tolerating the immigrants
parallel state, etc, Djindjic was yet to win the soles of majority of Serbians.
It was for that reason he used to put much weight on the publicity of his person and his activities.
His frequent t appearance on TV, for instance, was a double edged sward, however. By taking part
in popular TV programmes he did gain popularity of the ordinary citizens, but the price to pay was
a loss of authority. It was just the opposite of what Milošević did. The latter rarely appeared in
public and kept himself ”above all these ordinary matters”, but every appearance of him was
carefully arranged by his cronies and Party. 1 By creating the feeling of familiarity with “ordinary

1
He was following, in fact, the manners of Tito, his idol, whose appearances in public were experienced as sort of
epiphany.
 226

people” Djindjic at the same time allowed the criminals to come close to him in a “psychological
space”, what will turn out fatal at the end.
But within six months or so before the assassination, Djindjic concluded that the preparatory period
of strengthening the position of the new government was over and it was time to act as a statesman
and start to pull the state train forward. In addressing the ordinary people he did not fail to stress
that it was not just the obligation of the ruling parties to work hard for the common goal, but every
citizen must be doing his best if the society is to move faster and compensate for the large
retardation accumulated during the previous regimes. At an occasion before the Parliament he was
explicit, if not harsh, criticizing the MPs for their indolence (it turned out to be his last appearance
at the Assembly). Faced with the protests from the juridical sector, which was pressing for higher
salaries, Djindjic one morning suddenly appeared at a local Belgrade court, where he found almost
empty building and judges offices locked up. The juridical sector took it as an offense and
vigorously defended its independence.
Generally, Djindjic was moving too fast for the corrupted and indolent society, as Serbia was
(better to say, has been). (The parallel with John Kennedy appears here more than handy and
appropriate). Djindjic made a mistake common to many extraordinary personalities, who fail to
adopt/appreciate the attitude that it is not that the others are worst than them, but they are better
than the rest. That is, it is more profitable to exert an influence by example than by criticizing.
After that incident with the Red Berets, the tensions with police and Milošević’s infrastructure
continued. Legia started to provoke the government by making incidents at pubs etc, challenging
Djindjic and the state police. After one of these incidents, he resigned from the state service,
handing over the command over Red Berets to some of his cronies. In the retrospect, this move was
probably a step in preparation for the assassination.
That spring Djindjic visited a police unit on the Kopaonik Mountain in the central Serbia, which is
a big winter Serbian resort, close to KiM. He played soccer with the policemen and was badly hurt
by one of players. 1 As it turned out later, it was planned to assassinate him on his way to Belgrade,
in an ambush down the mountain road, but the plan was abandoned in the last moment. Djindjic’s
leg was immobilized and he could move only slowly, by the aid of invalid sticks. He has become
thereby an easy target. Soon afterwards, he paid a visit, despite advice of his environment, to Banja
Luka in Republika Srpska. On his way to the Belgrade airport another attempt of assassination was
made. The plan was to stop Djindjic car by a van, just purchased for the occasion, and to shoot the
car by bazooka and other rifles from the other side of the highway. The attempt to stop the convoy
failed, since the driver managed to avoid the van and did not stop. The police from the escort
stopped the van and driver was delivered to the local court. Driver, to be identified later as a
dangerous criminal, called Bagzi, was held for a day in custody and then released on his claims to
have a family to support. The name of the judge who let him go has never been disclosed. Instead
of retaining the suspect in custody for the assassination attempt, until the case is definitely settled
down, state administration displayed a suspicious indifference. In retrospect, it may well have been
the part of an assassination plan.
At Banja Luka, when asked about the incident, Djindjic laughed and claimed the driver was
learning driving on the highway and not much attention should be attached to the case. Whether he
was serious we do not know (in all probability it was his wife who could tell the truth). Anyway,
after his return to Belgrade, the galley loop was squeezing around his neck. Deputy president of
Serb Radical Party, Tomislav Nikolić, declared before TV cameras that Djindjic should mind his
steps, for he would not be the first to have problem with leg before dieing, a clear reference to
Tito’s last days. About the same time rumour was circling around Serbia that Vojislav Šešelj
promised a reward of 5 million DM for assassinating Djindjic. The green light for the execution
was on.

1
Interestingly, the name of that officer was never revealed.
 227

Both “declarations” from SRP side deserve our attention. Who was the person in whose name
Nikolić was talking? Somebody from the organized crime? But no politician would allow to be
linked with crime, in particular somebody from SRP, which was very loud linking their political
adversary with criminal organizations. On the other hand, SRP did not hide her links with Hague
clients, in particular with Ratko Mladic. It was the public secret that SRP was a political exponent
of the Bosnian and Croatian refugees, including those wanted by the Tribunal. During the period
they held the power at Zemun (the town adjacent to Belgrade) Šešelj used to sell municipal barren
soil to the refugees, for symbolical prices. (The latter were for Bosnians twice as large as those for
Croatians, since the former were considered to have fled their own land). Obviously, Nikolić was
talking in the name of Ratko Mladic, whose arrest and delivery was considered imminent. As for
the reward announcement, it was a gesture of instigation, rather than a serious offer. First of all,
SRP had no such money and even if they were serious about the matter, they would never
announce that publicly.
On March 5, 2003, Šešelj took a plane and left for Hague, accepting the pending invitation by Carla
del Ponte, whom his radicals used to call “whore del ponte”, an allusion to the Turkish practice to
execute prostitutes on bridges. 1 Explaining his unexpected move (which is still mysterious to those
in Serbia who consider their heads nice embellishments only) he declared: “It is better I go there by
my own will, than to allow Zoran Djindjic to deliver me by force.” His allusion to whom his
followers are to be after was more than transparent. Smiling while saying bye-bye to his followers,
with comment they should not worry about him, since he was an old prison customer, Šešelj took
off and left the political scene before March Ides arrived. He gained an alibi par excellence.
Fourteen days afterwards Djindjic was assassinated.

Serbian March Ides

It was a sunny spring day, March 17. I was working at my desk, when a neighbour of mine, came
as usually for coffee. On the coach besides me I had put a piece of newspaper with a brief
biography of Šešelj, I intended for my file on Serbian political situation. When he saw the
newspaper with the cartoon of Šešelj, my good Dinaroid said: I see you keep record of Šešelj, but I
must confess I prefer Šešelj to Djindjic. I did not response. My attitude concerning Šešeljoids was
like this: You ignore them, you eliminate them, but you never comment them! An hour later my
neighbour came again and said to me: I know how much you value Djindjic. I have just heard on
radio he was assassinated. I understood there was an attempt to assassinate Djindjic, for the other
interpretation was beyond my emotional capacity. But soon I heard the assassination was
confirmed by foreign media. Prime minister of Serbia was murdered. Serbia was shocked and
stunned.
The assassination was well planned and executed. Djindjic rout to the government building was
carefully supervised. One from his gate guards gave the signal Djindjic left his residence for the
government building. Two snipers were posted in a building about 150 m away from the entrance
into the building, from the courtyard side, used by prime ministers. Djindjic got out of the car and
approached slowly the door. It is still unclear whether the door was open or not. Rumors even
suggested it was locked up? Presumably Djindjic came to the door and turned towards the car,
when he was hit by bullet into the heart. Another bullet was shot, which hit the bodyguard,
Veruović. (Later, the same bodyguard would claim he heard another, third shot, but this testimony
has never been corroborated by others present on the spot). 2
The government was paralyzed for a moment, but quickly recovered and the state of emergency
was proclaimed. Mr. Zoran Živković (who was the minister for the internal affairs at the federal

1
There is still a bridge at the Kalemegdan ramparts in Belgrade called rospi ćuprija (rospija – prostitute, ćuprija –
bridge) in Turkish.
2
Interestingly, such a claim would provide grain to the mill of those claiming that there was another sniper, who
actually shot Djindjic.
 228

government at that moment), took over the position of prime minister. The police reacted quickly
and efficiently and the murderer and some of his accomplices were arrested. Two principal
accomplices Dušan Spasojević “Shqiptar” 1 and Milorad Lukić “Kum” 2 were killed while running
away. The massive campaign for uncovering the conspiracy, which pointed towards attempts to
overthrow the government and coup d’etat, was successfully accomplished. About two thousand
people were interrogated, hundreds detained in custody. The murderer, Zvezdan Jovanović, turned
out to be deputy of the Red Berets chief commander and the close crony of Milorad Ulemek. Te
latter was accused to be the organizer of the coup d’etat, but he escaped the pursuit and went to
hiding for the following year.
In the course of interrogations, the murderer confessed his involvement to minute details, which
fitted well the later overall evidence of the organization of the assassination. He identified the rifle
he used and places he and his accomplices used in the course of preparations and assassination.
One his declaration, aimed at his family and friends appears very significant to us here. He
declared:” I have not done it for money, but as a patriot!”. It is not a declaration of a common
criminal, but reveals well the political background of the entire affair. It shows that the murder was
a continuation of the actions started with that mutiny by Red Berets, we mentioned earlier.
Patriotism means here – Ratko Mladic & com.
Two questions concerning the assassination are in order here. First, how it happened that the
assassination was not foreseen and prevented? Second, how to explain the quick and efficace
intervention of the police? Two issues are, evidently, interrelated. In both affairs police (both
regular and secret) was involved. It was not the issue of the state against her criminals (ordinary or
political), but the state as an institution was involved on both sides. The assassination was the most
convincing proof that Serbia has been occupied. Djindjic was well aware of that (a she told that
Carla del Ponte), but could do very little, except to pretend to be a real boss of a real state. On the
other hand, the fact that those sectors supposed to protect the state were engaged in the criminal
activities, helped to catch the perpetuators (except the chief ones). It was, in fact, a clash within the
complex occupation forces – organized crime, where one part attacked the other. The scenario of
Rumanian coup d’etat from 1989 was repeated, mutatis mutandis, in Serbia in 2003. What have
remained undisclosed are the names of the political instigators of the attempted coup d’etat. Here
the parallel with John Kennedy assassination appears very indicative, indeed. And as in Kennedy’s
case the political background of the assassination will in all probability remain well buried into the
corruption of the USA administration at the time, so the case of Djindjic assassination will
probably be never clarified. It was indicative that president Kostunica strongly criticized the extent
and harshness of the police action, as if he was afraid that the involvement of the political sector
would be disclosed.
(The investigations would find out that the direct orders for the assassination came from Milorad
Ulemek and Dušan Spasojević. The latter was the chief of the Zemun criminal clan, dealing with
drugs, extrorsions, kidnapings etc. The assassiantion was planned as the beginning of coup d’etat,
with bridge and power station destructions, occupation of airports, etc).
The funeral of the assassinated prime minister, regularly elected for the first time since 1940 was
magnificent. But the very ceremony revealed the political tension behind the assassination. The
liturgy was held in the (unfinished) church St Sava, 3 by the archbishop Amfilohije Radović, 4 the
hawk among the Serbian Orthodox Church establishment. Serbians were surprised that the service
was not held by the patriarch Pavle, who otherwise was very active on that matter, serving in local

1
The nickname reveals he came from the South Serbia where he used to smuggle drugs, in cooperation with the local
Shiptars.
2
“godfather”, in the best Sicilian tradition.
3
Djindjic, though not a believer, gave much support to the construction of the church, the largest (apart from Aya
Sophia) on Balkan.
4
Montenegrin, who lives in Belgrade.
 229

churches at Belgrade once a week. But when Amfilohije started his preach it became clear that the
choice was deliberate, for he almost openly said that Djindjic got what he deserved, alluding to the
accusations of Djindjic’s political adversaries about his treachery etc. Those present and TV
watchers were astonished by this kind of preach. The funeral was a magnificent manifestation of
the sympathy of many Serbians with the dead prime minister. Even those who were skeptical about
his politics were deeply moved, that the number of participants at the funeral matched that of the
meeting Djindjic organized on October 5, 2000, when Milošević was finally overthrown, was a part
of a general symbolic parallel. The poet Petar Petrović-Njegoš wrote in his celebrated poetic drama
The wreath of Mountains about the Serbian leader in the first Serbian Uprising against the Turkish
rule Karageorgije Petrovic:
Tvojoj glavi bi sudjeno
Za vjenac se svoj prodati. 1

Only after Djindjic was assassinated many Serbians became aware of his significance for Serbian
free society project. In fact, only with the sentimental background after the cruel murder, Serbian
authorities managed to protect the state against the cout d’etat and the return to Milošević era.
Without the state of emergency the state would have collapsed.
Djindjic left wife, Ružica and daughter and son. And Serbia with KiM mortgage.

KiM under the UN protection

Djindjic government did not last long after his death. Under an unprecedented pressure from the
opposition, including the former political partner DPS, lead by Kostunica, Prime Minister Živković
scheduled elections for the end of 2003 and his party passed to opposition to the newly elected
government, lead by Kostunica. KiM hot potato was now in the hands of the latter.
Engaged with internal struggles and external pressure from the Hague Tribunal, Djindjic had little
room and time for dealing properly with the KiM issue. Somewhen around his visit to Banja Luka
he declared that if KiM claimed to have the right to secede, the same right should be recognized to
Republika Srpska. It was not an offer for exchange, as some interpreted it, but rather preparing the
ground for the struggle on the international scene. Never-the-less this declaration was later used by
his internal opponents to launch the fantastic thesis of western organization of the assassination,
allegedly as a prevention of making use of arguments like this. Of course, nobody took it serious.
The point of such accusations was the same as that of alleged links with the organized crime in
Serbia. Accordingly, all those dirty happenings were nothing but clash among criminals (common
and political ones).
Although formally under the protection/control of UN (UNMIK), KiM has remained what it has
been for centuries- no man land. Border with Albania has been under no control and about 400.000
Albanians moved into KiM, mainly to Priština. The province capital enlarged its population from
230.000 to 500.000/600.000 in 8 years. The monument of Milosh Obilic, Serb hero from the
Kosovo Battle, was pulled down and replaced with Albanian medieval hero Skenderbeg, showing
clearly what Albanian leaders are up to. Huge buildings have been constructed at Priština. The
capital for those new structures did not come from newly discovered oil fields, but from drug
traffic, which has been flourishing since the occupation. Oil stations along, otherwise modest, roads
appear every few kilometers, but with almost no customers. The explanation for this anomaly is
simple – these stations are for cleansing money rather than for delivering petrol. (See Figure 12 and
Appendix 3). KiM appears ideal drug traffic

1
Your head was destined to be sold for her wreath [freedom for Serbia].
 230

Figure 12. Tomorrow a narco-state on Kosovo?

station on the rout from the Middle East to Western Europe. First, Albanians are not as easily
recognized as intruders, since they appear (approximately) like ordinary Europeans, unlike
Afghans, Iranians etc. Second, a large Albanian gastarbeit population already exists in Western and
Central Europe, what appears very convenient for the organized smuggling and distributing
morpheme, hashish and other hallucinates. Since they are organized on fis scale (extended family),
it is virtually impossible to break in, particularly considering the language barrier.
As Tirana streets are name after the living American presidents, one of the main streets in Priština
bears the name of Bill Clinton. On one of the tallest Priština buildings a huge poster of Bill Clinton
is displayed, expressing the gratitude of Shqiptars for the American role in separating KiM from
the rest of Serbia. 1
In fact relatively little is known in (the rest of) Serbia about actual KiM situation. Even before the
secession Belgrade showed little interest in the life of the southern province, partly for
psychological reasons, experiencing a collective trauma for ”the open wound” of the state body.
After the occupation in 1999, situation even acquired an absurd turn that foreign media covered
KiM situation infinitely better than it was done by Serbian press and TV cover. The reason for such
an anomaly may be ascribed partly by the restrictions imposed by KiM authorities to Serbian media
presence there. On the other hand reports from the western media appear very critical as a rule
when describing the actual situation. There are at least two motives for such a critical approach.
One is a common one – media live not on the news ”a dog has bitten a man”, but on the opposite
arrangement. Good news is hardly news at all. Media live on reporting problems, even inventing
them. The other rationale may be classified as collective misgivings. Before the occupation
western media followed the campaign, monitored from the political centres of power, in favour of

1
Interestingly, Kosovska Mitrovica Serbs have not (yet) found it convenient to take counter measure by naming a street
Monica Lewinsky.
 231

KiM Albanians, for general reasons, which call for no explanation. After the strategic political aim
has been achieved, journalists found, first, that many of premises for taking Shqiptar side were
false and second, that the roles of oppressors-victims were exchanged in the new situation. But
apart from these understandable (U)turns, journalist started to disclose many hitherto unknown
facts about the strategic preparations for tearing Serbia apart. In particular the ugly face of German
diplomacy concerning the international engagement over KiM issue has been disclosed by many
analysts (see Appendix 6).
There have been dozens of reasons why KiM should be taken out of Serbia. We mentioned some of
them before and here we shall deal with the economic gains. KiM appears a rich region, with a
fertile soil and abundance of mineral resources. In particular lead and silver mine at Trepča near
Kosovska Mitrovica with the (floatation) separation plant, one of the biggest in Europe (owned by
a British firm before WW2), appears a strategic gain par excellence. Another precious resource is
the rich deposit of coal. Though not of a high quality, the lignite deposits has been estimated to last
for centuries of exploitation. On the other hand Albania is notorious for power deficit. Except for
few water power plants, Albanian power supplies strongly depend on the import from the
neighbouring countries. Hence it was no surprise that immediately after KiM was occupied, plans
for exporting electric power from KiM to Albania saw the daylight. In Figure 13 we show the
project made by an international consortium, published in a professional journal.

Figure 13. Energy drain from KiM to Albania.

Stability and prosperity of a country depend crucially on the balance between the state control and
freedom of exchange of people, goods and ideas. Sanctions and prohibitions turn out devastating to
the isolated or overcontrolled state. First what comes in is the corruption and organized crime, as
 232

the cases of Serbia during the 1992-95 sanctions and USA under the prohibition illustrate.
Occupied KiM illustrates, on the other hand, what happens when an artificial state is formed,
without proper administrative and political control. The region which was notorious for illegal
traffic of all kinds has become the Mecca for legalization of the social evils. The same mechanism
which enabled KiM politicians to achieve their separatist goals is now used by criminals to get rid
of any serious legal control. Two aspects of this situation must be considered here.
The local police are well aware that not only criminals are well equipped by all sorts of weaponry,
ready to use to secure their business, but the general population is armed and ready to intervene.
We described a typical situation when a criminal was to be arrested at Prekazi village before. As
for the UNMIK presence, it appears of no threat to the local crime. Not only it is unable to
intervene without the technical and implicitly political support by the local administration, but the
foreign staff is well aware they are experienced by the local population as intruders, as somewhat
less intolerable strangers than Serbian administration. Any conflict of the crime with the legal
forces is experienced as an attack on the Shqiptar independence and liberty. In other words, any
conflict situation is easily turned into ethnically-politically assault on the Shqiptars and their
freedom. This mechanism operated very well in the struggle with the state of Serbia, cunningly
presented as a fight against Milošević, who has still remained the trump whenever a tension on the
line Belgrade –Priština is strengthened.
Not only the UNMIK and any other international organization are aware that the official relation
with the local administration is one thing, but that the general feelings among the local population
are quite another matter. They know that he local politicians can easily turn the existing “peaceful
coexistence” into a fierce conflict, which would end in expulsion of the foreign presence on KiM. 1
In all probability this will be how the UNMIK and other mandates will end on KiM. Though not
much publicized, there are already organizations which demand the immediate evacuation of the
international presence from KiM. They organize from time to time protests at Priština and other
towns, just to remind the officials of all kind of their presence. KiM officials minimize their
presence and influence, but keep one eye on their activities and monitor appropriately the
demonstrations and protests.
From the more general viewpoint the animosity towards the foreign presence stems from the
ancient autistic mental structure of Albanians (and Dinaroids in general for that matter). They feel
uneasy in the presence of aliens and tend to separate maximally from the rest of the surrounding
population. In fact, they experience the presence of UN staff as they did the Turkish presence
during the Ottoman rule and Serbian presence after 1912.

(It is for that reason, without further elaborations, that Albanians want to live in a common,
ethnically pure state. But this goal must be kept hidden well, as Koha Ditore chief editor, Baton
Haxhiu, warned his compatriots, who started publicly pushing towards Greater Albania. He
appealed to the media not to run before the events, after some newspapers started commenting the
status of Greek North-west Epir, which Albanians call Cameria, with aspirations to annex it to the
future Albanian state.)

It is for that general motivation Shqiptar are wiping out the historical and actual presence of all
other ethnicities on KiM. The process of annulling the history and ethnical cleansing runs along
many parallel lines. The later takes generally a spontaneous course, and appears mostly of the
criminal character. One of the most frequent actions is devastation of the Serb graveyards. As these
are generally situated outside inhabited areas, like villages, they are unprotected now and local
peasants are unable to prevent demolishing graves by the local Shqiptars, mostly young ones.
When the Serbs come to their graveyards on religious occasions (protected by the local UNMIK

1
A parallel with the present (2008) situation in Iraq is more than appropriate here.
 233

forces), to pay tribute to their dead, they find the tombstones turned over and demolished.
Frequently the fence is destroyed and local Shqiptars look after sheep and cattle there. Some tombs
are even desecrated. Churches in abandoned villages and towns are demolished or/and desecrated.
Even in places where Serbs are still present their shrines are targets for demolition. In some case
these vandalism acts are really of vandalism nature, that is, the motives for demolitions are really
the inferiority feelings of the local Muslim population. Muslim shrines, mosques, are rarely of any
cultural value, either from the esthetic or spiritual point of view, though some of them may be nice
architectural pieces. Like the Ferhadia mosque at Banja Luka, we mentioned before. As it is well
recognized shrines and graveyards are of the most precious objects to the autochthonous population
and it is not by accident they are the objects of demolition and destructions. 1 Without them local
population sees no reason to endure under the oppressive environment and it exactly the rationale
for wiping them out. It was a kind of pilgrimage to their graveyards which those unfortunate
refugees made when their bus was blasted at Podujevo, as we described earlier. 2
As for the more ambitious plans to wipe out the presence of non-Shqiptar population on KiM, it
requires organized and long-term activities. Even after the Belgrade abolished KiM (and
Vojvodina, for that mater) autonomy, local municipal administrations were found with the new
names of the millennium old places, who bore Slavic names. At the moment these plans are
pending, waiting the status of independence to be fully recognized. Names of streets are already
changed, but the wiping out the old ones will be complete when the last non-Shqiptar leaves the
province. The most obvious evidence whose KiM is really, the KiM toponymy, will be lost and
new past of the province is going to emerge from the future. Even European settlers did not
care/dare to change the original Indian homonyms, as names Saskatchewan, Connecticut, Potomac,
Appalachia, Massachusetts, etc testify. 3

Ramush Haradinaj and Vojislav Šešelj trials

Ramush Haradinaj
Ramush Haradinaj was one of the prominent commanders in KLA, a Shqiptar counterpart of Zeljko
Raznatovic-Arkan, whom we met before. In this capacity his unit committed a number of atrocities
during 1998/9 fighting. After the occupation he was appointed to the position of prime minister,
primarily as an immunity shelter from the expected accusations for the war crimes. Under his
command 40 civilians, Serbs, Roma and Shqiptars, were tortured, raped and massacred. Out of all
witnesses planned for the Tribunal 9 lost their life before appearing at the court. Five of them were
killed, the rest died under suspicious circumstances. No witness dared to appear before the Tribunal
and Haradinaj was released, since the Court was unable to precede the trial.
The affair well illustrated the impossible task of the Tribunal facing the ethos of a traditional
society. While one need not search for the motives for killing Serb prisoners, but Roma and
Shqiptar victims invite explanations. Some of Roma were used by paramilitaries for burying the
dead bodies, but generally, they are even less welcome on KiM than Serbs or Croats. As for the
Shqiptar victims, they were presumably employed in the local administration, including military
one and thus considered traitors by KLA. However, the blood feud must not be ruled out. It is for
the latter Haradinaj’s release from Hague trial need not necessarily mean a favourable solution for
Haradinaj. Those who watched him while the verdict was pronounced at the Court could not help
noticing his unhappy face. In fact, a moderate sentence of prison would be most desirable from
Haradinaj point of view. First, he would be under prison protection for period sufficient emotions
on KiM to settle down. Second, by suffering because of Serbs, he would acquire an image of a

1
During the “wars” in Croatia and BiH shrines were the first to suffer, from all sides.
2
If the suicide-bombings in Israel (and even at New York) appear heroic acts of desperation, these tele-massacres are
nothing but cowardice crimes by sons of bitch.
3
Conversions from New Amsterdam to New York etc appear of a somewhat different kind.
 234

martyr, freedom fighter and hero. Anyway, he was appointed, after the release, to a political
positions gain, as an additional protection from further pursuits, both from the local and external
factors.

Vojislav Šešelj
What Devil likes the most to hear
is that he does not exist.

The Haradinaj story, however, is not an exception, but more the rule on the Western Balkan, as we
are going to illustrate by the case of Vojislav Šešelj. As we mentioned before, he went to Hague
voluntarily, 12 days before Djindjic assassination, for various reasons. One is deeply rooted into his
subconscious and he appears intimately aware of this. He feels in the bottom of his soul (sic) his
place is not in a society, but behind the bars. This complex stems surely from his childhood,
considering his humble social origin. His visit to Hague detention was fourth accommodation
behind bars in his life. Second, a layer of his devotion to Hague is linked with his political strategy.
We shall not dwell on it here, but shall postpone the issue for later occasion. Here we mention only
that Šešelj has studied Hitler’s career in details, and the political confinement is an essential part of
the scheme. Moreover, he has a clear advantage over his political hero – TV cameras. Šešelj did not
fail to notice the increase of Milošević popularity, both at home in Serbia and BiH and worldwide,
defending himself and Serbia at the Court. In fact, it was exactly for this reason Šešelj thought an
urgent matter to appear at the Court and turn the trial into political meting. His strategy comprised
many aspects. One was propaganda for the domestic audience, when he tries to present himself and
his movement as the only genuine patriotic (great-Serb) party. He is therefore exaggerating his
engagements in Croatia and BiH, even inventing carefully atrocities over Croats and Muslims. On
the other hand, when coming to the particular events, which would be crucial for the verdict, his
tactics is to deny it, usually by reinterpreting data. Since the burden of indictment lies mainly on
eye witnesses (written records are almost impossible to provide by the Court in majority of cases),
the crucial task for Šešelj’s supporters in Serbia, Croatia and BiH has been to eliminate them. This
has been done in various ways. Once a witness has been detected, one of the following procedures
followed.
The potential witness is approached and convinced that it would be in his (and his family) best
interests to forget about that. If the arguments appear unconvincing, the next steps follow:
The victim is offered a reasonable amount of money or some other equivalent favour for
abstaining.
The same or more for testifying in favour of Šešelj.
The victim is offered a murder or equivalent favour if he/she is not cooperative.

That the last point is not just an empty intimidation has been illustrated by several murders of
potential (noncooperative) people. On one of recent sessions a witness (a former general secretary
of SLP) on the video-link from Belgrade denied everything he declared and signed, even when his
signatures under every paragraph have been shown to him. One of his confessions he denied was
that he was to leave the SLP in 1994, but changed his mind when Šešelj threatened to have him
killed.
Fertile as they are, all those procedures require time and money and must be repeated all the time.
The heinous radical leader therefore decided to annul the very institution of testifying his deeds by
witnesses. He designed and performed a sketch at a session, which certainly deserved the ID
designation. 1 It runs like this:

1
Incidentally, ID supporters might be right, in the end, but with the proviso the I not to be specified as Divinity, but
rather as Satan.
 235

An eyewitness clamed he saw Šešelj at a place in Bosnia, on a specific date.

That was not possible, retorts the accused with satanic smile, I was in an official visit to Moscow
on that day, as can be verified by consulting the press reports at the time.

Are you sure? asked the judge the witness. The latter could reply something like

Well, I am not quite sure, but it was somewhen about that day ..

But no, the “witness” insisted it was that very day he saw accused there.
What sort of liars are you bringing here for testifying against me, asked Šešelj triumphantly the
judge?

Bribed, intimidated or like is of no importance here. The point that Šešelj’s supporters obtained
another proof that their idol was a victim of a mock trial, which is generally designed against Serbs,
etc, etc. Turning to Haradinaj’s trial, one concludes that only one thing is worse than a dead
witness, a counter-witness (mock witness). Generally Šešelj has turned the entire process into an
alternating series of farce and tragedies, as expected by those who already had experience with him
and his followers in former Yugoslavia. As for the court they feel as an old woman from Serb folk
story, who gave a coin to get in a chain dance, but would give two to get out. The ultimate losers
are Serbs as a nation, for Šešelj keeps saying “We Serbs” etc. That Serbia (and Serbs) is the
principal victim of this heinous creature nobody is aware, or if she is, does not care.
(Threatening or bribing witness or victim is not the exclusive department of Hague customers only.
Milošević’s son Marko was accused of torturing a member of the local movement Otpor and after
he flew away after October 5, 2000, presumably to Russia, he dared not to appear in Serbia. A year
ago a minister in Kostunica government, Velimir Ilić, pressed the victim at Požarevac to withdraw
the charge. What was the amount in question is not known, but must be considerable).
Hague and the Serbian farce
As we mentioned before, Carla del Ponte and the Tribunal were well aware that the delivery of
accused who were presumably within Serbian borders was not a matter of the good will or abilities
of the Belgrade government. 1 Serbia being occupied by Dinaroids, any government’s hope could
just to survive until the Tribunal expires. With this “” boundary conditions”” the political stage was
setup for a gigantic farce which has been played by Hague and Belgrade officials. This tragic-
comedy consists of successive acts, whose actors are government officials, first of all the sectors
charged with the “”cooperation with the Tribunal””, police officers, etc from Serbian side and the
chief prosecutors from Hague. The latter are regularly visiting Belgrade, listen to the well learned
text of utmost dedication to fulfilling Serbian duty in this respect, and information of what the
government is planning in the immediate future to do in this respect etc, etc. The Hague officials
know these are lies, the Belgrade officials are aware of that, people from the Tribunal are aware of
the fact that those are aware, etc, etc. At the departure the visitors express a he briefing that they
have noticed some progress in the affair, but it is not sufficient and they expect (sic) more concrete
results, etc. Those concrete results are plans of actions, which are ever and ever improved, and as
soon as the hiding places of the accused are detected, they will be arrested and delivered to Hague.
Once the performance of the lest act is over, the officials return to Hague, report that the comedy is
still going on and the deadlock remains firmly stabilized and recognized.
There are two exceptions to this game of cat and mouse (sic). First that of Radovan Karadzic, we
described earlier and of (former) general of Republika Srpska army, Tolmir. Two year ago he was
arrested, transferred secretly to Bosnia, where it was arranged to be re-arrested by the local police

1
Presumably situation in Croatia and BiH was not much different.
 236

and delivered to Hague. The case of Tolmir appears more significant than it seems at the first sight,
for it illustrates the thesis I exposed before, that the best way for Serbia is to arrest the intruders and
deliver them to their country of origin. Tat it is by far the most convenient way to get rid of
intruders has been appreciated by the very accused themselves. When appeared at the first hearing
at the Tribunal first thing Bosnian hero uttered was to deny he was arrested in Bosnia, but stressed
it was Serbian police who did it. Such a declaration aimed at two points. First, it had to discourage
Serbian authorities to do such a maneuver, for it would enable Serbia to get rid of the intruders, and
second to blackmail Serbia by threatening to testify at the Court against her. This point points well
towards the ethos of those Dinaroids, who did what they did, and then transferred all guilt to
Serbia, as innocent victims of her hegemonistic aggressivity etc. (Similar case with Milan Babić
has been already described earlier).
Serbia was caught in the disastrous position to fight on (at least) two fronts. First, she has had KiM
amputation, and the millstone of the Hague war criminals. As it happens as a rule, these two fronts
appear well entangled. Even if the IC were sympathetic to Belgrade cause, the Hague accusations
hang as Damocles’ sword over her head. There is no doubt that KiM politicians are making
extensive use of the Belgrade commitments to the Tribunal and her failure to fulfill her obligations,
as another proof that Serbia is a black sheep of the European community. So much is the Mladic
hiding favourable to KiM politicians’ cause, that I have meditated of writing a play (or a satire),
with gen. Mladic hiding on KiM, with KLA. Of course nobody would publish it. And even if
published I certainly would not have opportunity to see it (at least not in this world).
Talking about political fiction, it would be fair (though not advisable) to mention USA role in this
context. As the Florence Hartmann, the speaker of the Tribunal declared 08.08.2008, Karadzic,
Mladic and Hadzic were located many times by Hague Tribunal service, but their arrest was
prevented by USA and GB. What means that their hiding was necessary for depriving Serbia of
right to keep KiM. Hence another possible hiding place could be Bondsteel USA base near Priština.
The latter information explains also why Hague Tribunal has been so tolerant with Belgrade
officials: they all have been blowing different trumpets, but the same tune – Requiem for Serbia.
As we mentioned before, the general Serbian public had little opportunity to infer what has been
going on on KiM. Therefore, and I am not in a favourable position to describe the situation and
relevant events on KiM, for the same reason. Two reasons are present here for the informational
lacuna on the subject. Belgrade government, being unable to influence the course of events in her
southern province, did not find it profitable to keep the general public informed about KiM reality.
The KiM officials hold the same attitude concerning the domestic and international public scene,
understandably for different reason. Serbia has thus found herself in the course of sinking into the
moving sand, without possibility even to cry. In the worst position are the remaining Serbs on KiM,
whose desperate situation has been ignored publicly by all sides. Belgrade does not want to present
their situation for two principal reasons. First, it would be a clear sign of its impotence and second,
not unlinked with the first, this would trigger the final exodus of the non-Shqiptar population. The
only sector active in the context is Šešelj’s SRP, which makes as much noise as possible about the
difficulties of Serbs there (they never mention Roma or other ”endangered species”), as a part of
their critics of the government, and as a means to cease the power in Belgrade. It is for this reason
the poor KiM Serbs vote for radicals, expecting to gain something from the empty propaganda. In
fact, it is the electoral results which doom the KiM Serbs to failure in the medium run. Behaviour
of this retarded population illustrates best the difference between the rest of Serbia from one side,
where the democratization has made a considerable advance and European spirit has gained some
ground and the KiM reservation from the other, with two retarded populations, who were grasping
each other at throats.
Serbia has to cope with two retarded populations, one as KiM victims and the other as
unscrupulous intruders. In a sense, the case with Serbia and her Dinaroids resembles much that
episode from 1001 Nights, Sinbad the Sailor, who responded favourably to plead of that dwarf
 237

creature for help to cross a brook, to be caught in his deadly grip over neck and served as living
carrier. Radicals use every occasion to instigate Serbs to unrest and provocations, as a rule at their
own loss. To make the situation worse, Serb population as dispersed all over KiM has been split
into many local political and administrative organizations. All of them appear in the permanent
quarrels, and even antagonistic clashes, usually under the influence of the political factors at
Belgrade.
The absence of any, even rudimentary project for resolving the KiM knot, has resulted in the
feeling of desperation among KiM Serbs and the indolence of the Belgrade officials. The latter has
been epitomized by the “politics” of Vojislav Kostunica, whose indolence has been well masked by
his alleged ”conservativist” outlook. Generally Belgrade has remained passive on KiM agenda,
despite the permanent noise in the form ”Serbia will never renounce KiM …”. The empty rhetoric
of the sort ”We will never …” is the best signal to all sides involved that the officials have no idea
what to do with KiM. 1
The incapable Belgrade government (and politicians in general) has been adequately matched by
the Serbian population. Those reservists who were engaged in protecting “the most precious Serb
word – Kosovo”, 2 have been protesting for years before the government for not being paid
sufficiently for their patriotic service. (We love Kosovo, but we love money even more. With
citizens like these, Serbia needs no intruders).

The tray independence

Sjaši Kurta da uzjaši Murta. 3

Serbian proverb

The pending declaration of independence was finally declared on February 17, 2008. (See
Appendix 7). The date was surely determined by USA and Allies, as all other important moves by
KiM officials. The latter circumstance makes the Declaration doubly ridiculous. First, you never
obtain independence, you fight and win it. The independence as a gift is a change of the muster
rather than a real change of status. Second, USA being itself an Israeli vassal, is not in position to
endow anybody with independence. It is the fact which has never been noticed by Belgrade
officials. Not that they were supposed to make a statement of this sort, but the politics of a country
is the result of many factors, including the public media. The latter could well discreetly place the
point to the world public, without endangering the government position. Media could expose the
decisive role of Israel in the entire affair, making use of the same tactics which the very Israeli
employ. A clear parallel with the Palestinian case and Serbian Shqiptars would force the world
bosses to think about possible consequences of their double standards. The fact that Israel and
Serbia are not in the same position on the international scene should not be considered crucial to
the strategy. The difference in applying ”international rules” in two cases, in particular the role of
UN, when suitably exposed, would force UN officials to reconsider their ”well controlled
passivity”. The stratagem is risky, of course, but Serbia has nothing to lose. 4
Just how it is used by the press is well demonstrated by the very Israeli sources, as shown by the
following citation: 5
Talkbacks for this article: 0

1
It was this sort of rhetoric by Gamal Abdel Nasser & com. which prompted Israel in 1967 to launch ”the preemptive
strike” on the ”belligerent” Arab neighbours.
2
The famous syntagma of the (Montenegrin born) Serb poet Matija Bećković.
3
Dismount Kurta so that mounts Murta.
4
As a graphite in London tube reads ”You can’t lose more than everything”.
5
Caroline Glick, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 21, 2008
 238

Kosovo’s US-backed declaration of independence is deeply troubling. By setting a precedent of

legitimizing the secession of disaffected minorities, it weakens the long-term viability of multi-
ethnic states. In so doing, it destabilizes the already stressed state-based international system.
States as diverse as Canada, Morocco, Spain, Georgia, Russia and China currently suffer problems
with politicized minorities. They are deeply concerned by the Kosovo precedent. Even the US has
latent sovereignty issues with its increasingly politicized Hispanic minority along its border with
Mexico. It may one day experience a domestic backlash from its support for Kosovo independence
from Serbia.
Setting aside the global implications, it is hard to see how Kosovo constitutes a viable state. Its 40
percent unemployment is a function of the absence of proper economic and governing
infrastructures.
In November, a European Commission report detailed the Kosovo Liberation Army’s failure to
build functioning governing apparatuses. The report noted that “due to a lack of clear political will
to fight corruption, and to insufficient legislative and implementing measures, corruption is still
widespread... Civil servants are still vulnerable to political interference, corrupt practices and
nepotism.” Moreover, “Kosovo’s public administration remains weak and inefficient.”
The report continued, “The composition of the government anti-corruption council does not
sufficiently guarantee its impartiality,” and “little progress can be reported in the area of organized
crime and combating of trafficking in human beings.”
Additionally, the prosecution of Albanian war criminals is “hampered by the unwillingness of the
local population to testify” against them. This is in part due to the fact that “there is still no specific
legislation on witness protection in place.”
The fledgling failed-state of Kosovo is a great boon for the global jihad. It is true that Kosovar
Muslims by and large do not subscribe to radical Islam. But it is also true that they have allowed
their territory to be used as bases for al-Qaida operations; that members of the ruling Kosovo
Liberation Army have direct links to al-Qaida; and that the Islamic world as a whole perceived
Kosovo’s fight for independence from Serbia as a jihad for Islamic domination of the disputed
province.
According to a 2002 Wall Street Journal report, al-Qaida began operating actively in Kosovo, and
in the rest of the Balkans, in 1992. Osama bin Laden visited Albania in 1996 and 1997. He received
a Bosnian passport from the Bosnian Embassy in Austria in 1993. Acting on bin Laden’s orders, in
1994 his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri set up training bases throughout the Balkans including one in
Mitrovica, Kosovo. The Taliban and al-Qaida set up drug trafficking operations in Kosovo to
finance their operations in Afghanistan and beyond.
In 2006, John Gizzi reported in Human Events that the German intelligence service BND had
confirmed that the 2005 terrorist bombings in Britain and the 2004 bombings in Spain were
organized in Kosovo. Furthermore, “The man at the centre of the provision of the explosives in
both instances was an Albanian, operating mostly out of Kosovo... who is the second ranking
leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Niam Behzloulzi.”
Then, too, at its 1998 meeting in Pakistan, the Organization of the Islamic Conference declared that
the Albanian separatists in Kosovo were fighting a jihad. The OIC called on the Muslim world to
help “this fight for freedom on the occupied Muslim territories.”
Supporters of Kosovo claim that as victims of “genocide,” Kosovar Muslims deserve
independence. But if the Muslims in Kosovo have been targeted for annihilation by the Serbs, then
how is it that they have increased from 48% of the population in 1948 to 92% today? Indeed,
Muslims comprised only 78% of the population in 1991, the year before Yugoslavia broke apart.
In recent years particularly, it is Kosovo’s Serbian Christians, not its Albanian Muslims, who are
targeted for ethnic cleansing. Since 1999, two-thirds of Kosovo’s Serbs - some 250,000 people -
have fled the area.
 239

The emergence of a potentially destabilizing state in Kosovo is clearly an instance of political

interests trumping law. Under international law, Kosovo has no right to be considered a sovereign
state. Even UN Security Council Resolution 1244 from 1999, which the KLA claims provides the
legal basis for Kosovo sovereignty, explicitly recognizes Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.
For Israel, Kosovo’s US-backed declaration of independence should be a source of alarm great
enough to require a rethinking of foreign policy. Unfortunately, rather than understand and
implement the lessons of Kosovo, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government is working actively to
ensure that they are re-enacted in the international community’s treatment of Israel and the
Palestinians. Today, Israel is enabling the Palestinians to set the political and legal conditions for
the establishment of an internationally recognized state of Palestine that will be at war with Israel.
By accepting the “Road Map Plan to a Two-State Solution” in 2004, Israel empowered the US, the
EU, Russia and the UN, who comprise the international Quartet, to serve as judges of Palestinian
and Israeli actions toward one another. In November 2007, at the Annapolis conference, the
Olmert-Livni-Barak government explicitly empowered the US to “monitor and judge the fulfilment
of the commitment of both sides of the road map.”
That these moves have made Israel dependent on the kindness of strangers was made clear this
week when Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni instructed Israel’s ambassadors to launch a campaign to
convince the international community that Israel and the Palestinians are making great strides in
their negotiations toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Livni’s move was precipitated by
growing European and US dissatisfaction with the pace of those negotiations and by reports from
the meeting of Quartet members in Berlin on February 11. There all members voiced anger at the
slow pace of negotiations and opposition to Israel’s military actions in Gaza, which are aimed at
protecting the western Negev from rocket and mortar attacks.
Reading the above lines one wonders if the author is a Serbian or Israeli citizen. Or put it more
dramatically: is there any Serbian of Jewish origin that would be able or willing to write such an
analysis of the state affairs which appear crucial for her existence?
What was the response of the European Union members to this unilateral (sic) decision? (see
Appendix 6). Out of 27 member states only five declined to recognize the new “independent” state
immediately. The support, albeit implicit, by the remaining members, had, however, little political
weight. Those states: Slovakia, Spain, Rumania, Cyprus and Greece, had already their Kosovo
(Eastern Slovakia populated by Hungarians, Western Rumania with large Hungarian population,
too, Spain with Basque and Greece with the North-west Epir, which Albanians call Cameria and
consider their land). Besides, Serbia has a considerable Hungarian ”national minority”, as well as
Romanian and Slovakian ones, though in much less proportion. Greece has but a small Albanian
community, but it has proved a reliable friend of Serbia and her case stays somewhat apart. But the
closest case to Serbian KIM was that of Cyprus, whose Turkish population may well have sent a
Caesarean message to their homeland: We came, we multiplied, we separated.
As for the practical consequences of the formal change of status, they appear of minor importance.
KiM authorities wisely found profitable to ease the communications with the Serbian media, which
were allowed an easier access to the region, not only to Serb enclaves. The most severe response
came from the North Mitrovica region, populated almost entirely by Serbs, but this was mainly
instigated by Šešelj’s radicals, who appear the favourite party (sic) of Mitrovica citizens. Even b
fore the declaration of independence, Serb population was divided with the respect to the
acceptance “the new reality”, as the Shqiptars and their patrons put it, whenever they find
themselves pushed to the ethical wall. This ambivalence comes out first regarding the involvement
in the elections. Generally, Belgrade has no clear strategy when the elections for the KiM
parliament are announced, for any choice appears bad. Boycott means the total rejection of “the
reality”, whereas joining the parliament and government would, in principle, provide an
 240

opportunity to protect Serb cause. 1 On the other hand, the later decision would be interpreting as
the recognition of the ”reality” in the region. The immediate gains which might be available in the
transient period could be, surely, annihilated once the new state gains in strength. For it is clear that
the ultimate goal of the KiM leaders is the ethnically pure region and founding the Great Albania.
As for the local elections situation appears less controversial. In the areas where Serbs are majority,
it is important that hey hold the administrative control. If for nothing else, but to monitor the
”humanitarian help” from the rest of Serbia, which appears instrumental for their (biological )
survival. All Serbs on KiM, besides, receive double salaries compared with those in Central Serbia,
while those who are jobless receive permanent financial and other help. For non-Shqiptars KiM
turns out an extended prison. With KFOR as prison guards, but with the inverse ”criminal
distribution”: those who are socially dangerous are outside the walls (barbed wire) and vice versa.
Without a clear long term perspective local non-Shqiptar population live on the day-to-day. They
provide a member of the Priština government and a few MPs. Thus they fulfil the requirements of
the IC for the multi-ethnical society, although it is obvious to everybody acquainted with the KiM
reality it is nothing more than a wishful thinking. We mentioned above the ”Mladic farce” going on
in the Serbia. KiM has it own theatrical performance, this time concerning the multi-ethnicity issue.
Local Shqiptar politicians go around, delivering new houses to those attracted to return from exile,
with utmost publicity. At one occasion show like these turn out cynical, even grotesque. When the
Prime Minister Hashim Tachi visited a Serb village and asked a local peasant how he was going on,
the latter quickly complained had an obsolete tractor. Hashim Tachi promised to help him and soon
brand new tractor appeared in front of the house and TV cameras. But the highlight was just to
come. With the tractor arrived a rather large, new trail wagon. TV cameraman did not fail to expose
it several times, in the front perspective. The massage was more than obvious: the entire family
will be able to accommodate, when the time comes, and even some households could be carried
out. 2
When the new police forces were founded, consisting mainly from the former KLA, Serbs who
served in the previous police rejected to be subjected to the new command and generally left the
police. But the decision was not unanimous, as usual, and the Serb population found itself split up.
The Belgrade government has turned out incapable to cope with gradual losing the province, step
by step, since every step could be tolerated to some extent. It is the old story of a frog boiled
gradually until it dies.
The overall strategy of Allies (USA) has been to replace gradually everything under the auspices of
UN and substitute it with any other cover, like EU. The last move was replacement of a part of a
KFOR by the so-called EULEX administration. The point is the formal jurisdiction of UN
specifically the Security Council, which is responsible for the KiM status, according to the
Resolution 1244. Any change of the status should pass through SC, but it appears impossible, under
the actual circumstances. The tactics adopted by USA looks like this: They propose a resolution,
which would replace that of 1244. The content of the new resolution is of little importance, the
point is just the actual one, which guarantees the KiM status as an integral part of Serbia, to be
removed from the table. Russia then objects and the new resolution is not submitted to SC. Then
Americans offer a somewhat milder variant, still unacceptable for Russians, but negotiate with the
latter that the new proposal is implemented, without going to SC. The gain is mutual. USA
proceeds with its (sic) politics, whereas Russians are spared of another veto and pretend to protect
Serbian interest. Game like this has been played for the last 20 years, since Gorbachov was
deprived of power.

1
We note that though the non-Shiptar non-Serb population still present in the region, its political influence appears of
marginal importance and nobody even mentions those minorities in this context.
2
One of the famous remarks by Zoran Djindjic was that wherever Milošević’s tanks entered in, Serbs with tractor trails
came out.
 241

In summaryy, USA first put a choice to Serbia: you succumb or else you are destroyed. When the
destruction was well advanced, new choice was put now to Russia: you do not veto a SC
resolution, which will legitimize a posteriori our aggression, and we stop bombing. The Resolution
will contain a few concessions to Serbia, which will never be realized. And Russia agreed. 1

International law – a juridical interlude

When the war starts the law stops. No matter how one defends an armed aggression, it always
reduces to the simple formula – I can do it and I do it. The USA agrees ion on Yugoslavia in 1999
raised, never-the-less the perennial juridical question concerning the relationship between the state
sovereignty and the international community right to interfere into domestic affairs. In particular, if
a part of a state wants to secede, what are the rules to comply? Generally, there are three principal
streams regarding this issue.
(i) Domestic constitution has the preference to the international regulations and nobody
should interfere into the state affairs.
(ii) International law should be considered the supreme rule and any domestic affair should
be valued via this common regulation.
(iii) There are no rigid rules and the behaviour of the international community depends on
the specific situation. In particular, the clash between a minority and the rest of a state
should be resolved by internal negotiations.

Of course, if the point (i) is adopted by the minority, point (iii) becomes pointless. The
secessionist side will never negotiate and will demand for the external intervention. It was
exactly what happened to Shqiptar secession movement in Serbia. 2

The danger with the point (ii) is that it may be misused by more powerful state to subjugate a
weaker one. The case in point was the Sudety (Sudetenland) Germans in Czechoslovakia in
1938, who were used by Hitler as a pretext to occupy a sovereign state. Point two was an
ideological background of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, what became conspicuous during
the Warsaw Pact (sic) intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the other hand point (i)
interpretation of the rules regulating the international community was the basis of the so-called
Monroe doctrine. True, this concerned not single states, but the entire (American) continent, but
the principle was the same. Balkan history has been plagued with external interventions, made
with or without referring to the formal regulations.

Formal juridical ground for point (i) has been (or better was) Westphalia agreement, made in
1648, which stated that nobody should interfere with that what a sovereign state does on her
own territory. The conflict appears on the line sovereignty – individual rights. Vestphalia
agreement allowed an individual to address the international community, with proviso that the
state agrees with this. Yugoslavia did not agree with such an intervention, and the NATO attack
was a break of the Vestphalia agreement.

Of course, all these considerations appear a sheer scholastic, in the face of the political, better to
say military reality. It has been stated over and over by USA that Kosovo issue is a special,
unique one, that is not to be subdued to any formal international regulations, even not principle.
Translated into common parlance it means: “We are powerful and everybody must obey our
rules, or comply with our will”. Hence, Shqiptar may demand secession, but Kurds may not.
1
According to some Russian sources, the Russian mediators in KiM affairs were, in fact, fifth column, who did well
their job for USA.
2
And to Macedonia, though with different outcome.
 242

Tibetans may, but Basques may not. Chechens may, but Abkhazians may not. Etc. In the KiM
case, the “rule” reads: Shqiptars may, but Kosovska Mitrovica region may not.

What’s wrong with such an approach? Nothing, except for mentioning law, rights, principles
and other fictions. Any formal rule may be misused and abused, regardless of the actual sense
of justice. USA did intervene in Croatia siding Zagreb against Knin, but in the case of KiM
they chose to side Priština against Belgrade. The humanitarian aspect may equally be misused,
if somebody is eager to achieve his political goals. It is not inconceivable to imagine that
Shqiptar rebels intentionally provoked the Serbian paramilitaries to commit killings, even
massacres, so as to make appeal to the international community to intervene. In fact, it is
obvious that they were well aware of the impossibility to achieve their secessionist goals by
normal armed uprising. They evidently did not count on it, but had in view the armed rebellion
just as a trigger of the foreign (that is USA) intervention. And it what actually exactly what
happened. In a sense, paramilitaries did Shqiptar job, and they did it very well.

All courts of god Janus

Year 1982 witnessed two remarkable events in the Middle East. One was the air raid of the Israelis
on Iraq, when the Iraqian nuclear reactor in the course of construction was destroyed and Iraqi
nuclear programme put out of agenda. The attack was not sanctioned by UN or any other
international organization, though it was a clear case of an unprovoked aggression on an
independent state, member of UN. We note here that Israel probably had already its nuclear
reactors and nuclear bombs, though it has been neither confirmed nor denied by the Israeli
authorities. Both Israel and USA remain silent on the matter, leaving the world under impression
that the nuclear arsenal exists and thus warning the potential Israeli enemies against any hostile
action. Since it is an obligation of any nation to state publicly its (non)possessing nuclear arms, not
to mentioned the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, this situation has put Israel above the IC, in
particular UN.
The other event was part of the massive assault of Israel on the Lebanon in the same year. Annoyed
by permanent incidents which PLA used to provoke from the Lebanon territory, Israel invaded
Lebanon and reached the southern outskirts of Beyrouth. In those years Lebanon was in the state of
total disorder, mainly due to the presence of the Palestinian armed forces, who controlled much of
the state, particularly the southern region, which was effectively occupied by Palestinians. Israeli
forces occupied two of the biggest refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra and Shatilla, and after
retreating left them to the Lebanon Christian paramilitaries, known as fierce adversaries of
Palestinians in Lebanon. As result, paramilitaries slaughtered some 300 – 800 refugees (depending
on the sources of information) in two camps, including women and children. Some years later,
Ariel Sharon, responsible for the incident, was accused before the International Court of Justice at
Brussels. 1 Israeli citizens were enraged with the indictment and a severe campaign against the
Belgium, host country of the Court, was launched, including a call for boycott of Belgium
products. The indictment was withdrawn, but not because of the boycott, but at the USA
intervention. UN did not intervene on the case, owing to USA veto, of course.
In 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina accused Serbia (and Montenegro) at the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), for alleged genocide, referring principally to Srebrenica massacre. Since this case
appears an extraordinary example of the ethos as conceived by some Balkan population, we shall
consider it in some detail.

1
A counterpart of the Hague Tribunal for the war crimes, founded specifically for the crimes in Rhuwanda and
Yugoslavia.
 243

BiH after Dayton agreement in 1995 was left in a state of undefined attributes, like a raw stately
material rather than a proper state. ”Great Powers” had concluded long time before that those
(Dinaric) people involved in their secular disputes, fighting and atrocities could not be managed by
any civilized standards and therefore decided to leave them alone, provided they are no longer
trouble makers. BIH consists now of two parts of different character and status: (i) Federation,
which comprised formally Muslims and Croats (Roman Catholics) and (ii) so-called Republica
Srpska. The latter is called by the rest of BiH simply Entity, for the following reason. If accepted as
republic, its citizens (predominantly Serbs) could claim the status of a state and that would be just a
step toward demanding secession. So the Serbs claim to have a state, the rest consider them as BiH
citizens like the rest of the overall population, and as a Serb proverbe says: ”The wolf is fed up and
the sheep are in number”. In fact, Republika Srpska (RS) appears tigthtly bound to Serbia (perhaps
as tightly as tick is with sheep) and this makes, in its turn, Serbia status vaguely determined, too.
The mutual border (River Drina) appears very soft and majority of RS citizens have double
citizenship (BiH and Serbian). Army officers in RS are paid by Belgrade funds, including retired
ones. Many MP at Belgrade parliament came as refugees from BiH (as a rule, they have joined
Šešelj’s party), and protect RS interest, even at the expense of Serbian ones. In the central political
institutions of BiH both parts, Federation and RS have equal saying and a common senses must be
reached for any federal political decision.
Now we come back to the BiH accusation before the Brussels court. As we emphasized earlier,
majority (if not all) of the prospective war criminals, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic, fled after Dayton to Serbia, hiding at the expense of Serbian being prosecuted by Hague
Tribunal and European Union. The latter has clearly stated that Serbia can not hope to join EU
before delivering the last accused. Now, what happened? BiH accuses Serbia for genocide on
Bosnian Muslims, practically for the Srebrenica massacre, committed, according to the generally
accepted evidence, by Bosnian Serbs, more precisely by the RS army, lead by Ratko Mladic and
approved by Radovan Karadzic. Representatives of the same RS Serbs seat in the federal political
institutions which have pressed charges against Serbia for genocide, committed by the same
Bosnian Serbs. The amount of compensation demanded from Serbia was claimed as much as xx
billion Euros, what would mean that generations of Serbians would pay for misdeeds committed
not by Serbian citizens. Moreover, if paid, this money would be shared by all citizens of BiH,
including their Serbs, who ”earned” the money at Srebrenica etc.
How Serbia responded to this accusation? She denied the eligibility of the Court for the matter, but
sent a delegation to protect her interests. Could she do anything worse concerning her interests?
No. By denying the legitimacy of the Court she recognized, albeit implicitly, her guilt. By sending
her delegation she accepted in advance any decision to be reached on the matter. Serbia behaved as
if she was RS. In a sense, she was, for it was Dinaric Serbs who made decision on the matter, and
not only on that matter. We note only here that the actual president of Serbia, Boris Tadić, is a
Montenegrin born in Sarajevo. (Unlike USA, Serbian president need not be born in Serbia, with
the consequences just mentioned).
What the Brussels court did? It was court in an awkward situation to decide on an idiotic case and
not lose its credibility. It made a compromise therefore, with the verdict which left that wolf and
sheep satisfied. It found that there was no proof Serbia was an accomplice in the alleged genocide,
but concluded at the same time that Serbia was guilt for not preventing the genocide. Serbian
citizens relaxed after leaning that they (and their descendents) are not going to pay somebody else’s
bill and the affair was quickly forgotten. Only Dragoljub Mićunović, a founder and former leader
of Democratic Party and member of Serbian delegation at the Court, commented, with a charming
smile, before TV cameras, the weird logic of Bosnian accusation and it was that.
We don’t know what the judges had in mind when considering the charge against Serbian citizens,
but at least some of them may have imagined a postman delivering to a former RS fighter, who
 244

shot hundreds of Srebrenica Muslims, a part of the sum Serbian citizens, majority of whom never
heard of Srebrenica before the war, would be paying for his crime.
We dealt already wit the Hague Tribunal, but here another case came up with Serbia decision to put
her case before the Hague Court for the International law, in 2008. The Court has an advisory
character, but Serbia authorities considered it of some help concerning the Kosovo issue, at least
from the viewpoint of a possible moral gain. After an extensive diplomatic offensive from the
Serbian side, the vote turned out a marginal approval of the positive declaration. Interestingly some
states which had already recognized KiM independence voted in favour of the resolution, while
some abstained from voting. Such an outcome, calls, however, for a few comments. First, some
states. like USA and to demonstrate they were not going to obstruct Serbia’s efforts to consult the
Court and thus allow for a free decision of the Court. But more probable is the interpretation those
state already knew the final decision and were just playing cat and mouse game with Serbia. But
the real explanation came the next day after General Assembly voting – Montenegro and
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic) declared their recognitions of KiM independence. Why
just next day and why such a synchronized action? Obviously, the Boss thought it would be too
much for Serbia to enjoy the UN support on the matter, what could encourage her for a more
resolute demands and steps. Besides, by forcing those two states to slap Serbia, these
”independent” Serbia’s neighbours and former partners in Yugoslavia, would further lose their self-
respect, what would make them even more obedient. Irrespective of the political implications and
real significance, these moves of all three states involved could not be described otherwise but
miserable.
But the story does not end here. Croatia had accused Serbia for the same crimes and at the same
court. What was the response of the Serbian authorities? Instead of denying her alleged
involvements in Croatian internal affairs, they made the worst possible reaction – counter-
accusation. They chose to accuse Croatia for the same crimes committed against Croatian Serbs,
particularly during the ”Storm” action in1995. What amounts to confess the accusations about the
interference into internal affairs of an internationally recognized state. The logic is as simple as
idiotic: “You have maltreated your citizens, and we are going to protect their interests before their
own state”. Croatia needed no better support for her accusations. Why Serbian authorities did it?
The answer is as simple as devastating: Serbia is not ruled by Serbians, but by the Dinaric
newcomers. The latter prefer their own interests to Serbian ones and want to involve their host
country as much as possible in their own affairs. The implicit slogan runs like this: The worse for
Serbia, the better for us. And here the circle closes: four columns have been marching towards
Serbia (Croatia, BiH, Macedonia and Montenegro), and the fifth is already in Belgrade.
Finally we mention the latest (February 5, 2009) voting at the European Parliament, which
recommended all European states to recognize KiM independence. Though this declaration had no
executive power, it never-the-less was another slap into the face of Serbia. What did Serbian
delegation do during the debate? Nothing. For the simple reason – it was absent at the meeting.
Why? In the Serbian Parliament, which elects the state delegation members, Šešelj’s MP obstructed
the session and the delegation was not formed and sent to defend Serbian interests. No public
media even discussed this failure. For good reasons again: they have been controlled by the same
intruders. And here we back to square one.

KiM - What solution?

What would be solution of the question of X?

There is no question of X.
There is no solution of the question of X.
 245

Though linguistically different, the answers on the question are, in fact, the same, though not
identical. To illustrate the point, suppose somebody asked a German in 1930ies:

What about the Jewish question?

The answers might have been:
Which Jewish question? (from a Jew)
There is no solution to the Jewish question (from a non-Jew).

The second answer probably would not have been given, but a dozen of various answers instead,
which put together could be subsumed as quoted above.
After these preliminary exercises, we now ask the most crucial question linked with the KiM issue:

What about Albanian question on Balkan?

Which Albanian question? (from an Albanian).
There is no solution for the Albanian question (response from a Macedonian, Serb, Greek and
Montenegrin).

Though only indirectly related to our topic, we add for the sake of comparison and completeness
the Roma (Gipsy) question. If asked, a Central-European and South-European subject would
certainly respond by:

Yes, there is the Roma question.

If it happens to be a Roma, he would state:
Yes, there is the solution to Roma question.
In the case of non-Roma subject, the answer would be:
No, there is no solution of the Roma question.

If one sums up all variants of solutions suggested by Roma subject, the interrogator would
conclude that both sides agree: there is no solution to Roma question.
As in the above case of Jewish question in Germany, we shall here consider possible answers,
which would be subsumed as the joint ”solution”, the negative answer.
We now reformulate the question in a number of various forms:

What would be an ideal solution?

Which solution would suit the most a particular side involved?
Which instance, or institution, would be entitled to decide on the matter?

Global solution
What is the nature of the question, or problem involved in the Albanian question?
We argued in the previous considerations that the crux of the Albanian question lies in the
anthropological sphere. (See Appendix 9). It is a part of the tension which arises due to the
historical and anthropological retardation of the Balkan Albanian population, which has been
linked with distinct anthropological features of this ancient Balkan population, as compared with
the neighbouring population. The problems Balkan non-Albanian countries have with Albanians
appear similar, though not identical, with those central-European countries had with Balkan (non-
Albanian) people two centuries ago. Albanians have arrived at the national(istic) table too late, for
a century or so. With an important difference: the advances of the medical care and material
welfare have resulted in an unprecedented demographic explosion of the Albanian population,
unknown in the European history. This fact has been instrumental in making Albanian issue,
otherwise political one, an anthropological problem. The persistency of the Albanian question has
 246

been the direct result of this shift of the playground from the political to biological sphere.
Albanians have skillfully made use of the ”logic of numbers” as their invincible weapon, which has
been proclaimed taboo, so that one has even no opportunity to put it on the table, not to mention to
discuss it.
One may not recognize, or admit, there is an Albanian question, but one thing is sure and not
negotiable: KiM issue is just a part of the general Albanian one, whatever one means by that.
Albanian population has been flooding the neighbouring areas, occupying gradually new territories,
and then claiming their ”ethnical rights” on the same land. It may be seen as a tide, or a tsunami,
depending on the intensity of the advance of this domino effect. Two things should be noted here.
Not all neighbouring non-Albanian populations have met this Sturm und Drang with the same
response and vitality. Macedonians have quickly succumbed to the Albanian aspirations (and USA
pressure), based on the drastic change of the percentage (true or invented) of the non-Slavic people
in formerly purely Slavic country. Greeks have not yet responded to the discrete announcements
concerning the Western Epir, claimed to be Albanian Cameria. Montenegrins are trying to ignore
the issue, particularly since they have taken distance from Serbia, long before separating officially.
Their position is specific in this context, since they belong to the same Dinaric race as the
Albanians and do not feel much disturbed by the presence of the population still partly in the state
of a traditional society. Serbia has found herself in a particularly difficult position, since KiM
appears like a knife penetrating the national body. In fact, KiM is not even the most dangerous part
of the problem. Since after founding KiM autonomous region (later province), some adjacent parts
of the mainland, with a small Shqiptar population, have gradually become the Shqiptar regions,
with Albanians as majoritarian population. Now that KiM has become independent (sic), their
demands to join in have been strengthened. It is the best illustration of the domino effect, as the
victorious stratagem of the population which proliferates at the African rate. If Cuba was “the gun
aimed at USA stomach”, 1 Shqiptar KiM is the knife in Serbian stomach, indeed. With no man’s
strip around KiM of 10 km, where Shqiptars make regular raids, what has resulted in evacuation of
the non-Shqiptar population from the area, the inflation of the new “free country” territory may be
taken for granted.
Serbia has been affected by another anthropological phenomenon, that of the occupation by
highlanders from the western Yugoslav regions. Though these ”refugees” constitute only 5% of the
overall Serbian population (without KiM), their presence is felt to a much greater extent, since they
appear a ruling class in Serbia, populated formerly by plain people. The state politics concerning
KiM has been run and directed by these Dinaroids, as we discussed before. This will become
crucial when we talk about Serbian interests and ensuing politics regarding KiM crisis.
All together, the surrounding countries appear affected in different ways, what makes a common
approach to Albanian question difficult indeed. On the other hand by letting the events go on
unchecked, each country will find her in the situation which Serbia faced, with the same outcome.
In particular difficult position appears Macedonia, which is threatened to be swallowed by the
Albanian demographic inflation. With a large Roma population, she will soon become a non-Slavic
country. Therefore we start first by considering the scheme of a sustainable overall regional
solution. But before doing that a few words of the methodology seems in order. The nature of the
problem requires global approach, but this is not the only specific feature of the issue. In dealing
with systems, physical, chemical, biological, social etc one first starts from a stationary model.
System is supposed to change only slowly, if any, so that number of approximate methods may be
applied (quasi-stationary hypothesis). Fast changing systems require, however, time-dependent
description and relevant methods for solving the problem. Normally, human societies are supposed
to change slowly, if they are fixed at a particular land or region. The only fast moving changes have
been considered up to now in context of migrations, but the demographic explosions have never

1
John Kennedy’s declaration in 1962.
 247

been considered by politicians. We mentioned some places in the Bible where these processes, real
of fictive, have been recorded, as in the case of the so-called “Egyptian slavery”, before the
Exodus.
Consider a particular region populated by a number of ethnicities (including a single one). What
can cause a noticeable ethnical change within a prescribed historical period? Two factors may play
remarkable roles: (i) the influx from outside (migration from the neighbouring area(s)); (ii)
misbalance in the reproductive rate between the ethnical components. This may result in a drastic
perturbation of the ethnical balance within the region. If the region appears large enough, a part of
it may become a strong resource of “human surplus”, as the case of Dinaric region on Balkan
appears. The density of population in the latter case remains the same, at the expense of the
neighbouring regions, which are populated by newcomers from the (usually highlanders)
demographically over'productive areas. The trouble with the latter effect is that he demographic
invasion appears sufficiently fast to result in misbalance, but not sufficiently noticeable to
politicians. The latter think in terms of years, rarely decades, whereas the ethnical change due to
“birth rate invasion” is measured by centuries. Only statesmen of high intellectual capacity and
good knowledge of history keep these changes within their horizon and take measures whose
effects will be harvested by their descendents, or later generations. Ordinary politicians, even if
their attention has been drawn to the phenomenon, take it fatalistically, as an elementary disaster,
going beyond their capabilities, competence and responsibility. They experience the situation as a
snapshot picture, static and fixed.
Fast changing anthropological situation in the area where Albanians are present requires a time-
dependent methodology, as a prerequisite to searching any sustainable solution. In this context not
only the entire geographical region must be considered, but the evolution of the anthropic content
of the region. Without accounting for the time component, any particular solution will become
obsolete in a short time and the procedure must be repeated again. In physical science there are
many situations when the static picture appears insufficient and even useless. Physical phenomena
where the external influx and the internal change must be combined in order to describe the system
and predict its further development abound. We mention, as an example, the heat examination in a
substance, when an external heat flow imports the external thermic energy, but the latter may be
produced by chemical reaction inside the determined volume of the substance too. In our case, the
heat transfer appears analogous to the massive migration from, presumably neighbouring,
surroundings, whereas the heat production to demographic increase of a particular population
within the region.
The problem with the above analogy comes when one starts to meditate about solutions, if they are
considered necessary from a point of view of a particular side involved. The migrations are usually
stopped, if necessary by force, what as a rule provokes wars. As for the demographic expansion the
remedy appears even less agreeable, if not inapplicable. Chemical reactions are rarely conspicuous,
as the birth rate are neither and the ensuing demographic explosion. The principal problem is the
implicit shift in the field of examination. In the case with the heat, we have two distinct fields:
physics and chemistry, whereas in the demographic case we face the political issue mixed with the
anthropological (biological) one. However, while in the natural science application of different
models and theories appears normal and causes no ethical or other embarrassing, introduction of
the anthropological aspects leads inevitably to a moral resistance of the external witnesses.
Chauvinism, racism, misanthropy etc are terms first to come to mind. At this point we note an
interesting parallel with the ecology, where it appears normal, and at least fashionable, to talk (and
work) about protecting a particular species, or reducing the number of another, etc. Ecology thus
appears a sort of meta-ethics, with human playing the role of gods. In fact, this issue may be pushed
even to an absurd, regarding our battle with microworld - bacteria, viruses etc. We do not consider
making use of antibiotics as bactericide, pesticides as insecticides etc. On the other end of the rod
 248

lie extreme religious dogmas, like that of ahimsa in Jainism, which strictly forbids killing (and
eating) any living creature. 1
Though I am pretty sure my readers do not appear hypocrites, never-the-less I shall dwell in some
detail on the issue of mixing political with anthropological aspects, for the sake of completeness. It
concerns the concept of eugenic, practiced by many nations, under various disguises. The strict diet
prescriptions by the biblical authors, iconoclastic commandments etc are really meant to prevent
mixing with ”nations” (goyim), in order to preserve the “purity” (that is ”superiority”) of the
Jewish race. When Hitler adopted the same politics, (Nürnberg racial laws etc), such racism
became Racism with the negative, even disgusting connotation. Eugenics was practiced by
Spartans, but it was a sort of “internal racism”, which provoked no antagonistic response from the
external people. Family planning, abortion etc are aimed at the same target – an improvement of
the quality of population. We add here that there are various forms of indirect eugenics, like the
immigration rules. You can not settle in USA if you suffer of a genetic or other incurable decease.
If one adds the mental ability, professional skill, etc, selection, which apply equally to the
immigration candidates, USA appears real racial state, if not society. 2 In the same vain, though not
so conspicuous, are the immigration rules concerning Israel, disguised by the “ethnical purity”
restrictions, which in themselves are based on eugenetics.
In fact Israel is a good example to illustrate our model of coping with the ethnical diversion, we
discussed above. Facing the big fertility of the local Palestinian (euphemistically called Arabs)
within the ”proper Israel”, and not daring to expel them rightway, authorities are encouraging Jews
from Diaspora, to come and settle in Holy Land. Particularly this policy was conspicuous in the
case of Soviet citizens, who were eager to emigrate from USSR and applied for Israel visas, on the
ethnical grounds. Majority of them were not Jews at all, but the Israel authorities turned blind eye
and accepted the influx of immigrants, which were about to balance the high birth rate of the
Palestinians. Thus, in the Israel case we have both effects of external influx and internal
demographic explosion, but unlike KiM issue, these effects are to cancel each other, not to add up.
It is the demographic misbalance which Israelis are afraid of and state explicitly that a common
state with Palestinians on the occupied territories is out of question. Contrary to that, the principal
argument of KiM occupiers, USA&com, for an “independent Kosovo” is that it is a nice example
of “multiethnic society”. (Of course, when Serbia comes to consider, the same states run out of
arguments of this kind). We shall come back to this point, which is central to our approach to KiM
issue, later on.
Before passing to the particular KiM issue, a few words about other aspects of the demographic
processes seem in order. We have seen how the enormous, uncontrolled (sic) demographic
explosion, on KiM and in Albania alike, has caused ethnical and political turmoil, to give rise to
drastic social and ethnical disturbances in the area. Fast growing population in an underdeveloped
society, with poor economy inevitably gives rise to uncivilized behaviour of the young, uneducated
generations, whose general economic, cultural and other deficiencies are easily turned into inter-
ethnical divisions and hatred. The new nonproductive population means jobless young people,
unemployment, despair, violence etc. To channel this dissatisfaction towards their own state and
home country can be done only by extremely unscrupulous politicians (sic). What scrupulous
politicians do is best demonstrated by the Chinese authorities, who have imposed the law of a
single child per family. This has drastically decreased the natality of the most numerous population
of the world. The direct consequence of this measure is the enormous rise of the rate of the
economic development of about

1
Interestingly, though unaware of the existence of microcosm, like bacteria and viruses, the latter were also protected
by the dogma, since we can not eat viruses, for example (the opposite does not hold, of course).
2
The eugenetic issue in USA has been brought inadvertedly to light by a recent incautious statement by Watson about
Africans.
 249

10 %, which appears the largest in the world. Considering the overall population of the China, such
an increase appears a miracle, indeed. It is interesting that nobody mentions the cause of this
development. Another effect, not independent of the first, is the improvement of the overall quality
of the Chinese population, in every respect, from the health, education, initiative, self-confidence,
etc. Parents now can care of their offspring, dedicating to the kid their attention and love. In the
family of 8-10 children, which resembles more a kindergarten than the most important social unit,
family, kids are left to themselves, rising as members of a flock And when brought to streets and
set on an external enemy, the troubles come inevitably. It was exactly like that with Hitler and
Nazis, and mutatis mutandis with Iranian Khomeini followers.

An ideal solution

[For] solutions come and go and the problems remain.

H. Höffding.

After these preliminary considerations, we ask the crucial question: what would be the optimal
solution for the Albanian question. But before attempting to answer the question, we must address
the prerequisite question as to the definition of optimal. By this we mean the most socially
desirable solution from the widest point of view, that is considering the benefits it would bring to
the world society. Of course, one need not agree with a particular solution offered, but if the
premise of the overall benefit is turned down, then there is little point in considering the issue, this
particular concerning KiM affair or any other. It is with this premise we propose that the KiM affair
should be treated within the broader issue of the Albanian question. What is the aim of such a
solution, whatever it may be? We state it here rightway: to prevent the expansion of the Albanian
population on Balkan, at the expense of the surrounding population. (See Appendix 10). In
principle, one may envisage two ways of achieving this goal. One is to prevent the current rapid
proliferation via uncontrolled birth rate, by adequate technical means; the other would be stopping
the very fast breeding and reducing the birth rate to an adequate level. Neither of these tools could
be achieved without cooperation of all countries involved, in particular Albania herself. What
brings us to the organization of an international conference, we argued for before, under the
auspices of a broader international institution, like the European Union (EU). The conference
would have two principal agendas: (i) family planning and (ii) settling the interstate borders, which
in the case of the failure of (i) would prevent in a long term the future change of the Balkan
borders, except, of course, under mutual agreements between states involved.

Ideal solution I
Now we come to the particular measures necessary to realize one or both of the above goals. We
start with (i). The most effective measure would be reducing the number of children to one per
family, just as the case with China is. This would in a medium term reduce the Albanian population
to the level it had before the demographic explosion, two centuries or 150 years ago. It would
reduce and stop the demographic pressure from Albania on the neighbouring countries and result in
a great relief among the latter concerning the threat of losing territories. In the neighbouring
countries, like Macedonia (FYRM) and Serbia, where the misbalance has already made havoc
among the autochthonous population, the shrinking of the Albanian subpopulation would result in
the peaceful coexistence, which in the medium term run would end in a civilized ay of life,
deprived of inter-national tensions and animosities, which are present today in the area. We
mention here that the non-Albanian population in the regions involved, has already very low birth
rate, between one and two children per family.
 250

To be honest, talking about demographic expansion and family planning, Albanians are not the
only perturbative agent in the area. The problem with Roma, not only on Balkan, but in the Eastern
and Central Europe appears as serious as in the Albanian case, but the consequences of this
uncontrolled proliferation differ substantially from our issue here. First, Roma are almost
impossible to handle in a regular way, since they appear mostly people without (administrative)
identity. Second, although they present even a greater problem to host countries, the Roma issue
belongs exclusively to the social sphere, mainly since they live scattered within the host countries.
We shall address this issue later on, for it is impossible to avoid the general issue of the family
planning, as a general world problem. At the moment we just stress that although Roma are present
on the area we are dealing with, their demands are restricted to the social aid requests, what makes
the problem essentially different from the Albanian one. The case in point is Macedonia, where
there are almost as many Roma as Albanians. It is interesting that the latter never raised the Roma
question, neither in Macedonia nor in Serbia, proving that their cries about “humanitarian
catastrophe” are mere demagogical means for achieving political goals. We do not deny, of course,
both Albanians and Roma have problems, but hey are their own, which they should solve
themselves, with the help of the ambient society. But unless they admit they should not behave as
irresponsible citizens, their problems will stay for long.

Ideal solution II
Now, we come to the point (ii), as a way to solving the Albanian problem. If Albanians turn down
the variant (i), then the neighbouring countries will be put into position to try to solve their
problems by negotiating with Albania and Albanian population outside their country of origin. This
sort of solution will by necessity be of an administrative nature, and thus less sustainable. Solving
anthropic problem by political means is like curing a malign decease by cutting off an organ. As we
saw before the domino effect makes the final solution practically impossible. Even a small
community left outside the encircled area becomes in due course a large population, which starts
with his political demands for secession and so long. Ideal solution would be drawing a line
between the Albanian ”mainland” (whatever I would be) and the rest of the region, with the latter
completely evacuated from the Albanian population. This sort of solution, of course, is not only
possible, but has been realized already elsewhere. We refer, of course, to the Israeli (in)famous
wall, which separates ”Israel proper” from the ”Occupied territories”. 1 As we mentioned already,
this kind of solution can never be taken as permanent. In particular, it is dubious to expect that such
an arrangement would inevitably force Albanian authorities to adopt the strategy of family
planning. In most probability the fast increase of the population inside the walls would find another
ventilation, this time towards the Mediterranean Sea, first of all towards Italy. The latter has
already experienced this sort of immigration, as the large Albanian population in the South
(mountains) Italy testifies. In any case a massive population displacement would be involved, if a
solution of this kind is accepted. What would happen to Greeks, Macedonians, Serbs,
Montenegrins and other citizens of Albania would be surely the subject of negotiations. If
somebody objects such a solution as improper or impractical, we remind these skeptics that it was
exactly what Greeks and Turks did after 1922. Now Turkey is devoid of ethnical Greeks and
Greece of ethnical Turks. Their mutual relations are still bad, but disaster has been definitely put
out of the agenda, concerning ethnical conflicts and hatred.
Finally, massive migrations, expulsions, displacements etc have been carried out recently within
the area, from Croatia, KiM, and BiH. Those who gained territories by these displacements
consider the latter as definitive solutions, regardless of the ethical, political, historical, cultural
implications. They call it ”real politics” (or political reality), as those external factors involved in
one or other way, do. But when one tries to point to the future and propose similar solutions, they

1
As the wall appears a very unpopular border, we may take the term as a metaphor for an impenetrable border.
 251

consider it unrealistic from the start, that is postulating, albeit implicitly, a number of taboos, which
some country, in this case Serbia, must be burdened by.

How to achieve a sustainable solution

As mentioned above, this kind of solution must be searched for by a consensus of the countries
involved, either explicitly and acutely, as Serbia, or Macedonia (presently in a metastable state,
ready to explode), or in a apparently safe position, like Greece and Montenegro. The country which
should initiate the conference should be Greece, for many reasons. One of these is the fact that it is
the oldest country the region, a stable ally of the West. It has an experience, albeit indirect one,
with the immigration and secession on Cyprus. The memory of ethnical separations and
redistributions, from 1922 is still present in the Greek minds. Greece has enormous number of
Albanian gastarbeiters (about 800.000 in the season) and Greeks are well acquainted with
Albanians and their mentality. A conference on the subject would, in passing, help a number of the
local controversies solved, like that of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia.
As for the external factors they should be kept aside, for many reasons. First, as the recent history
has shown, they do not appreciate the crux of matter and their interference has turned out fatal for
the region, creating more problems than solving them. In particular USA must be excluded from
any interference. Since it was USA which was most directly involved in KiM secession, their
presence in the Conference would be an act of cynics, if not of grotesque. An involvement of USA
would bring in a much broader interference from the sides which have strong interests in Balkan
affairs, but not as conspicuous as USA. Balkan affairs are sufficiently complex to allow for further
complications. The only international institutions whose help would be positive are UN and EU.
But neither of these organizations should include in its delegations those country members who
were involved in one or other way in the NATO aggression in 1999. EU would be welcome, at
least since the entire Balkan region is expected to join it in a foreseeable future, and it is the right
position of the EU to be an observer in the process of negotiation.
But only as an observer. The conference should be left to the countries involved, as numbered
above and no mediation, interference, control, supervision and like should be allowed. As we have
seen in the previous cases, like that at Rambouillet, a country which has a support from somebody
else side, never negotiate. The Conference should promote the independence of the Balkan
countries, which is incompatible with the institution of patron.
Such a meeting, even if unsuccessful, would put on the agenda the most serious problem World is
facing today – the problem of overpopulation. More precisely, the issue of the family planning
should become the primary concern of the present day politicians, better to say statesmen. The
uncontrolled natality in some parts of the World, in particular in Africa, South Asia and Latin
America, present a real threat to the welfare of the mankind and can not be avoided to consider by
the most responsible decision making people. There is no need to dwell on this subject here, for it
is too well known. Once the psychological barrier is broken, the issue will get the visa for the most
serious considerations on the global level. The case of the European singularity in the form of the
Albanian population with the natality which surpasses that of the neighbouring population (and
European standards on the matter) by factor 5 would be the best occasion for initiating the issue of
the world population growth. Once a particular case has been solved, the general approach would
be made much easier, than by starting with academic discussions.

How realistic all this is?

Politics is an art of possible. What are real chances solutions like those discussed above to
materialize? Next to nothing. Why? Albanian question has long ago become a part of the global
game, the struggle for power, better to say for domination in the world. Two principal players
appear on the stage, or behind it: Muslim part of the world and USA as the world super power (sic).
We comment briefly both parts.
 252

Muslims are coming

Despite the claims of Albanians they are ”above religion”, that their religion is “Albanianism”, etc,
their way of life has been mostly determined by the Muslim religion. Those smaller parts of the
overall Albanian population, Greek orthodox and Roman-Catholics, appear considerably less
troublemakers. First of all their birth rate is reasonably lower than that of their Muslim country
fellows. Muslim counties, first of all Arab fundamentalists, like Saudi Arabia, have been engaged
in the entire Yugoslavia affairs since late 1980ies, with the rise of the political freedom and liberal
democracy, after Tito’s death. For these states BiH, KiM and Macedonia appear a very convenient
platzdarm of Islam in Europe. We note that although there is a large Muslim population in Western
Europe, as more or less recent immigrants (Gastarbeiters), they are not concentrated in particular
compact regions and are not yet threats for the host countries as possible agents of secession. Their
interference with the domestic way of life and culture generally appears mainly restricted to the
social domain. The problem with Muslim population in Europe is less in the very religious sphere,
but predominantly in the way of life their religion imposes. Moreover, the latter is less determined
by theological dogmas, but by the physical environment in the region where the new religion arose.
This happened to be the Arabic peninsular, which in its turn happened to be a semi desert. Islam
appears essentially nomadic religion, originated and practiced in tents, rather than in houses and
towns. All religious rules are determined by this circumstance. To get an impression of this way of
life, one best imagines the Gypsy (nomadic) population in Europe until recent times (say, second
half of the last century). The poor health and bad educational conditions dictated the high birthrate,
otherwise the population would have disappeared for the high morality. When the overall
conditions improved, (mainly due to the Western advances in the medical care sector), this advance
has resulted in the overall demographic explosion, we witness in the Islamic countries today. One
might argue that the Albanian high birth rate was caused by their historical isolation and ensuing
retardation, but this has been caused, in its turn, by the difference in religious practices and
accompanying way of life.
Though rarely discussed openly, the issue of the ethical questions related to the abortion, have little
to do with religious dogmas, but much more with the struggle for dominance, between the world
churches. All controversies concerning the exact instance of a fetus becoming a (human) being and
thus acquiring the right to live, are only masque for much more mundane background: the struggle
for proliferation of their own flock. Holy Father would have nothing against abortion among
Muslims, for instance, on the contrary, but forbids strongly this practice within his congregation.
And vice versa.
It is for these religious reasons western governments are suspicious regarding their Muslim
citizens. They are well aware it is a biological warfare that is going on, but nobody dares to admit
it openly. In the face of the religious and cultural inferiority of their Islamic followers, Muslim
leaders, particularly the clergy, resort s to the only weapon where they appear superior - to the
human proliferation. Whence outnumbered by the domestic Muslims, the western countries will
succumb to the human tide.

USA respond
If the Islamic offensive appears slow and behind the scene, USA response is both explicit and
hypocritical. Appearing as an Israeli vassal for all practical purposes, USA government is eager to
convince the Muslim part of the mankind they have nothing against Islam as such. They are siding
Israel just for the sake of its right to exist, not because they prefer the Israelis to Arabs. And the
best (if not the only) proof of this assertion is USA support for the Islamic population on Balkan. 1

1
As on would put it, USA appear a blood donor volunteer of somebody else’s blood.
 253

First in BiH, and then on KiM. As a result, Balkan countries, like Serbia, will pay the bill of the
Israel protection by USA.
Of course, there are other motives for supporting Albanians on Balkan, first of all as servile
population, ready to sell the independence and national pride for supplying USA with military
bases. Albania and KiM have become USA sea carriers on the European ocean. True, USA have
already put the foot on European land via NATO, but with counties like Albania, they do not have
to worry about the domestic resistance to USA march for domination. Albania and KiM has thus
become a stronghold of the USA world strategic web. In this respect, Albanians turn out a Trojan
horse within European fortress (sic).
Hence, one may well expect a most fierce resistance to solving Albanian question from USA side.
It is for this reason, too, that the interference of the external factor should be kept at the minimum.
One of the potentially most effective way would be to direct the prospective ”advisers” and
”patrons” to the Middle East and propose that these peace-giving friends prove themselves in
resolving the Palestinian question, that is the regional crisis caused by founding the Jewish state of
Israel. When affirming themselves by providing the durable peace in the Middle East, USA and
any other peace-bringing candidate, may expect to be invited to interfere the Balkan affairs.

The role of Albania

This will surely be both decisive and abstinent. Albania has been keeping low profile ever since the
KM crisis arose in its acute form, pretending she had nothing to do with the Shqiptar
dissatisfactions and rebellions in Yugoslavia. Her role resembles much that played by USSR during
the World War 2, when Stalin turned down all proposals from the west allies to help settling down
the Yugoslav disputes, that is the mutual animosities and fighting between Draža Mihailović’s
chetniks and Tito’s partisans. Allies were well aware that Tito was an exponent of USSR in
Yugoslavia, whose role was to impose communist regime after the war. Tito used to send daily
reports to Stalin on the Balkan situation and after Red Army pushed German Wermacht from
Yugoslavia, Tito took over the control over the country, never to abandon it. As we mentioned
before, Albania used to supply the KiM rebels with all necessary equipment, including four
buildings where Albanian surgeons used to take out organs from Serbian captives, to be sold to
foreign clinics (mainly in Turkey). Albania provided ground for the military training camps for
KLA (organized and supported by Germany).
The affair with the organs trade was one of rare occasions when the Albanian involvement was
explicate and, what was even more important, recognized by the IC, in particular by the Tribunal
officials. This involvement will show up in ever more details, but at the beginning the fact already
revealed were sufficient Serbia to accuse Albania for interfering her internal affairs. We note here
that BiH officials accused Serbia for the same interference, although they had no hard evidence for
that. But the IC was rightly convinced, by the circumstantial evidence, Serbia was engaged on the
side of Bosnian Serbs during the fighting there. By the same token, Serbia should have made use of
the occasion of Albania being caught in flagranti to expose the international engagement over KiM,
in particular that of USA and Germany.
Albanian leaders restrict their involvement to giving occasionally moral and political support to
their compatriots living in the neighbouring countries, but never admitted they were engaged
themselves in the Albanian activities outside Albania. All this is, of course, understandable, even
acceptable from a general point of view and every other country would do the same in such a
situation. What makes the Albanian question essentially different from other disputes in the region,
however, is not the momentous situation, but the process which is going on, as we have been
elaborating above. It is the role of time bomb which makes the question both important and acute.
In such a situation no player in the region may expect to be ignored, or excused.
Hence, one may expect that an axis Washington-Tirana will try to block any attempt to resolve this
abnormal and potentially disastrous situation. What are the chances this expected hindrance to be
 254

overcome? From the Albanian side one may surely expect to push further the politics of the
demographic expansion. This syndrom of “nation in nascent state” has been well known in the
region. We mention the case of Croatia, which has been desperately trying to increase the number
of Croats in the region, so as to match the Serbian rival. This increase was realized partly during
the regime of Ustashas in the World War 2, when a large number of Greek Orthodox Serbs was
forced to convert into Roman-Catholic, that is into Croats. Another rout to the “big nation” was
proclaiming Bosnian and Herzegovian Muslims as Croats. We mentioned similar politics adopted
by Albanians in Albania and the surrounding regions. All national minorities in Albania have been
proclaimed Albanians and practically deprived of their native language in public. Conversions of
Serbs on KiM into Muslims, practically into Albanians, during the Turkish rule, have been already
considered earlier. Albania evidently seeks to catch up with the neighbouring countries, Serbia and
Greece in particular, at least as the population multitude is concerned. The peculiarity of this
endeavour is not in its motivation, but in means. The battle field has been shifted from warfare to
bed. The stratagem: make the child in the evening and submit the bill to the host country in the
morning, has been so far very successful, indeed. Now that the goal has been almost achieved
(hopefully), Albanians want to harvest the fruit of their battles. They require the territories they
inhabited with the majoritarian population. Albania turns out to play a domino game with the
neighbours. One by one, at the time. It is that stratagem which will determine the tactics of
avoiding any considerations concerning the national expansion at the expense of the neighbouring
countries. And it is USA Albanians rely on the most in this enterprise.
The question arises: is it a winning strategy? Not necessarily.

The power of powerless

There is always a priest above priest.

Serbian proverb

We have seen that KiM issue has much broader implications from a local dispute over land. It
appears a generic polygon for a number of far reaching projects. The focus of these projects lies in
Israel. Albanian case, in Particular KiM affair, turns out to mirror the more dangerous Middle East
crisis. It is for that reason the Albanian question must be resolved in a sufficiently just manner, for
any solution will have serious, perhaps fatal, repercussion on the global stage and in the near future.
KiM issue complicated as it is will never give rise to World War 3, but Middle East crisis might do.
One the world becomes aware of this, it will look at the Balkan with different eye. To occupy a
land and deprive the local inhabitants from their rights would be a very dangerous precedent
indeed. The role of USA, as a shock force for somebody else interests, has already been
recognized by her citizens. It is the tension along the line USA government (including other
representative institutions) from one side and the USA taxi payers, which will turn decisive in
getting free USA of her vassal status. And when this has been achieved, USA citizens will have the
final word about foreign politics of their officials. When the humiliating status of vassal state
becomes public in USA and world, USA citizens will realize that their officials have no power to
provide independence to any country in the world, as a gift, since USA themselves are not
independent. They may occupy Afghanistan, Iraq, KiM etc but all they can do is to impose quisling
governments there, and pretend they have made service to the world justice, peace, etc. At the
moment, USA is just another state of the Greater Israel, together with the “Occupied Territories”
(Cisjordania, Gaza and Golan Heights). The Israelis refer to Americans with derision, with good
reason.
Sunday, 01 February 2009

”Another Israeli spokeswoman, Tzipora Menache, stated that she was not worried about
 255

negative ramifications the Israeli onslaught on Gaza might have on the way the Obama
administration would view Israel. She said ‘You know very well, and the stupid
Americans know equally well, that we control their government, irrespective of who sits
in the White House. You see, I know it and you know it that no American president can
be in a position to challenge us even if we do the unthinkable. What can they
(Americans) do to us? We control Congress, we control the media, we control show biz,
and we control everything in America. In America you can criticize God, but you can’t
criticize Israel.”

As simple as that. Hence, the difference between West Bank Palestinians and USA citizens is that
the former may state they have been occupied, whereas the latter may not.

Serbia and local KiM solution

It may seem absurd, but the local solution appears more complex to achieve than the regional one,
considered above. For many reasons. We shall elaborate this point in some detail now.
Which Serbia?
One of the necessary prerequisites for a state to solve a problem is that the state exists. Is this
premise met by what is called now Serbia? We shall argue that there is no such an entity as State
of Serbia. As we have elaborated before, Serbia has not met three essentially important qualities to
pretend to be a state.
First, it has no definite borders. Her border with BiH, more precisely with Republika Srpska, along
River Drina, appears a formal line of division, with more geographical than administrative
significance. People cross the border without any control. It was across that “border” that some at
least 30.000 rifles have been carried in 1995, during the “refugees” wave from Republika Srpska
Krajina and Republika Srpska. Border with Montenegro is equally “soft”, though a sort of custom
control does exist. As for the line dividing KiM from the rest of Serbia, it has been from 1999
onwards a strange hybrid of an interstate and intrastate boundary. People from the Central Serbia
cross the boundary freely when going to the Northern KiM, inhabited and controlled by Serbs.
Similarly, Shqiptars form the South-East Serbia move more or less freely to KiM and vice versa.
Altogether, Serbia remains just a geographical entity, as far as her boundaries are concerned. The
most crucial border line appears that between Albania and Serbia. Since the later has no control
over the border, and the Belgrade government pretends that the line between KiM and the rest of
Serbia is just of provisory administrative boundary and is thus ill controlled, a strange situation
may be envisaged regarding the penetrability of the Serbian territory. Namely, somebody may enter
Albania via the Adriatic Sea, cross the border with KiM, and then easily reach Belgrade without
being checked for visa and passport at all.
Second, each state must have her citizens, with a definite citizenship. Who are these in Serbia? The
autochthonous population has been pushed down by the western incomers, as described earlier. The
latter have occupied the most important positions in the state and society, by “serbing”and other
demagogic means. Many citizens of Republika Srpska are at the same time citizens of Serbia (the
opposite does not hold). They are even MP in Belgrade Assembly, protecting interests of Republika
Srpska vis a vis Serbian ones. Situation with Montenegrins appears even weirder indeed. The
notion of Montenegrin is fluid in many respects. He/she is a Montenegrin in Montenegro (unless he
appears to be a member of the Serb party in Montenegro), Serb when in Serbia (possibly Croat in
Croatia) etc. For some Montenegrin is not an ethnical designation, but merely a geographical
(regional) origin. If the latter definition I adopted, then it is estimated that there are more
Montenegrins living in Serbia than in Montenegro (c. 600.000). In particular there are more
Montenegrins in Belgrade than in Montenegro capital Podgorica. Since they occupy high positions
in the Serbian society, in all sectors, no wonder they protect Montenegrin interests whenever they
collide with Serbian ones. For instance, Montenegrin students, very numerous in Belgrade, are
 256

exempted from paying university fees, unlike students from other countries (the same holds, of
course, for the students from Republika Srpska and Serbs from Croatia). When Montenegro
separated from Serbia two years ago, the question of the university fees was raised in Serbia, but
was played down by officials quickly. Many Serbian citizens register their cars in Montenegro,
where the taxes are symbolically low and thus avoid paying tax to Serbia, whose infrastructure they
are using. This criminal situation was brought to the public attention, but has not yet been resolved.
The point is that many of the members of government are Montenegrins, at least of the second
generation. On the other hand, after the separation (and even before) Serbs found they were not
persona grata in Montenegro. Many sold their property in Montenegro for that reason, at
underrated price.
Serbia found herself to have a substantial proportion of citizens who are not loyal to her, but prefer
their tribal kinship interests. When we consider the interest of Serbia concerning KIM and
Albanian question, this circumstance will prove of utmost importance.
We pass now to the third state prerogative, the sovereignty of the country. This is the question of
the existence of the control over territory and population in it. Who controls Serbia? That Belgrade
government was not in control of KiM longtime before the occupation in 1999 was an evident fact,
which calls for no explanation. But the situation is even more complex than the mere lost of a
territory. As we mentioned before, when the so-called refugees from BiH and Croatia came to
Serbia in 1995, they brought in with them an arsenal of weaponry, rivaling the equipment of the
regular Serbian army. Those Ijekavians constitute, together with their compatriots in filtrated into
each pore of the Serbian society, a state in a state. It is for that reason Mladic and other war
criminals from over Drina would never be arrested and delivered to the Hague Tribunal. Murder of
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was a telling warning what will happen if somebody attempts to
interfere with the Ijekavian affairs in Serbia. Note that an army of around 30.000 armed newcomers
can easily withstand a conflict with the armed forces of the host country, even if we disregard that
the officers of the latter are predominantly Dinaroids themselves.
We note that it is not just the matter of numbers and mentality. Those Dinaroids have their own
political party, disguised as Serb Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj. Well organized, strongly
motivated, aggressive, violent, imposing, ruthless, those Dinaroids appear like a predator among
the host prey. The latter appear defenseless against these highlanders, determined to make of Serbia
their new homeland and turn the country which hardly managed to achieve the European
civilization level, into Bosnian-Turkish casaba. What they are doing successfully, indeed.
Before passing to the KiM issue and Serbian interests involved, we note, in view of the above
situation, that in retrospect one can appreciate better the recent history of the intra-Yugoslav
conflicts, in particular in Croatia and BiH. Not only that Serbia interfered with the business of
regions which were populated by Orthodox population, but this interference was unavoidable,
regarding the ethnical constitution of the Serbian rulers. But most importantly, the above
considerations shad the light on the mutual relations along the line Serbia-Orthodox population
over river Drina. The orthodox opinion that it was Serbia who controlled Serbs in those regions
outside Serbia appears not only false, but cynical. It was those Dinaroids there who controlled
Serbia and who dragged her into their regional disputes with Muslim and Croat neighbours. Now
that they lost the battle, they have moved to Serbia to compensate their loss by subduing country
they used to make use of for the last two decades. And when (former) Gen. Mladic lines up the
staff of a caserne in Serbia he used to “hide” in, and threatens to exterminate potential traitors “up
to fourth generation”, the humiliation of former proud state of Serbia is complete.
Finally, we note that non-Serb citizens in Vojvodina appear a civilized, loyal population. 1 As for
the Shqiptars living in those counties adjacent to KiM, their behaviour becomes ever more arrogant
as the KiM slips away of the Belgrade control. Their local leaders, including Serbian Assembly

1
Hungarian population just after WW2 was almost as numerous as was Shiptar population on KiM.
 257

MPs, keep USA flag, together with Albanian one, on their desks, without the flag of Serbia. When
asked in an interview in which country he lived, Riza Halimi, Shqiptar MP, replied “In Preshevo
Valley”. 1

What to do with KiM?

This has been the pending question since Serbia regained KiM in1912. It was clear from the
beginning that with the territory, which used to be the core of Serbian nation, Serbia got a
numerous unfriendly Shqiptar population. Many plans to sole the problem have been proposed
since, including a preliminary agreement with Turkey to accept this Muslim population, which
Turkey herself settled onto KiM. Some less human solutions have been put forward by (non-
Serbian) individuals, likeVaso Čubrilović, as discussed earlier. With the rapid increase of the
Shqiptar population, the crisis grew to the proportion that slipped from the control. The question
arose then: what are realistic interests of Serbia regarding KiM? Which one of many possible
options are the best for the Serbian state? Let us enumerate some of them, before considering the
optimal choice, from the Serbian point of view.
But before we start rolling uphill Sisif’s stone, let us see if there has been precedence to the KiM
issue in the Western history. And we turn again to the case of Israel.
Palestine and Kosovo – a parallel
As we noted before, there are many striking similarities between Israel and Serbian history,
including overtones, that it pays off to make an overview of Palestinian and Shqiptar issues.
Although the question as to the origin of Jewish nation has not yet been answered satisfactorily, 2
some of convincing explanations do emerge after many scholars have studied available evidence.
Proto-Israelis seem to have been a highlanders population, inhabiting what is today Cisjordania,
where Palestinians live today. Somewhen around 13-th c.BC they occupied somehow the lowland,
to be called later Israel. Proto-Palestinians seem to have come from Greek regions to Gaza strip,
known in the Bible as Philistines. What happened to the autochthonous Canaanites and the
neighbouring Phoenicians is still a mystery, in particular to concerning possible mixing with proto-
Israelis. After the destruction of the Second Temple (70 AD) and particularly after the abortive
rebellion under Bar Kosba (132 AD), Palestinian Jews migrated towards West, mainly to Europe,
forming what is called today Diaspora. At the end of 19th century, following the founding of the
Zionist movement, world Diaspora started to realize the great national project of returning to “Holy
Land”, that is then Palestine. By buying land, pressure, terrorism and other legal and illegal means,
Jews managed to acquire a big part of the former Israel, which is now the state of Israel, with the
Occupied Territories. Ironically, Palestinians proper and Israeli Jews have exchanged their
territories, relative to what they inhabited in the past.
Though condemned by UN, Israel retains the lands she occupied in 1967. Palestinians have been
pushed to refugee camps in the neighbouring countries, and inhabited also the Occupied Territories.
Since then they are under control of the Jerusalem and by their quisling governments. Israel wants
neither to annex the occupied territories, nor to let them free. The reason for the first rejection is the
high birth rate of (Muslim) Palestinians, who would soon outnumber Jewish population in a state
which has been from the start declared to be exclusively Jewish. In fact, together with Albania,
Israel is the only racial state today. In order to prevent terrorist actions for liberation of Palestine,
Israel has erected the wall delineating the Palestinian and Jewish inhabited lands. Both Western
Coast and Gaza appear today as two enormous concentration camps, despite the revolt of the world
public and UN decisions on the matter. 3

1
The name given by Shiptars to the entire region.
2
See, e.g. Israël Finkelstein, Neil Asher Silberman, La Bible Devoile, , Bayard, 2002, Paris; The Bible Unearthed, The
Free Press, New York, 2001
3
We note that SC accepted mentioning Palestinian state, besides Israel, on March 12, 2002, on the USA initiative!
 258

When Slavs moved into Byzantine controlled Balkan lands inhabited mainly by Illyrs, the latter
retreated to the Dinaric mountainous region and the lowland of modern Albania. Those of Illyrs
living on what is today Montenegro and Herzegovina were assimilated by the Slavs and become
Slavo-phonic, whereas those in Albania retained, presumably, Illyric language, though there is no
reliable evidence for this claim, as we mentioned before. In 17th century Albanians moved from the
mountainous Northern Albania into today KiM. This process resembled what was described in the
Bible as Joshua’s conquest of Canaan, followed by later gradual infiltration into the Canaanite
society.
Now, in view of the current political demands and conveniences, both Albania and Israel strive to
(re)interpret the (pre)historic events. Albanians claim to be the most autochthonous population in
this part of World, rejecting any possibility to have come from the other areas, like Dacia or
Caucasus Mountains. Similarly, Israelis renounce those parts of the Bible, which describe their
occupation of Canaan, like the Book of Exodus. Albanians do not recognize the migration wave
from Albania to KiM following the abortive uprising against Ottoman Empire in 1690, just as
Israelis deny Joshua’s exploits after Exodus. There is no archeological evidence of Hebrew
presence in Palestine during the “biblical fathers” period (Abraham, Isaac and Jacob), as there is no
archeological evidence about Illyric presence on KiM before Slavs arrived in 7th century AD. But
the similarity stops here. Israelis did have their state in Palestine, what has been substantiated by
the historical and archeological evidence. Contrary to that, Albanians have nothing to do with KiM
land, which has never been a part of any kind of Illyrian state in the known history (even if one
accepts the claims for the Illyrian origin). Their claims on ”ancestral soil” has as much meaning as
eventual Europeans’ claims on the South African lands, which is considered to be the cradle of
Homo sapiens.
At present, Israelis have no insurmountable troubles with West Bank Palestinians, but they do have
an unsolvable problem with the Palestinians who have remained in the Israel proper. Similarly,
those Shqiptars who inhabit Serbia outside KiM appear the principal concern to Serbia, though it
does not seem Belgrade politicians are aware of that. We mention here that just as Serbian
government tried at time to settle “Shqiptar question” by making an agreement with Turkey, as we
mentioned before, Israel is trying to solve the “Palestinian question” by moving them from
Palestine to the neigbouring countries, like Egypt, as noted above. 1

Which solutions?

The [W. Pauli’s] idea is crazy, but not

sufficiently crazy to be true.
Niels Bohr

After this digression, we return to the Gordian knot of KiM. Which one of many possible options
are the best for the Serbian state? Let us enumerate some of them, before considering the optimal
choice, from the Serbian point of view.

Doing nothing
This the strategy Belgrade authorities have pursued vigorously for the last half century or so. In
fact, on a broader scale, faced with the task of solving nonpolitical problem by political means,
Belgrade policy oscillated between two extremes: radical (unrealistic) projects and laisser pass.
After Tito’s death, no Belgrade politician felt obliged or strong enough to opt for a sustainable
solution. It used to be left to the next generation and so on. KiM was considered rightly to be a time

1
We note here how by a twist of history Israelis have turned the perennial “Jewish question” into the present day
“Palestinian question”.
 259

bomb and one just expected it to explode after his mandate was over. The point was that that bomb
was in the courtyard of Yugoslavia and the first steps the other republics took were to abandon the
federal state. The last to do so was Montenegro, two years ago, without providing any reasonable
explanation for that move. Thus the bomb was left to Serbia to cope with. And after a couple of
dress rehearsals in 1968 and 1981, the bomb blasted in 1998.
After the occupation in 1999 and independence declaration in 2008, with the quisling local
government at Priština, Belgrade continued to mock the diplomatic activities, appealing to other
states not to recognize Kosovo state. But this activity has been more devoted to the domestic stage,
where the mock-patriotic ultra-right parties {sic), like SRP are trying to cease the power via the
loss of KiM. The latter tactic is not unreasonable, since it was after Kumanovo capitulation Zoran
Djindjic threw down Milošević the Loser.
The pivotal column of the Belgrade strategy (sic) has been the famous SC Resolution 1244. But
even this has never been used as a practical tool for achieving a measurable result. According to
Resolution, Serbia had right to implement a restricted army force into KiM, what has never been
done, not even attempted to. Further, according to the same Resolution, the final status of KiM was
to be decided by ”the free will” of its inhabitants. This referendum has never been carried out, not
even mentioned by either side involved. The reason for that lays in the fact that such a referendum
would reveal the singular situation on KiM, where not even the most fundamental attributes of a
civilized society were present, like the census. After the road to the secession was adopted, EU and
other institutions declared the sacrosanct rule: first standards and then status. The declared goal
was to make of KiM a civilized society, which would provide a reasonable security to all ethnic
groups within the region. One of the most conspicuous sign that such a state has been achieved
would be the absence of barbed wires, surrounding non-Shqiptar enclaves, then the free
movements of all population etc. It became clear, however, from the very start, that such a state
belongs to the realm of political fiction, and not to foreseeable reality. Once this has been realized,
it was clear that fulfilling standards before status would mean an indefinite prolongation of the
“transient state”, and thus freezing the problem. Hence, the demand “standard before status” has
been vigorously forgotten and the declaration of independence promulgated and accepted. Thus,
the tactics of “doing nothing” has been accepted by all sides involved: Belgrade, Brussels and
Priština. KiM has been left as wreckage floating on the Balkan pond.

(b) Doing something

That KiM is a time bomb has been used as a trump by all sides involved, but different solutions
have been offered in order to dismantle it. This was a very convincing arguments, forwarded by
Priština politicians, albeit implicitly, in dialogue with Belgrade. The enormous birthrate has been
used, almost openly, as blackmail, arguing that it would be in the interest of Serbia to get rid of
KiM. Cynical as it may sound, but the same argument was adopted by a number of Serbian
prominent individuals, as a sign of desperation. The arguments go as follows:
It has been estimated that by 2030 Shqiptars will constitute over 50% of the overall population
(7.200.000 Shqiptars, versus 6.300.000 Serbs). If Serbia pretends to be a democratic society, with
one person one vote rule, then by the middle of 21st century the country will be controlled by
Shqiptars. The argument appears sound, but the numbers must be taken with caution. 50 % of
population does not imply 50 % of votes, in the situation when enormous majority of the fast
proliferating population appears adolescent. 1 In mid 90-ties the president of Serbian Academy of
Science and Arts, Aleksandar Despić, proposed a debate on the KiM, suggesting that Serbia better
let Shqiptars swallow KiM, but the rest of Serbia would escape this fate. Nobody in Serbia lifted
that glove Despić threw to the public scene. After that the former president of Yugoslavia in 1992,
the writer Dobrica Ćosić, proposed a division of KiM. He was criticized by some circles in Serbia

1
It was partly for this fact that the Referendum mentioned before has never been carried out on KiM.
 260

for trading the ”sacred land”. The problem with this kind of solution appears not so much
psychological, but technical. There is no way to divide KiM into two “natural parts”, since the
population appears strongly mixed. The irony of the plan like this is that that part of the KiM,
namely Metohia, which appears densely packed with Serb orthodox shrines is predominantly
populated by Shqiptars. This region adjacent to neighbouring Albania, which was first occupied by
the Albanian immigration wave since 1690, has been densely packed by monasteries, churches etc
(as we mentioned before, the very name Metohia means monastery estate- metoh in Greek). With
Pećka Patrijaršija, Prizren and other medieval religious and historical places, Metohia appears the
core of the hart of Serbia. Within this frame of division ideal solution from Serbian point of view,
would be an evacuation of Shqiptar population from Metohia. Not only the historical sites would
remain in Serbia, but the rest of Shqiptar population would be cut off from their homeland and thus
better controlled.
Another subproject within the division stratagem, which was put forward by Nebojša Čović, former
chairman of a board for KiM in Belgrade governments, was based on non-compact ethnically pure
regions. Those parts with majority of non-Shqiptar population would be run by Belgrade and the
rest by Priština. But such a solution would not last for long. In a short time Shqiptar population
will become majoritarian one in every place and one thus returns to square one. KiM would be a
collection of small KiM-s, but the geometrical delineation never solves human problems. No
separation without “ethnical cleansing” can provide a long-term stable situation.

Doing Something
In a case when situation on the spot changes significantly, doing nothing is the worst of all
approaches. Radical solutions, like those enumerated above, would solve, a least partially, the
problem, but they appear unrealistic. Here we consider some even more radical approaches. The
standard wisdom that if less radical solution are unrealistic, the more radical seem to be the more
so. But politics is not, unfortunately or fortunately, pure logic.
Let us start from the ideal state (from Serbian vantage point): that is KiM without Shqiptars. (Nota
bene – not without non-Serbs). This could, in principle, be achieved by massive exodus. We make
parallel here again the Hebrew syndrom, more precisely with Exodus. 1 Hebrews came to Egypt as
guests, multiplied and then ran away without Egyptian land. Albanians came to Serbia, multiplied
and then ran away, but together with the Serbian soil. After 1948, more than million Palestinians
ran away from Palestine soil and are still in the status of refugees. Those Shqiptars who ran away
from KiM in 1999 were returned to KIM by force, escaping, unlike Palestinians, the fate of
refugees.
In both parallel situations, it was the extraordinary birth rate which caused massive perturbations
within the areas. If this phenomenon could be suppressed to a reasonable level, not only the fair
solution could be reached, but the situation would be improved to the level when there will be no
ethnical tension. The technical tool would be, of course, the family planning. If the number of kids
per family is fixed to one, as it is the case with China, then in a reasonable time the negative
natality would automatically remove all troubles linked with the demographic misbalance. Whether
this planning should be imposed to all ethnical groups in KiM, or just to those fast-breeding
subgroups, depends on the willingness of non-Serb population to be subjected to this
“demographical remedy”. (We note that on KiM it was Roma population who participated in the
uncontrolled growth, too). But the strict, ethnically neutral regulation would be more acceptable to
the world opinion.
Once Shqiptar population reaches it previous demographic level and become minoritarian group,
all troubles with such a population will be reduced to the normal level (as Serbia has with other
minorities). Not only they would be automatically discouraged from violence, but within the

1
As usually, we refer to the biblical narrative, not to the history.
 261

normal population growth young generations can be made civilized and satisfied. This in its own
turn will make young Shqiptars feel on equal footing with the surrounding nations and eliminate to
a great extent the inferiority complex, which lies at the bottom of all troubles Albanians experience
with their neighbours (on Balkan and elsewhere). What implies in its turn, that such an approach
must be agreed by all sides involved on the spot, without interference from outside. No imposed
solution will ever be operative, as the case with BiH illustrates. Since the “Albanian question” is
biological one, the solution must be found within the game-theory, rather than by standard political
means. Only counter-biological measures can stop biological aggression. But to implement any
kind of measures, one must first have a political control over the disputed territory. And it is the
political problem.
Everything we considered for the sustainable solution on KiM was based on the “initial conditions”
which existed before the NATO aggression. One of the most natural approach to assessing the KiM
problem would be to restore the situation which existed, say, in1997, that is even before the
international “supervoisers” stepped on the Serbian soil. At that time Serbia regained control over
her southern province. No massacres, no exodus, no forced massive movements etc. But, the
question arises, who should restore the previous situation? KLA was shattered by Serbian forces
and there was nobody to be a serious threat to the legal state authorities. With KLA turned into a
legal military and police forces, re-establishing the previous state would imply bloody fighting.
Serbia already lost many lives of her citizens in 1997/8 fighting the rebels, organized and supported
by western allies, in particular USA and Germany. The latter fact offers the answer itself: it would
be the task of the same, now occupying forces, to disarm and dismantle present illegal Shqiptar
forces. This would not be an easy task, for sure, but it is the price to pay for interfering somebody
else’s affairs. Not improbably, KiM would turn into Balkan Iraq, or rather Afghanistan. One
additional gain of such scenario would be the experience the present KiM occupiers would gain
in fighting guerrillas forces, the experience Serbians already had. The forces which make use of the
civilians as a shield against legal state police.
After cleaning the area from the illegal forces, and restoring Serbian control, the next step would be
“Palestinization”of KiM. That is, an impenetrable border around KIM, both from central-Serbian
and non-Serbian sides. In the case of the West Bank, it consists of the Wall (of separation) and the
strongly controlled border with Jordan (along Jordan River). The role of the present occupation
forces would be the same as the role of Israeli forces in the West Bank – to ensure the peace and
order on the spot, until the normal pre-was situation is achieved. The present day UNMIK military
spots would serve as Israeli “settlements” in West Bank, with a number of them placed within the
non-Shqiptar enclaves, as the primary protection forces.
To make the parallel with West Bank situation complete, KiM could be treated under
circumstances as a separate state. Thus, the Province could have her representatives at the Olympic
Games and sport organizations in general. UN humanitarian organizations would be engaged in
helping the citizens emancipate, in particular concerning family planning, women rights, blood
feud, the rule of law, etc. After this transient phase, once the normal, pre-war situation is achieved,
all non-Serbian military presence would cease and Serbia would regain KiM as the integral part, as
before the rebellion. What is of even greater significance, this would restore the UN as an
international organization in its full, original capacity of keeping piece and order within its
international community. At present, UN appear nothing but an occasional tool for Western Allies,
lead by their (Near East) boss.
Before we move on, another alternative solution should be mentioned, at least for the sake of
completeness. Instead of forcing the family planning and reduction of the fast-breeding population,
one may try with the massive displacement. As in the case of Palestinians in Cisjordania, an
agreement with Albania may be offered to accept a substantial part of Shqiptars and make Albania,
their county of origin, their home, just as Israel is considering “selling” Palestinians to Egypt, for
instance. Such a solution (or “solution”) suffers, however, from a number of deficiencies. One is of
 262

the ethical nature, for surely such massive moves invoke the cursed “ethnical cleansing”,
understandably unpopular among politicians. Second, more practical reason is the material
compensation for the estate the displaced population would leave on KiM. Since it is quite
improbable that USA taxi payers would finance such an exodus (unlike that proposed by Israeli
government), and in the absence of an organization like USA Evangelistic church, which finances
settling Jews from allover world into Israel, it would be Serbian government responsible for
compensating the Shqiptar material losses. But another instance, pertinent to this kind of solution,
appears even more important, that of the responsibility of Serbia herself. We considered above the
vagueness of determining Serbia as a state. Our “ideal solutions” refered not only to the reality of
achieving a particular solution, but also to the mess which Serbia has found herself in, regarding
her sovereignty. We emphasized the presence of the tribal mentality and ethics which Dinaroids
have brought in, which precludes every civilized resolution of the KiM issue. Banishing Shqiptars
from Serbia would prove, in retrospect, that Serbia never accepted Shqiptars as her proper citizens.
In fact, current Belgrade politics (sic) proves it on a daily scale. Belgrade officials keep on
demanding that “Serb rights” (note been, not Serbians’ rights”) are to be protected, as if Shqiptars
are not Serbians. Stupid? Not necessarily. More probable is interpretation that it is that dinaric
tribal mentality, which has not superseded the tribal world outlook. They can thing only in terms of
“ours” versus “theirs”. The bloody fighting in Croatia and especially in BiH, where this mentality
has expressed itself without any restrain, illustrates the fatal nature of the traditional society mind.
Mentality from the prehistoric phase of “hunters and gatherers”, who had no permanent settlements
and therefore did not need the concept of state, but only the concept of blood kinship. It is this
attitude which enabled the Shqiptars (and Albanians altogether) to impose their interpretation of the
KiM issue as a fight of two ethnicities over a territory, and not as rebellion of a subpopulation
within a sovereign state. Tat makes the case of Serbia doubly handicapped. A unique case in the
history that a state, internally occupied, fights for liberating a part of her territory from an external
occupation. The only consolation to the autochthonous Serbian population is that the external
occupation was done by a vassal state, which made of KiM her own vassal territory, with the
quisling government. The central figure of this entire mess is USA taxpayer, who, in all
probability, will never become aware of this. And thus we return to square one.
The preference of the family planning scheme over displacement variant has much greater
significance than the mere technical advantage. In the former case it would mean solving an
“uncivilized” problem by uncivilized means. In the case of family planning the “prehistoric issue”
would be resolved by the historical (civilized) means, what would, at the same time, mean a
cultural advance within the region, which could not be overestimated. Otherwise, the ”displacement
solution” would reduce to one retarded population (Illyric part of the Slav Balkan population)
pushing out another Dinaric population (Albanophonic Illyric part) in their perennial struggle over
Lebensraum. 1

World overpopulation

But solving KiM (and Balkan) fast-breeding problem would have much broader significance from
the mere local population misbalance. For the question of the world over-population has been on
agenda for centuries, but has been ignored by the decision making political establishment. Not only
the misbalance in the natality has already been at the root on the most serious world disturbances,
but even under assumption that this has been solved, the overall population rise remains the
Damocles sword over the world neck. Many areas of the world have been populated to such extent
that according to standard of a century ago, or of some at present reasonably depopulated areas, the
world has already crossed the line of human tolerable conditions. To a European around the turn of

1
See our elaborations on Vaso Cubrilovic and Vojislav Šešelj cases above.
 263

18th century present day living conditions would have certainly appeared intolerable, just it is to us
the near-future foreseeable situation, as epitomized by the cult movie “The green Sun”. When
crossing the KiM border from any direction, one immediately becomes aware of the
overpopulation. To a Japanese Great Britain, an overpopulated country, looks almost like desert.
To a Sibiriak, New York with his termite-hive like sky scrapers looks as from other planet. Why is
that so? The point is that those decision-making politicians do not live in such human ant-hives, but
rather in villas well far away from the crowd (as well illustrated in the already mentioned movie
“The green Sun”).
To hypocrites who play the role of philanthropists an unpopular family planning regulation appears
less profitable than letting things go by themselves. Had they accepted the obligation that every kid
in Africa, for instance, must be ensured by the same standards, in every respect, as those Swiss or
New Zeeland have, they would surely take a risk of imposing the appropriate measures. The case of
China is the case in point. Reasonably educated population will accept any profitable measure. The
point is, however, not so much along the line industrialized versus undeveloped country, but
essentially male versus female part of the mankind. It is women who suffer from the uncontrolled
proliferation of children, women who spend the best part of their life raising children. If one speaks
on ”humanitarian catastrophe” in KiM, it can refer of Shqiptar (Muslim) women only. It is this
hypocrite cynic that women are “human” when they can serve as a political trump, but not when
they are object of male lust and pleasure (not to mention producers of new guns).

Ideal solutions 1 – Albanian variants

Up to now we have considered possible resolutions of the KiM affairs from the Serbian point of
view. We now turn to Albanians and their ideal solutions concerning the Serbian southern
province.

Solution I.
KiM remains under Albanian control and after a transient period all international forces are
withdrawn, except, of course, USA military base (Bondsteel). Non-Shqiptar population is expelled
from the province and with the Albanians from Albania settling in, KiM becomes ethnically pure.
Te next stage will be “Albanization “of the province. Two ways for achieving it may be envisaged.
Orthodox churches and monasteries are destroyed. This may be accomplished in a number of ways,
each secure from the IC resistance. Incidents, like that of March 17, 2004, may be arranged or
provoked and a “spontaneous revolt” of Shqiptars would wipe out any historical presence of non-
Albanians on KiM. We note that such an “historical cleansing” need not necessarily be carried out
before the ethnical cleansing, since Shqiptars outside KiM, like those at Preshevo Valley would do
the job equally well.
Orthodox churches are destroyed, by monasteries (some of them being under the UNESCO
protection) would be “Albanized”. Gračanica, Dečani, Bogorodica Ljeviška etc would be
proclaimed to be built by Albanians, not by Serbs, and thus part of Albanian history. All toponyms
on KiM, villages, towns, rivers, mountains etc would be rebabtisized and given Albanian (“Old-
Illyric”) names.

As for the Preshevo Valley, two possible solutions may be foreseen.

Shqiptars from this region adjacent to KiM might be exchanged for non-Shqiptars who still
remained on KIM, in the process of ethnical cleansing of KiM.

1
In the sense of maximalistic solution.
 264

Better solution would be, however, to keep Shqiptars outside KiM, and that successively join those
parts with Shqiptar majority to KiM, with the rest waiting the majority to be yet achieved, and the
process proceeded (domino effect).

Solution II.
The present mock independence abolished, KiM joined to Serbia. In 40-50 years Shqiptar become
electoral majoritarian population in Serbia, and take over the control over Serbia by voting ballots.
We note here that the assumed period of 60-70 years, in fact, conservative one (from the non-
Shqiptar perspective), since it assumes a passivity of the non-Shqiptar environment in the region.
As we saw in the case of the regions where Shqiptar population is already majoritarian one, as on
KiM, when the Albanians’ presence becomes noticeable, the neighbouring people start moving
away and the process is speeded up, up to the final exponentially fast evacuation. When this is
achieved, the entire procedure carried out within the present KiM would be repeated and in a short
time Serbia will become ethnically pure, without non-Shqiptars. This solution, of course, takes
some time (probably 40-50 years), but, combined with the same strategy relative to the other
neighbouring regions in Macedonia, Greece and Montenegro, would eventually bring Albanians to
completing their final solution. (Needless to say that the retrospective Albanization of the relevant
history of those regions would be carried out, too, just as described for the case of KiM).
Now we come to what one might dub realistic solutions. But before starting considering them, let
us first make a quick overview of the present day situation in situ.

“Independent” Kosovo

What the declaration of independence means in political and statistical terms? Out of 192 UN
members, 54 states have recognized “Independent Kosovo”. Out of 6.750 million 5.850 of the
world population does not recognize Kosovo independence. UNMIK and KFOR, who control at
present the region, do not know how many inhabitants there are on KiM. Estimates go from 1.8 to
2.4 million. On the other hand, it has been estimated that (UNDP at Priština) that 460.000 Shqiptars
possess weapons on KiM. More than 23.000 Shqiptars are in prison now in 27 states of EU, for
dealing with drugs (Interpol, 2008). For the last two years more than 40 fields with marihuana
have been detected and destroyed.
Priština officials confirm that about 95 % of goods are imported to KiM (valued $3 billion).
Unemployment has been estimated to be 72%, with the average wages of €150, and €1.100 GDP.
According to UNDP chief Freddy Moring in 2008 “On Kosovo every tenth inhabitant goes to bed
hungry”. According to the same source, 53% Kosovo population is poor (about million people), of
which 14% extremely so. The standard of Kosovo population appears the same as in African state
Togo. 1
After the organization ”Transparency” (Berlin, 2008), KiM occupies fourth place on the list of the
world most corrupted states, after Cameroon, Myanmar and Albania. For the last 10 years about
6.880 tombs have been destroyed in Serb graveyards, and 155 churches and monasteries too. About
80 % inhabitants do not pay the electric power, which is more often cut off than not. The traditional
electric power exporter, KiM imports it today. (It produces 600 MW, but needs 900 MW).
According to reports from October 2008 (OEBS, UNMIK) 88% of counties suffers from the lack of
water.
Out of over 30 Albanian parties neither has non-Albanian members. 2
What makes a country state is not just the territory, hymn and flag, but the attitude the inhabitants
have regarding the overall community On KiM people do not pay tax, water, electricity etc. Only

1
This is not surprising, since both states, in all probability, share similar birthrate.
2
All data taken from “Politika”, March 27, 2009.
 265

20 % of the electric power used is paid (mainly by the big organizations, like UNMIK), whereas
the rest is used freely. Out of those 80 %, 6 % goes to Serbs. The latter justify there nonpaying by
the lack of income, since they have lost their jobs. But the Shqiptar response to the demands to pay
appears illustrative. Nonpayers from Mileševo surroundings sent the message to the bill collectors
from Prizren: “If you come, we will kill you like rabbits!”. Those from Drenica (notorious core of
the Shqiptar nationalism), put it in a somewhat more subtle form: “Don’t do that, or else you will
remain on the posts!”. All attempts to impose paying the electricity, including power cut-off, have
failed. Serbs rely on the Belgrade help and interventions, whereas Shqiptars on their weaponry.
We finish this account by reviewing the situation in the so-called “free (buffer) zone” around KiM,
wide 10 km. It has been exposed to permanent raids from KiM side since the very beginning. As a
consequence, the local Serb population leaves the area and moves further away. In a recent report
from a county 6 villages have been totally abandoned, with the rest in the state of being evacuated.
Organized wood cutting has been reported by the local police. Shqiptars come in from KiM, with
armed escorts, and when the police appears either run away, or open fire on the Serbian police. The
entire area appears devastated by this way. That this happens with (tacit?) agreement with the KiM
police is evident from the lack of any cooperation from KiM side. One has to be naïve indeed to
consider all this a spontaneous series of events, in particular knowing the famous Turkish tactics of
bashibosuks, who used to make permanent raids across the borders with Christian states. Having
devastated the land and expelled the local population, Turkey simply moved her borders forwards
(domino effect). It is exactly the tactics KiM Shqiptars are employing in banishing the local non-
Shqiptar population from KiM, as we elaborated before.
As for non-Shqiptars within the KiM borders, there is no need to rush. They have been squeezed in
their enclaves and deprived of the production possibilities condemned to die out. Situation
resembles the python encircling the pray and squeezing his deadly grip makes the victim lose its
breath and die. Those who do not want to wait for such an end sell their estate and move away.

Cynical solution 1

Of that even gods are deprived - to make

not to have happened that has happened.
Agathon

Many observers or participants, who otherwise are sympathetic to “Serbian cause” or pretend to be
so, usually refer to the famous “political reality”. Shqiptars are there, Serbs have lost the battle and
that’s it. Any attempt to change the situation, what they see as a return to the previous one, would
be, according to them, a trial to turn the wheel of history back, and that’s impossible. But even if
this interpretation is correct, would something like this be really impossible. In particular, even if
we recognize that to turn the history back, does this prevent the other side to make use of the same
tactics to recover the previous status of KiM. Of course, this would not turn the history back, but
would retrace the same logic by which KiM was torn out from Serbia.
The scenario would be the following. Non-Shqiptar part of KiM population performs an
insurgence, with a help from outside (mainly from the rest of Serbia). Women, children, elderly
people are killed, massacres are reported by the world media … Humanitarian organizations are
stunned, they appeal for stopping the humanitarian catastrophe (in particular Shqiptar NGO are
prominent in that), UN send first supervising teams, lead by some expert for ethnical cleansing, like
gen. Walker 2 and then peace forces. Finally, since the latter appear incapable of stopping the
massacres, international forces are brought in and they occupy the province. The latter is then

1
Cynical parts of the scenario are written in italic.
2
Note that the original meaning of walker was a traveling cloth cleaning man.
 266

returned to the mother country, Serbia. Serbian forces push the remaining Shqiptars out, return non-
Shqiptar back to their homes on KIM and add those Dinaroids recently arrived to Serbia 1 . So the
ethnical balance is again restored as it was before the Albanian invasion 4 centuries ago.
What’s wrong with a solution like this? Nothing, except it would be favourable to Serbia.

Just solutions

What are, in principle, just solutions and who is entitled to determine, in a concrete situation and
impose them? Is it possible to achieve it in KiM affairs? These are the questions one has to tackle
before considering particular proposals.
In principle, just solution is that which both sides are equally (dis)satisfied. What are criteria for the
latter resolution? Both sides sign agreements and then an everlasting peace pops in and everything
is fine and durable. But agreements are signed at a particular instance, under a concrete situation.
During war in BiH (1991-1995) many agreements were signed and then quickly broken. Dayton
agreement turned out more durable, but at present neither side appears satisfied by the arrangement,
made under strong pressure from the external agents. There were the layers of agents, acting at
Dayton. First USA exerting enormous pressure on Serbia and Croatia. Then the latter forced their
representatives to sign the formal agreement, together with Bosnian Muslims, who were considered
to be the principal victims in the affair. It is important to note that no permanent international
organization like UN appeared as a sponsor of the meeting at Dayton. What implies that the
longevity of the agreement depends on the (accidental) external factors. The agreement was
imposed, not reached by the sides in conflict. It is the external pressure which will keep the present
arrangement last for some time. But even with the proviso that the agreement lasts for a reasonably
long period, it can not be taken as an ansatz for solving KiM crisis.
In the case of BiH conflicts, one had three sides, whose conflict was based on religious differences.
It was not an inter-racial antagonism. Besides, there were sides, that is, conflicting parts of the
intra-state population, which were to be treated on equal footing. The later should not be
understood as a value judgment, but as the fact that the conflicting sides had different juristic nature
(state and a part of state). But even more significant is the fact that the case goes out of a political
sphere and appears essentially anthropological issue. In such a case, with heterogeneous
participants both regarding the status and nature, any juristic logic (and code) fails. The solution
must be sought at a meta-juristic level. That is, must be imposed by force. Whose force? The
immediate answer is: by the most powerful external agent. His immediate instrument is USA. But
only immediate. The complete command line structure is this: Israel → USA→ EU → Serbia. 2 The
external evidence for this command line augments while going from left to right, as indicated by
the length of arrows. Hence, a realistic solution reduces simply to the most probable one, under the
circumstances.

Vae victis (realistic solutions)

Predicting is difficult, especially future.

N. Bohr.

The real question is: What’s the probability that a political action recognizes the biological
background of the problem and adopts appropriate measures to resolve the long-standing conflict?
We mention that it would not be the first time in history that such an approach was adopted. Two
most recent ones, albeit very different, have been witnessed on Euro-Asian continent: By Hitler and
1
Their ancestors came from KiM anyway.
2
Readers will probably find such an explicit subordination chain too risky to display, but after an objective
consideration they will find them right.
 267

by Chinese leaders. The former concerned Jews and Gypsies (the famous “Final solution”), the
latter internal “family planning solution” (which turns out successful, for the time being). We
mention one North-American “solution”, that of the “Indian question”, “solved” almost completely
by extermination of the endogen population.
Of course, one can always find “reasonable solutions”, “common sense solutions” etc. These
appear, as expected, more like cosmetic interventions, than durable solutions, which appreciate the
essence of the problem. (See, for instance, AppObeg_Kosovo.html). They are concerned more with
the peace, rather than with justice and historical logic. But could, in principle, the latter be restored
at the present day circumstances? Hardly. For the simple reason: one would have to restore Serbia
and then her territorial integrity and historical being. As we have seen above, not only KiM has
been occupied, but the rest of Serbia has undergone the same fate. The problem is that these two
tasks are mutually entangled. The “internal occupiers “ have been using the KiM issue to fasten
their domination over the autochthonous population, by keeping the KiM problem fresh and intact.
KiM issue appears a reliable trump in the hands of unscrupulous incomers, just as the case with so-
called refugees from the western Balkan, who have long before ceased to be refugees, but have
already acquired the status of Serbian citizens., beneficing still the advantages of being “refugees”.
With the NGO as the fifth columns and the unofficial army of hundreds thousand armed Ijekavians,
Serbia not only has no chance to restore anything she lost, but to restore herself as a political
entity. In this respect the KiM issue becomes almost irrelevant.
It is a rare instance in the history that a country has lost its identity, without even noticing it. The
(imposed) battle between Albanophonic and Slavophonic Dinaroids has been settled down with the
former occupying KiM and the latter the rest of Serbia. Concerning the latter we note once again
that when Šešelj was incorporated into Milošević’s ruling establishment there arose two parallel
policies, including that toward KiM affair. While Milošević was trying to settle the troubles by
making use of the legal forces and by calming down the international factors, Šešelj was pursuing
exactly the opposite policy. His irregular forces were engaged in a number of atrocities, but even
worse was the inspiration his public propaganda made on the local people, who were encouraged to
commit atrocities themselves.
Realistic solution reduces thus to the laisser fair from Belgrade side and let the time bomb clock
ticks, from the Albanian side. Belgrade’s “choice” has turned out a fighting for formal
postponement of the recognition of the actual secession, while not taking any real action to recover
its sovereignty over the lost province.

Surrealistic solution - The myth of eternal return

One of the greatest and the longest standing riddles in mathematics was the so-called Fermat last
theorem (FLT). The great French (amateur) mathematician (17th century) Pierre de Fermat
considered the so-called Diophantine equation, in Arithmetica by Diophant:
an + bn = cn, a,b,c, n – natural numbers
and stated (1637) that he proved that the equation has no solution for n>2, but he had no space on
the margin of the page to prove it. For n = 2 it is Pythagoras’ theorem, of course, with many
solutions. After him many most famous mathematicians tried to prove the theorem (some suspected
Fermat proved it himself either). Many solutions offered by contemporary mathematicians turned
out wrong and the theorem resisted the attacks until recently, when an English mathematician
Andrew Wiles claimed he solved it (1995). His claim was disapproved but he managed, with help
of some other colleagues, to provide the correct solution, which has been accepted today as the
final one. No the question arises how it happened that much more capable predecessors could not
do what Wiles succeeded? 1 The answer is: Wiles did not tackle the Fermat last theorem. What he
did was considering another more general issue, that of the so-called Taniyema-Shimura conjecture

1
We note here that the greatest of them, Gauss, rejected to tackle the problem.
 268

about a class of mathematical objects – semistable elliptic curves. The solution came as a collateral
gain. The moral is – never tackle a long standing problem, for the solution will come from another,
unexpected direction by itself, if ever.
What all this has to do with KiM issue? Before attempting to answer the question, we note that the
period relevant to FLT approximately matches the KiM crisis span. We notice that many attempts
to resolve the KiM problem have been made within the KiM region and all failed. The “solution”
came from outside, as a collateral “gain” of solving another, more important question – that of
Israel security. It was imposed via USA power, in a manner of cutting off the Gordian knot. The
parallel - Israel security and Taniyema-Shimura conjecture – appears appropriate, for the former
does involve much wider region (both geographically and politically) from the mere Palestine, the
entire globe, in fact. But there is a difference in the final outcomes: Wiles solution has been
accepted as final one, that is correct, whereas USA “solution” is still to prove itself. Of course and
that’s the point, the meaning of “correct” appears quite different in mathematics and politics. What
is correct for one side need not be correct for others. In fat, in politics “correct” appears
synonymous to durable, for all practical purposes. And here we come to our final “solution”(no
historical reminiscences, please). To Balkan “Taniyema-Shimura conjecture”.

KiM affair looks like an incurable decease, though those knot-cutters have different impression (at
least they pretend so). Mircea Eliade had an idea that the traditional societies used to try to
overcome difficulties in their societies by attempting to return the current state to the initial one,
displaced remotely in time. 1 Then, by starting again from new initial conditions, they expected to
avoid the path which led to the current disfunctioning of the social organism. In fact this stratagem
has been employed often unintentionally, by many other agents in various disciplines, including
medicine, politics etc. Breuer’s method (adopted by Freud) of making the patient to return to the
previous (usually adolescent) state, where the trauma took place, is nothing but the particular
variant of the general concept of repeating the history via alternative paths. The syndrom appears
the psychological background of many so-called heresies within Christianity. 2 (In fact the very
Christianity appears another manifestation of the syndrom within the Judaistic world).
But what has it to do with KiM issue? Very much. We already saw the Albanians revolving their
history to prehistory, to the age of Illyrs, when everything on Balkan was Illyric, y compris
Alexander the Great, Pelasgians etc. And since they are heirs of Illyrs, everything on Balkan this
day belongs (or should belong) to Albanians. Similar situation appears with the other eminent
(though not prominent) actor in the game – Israel. We already mentioned Jewish reconstruction of
the ancient Palestine, which once was exclusively Jewish, from the time immemorial (if even not
earlier). The very God (Yahweh) was Jew, as the Jewish Bible modestly testifies. But what’s about
Serbs? They tried to join the party, by referring to the monasteries and churches on KiM, built by
Serb rulers from 10th century onwards. And since KiM appears (particularly Metohia) the Holy
Land of Serbs, it can not be torn from them, just as Holy Land of Palestine can not be torn from
Israelis. Clever enough? Yes, but not sufficiently. Both claims, Jewish and Albanians’ refer to the
ancient, pagan ages, before Judaism and Christianity. Serbian Orthodox Church is an offspring of
Byzantine one, who in her turn, was a bud of the Hebrew tree. Serbs, as all Slavs, had their own,
autonomous religion, Old-Slav mythology. Unfortunately it did not occur to them to proclaim their
mythology a religion, unlike Hebrews. But this can rectified now. And it is here again that Eliade
enters the scene.

1
Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History, The myth of the eternal return, Harper Torchbook, New York, 1964.

2
Walter Nigg, Das Buch der Ketzer, Atremis-Verlag, Zürich
 269

When South Slavs stepped on the Balkan Peninsular they were descendants of Perun, Vid, Vesna
etc just as Illyrs were of their “pagan” gods. Like xx. True, no material record on KiM was found
from that time, but it holds for Illyrs too. Hence, if we start from the “beginning”, all pretenders are
on equal footing. What Serbs need to do now, is to discard the alien religion and return to their
authentic one, the faith of her primordial pantheon. By doing this she will get rid of the Christian
chains, and get free from the “monastery obsession” concerning KiM. KiM is part of Serbia not on
the ideological grounds but as a historical fact. Moreover, by returning to the faith of her fathers,
Serbia will at the same time emancipate from religion itself, what the Jewish intellectual elite has
already done, together with Marx, Freud, Einstein etc. Thus, Serbia may won understanding from
the world elite, and not mingles with the retarded parts of the mankind.
As a collateral gain, this turn will help Serbians get rid of Ijecavians, who are the leading part of the
clerical influence on the current politics on the Western Balkan. They hold dominant positions in
the Serbian Orthodox Church. Šešelj’s MPs make oath in the church and have a tacit support of the
Church on the present day political scene. Another important gain would be deprivation of the
western claims (and Albanian propagandists) about “Serb obsession of the Kosovo myth”, and the
underlying religious connotations.
This emancipation from the Semitic mythology and its European “fifth column” in the form of
Christianity, would reshuffle the cards again. It is this “eternal return” which would put the entire
historical and ideological situation into a new framework, much more general than the current one.
It is this generalization of the KiM issue, which would allow a durable resolution of the Kosovo
not, just as the Taniyema-Shimura conjecture opened the door for resolving hitherto irresolvable
Fermat Last Theorem.

Concluding remarks

I have used throughout the book the term Shqiptar, to designate ethnic Albanians living in former
Yugoslavia. It is the appellation used by ethnic Albanians themselves. On the other hand many of
the latter find this appellation used by non-Albanians pejorative. This attitude stems from the time
when Albanians used to be underrated and the term has acquired non-friendly connotations. Similar
situation appears with Roma, who used to be known within European regions as Gypsies. They too
dislike being called Gypsies and in official communications they are now entitled Roma. 1 The
difference is that Roma do not call themselves Gypsies, but Roma. I am using the term Shqiptar
just to distinguish Albanians from Albania from those from (former) Yugoslavia. The issue goes
beyond the linguistic. Insisting to be called Albanians implies that they adhere to the project of
Greater Albania, and want the world to get accustomed to the idea. We mention in passing that
other names by which they used to be known in history, like Arbanases, Arnauts etc are also
considered by ethnic Albanians as pejorative. By the way, ethnic Albanians also have pejorative
names for other ethnicities in the region, including Serbs, but nobody makes case of it. (One may
recall the terms used by Allies soldiers for Germans in the WW2, or USA soldiers for Japanese,
USA soldier for Vietnamese, etc, but it belongs to another anthropological sector).

My insistence on designation KiM (Kosovo and Metohia), instead of the widely accepted
Kosovo goes along the same line. Serbians call this region so for millennium and there is no valid
reason to abandon their right to entitle their territory as they want. The issue, also, goes beyond the
mere linguistic and is to remind the broader readership whose land it is.

Epilogue

1
The term is derived from Egyptians, as Roma used to pretend to be originally.
 270

Sir
I am submitting this paper, which solves everything.
The next paper is following soon.
Erwin Schrödinger

Summary

Could you say it in one sentence?

Socrates to sophists

The view I have been offering about Kosovo issue may be summarized as follows. Illyric
population on Balkan was pushed by the Slavic migration into the mountainous Dinaric regions.
This population then mixed with the Slavs, producing Slav Dinaroids on one side, whereas
Albanians retained their Illyric features almost intact. The difference in ethos of both populations
from one side and the rest of Balkan population on the other has resulted in the clashes the Western
Balkan has been experiencing for the last two centuries. The initial handicap of the Albanian
population, as a lake adjacent to the Slav sea, appears a hindrance to their, otherwise legitimate,
strive for the national promotion. This handicappe has been abundantly tried to eliminate by
making use of wombs of Albanian women, which has resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of
the ethnic Albanian population in the region. By exerting demographical pressure Albanians have
already acquired much greater territory than they used to occupy in the known history (KiM and
Western Macedonia). The Shqiptar unrests and rebellions have initiated the decay of Yugoslavia,
though it was KiM who separated from the original country the last. Though the clash between
Shqiptars and the rest of Yugoslavia was controlled by politicians, at least initially, it was the ethos
of Dinaroids, both Slavophonic and Albanophonic, which gave the bloody character to the clash.

The international environment reacted to the Balkan turmoil as an elephant making order in a
glass shop. But from a deeper insight, the USA intervention (and Western European to some extent
too), has been directed by two principal motives: first (subconsciously heeling their misgivings)
remaking the invasion of the biblical Canaan, (but this time “in reverse”), and second making use
of the conflict to convince the Muslim part of the World (by siding Muslim Shqiptars) that USA
has nothing against them. From the technical side NATO aggression may be viewed as a massive
war exercise (maneuvers with real ammunition) in order to test the latest military technical
advances. The military base established on KiM appears a collateral gain, but it is of a marginal
importance here, since this is a common case for USA striving to dominate the Globe, albeit as a
vassal state.

We note here a striking parallel between the founding of the so-called Independent State of
Croatia (ISC) in 1941 and the independent Kosovo state. The former was established by Nazi
Germany, the latter by USA. Hitler posted in ISC the quisling government of Anta Pavelić, George
Bush did simiar thing with KiM, posting Shqiptar quisling government. The first thing Ustashas
regime did in ISC was to exgerminate Serbs (as well as Jews and Gypses), whereas Shqiptars
banished all non-Shqiptars from KiM, leaving only those people in enclaves, which do not differ
much from the concentration camps. There are some diferences, however. Jews and Gypses were
persecuted by the state of Germany, that is by the official istitutions, under the strict orders and
rules, whereas non-Shqiptars on KiM has been left to the mercy of the local population. What it
means we saw in the case of the pogrom of March 2004 (KiM Crystal night). The case of the KiM
secession closley resembles the procedures already witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, so that a
rather clear pattern of seting up USA colonies emerges. But while Afghanistan and Iraq have been
 271

«pacified» as the enemies of Israel, Muslims in Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia have been supported
so as to «tame» those muslim countries around Israel and prevent further deterrioration of Israel
position in the region. Symbolically, Balkan Christian shrines have been sacrified in order to secure
the existence of a wall in Jerusalem, a remnant of Jewish shrine desroyed two millenia ago.

Some readers might wonder about my involvement of Israel into KiM issue, but I can’t help
them. Anyway, if the resolving of the Kosovo knot continues along the presently drawn line, KiM
will in all probability become Western Wall to Serbs. Unless they return in the meantime to their
fathers’ faith, as I suggested, or begin believing in Nothing (which some call God).1

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Leh leha.

“…we must appear to be as mad dogs…to create worldwide hatred for the Jewish Diaspora to force
them to flood to Israel…”

1
As Jewish intellectual elite has already done.
 272

“Even today I am willing to volunteer to do the dirty work for Israel, to kill as many Arabs as
necessary, to deport them, to expel and burn them, to have everyone hate us, to pull the rug from
underneath the feet of the Diaspora Jews, so that they will be forced to run to us crying. Even if it
means blowing up one or two synagogues here and there, I don’t care. And I don’t mind if after the
job is done you put me in front of a Nuremberg Trial and then jail me for life. Hang me if you
want, as a war criminal. Then you can spruce up your Jewish conscience and enter the respectable
club of civilized nations, nations that are large and healthy. What you lot don’t understand is that
the dirty work of Zionism is not finished yet, far from it. True, it could have been finished in 1948,
but you interfered, you stopped it. And all this because of the Jewishness in your souls, because of
your Diaspora mentality. For the Jews don’t grasp things quickly. If you open your eyes and look
around the world you will see that darkness is falling again. And we know what happens to a Jew
who stays out in the dark. So I am glad that this small war in Lebanon frightened the Yids. Let
them be afraid, let them suffer. They should hurry home before it gets really dark. So I am an anti-
Semite? Fine. So don’t quote me, quote Lilienblum instead [an early Russian Zionist - ed.]. There
is no need to quote an anti-Semite. Quote Lilienblum, and he is definitely not an anti-Semite, there
is even a street in Tel Aviv named after him”.
Quote from Ariel Sharon:

APPENDIX 2

Jerusalem Post
November 19, 2007

When I first moved to this country, I was prepared to play my part by enlisting in the IDF and
serving in the West Bank. While there, I saw for myself the effect my mere uniformed presence had
on the Palestinians I encountered on a daily basis. Every interaction took place with me holding all
the cards - it was me with the loaded gun in my hands; it was me barking instructions to "stop or I'll
shoot", "lift up your shirt", "don't come another step closer"; it was me playing with my quarry as
though they were puppets on the end of short, taut strings.

However, I still believed that we "did what we had to do", since it was a case of us or them, and we
could never ease up in our actions for fear that the next Palestinian we encountered was the one
with a bomb strapped to his chest. And so it continued, bursting into buildings to round up the
residents and lock them in their own basement, so that we could take over the house and grab a few
hours' sleep in the middle of a mission - and all perfectly acceptable in the context of war.

But that was when I saw the wide, silent eyes of the families' children as we screamed at their
father - their hero, their protector - and wrested from him the reins of power inside his own house.
And that's when it started to dawn on me just what kind of effect our actions were having on the
next generation, who were guaranteed to end up hating us when all they saw was us herding them
like cattle and imposing our will on them through the sights of our guns.

Once I left the army, my forays into the West Bank were on more equal terms, as I sought to meet
the very people whose towns I'd previously patrolled, to hear their stories about life under military
rule. From Jenin to Bethlehem to Ramallah and beyond, the extent of the suffering and the depth of
the torment was exposed to me time and again. There was no doubt in my mind that our mere
presence in their daily routines was twisting the knife every time they encountered a soldier - and
breeding extremism and radicalism all the while.
 273

The unspoken truth that every Israeli knows, uncomfortable as it may be to admit, is that
occupation breeds terror. Every incursion, every raid, every curfew and collective punishment,
drives the moderates into the welcoming arms of the militants, who promise to return their honour
and their wounded pride by fighting the oppressors' fire with fire of their own. And that fact alone
should be enough to shake Israelis awake and realise that the occupation has to end, as much for
our own security as for the sake of the Palestinians that we're subjugating.

Even those who only care about the safety of the Israeli people, and to hell with the Palestinians,
should be backing the withdrawal of troops to the Green Line. They should know that the
labyrinthine network of checkpoints is not actually making them safer, but is there just to make the
Palestinians' lives a misery, thus endangering Israeli lives further in the end. And they should
recognise that while Israel's presence continues to fester in the Palestinian territories like an open
sore, there is little to no chance that the Palestinians will seek rapprochement and dialogue with
their neighbours.

And that means that any coexistence projects - such as those promoted by OneVoice, the
Clubhouse network, and so on - are doomed to fail while the occupiers refuse to acknowledge the
plight of the occupied. Israel has the upper hand whichever way you look at it, and to treat the
situation as somehow balanced is to overlook totally the sheer injustice of it all.

Of course, the Israelis have suffered decades of terrorism at the hands of extremist Palestinian
groups, and as such have every right to demand their government protects them from similar
atrocities in the future. But, for all that Israelis have had it bad, they haven't seen every facet of
their lives systematically destroyed at the hands of an uncaring occupying force. They haven't seen
their economy run into the ground by crippling border closures and sanctions, they haven't been
denied freedom of movement between their homes and farmlands, and they haven't had to beg
soldiers to let their wives through checkpoints in order to give birth in hospital.

At the same time, the settlements are as much of a problem to a viable Palestinian state as anything,
thanks to the watertight security their presence demands from the army, restricting Palestinian
movement and cutting the West Bank into tiny ribbon-like strips. As one Palestinian said, in Emma
Williams' essential book on the region, "thanks to the settlers and their infrastructure, we're locked
so tight into the State of Israel we're like a bug in concrete."

But still the expansion continues, and still the stranglehold on the Palestinians persists. While the
Israeli public stays silent, while their taxes swell the government's coffers, they are tacitly aiding
and abetting slow torture on a national scale. On top of the sporadic killing that the occupation
inevitably causes, the killing of an entire people's hopes and dreams takes place 24 hours a day, 365
days a year.

And it has to stop. Even though it's no doubt too late to pull many of the current generation back
from the brink of hate and enmity, there's still time to ensure that today's resentment doesn't have to
be instilled into the children of tomorrow. Playing the "fighting terror" card might win Knesset
votes, but it doesn't push things forward nor work out how to pave the way towards long-lasting
future peace.

Israel must leave the territories, and they must do it soon - whether accompanied by concessions on
the Palestinian side or not. The occupation is illegal, it is abhorrent, and it is utterly
counterproductive if its aim is to bring security to Israelis. Anyone who ventures into the
Palestinian towns and cities, who witnesses the devastation for themselves and hears the tragic tales
 274

from the horse's mouth, knows this. And anyone who prefers to cover their ears or avert their eyes
is only doing damage to both sides in the long run. Israel will never have peace whilst it crushes
Palestinian aspirations - and both sides deserve far better lives than those they are being forced to
endure at present.

Seth Freedman

APPENDIX 3

Nagoya, Japan, November 22, 2007

The soon-to-come tragedy called Kosovo - caused more by international than local factors
News media cover violence rather than underlying conflicts. That's why you hear so little about the
soon-to-be-again tragedy called Kosovo. There is growing risk that, in a few weeks, we shall
witness another round of violence, repression and other human misery. And then the media will be
there.
Since 1991 TFF has analyzed and predicted developments in former Yugoslavia. Thirteen years
ago we began publishing ideas, models and plans for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo+ conflicts.
If the above prediction comes true, it will neither be the fault of the Serbs nor the Albanians. It will
be caused by the international so-called community (IC). It did nothing to prevent violence or
negotiate peace when both were possible, i.e. in the early 1990s. See TFF's books and reports about
former Yugoslavia, including ovo is only the stage on which a much larger drama is played out. It
ignored the immense complexities of the Yugoslav conflicts as well as the unique potentials for a
nonviolent solution to this conflict. It used violence in a fake "humanitarian intervention" the
consequences of which now threatens to blow up the region once again.
And it put the UN on one of the saddest mission thinkable - UNMIK in Kosovo.
In 1998 the war between the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, and Serb forces broke out because the
US, Germany and others had equipped, trained and armed KLA over several years. NATO bombed
Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 based on a diagnosis so deficient and false that, had it been a doctor
before surgery, the patient would have died.

Few listened - and those who did, including top-level UN diplomats in New York, could do nothing
- the member states were engaged elsewhere or pursuing their own narrow national interests in the
tragedy of the Balkans - including oil and gas pipelines through the region, selling arms and
building basis to "contain" Russia. The Clinton administration - with Al Gore, the Nobel
Committee's bizarre choice this year as Vice-President - was behind most of it, the EU being as
split as ever.
Why did the recent elections in Kosovo not cause massive concerns?

Although aspiring to independence in a few weeks, only about 45% voted and the Serbs boycotted
the recent elections. It bodes ill for democracy and human rights. Even worse, its victor Hachim
Thaci is a former KLA warlord, likely to replace the present warlord prime minister and KLA
architect Agim Ceku, who also was a leading general in the Croatian Army when it ethnically
cleansed 250 000 Croatian Serbs out of Croatia in 1995 with the substantial support of the US and
European governments. In short, he is our warlord and, thus, OK.
In addition, Kosovo is a place with extremely little production and the more (black economy) trade
and a crime structure reaching from Afghanistan deeply into Switzerland, Brussels and major cities
in the US. Unemployment is about 70 % and the place is a series of segregated communities,
minority Serbs and others living in ghettos.
 275

Kosovo's Albanian leadership has by no means satisfied the criteria long ago set up by the IC or
secured the return of the 150 000 or so Kosovo-Serbs who saw it best to leave when KLA's
political and military leaders did reverse ethnic cleansing in autumn 1999 under the very eyes of
tens of thousands of NATO, EU, OSCE and UN staff - the largest ever peace mission per square
kilometre.
In summary, when the Kosovo-Albanian leadership will declare independence in December,
presumably supported by Washington, it is for all practical purposes a segregated community, a
predominantly black economy, a state run by Western-supported, non-convicted war criminals - in
short, failed state before declared a state. In spite of the billions of dollars poured into it since 1999.
Independence? Perhaps but not in this manner
Does this mean that Kosovo should not become an independent state?
Eleven years ago, TFF published a blueprint for a negotiated settlement - still the only document at
the time given wide publicity on both sides based on hundreds of hours of conversations in Kosovo
and Belgrade. More here.
Much indeed speaks in favour of independence. I for one would not be against it and have never
been - because: The basic concept of independence for Kosovo was developed in 1991-1994 by
intellectuals and politicians around Dr. Ibrahim Rugova in consultation with teams of TFF experts.
The idea was a democratic, lawful state, with open borders, no army, no future integration with
Albania and good relations to all sides - brought about through negotiations. (Italics because there
are still people who believe that the present author and TFF is anti-Albanian and pro-Serb - which
has never been true - and thereby avoid a serious discussion about mediation and conflict-
resolution options. That was also politically convenient to 95% of the world's media).
Today's Serbia has made up the account with its war-time leadership. Today's Serbia refuses total
independence for Kosovo but proposes uniquely high autonomy and points to models such as
Hongkong and the Åland Islands. It is time to reward Serbia's new maturity and lawful approach by
at least giving it a fair media coverage and a fair hearing. But who dares to break with the old
black-and-white media image of the Balkans?
For instance, did it ever occur to you that Serbs were consistently called "nationalists" while others
who worked for only their own nation and independent states insisted to get it by violent means and
were treated as friends of Western democracy? (Pro-Serb again, right? No! It is a matter of politics
and media distortion - naturally, none of those responsible for it at the time willing to admit it).
Conclusion - it's the 11th hour to prevent a new tragedy
If in contrast to spin and propaganda, knowledge still matters, this e-mail/homepage articles can be
your guidance to a more comprehensive understanding of the very dangerous developments in
Kosovo - and Bosnia - in the wake of the thoroughly failed peace-making of the international
community.
There is no way things can go well in the region the next few months, and you may want to know
why when the IC will blame either the Serbs or the Albanians but never themselves.
The future requires one thing before anything else: A recognition by the international community
itself that it is co-responsible for the terrible situation in Kosovo and Bosnia and that it has
basically put itself in a political prison there. A new beginning Based on a series of open, honest
lessons learned is an imperative. I fear it will not come...
If the highest goal of the European Union is peace, it is the 11th hour to show it. But how could it
with "foreign minister" Javier Solana being personally so responsible for the destruction of the
region? In 1999 he was NATO S-G and the highest civilian responsible for NATO's bombing.
After this moral, legal, intellectual scandal he was rewarded by his peers and kicked upwards to the
top level of the EU. It is conveniently forgotten today that peace-making EU is lead by a non-
convicted war criminal...
And this in a world that desperately needs an alternative to reckless divide-and-rule and
occupation/independence US policies.
 276

The tragedy of our international times all comes together in Kosovo.

Will anybody be able to change course and prevent utter chaos?

Jan Oberg

APPENDIX 4

Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937

:
The Expulsion of the Albanians - Memorandum

"The Expulsion of the Albanians," is a memorandum prepared and written by the noted Bosnian
Serb scholar and political figure Vaso Cubrilovic (1897-1990). As a student in 1914, Cubrilovic
had participated in the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, the
event which precipitated the First World War. Between the two wars, he was professor at the
Faculty of Arts in Belgrade. A leading member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art,
Cubrilovic also held several ministerial portfolios after World War II. Among his writings is the
monograph "Istorija politicke misle u Srbiji XIX veka," Belgrade 1958 (History of political thought
in Serbia in the 19th century).

The Expulsion of the Albanians

The problem of the Albanians in the life of our country and people did not arise yesterday. It
played a major role in our life in the Middle Ages, but its importance only became decisive towards
the end of the seventeenth century, at a time when the masses of the Serbian people were displaced
northwards out of their former ancestral territory of Rashka / Raška, supplanted by Albanian
highlanders. Gradually, the latter came down from their mountains to the fertile plains of Metohija
and Kosovo. Spreading northwards, they continued in the direction of southern and western
Morava and, crossing the Shar mountains, descended into Polog and, from there, towards the
Vardar. Thus, by the nineteenth century was formed the Albanian triangle, a wedge which, with its
Debar-Rogozna axis in the rear, penetrated as far into our territories as Nish / Niš and separated our
ancient land of Rashka from Macedonia and the Vardar Valley.
In the nineteenth century, this wedge, inhabited by wild Albanian elements, prevented the
maintenance of any strong cultural, educational and economic links between our northern and
southern territories. This was also the main reason why, until 1878, Serbia was unable to establish
and maintain continuous links with Macedonia through Vranja and the Black Mountain of Skopje
and thus to exercise its cultural and political influence on the Vardar Valley, to the extent that one
would have expected in view of conducive geographical factors and historical traditions in these
regions. Although the Bulgarians began their life as a nation later than the Serbs, they had greater
success initially. This explains why there are permanent settlements of southern Slavs from Vidin
in the north to Ohrid in the south. Serbia began to slice off pieces of this Albanian wedge as early
as the first uprising, by expelling the northernmost Albanian settlers from Jagodina.
Thanks to the wide-ranging national plans of Jovan Ristic, Serbia sliced off another piece of this
wedge with the annexation of Toplica and Kosanica. At that time, the regions between Jastrebac
and southern Morava were radically cleared of Albanians.
From 1918 onwards, it was the task of our present state to suppress what remained of the
Albanian triangle, but it did not succeed. Though there are a number of reasons for this, we shall
examine only the most important of them.
 277

1. The fundamental mistake made by the authorities in charge at that time was that, forgetting
where they were, they wanted to solve all the major ethnic problems of the troubled and bloody
Balkans by Western methods. Turkey brought to the Balkans the customs of the Sheriat, according
to which victory in war and the occupation of a country conferred the right on the victor to dispose
of the lives and property of the subjected inhabitants. Even the Balkan Christians learned from the
Turks that not only state power and domination, but also home and property could be won and lost
by the sword. This concept of land ownership in the Balkans was to be softened somewhat by laws,
ordinances and international agreements brought about under pressure from Europe, but it has, to a
good extent, remained a primary instrument of leverage for Turkey and the Balkan states up to this
very day. We need not evoke the distant past. It is sufficient to refer to a few cases which have
taken place in recent times: the transfer of Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of Turks from
Greece to Asia Minor, or the recent expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey.
While all the Balkan states, since 1912, have solved or are on the point of solving their problems
with national minorities through mass population transfers, we have stuck to the slow and
cumbersome strategy of gradual colonization. The result has been negative, as evident from the
statistics of the eighteen districts which make up the Albanian triangle. These figures show that the
natural growth of the Albanian population in these regions is still greater than the total increase in
our population from both natural growth and new settlers (from 1921 to 1931, the Albanian
population increased by 68,060, while the Serbs showed an increase of 58,745, i.e. a difference of
9,315 in favour of the Albanians). Taking into account the intractable character of the Albanians,
the pronounced increase in their numbers and the ever-increasing difficulties of colonization will
eventually put in question even those few successes we have achieved in our colonization from
1918 onwards.

2. Even the strategy of gradual colonization was not properly applied. Worse still in a matter of
such importance, there was no specific state plan for every government and regime to adhere to and
implement. Work was intermittent, in fits and starts, with each new minister undoing what his
predecessor had done and himself creating nothing solid. Laws and regulations were amended but,
weak as they were, were never implemented. Some individuals, especially deputies from other
regions, who could not manage to secure a mandate at home, would go down south and butter up
the non-national elements to gain a mandate there, thus sacrificing major national and state
interests. The colonization apparatus was extremely costly, inflated and loaded with people who
were not only incompetent, but were also frequently without scruples. Their activities are indeed a
topic in itself. Finally, one need only total up the huge sums this state has invested in colonization
and divide them by the number of families settled to prove how costly every new household
established since the war has been, regardless of whether or not this expenditure was met by the
settlers themselves or by the state. Likewise, it would be interesting to compare the amounts paid
out for personal expenditures and those for materials needed for colonization. In the past, Serbia
went about this matter quite differently. Karageorge, during the first uprising, as well as Miloš,
Mihajlo and Jovan Ristic had no special ministry of land reform, no general land inspectors, or
costly apparatus, and still, they managed to purge Serbia of foreign elements and populate it with
our own people who felled the endless forests of Shumadia (Šumadija), transforming them from the
wild state they were once in to the fertile Shumadia we know today.

3. Even those few thousand families who were settled after the war did not remain where they were
originally located. There was more success in Kosovo, especially in the Lab / Llap valley, where
the Toplicans penetrated of their own accord from north to south. Our oldest and most stable
settlements there were established with elements from various Serbian regions. In Drenica and
Metohija we had no success at all. Colonization should never be carried out with Montenegrins
alone. We do not think that they are suitable as colonists because of their pastoral indolence. This
 278

applies to the first generation only. The second generation is quite different, more active and more
practical. The village of Petrovo in Miroc north of the Danube, the most advanced village in
Krajina, is inhabited exclusively by Montenegrins. In Serbia today, there are thousands of other
flourishing towns, especially in Toplica and Kosanica, which were established by Montenegrins of
the first generation who mixed with more advanced elements. The foregoing consideration,
nonetheless, still applies in Metohija where, since the settlers are on their own ancestral lands, old
customs still abound. A visit to any coffee-house in Peja / Pec is sufficient proof. This is why our
colonization has had so little success throughout Metohija. It must be admitted, on the other hand,
that these colonies were poorly situated on barren, scrub-covered land, and were almost totally
lacking in basic agricultural equipment. These people should have been given more assistance than
other colonists because they were among the poorest Montenegrin elements.

4. Without doubt, the main cause for the lack of success in our colonization of these regions was
that the best land remained in the hands of the Albanians. The only possible means for our mass
colonization of these regions to succeed is for us to take the land away from them. This could have
been achieved easily during the rebellion after the war, when the insurgents were active, by
expelling part of the Albanian population to Albania, by refusing to legalize their usurpations and
by buying up their pasture land. Here, we must refer once again to the gross error committed in our
post-war strategy, that of the right to own land. Instead of taking advantage of the strategy used by
the Albanians themselves for ownership of the land they usurped (scarcely any of them had deeds
issued by the Turks, and those who did, got them only for land purchased), we not only legalized
all these usurpations to the detriment of our state and nation, but worse still, we accustomed the
Albanians to western European attitudes to private property. Prior to that, they could never have
understood such concepts. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon with which to defend
themselves, keeping the best land for themselves and rendering impossible the nationalization of a
region of supreme importance to us.

It is apparent from the above that our colonization strategy in the south has not yielded the
results which ought to have been achieved and which now impose themselves upon us as a major
necessity of state. We are not criticizing this strategy merely for the sake of criticism, but so that,
on the basis of our past experience, we can find the right way to solve this problem.

The Problem of Colonization of the Southern Regions

Reading the first part of this paper and comprehending the problem of colonization of the south,
one realizes immediately that the primary issue at stake are the regions north and south of the Shar
mountains. This is no coincidence. The wedge of Albanians on both sides of the Shar range is of
great national and strategic significance to our state. We have already mentioned the way the
population structure came into existence there and the importance of these regions for links to the
lands of the Vardar Valley, which are firmly within the limits of our ancient territories. The
strength of Serbian expansion ever since the foundation of the first Serbian state in the ninth
century has lain in the continuity both of this expansion and of the expansion of ancient Rashka /
Raška in all directions, including southwards. But this continuity has been interrupted by the
Albanians, and until the ancient link between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand, and
Macedonia on the other, is re-established along the whole line from the River Drin to southern
Morava, we will not be secure in the possession of our territories. From an ethnic point of view, the
Macedonians will only unite with us, if they receive true ethnic support from their Serbian
motherland, something which they have lacked to this day. This can only be achieved through the
destruction of the Albanian wedge
 279

……………………………………………………………………………………………..

ns In view of all that has been said, it is no coincidence that in our examination of colonization in the south, we
ew that the only effective means of solving this problem is the mass expulsion of the Albanians. Gradual
n has had no success in our country, nor in other countries for that matter. If the state wishes to intervene in
ts own people in the struggle for land, it can only be successful by acting brutally. Otherwise, the native, who has
n his place of birth and is at home there, will always be stronger than the colonist. In our case, we must keep this
much in mind, because we have to do with a hardy, resistant and prolific race which the late Cvijic described as
most expansive in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914, Germany spent billions of marks on the gradual colonization
rn territories by purchasing land from the Poles, but the fecundity of Polish women defeated German organization
. Thus, Poland regained its Poznan in 1918. Our above-mentioned statistics of the 1921-1931 period show that it
cundity of Albanian women which defeated our colonization policy, too. We must draw our conclusions from this,
st do so quickly while there is still time to correct matters.
urope is in a state of turmoil. We do not know what each new day and night will bring. Albanian nationalism is on
our territories, too. Should a global conflict or social revolution occur, both of which are possible in the near
ving the situation as it is would jeopardize all our territories in the south. The purpose of this paper is to avert such
nce.

Dr Vaso Cubrilovic
(signed)

he memorandum attaches to the document a detailed map of the region to be cleared [editor's note].
avanje Arnauta. Manuscript in the Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav People's Army (Vojno Istorijski
hives of the former Yugoslav Army (Arhiv Bivše Jugoslovenske Vojske), Belgrade, 7 March 1937, No. 2,
9 pp. Retranslated from the Serbo-Croatian by Robert Elsie, on the basis of an existing English version. First
sie, Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, Dukagjini Balkan Books
-130.]

Vaso Cubrilovic, : 1944

The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia: Memorandum

"The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia," is a second memorandum on the Albanians (and
other minorities) written by the noted Bosnian Serb scholar and political figure Vaso Cubrilovic
(1897-1990). As a student in 1914, Cubrilovic had participated in the assassination in Sarajevo of
Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, the event which precipitated the First World War.
Between the two wars, he was professor at the Faculty of Arts in Belgrade. A leading member of
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, Cubrilovic also held several ministerial portfolios after
World War II. Among his writings is the monograph "Istorija politicke misle u Srbiji XIX veka,"
Belgrade 1958 (History of political thought in Serbia in the 19th century).

Reasons Why the Minority Problem in Yugoslavia Must be Solved

Quite aside from the disloyalty of the minorities, there are other important interests of state
which compel us to take advantage of the current war to solve the problem of minorities by
 280

expelling them. Our minorities, as we have previously stressed, do not constitute a danger to us
because of their numbers but rather because of their geopolitical position and the ties which they
maintain with the neighbouring peoples to whom they are related. It is because of such ties that the
neighbouring peoples have been able to use them to wage war against us. At present, the minorities
are nothing more than stumbling-blocks in our relations with these neighbouring states. The
democratic federation of Yugoslavia will only achieve peace and ensure its development if it can be
made ethnically pure and if, by solving its minority problems, it can remove the causes of friction
with neighbouring states once and for all.
Taking a look at the relevant charts and maps, it can been seen that our minorities occupy very
important positions in our country, both from an economic and from a strategical point of view.
The Vojvodina on the banks of the Danube, for instance, is Central Europe's gateway to the
Balkans. In geopolitical terms, it is the strategic key to the peninsula. Without it, the nations of
Yugoslavia, i. e. Serbia and Croatia, would lose their control over the Drava, Sava, Danube and
Morava rivers and would once again become the backwater of a new Austria or of a new Turkey.
The Vojvodina is the breadbasket of all of Yugoslavia and, even if not a single Serb or Croat lived
there, we would still have to fight to keep it in order to feed millions of our citizens in the poorer
regions to the south of the Sava and Danube. Devising a plan for the economic future of
Yugoslavia would be senseless without the Vojvodina and its grain reserves. The regions to the
south of the Sava and Danube with their mineral resources, forest reserves and hydroelectric
potential provide all the prerequisites for modern industry, but this industry can only be set up if the
plains of the Vojvodina provide the working masses in these new industries with food. We Serbs
and Croats, however, make up only a relative majority of the population in the Vojvodina. It could
happen, as a result of the war, that the Hungarians take over Backa and the Germans, with their
people in the Banat, set up a miniature Reich there.
The situation is similar in the area around the Shar mountains, inhabited now by an
overwhelming majority of Albanians. This region is the watershed of major Balkan rivers which
flow into three seas. Because of this, Kosovo and Metohija have always been considered a strategic
area in the Balkans. By occupying the central part of the Balkans, Kosovo and Metohija separate
Serbia from Montenegro and these two, in turn, from Macedonia. The countries of the Yugoslav
federation will never be strongly attached to one another so long as they have no direct ethnic
border with one another. This matter is of particular concern for Macedonia. The upper reaches of
the Vardar river are held by the Albanians whereas the lower reaches of the river are in the hands of
the Greeks. We southern Slavs hold only the middle portion. Our position is too weak not to be
challenged, as Italy did when it ceded to Albania not only Kosovo and Metohija but also Dibër /
Debar, Kërçova / Kicevo, Gostivar and Tetova / Tetovo. We must have no illusions about what the
future of Europe may bring. This horrendous war will certainly not be the last. We will find
ourselves at the crossroads again and will once more be exposed to attack in some new war. It is
therefore the duty of those who hold the destiny of this country in their hands to be prepared for all
eventualities and to ensure that events we have lived through in this war never occur again. The
statesmen of the old Yugoslavia never considered this in 1918 when they agreed to incorporate the
national minorities within the borders of the newly-created state. For political reasons, they even
gave their support to the minorities, and we are the ones who have had to pay the price, sacrificing
tens of thousands of lives. Such a calamity must never be repeated. The fertile valleys of Polog,
Kosovo and Metohija are important in economic terms. Surrounding them are our wretched lands:
Montenegro, the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, the areas to the north of the Shar mountains and the
destitute Macedonian settlements to the south of the Shar. These people rightfully demand that the
lands from which they have been driven by the Albanians over the last 150 years be returned to
them.

……………………………………………………………………………………………….
 281

Conclusion

This memorandum on the minority problem may have turned out a bit long, but the issue is of
such importance to the future of our country that I was, more than anything, concerned about
having omitted something. We may never again have such an opportunity to make our country
ethnically pure. All other problems our country is currently facing, be they of a national, political,
social or economic nature, fade in comparison. If we do not solve the minority problem now, we
will never solve it. It is my hope that the leaders of the national liberation movement will assess
this issue as I have, and will approach the problem with the same energy and self-sacrifice they
exhibited when, in 1941, they plunged into the terrible war of liberation for the creation of a new,
democratic and federal Yugoslavia. If this report can contribute even modestly to this lofty
objective, its aim will have been fulfilled.

Belgrade
3 November 1944

Vaso Cubrilovic
[signed]
University Professor

[Taken from the typescript Manjinski problem u novoj Jugoslaviji. Retranslated from the Serbo-
Croatian by Robert Elsie, on the basis of an existing English version. First published in R. Elsie,
Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, Dukagjini Balkan
Books (Peja 2002), p. 149-170.]

APPENDIX 5

Sir
The currеnt attacks bу NATO forces on military and related targets raise many questions.
ones that should have been clarified long before the decision was made to enforce an agreement on
Kosovo status. A number of points appear in order here, concerning the legitimacy and consistency
of the whole approach.
When Croatia became an independent, sovereign country a decade ago, a rebellious Serb-
populated region separated from the new state by force. Inspired and helped by then president of
Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, it declared itself an independent state (Serbian Krajina). In 1995,
Croatia regained that territory, again by force end expelled the rebellious population (who moved
mainly to Serbia). No sanction whatsoever was taken against Croatia, though some international
institutions raised their voice on behalf of the people banished in that way.
In 1992, Serbia was punished by international community, mainly via the UN for
interfering in the affairs of another independent and sovereign state, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Severe sanctions, many of them still operative, have been imposed on Serbia, for helping
separatists in Bosnia.
A year ago the ethnic Albanians population detached about two thirds of the Kosovo region
from the control of the state of Serbia – inspired and helped by Albania, which supplied a
considerable number of fighters to the KLA. The ethnic Albanians` goal is clear to all except those
who do not want to see it – merger with Albania. That no one either from Albania or from Kosovo
 282

ever mentions this aim (which is natural after all), corroborates this assertion. A large part of the
700.000 weapons “stolen” from military magazines two year ago in Albania have found their way
into Kosovo – a fact well known to everybody, including NATO and his members. Kosovo
Albanians are trained in Albania and then sent to Kosovo. Without going into further details,
ethnic-Albanians have formed practically their own state within Serbia. All those requests for
independence, the mock meeting in France etc., cannot conceal this political reality.
Thus, when compared with the irredentism mentioned above, the parallel is clear. One has
again the external interference, separatist movement, etc. But the similarities stop there? For now it
is the state that is the victim of foreign interference that is being punished, not the homeland of the
rebellions population, not the intruders.
Evidently, the prehistory of these last troubles have made Serbia an easy target to those who
consider it is time to take advantage of demonized Serbs, and their self-appointed leader (who by
the way comes from Montenegro).
In case of Croatia and Bosnia it was the UN who took the matters in their hands, not
NATO. But NATO rockets and bombs started dropping on Yugoslav territory, without any
decision from the Security Council. Does this mean that from now on the UN
will be just a mock institution as turned out to be the case with the League of Nations?
As we know the later collapsed just before the Second World War. What does the present
beginning of the UN collapse signify?

Yours Sincerely,
Petar Grujic,
Zemun, Serbia, Yugoslavia
 283

APPENDIX 6

The Trumpet

Misreporting Kosovo,

March 26, 2008 , December 13, 2007

How the mainstream press has missed the single most important angle to what’s happening in
Kosovo.
Brad Macdonald

On back-to-back days in December 1991, the New York Times published two separate articles
highlighting Germany’s alarming and audacious decision to recognize and legitimize the efforts of
Slovenia and Croatia to break away from Yugoslavia. Both articles (you can read them here and
here) are refreshingly honest and hold little back in their analysis of Germany’s seminal role in the
violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia.

In this article, Paul Lewis cites European diplomats who warned that Germany’s decision to
support Croatia and Slovenia, despite opposition from virtually the rest of the world, “underscored
Germany’s growing political power in the 12-nation European Community.” Germany’s incursion
into the Balkans, wrote Lewis, “has worried many in Europe who see it as an attempt to re-exert
traditional Germanic influences over this area of the Balkans” (emphasis mine throughout).

Lewis exhibited little reticence in exposing the German undercurrent gushing beneath what was
unfolding in Yugoslavia, even when it meant connecting Germany’s decision to recognize Croatia
and Slovenia in 1991, to its sordid history with these entities during World War ii.

Moreover, in its unusual assertiveness in moving ahead with a plan to extend diplomatic
recognition to the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany has stirred
troubling historical associations …. Nazi Germany dominated the two Yugoslav regions during
World War ii, absorbing Slovenia into the Third Reich and creating a puppet regime in Croatia.

Then there’s this piece from the Times a month later: “Germany’s decision to press for quick
recognition of the two republics, disregarding appeals from the United States and the United
Nations, marked a new assertiveness that some Europeans find disconcerting” (Jan. 16, 1992).

The point?

In 1991-92, a mainstream news organ like the New York Times was not afraid to confront the
reality that Germany was manipulating the Balkans in an effort to “re-exert traditional Germanic
influences” over the region. A willingness to analyze the Balkans through the German prism was
plainly evident.

How times have changed.

On Monday, the deadline for a mutual solution to the Kosovo dilemma expired, and Kosovar
Albanians, led by former terrorist leader Hashim Thaci, said they would immediately start
 284

finalizing their declaration of independence from Serbia, which they will likely announce within
the first two months of 2008.

The subject of Kosovo’s independence does not lack coverage. What it lacks is the kind of fresh,
up-front, in-depth reporting practiced by the likes of the New York Times when it covered
Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1991-92. When Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia broke away from
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the Times didn’t hesitate to declare Germany’s pivotal and alarming
role in the crises (though later, when the U.S. and British governments switched sides, so too did
the Times).

Now Kosovo is about to erupt, and few people, certainly not the mainstream press, are talking
about Germany’s fundamental role in this crisis!

Why not? It’s a blockbuster angle!

What’s happening in Kosovo is covered with German fingerprints. It was Germany (and the
Vatican) that first legitimized the dissolution of the state formerly called Yugoslavia. The day Bonn
threw its weight behind Croatia’s and Slovenia’s decision to break away in 1991, every republic in
Yugoslavia that was thinking about breaking away, including Kosovo, learned that it could do so
and have the support of Germany and the Vatican.

But Germany’s intimate relationship with Kosovo runs deeper than mere ideological support. The
involvement in the province by Germany, one of Kosovo’s most important and long-standing
supporters, has manifested itself in very practical-and dangerous-ways. The German government
has been closely linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (kla), a terrorist organization that during
the early to mid-1990s was linked to the mafia in Kosovo and other Islamic terrorists in the region.

In 1996, the German foreign intelligence service (bnd), established a major outpost in the Albanian
city of Tirana, where kla terrorists were trained to fight against Serbian authorities. According to Le
Monde Diplomatique, “special forces in Berlin provided the operational training and supplied arms
and transmission equipment from ex-East German Stasi stocks as well as black uniforms” (May
1999).

Here’s what Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote in July 2002:

Kosovo’s “internationally unrecognized government-in-exile” had a prime minister who was based
in Germany and operated freely with the blessing (perhaps even the direction) of the German
government! So Germany recognized Kosovo’s government-in-exile when nobody else did. But the
international community submissively followed Germany’s lead. The kla guerrillas didn’t just
happen. They were essentially raised up and directly supported by Germany-the powerhouse of
Europe.

How many analysts, when they consider Kosovo’s independence today, are factoring in Germany’s
central role in the growth and expansion of the kla? How many wonder why Germany would be so
interested in, and go to such great lengths to secure, Kosovo’s independence from Serbia? What’s
in it for Germany?

These questions lie at the heart of analysis on Kosovo-but few are asking them!
 285

The Trumpet has explained how, under the umbrella of the United States and nato, Germany and
Europe have, since 1991, dramatically increased their influence in the Balkans. By employing a
subtle diplomatic divide-and-conquer policy, Germany has precipitated the systematic and violent
fracturing of Yugoslavia. It was Germany, through cunning use of exaggerated and inaccurate
claims and emotive language, that in 1999 stirred nato, predominantly comprised of U.S. troops, to
bomb Serbia.

In March 1999, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said in a television interview on zdf
that “genocide is starting” in Serbia. His alarmist vocabulary turned the collective Western mindset
against Serbia. The Australian reported on April 1, 1999, “With thousands of refugees continuing
to stream out of the war-torn province, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping claimed in
Bonn last night that evidence had emerged of concentration camps being set up by Serb forces.”

“People watched television and saw the streams of Albanian refugees,” wrote Gerald Flurry at the
time. “Then they totally blamed the Serbs. Most knew very little about Kosovo, yet spoke of
‘genocide’-the deliberate and systematic destruction of a race. Then came talk about ‘concentration
camps.’ Genocide and concentration camps-words introduced by the German defense minister”
(The Rising Beast).

Are Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s supposed atrocities against Albanians the real reason
America and nato bombed Belgrade into submission? During the 1990s, actual genocides were
occurring in Rwanda and Sierra Leone-not to mention the slaughter of Serbs by Croatians and the
Kosovo Albanians themselves-and the Clinton government did little to intervene. Why was
America prepared to bomb Serbia into submission, but not the evil forces killing hundreds of
thousands of innocent victims in Rwanda or Sierra Leone? Because America was pressured into
bombing Serbia! Germany and Europe convinced all of nato to fight for their Balkan cause!

From the very beginning, Germany and Europe have been determined to conquer the Balkans, be it
by force or in a web of diplomatic maneuvers.

In 2003, EU Commission President Romano Prodi promised that all Balkan countries-if they
danced to the EU’s tune of course-could “become members of the EU one day.” While they might
not necessarily become members on the same day, and each would have to follow its own course,
he said, nonetheless, “in the long run, [the] Balkans belong strictly to the EU” (EU Observer, Jan.
10, 2003).

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks!

This is why Germany wanted Serbia, its historical enemy and counterweight in the region,
destroyed by nato. Germany and Europe believe the Balkans belong “strictly to the EU.” Without
the pesky Slobodan Milosevic around to interrupt their plans, Germany and Europe could more
easily conquer the Balkans!

Any in-depth analysis of the events unfolding in Kosovo must account for this history.

The International Herald Tribune reported yesterday on a plan concocted by Slovenia (which will
likely be holding the EU presidency when Kosovo declares its independence) by which the
European Union will embrace Kosovo when it declares statehood. Europe is prepping itself for
action in Kosovo.
 286

The Tribune quoted one diplomat who said that if violence breaks out in Kosovo, Europe’s
response must be “fast and decisive because the EU is showing it’s boss in its own courtyard. We
want to show we don’t need Washington or Moscow to tell us what to do.”

Considering the history we just covered, against whom do you think Germany and Europe will take
action?

On Monday, the Itar-Tass news agency reported that Wolfgang Ischinger, the German diplomat
representing the EU in the group of three international mediators (Russia, the United States and the
EU) at the talks that were held between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians, told Radio Berlin
Brandenburg that the EU would soon be in agreement on the Kosovo issue.

Ischinger’s interpretation of what Kosovo’s independence will look like was intriguing. “It will be
a state entity,” he said, “which will continue to be under broad international observation. The nato
troops will continue to be deployed there. A further international presence of the UN and,
consequently, of EU, will be ensured.”

Germany and Europe are making plans to cement their control of Kosovo via the UN and nato!

In 1991, both Germany and Europe as a whole were significantly weaker, less unified and less
defined than they are today. Germany was a newly united, largely inward-focused state in the early
stages of resurrecting itself as the leader of Europe and on the global scene. Europe was even more
amorphous than it appears today.

But this seemingly innocuous appearance didn’t stop a major newspaper from ringing alarm bells
when Germany boldly announced it would support Croatia and Slovenia in their quest for
independence, a decision that many knew would set a dangerous precedent and likely cause
Yugoslavia’s dissolution. At that time, even a mainstream news source analyzed the breakdown of
Yugoslavia in the context of German ambition in the Balkans!

Today, we don’t see any such analysis in the news media. Germany and the EU are widely
embraced as legitimate and influential global powers with a formidable economic, military and
geopolitical imprint. Europe, with Germany at its vanguard, has become a respected and
increasingly powerful geopolitical force motivated by lofty ambitions of becoming a united
superpower.

Still, the mainstream media today refuse to analyze the Balkans in the context of what’s happening
in Germany and Europe, and of Germany’s history with the region. This is the most dangerous and
ominous angle of the story, and the most underreported one!

In time, this shameful ignorance will prove to be an expensive mistake.

APPENDIX 7

Jerusalem Post, December 30, 2008

The US representative at the Quartet's meeting, Assistant Secretary of State David Welch,
reportedly told his colleagues, "First, we must not allow the suicide bombing in Dimona and the
shooting on Sderot to affect the negotiations."
 287

Welch reportedly added, "It is also important to us that neither the Palestinians in Gaza nor the
Israelis in Sderot are hurt. Also, we must continue to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas and Salaam
Fayad."

Moreover, Ran Koriel, Israel's ambassador to the EU, reportedly warned Livni that the Russians are
pushing for the re-establishment of a Fatah-Hamas government. Several EU states, including
France, are reconsidering their refusal to recognize Hamas.

If Israel had not empowered the Quartet generally and the US specifically to determine whether the
PA and Israel are behaving properly, a European or Russian decision to recognize Hamas would
have little impact. But given their role as arbiters, Quartet members can take punitive action against
Israel if it fails to comply with their wishes. The Quartet can replace international law in
determining who can assert sovereignty over Gaza, Judea and Samaria and how Israel can exercise
its own sovereignty. And so, Livni is reduced to begging them not to recognize Hamas.

Once the US decided in 1999 to commit its own forces to NATO's bombing of Serbia and
subsequent occupation of Kosovo, the jig was up for Serbian sovereignty over the area. The fact is,
NATO forces in Kosovo were deployed for the express purpose of blocking Serbia from exercising
its sovereignty over Kosovo, not to prevent violence between the Kosovars and the Serbs or among
the Muslims and Christians in Kosovo. That is, NATO deployed in Kosovo to enable it to gain
independence.

And if US or NATO forces are deployed to Gaza or Judea and Samaria, they will not be there to
protect Israelis from Palestinian terror or to prevent the areas from acting as global terror bases.
They will be there to establish a Palestinian state.

Failing to understand the meaning of Kosovo, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government refuses to

understand this point. Indeed, the government is actively lobbying NATO to deploy forces in Gaza.
Just as it wrongly hoped that UNIFIL forces in south Lebanon would fight Hizbullah for it, so
today, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government insists that NATO forces in Gaza will fight Hamas for
it.

If applying the lessons of UNIFIL to Gaza is too abstract for the Olmert-Livni-Barak government,
Israel has experience with EU monitors in Gaza itself to learn from. Wrongly assuming that the
Europeans shared Israel's interest in preventing terrorists and weapons from entering Gaza, Israel
requested that EU monitors set up shop at the Rafah terminal linking Gaza to Egypt after Israel
withdrew from the border in 2005. Yet whenever confronted by Fatah and Hamas terrorists, rather
than fight the EU monitors flee to Israel for protection. And its monitors' experience with
Palestinian terrorists taking over the border has never caused the EU to question its support for
Palestinian statehood.

Then, too, since the US, EU, UN and Russia all consider Gaza, Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem to be
one territorial unit, it is not surprising that Israel's request for NATO forces in Gaza has been
greeted by a US plan to deploy NATO forces in Judea and Samaria. If NATO forces in Gaza would
do nothing to secure the border with Egypt or to fight terrorists and would scuttle Israeli operations
in the area, NATO forces in Judea and Samaria would not simply prevent Israel from protecting its
citizens who live there. They would also prevent Israel from taking action to prevent the
Palestinians from attacking central Israel and asserting control over the border with Jordan. And
 288

yet, as The Jerusalem Post reported this week, Israel is conducting talks with the US regarding just
such a NATO deployment.

What the Serbs made NATO fight its way in to achieve, Israel is offering NATO on a silver platter.

Not surprisingly, Abbas's adviser and PA propaganda chief Yasser Abd Rabbo reacted to Kosovo's
declaration of independence by recommending that the Palestinians follow the example. Abd
Rabbo said, "Kosovo is not better than us. We deserve independence even before Kosovo, and we
ask for the backing of the United States and the European Union for our independence."

For its part, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government has responded to Kosovo's declaration of
independence with customary confusion. But the lessons of Kosovo are clear. Not only should
Israel join Russia, Canada, China, Spain, Romania and many others in refusing to recognize
Kosovo. It should also state that as a consequence of Kosovo's independence, Israel rejects the
deployment of any international forces to Gaza or Judea and Samaria, and refuses to cede its legal
right to sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem to international arbitration.

Caroline Glick

Figure 1. Palestinians’ owned lands are in green.

APPENDIX 8

Kosovo
At family farm, grim claims of organ culling from captured Serb
 289

soldiersInvestigator to re-examine allegations of war crime by Kosovan

Albanian guerrillas

Paul Lewis in Burrel

The Guardian, Tuesday November 25 2008

Article history

Paul Lewis travels to a house in Albania at the centre of allegations of

organ harvesting during the Kosovan war Link to this video Seven members
of the Katuci family sat silently in their living room, hands on knees, as
rain tapped at the window. They had been asked if they hosted one of the
most macabre war crimes of the 1999 Kosovo war. And they did not want to
talk.

It was to their country house in northern Albania's mountain region that

Kosovan Albanian guerrillas are believed to have brought hundreds of
captive Serbian soldiers to cull their organs in the aftermath of Nato's
bombing.

"I did not do it," said Mercim Katuci, the 50-year-old head of the family,
breaking the silence with a shot of liquor. "That is why I am angry. Shame
has been brought on us. People in the village tell us: 'You killed the
Serbs. You are evil people.' We are poor people - how could we kill
hundreds of soldiers in this house?"

The spotlight will soon fall on the house again when a fleet of 4x4
vehicles brings Dick Marty - a special investigator mandated by the
Council of Europe to re-examine the case - and his team up a crumbling
dirt track, seven miles south of the town of Burrel.

There have been calls for an investigation into the Burrel "house clinic"
since April, when the ex-chief prosecutor for war crimes in the former
Yugoslavia, Carla Del Ponte, said there had been "credible" reports about
the fate of Serbian soldiers held there.

Del Ponte said her investigation was shelved because of lack of evidence
and resistance from senior UN figures.

However, the Guardian has obtained the report of a UN forensic examination

of the Katuci house, commissioned by Del Ponte. The report, by a UN
expert, José Pablo Baraybar, was previously believed to be missing. Though
not conclusive, it mapped traces of blood that could have been human in
two downstairs rooms. Discarded in a nearby stream, the report said, was
material "consistent with surgical overalls", syringes, a handgun holster,
pill containers and bottles, and four empty drug containers, including one
that contained a muscle relaxant.

Asked about the traces of blood found by the UN forensic team, Katuci said
it originated from when his wife gave birth. The discarded medical
 290

equipment, he added, was used by his family to self-administer drugs

because the nearest hospital is several hours' walk away.

But Baraybar, the former director of the UN's missing persons and
forensics unit in Kosovo, said his team found "highly indicative evidence"
that pointed to organ removal at the Burrel house, and prosecutors
received testimony from eight witnesses.

They comprised "foot soldiers" who claimed to be present during the

surgery, he said, and a driver who claimed he brought small groups of Serb
soldiers to the house from across the Kosovo border. The driver then
described taking conspicuous packages to Tirana airport, bound for flights
to Turkey. The surgeon conducting the operations was identified as a
Kosovan doctor from Pec, Baraybar said.

'Slaughterhouse'

"What the sources indicated was it was almost like a slaughterhouse,"

Baraybar said. "People came in alive, then things happened inside the
house, and the people ended up dead. But certainly they were not just
killed. The reference was of organs of some kind being taken out."

Angry villagers prevented Baraybar and his team from conducting

exhumations at a nearby cemetery where the bodies are said to have been
buried. At the Katuci house - where Del Ponte is known as "the witch" -
the family of subsistence farmers show letters requesting compensation for
the UN investigation, which they complained was intrusive. "They wanted to
get under the floor with pick axes," said Katuci. "What I want is for
light to be shed on this case so my family's innocence can be recognised."

Marty's investigation could gain additional impetus from the recent

discovery of an illegal organ transplant clinic in neighbouring Kosovo.
Police there raided a clinic in the suburbs of Pristina three weeks ago,
arresting two doctors and the country's acting permanent secretary at the
ministry of health, Ilir Rexhaj. Interpol is helping to search for a third
doctor, Yusuf Ercin Sonmez, a notorious Turkish surgeon who they believe
was behind the operation.

The investigation was opened after a 23-year-old Turkish man was found at
Pristina airport with scars from an operation to remove his kidney.

At the clinic police found a 74-year-old Israeli man who had just received
a kidney transplant. Although there is no evidence any of the individuals
connected with the Pristina clinic worked in Albania, Marty is now
expected to travel to Kosovo amid claims that the two cases could be
linked.

Serbian war crimes prosecutors, who were denied access to the Katuci home
last month, said they handed over evidence about organ trafficking
networks in Kosovo to Marty's investigation.
 291

Speaking at the weekend for the first time about his organ harvesting
investigation, Marty said: "I have started gathering data from all
quarters for my inquiry, and hope to visit Belgrade, Pristina and Tirana
soon for further leads, including information from the Serbian
prosecutor's office."

Baraybar said information gleaned from the Pristina clinic could be

crucial. "If police have cracked a network of organ harvesting linking
Kosovan Albanian doctors with individuals in Turkey, that is a potentially
huge development for solving the Burrel mystery," he said.

For Marty, though, the focus is likely to remain on the Katuci house,
where there are no obvious signs of the alleged horror story. Young
children chase chickens around the same yard where, according to Del
Ponte, Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas herded their prisoners. The shed
where Serb soldiers were allegedly held captive is now filled with cows.
Thick Albanian coffee simmers on a stove in the room where Baraybar
discovered blood stains.

"Do we look like a family that would do this stuff?" said Katuci's nephew,
Defrim Kadiu, 32.

"Does this house look as if it's been treated as a hospital for 300
people? If it's true, then my family needs to be hanged in front of
everyone."

Backstory
Of all the many atrocities that human rights groups want investigated from
the 1998-99 Kosovo conflict, the alleged harvesting of organs from Serbian
soldiers by ethnic Albanians is one of the most gruesome. Hundreds of
Serbian families have for a decade been demanding what happened to those
who disappeared during and after the war. In April, Carla Del Ponte the
former UN war crimes prosecutor, gave greater credence to suggestions of a
macabre operation, in which as many as 300 Serbs were allegedly abducted
and transported to Albania to have their organs removed. In a memoir, she
wrote: "Victims deprived of only their first kidney were sewn up and
confined again inside the shack until they were killed for their vital
organs."

APPENDIX 9

Times
Saturday, March 22, 2008
The West-East conflict in a microscope
Kosovo & the population imbalance

In a recent article in this column the importance of the Kosovo precedent was discussed, from the
point view of the international law as it has been exercised for the past generations. Certainly the new
 292

situation arising from the unilateral Kosovo declaration of independence shapes a new reality that will
have multitude and mostly negative consequences for countless nations across the globe. It is
important also to illuminate around the existence of the Kosovo issue as a demographic one, shaped
by
the expansion of one group of people (Albanian Muslims) versus the other one (Serbian Christians).
Moreover the existence of facts on the ground as resulting from the population growth of the former,
signify a real precedent for other regions in the world.
In 1913 when Kosovo & Metojia became a part of the Serbian state the population of Christians
exceeded 50% , whilst the Albanians counted around 350,000 souls, approximately 40%, the rest
being occupied by Roma, Bosniaks, Turks and people of mixed origin. A generation later in 1948,
after
WW2 that resulted in the killings of 20,000 Serbs and the expulsion of some other 150,000 by the
Nazi
Albanian collaborators, the balance tilted in favor of the Albanians. On top of that, the Tito
administration willingly opened up the border up to 1949 and accepted 150,000 illegal immigrants in
order to deliberately change the population makeup of the province as a counter-measure against the
Serbs. Tito’s motto was “For a strong Yugoslavia we need a weak Serbia”.

Thus, in 1961 the Albanians numbered 650,000 people, and the analogy was 65% Albanians, 28%
Serbians. From that period onwards a dramatic –And basically unexplained- population expansion
derived from the Albanian community. In the mid-60’s the Albanian population had a 6.5 children per
woman ratio, whilst the Serbians around 2.5. Although the second number is enough to replace the
previous generation, it was much less and that resulted in a virtual takeover of the land by the
Albanians. In 1981 just after Tito’s death and the start of the first rebellions in Pristina, the Albanians
numbered 1.2 million, a 100% increase in less than 20 years. The pressure exercised by them against
the Serbian farmers that took the form of homicides, arsons, rapes and vandalism obliged to an exodus
a considerable part of the Christian populous.
Nowadays the Albanian population is estimated at around 1.8 million people, and one has to consider
that a part of the population immigrated to Western Europe and Northern America during the past 15
years. In short the demographic imbalances altered the established order and of course the
international intervention took advantage of this fact by initiating a round of land take over from the
Serbian state. The message that a neutral observer can get is the following: Population imbalances
endanger national sovereignty therefore measures have to be taken to ensure that the Kosovo
precedent does not apply to them.
In simple terms no prudent government would let its minority citizens reproduce to a pace that will
ultimately lead them to declare themselves independent, or even worse form a state that will
constitute a real threat against them. The intervention in Kosovo instead of making a positive
contribution to the world stage will certainly raise the above issue and result to future minority
massacres, forced abortions and ethnic cleansing of a grand scale. For the policy-makers who conduct
their profession based in a pragmatic approaches of every day life it is a notion perfectly
understandable. Unfortunately modern day diplomacy seems to be hijacked to an extent, by radical
elements that lead each and every nation towards a new age of barbarity.
In Kosovo the 1,500 Churches, Monasteries and pilgrimages constitute one of the “Holy places” of
Eastern Orthodox Christendom on par with Mount Athos, Meteora, Constantinople (Hagia Sophia),
Alexandria, Jerusalem, Ohrid and Mystras and other important regions. A 350 million strong Eastern
Orthodox population is being subject to a humiliation of historical proportions, similar to that of the
Ottoman conquest with two major differences: The Turks were far more tolerant and respectful
towards the Christians than the modern-day Albanians and secondly the role of the West has been a
total disappointment, to say the least.
The rest 1.2 billion Roman Catholics, Protestants and the Jewish communities are also negatively
 293

affected judging by the demise of their numbers in the world stage and the re-emergence of two
cultural and social giants; the Arabic-Muslim one and the Confucian-Chinese one. Of course there are
quite a few analysts that do not conform to the notion that the world was, is and will be divided in
ethnic-cultural zones on which religion often plays a decisive role. It seems the everyday news and
special broadcasts from the Middle East, Africa or East London- (-istan) haven’t still grasped their
attention. Human history is a spiral never-ending procedure. On that basis everything is possible and
nothing can be excluded in the end of the day.
Since 13/06/1999, 350,000 Serbians, Roma, Gorani and other were forced to flee from Kosovo. It was
a flight of survival, considering the 1,500 homicides against Serbs in the coming months, up to early
2000. Around 80 UNESCO “protected” Christian monuments were blown up by the Albanians in
front of the eyes of 40,000 KFOR personnel. It has to be stressed once more that even during the days
of the Ottoman Empire and the numerous battles in the eparchy, nowhere close did the destruction of
shrines came that close. This constitutes another issue having to do with the psycho-synthesis of the
nationality that committed these acts and has a specific modus opperandi from the medieval ages and
onwards. Another 1,300 Serbs were killed up to 2003, 80,000 houses and estates were grabbed by
the Albanians along with 20,000 automobiles and 15,000 shops, barns and commercial property. Some
other 30,000 houses were burned to the ground in well-organized arson a campaigns another method
regularly exercised by Kosovo-Albanians over the 20th century. It is also interesting to point out the
situation in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Until 1999, Serbians constituted some 20% of the
population. Nowadays there is a mere 0.1% having being entirely wiped out. The declaration of
Kosovo’s independence as a multicultural state-Without minorities- is one of the worst public relation
campaigns that someone would advise the Albanian leaders in Kosovo. Certainly it is something that
only certain State Dept. officials could explain.
In 2004 the last phase of the most recent genocide in a European soil (By Muslims against Christians)
took place. In a space of 2 days, 27 Churches were burned to the ground, 7 Serbian villages, 40 people
dead, 1,000 wounded and 4,000 refugees on their way to Serbia. The 17th of March 2004 constitutes
a stigma for the United Nations and marks the imposition of the will of the fanatics that control
Kosovo.
A state that is much interested in the Kosovo precedent and history is Israel. Up to 1987, Tel-Aviv
controlled the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, having being victorious in five consecutive wars
against its Arab neighbors. The start of the first Indifada, the population explosion of the Muslim
Arabs, the dramatic appearance of international Jihad, and the relative decline of the Western
(European) support to Israel poses a strategic-survival dilemma to the Israeli policy makers:
Should they try to push towards a conciliation approach towards the Palestinians and decide for a low
key strategy against them, or to oppose all calls for bargain and form a strategy of a total war. That
was the same dilemma the Serbians reached in the early ‘90’s. The firstly used the tactic number one
and it failed. The second option was barely begun to be implemented in late 1998 and would have
yielded total success bar the NATO air campaign in 1999. Note however the Kosovo is a province of
the Serbian state therefore in contrast with the Israelis the Serbians are not in fear of “Being driven to
the sea”. One certain conclusion is that countries such as Israel will invest considerable intellectual
capacity in making concrete analysis based on Kosovo’s recent history.
The present day situation in Kosovo will lead ultimately to a division between the Serbian-controlled
North and the rest of the province. That means that the multiethnic concept is dead and a new
Christian-Muslim division line will be established. The only hope for the region is the assistance of
the EU in creating the necessary conditions for an overall security framework for the Western
Balkans. It is a gigantic task that has to face the USA-Russian antagonism, the internal EU
differences, moves towards a “Great Albania”, the widespread poverty & corruption, and the
presence of active Islamic groups. If there was a bet most would choose the option for another
conflict in these lands. The Kosovo issue will soon become another frozen conflict that will erupt
from time to time in accordance to the local geopolitical balances, the demographic shifts and the
 294

various economic interests. What will remain though is that Kosovo marks the first definite victory
of the European Islam since the occupation of Crete by the Ottomans in 1669. The difference was
that then all the major European powers fought in unity.
NOTE: The role of religion is often omitted by many analyses on the issues of regional conflicts. By
itself any religion cannot ignite a war, but one has to take into account that any religion is simply the
outer appearance of a whole system of beliefs, norms and mentalities of particular groups of people
that have been molded by historical events and have constructed collective archetypes and cultural
icons. The mistakes made by Western policy makers will come to haunt sooner than latter,
even if they aren’t aware of the stakes involved in the first place.

Ioannis Michaletos

APPENDIX 10

The Spectator, February 27, 2008 |

Is this crazy, or is this crazy?

The decision by Britain, America and certain other European countries to recognise Kosovo as an
independent state is mind-blowingly stupid and suicidal and of a piece with their obvious
determination to capitulate in the war for civilization. It is a rotten decision for the following
reasons:

1) It endorses a breach of a country’s right to maintain its own integrity. Serbia is a properly
constituted democratic country. To recognize the validity of such a secession is to undermine the
principle of a country’s right to determine its own composition. It puts up two fingers to
international law, which explicitly recognizes Serbian authority over Kosovo and upholds a state’s
right to its own sovereignty. It opens the way for any other breakaway movement to do the same,
both in the Balkans and around the world. So Tamils can now claim a precedent for seceding from
Sri Lanka, Corsicans from France, Basques from Spain. And after Kosovo, can Scotland be far
behind?

2) It asserts that religion matters more than nationality. This is multiculturalism taken to its lunatic
natural conclusion. It says in effect that nationality is not the glue that must bind people of different
creeds together, but religion or ethnicity can be allowed to break the nation apart. Every nation with
restive ethnic minorities will now be undermined by this endorsement of illegal Balkanization.
Serbians will now find themselves foreigners in their own country. And as Eldad Beck applies the
same thinking to Israel – whose kamikaze government is said to be ‘thinking about’ recognizing
Kosovo too — a horrific potential scenario presents itself:

In contradiction to all the pessimistic predictions, Israel and the Palestinians are able to successfully
conclude negotiations on a final-status agreement, among other things based to incentives provided
by the European Union. In the final stages of negotiations, Israeli representatives cave in to
international pressure and waive the demand to recognize Israel’s unique Jewish character.

A short while after the agreement is signed, an uprising breaks out in the Galilee, in the Triangle
area, and in the southern Negev desert, with Arab Israelis demanding a cultural and political
 295

autonomy that would enable them to manage their own lives while disconnecting from the State of
Israel’s ‘Jewish’ institutions.

The bloody clashes between the sides prompt the United Nations to call on Israel to restrain itself
and consider the deployment of multinational forces to serve as a buffer. The European Union
threatens to renounce Israel’s special status if it fails to act immediately in order to meet the
demands of the minority living within it. Israel’s dependence on the EU is so great that it is forced
to capitulate and turn into a ‘greater Tel Aviv’ shtetl.

3) It gives victory to the forces of ethnic cleansing. Although the Serbs under Milosevic committed
atrocities, the Kosovars started the killing in their revolt against a sovereign country and drove out
between 150,000 and 200,000 Serbs. In the past eight years 1,248 non-Albanians have been killed,
with many more kidnapped, now presumed dead. 151 spiritual and cultural monuments in Kosovo
have been destroyed by Albanians and 213 mosques built with money from Saudi Arabia. Eighty
per cent of graveyards have been destroyed or desecrated, with no response from the international
community. The Albanians have turned Christian graveyards into car parks, playgrounds and
rubbish dumps. Anything relating to Serbia or Christianity libraries, public records, books, names
of places and even towns have been wiped out.

4) Most important of all, an independent Muslim Kosovo is a beachhead for radical Islam in
Europe. Al Qaeda has been operating in Kosovo since the early 1990s. Jihadis from Yemen and
Chechnya have been fighting with the Kosovo Liberation Army and Saudi is pouring money into
the Kosovo mosques thus turning them into Wahhabi hotbeds of radicalism. Caroline Glick notes
in the Jerusalem Post:

In 2006, John Gizzi reported in Human Events that the German intelligence service BND had
confirmed that the 2005 terrorist bombings in Britain and the 2004 bombings in Spain were
organized in Kosovo. Furthermore, ‘The man at the center of the provision of the explosives in
both instances was an Albanian, operating mostly out of Kosovo… who is the second ranking
leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Niam Behzloulzi.’

It was at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 that some 70,000 died to keep the Islamic Ottoman Empire
from advancing further into Europe. What is the point of fighting the jihad in Iraq when we are
cheerfully opening the door to it in that very same place?

Russia’s President Putin has warned that recognizing Kosovo will rebound very badly upon the
countries who have blundered into endorsing it. The fact that this outcome is merely the inevitable
consequence of the war so unwisely prosecuted by those countries against Serbia does not soften its
deeply alarming implications. Putin is warning only too correctly of the dangers to the west of this
development and the supreme folly of endorsing it.

For once, Putin is on the right side and Britain and America are utterly wrong. That is the measure
of this debacle.

APPENDIX 11

Battle at Caglavica
 296

The prettiest view of Pristina, the regional capital of Kosovo, is from the top of a hill, a kilometer
south of the city on the highway to Macedonia. But today that hilltop has become a battle ground
with local Kosovar and ethnic Albanians fighting NATO troops and UN police.

“These are not peaceful demonstrators seeking independence,” the KFOR commanding officer on
the front line told me. “Last night they shot at us and we shot back. It was a heavy gun battle. I
estimate we killed about 10 Albanians. If they had broken through our lines they would have cut
the throats of everyone in the village behind us.”

That village is Caglavica, two kilometers south of Pristina, home to about 200 Serbian and 10
Romani families. Yesterday more than a 1,000 Albanians, many of them students, broke through
KFOR lines, overturning and burning seven jeeps, and marched on Caglavica. Before KFOR
reinforcements could stop them, the Albanians chanting “KFOR GO HOME” burned ten Serbian
homes, and forced many inhabitants to evacuate to other nearby villages.

“The battle eased off about 1:30 this morning,” the CO said. “But we lost one armored personnel
carrier and had about 30 soldiers injured.”

Today the “demonstrators” are back on the hilltop with about 1,300 blocking the highway into
Pristina. KFOR troops have formed three defensive lines with a company of Norwegians forming
the first defensive line. Half a kilometer behind them is a contingent of Indian, Irish and Finnish
soldiers. The last line are all Swedes from Got land.

“We expect them to attack sometime this evening,” the CO said. Asked if he would fire on the
Albanians if they broke through the first two defensive lines, the CO said: “I wont hesitate to order
my men to fire. If the Albanians break through they will massacre every Serb and Rom in the two
or three villages behind us.”

The last defensive line consists of 150 Swedish soldiers with 14 APCs. Although most have been
up all night, they still looked determined as they strapped on their body armor and cleaned their
weapons.

Making up their right flank protecting the town of Grachanica is a company of Czech soldiers. “I’m
pleased to have them with us,” the CO said. “They are good soldiers, well-trained and are doing a
good job.”

As two NATO helicopters circled overhead relaying information on the Albanians confronting the
first line of KFOR troops, the CO admitted there had been many casualties already today. “The
helicopters have reported several ambulances coming and going. The Albanians know we are not
here to play games with them.”

Although dozens of Serbs gathered on the knolls behind the KFOR soldiers as if watching a soccer
match, their numbers have been dwindling fast since 1999. In fact, so many Serbs have left
Caglavica for the city of Nish that there is now a neighborhood in that Serbian city called
Caglavica. Although some vow they will never leave the village of their Serbian ancestors, many
admit that if NATO forces ever leave Kosovo, the Serbs will have to leave with them. As for the
Roma, who are too frightened to watch the battle, they are already packing their bags. “We’re
going to Germany,” their leader said, “to join relatives. We’ve already paid the smugglers to take
us.”
 297

After interviewing the KFOR commanding officer, I drove over to the nearby town of Kosovo
Polje where Albanian demonstrators yesterday burned down the former Russian KFOR hospital.
Although a Kosovo police car with two officers was parked across the street they were not stopping
looters from taking an ambulance and other vehicles from the parking lot of the destroyed hospital.
The police did stop me, however, when I got out to take photos. Although I showed them my
KFOR press pass, they still detained me until they called headquarters and were told to let me go.
But they warned me, no photos of the looting, no photos of the burned down hospital, no photos of
the burned down Serbian restaurant where they had parked their car, and no photos of the many
houses being burned today in Kosovo Polje on this second day of the Albanian uprising for
independence from their UN and NATO saviors of 1999.

Paul Polansky
March 18, 2004

Paul Polansky is the author of 14 books, four on Kosovo.

APPENDIX 12

One of the first major engagements between the Serbian police and the so-called KLA was in
securing the villages of Lausa, Gornje Prekaze and Donje Prekaze, in March, 1998.

A terrorist group led by Adem Jashari had attacked police patrols on February 28, killing four
officers and injuring two. While the Serbian MUP forces dealt with this terrorist situation in the
Drenica area, focusing on the villages of Prekaze and Jablanica and the road to Kalausa, the
Pristina Corps HQ monitored their activities, documenting them in command reports of March 5
and March 6, 1998.

In these reports, the Corps’ commanding officer indicated some problems created by the MUP
forces’ actions, such as the use of combat vehicles that were not painted blue or clearly marked.
This could have created the impression that VJ units were involved in the operation, which was not
the case (classified order 78-18 of March 9, 1998). This report also noted that the terrorists were
using civilians as human shields when confronting the police, a practice which caused a number of
unnecessary, civilian casualties. Civilians who defied terrorist orders to remain in the combat zone
were nevertheless organized in a refugee column, to create the impression of expulsion or exodus.
This practice, which was part of the standard tactic employed by the “KLA", will be discussed
separately.

Terrorist attacks throughout Kosovo-Metohija did not spare the VJ, targeting its units, command
facilities and outposts, especially along the border with Albania. A coded report from the Pristina
Corps HQ to the Security Directorate of the VJ General Staff, dated April 28, 1998, cites the
number of killed (19) and captured (2) terrorists, as well as the precise quantity and composition of
weapons and equipment captured around the border outposts, “Morina”, “Gorozup”, “Kosare”,
“Cestak” and “Orgusa”: 169 assault rifles, 67 rifles, 4 anti-tank guns, 7 machine guns, one RPG, 6
machine pistols, 164 RPG rounds, 18 boxes of ammunition, 27,163 bullets (7.62 mm), etc.

Operational logs of the Pristina Corps HQ also show that on April 24, 1998, one group of “KLA”
terrorists attacked a unit belonging to the 52nd Military Police Battalion from the position of Suka
Vogelj, while on the same day the border outpost in the village of Babaloc came under fire.
 298

Responding to the terrorist attack, units of the 52nd Military Police Battalion attacked Suka Vogelj
and killed seven terrorists. The following day, VJ border patrol units engaged a terrorist group
attempting a crossing from Albania near the border outpost, “Kosare,” killing 16 terrorists and
capturing large quantities of weapons and ammunition. In April 1998, Albanian terrorists launched
11 attacks altogether against VJ units and positions. Only three and a half months after these initial
terrorist attacks on the VJ did the Army begin offensive, counter-terrorist operations.

This ought to be enough to unequivocally answer the question of who initiated the use of force in
Kosovo-Metohija. Attacks on VJ units apparently had the goal of forcing and accelerating its
logical response, which was to be used by separatist and Western propaganda as evidence that a
“mass Albanian uprising” was underway in Kosovo-Metohija, which “rightfully expected NATO
aid.”

Therefore, in the first half of 1998 (from the end of February to mid-July), the VJ did not take
offensive actions against the “KLA,” nor did it have paramilitary formations under its command,
then or ever. The Army’s general position on volunteers and possible emergence of militias was
clear in the Directive of the Joint Command for Kosovo-Metohija of July 1, 1998. Among other
things, it prohibits “enlistment of volunteers on any basis or ethnicity, into these units,” meaning
the units belonging to the Joint Command for Kosovo-Metohija.

Finally, we point out that federal police never took part in fighting the Albanian terrorists, contrary
to allegations in the Indictment.

Paragraph 26 of the Indictment says: “In response to the intensifying conflict, the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 ‘condemning the use of
excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo,’
and imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. Six months later the UNSC passed Resolution 1199
(1998) which stated that ‘the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.’ The Security Council
demanded that all parties cease hostilities and that ‘the security forces used for civilian repression’
be withdrawn.”
COMMENT: In responding to this Paragraph, we cited the numbers of “KLA” attacks on Serbian
police forces, the VJ and civilians (on an average, three attacks per day) during February and
March 1998, resulting in dozens of killed and wounded among civilians, police and military
personnel.
The extent of these attacks is convincingly documented by the Interior Ministry’s report to the
Serbian government on March 10, 1998, on the topic of counter-terrorist activities in Kosovo-
Metohija, stating, among other things:
“Terrorist attacks in the region of Srbica, which for many months have
endangered the security of several roads, led to numerous civilian casualties, and
jeopardized the safety of citizens of all ethnicities, created a need to re-establish
full control of the roads in this area through the use of police outposts. Adem
Jashari’s terrorist group tried to interfere with this operation on February 28,
attacking police patrols and killing four, while wounding two officers. Sixteen
terrorists were killed in a battle with this group. In the early morning hours of
March 5, a terrorist group attacked another police patrol near the village of Donje
Prekaze. After police returned fire, the terrorists retreated to their base and dug in
at the Jashari family farm in that village... engagement with the terrorists lasted
for 27 hours, with a total of 51 casualties. Unfortunately, it was later established
 299

that Jashari family members were among them. Terrorists physically prevented
them from leaving the farm, despite the police invitation. The Interior Ministry
expresses regret and bitterness that these victims were a direct consequence of
cruelty and ruthlessness of Albanian terrorists. The police could not have known
how many, if any, civilians were detained by the terrorists, since dozens of
civilians did respond to the police invitation to evacuate the village. The fact that
he personally shot his nephew to prevent him from surrendering testifies to Adem
Jashari’s cruelty. Two officers lost their lives in this action, and seven were
seriously injured.”

Here is a calendar of the “KLA’s” terrorist attacks on Serbian police in late February and early
March 1998:

February 28: in the village of Liposane, around 12:30, terrorists ambush an MUP vehicle and open
fire with assault rifles; several kilometers ahead, terrorists ambush the backup MUP force, shooting
up a “Lada-Niva” 4x4 vehicle; two officers are killed, two injured. Around 14:00, MUP special
forces arrive, extracting the wounded officers and pursuing the terrorists. After the ambush, the
terrorists retreat towards Gland Selo, battling the MUP, which is in pursuit. Three terrorists are
killed, and three more wounded. For many hours, terrorists retreat towards the villages of Poljanci,
Sirez and Gradica, where the battle continues. After a battle with the terrorists, MUP forces capture
three Albanians in camouflage uniforms. In the village of Vrbovac, they find a vehicle used to
transport weapons and ammunition to terrorists in boxes marked “humanitarian aid.” Fighting goes
on throughout the night of February 28-March 1. One police officer is wounded and later dies.
Terrorists open fire on an MUP observation helicopter with automatic weapons and a “Zolja” RPG
launcher. One officer is killed, another injured;

March 1: Police force the terrorists to retreat towards Poljance, with sporadic fire by the fleeing
terrorists;

March 5: At dawn, in the village of Lausa, a group of terrorists attacks a police patrol, wounding
two officers. Reinforcements arrive and the battle moves towards Donje Prekaze and Gornje
Prekaze. Women, children and the elderly villagers are evacuated. Terrorists are forced to scatter,
carrying off their dead and wounded into the nearby woods. Two officers are killed and four
injured. Twenty terrorists are killed. Eight terrorists surrender, emerging from a well-camouflaged
bunker. Three large bunkers are discovered overall, two with medical equipment and one filled
with ammunition, weapons and demolition explosives, which also served as the command center.
Among the terrorists killed in Donji Prekaz are terrorist leader Adem Jashari (age 43) and Rexhep
Sellami (age 29). Both had been sentenced in absentia to 29 years imprisonment.

March 6: Terrorists retreat towards the Albanian border, into Klina and Djakovica municipalities.
They attack another MUP patrol near the village of Josanica.

Before the first significant counter-terrorist action by security forces in the villages of Lausa,
Gornje Prekaze and Donje Prekaze (March 5, 1998) neither the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), not
any other international body acted in any way to stop the terrorist acts of the “KLA.” All attempts
to have the Security Council issue even a formal communiqué condemning “KLA” terrorism, or
declare this paramilitary wing of the Albanian separatist movement a terrorist organization, were
systematically blocked by the United States (three times in one month, in one instance). This
impotence of the Security Council before American obstruction was publicly called a disgrace by
the chairman, Brazilian Ambassador Salma Amorim. Nor did U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
 300

ever bother to visit this region and personally ascertain which side was responsible for the
“intensifying conflict.”

As soon as the terrorists suffered their first crushing defeat at the hands of the police, however, (in
the battles of Lausa and Prekaze), a Security Council session was called immediately and the
UNSC Resolution 1160 “condemned the police for excessive use of force,” against, as the
Indictment alleges falsely, “civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo.” The only civilian
casualties in those battles were those kept by Adem Jashari’s terrorists as human shields in their
fortified compound.

APPENDIX 13

The New York Times Magazine

December 26, 1999.

The Curse Of Blood and Vengeance

In remote northern Albania, communal life is governed by ancient codes of honor

unchanged by modern notions of rights or the rule of law. That's why Shtjefen Lamthi was
gunned down in broad daylight -- and why his killer's family will probably get theirs, too,
someday.

By conservative estimate, at least 200 people witnessed the murder of Shtjefen Lamthi in Shkoder,
the northernmost city of Albania, early on the afternoon of Aug. 3, 1998. The 43-year-old farmer
was walking south along Zyhdi Lahi Street, one of the main thoroughfares of the Rus marketplace
in downtown Shkoder, his hands weighted down with plastic bags filled with his day's purchases.
Just in front of a small tobacco kiosk at the northwest corner of Rus Square, a burly man who
looked to be in his mid-30's suddenly stepped into Lamthi's path, brought up a Kalashnikov assault
rifle, shot him 21 times and walked away. None of the witnesses came forward to identify the
killer. Instead, a wall of silence immediately descended. Today, 16 months later, Lamthi's murder
remains officially unsolved, despite the fact that almost everyone knows exactly who killed him. A
strange event, but not in Albania.

Albania was largely forgotten during the war in Bosnia, and only talked of indirectly during the war
in Kosovo, as those driven out of the province by the Serbs were of Albanian descent. But the tiny
nation of 3.5 million, tucked between the former Yugoslavia and Greece on the Adriatic coast, was
high among the concerns for the Balkans at the beginning of this decade. Intent on transforming the
poorest land in Europe into a free-market economy, on building a democracy atop the ashes of one
of the world's most repressive Communist dictatorships, Western nations poured untold millions in
aid into Albania in the early 1990's. For a time, all seemed to go well -- and then it all blew apart.
Today, Albania is an economic ruin, its government is largely theoretical and the frequency of
murders like that of Shtjefen Lamthi makes it one of the deadliest "at peace" nations on earth.

What is it about the Balkans that so defeats all efforts to calm them? In searching for an answer,
observers have naturally focused their greatest attention on the succession of conflicts that have
torn apart the former Yugoslavia. And in so doing, they have tended to conclude that the Balkans
are singularly riven by centuries-old ethnic and religious hatreds -- that these are people, or better,
groups of people, who simply can't live together.
 301

"Ethnic cleansing" and concentration camps are strong evidence of this assessment. And yet from
my own travels through the Balkans over the past two decades, I've never found that explanation
wholly convincing. How, for example, to reconcile the "centuries of hate" with the historical
cosmopolitanism of places like Sarajevo and Belgrade? How to account for the high degree of
intermarriage in cities between "enemy" groups like the Muslims and Orthodox Christians? What
to make of a man like Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader whose genocidal pogroms
against Muslims have earned him an indictment for war crimes, but who once routinely treated
Muslim patients in his psychiatric practice and, by all accounts, got along with them very well?
And how does this theory explain Albania, a corner of the Balkans that, despite its mix of
Christians and Muslims, is relatively free of ethnic or religious tensions, but where people still die
violently in appalling numbers?

I have come to believe that a key ingredient of the Balkan poison -- perhaps the key ingredient --
is a different kind of schism, one that largely disappeared from the rest of Europe a half-century
ago: that between urban and rural, between village and city. In contrast to all but the most isolated
pockets elsewhere in Europe, the gulf of experience between the city and the village in the Balkans
represents an awful chasm. The cities of Sarajevo and Belgrade are -- or were, until only yesterday
-- emblems of European sophistication and cultural fusion. The typical Balkan village, on the other
hand, has always been a hard and pitiless place, one where ancient feuds are nursed and passed on
for generations, where change and outside influence is deeply mistrusted. What's more, so
ingrained is the Balkan village's medieval code of honor and loyalty -- and this is true for Muslim
and Christian villages alike -- that even many of those who have escaped its grip and become city
dwellers seem to return to its thrall in moments of crisis.

This was true, I think, of Radovan Karadzic, a university-educated psychiatrist -- a Modern Man --
who grew up in a tiny mountain hamlet so grim and remote that it essentially consisted of his own
extended family. Only slightly larger was the home village of Karadzic's military commander --
and fellow indicted war criminal -- Gen. Ratko Mladic. Indeed, when looking at the backgrounds of
those most responsible for the Balkan slaughters of this decade, including both Serbia's Slobodan
Milosevic and Croatia's Franjo Tudjman, who died earlier this month, you can't help noticing that
all of them came from villages or small towns. When crisis came -- and the economic stagnation
and political fracturing that befell Yugoslavia in the 1980's was surely a crisis -- it was to the
primitive laws and passions of the village that these men reverted.

This past autumn, I set out to explore the nature of the Balkan village -- its codes and violent means
of enforcing them. I chose to avoid the recognized battlefields of Bosnia and Kosovo and to
journey instead to a corner of the Balkans that is officially at peace, but where the ancient ethos of
the village has now resurfaced to deadly effect: northern Albania. The story of how Shtjefen
Lamthi came to die in the streets of Shkoder, of who killed him and why, affords a glimpse into a
world where old offenses are never forgotten, where no easy mechanism exists to break a
murderous cycle of vengeance.

n a different part of Europe, Shkoder would be a tourist resort. A city of some 80,000 in
northernmost Albania, it spreads gracefully over the plains beside Lake Shkoder, surrounded on all
sides by rugged mountains. On its southern edge, a great medieval castle overlooks the confluence
of the Kiri and Drin Rivers, the country beyond giving over to wheat fields and forest. Rather than
a tourist resort, though, Shkoder today is pretty much a ruin, its lake thoroughly polluted, most of
its old factories crumbled to dust, the rows of drab high-rise apartments on its outskirts seemingly
ready to follow suit. Most of all, Shkoder suffers under the reputation of being one of the most
dangerous places in a very dangerous country.
 302

Testament to the level of violence in Shkoder is that the junior prosecutor assigned to solving
Shtjefen Lamthi's murder has trouble recalling much about the crime. At the moment, he is
juggling some two dozen criminal cases, almost all of them murders, and the killing of Lamthi in
the summer of 1998 is basically ancient history to him, the details growing indistinct.

"It did have one unusual aspect," he finally offered, when I sat and talked with him in a quiet cafe
about 100 yards from where the killing took place. "To do it in public like that, with so many
witnesses, that is not normal. It means the killer wanted to send a message." As for what that
message might be, the prosecutor was unwilling to even hazard a guess.

On at least two points, there is no dispute: the end of Shtjefen Lamthi came very quickly and was
very ugly. Before Lamthi had time to react, he was felled by several shots to the chest; his attacker
then stood over him on the sidewalk and emptied the 30-bullet Kalashnikov clip into his body.
When the firing finally stopped, the killer calmly slipped the assault rifle into a plastic bag and
went on his way.

Brazen even by the standards of Shkoder, the murder in Rus Square seemed to underscore just how
deeply a climate of mayhem had taken hold in Albania, and how little Shtjefen's killer had to worry
about consequences. When the police arrived at the murder scene, they simply loaded his body for
the trip to the morgue, not even bothering to question any potential eyewitnesses to the attack. A
young girl who had been wounded in the fusillade of bullets was taken home rather than to a
hospital, her parents apparently wanting no association with the event. Even Shtjefen's brothers,
who had accompanied him into Shkoder that day, were tight-lipped. When they came to the morgue
to collect his body, they professed to have absolutely no idea who might want their brother dead.

"That's how it works in Albania," the junior prosecutor said that afternoon in the cafe. "No one
talks."

lbania has never registered very high in the average American's consciousness -- and for good
reason. For 40 years following the end of the Second World War, the small mountainous country
was hermetically sealed from the outside world by its Communist strongman, Enver Hoxha, its
inhabitants existing in an isolation rivaled by only that of North Korea. What news did filter out
tended to fit neatly into the "News of the Weird" column: the hundreds of thousands of tiny
concrete bunkers -- Hoxha's mushrooms" -- being built to repel some phantom foreign invasion; the
fact that in the entire country there were only 700 television sets and 400 cars, all in the hands of
the state. With the end of Communism, the world saw fleeting images, but they still tended to be
odd and decidedly un-European: impoverished Albanians crammed shoulder to shoulder on rusting
freighters pulling up on Italian beaches in the early 1990's, gunmen and looters taking to the streets
in 1997 after vast pyramid schemes had bankrupted the economy.

For such a small country -- roughly the size of Maryland -- Albania has very large problems. Along
with being the poorest nation in Europe, it suffers the highest infant mortality rate and the lowest
life expectancy. With virtually all its Communist-era factories in ruins, it has an unemployment rate
well over 30 percent. It is also an environmental disaster zone, without a single waste-treatment
plant in operation, and with huge tracts of the countryside now little more than toxic waste sites as
a result of Hoxha's reliance on heavy industry. Two years ago, both the national economy and the
government collapsed, and looting was rampant. A special target of the looters was the police and
army arsenals conveniently located outside nearly every town, so that Albania was suddenly awash
in high-powered weaponry. Ever since, the central government in the capital, Tirana, has struggled
to re-establish its legitimacy and some semblance of order.
 303

While that campaign has had some success in Tirana, it has had little in the countryside. With
whole towns controlled by heavily-armed smuggling mafias or mini-warlords, and ambushes
frequent, travelers race to be off the roads before nightfall. In the northern district of Tropoje,
several relief workers have been murdered by bandits, and the humanitarian organization, Doctors
Without Borders, has had so many of its vehicles stolen that it has won the local nickname Doctors
Without Cars.

The rise of organized and semiorganized crime is not the whole story, however. In fact, it has
served to mask a deeper, darker truth about Albania. Communism never actually modernized
Albania, but merely put the old ways, the village ways, in a kind of deep freeze -- much as Tito did
in Yugoslavia following World War II. The collapse of the state and the national economy has led
many Albanians to once again openly embrace the traditional laws and loyalties of the village.
These are spelled out in the kanun (pronounced ka-NOON), a book of rules and oaths. By the
dictates of the kanun -- there are actually several versions, most of which came into being centuries
ago -- one's primary allegiance is to clan and community, not to the state. In accordance with this
allegiance, taking revenge in order to defend the honor of one's family is not only permissible but
also a sacred duty. Of course, unlike medieval times, now that duty can be carried out with modern
weaponry like assault rifles.

The most enduring of the kanuns, and also the most severe, was that formulated by a 15th-century
nobleman named Leke Dukagjini. For centuries, the horrifically bloody vendettas sparked by his
kanun in the northern mountains of Albania was the stuff of Balkan legend, until the practice was
largely stamped out during the country's Communist era. Now, with the flood of weapons into the
streets following the 1997 crisis, his edicts have been resurrected to deadly effect, claiming lives all
across Albania.

Dukagjini's base of power was a narrow rugged valley in northern Albania that now bears his
name; not coincidentally, the Dukagjin Valley was also the original home of Shtjefen Lamthi and
of the man who killed him. That man's name is Leka Rrushkadoli, and on Aug. 3, 1998, he stalked
Shtjefen through the Rus marketplace to take revenge for an incident that had occurred 13 years
earlier in their home village, Thethi, 50 miles northeast of Shkoder. That incident began with an
overturned dinner table. But in murdering Shtjefen Lamthi, Leka Rrushkadoli had set into motion
one of the trickier tenets of the Dukagjini kanun. By atoning one blood debt he had given birth to a
new one. Now it was his family's turn to be hunted, the Lamthi family's turn to take vengeance.

estled in the uppermost reaches of the Dukagjin region, the vale of Thethi is imbued with a
mournful kind of beauty, its spectacular setting tinged with a claustrophobic, end-of-the earth feel.
Closed on all sides by sheer limestone cliffs of several thousand feet and cut through by a glacial
blue river, its 500 or 600 inhabitants -mostly subsistence farmers and shepherds -- receive only a
few hours of sunlight a day, and for centuries their only way out was the narrow river gorge cutting
south into the rest of the Dukagjin Valley. Today, a rugged and rarely used dirt track leads over the
mountains to connect Thethi with Shkoder, three hours away.

So isolated and poor was the Dukagjin that the Islamic Ottomans who ruled Albania for 400 years
barely bothered with it. As a result its inhabitants, mostly Catholic, lived out an existence little
changed from medieval times. And rather than submit to any concepts of Ottoman or Western law,
they continued to govern themselves accordingAt the south end of the Thethi vale is a reminder of
the kanun's power, a three-story stone tower known as a kula . In old times, the males of a family
involved in a blood feud would gather in a kula to await a peace settlement or to learn the terms of
the vendetta, a wait that could last months or even years. Testament to the frequency of such feuds
 304

is that at one time nearly every Dukagjini family had a kula. While today most of the kulas are
gone, the mentality that they represent is not.

At the northern end of the valley, a narrow path leads over open fields to three stone houses. One
belongs to Leka Rrushkadoli, the killer of Shtjefen Lamthi. Since the murder, his house has sat
empty. Just up the slope from Leka's house is that of his 35-year-old cousin, Martin. Martin and I
sat on his stone terrace one afternoon, eating olives and sipping raki, the homemade Albanian
version of grappa, as his half-naked children scrambled about in the warm sunshine. But every few
moments Martin turned to glance down the path. Caught in the act, he gave an embarrassed smile.

"Even sitting here," he explained, "sometimes it makes me nervous." He grabbed the arm of his
youngest child, a 3-year-old boy. "Even this one, he has to worry, because after all this time we still
don't know the terms of the blood."

Since the murder in Rus Square, Martin and all the other males of the extended Rrushkadoli family
-- some 50 just in the Thethi environs -- have been "locked," confined to their houses as they wait
for the Lamthi's to take their revenge. In that time, Martin has barely left his tiny patch of land;
when he does, he always carries his Kalashnikov assault rifle with him. "We are all afraid, just
waiting for the peace to be done or. . . . " He glanced down the path again. "Well, if they come for
me and I kill them first, then I am free. By the kanun, they can't come for me a second time."

Taking in the limited view from the terrace -- a few fields and then the enclosing wall of cliffs -- I
tried to imagine what it would be like to stare at that, and little else, for more than a year. When I
brought this up with Martin, he seemed puzzled. "It's dull," he finally managed, "but I am luckier
than most. My relatives in Shkoder, they can't even go outside their houses." Despite a life that
amounts to a form of captivity, one in which death may be just around the corner, he has no anger
toward Leka. "Leka had to do it to restore the family honor," he said. "He had no choice."

More than a mere set of laws, the kanun of Leke Dukagjini is a meticulous blueprint governing all
aspects of communal life, with rules set in place for everything from how to bury the dead and
conduct a proper wedding to what happens when one person's bee swarm ventures onto another's
property. Even in the settlement of simple disputes, the logic can, at times, be elusive. If, for
example, a neighbor's pig is marauding your property, it can be killed so long as it is not wearing a
verze, or restraining collar; if it is wearing a verze -- which presumably should have kept it from
wandering off in the first place -- and you kill it, the pig's owner has to be compensated.

But it is in the area of criminal law where matters become the most exacting -- and the most exotic.
At its core, the kanun is all about defending one's honor, since "a man who is dishonored is
considered dead." While lesser offenses to one's honor can be settled through apologies or gift-
giving, higher offenses mandate the taking of bBy the dictates of the kanun, a murder is the
ultimate affront to a family's honor, the family existing in a limbo state of disgrace, essentially
"owned" by the killer, until they "take their blood back" -- and the most respectable way to do that
is to kill the killer. Of course, once this is done, it means the other family is in disgrace and needs
to take its blood back.

If it sounds like a recipe for slaughter, it gets worse. Since the kanun of Leke Dukagjini was not
written down until the beginning of this century, its precepts were passed down orally -- which
meant they mutated. In the original edicts, for example, only the actual murderer was targeted in a
"blood," or a kanun-sanctioned vendetta, but those parameters gradually expanded over time to
include all his male relatives. In some villages, certain crimes were judged so heinous that they
 305

mandated a 2-for-1 or even 3-for-1 payback. A result was bloods that ranged over entire regions
and for generations -- the longest reportedly lasted 240 years -- and left scores dead. They also had
a devastating economic impact. Since a home could never be invaded in order to carry out a blood,
the males of an entire extended family on the wrong side of a feud could spend years "locked"
inside their houses or kulas.

It was not until the rise of Enver Hoxha and his particularly vicious brand of Communism in 1945
that the cycle of vendetta in northern Albania began to be broken. In his fanatical pursuit of
transforming the nation into a Red beacon, Hoxha immediately set about crushing anyone or
anything he deemed counterrevolutionary -- and he took special aim at the kanun. In the Dukagjin,
the kulas were razed and the authority of village elders subsumed by party commissars. For those
caught in possession of a book of kanun, the sentence could be years of hard labor in the prison
camps and the banishment of their families to the opposite end of the country. An especially
ghoulish end was said to await those found guilty of committing a blood killing; according to
folklore, Hoxha ordered the killers to be buried alive in the coffins of their victims.

Not surprisingly, overt adherence to the kanun all but disappeared in the Dukagjin during the long
Communist era. But the kanun was not eradicated. It survived quietly, beneath the Communist
state, and it was a collision of these two forces -- the laws of the village and those of the state -- that
ultimately set the Lamthis and Rrushkadolis of Thethi at war with each other.

ix miles north of Shkoder is a grim patch of wind-swept farmland, remarkable only for the rounded
tops of a half-dozen old bunkers of the Hoxha era rising out of the earth. Just beyond is a decrepit,
three-room farmhouse held together with wood scraps and plastic sheeting. For eight years, this has
been home to Shtjefen Lamthi's older brother, Preka Lamthi, his wife, and their three daughters and
two sons.

Preka Lamthi, 52, has the unmistakable air of a mean drunk, the sort who can slide from macho
joviality to offended rage in a flash -- and on the day I visited, Preka had been drinking a lot. As we
sat in his dingy living room, he brought out a bottle of homemade raki and filled the shot glasses he
had set before us.

He began with a rambling, 15-minute disquisition on the evils of Communism, the horrors inflicted
on Albania during Hoxha's rule. Then he suddenly stopped, raised his raki glass and waited until I
raised mine. "When the Communists came to Thethi," he said slowly, in broken English, "I was the
first person they asked to join the party. I didn't have to join. It was not required." He broke into a
mirthless grin. "I joined."

In the next instant, the grin was gone, replaced by anger. "And what do I have for my years of
service?" he sneered. "This place. One cow, seven sheep, two pigs. That is all. I swear to you, that
is all. That is what serving Hoxha gave me."

In the collective memory of his people, Enver Hoxha lives on as a malignant ghost. From the end
of World War II until his death, in 1985, he ruled Albania with all the capricious cruelty of a Stalin,
combined with the paranoid xenophobia of North Korea's Kim Il Sung. For the slightest sign of
disobedience to the Great Leader, an Albanian could be denounced as an enemy of the state and
sent to one of the country's myriad prison camps; given the all pervasive security apparatus and the
handing out of medals to schoolchildren who detected subversive tendencies in their parents,
Hoxha was assured a steady supply of victims.
 306

Maintaining this "workers' paradise" required constant vigilance against all taint from the outside.
The few Albanians allowed to possess radios or televisions, mostly the party elite, were constantly
watched by the secret police; those found to have rigged homemade aerials to pick up transmissions
from nearby Italy were sent to the gulags. In the 1970's, even as the horse-drawn cart remained the
chief source of transportation in his impoverished nation, the Great Leader embarked on a
fantastically expensive project to ring Albania with his reinforced concrete bunkers, not stopping
until some half-million of his "mushrooms" dotted the landscape. Perhaps most crucially of all, his
rigid control of internal migration ensured that Albania remained a largely village society.

But of course, there is really no such thing as one-man rule; like despots everywhere, Hoxha sat
atop a great pyramid of capos, each level of the pyramid lording its power over those below and at
the mercy of those above. In the village of Thethi, Hoxha's man was Preka Lamthi.

First recruited into the party as a teenager in the 1960's, Preka steadily
For the next hour, leka rose through the ranks until he was named the secretary general for the
matter-of- factly Thethi region in the late 1970's. As such, he was one of the most powerful
explained why he killed men in the Dukagjin, with virtual life-and-death control over everyone
shtjefen lamthi. 'by the else. To the Rrushkadoli family, a clear sign of Preka's omnipotence was
kanun, any of the what occurred inside his house on the night of Jan. 13, 1985.
lamthis were equal, just
so long as one of them Both the Lamthi and Rrushkadoli clans had been in the Thethi area for
paid. i saw shtjefen first centuries -- in fact, given the degree of intermarriage over the years, it
so he paid.' was difficult to determine where one family ended and the other began --
and one of Preka's closest friends since childhood was a neighbor named
Noue Rrushkadoli. As men, and as fellow members of the Communist Party, the two frequently got
together in the evenings to socialize, which usually meant playing cards over glasses of raki. So
was the plan on the night of Jan. 13, 1985, when Noue dropped by the Lamthi house in Thethi;
already gathered in the living room was Preka, his younger brother, Shtjefen, and two or three other
men. While accounts differ on specifics, all agree that a lot of drinking ensued.

"For a time," Preka recalled, "everything was fine, all having a good time. But then Noue lost his
temper over something -- and he had a bad temper when drinking."

According to Preka, the argument culminated in Noue's overturning the dining-room table, one of
the gravest insults that can be committed in an Albanian home. When Preka ordered him from the
house, Noue instead went for his knife, stabbing Shtjefen six times before being overpowered.
Then, either there in the living room or in the corridor leading to the front door, someone stabbed
Noue once in the chest. The blow hit his heart and he fell dead.

"It was all a stupid, tragic thing," Preka says, "because Noue was a good friend of mine. But you
have to say he brought his end on himself by taking up the knife."

The authorities agreed. At an official inquest into the incident, a tribunal ruled that whoever struck
the death blow -- it was never determined which of the men in the room stabbed Noue -- had acted
in self-defense, and the case was dropped.

Dropped but not forgotten. To Noue Rrushkadoli's two teenage sons, Leka and Angelo, then 19 and
16 respectively, Preka Lamthi had escaped justice because of his high position in the Communist
Party. Even more to the point, he had violated one of the most solemn covenants of the kanun.
 307

"The house of the Albanian belongs to God and the guest" reads the kanun of Dukagjini, and so
sacred is this notion of hospitality that a homeowner is expected to lay down his life for it. For the
woman of the house, says the kanun, churlish behavior toward a guest deserves the same
punishment as adultery: a cut locket of hair for a first offense, a bullet in the back for a second.
There have even been cases of killers finding protection in the homes of their victims, for, as the
kanun states, "If a guest enters your house, even though he may be in blood with you, you must say
to him, 'Welcome!' "

While Preka Lamthi had clearly failed to maintain these high standards, to Noue Rrushkadoli's two
sons that wasn't the half of it. By officiating over the death of their father inside the Lamthi house,
Preka had committed a crime explicitly listed in Chapter 157 of the kanun as mandating the "fire-
torch and ax" punishments: "If someone commits these crimes, he is executed by the village, his
family is fined, his house is burned, his trees are cut down, his garden and vineyards are destroyed,
and his survivors are expelled from the country with their belongings."

If the Rrushkadoli brothers couldn't restore their family's honor so long as Preka was the
Communist Party boss in Thethi, they were willing to wait.

In 1988, with Hoxha dead three years and the Communist apparatus in Albania disintegrating, Leka
made his first strike. Ambushing Preka in a Thethi lane, he managed to stab him several times
before being pulled away. According to Preka, it was his first indication that the Rrushkadoli boys
considered themselves "in blood" with him.

"And that is not the way of the kanun," he told me. "You must inform the other side immediately
that a blood exists. I had gone to their father's funeral, I had shaken their hands, so to attack me
years later, this was a violation of the kanun." Not seriously injured in the attack, Preka declined to
press charges against Leka. For the next several years the two families maintained a wary vigil --
even as the society around them came apart at the seams.

When Communism finally collapsed in 1991, it was as if Albania had awakened from a 46-year
slumber. For the first time, Albanians saw both the cruel hoax they had lived in Hoxha's "paradise,"
and the comparatively fantastic wealth of their capitalist neighbors. Almost overnight, the face of
the country changed. Tens of thousands of young men streamed for the borders, becoming the new
"guest labor" of the continent, while mountain villagers who had been barred from moving in
Hoxha's day poured down into Tirana and the coastal towns. With land ownership and free
enterprise having been banned for nearly a half-century, everywhere a mad scramble was on to
stake a claim or start a business.

Amid the tumult, backwaters like Thethi quickly emptied out -- and among the first to leave that
isolated village was the Lamthi family. By late 1992, nearly all the extended clan, including Preka
and his five brothers, had gone over the mountains to resettle on the wind-swept plains north of
Shkoder.

If no longer enjoying the relative privilege they had known with Preka as party boss in Thethi, the
six Lamthi brothers were at least able to get by on their Shkoder farmsteads. Gradually, with the
Albanian economy coming to life under a succession of nominally democratic governments, they
could even afford a few simple pleasures: radios, televisions, a battered old Mercedes for running
errands into town. As for the old blood feud with the Rrushkadolis, most of the brothers barely
gave it a thought.
 308

"We would watch if someone approached the house," Preka said, "maybe look around a bit when
we went into town, but nothing more than that. It was a new time, so those things were over."

Life slowly improved for the Rrushkadoli boys, too. In 1996, they also abandoned Thethi, moving
together into a small apartment on a back street of Shkoder. If the living quarters were cramped --
both Leka and Angelo were now married -- they were earning enough from short-term jobs to keep
things together and at least imagine a better future. The feud with the Lamthis, now living six miles
away, seemed all but forgotten to Leka and Angelo as well.

For all, the brighter future ended very abruptly in early 1997, when Albania was felled by one of
the most outlandish financial swindles the world has ever seen.

By the mid-1990's, so-called investment banks had begun popping up in Albania and promising
remarkable returns on client's deposits, often 200 percent to 300 percent annually. With little
understanding of how capitalism actually worked, and with the Albanian government doing little to
monitor the banks, Albanians began selling everything they had to cash in on the gold rush. As the
deposits grew, so did the competition among the "banks"; by late 1996, several were advertising
returns of 40 percent per month.

In truth, the investment opportunities were nothing more than pyramid schemes, and when they
started to collapse in February 1997, Albania exploded into violence. The riots seemed to release a
collective rage that had been held back since Hoxha's time, and the mobs turned their wrath on any
symbol of authority they could find: police barracks, town halls, even the old state-run factories.
They also turned their attention to the weapons arsenals that Hoxha had built outside almost every
town. By the time the government was brought down and more than 6,000 mostly Italian
peacekeeping troops arrived in April of that year, Albania had been transformed into

a very scary place; there were now an estimated 650,000 modern weapons, mostly Kalashnikov
assault rifles, in the hands of people largely ungoverned, destitute and steeped in the notions of
blood and vengeance.

One person that the collapse deeply affected was Leka Rrushkadoli. Now 35 and unemployed with
a young son to care for, he seemed to remember suddenly his old blood feud from the Dukagjin.
Buying a Kalashnikov assault rifle in the Shkoder market, he set out to find one of the Lamthi
brothers. The first one to cross his path, on the early afternoon of Aug. 3, 1998, was Shtjefen.

Of course, the 1997 crash had also profoundly altered the Lamthi family's lot in life, leaving them
little incentive to ignore the "in blood" demands placed on them by the kanun for the murder of one
of their own.

lesh Prela clearly subscribes to the best-defense-is-a-good-offense theory. A "cousin" of Leka

Rrushkadoli, in the elastic way that term is used in the Dukagjin, the 71-year-old shepherd has
made a number of preparations around his little stone house in the back reaches of Thethi should
one of the Lamthis come calling. When asked what those preparations consist of, the elfin old man
smiled mischievously.

"Well," he said through an interpreter, "all of us who are related to Leka have guns in our houses,
of course, but maybe we also have them buried in the fields for when we are working. Maybe some
of us have grenades, even rocket launchers. The situation in Thethi today requires it."
 309

For seven months after the killing of Shtjefen Lamthi, Llesh Prela never left his property. He now
feels emboldened enough to venture a little farther afield, usually to visit with other Rrushkadoli
relatives in Thethi who are similarly "locked." With evident amusement he told of a cousin who
lived in Canada for 10 years, but who returned to Albania the previous summer.

"Bad luck," he laughed, "because now he is locked, too."

The Lamthi-Rrushkadoli blood feud is, in fact, just one of two currently taking place in Thethi. The
other is so bizarre that Mark Shyti, a wizened man who fixed his age at "about 80," can barely
bring himself to speak of it. "It is within one family," he whispered with incredulity, "one set of
cousins against another. This is something I've never heard of before, against everything in the
kanun."

This blood is such a disgrace and blot on Thethi's reputation that the old
'Well, all of us who are man became fretful at the mere suggestion of my meeting the family.
related to Leka have "But these people are very low," he said, "not worthy of being spoken to.
guns in our houses, of It could cause problems for you." The implication was that my own status
course, but maybe we as a privileged guest in the valley would suffer should I pursue the matter.
also have them buried
in the fields for when As a lifelong resident of the Dukagjin, Shyti has tremendous experience
we are working. . . . with bloods; he estimated that, in this region of some 13,000 inhabitants,
The situation in Thethi there have been at least 200 blood killings in his lifetime. "Very many
today requires it.' when I was young," he said, "then very few during the dictatorship. Now
it has come back again, and new ones are starting all the time."

As one of the elders of Thethi, Shyti is occasionally called upon to mediate in local disputes and,
with luck, forge a peaceful resolution. He also represents a vital bridge over the Hoxha
interregnum, drawing on his knowledge of earlier bloods to set precedents -- and limits -- for those
occurring now. Late into one night, we sat with half a dozen other men in the living room of his
son's home as he described noteworthy bloods of the past and their legalistic peculiarities. The
conversation eventually turned to a very recent incident, one that revealed both the complexity of
the kanun and the slipperiness with which it can be applied.

Six days earlier, a married couple from the Dukagjin had been stopped on the road to Shkoder by
four bandits. The woman had a pistol hidden in her purse and, when the bandits' attention was
diverted, used it to shoot two of them dead; the other two bandits then returned fire, killing her and
wounding her husband before fleeing.

For the next half-hour, Shyti was silent as the other men in the room offered theories as to where
the blood lies in this case. Most eventually decided that the dead woman's family -- that is, her
father and brothers -- should now take revenge against the families of the two surviving bandits,
until Shyti raised a dissenting finger.

"By the kanun," he intoned, "banditry is permissible if it is to feed one's hungry children. If that can
be proved in this case, then it is the families of the dead bandits who have a blood with the
woman's family, because it was she who started the shooting."

The others in the room nodded solemnly at this pronouncement, but I couldn't recall ever having
come across the "hungry children" clause in the kanun. When I politely pointed this out, the old
man shrugged and said, "It is a local interpretation."
 310

efore setting out for Shkoder, Albanian journalists in Tirana had warned me of a city under virtual
siege, its streets cleared by early afternoon, the nights given over to shootouts between local mafias
and the mountain clansmen who have come down in recent years and brought their blood feuds
with them. The reality was not nearly so dire. Shkoder residents this past autumn didn't begin to
head indoors until 4 or 5 in the afternoon, and an elite, well-armed police battalion trained by the
Italians was manning roadblocks on the edge of town, conducting spot checks of travelers from
behind black ski masks. The heavy police presence was clearly having an effect; as the United
Nations noted about Shkoder in one of its weekly security reports: "The situation is calm, with only
two reported murders on the 19 Oct."

One of those responsible for Shkoder's incremental return to civility is a dapper 41-year-old man
named Emin Spahia. A former hospital barber, Spahia is now the general secretary of the All-
Nation Reconciliation Mission, a grass-roots organization dedicated to ending the blood feuds in
Albania through mediation. This is no simple task, since arranging a peace can take years of
negotiations with the warring families and then, if a peace is achieved, a mass gathering of all the
extended relatives must be organized for a ceremony.

"You must get them all to gather for the ceremony," Emin Spahia told me. "Otherwise, someone
can decide they are not bound by the peace, and the blood will start again."

Spahia came to his current vocation after his own family was involved in a blood. In 1987, his
uncle was killed in a dispute with a neighboring family, and five years later his cousin took
revenge. While the feud was eventually settled, Spahia spent eight months "locked," long enough to
persuade him never to be involved in another blood and to work toward ending others.

By his account his work has been remarkably successful. With virtually no outside funds (the Soros
Foundation did donate a computer and two-way radio system this year), he and his mediators --
usually elderly men respected in their communities -- have met with more than 2,000 Albanian
families "in conflict" in the past two years. In the process, they have managed to head off some 350
disputes before they reached the killing stage -- even divorces and car accidents can spark bloods --
and brought an end to more than 600 active feuds. As Spahia proudly pointed out, that translates
into more than 10,000 people being freed of their "locked" status, including more than 1,000
children now able to return to school. At the same time, with an estimated 2,700 feuds still active in
Albania and more starting up every day, Spahia suspects he won't be out of a job any time soon.

"Most of these go back to the land ownership disputes of '91," he said, referring to the national
scramble for property after the collapse of Communism, "but then when all the guns came out in
the '97 crisis, that's when the killing really started. The big problem now is a lack of government, so
it keeps spreading. Before, the Dukagjini kanun was only in the north, but since '97 you are seeing
it in Tirana, in the south, even in other countries."

According to Emin Spahia and others, there have been several cases of Albanian emigres in the
United States and Western Europe being killed as a result of homeland feuds; there have also been
cases of emigres returning to Albania in order to take revenge.

By coincidence, the headquarters of the All-Nation Reconciliation Mission -- a windowless second-

floor cubicle donated by a local merchant -- is a mere 40 feet from the spot where Leka
Rrushkadoli gunned down Shtjefen Lamthi. That blood feud is one that Spahia and his mediators
have been trying to end. Over the past year, the general secretary has paid a number of visits to the
 311

Lamthis on their farmsteads north of town, as well as to many of the Rrushkadolis who are
"locked" in Shkoder.

"I'm optimistic about ending this one," Emin Spahia said, "because the Lamthis seem ready to
negotiate. The big obstacle, though, is Leka. His relatives are still too nervous to arrange a meeting
with him, and until we speak, it's very difficult to negotiate a peace."

When I mentioned that I'd heard Leka was living as a fugitive in the hills above Thethi, Spahia
smiled. "Yes," he said, "that is what families like to say in these situations, but it is possible that he
is still here in Shkoder."

That night an intermediary with extensive contacts in the "locked" community of Shkoder led a
rambling tour through the town's deserted back streets. It turned out that Shkoder's "locked"
inhabitants, estimated to number about 1,500, maintain an informal network among themselves;
after knocking on the doors of half a dozen homes, and staring down the barrels of several guns, we
were directed to an address near downtown. After a brief discussion with a woman at the building's
entrance, we were told to come back in the morning, that someone who might know Leka's
whereabouts would meet with us.

he metal door opened a few inches, and a heavily-built man quickly looked me up and down. I
noticed he had worried eyes and was very pale. After a moment, he pushed the door open and
ushered me inside, into a tiny living room adorned with old family photographs and Catholic icons.
As we sat, the man continued to study me, seeming both timid and wary. "I am Leka," he said
finally.

A few minutes later, we were joined by Angelo, Leka's younger brother. He, too, was very pale, but
he had used his 14 months of house imprisonment to learn rudimentary English from a textbook.

For the next hour, Leka matter-of-factly explained why he killed Shtjefen Lamthi, starting with
how his father came to die in Preka's house 13 years before. Interestingly, his account of that first
death differed very little from Preka's, and he readily acknowledged that his father had escalated
the argument by going for his knife. When I suggested that this act made his father more culpable
in the tragedy, and the Lamthis less so, Leka simply shrugged.

"That doesn't matter in the kanun," he replied. "By the kanun, the very worst crime is to kill
someone inside your house, no matter the circumstances or how it started."

"That's right," Angelo chimed in. "For this, the Lamthis should have left Thethi. By the kanun,
Preka should have been executed, his house destroyed and all his family made to leave the valley
and never show their faces again."

Leka nodded. "But we didn't ask for that. All we wanted was for Preka to come to us and ask for
our forgiveness. But he was the big party boss for the district, he knew he couldn't be touched, so
he treated it like nothing. For 13 years we waited for him to come to us, and finally I could not wait
any longer."

Throughout the brothers' tale ran a deep current of animosity for Preka. For Shtjefen, on the other
hand, there seemed no rancor and even a measure of sympathy; after all, both Leka and Angelo
recognized that he was the first victim in the whole case, stabbed by their drunken, knife-wielding
father. It prompted me to ask an obvious question.
 312

"Rather than kill Shtjefen, why didn't you wait for the chance to kill Preka?"

Leka pondered. "But it made no difference" he said eventually. "By the kanun, any of the Lamthis
were equal, just so long as one of them paid. I saw Shtjefen first, so he paid."

What the Rrushkadoli brothers wanted now was a peace settlement with the Lamthis so that they
could venture out their apartment door and return to the world. The score has been evened at one
death apiece and, as Emin Spahia had earlier pointed out to me, it is always easier to broker peace
when the score is tied. Except this blood feud doesn't quite have a tie score, as Angelo reminded his
brother: "There is still the time you stabbed Preka in Thethi."

"That's right," Leka conceded. "That will have to be negotiated."

ater, when I told Emin Spahia of my meeting with Leka, he was pleased. "This means he is trusting
now," Spahia said, "maybe even a bit desperate for it all to end. I'm very confident that we will
have a peace here very soon."

He may be right, but I can't say I share his confidence. I remember sitting across from Preka
Lamthi, his look of feigned amazement when I asked about the ongoing blood feud between him
and the Rrushkadolis.

"Blood? But we have no blood with them. That is all in the past now."

At that, his two grown sons had exchanged sly glances and smirked.

I also remember what the Rrushkadoli brothers said as I left them. Perhaps emboldened by the
presence of a visitor, they had stepped across their apartment threshold to stand on the landing and
gaze out at the sunlit street.

"The Lamthis should give us peace now," Angelo said, "because technically they still owe us. We
are not asking for anything more but, by the terms of the kanun, for killing our father inside their
house, they owe us three deaths."

"That's right," Leka had nodded, blinking furiously against the sunlight he had barely glimpsed in
14 months. "Three of theirs."

Scott Anderson
 313

CONTENTS

Preface …………………………………………………………………..……….……1

Prologue …………………………………………………………………….…..…….1

Introduction …………………………………………………………………..……. 2
.
Kosovo in Serbia ……………………………………………………..…………… 3

Dinaric region ……………………………….………………………..………..… 9

Dinaroids ............................................................................................................. 11
Who are Albanians ? …........................................................................................20

Kosovo and Metohija ……………….………………………………………..….30

The autonomous province Kosovo and Metohija ………………………………44

Yugoslavia after Tito ……………………………………………..…………..…60

The Fall of Titonic (Disintegration of Yu2) ……………………..….…………..…….72

Disintegration of Yugoslavia and KiM ……………………….…………..88

Dinarization of Serbia …………………………………………………...........100

KiM and world……………………………………………………………………111

Shqiptar rebellion ……………………………………………………….……...138

The Merciful Angel ………………………………………….……………..……....167
Epilogue ? ………………...………………………………….………………..…..186

Two Serbias ……………………………………………………………….….…. 218

KiM under the UN protection …………………………..…………………….…….229

KiM - What solution? ………………………………………..……..……….244

Concluding remarks ……………………………………………..………..….269

Epilogue ……….……………………………………………………………….….269

Summary .........……………………………………………………………………270

APPENDICES ……………………………………………..……………………271
APPENDIX 1 ……………………………………………………………………..…271

APPENDIX 2 ………………………………………….…………………..………..272
APPENDIX 3……………………………..…………………………….…………. .274
 314

APPENDIX 4 ...........……………………………………………………………… 276

APPENDIX 5 ……………………………………………………………………….281

APPENDIX 6 ….…………………………………………………….……..……….283

APPENDIX 7 …...………………………………………………………………….286

APPENDIX 8 .......………………………………………………………………….288

APPENDIX 9 ……………………………………...........………………………………….291

APPENDIX 10 …………………………………………………………………… 294

APPENDIX 11 .....................................................................................................................296

APPENDIX 12 ......….……………………………………..……….…..………… 297

APPENDIX 13 ……………………..……………………………..……….………………300
315