Economía Política Internacional

CRONOGRAMA Y DOCUMENTOS Energy Sector Inquiry

(se irán colgando más documentos a medida que se avance en el programa)
Regulación y competencia. El sector eléctrico en
SESIÓN CONTENIDO DOCUMENTOS DE APOYO España y Europa
Presentación y primera Decimoquinta
Finanzas
Primera Sesión aproximación a la Sesión
globalización Decimosexta
Comentario lecturas
Segunda Reflexion Metodológica en torno a la Globalización Sesión
Comentario lecturas Decimoséptima
Sesión Shifts in economic geography Regulación estatal
Economic history and "the new economy" Sesión
New economy: fact or fiction Anteproyecto de ley de economía sostenible
Decimoctava
Metodología: escalas de Comentario lecturas Principales medidas del anteproyecto
Tercera Sesión Sesión
actividad y análisis Presentación empleada Estrategias de Kioto
Perspectiva histórica Decimonovena
Exposición de trabajos
Sesión
Comentario lecturas
Cuarta Sesión Introducción al crecimiento económico
sesión 3
El papel de la tecnología
Quinta Sesión
como motor del cambio
The US Productivity Slowdown the Baby Boom
and Management Quality

Technical Change and U.S. Economic Growth

Comentario lecturas
Sexta Sesión
sesión 5
In defence of the dismal science.

The other-wordly philosophers.

Séptima
Producción y servicios
Sesión
Octava Sesión Comentario lecturas
El problema energético:
Novena Sesión La Inversión exterior directa en 2008
análisis global
Undécima La globalización de la producción. Empresas
Comentario lecturas
Sesión transnacionales.
Duodécima
Exposición de trabajos
Sesión
El problema energético
Decimotercera Comercio y cooperación al
World Energy Outlook
Sesión desarrollo
La Energía en Internet
Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del
Decimocuarta
Comentario lecturas Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los sectores
Sesión
europeos del gas y la electricidad (informe final)
 ISSN 1576-0162
SECCIÓN GENERAL

REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON GLOBALISATION
Angel Martínez González-Tablas
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
angeltablas@ccee.ucm.es
BIBLID [1576-0162 (2003), 9, 83-110]
RESUMEN
Ha pasado el tiempo en que el mero discurso sobre la globalización resul-
taba sugerente. Para avanzar, hay que pasar a otra fase. Necesitamos enten-
der, caracterizar y medir el proceso de globalización, en cuanto tal, por muy
poliforme, mutante e inaprensible que parezca. La intención de este artículo
es postular un conjunto de temas que deben ser estudiados y proponer una
metodología que permita hacer avanzar la investigación empírica de las finan-
zas, el comercio, la producción y la demanda globales, medir el grado de
globalización económica y estudiar las implicaciones para el conjunto de la
economía mundial.
Palabras clave: metodologia, medir la globalizacion economica, grado de
globalizacion, efectos.
ABSTRACT
The time has passed where the discussion about globalization seemed
exciting. To advance, it must move to another phase. We must understand,
characterize and measure the process of globalization, even as mutant and
inapprehensible as it may be. The purpose of this article is to postulate a group
of topics that must be studied and to propose a methodology which enables
the advancement in the empiric research of finance, commerce, production
and global demand, so as to measure the degree of economic globalization
and to study the implications for the world economy as a whole.
Key words: methodology, measuring economic globalisation, degree of globa-
lisation, impact.
Clasificación JEL: B41, F02.
INTRODUCCIÓN
Sobre la globalización (G) se habla cada día más, pero es sorprendente
que, tratándose de un fenómeno cambiante, que no es en 2003 lo que era
en 1995, los análisis descansen en estereotipos y no estén actualizados.
Además, se pretende establecer sus efectos en términos que permitan
conclusiones inequívocas a favor o en contra, cuando, por mucha que sea la
urgencia, los pasos tienen que ser otros; un planteamiento de esa naturaleza
difícilmente alcanzaría resultados fructíferos.
La mayor aportación que desde el ámbito intelectual se puede hacer a
la crítica de la G, a la búsqueda de una G alternativa y a los movimientos
sociales comprometidos en ese proceso sería producir informes que situaran
su cambiante estado y realizar estudios particulares, que caracterizaran con
precisión la posición relativa de países o áreas geográficas respecto a ella,
identificando los factores que determinan su desigual situación. Algo sólo
realizable a partir de un planteamiento teórico-metodológico consistente.
Sólo si entendemos lo que es la G y su evolución, si diferenciamos la
desigual situación de los países y conocemos los componentes que la deter-
minan, sólo entonces estaremos en condiciones de adentrarnos en el análi-
sis de su impacto –sobre el crecimiento, la distribución, el bienestar, la
pobreza, la cultura- y en la propuesta de medidas. Tratar de analizar direc-
tamente los impactos, sin casi saber de qué estamos hablando, es poner la
carreta delante de los bueyes.
Globalización es un término que, aunque se refiera a una realidad, a
base de usarlo, ha pasado a ser manido. Superar el cenagal en que normal-
mente se empantanan tantas reflexiones exige un sólido cuerpo teórico -una
articulación de categorías bien definidas- y una sostenida investigación empí-
rica que nos permita ver dónde estamos, hacia dónde nos desplazamos,
cómo operan las relaciones de causalidad e interdependencia y cuáles son los
efectos inducidos. Ese imprescindible ensamblaje de teoría y realidad sólo
puede alcanzarse si disponemos de una propuesta metodológica que, de
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110

REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110

86 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
forma simultánea, posibilite la comprensión del fenómeno en toda su
complejidad y propicie su estudio empírico1.
Ha pasado el tiempo en que el mero discurso resultaba sugerente. Hoy esta-
mos ahítos de publicaciones que introducen el término globalización en su enun-
ciado, en una danza circular y repetitiva. Para avanzar, hay que pasar a otra fase.
La intención de este artículo es precisamente ésa: postular un conjunto de
temas que deben ser estudiados y una forma de abordarlos, apuntando ejemplos
y posibles aplicaciones para evitar que el discurso se mueva en un excesivo nivel
de abstracción.
Es indudable que vamos a utilizar, de forma subyacente, una cierta concep-
ción de la globalización, expuesta con detalle en otros trabajos en los que se abor-
dan su contenido, sus causas y las consecuencias que induce.
Dado que buscamos huir de metadiscursos estériles para el análisis empírico
e inútiles para la comprensión de la realidad, necesitamos, en primer lugar, enten-
der, caracterizar y medir el proceso de globalización, en cuanto tal, por muy poli-
forme, mutante e inaprensible que parezca. Es la propuesta a la que se orientan
estas páginas, porque si no conseguimos caracterizarlo con rigor y no podemos
medir su evolución estaremos a ciegas, impotentes para cualquier logro.
Pero tendremos que hacerlo conscientes de que los espacios particulares -
bloques, economías nacionales, regionales o locales- no desaparecen con el
auge de la globalización, sino que se ven determinados por su existencia, como
consecuencia de la combinación de aspectos internos de esas sociedades y de
los términos de su inserción en el proceso globalizante; el impacto será desigual
y sólo podrá ser estudiado a través de esa combinación.
Finalmente, seguiremos confrontados con la necesidad de actuar, de inter-
venir en el desarrollo de los procesos con políticas congruentes y operativas,
gestionando la globalización en lugar de simplemente padecerla (o disfrutarla).
¿Por qué aventurarnos en un tratamiento, que algunos pueden calificar de
enrevesado, si podemos estudiar los mismos componentes, con análisis parciales
sucesivos? La cuestión nos remite a la relación que debe existir entre análisis
parciales y dinámica sistémica, problemática insoslayable en cierto tipo de fenó-
menos. Es cierto que la globalización, con toda su trama de variables, niveles e
interrelaciones es tema que parece de casi imposible tratamiento científico. Sin
embargo, los aspectos parciales susceptibles de análisis empíricos, con categorías
y modelos bien acotados, corren el riesgo de perder lo que es más genuino de la
globalización: el juego de las interdependencias. Por ello, la propuesta enfatiza la
necesidad de reintegrar los análisis parciales al lugar que les corresponde en el
sistema, sometiendo los resultados a una prueba adicional de significación: la
medida de lo que aportan a la comprensión del conjunto; de este modo, evitamos
desechar lo que los análisis parciales pueden aportar pero impedimos que vuelen
1
El planteamiento de este trabajo encuentra sus antecedentes en diversos trabajos del autor: Martí-
nez González-Tablas (2000), (2002 a) y (2002 b), siendo también deudor de enfoques explícitos o
sugeridos por Gray,H.P. (1999) y Held, McGrew, Goldblatt y Perraton (1999).
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 87
autónomos, obligándoles a reintegrarse a una visión interdependiente. Es algo que
sería a todas luces excesivo si la intensidad sistémica de lo global fuera débil -ya
que nos obliga a manejarnos con un pesado bagaje, aparentemente lesivo para la
productividad inmediata de las investigaciones- pero es algo imprescindible si lo
específicamente sistémico es determinante en la composición y comportamiento
de la realidad estudiada. La tesis que se defiende es que éste es precisamente el
caso de la mundialización de los procesos económicos2.
La línea que defendemos es no renunciar a planteamientos econométri-
cos, pero ni buscar obsesivamente análisis formalizados en esos términos, ni
atribuirles mayor virtualidad de la que sus limitaciones les confieren; el obje-
tivo es tratar de avanzar en el conocimiento y la comprensión de los procesos
globalizantes construyendo con pasos sucesivos, sistemáticos y cualitativos,
enlazados por líneas de razonamiento económico, aunque no estén sustan-
ciadas con un alto grado de estilización formal, sin aceptar el enclaustra-
miento en los límites de los análisis parciales.
Resumiendo, necesitamos un método que permita: primero, aprehender el
problema como totalidad interrelacionada y dinámica; segundo, analizar aspectos
y subconjuntos en sí mismos (lectura menor) y en sus interrelaciones con el resto
(lectura mayor). No nos sirve un método que se concentre en un solo aspecto de
la realidad (v.gr. las finanzas o las empresas transnacionales); que sólo sea capaz
de captar una dimensión de una realidad compleja y pluridimensional, por muy
preocupado que en apariencia esté por la totalidad (v.gr. enfoque de economía de
mercado); tampoco uno que no sea capaz de estudiar aspectos parciales y
subconjuntos constitutivos, obsesionado por no perder la visión integral3.
1. MARCO GENERAL PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN
Por globalización entendemos la situación que se crea cuando existen
factores, relaciones y procesos que tienen origen, actúan, se reproducen, reper-
cuten o se identifican en el espacio mundial, con concreción y materialización
diversa en flujos, actores, comportamientos y valores.
Aunque nuestro campo de interés vaya a ser la globalización económica, si
queremos llegar a entenderla, tendremos que situarla en relación a otras, estu-
diarla en sí misma y plantear el problema de los espacios submundiales, conclu-
yendo con todo lo relativo a las políticas tendentes a regular, guiar y controlar
los procesos económicos globalizantes.
2
No soy el único que defiende este enfoque. La UNCTAD en el World Investment Report (WIR) (1999:
315/6) sostiene que “ es casi imposible medir con precisión los efectos de la IED. Las transnaciona-
les representan un complejo paquete de atributos...difícil de separar y cuantificar (de forma que) las
conclusiones de los análisis econométricos de IED y crecimiento económico distan de ser claros, en
especial en lo que concierne a la causalidad dentro de la relación, (mientras que) los análisis cualita-
tivos de la IED, que toman sus componentes de forma separada, son más sugerentes...”
3
Gray, H.P.(1999) hace un enunciado similar de objetivos y formula una crítica convincente a los enfo-
ques convencionales, aunque su potencialidad inicial se diluya en el posterior desarrollo.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110
88 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
1.1. GLOBALIZACIÓN(ES)
Además de la económica, hay otras muchas dimensiones que se globalizan y
que de forma más o menos directa interactúan entre si y con lo económico. No
tendría sentido intentar caracterizarlas aquí con precisión, pero lo tiene pleno situar-
las, aunque sólo sea para no olvidar que existen y que influyen en la economía.
Algunas dimensiones son particularmente relevantes y sus intersecciones con
la GE dignas de atención:
- Ecológica. En todo lo que va del comportamiento de los grandes ecosiste-
mas al de la propia biosfera.
- Comunicacional. Infraestructuras y redes que posibilitan tanto los flujos
materiales como los informacionales en el espacio mundial.
- Militar. Existencia de medios y procesos que permiten funcionamiento e
intervención de este tipo a escala mundial.
- Política. Vigencia de normas, instituciones y organismos de ámbito mundial.
- Demográfica. En tanto en cuanto que la evolución de la población mundial
tiende a llenar el mundo y que las migraciones suponen desplazamiento
físico significativo de los seres humanos en él.
- Cultural o ideológica. En la medida en la que los referentes de este carác-
ter actúan y penetran con tal alcance en los comportamientos.
- Irregular, esto es, componentes y relaciones de ámbito mundial considera-
bles como desviados, desde el narcotráfico, a la trata de mujeres o la difu-
sión de enfermedades, con sus efectos colaterales de blanqueo de dinero,
corrupción, etc.
Las relaciones que inducen cada una de estas globalizaciones son coercitivas
unas, cooperativas o competitivas otras, aunque no siempre su condición sea
unívoca, ni similar su mensurabilidad. Algunas estarán regidas por relaciones multi-
laterales, pero a su lado germinarán variantes marcadas por vínculos más restrin-
gidos o por descarnados ejercicios de unilateralidad. La coexistencia y combinación
de tipos de globalización tan distintos hace aún más complejo el cuadro, porque a
su heterogénea naturaleza se añade su dispar lógica de funcionamiento, induciendo
compatibilidades imperfectas, fricciones o incluso abiertos antagonismos.
A corto plazo, es difícil establecer la importancia relativa de cada una de las
globalizaciones. En cambio, en una perspectiva de largo plazo es posible identifi-
car las relaciones externas que han sido o son dominantes en los distintos perío-
dos históricos, aunque no siempre hayan llegado a alcanzar plenamente la
condición de mundiales y hayan quedado circunscritas al <mundo> conocido o
accesible en una época determinada.
En todo lo que sea posible, la medición de la globalización y la articulación
de sus dimensiones debe buscar un seguimiento empírico preciso, sin limitarse a
enunciados genéricos o valoraciones especulativas. Pero en un estudio de la
globalización económica sólo podemos aspirar a situar el resto de ámbitos y a
subrayar los términos cualitativos que parezcan de mayor interés o el eventual
predominio de algunos de ellos.
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 89
En la fase actual, un diagnóstico de este tipo resulta a la vez necesario y difí-
cil. Hay aspectos cuya intensidad ofrece pocas dudas –piénsese en lo ecológico o
lo comunicacional-, otros emergen como desafíos y ofrecen un carácter abierta-
mente problemático –pudiera ser el caso de lo económico, lo demográfico, lo ideo-
lógico y las prácticas desviadas-, algunos, tras su aparente contundencia, parecen
estar en abierta mutación –la dimensión militar-, mientras que los hay en marcada
regresión temporal –como todo apunta acaece en la institucionalización política-.
Tanta disparidad configura una amalgama precaria, cuya inestabilidad, descom-
pensación y acusada fragilidad son rasgos de su identidad.
1.2. GLOBALIZACIÓN ECONÓMICA (GE)
Entendemos la globalización económica (GE) como la tendencia a la mundia-
lización del sistema económico capitalista (SEC), a la utilización del espacio
mundial por parte de sus componentes y relaciones, ascendiendo esa dimensión
en el funcionamiento y reproducción de cada uno de ellos, de sus interrelaciones
y del SEC como totalidad, de modo que el grado de mundialización podrá ser
desigual según los planos y su condición consustancialmente evolutiva. Además,
ya hemos subrayado que la GE no es una dimensión aislada, sino que se relaciona
con otras, sobre las que influye y por las que se ve determinada.
Medir y caracterizar la GE, constatar lo que existe y seguir su evolución,
nos conduce inevitablemente al estudio del conjunto de las relaciones externas
y de cada una de ellas en particular, al análisis de su naturaleza, su dimensión
espacial, su institucionalización, a los efectos de la GE y al conocimiento e inter-
pretación de la economía mundial, como conjunto diferenciado de las relaciones
que la crean y la materializan.
La evaluación del grado de GE realmente existente es consecuencia natu-
ral de los pasos expuestos, aunque estemos lejos de disponer de un indicador
que permita responder con precisión. Es útil distinguir entre las acepciones posi-
tiva y negativa de la GE. Ambas se refieren a factores, relaciones y procesos
procedentes del nivel mundial, pero mientras la primera trata de identificar los
que determinan el funcionamiento y reproducción de la economía, la segunda
busca los que condicionan y perturban al funcionamiento y a la reproducción4.
Dado que la segunda parte de este artículo va a estar dedicada a profundizar
en la temática de este apartado, nos detenemos aquí en su simple enunciado.
1.3. ESPACIOS PARTICULARES ANTE LA GE
Aun en el supuesto de que conociéramos todo lo relativo a las globaliza-
ciones y de que dispusiéramos de una caracterización satisfactoria y con medi-
ciones precisas de la GE, para dotarnos de un conocimiento operativo
necesitaríamos abordar el estudio y caracterización de los espacios particula-
res ante la GE, una temática que también cabría enunciar como ”los espacios
4
Profundiza en esta distinción Martínez González-Tablas (2002b), págs 79-80.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110
90 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
particulares ante las múltiples globalizaciones”, enunciado que, aunque más
completo, nos resultaría inabordable.
Desde una actitud pragmática proponemos abordar lo que estamos en condi-
ciones de estudiar, conscientes de que, aun así, se trata de un enorme desafío5.
Primero, los aspectos internos de los espacios particulares que son determinantes
para su relación con el entorno mundial: identidad societaria, dotación de recursos,
desarrollo institucional, articulación y consistencia económicas internas, políticas
practicadas. Segundo, la medición y caracterización de la inserción de los espacios
particulares en el proceso de globalización, estudiable a través de la naturaleza de
las relaciones externas, su dimensión espacial, el grado de simetría de las relacio-
nes (pasivas o activas), la participación en la institucionalización de los diversos
espacios, la estructura de la posición espacial resultante en el espacio mundial, la
exposición o sensibilidad a factores externos. Tercero, la medición y caracterización
del impacto (de la globalización y de su inserción en ella) sobre los espacios parti-
culares y dentro de ellos sobre distintos planos: opciones sociales e identidades
culturales, desarrollo institucional y capacidad de emprenderlo, equilibrio ambien-
tal, crecimiento económico, distribución de renta y riqueza, pobreza, bienestar,
retroalimentación sobre la inserción, vulnerabilidad, etc.
1.4. POLÍTICAS PARA GOBERNAR LA GE
Sería frustrante no atreverse a plantear las políticas frente a la GE, dado
que sus efectos los percibimos inquietantes y de entidad. De nuevo sería más
completo pretender formular la búsqueda de ”políticas frente a las globalizacio-
nes”, pero sería una pretensión que, por excesiva, correría el riesgo de abocar-
nos a un vacío de resultados.
No obstante, las políticas frente a la GE, si quieren ser realistas, no pueden
ignorar la situación y tendencias de la G en otros planos. No tendría sentido
delinear propuestas en el plano económico de espaldas a la evolución de la
globalización militar o al grado y tipo de institucionalización dimanantes del
ámbito político. Lo económico sirve de substrato a lo militar y a lo político, pero,
a la vez, estos condicionan lo que en lo económico pueda plantearse.
Por otro lado, las políticas que buscan gobernar la G no se radican en un
único nivel espacial, sino que se desarrollan en una pluralidad de niveles que
dialogan entre si y se condicionan recíprocamente. Lo mundial, lo internacional,
lo submundial y, a la vez, supranacional, lo concerniente a los Estados e incluso
los espacios subestatales ofrecen posibilidades de regulación, cada una de ellas
tan limitada como articulable con el resto. Es una consecuencia derivada de lo
que la G comporta de recomposición del espacio, una consecuencia que desapa-
recería si interpretáramos que la G conlleva la afirmación exclusiva y excluyente
de lo mundial y la dilución de todos los niveles inferiores.
5
Sobre el margen de maniobra de las economías particulares y sobre las políticas posibles frente a la
globalización, ver Martínez González-Tablas (2002 a).
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 91
Un estudio riguroso de la globalización tendría que afrontar simultáneamente
todos esos planos, profundizando en cada uno de ellos y, a la vez, entrelazándolos.
Como no tenemos capacidad para hacerlo, el propósito tiene que ser más modesto:
crear un marco metodológico que permita caracterizar y seguir la evolución de la
GE, posibilitando la realización de análisis parciales, que se puedan integrar en un
esquema interpretativo más amplio, al modo en que lo hacen las piezas en un
puzzle. La propuesta se limita, pues, a intentar medir la GE, dejando fuera de foco
las diversas globalizaciones y sus interacciones, el estudio de los espacios particu-
lares y las políticas para gobernar la globalización. No se cuestiona que todos ellos
sean aspectos cruciales, pero de nada nos serviría el empeño en abordarlos si no
disponemos de las categorías teóricas y el método para estudiar cada uno de los
grandes apartados que hemos enunciado y para combinarlos en una visión de
conjunto. Se trata de aceptar con modestia y realismo que son tareas que quedan
pendientes6, porque saltar de una a otra manifestación es pura banalidad y preten-
der avanzar en todo el frente temático propósito ingenuo. Si queremos ser modes-
tamente científicos, hay que decir que ya vale, que hay que parar. Hay que ponerse
a la tarea, hay que hacerlo con constancia, paso a paso, con la ambición que
proporciona el rigor. Sembrar, irrigar, sin pretender cosechar antes de que grane.
2. PROPUESTA ESPECÍFICA PARA MEDIR LA GLOBALIZACIÓN ECONÓMICA
¿Cuánta GE existe? ¿Cuánta en cada uno de sus momentos constitutivos?
¿Cuáles sus efectos? ¿Cuál, a la postre, el grado de globalización realmente
existente y en qué medida mayor o menor que el de épocas pasadas? ¿De qué
modo se ven afectados por el proceso analizado el funcionamiento y reproduc-
ción de la economía mundial?
No hay respuesta directa a estas preguntas, por lo que hay que entrar a
abordar el tema a través de aproximaciones sucesivas. Empezaremos con las
dificultades metodológicas del estudio de las relaciones económicas externas -
hasta cierto punto, vehículo y plasmación de la GE- y formularemos una
propuesta al respecto. Continuaremos con el análisis específico de cada relación
económica externa, adaptando a su singularidad la propuesta metodológica del
punto anterior. Finalmente, daremos el salto cualitativo de inquirir por la econo-
mía mundial en su conjunto, al fin y al cabo punto de destino hacia el que está
abocado cualquier estudio de la globalización que aspire a tener sentido.
2.1. PROPUESTA METODOLÓGICA PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LAS RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS
EXTERNAS
Empezamos identificando las relaciones económicas básicas, para avanzar
hacia la delimitación de la fase actual de su dimensión externa, cuya caracteri-
zación -determinada por componentes, cuantía, agentes, lógica e institucionali-
6
En el mejor de los casos han podido ser o están siendo abordadas en otros trabajos.
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92 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
zación, nos permite tomar distancia respecto a la simplificación de basarse en
lo simplemente externo, dando paso al estudio de los efectos que de ella se
derivan y del grado de globalización resultante.
2.1.1. RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS BÁSICAS Y DESARROLLO DE SU DIMENSIÓN EXTERNA
Las relaciones básicas -que deben ser objeto de medición, estática y diná-
mica- son las que afectan y determinan los momentos y los protagonistas
económicos fundamentales. Se seleccionan en función de lo que entendemos
por globalización económica, poniendo especial atención en las que son suscep-
tibles de medición objetiva, descendiendo siempre que sea posible hasta las
subrelaciones significativas para el funcionamiento y reproducción de cada
momento específico y de la economía en general. Desde esta perspectiva, finan-
zas, comercio, producción y demanda son los momentos determinantes de la
actividad económica capitalista.
En la globalización nos concierne e interesa lo mundial, pero la forma más
elemental de acercarnos a lo global es considerar a lo externo como una primera
aproximación, aunque sepamos no lo es en sentido estricto y progresivamente
intentemos diferenciarlo.
Para poder concentrar el estudio en períodos relativamente homogéneos,
es conveniente delimitar fases del desarrollo externo de las relaciones económi-
cas, eludiendo las generalizaciones que serían inevitables si nos ocupamos de
un tiempo, por dilatado, poblado de plasmaciones heterogéneas.
2.1.2. CARACTERIZACIÓN DE LAS RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS EXTERNAS
Necesitamos una caracterización que permita medir la situación de las rela-
ciones económicas externas y seguir el curso de su evolución. Pero no será posi-
ble hacerlo si no somos capaces de identificar los componentes constitutivos de
cada relación -diversos y con rasgos específicos en cada caso- cuya cuantía, abso-
luta y relativa, no es mensurable a través de indicadores estandardizados sino que
tendrán que adaptarse a la naturaleza de los componentes.
Los agentes que llevan a cabo y protagonizan las relaciones económicas
externas pueden ser de muy distinta condición y estar nítidamente delimitados o
tener un perfil difuso, circunstancias que pueden llegar a cualificar el carácter de
la relación. Se trata, en la medida de lo posible, de identificarlos, haciendo aflorar
las articulaciones y organizaciones con presencia o influencia transnacional.
La lógica de las relaciones económicas externas está determinada en última
instancia por la del SEC, pero puede tener entidad propia la de cada relación, por
lo que conocer la específica de la fase actual ayuda a precisar el tipo de relación
ante el que nos encontramos.
La dimensión institucional caracteriza cualquier relación económica externa y,
si existe institucionalización a distintos niveles espaciales, será útil abordar la de
rango mundial, y situar la de niveles inferiores, conscientes de que, cuando trata-
mos de medir el grado o el tipo de regulación, cualquier juicio de valor inevita-
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 93
blemente conlleva cierto grado de subjetividad, dado que no estamos ante magni-
tudes perfectamente mensurables. Finalmente, algo que en principio es desigual
y susceptible de medición, es la accesibilidad de las distintas relaciones externas
y de sus instituciones para las economías particulares.
2.1.3. PROFUNDIZANDO EN LA DIMENSIÓN ESPACIAL DE LO EXTERNO
Una vez medido, tratamos de diferenciar las diversas condiciones de lo
externo: mundial, regional, bilateral, ya que es obvio que no todo tiene la
misma dimensión espacial. Dado que externo y mundial no son equivalentes,
para avanzar se necesita desagregar los indicadores brutos (de cada una) de las
relaciones, diferenciando lo que es global de lo que es simplemente externo, ya
que la apertura puede quedarse en relaciones bilaterales o en regionalización.
En lo más alto de la escala están relaciones externas no contenidas en
espacios regionales supranacionales o simplemente bilaterales. El tránsito de
internacional a mundial no lo tomamos en sentido cualitativo sino sólo como
cuestión de grado: mundial lo que interconecta muchos o casi todos los espa-
cios nacionales existentes e internacional lo que sólo vincula a algunos (pocos)
espacios. Una diferenciación a todas luces burda aunque nos sirvamos de ella
mientras nos sea de utilidad.
El análisis del grado de dispersión permite desagregar espacialmente los
indicadores obtenidos en el punto anterior, midiendo la proporción en los flujos
externos de las relaciones contenidas en distintos niveles espaciales: internas a
bloques regionales (por ejemplo, flujos internos de la UE), circunscritas a zonas
de influencia creadas en torno a un polo determinado, intratriada (entre las
grandes áreas desarrolladas del mundo) y un resto que podríamos calificar de
propiamente mundial, en cuanto marcado por su elevado grado de dispersión.
Interesa hacer estas mediciones desagregadas en todos los aspectos esti-
mados al referirnos a lo externo (finanzas, comercio, producción, demanda),
enriqueciéndolas con lo que pueda ayudar a desvelar lo que buscamos7.
Este enfoque permite evaluar la importancia relativa de los niveles, analizar
la dispersión espacial, relacionar las magnitudes obtenidas para cada uno de
ellos y medir la participación de los espacios en las distintas relaciones.
Es una propuesta relativamente objetivable, aunque en ocasiones sólo
podamos establecer la concentración de las operaciones en determinados
mercados (las transacciones comerciales tienen radicación espacial, pero
muchas operaciones financieras se realizan en mercados identificables con sumi-
nistradores y tomadores de fondos de radicación espacial difusa).
Buscamos un juicio sintético sobre el grado de dispersión o su contrario,
el grado de concentración de las transacciones económicas externas, así como
sobre la mundialización relativa de los distintos ámbitos.
7
Podrían cualificarse aún más los resultados con datos adicionales sobre relaciones bilaterales especí-
ficas que parezcan significativas (por ejemplo, en lo comercial las derivadas de intercambios energéti-
cos o agrícolas).
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94 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
Podemos evaluar la evolución de la dispersión a través del ritmo de cambio
de cada relación estudiada y de la modificación de la estructura de relaciones
resultante. ¿Hasta qué punto sube lo externo, pero no lo mundial? ¿Avanzamos
hacia la mundialización o lo más notorio es la tendencia a la regionalización?
¿Son los comportamientos similares en todos los planos o difieren sustancial-
mente de unos a otros?
El juicio sobre la interconexión de los espacios no se debería limitar a unos
componentes, sino realizarse a través de tantos como estemos en condiciones de
medir, buscando la dimensión espacial de agentes, lógica e institucionalización y
sin descuidar redes de actividad y estructuras de poder. Sin embargo, mediremos
principalmente los componentes más accesibles (transacciones, flujos, stocks) ya
que los demás aspectos no tienen un reflejo estadístico inequívoco y sólo podre-
mos utilizarlos de forma cualitativa o mediante investigaciones específicas.
2.1.4. EFECTOS DE LAS RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS MUNDIALES
Delimitado lo que representan las relaciones mundiales dentro del total de
relaciones económicas externas, se trataría ahora de considerar los efectos que
inducen, ya que lo necesitamos para medir el grado de GE. Sin embargo, debe-
mos ser conscientes de que la medición de los efectos nos adentra en un terri-
torio complejo, plagado de interrelaciones en cuyo seno las relaciones de
causalidad distan de ser inequívocas. No podremos ir más allá del simple
esbozo, porque se trata de una problemática que requiere una investigación
autónoma, conducida de forma separada, aunque podamos formular hipótesis
de trabajo o incorporar sus resultados a nuestro proyecto con indudable prove-
cho. En resumen, de no necesitarlo para medir el grado de GE, lo lógico sería
prescindir aquí del estudio de esta temática.
Una dificultad adicional proviene de que no buscamos los efectos genéricos
de las relaciones económicas externas, sino sólo los efectos específicos de las de
rango mundial, las que pertenecen a la GE y la determinan. Es, por otro lado,
obvio que los efectos de finanzas, comercio y producción mundiales son dispares
y actúan de forma inmediata sobre muy distintas variables, aunque a la postre
todos reviertan sobre lo económico. Seguir la pista de esos efectos específicos sólo
es realizable desde el análisis concreto de cada relación, no mediante un plantea-
miento teórico-metodológico de validez general para todas las relaciones.
2.1.5. GRADO DE GE
Para medir el grado de GE tenemos que utilizar plenamente la capacidad
discriminatoria que nos proporciona la profundización en la dimensión espacial
de lo externo, quedándonos exclusivamente con lo que concierne al nivel
mundial, depurado de las relaciones externas de niveles espaciales inferiores.
Pero para hacerlo tendremos que tener en cuenta no sólo la caracterización
sino también los efectos, combinando ambos. Como sostuvimos al referirnos a
la GE, la medición del grado de GE se facilita si distinguimos entre sus acepcio-
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 95
nes positiva y negativa. Ambas tienen en común que se refieren a factores, rela-
ciones y procesos provenientes del nivel mundial, pero la primera inquiere por
la medida en la que determinan el funcionamiento, mientras que la segunda
busca detectar los condicionamientos y perturbaciones que inducen.
Es una distinción metodológica que podremos aplicar con provecho para
medir el grado de G de los distintos momentos y también para medir el del SEC
en su conjunto. En determinados momentos, si prescindiéramos de esta dife-
renciación nos sería muy difícil afinar las conclusiones, porque nos veríamos
confrontados con palmarios déficits de GE junto a consecuencias profundas y
perturbadoras perfectamente detectables. ¿Con qué quedarnos, con la imper-
fección de la GE o con la intensidad de algunos de sus condicionamientos?
2.2. ANÁLISIS ESPECÍFICO DE CADA UNA DE LAS PRINCIPALES RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS
EXTERNAS.
Necesitamos adaptar ahora la propuesta metodológica genérica a cada
plano singular, aplicándola de forma sucesiva a finanzas, comercio, producción
y demanda.
2.2.1. FINANZAS
Entender el significado de las finanzas y el desarrollo de su dimensión externa
presupone una buena comprensión de la función del dinero en el SEC, así como
de lo que implica el surgimiento diferenciado de lo financiero, la peculiar idiosin-
crasia del mercado en que se intercambian sus productos y la composición y
funciones que realiza el sistema financiero dentro del conjunto económico. Estare-
mos así en condiciones de situar los antecedentes financieros internacionales y, en
particular, el origen de la fase actual de las finanzas internacionales.
La caracterización de las relaciones financieras externas exige identificar los
componentes característicos de la fase actual, muchos de los cuales son peculia-
res y no mera continuidad de los procedentes de períodos anteriores. No hay,
pues, un indicador unitario con capacidad para medir las relaciones financieras
externas, por lo que, desde el inicio tendremos que distinguir divisas, capitales y
derivados, así como las subdivisiones significativas en el seno de cada uno de
ellos: distintas monedas en las divisas, renta variable y fija (sea en forma de títu-
los o préstamos) en los capitales, continua aparición de nuevos instrumentos en
los derivados.
La medición de la cuantía de las operaciones tendrá que adaptarse a la natu-
raleza de los distintos componentes, de forma que si en las divisas podremos
medir el volumen de las transacciones, en los capitales tendremos que distinguir
entre flujos brutos y netos (dado que su significado económico es profundamente
diferente) y en los derivados será preciso habilitar indicadores adaptados a su
capacidad de ramificación y a la continua innovación de los productos.
Tampoco los agentes ofrecen una foto fija: hay cierta continuidad en la
permanencia de bancos que actúan en el ámbito internacional, pero junto a ellos
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96 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
emerge una pléyade de instituciones de inversión colectiva de distinto perfil
(compañías aseguradoras, fondos de inversión o fondos de pensiones), cada
una con propósito y exigencias propias.
La combinación de nuevos componentes, cambiante estructura cuantitativa
y diversidad de operadores no es extraño dé lugar a una lógica de funciona-
miento con rasgos peculiares, en la que se detecta tendencia a la desinterme-
diación, agudización de la información asimétrica, comportamiento de rebaño,
cierto ensimismamiento cuando lo financiero parece cerrarse sobre si mismo,
acento en el corto plazo y una compleja conexión con la economía real (de la
que provienen impulsos, respecto a la que se realizan imperfectamente las
funciones esenciales de los sistemas financieros, pero a la que se transmiten con
notable intensidad condicionamientos y perturbaciones).
Al aproximarnos a la institucionalización de las finanzas sólo buscamos la
simple constatación de lo existente, sin adentrarnos para nada en la realización
de propuestas que excederían nuestro propósito de mera caracterización. La
radiografía de la trama institucional vigente debe detectar la que concierne a los
distintos componentes y agentes en los sucesivos niveles espaciales. Hay que
diferenciar la que regula las transacciones en divisas (a menudo en niveles
submundiales), de las que se ocupan de los capitales, con variantes según
productos y agentes (bancos o instituciones de inversión colectiva) o las que de
forma tentativa se refieren a derivados. Algunos organismos tienen larga trayec-
toria y un funcionamiento reglado (FMI), mientras que otros tienen un origen
más reciente y unas pautas de comportamiento menos precisas que los confi-
guran como regímenes difusos (BIS, IOSCO).
La profundización en la dimensión espacial de lo externo busca identificar
las relaciones estrictamente mundiales dentro del universo de las externas, para
lo cual habrá que desarrollar indicadores que midan el grado de dispersión
espacial de estas últimas, su concentración en determinados focos y el punto en
que estos se vinculan en una red articulada con cierta dimensión espacial. Al
final lo inicialmente calificado de externo se concretará en bilateral, circunscrito
a un bloque, área geográfica o zona de influencia, o bien trascenderá esas agru-
paciones inferiores y sólo mostrará su verdadero alcance si se contempla desde
una perspectiva mundial. Aplíquese a divisas, capitales y derivados y obtendre-
mos lo que buscamos para el plano financiero.
Los efectos de las relaciones financieras mundiales podemos medirlos,
primero, sobre las funciones atribuidas al sistema financiero, en concreto, por
su impacto sobre ahorro, precio del dinero y de los activos financieros, inver-
sión, estructura de carteras. Segundo, sobre otras relaciones, variables y
comportamientos económicos, como comercio, producción, demanda, funcio-
nes económicas del Estado, incertidumbre, grado de competencia.
La medición del grado de globalización financiera (GF) podemos realizarlo
desde una doble perspectiva. En su acepción positiva la GF viene dada por el
peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 97
determinación del funcionamiento del mercado y sistema financieros; de forma
que una plena GF implicará la existencia de mercado y sistema financiero únicos
en todo el espacio mundial. El logro de una completa GF exige como condición
previa la ausencia de barreras para todos los componentes y agentes, tanto en
lo concerniente a carencia de controles intencionados, como en la ausencia de
costes de transacción y, a la vez, un resultado acorde con dichas condiciones,
esto es, similares rentabilidades y precios de dinero (sin diferenciales en los
tipos de interés) y activos, así como sustituibilidad entre activos domésticos y
extranjeros que se manifieste en falta de sesgo doméstico en la constitución de
las carteras. Si se dan tanto las condiciones ex -ante como los resultados ex -
post implicará que sólo opera un mercado financiero en el que se intercambian
este tipo de productos y que las funciones del sistema financiero se determinan
y ejercen desde el nivel mundial.
Por su parte, la GF en sentido negativo viene dada por el peso de factores,
relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la existencia de condi-
cionamientos y perturbaciones en el funcionamiento del mercado y sistema
financieros. En la medida en la que no es directamente dependiente del grado
de GF positiva no presupone mercado y sistema financieros únicos en el ámbito
mundial y podrá, al margen de aquélla, repercutir en el comportamiento de los
que existan en los niveles nacional, internacional o mundial y en la realización
de las funciones a ellos atribuidas. También se relaciona con la problemática de
los contagios y los efectos que de los mismos se derivan.
2.2.2. COMERCIO
El comercio o circulación de mercancías se lleva a cabo en el mercado, pero
éste -dentro de una tendencia a la afirmación del mercado autorregulado (Polanyi)
a medida que se generaliza la producción de mercancías bajo el dominio del SEC-
puede ser de muy variada condición y alcance. La creciente mercantilización es
una forma de expresar la expansión de las mercancías, su penetración en ámbitos
inicialmente ajenos o resistentes, extensión interna de los mercados que suele
correr en paralelo con el desarrollo de su dimensión externa. El comercio externo
tiene larga trayectoria histórica y múltiples variantes, pudiendo decirse que la fase
actual es la que bajo el impulso del GATT y en el marco de la apuesta por la multi-
lateralidad emerge de la segunda guerra mundial, se desarrolla en la segunda
mitad del siglo XX y no deja de profundizarse, en medio de fricciones y con conti-
nuos cambios, hasta llegar a nuestros días.
En cuanto a la caracterización de las relaciones comerciales externas -a
diferencia de lo que acaece en las finanzas internacionales, en las que los obje-
tos de globalización pueden ser diversos- aquí todos los componentes son
mercancías, aunque podamos diferenciar algunas de sus categorías más signifi-
cativas : primeras materias, manufacturas, servicios; interindustrial, intraindus-
trial, intrafirma; mercancías de distinto contenido tecnológico, hasta la
depuración extrema que representan las propias transferencias de tecnología
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La referencia básica para medir la cuantía es el volumen monetario de
comercio exterior, exportaciones e importaciones que a escala mundial
tendrían por definición que compensarse, aunque imperfecciones estadísticas
e intercambios irregulares no registrados lleven al incumplimiento de esta
regla básica. Es obvio que nos interesará medir el volumen de los principales
componentes antes aludidos.
Lo habitual es que los agentes que protagonizan el comercio externo sean
empresas que, según sectores, producen las mercancías o sólo asumen la
función de comercialización. Entre ellas, en las últimas décadas, ha crecido la
participación relativa de las empresas transnacionales, cuyo peso y evolución
debe ser seguido con particular atención.
A estas alturas, es difícil pretender que exista una única lógica reguladora de
todas las variantes de comercio exterior, desde la primeras materias a los secto-
res tecnológicos de punta, desde el comercio interindustrial al intrafirma. Nuevos
enfoques teóricos han venido a añadirse a los planteamientos tradicionales
creando un cuerpo interpretativo controvertido, que desborda nuestro propósito.
En el plano institucional, el incontestable predominio de la OMC se combina
con la dificultad de que sus procesos decisorios ganen en transparencia y legiti-
midad, al tiempo que sigue en cuestión su capacidad para imponerse a todos sus
miembros, en especial los más poderosos. A su lado, los procesos de integración
económica son un desafío y plantean el interrogante de cuál de las dos dimensio-
nes, la multilateral o la de bloque, va a predominar y en qué medida va a darse
una evolución compatible y acumulativa o friccional y excluyente.
La profundización en la dimensión espacial del comercio externo conduce
al análisis de la estructura espacial de las transacciones, que debe permitir dife-
renciar lo que es bilateral, interno de bloques o multilateral dentro del comer-
cio externo. Los dos primeros no pertenecen propiamente a la G y dentro del
último tendremos que afinar los criterios para precisar lo que vamos a tomar
como mundial, porque no todo lo que en principio se presenta como multilate-
ral tendrá necesariamente ese carácter.
Los efectos de las relaciones comerciales mundiales pueden leerse sobre la
configuración y comportamiento de los mercados: tipo y grado de competencia,
gama de productos ofertada, proceso de formación de los precios. Pero también
en lo relativo al impacto sobre otras relaciones, variables y comportamientos
económicos, terreno más escabroso, porque son mayores las mediaciones nece-
sarias para concretar la influencia sobre crecimiento, distribución o bienestar.
Por citar algunas de las más relevantes.
El grado de globalización comercial, en su acepción positiva viene dado por
el peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la
determinación del funcionamiento de la circulación de mercancías. Son condi-
ciones para su desarrollo la ausencia de barreras de cualquier tipo a dicha circu-
lación (contingentes, aranceles o la gama de instrumentos restrictivos que se
vinculan al nuevo proteccionismo) y la pérdida de relevancia de los costes de
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 99
transacción (transporte, normas legales, resolución de conflictos, etc). En la
medida en que esas condiciones se asienten plenamente darán lugar a precio
único para productos similares y a una distribución de compras y ventas sin
sesgo doméstico. Sin embargo, la total materialización de este último resultado
presupondría la ausencia de especialización y de división internacional del
trabajo, y el predominio de mercados carentes de todo grado de monopolio, de
forma que, si existen tanto los unos como los otros, es obligado reformular ese
enunciado. La toma en consideración de esas restricciones aconseja limitar el
juicio sobre el grado de globalización comercial en sentido positivo a mercados
particulares y no al conjunto de la economía, ya que la existencia de costes de
transacción configura sectores no expuestos al comercio externo o la extrema
especialización en la producción de algunos productos los excluye a priori de
una eventual ponderación. No obstante, el grado de apertura, expresado en
valor añadido de exportaciones multilaterales sobre PIB o su simétrico, de simi-
lares importaciones sobre la demanda total será un indicador tanto más signifi-
cativo cuanto más podamos aproximarnos al valor añadido realmente contenido
en las transacciones externas registradas (depuradas, por tanto, de importacio-
nes y exportaciones interpuestas que hinchan las magnitudes y convierten en
heterogéneos los términos de comparación).
En su acepción negativa estará determinado por el peso de factores, rela-
ciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la existencia de condicio-
namientos y perturbaciones en la circulación de mercancías. ¿En qué pueden
concretarse esos condicionamientos y perturbaciones? ¿En hacer inviable la
producción interna de gamas de productos que podrían elaborarse sin la presión
del mercado mundial? ¿En la vigencia de precios gravados por el poder de
mercado de las empresas fabricantes? ¿En la materialización de una especiali-
zación inductora de deterioro de la relación real de intercambio para ciertas
economías? ¿En la tendencia a la aparición de perturbadores desequilibrios en
las balanzas comerciales?
2.2.3. PRODUCCIÓN
La producción de mercancías siempre ha tenido centralidad en el funciona-
miento y reproducción del SEC, por la importancia determinante de las relaciones
sociales de producción y por la influencia de este momento en la extracción y apro-
piación del excedente social. Sus protagonistas, capital y trabajo asalariado, se arti-
culan a través de un tejido de relaciones y ámbitos funcionales profundamente
diferentes a los que rigen la circulación de mercancías. La permanencia de un
núcleo inmutable en el carácter de su relación no ha impedido que los términos
concretos de la misma hayan estado sometidos a cambios significativos, siendo las
empresas las organizaciones en cuyo seno se desarrolla el proceso productivo y
estando el universo empresarial marcado por una gran heterogeneidad. El desarro-
llo de la dimensión externa de los procesos productivos sólo tiene lugar a partir del
momento en que el SEC en general y las empresas en particular alcanzan un cierto
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100 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
grado de maduración, circunstancia que propicia la instalación incipiente de activi-
dades empresariales fuera del espacio de origen y la progresiva conversión en prác-
ticas generalizadas de lo que empezó como anécdotas dispersas. La fase actual del
proceso de transnacionalización productiva la situamos en la década de los 70s,
momento en el que confluyen un conjunto de circunstancias propiciadoras de un
salto cualitativo en el lento despegue iniciado en las dos décadas anteriores
La caracterización de las relaciones de producción externas tiene que basarse
en el análisis de la doble componente que las define: la IED y la actividad empre-
sarial que induce, siendo la materialización sectorial de ambas significativa y digna
de seguimiento, por los notables cambios a que se está viendo sometida.
La cuantía de la producción transnacional se escinde en la de sus dos
componentes. En el seno de la IED las distinciones pueden ser varias, pero tal
vez las más significativas sean las que diferencian, de un lado, entre flujos y
stock, de otro, entre IED de nueva planta o vinculada a fusiones y adquisicio-
nes. En la actividad empresarial externa inducida por los flujos de IED los planos
susceptibles de medición son tan variados como los de la actividad de las
empresas (movilización de capital, empleo, organización del trabajo, compras,
ventas, valor añadido, beneficios y su reparto).
El análisis de los agentes de la producción transnacional nos remite a un
universo de transnacionales -matrices y filiales, de tamaño y condición diversa-
cuya combinación da lugar a los grupos transnacionales. En particular, cobra
relieve la medición del grado de transnacionalización de las empresas porque,
aunque a todas se las denomine de forma similar, su contenido transnacional
real puede ser diferente y digno de estudio.
La IED y la actividad de sus empresas no son fruto del azar, tienen una lógica,
pero el empeño de descubrir una teoría general de la producción transnacional
puede ser estéril, ya que pretendería una explicación única para variantes hetero-
géneas, nacidas de causas diferentes y alimentadas por comportamientos singu-
lares. Tomar conciencia de esa diversidad es un primer paso que posibilita cuerpos
explicativos singularizados, poco enriquecidos por intentos eclécticos.
Desde la perspectiva de una economía nacional, la producción transnacio-
nal es una actividad externa, pero su institucionalización puede tener cobertura
dispar. De hecho, se superponen la proliferación de acuerdos regulatorios bila-
terales (BITS), con normativas que no superan el ámbito de bloques (UE o
NAFTA), hasta llegar a intentos de acuerdos de amplio espectro e irrestricta
generalidad, tipo AMI (al margen de la institución concreta en la que se nego-
cie y formalice). Junto a ellos se sitúan los compromisos que regulan aspectos
parciales de la actividad empresarial, conciernan al trabajo y al ámbito social
(OIT) o a normas ambientales y códigos de conducta, sean indicativos (OCDE),
voluntarios o promovidos por distintas partes interesadas (multistakeholders)
Si profundizamos en la dimensión espacial de la producción externa detec-
tamos cierta similitud con lo expuesto para el comercio: hay que diferenciar lo
que es bilateral, interno de bloques o multilateral, pero aplicado aquí a IED y a
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 101
los distintos ámbitos de la actividad empresarial, siempre buscando segregar lo
que tiene rango mundial.
Los efectos de las relaciones de producción mundiales se reflejarán directa-
mente sobre el funcionamiento y reproducción del sistema productivo: correlación
de fuerzas entre capital y trabajo, estructura del tejido empresarial y todos los
aspectos a los que nos referiremos al ocuparnos del grado de globalización produc-
tiva en el próximo párrafo; también, de forma indirecta y difícilmente evaluable,
sobre otros planos y variables económicos, como finanzas, comercio, demanda,
funciones del Estado, grado de competencia, crecimiento, distribución, bienestar.
El grado de globalización productiva8, en su acepción positiva viene determi-
nado por el peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito
mundial en la determinación del funcionamiento del sistema productivo. Su
aumento exige condiciones de ausencia de barreras a los flujos de IED y a la insta-
lación y libre funcionamiento de las empresas e irrelevancia de los costes de trans-
acción en el desarrollo de dichas actividades. Si esas condiciones se alcanzaran de
forma completa tenderán a aparecer similares rentabilidades y perdida relativa de
sesgo en la distribución espacial de las actividades productivas de las empresas,
descontada la influencia de economías de escala y similares; son indicativas la
proporción que representan las transnacionales sobre los respectivos totales
mundiales en volumen de producción, demanda de fuerza de trabajo, formación
bruta de capital fijo, generación, difusión y utilización de tecnología, generación,
apropiación y utilización de excedente; además, el grado de convergencia salarial
y la homogeneidad de condiciones y organización del trabajo.
Su acepción negativa viene marcada por el peso de factores, relaciones y
procesos procedentes del ámbito de la producción transnacional en la existen-
cia de condicionamientos y perturbaciones en aspectos relevantes del sistema
productivo: ¿perturban la creación de empleo?, ¿dificultan la inversión?, ¿
disminuyen el excedente total y erosionan la tasa de ganancia?, ¿perjudican al
nivel y comportamiento de los salarios?, ¿degradan las condiciones del trabajo?,
¿erosionan las expectativas de los empresarios?
2.2.4. DEMANDA
La demanda es necesaria para la reproducción del SEC, pero a la vez
elusiva dado que aparece desvinculada de las necesidades de los seres huma-
nos y la lógica de funcionamiento del sistema tiende a comprimir una de sus
componentes más sustantivas, la masa salarial. En cambio, se ve favorecida por
la tendencia a exceso relativo de acumulación. Su dimensión externa depende
del desarrollo del comercio externo y, por tanto, la delimitación de su fase estará
inevitablemente relacionada con la de éste.
En lo que concierne a los componentes de su dimensión externa, para las
empresas la demanda se concreta en ventas y, en el comercio externo, en expor-
8
OCDE (2001) representa una tentativa de medición en la que predomina la recopilación de estadís-
ticas sobre la utilización coherente y sistemática de categorías e indicadores.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110
102 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
taciones, mientras que, desde la óptica del consumo, la materialización de la
demanda son las compras y, en el comercio externo, las importaciones. A la postre,
dado que las dos perspectivas son igual de válidas y desembocan en los mismos
importes podemos concluir que exportaciones e importaciones son expresiones
equivalentes de la demanda externa. Sin embargo, su composición es de distinta
naturaleza por el tipo de producto y comprador, así como por la razón de ser de su
existencia. En el consumo productivo, las mercancías consumidas son medios de
producción, los compradores empresas y la razón de la compra un destino produc-
tivo. En cambio, en el consumo final se compran mercancías no productivas, lo
hacen economías domésticas y su motivación es satisfacer una necesidad o deseo.
En lo referente a la cuantía de la componente externa de la demanda, si nos
limitamos a medir exportaciones e importaciones, estaremos repitiendo lo que ya
hemos considerado en el comercio externo, ya que ambas dimensiones son, a la
vez, expresiones de la circulación y representaciones de la demanda. Igualmente,
si obtenemos expresiones relativas por medio de las distintas mediciones del
grado de apertura (valor añadido de exportaciones sobre PIB o importaciones
sobre demanda total) los resultados parecen de nuevo redundantes respecto a los
ya calculados al medir el comercio externo. La conclusión es que la cuantificación
de la demanda externa no parece aportar información adicional, por lo que, para
analizar esta dimensión, habrá que recurrir a relecturas, desde otra perspectiva,
de los materiales obtenidos en el análisis del comercio exterior.
Los agentes que protagonizan la demanda son, como acabamos de indicar,
empresas en el consumo productivo y economías domésticas en el final. De
nuevo una conclusión inespecífica y de escasa virtualidad.
La lógica que determina la demanda externa es la misma que genera el
comercio exterior, subrayando desde la perspectiva de la demanda la necesidad
de creación de un patrón de consumo tecnológico y final con vigencia en los
espacios vinculados por las transacciones externas.
En lo que hace al consumo final, la vigencia de un referente universal es de
difícil institucionalización, aunque puedan serlo normas sanitarias, ambientales,
etc. que lo propician. En lo concerniente al consumo productivo el predominio
de un determinado estilo tecnológico puede venir favorecido por la dinámica
que determina la tecnología y, complementariamente, por la reglamentación de
la propiedad intelectual.
La profundización en la dimensión espacial de la demanda externa nos lleva
a un territorio ya tratado en el comercio externo. Pero la evaluación del grado
de universalización del patrón de consumo no parece abordable sin recurrir a
materiales cualitativos (por la dificultad de encontrar indicadores capaces de
medir con precisión esta dimensión).
Los efectos de la presencia de una demanda de ámbito mundial no pare-
cen diferentes de los de una demanda simplemente externa: no para todas,
pero sí para las economías cuya posición se lo permita, hará disminuir la nece-
sidad relativa de crear demanda interna.
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 103
El grado de globalización de la demanda en su acepción positiva viene
determinado por el peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del
ámbito mundial en la determinación de la demanda total. Requiere condiciones
de conocimiento y accesibilidad al patrón de consumo y los resultados espera-
bles conducirían a la universalización de dichos patrones.
Su acepción negativa está marcada por el peso de factores, relaciones y
procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la existencia de condicionamien-
tos y perturbaciones que afectan a la formación de la demanda. Su concreción
no es sencilla: ¿erosión de la capacidad adquisitiva? ¿inadaptación de las
mercancías demandadas a las producidas?
* Finalmente, podremos comparar lo que con carácter bien meramente
externo o bien mundial existe en los distintos planos. Si, al realizar las medicio-
nes parciales de cada uno de ellos, hemos obtenido grados de G comparables
las preguntas se presentan sugerentes ¿En cuál de ellos es mayor la G? ¿Cuánto
más o menos que en los demás planos? Sin embargo, se impone la cautela,
dado que en la mayor parte de los casos nos hemos limitado a considerar cada
relación en sí misma, desde una perspectiva tanto estática como dinámica y, en
consecuencia, lo que podamos obtener de la comparación de los datos obteni-
dos tendrá una virtualidad limitada. En resumen, podremos hablar de magnitu-
des heterogéneas y de su crecimiento en el tiempo, pero apenas nada más; su
ponderación relativa tendrá un valor precario y tendremos que esperar a
momentos ulteriores para obtener información más significativa.
2.3. LA ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL EN SU CONJUNTO
Disponemos del conocimiento que hemos acumulado en la caracterización de
cada una de las relaciones económicas externas, en el estudio de sus efectos, en
el intento de aislar las que dentro de ellas tienen rango mundial y en la detección
del grado de G de cada uno de esos momentos, un conjunto que, aunque cons-
truido mediante la adición de análisis relativamente parciales, proporciona valiosa
información sobre la economía mundial. Damos ahora un paso adicional y preten-
demos - articulando esos planos y complementándolos con otros aspectos- dotar-
nos de una visión de conjunto que nos ayude, primero, a realizar una
caracterización descriptiva de la economía mundial en su fase actual, para desve-
lar luego el modo en que el grado de GE alcanzado por el conjunto del SEC -y no
sólo por cada uno de sus planos sucesivos- influye en el funcionamiento y repro-
ducción del nivel mundial y provoca en él condicionamientos y perturbaciones. No
tratamos de explicar el modelo de desarrollo que tiende a regular la economía
mundial actual, sino sólo analizamos la contribución o función que dentro de él
realiza la GE. Son cosas distintas, de mucha mayor amplitud la primera9, circuns-
crita a un campo más limitado la segunda.
9
La pugna e incertidumbre en torno a la emergencia de un nuevo modelo de desarrollo emergente es
objeto de investigación en curso del autor. Un esbozo del enfoque en Martínez González-Tablas (2002
b), págs 96-100.
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104 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
2.3.1. MANIFESTACIONES, ESTRUCTURA ESPACIAL E INTERDEPENDENCIAS
La constatación del comportamiento agregado de la economía mundial, la
disección de su estructura espacial y la toma de conciencia de la trama de inter-
dependencias que se establece entre los distintos ámbitos objeto de G nos propor-
cionan una primera aproximación al conjunto de la economía mundial, a modo de
escalón intermedio que nos acerca a los siguientes apartados.
La consideración del comportamiento agregado de la economía mundial se
limita a constatar cómo se comporta la economía mundial, no busca aportar nada
nuevo respecto a los múltiples informes de este tipo, sólo leer los datos desde la
perspectiva de la mundialización para dejar constancia de ellos y evitar errores de
valoración.
Con el estudio de la estructura espacial de la economía mundial nos detene-
mos en la posición económica relativa de los distintos espacios, en su eventual
diversidad y en el grado en que están vinculados a ella.
La posición relativa de los espacios dentro de la economía mundial no trata
de establecer relaciones de causalidad entre la situación de los distintos espacios
y la globalización. Sólo constata la calidad de las situaciones de hecho, su simili-
tud o desigualdad, sin pretensión alguna de causalidad científica (nos mantendre-
mos en proposiciones del tipo siguiente: “el aumento del grado de GE coexiste con
un aumento de la igualdad o desigualdad entre países o entre grupos sociales”),
pudiendo construirse escalas descriptivas y esbozos de tipologías. A pesar de que
nos alimentemos de la información estadística que proporcionan los organismos
internacionales, es una medición que hay que hacer con escrúpulo para no presen-
tar como causalidades probadas las que no lo están. La lectura dinámica de la
posición relativa de los espacios nos remite a un terreno harto controvertido: los
estudios relativos a la convergencia10. Tampoco se puede ignorar el grado de jerar-
quía en y de las distintas relaciones externas y de sus instituciones, porque son
datos a los que subyacen relaciones de poder y de dominación.
La visión de la diversidad en el ámbito mundial se enriquece si, junto a los
datos económicos, consideramos la permanencia, transformaciones o aparición de
civilizaciones, culturas, perfiles sociales, variantes de capitalismo, modelos de
desarrollo, dentro del proceso globalizador. El riesgo de este ensanchamiento de
campo es caer en el descriptivismo banal, pero es indudable que, en contrapar-
tida, ilumina la heterogeneidad existente.
Un último aspecto que ayuda a matizar la estructura espacial nos lo propor-
ciona el conocimiento de la vinculación relativa de los espacios a la economía
mundial; aunque explícitamente lo excluimos de nuestra propuesta de investiga-
ción, nada nos impide servirnos de los estudios que puedan existir al respecto.
Conlleva comparar lo externo con lo interno y sopesar el grado y tipo de extraver-
sión (y de actividad autocontenida en los espacios particulares); obliga a salir de la
10
Martínez González-Tablas (2002 b), págs 106-113.
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 105
mera comparación entre relaciones externas, para estudiarlas respecto a otras
magnitudes económicas, unas u otras según lo que se pretenda medir en cada
caso; también aquí habrá que diferenciar entre la mera externalización (proporción
de las relaciones externas respecto a macromagnitudes totales) y el grado de
mundialización (porcentaje de las relaciones mundiales en esas macromagnitudes).
Para conseguirlo serán necesarios indicadores que permitan evaluar en términos
relativos los de finanzas, comercio, IED y transnacionalización empresarial11.
Finalmente, se trata de detectar las interdependencias e interrelaciones entre
momentos parciales derivados o identificables con la globalización, fundamentán-
dolas, siempre que sea posible, con información estadística. Supone un paso más
allá de la simple constatación de la importancia de la mundialización relativa de
los distintos momentos. La trama de interacciones es una primera aproximación
al funcionamiento del conjunto del sistema como ilustran los siguientes ejemplos:
- La producción de las filiales extranjeras para los mercados internos en los
que están instaladas se relaciona con el comercio exterior, si eventuales
exportaciones de las matrices (relaciones mediadas por mercados) dan paso
a suministro a los mismos mercados valiéndose de producción transnacio-
nal (relaciones internas de producción). Un proceso en el que habría una
modificación de la lógica dominante, marcada ahora por relaciones sociales
de producción, donde antes regían las mercantiles.
- Las transferencias de tecnología en el seno de grupos transnacionales son
una plasmación mercantil de dinámica interna empresarial, una articulación
de comercio y producción que puede ser importante.
- El comercio intrafirma es una combinación de las dimensiones de comercio
y producción (desde el punto de vista empresarial, de nuevo, apariencia
mercantil de un funcionamiento que, en lo substancial, es intraempresarial;
pero desde la perspectiva macroeconómica, auténtico comercio exterior, en
cuanto mediado por tipo de cambio y reflejado en la balanza de pagos). En
suma, una articulación sui generis de lógicas y efectos.
- Las operaciones financieras realizadas por los grupos transnacionales en
nada se diferencian, desde un punto de vista formal, de las similares reali-
zadas por otros protagonistas, pero proceden de la lógica de la producción
transnacional y son, a la postre, interacción de los planos productivo y finan-
ciero, consecuencia de una lógica híbrida.
- Las transnacionales sufren perturbaciones y contagios provenientes de las
finanzas internacionales, que impactan sobre su actividad empresarial; de
nuevo intersección entre finanzas y producción.
- Los mercados de divisas han adquirido un carácter dominantemente
financiero, pero el tipo de cambio que ellos establecen determina los
precios relativos de exportaciones e importaciones y los flujos comercia-
les; interacción de las lógicas de finanzas y comercio.
11
La referida al conjunto mundial no siempre será sencilla de medir y, en ocasiones, habrá que tomar,
como aproximación, la de los espacios de los que se tenga suficiente información (EEUU, UE, Japón,
etc).
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106 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
2.3.2. LA GE POSITIVA: INFLUENCIA EN EL FUNCIONAMIENTO Y REPRODUCCIÓN DE LA
ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL.
El propósito es evaluar hasta qué punto factores, relaciones y procesos
provenientes del nivel global determinan el funcionamiento y reproducción de la
economía mundial. Para que esa determinación fuera plena sería condición
básica la ausencia de barreras intencionadas o fácticas y resultados esperables
los que hemos considerados en cada momento parcial al hablar de su grado de
G específico y, en el límite, convergencia de tasas de ganancia y sincronización
de coyunturas. Los resultados de cada momento parcial serían convergencia de
tipos de interés y del precio de los activos financieros, con ausencia de sesgo
doméstico en la estructura de las carteras; precios únicos para las mismas
mercancías y alto grado de apertura; elevada proporción del valor añadido y la
inversión de las TNCS sobre el PIB y la FBCF mundiales, convergencia de los
precios de similares tipos de fuerza de trabajo, confluencia de los patrones
tecnológicos, con dinámica mundial en su generación, difusión y reparto de
costes, predominio de las relaciones mundiales en lo relativo a la generación,
apropiación y asignación del excedente; tendencia a patrones de consumo
universales.
La eventual existencia de un sistema económico mundial o, con más
propiedad, de un sistema económico mundial capitalista es cuestión de menos
entidad de lo que pudiera parecer, porque lo importante no es si existe sino su
virtualidad o grado de vigencia relativa, ya que dadas las relaciones económicas
de rango mundial que hemos detectado parece razonable concluir que en el
nivel mundial existe cierta densidad sistémica, esto es, que hay propiedades
sistémicas emergentes en el nivel espacial mundial. Con lo cual, volvemos a algo
que hemos enunciado desde el inicio pero que es difícil de fundamentar empí-
ricamente: en qué medida la lógica de funcionamiento y reproducción del SEC
en la fase actual se ve determinada por el proceso globalizador.
A título indicativo, apuntamos algunos ejemplos de influencias de ese
carácter sobre el funcionamiento y reproducción de la economía mundial:
- Fuerzas de origen mundial, aplicadas a distintas circunstancias, pueden
intervenir en la formación de los precios de factores y mercancías, hacién-
doles confluir hacia un precio único o permitiendo que sean desiguales.
- Todo lo relacionado con el excedente puede verse afectado: la generación
(acceso a la fuerza de trabajo mundial con efecto inducido sobre la rela-
ción salarial, la fijación de las condiciones de trabajo y los costes), la
apropiación (por una correlación de fuerzas crecientemente favorable al
capital) y la asignación (mayor espectro en la elección de inversiones). En
sentido amplio, implicará una extensión del espacio abierto a la valoriza-
ción de los capitales.
- El proceso de formación de las tasas de ganancia se desarrolla en nuevas
circunstancias, marcadas por la extensión del espacio de valorización de
los capitales y por la modificación de los términos de competencia.
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 107
- El grado de sincronía de las coyunturas económicas se ve favorecido por
la mayor densidad de relaciones capitalistas de ámbito mundial e influido
por la erosión de la capacidad reguladora de las instituciones públicas.
- El aumento de la apertura de la economía mundial disminuye la necesi-
dad de generar demanda interna en cada economía.
- Las funciones económicas del Estado se ven confrontadas con nuevas
demandas y un nuevo contexto.
- Los agentes se ven obligados a formular sus expectativas y a tomar deci-
siones en entornos de mayor incertidumbre.
- Se hacen posibles distintas formas de ejercicio de la hegemonía en el
ámbito mundial y los poderes dominantes disponen de una gama más
amplia de medios para ejercerla.
En suma, si existe un significativo grado de GE en sentido positivo, tiene
que haber múltiples determinaciones sobre el funcionamiento y reproducción de
la economía mundial. Nuestro objetivo es detectarlas e interpretar su alcance.
2.3.3. LA GE NEGATIVA: CONDICIONAMIENTOS Y PERTURBACIONES DERIVADOS
Al referirnos a la GE negativa no buscamos respuestas del rango de las que
perseguíamos en el apartado anterior. Las preguntas son aquí más abiertas y es
posible obtener resultados con la simple acumulación de respuestas parciales.
Se trata de evaluar hasta qué punto factores, relaciones y procesos prove-
nientes del nivel global condicionan y perturban el comportamiento de la econo-
mía mundial, procurando avanzar, más allá de la constatación de las apariencias,
hacia la trama de interrelaciones y causalidades.
Dado el carácter que atribuimos a la GE negativa no es difícil formular pregun-
tas relacionadas con lo que planteamos, como ya hicimos al considerar las especí-
ficas de cada plano: ¿perturba la creación de empleo?, ¿dificulta la inversión?,
¿disminuye el excedente total y erosiona la tasa de ganancia?, ¿perjudica al nivel y
comportamiento de los salarios?, ¿degrada las condiciones del trabajo?, ¿erosiona
las expectativas de los empresarios?, ¿hace inviable la producción interna de gamas
de productos que podrían elaborarse sin la presión del mercado mundial? Pero el
avance sería muy escaso si nos mantenemos a ese nivel de generalidad.
Para subrayar el tipo de problemas que habría que estudiar en este
punto, apuntamos algunos ejemplos más concretos de condicionamientos y
perturbaciones:
- La problemática de los contagios financieros, con la secuela de efectos
que de los mismos se derivan para las funciones de los sistemas finan-
cieros y para las economías en general es, posiblemente, la dimensión de
GE negativa más importante en la actualidad.
- Existe una mayor facilidad para los trasvases espaciales de excedente,
como consecuencia de la disposición de canales cada vez más diversifica-
dos (financieros, comerciales, productivos), con el riesgo de que el ahorro
mundial fluya hacia las economías más dotadas.
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108 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS
- Los mecanismos de dominación y de reproducción de la desigualdad son de
creciente complejidad y los vínculos que desarrollan cada vez más inextri-
cables, con lo que el aumento de las diferencias y la profundización de
exclusiones corren el riesgo de convertirse en rasgos endémicos.
- Hay aumento aparente y alejamiento fáctico de las oportunidades para los
subdesarrollados, atrapados en una maraña en la que se combinan imposi-
ciones de los mercados financieros, con riesgos de una especialización
inductora de deterioro de la relación real de intercambio, continuo despla-
zamiento de una frontera tecnológica cada vez más inaprensible o compe-
tencia por la captación de una IED que de día en día pide más garantías y
soporta menos restricciones.
- Existe amenaza de erosión de la capacidad adquisitiva de los trabajadores
y de los sectores populares como consecuencia de la accesibilidad de la
fuerza de trabajo mundial, la menor dependencia de la demanda prove-
niente de la masa salarial y el deterioro de la posición relativa del trabajo.
- En lo concerniente a competencia y fiscalidad, la tendencia oligopólica y la
capacidad elusiva de las obligaciones fiscales de los agentes de ámbito
transnacional convierten a estas cuestiones en terrenos de difícil control,
con consecuencias para el deterioro del grado de competencia y para los
ingresos públicos que sustentan las funciones del Estado del Bienestar (allá
donde existe o donde las sociedades aspiran a dotarse de él).
- La labilidad de las normas de cumplimiento de contratos en el ámbito
mundial dificulta, para empresas y capitales, la consolidación del proceso
globalizador, pero su posición dominante les hace reacios a emprender
procesos de negociación participativos y de amplio espectro.
- La falta de regulación pública supone para los capitales individuales, a corto
plazo, un aumento del margen de maniobra, pero a la vez socava la regu-
lación que exige la reproducción del capital social en su conjunto y erosiona
los cimientos de cohesión social que precisa todo sistema para perdurar.
- Hay una fuerte tendencia al aumento del impacto en los ecosistemas parti-
culares y en la biosfera, como consecuencia de la extensión irrestricta del
patrón de producción y consumo vigentes.
La propuesta metodológica que posibilita la lectura de la GE en sentido nega-
tivo nos libera de una interpretación demasiado rígida y abre un sugerente campo
de investigación de las múltiples manifestaciones que pueden tener este carácter.
CONCLUSIONES
Las mediciones sugeridas se plantean en un marco coherente y, si dispu-
siéramos de ellas, nos darían información sobre el grado de globalización exis-
tente, su carácter y evolución.
El conocimiento de todo lo que habría que estudiar para alcanzar una
caracterización suficiente de la globalización no empece la necesidad de profun-
dizar en aspectos concretos, abriendo y precisando indicadores que permitan
REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 109
captar la idiosincrasia y los comportamientos singulares. Más aún, sólo hacién-
dolo conseguiremos llevar a término las posibilidades de la propuesta.
Hay que subrayar la conveniencia de reintegrar los resultados de esos análi-
sis parciales al cuadro general, regenerando así sus limitaciones y alimentando
el análisis de conjunto con el conocimiento detallado de sus componentes.
También sería aconsejable que los estudios fueran periódicos, porque esta-
mos ante una realidad evolutiva, algunos de cuyos cambios pueden alcanzar
rango de mutaciones, sólo captables a tiempo con un seguimiento sistemático.
En teoría, sería útil dar un paso más y hablar, en algún punto, del bienes-
tar de la humanidad en su conjunto. Pero cualquier avance en esa dirección
requiere escrúpulo y la aplicación rigurosa de un método. La libertad expositiva
sería otra si nos situáramos en los terrenos, legítimos y complementarios, del
ensayo o del activismo social.
En resumen, estudiar de forma sistemática la globalización y sus efectos no es
tarea ni de un día, ni sólo de un tipo de especialistas. Tenemos ante nosotros un
trayecto proceloso. Empezar a caminarlo es aceptar y entender que es una tarea
con muchos planos, cada uno con subdivisiones y matices difíciles de dominar y
que, además, tendrán que ser retomados desde fuera de la especialidad que los ha
hecho avanzar, buscando su sentido en un contexto más amplio, en el que aflora-
rán interdependencias inicialmente no detectadas que darán lugar a nuevas proble-
máticas a su vez necesitadas de estudio. Quienes sólo vivan a gusto considerando
que la Economía se ocupa de un sistema cerrado y que los mejores estudios se
realizan en el refugio de análisis parciales susceptibles de modelización formal y
ejercicios también formales de contrastación empírica, es mejor que abandonen el
campo; se necesita modestia para aceptar que todas las investigaciones y propues-
tas están llamadas a ser reelaboradas y, por así decirlo, destruidas dentro de un
programa de investigación de mayor cobertura, cuyo avance requiere de especia-
listas, pero también de generalistas que, siendo capaces de entender los logros que
se consigan en campos concretos, tengan una visión sistémica del conjunto, que
les habilite para integrar cada componente en el lugar que le corresponde. Proba-
blemente una tarea más propia de equipos que de personas aisladas.
BIBLIOGRAFÍA
A.T. Kearney, Inc. y Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2001):
“Measuring Globalisation”, Foreign Policy, enero/febrero.
Gray, H. P. (1999): Global Economic Involvement. A Synthesis of Modern Inter-
national Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Copenague.
Gray, J. (2000): Falso amanecer. Los engaños del capitalismo global, Paidos,
Barcelona.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. y Perraton, J. (1999): Global Transforma-
tions. Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford University Press, California.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110
110 ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS

Kotz, D. M., McDonough, T. y Reich, M. (eds.) (1994): Social Structures of

Accumulation. The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Martínez González-Tablas, A. (2000): Economía Política de la Globalización,
Ariel, Barcelona.
- (2002a): “Globalización y recomposición de los espacios económicos
nacionales. El margen de maniobra de las economías en entornos globa-
les”, en Palazuelos, E. y Vara Mª J. (eds), Grandes áreas de la economía
mundial, Ariel, Barcelona.
- (2002b): “Aspectos más relevantes de la globalización económica”, en La
globalización económica. Incidencia en las relaciones sociales y económi-
cas, Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial V-2002, Consejo General del Poder
Judicial, pp.71-130.
OCDE (2001): Measuring Globalisation. The Role of Multinationals in OECD
Economíes, 2 vols, OCDE, Ginebra.
UNCTAD (1999): Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development,
World Investment Report, Nueva York y Ginebra.

ABREVIATURAS Y ACRÓNIMOS
AMI Acuerdo multilateral de inversiones
BIS Bank for International Settlements (Banco de Basilea)
BITS Tratados bilaterales de inversiones
FBCF Formación bruta de capital fijo
FMI Fondo Monetario Internacional
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
G Globalización
GE Globalización económica
GF Globalización financiera
IED Inversión extranjera directa
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
OCDE Organización para el comercio y el desarrollo económicos
OIT Organización internacional del trabajo
OMC Organización mundial de comercio
NAFTA Acuerdo de libre comercio de América del Norte
PIB Producto interior bruto
SEC Sistema económico capitalista
TNCS Empresas transnacionales
UE Unión Europea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WIR World Investment Report
Shifts in Economic Geography and Their Causes
Anthony J Venables
Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; Fourth Quarter 2006; 91, 4; Academic Research Library
pg. 61

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 Metodología: escalas de actividad y
análisis

Economic history and "the new economy" New economy: fact or 
fiction
 
Perspectiva histórica

 
 31/10/2010

Economía política
p
internacional

MERIGG, 2009-10
UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA
Ó DE
MADRID

La nueva “geo-economía”
Signos de mundialización:
9Noticias empresariales
9Productos básicos
9Servicios
9T i
9Turismo
9Educación
9Capitales, etc.

1
 31/10/2010

Consecuencias
¾Nuevos mercados
¾Nuevos agentes
¾Nuevas formas de organización
¾Nueva “regulación”

Factores que facilitan la

“mundialización”

• Mejoras en transportes

• Mejoras en la transmisión de información

(TIC)
Factor clave: TECNOLOGÍA
Factor problema: mano de obra

2
 31/10/2010

GLOBALIZACIÓN: concepto
Proceso que afecta a diversas facetas de la vida,
vida
no sólo económica, sino también cultural,
tecnológica, política... y que se concreta en un
incremento generalizado del comercio, la
inversión y en general las relaciones entre
agentes
g a nivel mundial
mundial.

Debate acerca de la definición

¿global-nuevo orden natural?

Ámbitos de la globalización

Sistemas Acercamiento
físicos-biológicos espacio-temporal
• Demografía • Mejoras transporte
• Recursos no • Mejoras sistemas
renovables transmisión de
• Recursos renovables i f
información
ió

3
 31/10/2010

Globalización vs. internacionalización

Internacionalización Globalización
Fenómeno histórico Proceso vivo
Carácter cuantitativo Carácter cualitativo
Comercio de bienes y Integración funcional
servicios

Comprensión de la globalización

Unidad de análisis superior al Estado-nación

Estado nación
Cambios en las “cadenas de producción”:
• Coordinación y regulación
• Configuración geográfica

4
 31/10/2010

Coordinación y regulación a dos niveles

Por parte de las empresas: Por

o pa
parte
te del
de Estado:
stado:
• Relaciones inter e intra • Influencia significativa
empresas incluso en mercados
“desregulados”
Varios tipos de
Sistemas regulatorios
organización de negocios nacionales e
Regulación en internacionales: ventajas
t
transacciones
i d lla diversidad
de di id d (nexo
(
verticalmente integradas o triangulador de
en transacciones interacciones empresas-
externalizadas estado)

Configuración geográfica

ƒ Localización geográfica de cada elemento de la

cadena de producción
ƒ Nuevo significado “distancia geográfica”
(tecnología transporte y comunicaciones)
ƒ “Espacio de lugares” frente a “espacio de flujos”
ƒ Pero
P actividad
ti id d económica
ó i “anclada”
“ l d ” físicamente
fí i t y
a través de las relaciones sociales Æ Agrupación
de actividades (escala local)

5
 31/10/2010

Agrupaciones económicas

• Origen difuso
• Gran desarrollo debido a:
– Interdependencias “de mercado” (reducción costes de
transacción e intensidad transacciones)
– Interdependencias “no de mercado” (cuestiones socio-
culturales y económicas)
El “lugar” SI importa

Conclusiones
Escalas de actividad y análisis: local y global
Dimensión vertical: Cadenas de producción
globales
Dimensión horizontal: Sistemas territoriales a
diversas escalas
Sistema global: unión de las dos dimensiones

6
Economic history and the "new economy"
Joel Mokyr
Business Economics; Apr 2001; 36, 2; Academic Research Library
pg. 9

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 31/10/2010

Nueva metodología:
escalas de actividad y
análisis
Perspectiva histórica

Economía política internacional.

Merigg 2009-10

Explicaciones tradicionales
„ Existen cambios en las tendencias
actuales relativos a la producción, el
comercio y la inversión; pero
„ ¿cuáles son los procesos que crean la
internacionalización y globalización de la
economía?

1
 31/10/2010

TEORÍAS TRADICIONALES
„ TEORÍA DEL COMERCIO
INTERNACIONAL
„ TEORÍA CLÁSICA DE LA
LOCALIZACIÓN
„ TEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓN
DIRECTA
„ ¿NUEVO ENFOQUE?

TEORÍAS TRADICIONALES
„ TEORÍA DEL COMERCIO
INTERNACIONAL
„ TEORÍA CLÁSICA DE LA
LOCALIZACIÓN
„ TEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓN
DIRECTA
„ ¿NUEVO ENFOQUE?

2
 31/10/2010

Teoría del comercio internacional (I)

„ Concepto básico: teoría de la ventaja
p
comparativa ((Ricardo,, 1817))
„ Problema: No explica por qué existen
diferencias
„ Modelo Heckscher-Ohlin: Diversa dotación
de factores (capital y trabajo) de los
países
„ Problema: No aparecen grandes
diferencias entre países (desarrollados)

Teoría del comercio internacional (I)

„ Asunciones del modelo
… Movilidad de los factores de producción muy
limitada
… Costes de transporte igual a cero
… Tecnología dada y constante
… No existencia de tecnologías de escala
(i t
(internas y externas)
t ) sii se da
d competencia
t i
perfecta
¿Con qué grado de certeza se dan en la
economía real?

3
 31/10/2010

TEORÍAS TRADICIONALES
„ TEORÍA DEL COMERCIO
INTERNACIONAL
„ TEORÍA CLÁSICA DE LA
LOCALIZACIÓN
„ TEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓN
DIRECTA
„ ¿NUEVO ENFOQUE?

Teoría clásica de la localización (I)

„ Dos corrientes
… A) centrada en los costes de producción
como determinante de la localización de una
industria (Weber)
… B) centrada en el tamaño y forma del área de
mercado de una empresa

Punto clave en ambas: Distancia geográfica

4
 31/10/2010

Teoría clásica de la localización (II)

Teoría del coste de producción: La
localización de una industria viene
determinada por :
* factores generales o primarios
* factores locales o secundarios

Posible tercer factor: aglomeración (pool)

TEORÍAS TRADICIONALES
„ TEORÍA DEL COMERCIO
INTERNACIONAL
„ TEORÍA CLÁSICA DE LA
LOCALIZACIÓN
„ TEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓN
DIRECTA
„ ¿NUEVO ENFOQUE?

5
 31/10/2010

Teorías sobre la inversión directa

Concepto básico: Las empresas situarán
sus inversiones en los lugares donde esté
el mayor retorno financiero.
Problema: Medición del retorno financiero
por diferencias geográficas en los tipos de
interés de las inversiones financieras.

TEORÍAS TRADICIONALES
„ TEORÍA DEL COMERCIO
INTERNACIONAL
„ TEORÍA CLÁSICA DE LA
LOCALIZACIÓN
„ TEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓN
DIRECTA
„ ¿NUEVO ENFOQUE?

6
 31/10/2010

Necesidad de un nuevo enfoque

„ Siguen vigentes ciertos elementos

relativos a las teorías del comercio y la
localización.
„ Pero los modelos clásicos tienen ciertas
limitaciones:
… Son estáticos
… Asumen procesos sencillos
… Aparecen “discontinuidades”

En resumen:

„ Mundo volátil
„ Ventaja comparativa cambiante
„ Fenómenos complejos e interconectados

7
 31/10/2010

PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA

Breve perspectiva histórica (I)

„ Antes del SS. XV-XVI:

XV XVI: comercio local y de
larga distancia
„ S. XV-XVI: Expansión marítima
Æ núcleo y periferia
Æ manufacturas/bienes básicos
„ Aparición corporaciones internacionales
„ Segunda Guerra mundial

8
 31/10/2010

Breve perspectiva histórica (II)

¿Por qué es necesaria la visión histórica?

„ Confusión: proceso y resultados de la
globalización
„ Es necesario conocer antecedentes
„ Sirve para desmitificar ciertos errores
comúnmente aceptados

Tendencias del SEC

Premisa: el capitalismo tiende a intensificar y
extender sus relaciones
relaciones.
- La mercantilización creciente posibilita el
crecimiento…
- … pero el avance es cíclico
Surgen tres dificultades de análisis: definir qué hay
que medir,
di cómo
ó medirlo
di l y cómo
ó iinterpretar
t t llo
medido.
En resumen, el capitalismo tiende a extender e intensificar sus
relaciones, aunque sea de forma desigual el ritmo temporal y
utilizando variables múltiples, hasta lograr que, a día de hoy, no
existan espacios no sometidos en cierto grado al capitalismo.

9
 31/10/2010

Tendencia a la globalización de
los elementos del SEC
„ Transporte y comunicaciones
„ Migraciones
„ Finanzas
„ Comercio
„ Producción
„ Demanda
„ Agentes

10
INTRODUCCIÓN AL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO
1. INTRODUCCIÓN. LOS “HECHOS ESTILIZADOS”
La preocupación de por qué unos países son tan ricos y otros tan pobres ha
preocupado a la mayoría de autores desde el comienzo de la ciencia económica. Sin
embargo, el mayor desarrollo comienza en la década de los 50, cuando Robert Solow
publicó dos ensayos en los que aclara el papel de la acumulación de capital e insiste
en la importancia del progreso tecnológico como fuerza impulsora del crecimiento
económico sostenido.
Durante los 60 y 70 aparecieron numerosos trabajos sobre crecimiento de autores
como Moses Abramovitz, Kenneth Arrow, Simon Kuznets, etc. A principios de los 80,
Paul Romer y Robert Lucas, de la U. de Chicago, dieron un nuevo enfoque del
crecimiento insistiendo en la economía de las “ideas” y del capital humano. Siguiendo
estos trabajos han aparecido otros como los de R. Barro, en Harvard.
Antes de estudiar alguna de estas teorías, exponemos lo que algunos autores han
llamado “hechos estilizados”, que hacen referencia a las regularidades básicas que
experimentan países similares a largo plazo. Siguiendo a Jones, éstos son:
- hay una variación muy grande en el ingreso per cápita entre las economías.
Los países más pobres tienen ingresos per cápita que son inferiores al 5% de
los ingresos per cápita de los países más ricos.
- Las tasas de crecimiento económico varían de forma importante entre países.
- Las tasas de crecimiento no son necesariamente constantes en el trasncurso
del tiempo.
- La posición relativa de un país en la distribución mundial del ingreso per cápita
no es inmutable. Los países pueden cambiar de ser pobres a ser ricos y
viceversa.
- En Estados Unidos, durante el último siglo se observa que (y se han observado
como características de la mayor parte de las economías a largo plazo):
o La tasa real de rendimiento de capital, r, no muestra tendencia
ascendente ni descendente
o Las partes del ingreso dedicadas al capital, rK/Y, y al trabajo, wL/Y, no
muestran tendencias, y
o La tasa de crecimiento promedio de la producción por persona ha sido
positiva y relativamente constante en el tiempo
1 2
- El crecimiento en la producción y el crecimiento en el volumen del comercio
internacional están estrechamente relacionados (suma de exportaciones más
importaciones frente a PIB).
- Tanto los trabajadores cualificados como los no cualificados tienden a emigrar
de países o regiones pobres a los ricos.
2. LA COMPRENSIÓN DEL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO.
Las tres preguntas básicas que hay que intentar responder son: ¿por qué somos tan
ricos y otros son tan pobres?, ¿cuál es el motor del crecimiento económico? y ¿cómo
comprendemos los milagros económicos?
La respuesta a la primera pregunta nos la da el modelo de Solow. La producción por
trabajador en estado estacionario se determina por la tasa de inversión en inputs
privados como capital físico y habilidades, por la tasa de crecimiento de la fuerza
laboral y por la productividad de esos inputs. Los datos sobre capital, educación y
productividad dan un fuerte respaldo a la hipótesis de Solow. Los países ricos son los
que invierten una gran parte de su PIB y su tiempo para acumular capital y
habilidades. Sin embargo, países como EE.UU. son ricos no sólo porque tienen
grandes cantidades de capital y educación por trabajador, sino también porque estos
factores se usan en forma muy productiva. Los países pobres no sólo carecen de
capital y educación sino que la productividad con que usas los factores productivos
que poseen también es baja.
Pueden surgir otras preguntas adicionales (¿por qué unos países invierten mucho
menos que otros? ¿por qué usan el capital y las habilidades con menor
productividad?) que encuentran la respuesta en factores como leyes, políticas
gubernamentales, instituciones... en conjunto, la infraestructura que da forma al
ambiente económico en el cual las personas producen y realizan las transacciones. Si
dicha infraestructura estimula la producción e inversión, la economía prospera, pero si
estimula los desvíos en lugar de la producción, las consecuencias pueden ser nocivas.
Cuando no se puede asegurar a los empresarios que recibirán un rendimiento, ni
invertirán. Esto sucede para inversiones en capital, habilidades o tecnología. La
corrupción, los sobornos, el robo y la expropiación pueden reducir los incentivos para
la inversión, con efectos devastadores sobre la renta. Los impuestos, la regulación, los
litigios, etc. son otros ejemplos, menos graves de desvíos que afectan a las
inversiones de toda clase, incluso en las economías avanzadas (aunque estos países
son avanzados precisamente porque han encontrado las formas de limitar el grado de
desvío de las economías).
En cuanto a la segunda pregunta, el motor del crecimiento es la invención. El modelo
de Solow sugiere esto a nivel matemático: el crecimiento en ese modelo cesa a menos
que la tecnología de la producción mejore exponencialmente. Para Romer este motor
funciona gracias a los empresarios que, en busca de la fama y fortuna que
recompensan la invención, crean las nuevas ideas que impulsan el progreso
tecnológico. Las ideas no son bienes rivales (el uso de una idea –el cálculo, por
ejemplo –no impide el uso simultáneo de la misma idea por otra persona al mismo
tiempo). Esta propiedad significa que la producción involucra, necesariamente,
rendimientos crecientes. Por ejemplo, para producir la primera copia de Windows NT
se necesitaron cientos de millones de dólares, pero una vez creada la idea de
Windows NT es posible duplicarla sin apenas coste alguno. La presencia de
rendimientos crecientes a escala significa que no es posible hacer un modelo de la
economía de las ideas en competencia perfecta, por lo que hay que incluir la
competencia imperfecta: las empresas deben estar en posibilidad de cobrar precios
mayores que el coste marginal para cubrir el gasto, por una sola vez, requerido para
crear una idea.
Los milagros económicos (economías como Hong Kong o Japón, en las que desde la
Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta finales del siglo XX los ingresos reales crecieron
alrededor de un 5% anual) sólo son comprensibles como reflejo de los movimientos de
una economía dentro de la distribución del ingreso mundial. Algo sucedió en estas
economías para desplazar sus ingresos relativos en estado estacionario, de valores
que eran muy bajos en comparación con los de EEUU a valores que son relativamente
altos. Para realizar la transición del estado estacionario bajo al estado estacionario
alto, estas economías tienen que crecer con más rapidez que EEUU. Según los
principios de la dinámica de la transición, cuanto más lejos se encuentre un país de su
estado estacionario, tanto más rápidamente crecerá. Se espera que a la larga se
complete la transición al nuevo estado estacionario y el crecimiento en esos países se
estabilice en torno a la tasa tecnológica mundial.
¿Cómo tiene lugar esta transformación? La respuesta está implícita en la explicación
de la riqueza de las naciones. Si las diferencias en infraestructuras son un
determinante clave de las diferencias en ingresos entre un país y otro, entonces los
cambios en infraestructura en una economía pueden conducir a cambios en la reta.
3 4
Las reformas fundamentales que desplazan los incentivos en una economía, lejos de
los desvíos y hacia actividades productivas, pueden estimular la inversión, la
acumulación de habilidades, la transferencia de tecnología y el uso eficiente de esas
inversiones. Al desplazar el estado estacionario a largo plazo de una economía, esas
reformas adoptan el principio de la dinámica de transición y producen milagros del
crecimiento.
Como conclusión podemos decir que durante el transcurso de la historia del
crecimiento económico fue esporádico e inconsistente. Debido a que instituciones
como los derechos de propiedad no estaban suficientemente desarrollados, no eran
frecuentes los descubrimientos y las invenciones. No existían las inversiones en
capital y habilidades necesarias para generar y aplicar estas invenciones. En la
actualidad, problemas similares empobrecen a muchas naciones en el mundo. En
siglos recientes y en algunos países en particular han surgido las instituciones y la
infraestructura que son la base del crecimiento económico. El resultado es que el
progreso tecnológico, motor del crecimiento, ha adquirido vida.
3. EL MODELO DE SOLOW
3.1 Formalización del modelo
El modelo supone que se produce un único bien homogéneo con dos factores: capital
y trabajo.
Las dos ecuaciones a través de las cuales se construye el modelo son: una función
de producción y una ecuación de acumulación de capital.
La función de producción, tiene la forma tradicional de una Cobb-Douglas, y se
determina por:
Y = F ( K , L) = K α L1−α , donde α es algún número entre 0 y 1.
Una de las características de esta función es que presenta rendimientos constantes a
escala (si duplicamos los inputs, la producción también se duplicará).
Podemos redactar de nuevo la ecuación de producción, en términos de producción por
trabajador, y ≡ Y L , y capital por trabajador, k ≡ K L .
La nueva ecuación será por tanto:
y = kα
Si representamos esta función, tenemos un gráfico como el siguiente:
 k = K L ⇒ log k = log K − log L
y α d log k d log k dk 1 & k&
y=k = = k=
dt dk dt k k
d log k d log K d log L k& K& L&
= − ⇒ = −
dt dt dt k K L
Si combinamos este último resultado con la ecuación de acumulación de capital

K& = sY − dK , tenemos:
K& sY
k = −d
K K
Según el gráfico, con más capital por trabajador, las empresas generan más y del desarrollo anterior tenemos:
producción por trabajador, sin embargo, a medida que aumentamos más el capital por K& k& L&
trabajador, la producción por trabajador va aumentando a tasas menores, es decir, hay
= +
K k L
rendimientos decrecientes en el capital por trabajador. por lo que combinando ambas tenemos:

k& L& sY
La segunda ecuación a través de la cual se construye el modelo, es la ecuación de + = −d
k L K
acumulación de capital, que se expresa así:
y reordenando:
K& = sY − dK
k& sY L&
= −d −
Según esta ecuación, el cambio en la existencia de capital, K& , es igual a la cantidad k K L
de inversión bruta, sY , menos la cantidad de depreciación que ocurre durante el
L&
y de esta ecuación sólo nos queda por explicar el último término. es la tasa de
proceso de producción, dK . L
La notación “punto” indica que trabajamos con una derivada con respecto al tiempo, es crecimiento de la fuerza laboral. Nosotros supondremos que la tasa de participación de
dK la fuerza laboral es constante y que la tasa de crecimiento de la población se expresa
decir, K& ≡ .
dt mediante el parámetro n . Puesto que la participación de la fuerza laboral es
Uno de los supuestos del modelo, es que la economía es cerrada, por lo que tenemos constante, esta crecerá a la misma tasa que lo hace la población, es decir, a la tasa n .
que el ahorro es igual a la inversión, y suponemos que en esta economía el único uso Por lo tanto, la última ecuación se nos queda en:
de la inversión es la acumulación de capital.
k& sY
Para estudiar la evolución de la producción por persona, en esta economía, = −d −n
k K
reescribimos la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos de capital por
Así obtenemos la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos por trabajador:
persona. De este modo, la función de producción representada anteriormente,
k& = sy − ( n + d )k
mostrará la cantidad de producción por persona realizada para cualquier existencia de
Esta ecuación determina el cambio en cada periodo del capital por trabajador
capital por persona que tengamos en la economía.
Para obtener la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos de capital por mediante tres términos. La inversión por trabajador, sy , aumenta k , mientras que la

trabajador (para así poder compararla con la de producción) necesitamos valernos de depreciación por trabajador, dk , lo disminuye. El nuevo término nk , influye en la
un sencillo “truco matemático”. Este “truco” consiste en primero tomar logaritmos, y ecuación reduciendo k . En cada periodo, hay nL nuevos trabajadores que no se
después derivarlos. encontraban ahí durante el último periodo, por lo que si no se produjeron nuevas

5 6
inversiones, el capital por trabajador disminuirá como consecuencia del aumento de la sy = (n + d )k , por lo que k& = 0 . Llegamos en este punto a una situación en la que el
fuerza laboral. capital por trabajador permanece constante, y que es conocido como el estado
estacionario.
A partir de las dos ecuaciones clave del modelo de Solow: Si en lugar de partir de un punto como k0 menor que k*, lo hiciéramos desde uno
α
y=k mayor que k*, ocurriría el fenómeno inverso. En un caso así, el término k& sería

k& = sy − ( n + d )k
realizaremos el diagrama básico de Solow.
El diagrama de Solow, se compone de dos curvas. La primera de ellas es la cantidad
α La utilidad del diagrama de Solow, reside en que determina el valor del capital por
de inversión por persona: sy = sk . La forma de esta curva es la misma que la de la
función de producción representada antes, sólo que ahora se encuentra desplazada
hacia abajo por el factor s . La segunda curva, es la línea (n + d ) k , que representa la
cantidad de nueva inversión por persona necesaria para mantener constante la
cantidad de capital por trabajador. La diferencia entre las dos curvas es el cambio en
la cantidad de capital por trabajador. Cuando este cambio es positivo y en la economía
aumenta el capital por trabajador, se dice que está ocurriendo una profundización del
capital. Cuando este cambio es de cero, pero la existencia de capital crece (debido al
aumento de la población), se dice que ocurre un ensanchamiento del capital.
y aumentar de forma permanente la tasa de inversión, desde s hasta s’. El aumento en
(n + d ) k
sy
negativo y por tanto la cantidad de capital por trabajador comenzaría a descender.
Este descenso continuaría hasta alcanzar de nuevo del estado estacionario k* donde
sy = (n + d )k .
trabajador en estado estacionario, a partir del cual y a través de la función de
α
producción y = k obtenemos el valor en estado estacionario de la producción por
trabajador.
3.2 Estática comparativa
En este punto trataremos de ver como reacciona el modelo ante cambios en los
valores de diversos parámetros. Analizaremos lo que ocurre cuando se produce un
aumento en la tasa de inversión y uno en la tasa de crecimiento de la población.
Partiendo de una economía que ha llegado al valor de estado estacionario de la
producción por trabajador, supondremos que los consumidores desean ahora
la tasa de inversión desplaza la curva sy hacia arriba hasta s’y. Con el valor actual de
existencias de capital, k*, la inversión por trabajador excede la cantidad necesaria para
mantener constante el capital por trabajador y, por tanto, la economía comienza la
profundización del capital. Esta profundización continúa hasta que llegamos a un
nuevo estado estacionario para un nivel de capital por trabajador k**. Con este capital
por trabajador tendremos un mayor nivel de renta per cápita; la economía es ahora
más rica que antes.

k0 k* k

Supongamos que una economía, dispone de un capital k0, como es el caso de la figura
anterior. Lo que tratamos de ver es lo que ocurrirá con el paso del tiempo. En k0 la
cantidad de inversión por trabajador es mayor que la necesaria para mantener
constante el capital por trabajador, por lo que tiene lugar una profundización del
capital, k aumenta con el paso del tiempo. Cuando llegamos al punto en el que el
capital por trabajador es igual a k*, finaliza la profundización del capital, ya que

7 8
Supongamos ahora que debido a la inmigración, la tasa de crecimiento de la población
pase de n a n’. En este nuevo caso, lo que tendrá lugar, será un ascenso de la curva
(n+d)k. Al valor actual de las existencias de capital, k*, la inversión por trabajador ya no
es lo suficientemente alta para mantener constante la razón capital-trabajo. Por tanto,
la razón capital-trabajo comienza a descender, hasta que llega al nuevo estado
estacionario para un nivel de capital por trabajador k**. En este punto la economía tiene
un menor nivel de capital por trabajador y por lo tanto es más pobre. La producción per
cápita es menor después del aumento del crecimiento de la población.
3.3 Propiedades del estado estacionario
La cantidad de capital por trabajador en el estado estacionario se determina por la
condición de que k& = 0 .
Con las dos ecuaciones básicas del modelo, hallaremos la solución de las cantidades
en estado estacionario de capital por trabajador y producción por trabajador.
y=k α k& = sk α − (n + d ) k
k& = sy − ( n + d )k
Si sustituimos la primera ecuación en la segunda, obtenemos:
k& = sk α − (n + d ) k
y estableciendo la condición de estado estacionario k& = 0 ,
1 (1−α )
 s 
k* =  
n+d 
si sustituimos este resultado en la función de producción, obtenemos la cantidad en
estado estacionario de producción por trabajador.
α (1−α )
 s 
y* =  
n+d 
Con estos resultados podemos llegar a algunas conclusiones.
Los países que tienen más altas tasas de ahorro/inversión tenderán a ser más ricos.
Estos países acumulan más capital por trabajador y por tanto más producción por
trabajador.
9 10
Los países que tienen altas tasas de crecimiento de la población, tenderán a ser más
pobres. En estas economías, una mayor parte de los ahorros tiene que dedicarse
simplemente a mantener constante la razón de capital-trabajo. Este requisito de
ensanchamiento del capital hace que sea más difícil la profundización del capital, y
estas economías tienden a acumular menos capital por trabajador.
3.4 Crecimiento económico en el modelo sencillo
Con la versión del modelo de Solow que acabamos de analizar, no tenemos en el
estado estacionario crecimiento per cápita. La producción por trabajador es constante
en el estado estacionario. La producción en sí, está creciendo, pero sólo a la tasa de
crecimiento de la población.
En este modelo, las economías quizás crezcan por un tiempo pero no indefinidamente.
Por ejemplo, una economía que comienza con una existencia de capital por trabajador
inferior a su valor en estado estacionario experimentará crecimiento en k y en y, a lo
largo de la ruta de transición al estado estable. Sin embargo, con el tiempo el
crecimiento disminuye según la economía se acerca a su estado estacionario, llegará
un momento en que el crecimiento se detiene por completo. Mostramos a continuación
cómo el crecimiento disminuye a lo largo de la ruta de transición:
A partir de la ecuación de acumulación de capital:
calculamos la tasa de crecimiento de esta acumulación de capital:
k&
= sk α −1 − ( n + d )
k
como α es menor que 1, según aumenta k, la tasa de crecimiento de k disminuye de
forma gradual. Ya que la tasa de crecimiento de y es proporcional a la tasa de
crecimiento de k, esta afirmación también es cierta para la producción por trabajador.
Estudiaremos ahora la dinámica de transición de la última ecuación.
El primer término de la ecuación, sk α −1 , es igual a sy k . Cuanto más alto sea el nivel
de capital por trabajador, menor será el producto promedio del capital y k , debido a la
acumulación de los rendimientos decrecientes del capital (α es inferior a 1). Por lo
tanto esta curva tiene pendiente descendente.
El segundo término, al lado derecho de la ecuación, es n+d, que es independiente de
k, por lo que lo dibujamos como una línea horizontal.
La diferencia entre estas dos líneas, es la tasa de crecimiento de las existencias de K& sY
= −d
k& K K
capital, .
k La función de producción en términos de producción por trabajador, quedaría:

y = k α A1−α
después de tomar logaritmos y diferenciar:

y& k& A&

= α + (1 − α )
y k A
En la ecuación de acumulación de capital, se observa que la tasa de crecimiento de K
será constante si y sólo si Y/K es constante. Además, si Y/K es constante, y/k también
lo es, y lo más importante, y y k estarán creciendo a la misma tasa. La situación donde
el capital, la producción, el consumo y la población están creciendo a tasas constantes

La figura muestra que cuanto más baja se encuentre una economía de su valor en se conoce como una ruta de crecimiento equilibrada.

estado estacionario de k, con mayor rapidez crecerá. También cuanto más alta se A lo largo de una ruta de crecimiento equilibrada en el modelo de Solow, tanto la

encuentre una economía sobre su valor en estado estacionario de k, más rápidamente producción por trabajador como el capital por trabajador crecen a la tasa del cambio

disminuirá k. tecnológico exógeno, g.

El modelo con tecnología, revela que el progreso tecnológico es la fuente del

3.5 La tecnología y el modelo de Solow crecimiento per cápita sostenido.

Para generar crecimiento sostenido en el ingreso per cápita en este modelo, hay que 3.6 El diagrama de Solow con tecnología

introducir el progreso tecnológico en el modelo. Logramos esto introduciendo una

variable de tecnología, A, en la función de producción: La única diferencia con respecto al análisis anterior (sin tecnología), es que la variable
k no sigue siendo constante a largo plazo, por lo que se tiene que escribir la ecuación
Y = F ( K , AL) = K α ( AL)1−α
~
diferencial en términos de otra variable. La nueva variable de estado será k ≡ K AL .
Cuando la tecnología entra de esta forma en la función de producción, se dice que es
“neutral de Harrod”. El progreso tecnológico ocurre cuando A aumenta con el paso del Esto es equivalente a k A , y es constante a lo largo de la ruta de crecimiento
tiempo, lo que hace que una unidad de trabajo se haga más productiva a medida que ~
equilibrada. La variable k representa la razón del capital por trabajador a la
el nivel tecnológico es más alto.
tecnología. Nos referiremos a esto como la razón de “capital-tecnología”.
Uno de los hándicaps más importantes del modelo, es que considera la tecnología ~
Si rescribimos la función de producción en términos de k , obtenemos:
como algo exógeno, como un “maná del cielo” del que no tratamos de analizar cual es
~ ~
su procedencia. Simplemente reconocemos que existe progreso tecnológico, y y =kα
hacemos la suposición de que está creciendo a una tasa constante: donde ~
y ≡ Y AL = y A . Denominaremos a ~
y como la razón “producción-
A&
=g tecnología”.
A ~
Si rescribimos ahora la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos de k ,
g es el parámetro que expresa la tasa de crecimiento de la tecnología.
tenemos:
La ecuación de acumulación de capital en el modelo de Solow es la misma que antes:

11 12
~& nivel de la producción por trabajador a largo plazo, pero no afectan a la tasa de
k K& A& L&
~= − − crecimiento de la producción por trabajador a largo plazo.
k K A L
Un ejemplo sencillo para entender esto último:
al combinar esto con la ecuación de acumulación de capital, obtenemos:
Supongamos que una economía comienza en estado estacionario con la tasa de
~& ~
k = s~
y − (n + g + d )k inversión s, y después aumenta permanentemente esa tasa a s’ (debido por ejemplo a
~*
un subsidio a la inversión permanente). Según la siguiente figura, a la razón inicial k ,
En la figura siguiente se representa el diagrama de Solow con progreso tecnológico.
de capital-tecnología, la inversión excede la cantidad necesaria para mantener
Si la economía comienza con una razón de capital-tecnología inferior a su nivel de ~
constante dicha razón capital-tecnología por lo que k comienza a subir.
~
estado estacionario, por ejemplo, en k 0 , la razón de capital-tecnología se elevará

gradualmente con el tiempo. Esto sucede así, porque la cantidad de inversión que se
realiza, excede a la cantidad necesaria para mantener constante la razón capital-
~* ~
tecnología. Esto será así hasta alcanzar el punto k , donde s~
y = (n + g + d )k , y
donde la economía se encuentra en estado estacionario y creciendo a lo largo de una
ruta de crecimiento equilibrada.

3.7 Solución para el estado estacionario

La razón producción-tecnología en estado estacionario se determina mediante la

Vemos a continuación los efectos sobre el crecimiento de dicha variable.
~&
función de producción y la condición de que k = 0 De la ecuación de acumulación de capital:
1 (1−α )
~   ~& ~
k * = 
s
 k = s~
y − (n + g + d )k
n+ g +d  obtenemos que:
al sustituir en la función de producción, se nos queda: ~ ~
k& y ~
α (1−α ) ~ = s ~ − (n + g + d )k
~  s  k k
y * =  
~
n+ g +d  y ~
observamos que ~ = k α −1 . En la figura siguiente mostramos la dinámica de transición
k
si lo dejamos en términos de producción por trabajador, rescribimos la ecuación como:
α (1−α )
implícita en esta ecuación.
*  s 
y (t ) = A(t ) 
 n + g + d 
según esta última ecuación la producción por trabajador a lo largo de la ruta de
crecimiento equilibrado se determina mediante la tecnología, la tasa de inversión y la
tasa de crecimiento de la población. Para el caso especial en que g = 0 y A0 = 1, es
decir, de ningún progreso tecnológico, el resultado obtenido es el mismo que ya
explicamos anteriormente.
Un resultado interesante que se obtiene del análisis de la última ecuación es que los
cambios en la tasa de inversión o en la tasa de crecimiento de la población afectan al

13 14
Como muestra el diagrama, el aumento en la tasa de inversión hasta s’ eleva
temporalmente la tasa de crecimiento, mientras la economía transita al nuevo estado
~ ~
estacionario, k ** . Puesto que g es constante, el crecimiento más rápido en k , a lo
largo de la ruta de transición, implica que la producción por trabajador aumenta con
mayor rapidez que la tecnología: y& y > g . Esto se muestra en la figura siguiente, en
la que vemos como la tasa de crecimiento de la producción por trabajador se hace
mayor que g en el momento t*, y en periodos posteriores, a medida que se acerca de
nuevo al estado estacionario, la producción por trabajador vuelve a crecer a la tasa g.

Dos conclusiones interesantes que obtenemos son. Primero, los cambios de política
en el modelo de Solow, aumentan las tasas de crecimiento, pero sólo en forma
temporal, a lo largo de la transición al nuevo estado estacionario. Es decir, los cambios
en las políticas no tienen “efectos de crecimiento” a largo plazo. Segundo, los cambio
en las políticas pueden tener “efectos de nivel”. Es decir, un cambio de política
permanente puede elevar (o disminuir) permanentemente el nivel de producción per
cápita.

15
Comentario lecturas sesión 6
Forthcoming in Paul Rhode and Gianni Toniolo, eds., Understanding the 1990s: The
Economy in Long Run Perspective Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Technical Change and U.S. Economic Growth:
the Interwar Period and the 1990s
by
Alexander J. Field
Department of Economics
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
email: afield@scu.edu
• For comments on earlier versions of this research, I am grateful to Nick Crafts,
Stanley Engerman, Robert Gordon, Robert Solow, and Gavin Wright. I also
thank participants in the conference “Understanding the 1990s: The Economy in
Long Run Perspective” held at Duke University, March 26-27, 2004, seminars at
Harvard, Dartmouth, Rutgers, the University of Virginia, Indiana University, the
All Ohio Economic History Seminar (joint with the Macroeconomics Seminar),
the World Cliometrics conference, Venice, Italy, the Economic History
Association meetings, San Jose, California, Yale University, the University of
Michigan, and UCLA.
1 2
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105634
Technical Change and U.S. Economic Growth:
the Interwar Period and the 1990s
ABSTRACT
Multifactor productivity growth in the U.S. economy between 1919 and 1929 was
almost entirely attributable to advance within manufacturing. Distributing steam
power mechanically over shafts and belts required multistory buildings for
economical operation. The widespread diffusion of electric power permitted a shift to
single story layouts in which goods flow could be optimized around work stations
powered by small electric motors. Within this framework, as well as opportunities to
produce a variety of new products, economies of scale and learning by doing
permitted rapid and across the board gains in manufacturing productivity. The sector
contributed 83 percent of the 2.02 percent per year overall advance in the private
nonfarm economy in this ten year period.
The Depression years witnessed manufacturing MFP growth that was not as
uniformly distributed as it had been during the twenties, and only half as rapid: 2.60
as opposed to 5.12 percent per year. As a consequence, and in spite of a rise in the
sector’s share, manufacturing accounted for only 48 percent of PNE MFP growth
between 1929 and 1941. Yet overall growth in MFP was by far the highest of any
comparable period in the twentieth century – 2.31 percent per year. This resulted
from combining a manufacturing contribution which by any standard of comparison
other than that of the 1920s was world class, with spillovers from government
financed infrastructural investment that enabled rapid advance in other parts of the
economy, particularly transport and public utilities and wholesale and retail
distribution.
MFP growth between 1989 and 2000 was more than twice what it had been
during the years 1973-89, but less than a third that registered between 1929 and 1941.
Within manufacturing, advance was narrowly concentrated within the old SIC 35 and
36, virtually all of this attributable to information technology (IT). IT was also
responsible for some MFP growth in using industries, notably wholesale and retail
distribution and securities trading. This paper questions the common practice of also
crediting IT with the portion of capital deepening’s effect on labor productivity
associated with the accumulation of specific IT capital goods.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105634
 does make the revival look more striking. Whether it is desirable or appropriate to
Introduction
choose one’s start date with the objective of making the contrast between recent and past
Looking back over the twentieth century, the years 1948-73 stand out as the golden
history more dramatic is of course an open question.
age of labor productivity growth and living standard improvement in the United States –
Table 1
the result of a combination of respectable multifactor productivity growth and robust Compound Annual Growth Rates of MFP, Labor, and Capital Productivity
Private Non-Farm Economy, United States, 1889-2000
rates of capital deepening. The period 1973-89, in contrast, was the most disappointing,
Output/Adjusted Output/Unit
MFP Output/Hour Hours Capital Input
because of the virtual collapse of multifactor productivity growth during these years. The
1889-1901 2.21 2.20 2.79 .52
contrast between these periods gave rise to a raft of studies trying to pinpoint the causes 1901-19 1.08 1.71 1.44 .01
1919-29 2.02 2.27 2.33 1.09
of the slowdown in MFP growth and, as a consequence, labor productivity growth. More 1929-41 2.31 2.35 2.21 2.47
1941-48 1.29 1.71 1.42 1.32
recently, attention has shifted toward determining the contribution of the IT revolution to 1948-73 1.90 2.88 2.64 .18
1973-89 .34 1.34 1.03 -1.24
the revival of productivity growth in the 1990s. 1989-2000 .78 1.92 1.41 -.61

Most of these studies, however, embrace an historical perspective that reaches back 1973-95 .38 1.37 .98 -.98
1995-2000 1.14 2.46 2.08 -.84
no further than 1948, the year in which most of the standard series maintained by the
Note: Output per adjusted hour uses an hours index that has been augmented to reflect
Bureau of Labor Statistics begin. This paper, in contrast, pushes the time horizon back to changes in labor quality or composition. In creating this index, different categories of
labor are weighted by their respective wage rates.
Sources: 1889-48: Kendrick (1961), Table A-XXIII. The unadjusted data are from the
the end of the nineteenth/beginning of the twentieth century, with particular attention to column headed output per man hour, the adjusted data from the column headed output
per unit of labor input. Capital Productivity is output per unit of capital input.
the period following the First World War and preceding U.S. entry into World War II in 1948-2000, Bureau of Labor Statistics www.bls.gov, series MPU750021, MPU750023,
MPU750024, and MPU750028. These data are from the multifactor productivity section
of the website, accessed April 12, 2004. The labor productivity section contains more
1941. It combines a summary of the magnitude and sources of productivity advance recent data and is updated more frequently.

during the interwar years with a comparative examination of progress during the last That said, the recent achievement is impressive when measured in relation to the

decade of the century. period of slow growth that preceded it. But even if we show the recent acceleration in its

Because of the influence of cyclical factors on productivity levels, it is common in best light, by measuring from 1995 onward to the peak of the cycle in 2000, end of

historical research to restrict calculations of productivity growth rates to peak to peak century labor productivity advance remained well below golden age rates. Perhaps more

comparisons. For the most recent episode, this requires measurement from 1989 to 2000. surprisingly, it remained in the same range as that registered during the interwar period

Many students of the productivity revival prefer nevertheless to measure from 1995.

Although 1995 is not a business cycle peak, the acceleration in output growth after 1995

3 4
(see Table 1). And multifactor productivity growth was less than half what it was during Overview of Twentieth Century Growth Trends

the Depression years.2 For the moment, let’s look forward from 1929. With some simplification the labor

The seminal studies by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) showed that, in productivity growth history of the United States between 1929 and 1995 can be thought

comparison with the nineteenth century, a large gap opened up in the first half of the of as consisting of three periods in which the respective contributions of MFP growth and

twentieth century between the growth of real output and a weighted average of inputs capital deepening were quite distinct. The years 1929-1948 witnessed exceptionally high

conventionally measured. This gap, termed the “residual”, was subsequently interpreted rates of MFP growth, but very little capital deepening.

by Abramovitz as reflecting a shift to a knowledge based type of economic development Between 1948 and 1973 lower but still respectable MFP growth combined with a

which, from the vantage point of mid-century, was expected to persist (Abramovitz, revival of physical capital deepening to produce the highest rates of labor productivity

1993, p. 224). growth in the century, and a golden age of living standard improvement. Between 1973

By and large it did so for another quarter century. But the sixteen year period of and 1995 capital deepening continued at somewhat slower rates but multifactor

slow productivity growth generally dated from 1973 forced, or should have forced, a productivity growth in the U.S. economy effectively disappeared. Labor productivity

reassessment of the view that the Abramovitz and Solow studies identified a permanent rose, but at greatly reduced rates (1.37 percent per year) compared with the 2.88 percent

sea change. The end of century revival of productivity growth, in turn, has focused annual growth clocked during the golden age (see Table 1; data is for the private nonfarm

attention on what caused the growth of the residual to accelerate and how much of it economy). At the end the century, labor productivity growth again approached golden

could be laid at the feet of IT. age rates, principally as the result of a revival of MFP growth.

This paper focuses on the two major cycles of the interwar period (1919-29 and The Rise in Output per Hour during the Depression: Causes and Consequences

1929-41) and the more recent 1989-2000 period. All three periods experienced A number of economists have been aware of the rise in output per hour during the

comparable labor productivity growth rates. The respective contributions of multifactor Depression, but most of the attention in explaining this has been on the effects of

productivity growth and capital deepening were, however, quite different, as were the selective retention of workers, particularly during the 1929-33 downturn.(Margo, 1991).

sectoral locations of rapid advance. By 1941, however, when recovery had finally pushed unemployment rates into single

digit levels, much of this should have been unwound. There were secular improvements

in labor quality during the Depression years as well, but comparison of columns 2 and 3

2
Some scholars restrict the term Depression to the years 1929-33. As a terminological matter, I view the of Table 1 suggests that such improvements can explain only a small fraction of the
Depression to have extended over the 12 year period 1929-41; over these years output was persistently
depressed below its potential.

5 6
growth in output per hour between 1929 and 1941.3 Clearly other factors had to have apparatus in an effort to make it more sensitive to the possible contributions of the IT

been operative, and among these was not physical capital deepening, as can also be seen revolution to growth.

from Table 1. But the data from the end of the twentieth century, even after incorporating the use

Since there was virtually no increase in private sector inputs conventionally of hedonic methods to adjust for quality changes, tell a more nuanced story.

measured between 1929 and 1941, MFP advance accounted for all of the 32 percent Revolutionary technological or organizational change – the sort that shows up in MFP

increase in the real output of the private nonfarm economy over these years. And since growth -- was concentrated within distribution, securities trading, and a narrow range of

there was no private sector capital deepening, the same was true for the increase in output industries within a shrinking manufacturing sector. MFP advance within industry was

per hour. Masked by the continuing levels of high unemployment, an impressive largely localized within the old SIC 35 and 36,4 sectors that include the production of

expansion of the potential output of the U.S. economy was taking place. semiconductors, computers, networking, and telecommunications equipment. Aggregate

Does the claim that the Depression years witnessed the highest MFP growth rates of MFP growth remained modest by the historical standards of the twentieth century.

the century include consideration of the end of century “New Economy” boom? The Evidence from the beginning of the twenty first century suggests that we may

short answer is that it does. From my offices at a university in the heart of Silicon finally be getting more substantial MFP payback in the IT using sectors (Wall Street

Valley, I had a ringside view of the investment boom, the rising share prices, and some of Journal, November 7, 2003). Labor productivity grew at 2.94 percent per year

the hyperbolic claims that drove both. The upwardly spiraling equity valuations of the continuously compounded from 1995 to 2003 (BLS series PRS85006093, accessed

1990s were propelled by human fallibility and one of the most formidable marketing November 22, 2004). But the staying power of recent trends remains uncertain. We do

machines ever assembled in this country. With assists from research departments of not yet have MFP estimates beyond 2001 so it is not clear how much of this recent

brokerage firms, IT companies celebrating their own prospects, independent public growth might be due to an increase in the labor composition contribution due to selective

relations firms, radio, television and print media and, at times, government officials and retention during a recession (which would not persist at this rate through a full recovery),

academic economists, massive quantities of warm air continuously fanned speculative or how much the capital deepening contribution may have changed since the heady days

fires fueled by dreams of Dow 36,000. The drum beat thus created could be heard of 1995-2000. Capital services grew at 5.38 percent per year between 1995 and 2000,

distinctly and sometimes quite loudly within the Valley. For better or for worse, this and their rate of increase has certainly slowed. But hours, which grew at over 2 percent

enthusiastic advocacy lead to a reorganization of the Federal government’s statistical per year between 1995 and 2000, declined at -1.72 percent per year between 2000:3 and

4
The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are being replaced in post 1997 reporting with North
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes, but I will use the older vocabulary throughout
3
For a more extended discussion of this issue, see Field, 2004a. this paper.

7 8
2003:3. Until we have the capital services numbers we can’t know what has happened to multifactor productivity common in later stages of a business expansion (Gordon, 2003).

the capital/hours ratio, but it seems likely that it has risen. We will need to have the Nevertheless, there does seem to be a break in the series circa 1995, and, in deference to

economy approach closer to potential output, and have the data for it, before we can have current practice, I also report MFP advance over the last five years of the century. Here

a clearer picture of the sustainability of these recent trends. The bottom line is that, the compound average annual growth rate comes in at 1.14 percent per year. This is three

measuring from 1989 through the end of the boom in 2000, aggregate MFP growth, times the anemic MFP growth registered between 1973 and 1995. But it is still

including that in the IT using sectors, although more than double the rate in 1973-1989, substantially below golden age rates and, even more remarkably, less than half the rate

was only a third that registered between 1929 and 1941 (see Table 1). registered between 1929 and 1941.

Why 1989? And why 2000? Multifactor productivity data is available only on an The Role of Manufacturing

annual basis. According to the NBER business cycle chronology, the peak of activity in If we are discussing contributions to achieved productivity levels in the interwar

July of 1990 was followed by a recession which bottomed out in March of 1991 followed period, it is appropriate to place a good deal of emphasis on a growing manufacturing

by the long expansion of the 1990s, culminating in the peak 120 months later (March of sector that by 1941 comprised almost a third of the economy. I estimate that 83 percent

2001). But 2001 was also a year of economic downturn, with the trough reached only of MFP growth in the private nonfarm economy between 1919 and 1929 and about 48

eight months afterwards in November of 2001. Similarly, 1990 included five postpeak percent of the growth between 1929 and 1941 originated in manufacturing (see below).

months. Since we are using annual data, I measure from the last full year of expansion For 1995-2000, manufacturing’s contribution was about 39 percent of total MFP growth,

(1989) before a downturn to the subsequent final full year of expansion before a but that total and manufacturing’s percentage point contribution to it were much smaller

downturn (2000).5 than was true in the interwar period.

It is well known that MFP and labor productivity grew at an accelerated pace during Although Kendrick does not provide enough information to allow calculation of

the second half of the 1990s, and it has become conventional to measure to and from MFP growth rates within manufacturing for the 1929-41 and 1941-48 subperiods, I have

1995, even though the year was not a business cycle peak. The argument against 1995 is attempted to do so for the sector as a whole using Kendrick’s estimates for output and

that it is not a peak, a point reflected in the controversy surrounding Gordon’s claims that labor input combined with capital input data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s

much of the end of century improvement reflected cyclical acceleration in both labor and Fixed Asset Table 4.2.6 These calculations shows MFP growth within the setcor over the

5 1929-41 period to have proceeded at the rate of 2.60 percent per year. This is higher than
The story told here is not especially sensitive to using 1990 rather than 1989 (the level of MFP in the
private nonfarm economy was identical, so the annual rates calculated would rise a bit if we measured from
1990) although choosing 2001 rather than 2000 would reduce the calculated growth rates, since MFP fell
6
between 2000 and 2001. “Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal
Form of Organization.” See www.bea.gov.

9 10
in any subsequent period of the twentieth century. It does, however, represent a halving contrasted with what took place in the second half of the century, including the new

of the 5.12 percent rate registered over the 1919-29 period, years in which the flexibility economy period at the end of the 1990s. Although technical progress was broadest and

offered by the unit drive electric motor facilitated the shift to single story layout and most uniformly high during the 1920s, advance within manufacturing was taking place

assembly line production of automobiles and a host of new electrically powered across a broader frontier during the Depression than was true in the 1990s.

consumer durables (David and Wright, 2003, Field, 2004c). My calculations also MFP advance in manufacturing during the Depression years was increasingly

suggest, consistent with arguments advanced in Field (2003), a decline in the level of dependent on organized research and development. Table 3 summarizes National

MFP in manufacturing over the 1941-48 period. Research Council data on employment of scientists and engineers in U.S. manufacturing.

Total R and D employment increased from 6,274 in 1927 to 10,918 in 1933, and then
Table 2
Growth of MFP, Labor, and Capital Productivity in Manufacturing almost tripled in the next seven years, reaching 27,777 in 1940.
United States, 1889-2000
Margo has documented how much lower was the incidence of unemployment
Output/ Output/unit
Adjusted capital among professional, technical, and managerial occupational classifications as compared,
MFP Output/Hr. Hour input
1889-1919 .71 1.29 1.12 -1.53 for example, with unskilled or blue collar labor, or those with fewer years of schooling
1919-29 5.12 5.45 5.45 4.20
1929-41 2.60 2.61 2.46 2.96 (Margo, 1991). This is indirect evidence that the sharp increase in R and D employment
1941-48 -.52 .20 .03 -1.82
1949-73 1.49 2.51 n.a. -.03 during the Depression was driven more by an outward shift in the demand for this type of
1973-89 0.57 2.42 n.a. -1.22
1989-2000 1.58 3.56 n.a. .16 labor than by a shift in its supply.

1973-1995 0.66 2.61 n.a. -.82 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the real net manufacturing capital
1995-2000 2.09 4.07 n.a. .08
stock was less than 10 percent higher in 1941 than it had been in 1929 while, according to

Sources: 1889-29: Kendrick, 1961, Table D-1, p. 464. Kendrick, hours had risen 15.5 percent over the same period (Kendrick, 1961, Appendix
1929-41 and 1941-48. Output and Labor Iput are from Kendrick, Tables D-1 and D-2. Capital
input is based on the index for manufacturing fixed capital in the Bureau of Economic Analysis Fixed
Table D-II). So, at the same time that the aggregate capital-labor ratio in the sector fell,
Asset Table 4.2, Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry
Group and Legal Form of Organization. MFP is calculated based on an assumed share of .7 for labor, .3
for capital. See Appendix Table A-3 for complete calculations. the relative demand for scientists and engineers increased – not an instance of the capital-
1949-2000, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series MPU300001, MPU300002, MPU300003, accessed
November 22, 2004. skill complementarity described by Goldin and Katz (1998). During this period
Technical advance in manufacturing during the 1929-1941 period was not as rapid complementarity was between high end labor and the disembodied technical change that
and not as uniformly distributed across two digit industries as was true during the 1920s. was such an important feature of the Depression years.
The performance in the Depression years looks more impressive, however, when

11 12
 The overall trends revealed in the employment data are echoed in other R and D

Table 3 indicators. Between 1929 and 1936 the annual rate of founding of new R and D labs (73)
Employment of Scientists and Engineers, United States, 1927-1940
exceeded the comparable statistic between 1919 and 1928 (66), and real spending on R

1927 1933 1940 and D in manufacturing more than doubled during the 1930s, with an acceleration at the
Chemicals 1,812 3,255 7,675 end of the decade (Mowery and Rosenberg, 2000, pp. 814, 819).
Electrical Machinery 732 1,322 3,269
Petroleum 465 994 2,849
Between 1929 and 1941, as noted, MFP growth in manufacturing fell by half
Nonelectrical Machinery 421 629 2,122
Primary Metals 538 850 2,113
compared with 1919-29 (see Table 2). There are two closely related questions here. On
Transport Equipment 256 394 1,765
Food/Beverages 354 651 1,712
Stone/Clay/Glass 410 569 1,334 the one hand, why did MFP growth fall from 5.12 percent per year to 2.60 percent per
Fabricated Metal Products 334 500 1,332
Instruments 234 581 1,318 year? The main explanation is that the across the board gains from exploiting small
Rubber Products 361 564 1,000
electric motors, and reconfiguring factories from the multistory pattern that mechanical
Totals, 11 industries 5,917 10,309 26,489
Totals, Manufacturing 6,274 10,918 27,777 distribution of steam power required to the one story layout made possible by
Source: National Research Council; Mowery (1981); Mowery and Rosenberg electrification, were nearing exhaustion by the end of the 1920s. As of 1929, 79 percent
(2000), p. 814.

of manufacturing horsepower in the United States was already provided by electricity

Table 3 lists the eleven two digit industries that employed at least 1,000 scientists (Devine, 1983). It’s not that productivity levels in manufacturing were going to fall as a

and engineers in 1940. Chemicals tops the list by a wide margin, followed by electrical result of this exhaustion, it’s just that one could not hope to continue to generate five

machinery and petroleum. These three industries alone account for almost half the total R percent per year growth in the residual from this source.

and D employment on the eve of the Second World War. Absent from the list are The related question, then, is why didn’t MFP growth in manufacturing fall more?

tobacco, textiles, apparel, lumber, furniture, paper, publishing and leather – industries Here the answer has to do with the contributions of a maturing and expanding privately

which, with the possible exception of tobacco manufacture, we can identify with the first, funded research and development system that had begun with Edison at Menlo Park. The

pre-Civil War industrial revolution. Although the emphasis here is on R and D intensive lion’s share of private R and D spending was then and is now done in manufacturing, and

industries like chemicals, which turned in stellar productivity results during the a variety of new technological paradigms, most notably in chemical engineering, were

Depression, it should be noted that a number of these latter industries, including tobacco ripe for exploitation.

and textiles, also turned in very respectable MFP performance over the period.

13 14
 The growing importance of the manufacturing sector – it generated about a quarter It is useful to contrast the effects of the boom in street, highway, and other

of national income in 1929, almost a third in 1941 -- helped counterbalance the within infrastructure construction during the 1930s with those of the rather different government

sector decline in MFP growth in terms of the ability of the sector to contribute to high financed capital formation boom that took place during the 1940s. The latter effort

and indeed accelerating MFP growth in the aggregate economy during the 1930s. Still, poured more than $10 billion of taxpayer money into GOPO (government owned,

this roughly 2.6 percentage point decline in the MFP growth rate in the sector worked in privately operated) plants. Almost all of this infusion was in manufacturing, and a large

the opposite direction, reducing the overall importance of manufacturing in aggregate part went for equipment, particularly machine tools, in such strategic sectors as

MFP growth. Clearly, one had to have substantial accelerations in MFP growth in other aluminum, synthetic rubber, aircraft engines, and aviation fuel refining (Gordon, 1969).

sectors in order to produce the 2.31 continuously compounded growth rate reported in Most of this was then sold off to the private sector after the war. This boom in equipment

Table 1 for the private non-farm economy. investment was associated with negative MFP growth in manufacturing between 1941

That acceleration came principally within transportation and public utilities (about a and 1948 and, partly as a result, a slowdown in private nonfarm economy MFP growth

tenth of the economy) and to a lesser degree within wholesale and retail distribution overall (see Field, 2004b). In contrast, the infrastructure spending during the 1930s had

(about a sixth of national income). The remaining sectors, on net, contributed somewhat positive spillovers in the private sector, particularly in transportation and distribtution.

less. Agriculture is excluded from this analysis since we are examining the performance The achievements of the 1930s built on foundations put in place during the

of the private nonfarm economy, but we know that the farm sector’s productivity growth Depression years as well as work done in the1920s and earlier. By establishing

in the 1930s also lagged behind that of the rest of the economy (see Field, 2003). groundwork for subsequent advance, the period also restocked the larder. For example,

With the exception of water transport, productivity performance in transportation almost all of the development work done by Farnsworth on the quintessential postwar

and public utilities between 1929 and 1941 was stellar (Field, 2004a). Of the 4.67 consumer commodity was carried out during the Depression, supported by venture capital

percent per year MFP growth in the sector, trucking and warehousing accounted for funding. The new product (television) was introduced to a wide public in 1939 at the

almost 40 percent of the total (1.80 percentage points), railroads an additional 26 percent New York World’s Fair, but the demands of war forestalled its full exploitation until after

(1.22 percentage points). Thus almost two thirds of the sectoral advance took place in 1948.

surface transportation, and trucking and warehousing alone accounted for approximately Overall, I estimate that of the 2.31 percent CAAGR of MFP in the private

10 percent of MFP growth in the entire private nonfarm economy. nonfarm economy between 1929 and 1941, 48 percent was contributed by

manufacturing, 24 percent by transport and public utilities, 18 percent by wholesale and

15 16
retail distribution, with the remainder of the private nonfarm economy contributing about quite as good capital goods. Output and productivity growth rates would have been

11 percent (see Field, 2004a). somewhat lower, and we would like to know by how much.

We can now summarize the main distinctions between 1919-29 and 1929-41 with Common practice in estimating the IT revolution’s impact on labor productivity to

respect to aggregate MFP growth and its sources. First, MFP growth in the 1920s was date has been to sum three components: a contribution within the IT producing industries

almost entirely a story about manufacturing. Comparing the latter with the earlier period, to MFP growth, a contribution within the IT using industries to MFP growth, and a

there was a significant drop in the share of MFP growth in the private nonfarm economy portion of the effect on labor productivity of capital deepening associated with the

accounted for by manufacturing, from 83 percent in the 1920s to 48 percent in the 1929- accumulation of IT capital (Oliner and Sichel, 2000, or Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003).

41 period. This is primarily due to a halving of within sector MFP growth only partially There can be few conceptual objections to the first two of these components. We

compensated for by the expanding size of the manufacturing sector. There is also a should credit to the enabling technologies most of the MFP growth in the semiconductor

change in the sources of advance – away from the one time gains associated with the final and computer/network equipment manufacturing industries (SIC 35 and 36) and, where

stages of electrification to those associated with exploiting the results of organized and we can demonstrate it, a portion of noncyclical MFP growth in IT-using industries such

expanding research and development efforts. This interpretation is supported by the as securities trading and wholesale and retail distribution. The inclusion of the third

aforementioned R and D employment and expenditure data (see Table 3) and by component is more problematic, although it is endorsed by many, including Barro and

chronologies of major process and product breakthroughs (Kleincknecht, 1987, Mensch, Sala-I-Martin (1995, p. 352) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997, p. 608).

1979 and Schmookler, 1966; see Field, 2003) which all show peaks during the 1930s, The objection to including a portion of the capital deepening effect is this. What we

particularly its latter half. are trying to do here is to estimate the social saving of the IT revolution. In its absence,

The End of Century Episode saving flows would have been congealed in a slightly less beneficial array of physical

The aim of the second part of this paper is to examine the end of century episode in capital goods. We want to emphasize that breakthroughs such as the integrated circuit,

historical perspective, and in particular to consider how much of recent productivity and continuing advances in the manufacture of semiconductors, display screens, and

growth and its acceleration should be credited to the enabling technologies of the IT mass storage devices, have saved us real resources in generating quality adjusted IT

revolution. If we want to take the measure of the IT revolution, we need to try and services. We will pick that up in MFP growth in the IT producing sectors. The very

imagine a world in all respects similar save for the availability of these enabling

technologies. In their absence, saving flows would have been congealed in other not

17 18
rapid MFP growth in these sectors is indeed the reason why the relative prices of influence of IT innovations on marginal returns to investment and thus saving (this was

semiconductors and goods embodying them have plummeted.7 after all the rationalization for rising stock market values during the 1990s), we would

We also want to ask whether the fact that saving flows were congealed in this also need to argue, in order to justify the inclusion of the third component, that saving

slightly superior range of physical capital goods, as opposed to others, enabled a set of responded. And we would be hard pressed to do so.

resource savings in other parts of the economy. This we will pick up in MFP growth in There is a large literature on the responsiveness of saving to after tax interest rates.

the IT using sectors (these are typically referred to as spillovers or productive Theoretically, as in the case of the response of labor supply to increases in after tax

externalities). wages, there is the possibility of both an income and a substitution effect. Empirically,

But unless we can make the argument that the enabling technologies of IT raised the evidence is inconclusive, although consistent with a conclusion of little net effect. As

the rate of return to new investment projects at the margin, and that there was a response far as the income distribution mechanism, there is no question that there was a trend

of aggregate saving rates to this rise, the capital deepening effect should ultimately be toward greater inequality in the last quarter of the century, particularly in the United

credited to saving behavior, and not to the enabling technologies.8 It is of course States, and marked by a widening gap in the wages of highly and less highly educated

conceivable that the enabling technologies of the IT revolution led, by raising the workers. But there is no evidence that this redistribution resulted in an increase in private

incremental return to investment and perforce saving, or by redistributing income to sector saving rates.

households with higher saving propensities, to an increase in the total flow of Some argued, particularly in the late 1990s, that saving rates were improperly

accumulation as a percent of GDP at either the U.S. or the world level, in which case it measured because they did not include unrealized capital gains. But the conventionally

becomes more difficult cleanly to distinguish between the roles of saving and technical measured saving rate was largely invariant both to the expansion of stock market

change in fostering labor productivity growth. valuations in the 1990s and their collapse in the early twenty first century.

The evidence is, however, that investment in these goods did not crowd out Between 1995 and 2000, consumption spending in the United States increased $1.7

consumption goods. Rather, it crowded out other not quite as good capital goods within trillion (34 percent), from $4969 billion to $6683.7 billion nominal.9 Consumption rose

the United States and outside of it. Although we can comfortably posit an upward not just absolutely, but as a share of a rising GDP, from 67.2 percent to 68 percent. At
7
The “dual” approach to estimating MFP advance looks at relative price changes across sectors as an the same time, the growth of IT capital services accelerated from .41 percent per year
alternate means of inferring its incidence.
8
Assertions or assumptions of such a link are easy to find: “Ongoing technological advances in these (IT (1973-95) to 1.03 percent per year (1995-2000). Part of this acceleration came at the
producing) industries have been a direct source of improvement in TFP growth, as well as an indirect
source of more-rapid capital deepening” (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000, p. 128); “The spread of information
9
technology throughout the economy has been a major factor in the acceleration of productivity through In all of the subsequent discussion of the financing of the 1995-2000 investment boom, I use nominal
capital deepening” Economic Report of the President, 2001, p. 33. data, which insures that the saving – investment identities hold for each year. Inflation was relatively
modest over this period.

19 20
expense of the services of other components of the stock within the United States, whose government investment of $81.6 billion. How was this financed? Personal saving fell by

growth declined from .30 percent per year in the earlier period to .06 percent per year a third (decline of $100.9 billion). Retained business saving (net business saving) fell by

(Economic Report of the President, 2001, pp. 29). How was the boom in capital a quarter (decline of $51 billion). Gross business saving rose, however, as a consequence

formation, much of it IT capital, financed? of a $274.3 billion increase in corporate and unincorporated capital consumption

Table 4 allowances. This reflected the large portion of the gross investment surge comprised of
Changes in the Uses and Sources of Saving, United States, 1995-2000
relatively short lived IT capital goods, which increased the importance of short lived
1995 2000 Change Change
in uses in
sources capital goods in the capital stock. We thus experienced a net change in gross private

Gross Private Domestic Investment 1,143.8 1,755.4 611.6 saving of $106.1 billion.
Gross Government Investment 238.2 319.8 81.6
The increase in gross domestic investment was $693.2 billion. A saving gap of

Personal Saving 302.4 201.5 -100.9 almost $600 billion remains. It was filled through two main mechanisms: First, a
Retained Business Earnings 203.6 152.6
movement in the consolidated government surplus from $-108 to $302.8 billion – a
Depreciation Allowances 743.6 1,017.9
Gross Business Saving* 963.6 1,170.5 206.9
swing of $410.8 billion in the surplus direction. Secondly, a deterioration of net exports

Gross Government Saving -8.5 435.8 444.3 from a deficit of $38 billion to one of $395.8 billion, a swing of $297.8 billion The

Net Foreign Investment -98.0 -395.8 297.8 remaining gap between the changes in the sources and uses of saving is accounted for by

Statistical Discrepancy 26.5 -128.5 -155.0 an increase of $155 billion in the statistical discrepancy.

TOTALS 693.2 693.1 The end of century investment boom was enabled on the one hand by the

willingness of foreign wealth holders to divert their saving flows from investment in their
*Includes wage accruals and disbursements not shown separately.
All numbers are billions of dollars, nominal.
This table is based on a rearrangement of the open economy investment savings identity:
own countries or elsewhere and make it available to the U.S., and on the other hand by
I = S + (T - G) + (M - X). Private domestic investment must be financed by the sum of
private domestic saving, government saving, and inflows of foreign saving (capital the tax policies of the Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. Their fiscal
account surplus or current account deficit).
Note that negative net foreign investment is entered as a positive number in the sources policies, in particular modest tax increases in conjunction with an economy operating at
of saving column.
Source: Economic Report of the President, 2003, Table B-32
close to capacity, provided the foundation for the big increase in government saving.

Table 4 shows that between 1995 and 2000 there was a 53.5 percent increase in It is conceivable that, although the IT accumulation spurt was not associated with a

gross private domestic investment (a $611.6 billion increase) as well as an increase in rise in the private saving rate within the U.S., it was associated with a rise in the world

21 22
saving rate. But I have seen no data suggesting this to have been the case. We are left had the tax increases of the early 1990s not been enacted, the deterioration of the current

with the conclusion that, by and large, the IT capital accumulation spurt in the United account would have been even worse.

States represented a substitution not away from consumption, but away from other not If the enabling technologies of the IT revolution diverted toward the United States

quite as good capital goods, both within the United States and abroad. some portion of world saving flows that would not otherwise have come this way even

Whether the flows necessary to finance capital accumulation came from national though U. S. and world saving rates remained unaffected and may actually have

saving or from outside the country is irrelevant from the standpoint of productivity trends declined, it would technically be correct to say that we should grant to the IT revolution

within the United States. But it does have welfare implications, particularly for the that part of the growth in labor productivity associated with IT’s share of capital

future. Reliance on foreign borrowing meant that we were able to forego the sacrifice of deepening. But if we care about labor productivity because we care ultimately about

current consumption that would otherwise have been the price of capital deepening. The consumption per person in the U.S., this is a misleading calculation. Much of the capital

borrowing will turn out to have been a good deal for the country if the increases in output deepening has associated with it a liability tied to increased foreign indebtedness. This is

per hour associated with the additional capital deepening exceed the increases in debt in sharp contrast with the contributions to labor productivity growth of the first two

service per hour of labor input. But there is no guarantee this will be the case – it components of the traditional triad used to measure IT “contributions.”

depends on how much of the additional investment turns out to have been well directed. The IT Contribution and Social Saving Controversies

In any event, the gains in output per hour obtained through foreign borrowing will not be This framework for reckoning the impact of the IT revolution, particularly its

manna from heaven, given the obligation of debt repayment. emphasis on MFP to the exclusion of the portion of the increase in labor productivity

Within the United States, there was indubitably an acceleration in overall capital attributable to IT’s share of capital deepening, runs counter to current practice. It can be

deepening, comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-95. Capital services per quality adjusted better appreciated by comparing the challenge of coming to terms with IT in the 1990s

hour grew at 2.93 percent per year in the latter period, as compared with 1.96 percent per with one of the critical disputes that gave rise to the new economic history. This

year in the former. Thus the slowdown in non-IT capital accumulation was more than involved the attempt to estimate the social saving of the U.S. railroads. W.W. Rostow

compensated for by the rising rate of IT capital accumulation. One could argue that the (1960) had argued that railroads were “indispensable” to American economic growth.

drop in the U.S. private saving simply compensated collectively for the rise in Both Albert Fishlow (1965) and Robert Fogel (1964) wanted more precision. They tried

government saving. But this seems doubtful, since the saving rate has been trending to imagine worlds otherwise similar save for access to the blueprints needed to build

downward for decades through periods of government deficit and surplus. More likely, railroads. They calculated alternate channels for saving flows (into canal building and

23 24
river dredging, for example) and ultimately how much lower U.S. GDP would have been
in this alternate world.
The social savings calculations that came out of those debates four decades ago
were designed to impress upon us first of all the fact that because saving flows were
congealed in railroad permanent way and rolling stock, as opposed to other forms of
physical capital such as canals, GDP was indeed higher than it otherwise would have
been. But not by a whole lot. Fogel argued, for example, that 1890 US GDP was about
4 percent higher than it would have been in the absence of the availability of the railroad.
What kind of an increment to MFP over a quarter of a century would one have needed to
produce a GDP (or output per hour) in 1890 four percent higher than it otherwise would
have been? About .15 percent per year, continuously compounded.
In fact, Abramovitz’s and Kendrick’s analysis of nineteenth century growth after
the Civil War suggest, as was true for the 1973-95 period, that, at least up until 1889,
almost all of the growth in real output can be accounted for by growth in inputs
conventionally measured. It would make little sense to suggest that we have
underestimated the contribution of the availability of railroad blueprints to growth in
living standards in the nineteenth century because we have not accounted for the share of
the increment to output per hour attributable to that portion of capital deepening
associated with investments in locomotives, rolling stock, and permanent way.10
The key message of the classic works by Fishlow and Fogel was that, in the absence
of the railroad, saving flows would have been congealed elsewhere, with results for the
10
In this respect as well the railroad/infrastructure investment boom of the late nineteenth century was
analogous to the IT boom of the late twentieth century: both triggered and were associated with foreign
borrowing.
25
economy that would have been almost, but not quite as good. We should take the same
approach to reckoning the importance of the IT revolution.
In defense of what has become the conventional approach, some labor productivity
is certainly, in an accounting sense, attributable to capital deepening. And a large fraction
of capital deepening, particularly at the end of the 1990s, was indeed associated with the
accumulation of physical IT goods: computers, servers, fiber optic cable, routers, etc.11
But since the counterfactual I have in mind imagines saving behavior largely unaffected
by the presence or absence of the IT blueprints, our estimate of the portion of labor
productivity growth we attribute to saving (as opposed to technical innovation) should be
largely independent of the particular forms in which saving flows were congealed.
It should, to be fair, also be independent of the sources of that saving. With respect
to the labor productivity growth caused by capital deepening, it is irrelevant whether the
saving came from outside of the country. But from the standpoint of their contribution to
U.S. standards of living, labor productivity gains from capital deepening financed by
foreign borrowing come encumbered in a way that similar gains financed by domestic
saving do not.
It is true that if we are operating below capacity, and a new attractive invention
offers profitable opportunities for new investment, it is reasonable to talk about the extent
to which the innovation increases real output through its effect on the amount of real
capital formation. From an aggregate perspective, such investment will be largely self
financing (just as, in the presence of accommodative monetary policy, will be
11
Estimates of the amount of this capital formation surge have been augmented by the BLS’s 1999
reclassification of business software acquisition as capital formation (as opposed to its previous treatment
as an intermediate good.
26
government deficits). Under these circumstances, we can argue that it is investment that How important, in terms of their impact on labor productivity, were the respective

drives saving. roles of MFP and capital deepening over the 1995-2000 period? There are a couple of

But once we reach potential output, the old rules of microeconomics again apply. ways of looking at this. The first is to ask how much of the acceleration in labor

Choices have opportunity costs, and saving constrains investment rather than the other productivity growth each is responsible for. For the private nonfarm economy, that

way around. This has always been the rationale for policy changes designed to increase acceleration, comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-95, was 1.09 percentage points, and about

the after tax return to saving, and, if the elasticities are right, saving flows – policies three fourths of this is attributable to MFP acceleration.

which make sense from a long range growth perspective but are contraindicated if one is The contribution to output per hour growth of labor composition change was about

below capacity. By and large, in growth accounting, we are trying to abstract from the same during the two periods (slightly lower between 1995 and 2000). Comparing

cyclical effects, and study the effect of saving and innovation on the increase of potential 1995-2000 with 1973-95, capital services growth accelerated from 3.94 percent per year

output. We want to know, in the long run, what is the effect of the IT enabling to 5.38 percent per year. Growth in hours rose from 1.58 to 2.09 percent per year. As a

technologies on the growth of potential output. If we are concerned with contributions to result, the rate of capital deepening increased from 2.36 to 3.28 percent per year between

long run growth, an appeal to the role of IT capital formation role in “contributing” to 1995 and 2000.

increases in real output based via these Keynesian arguments is misplaced. But assuming a capital share of .32,12 this .92 percentage point increase should have

It is analogous to emphasizing, as did Rostow, the stimulus to the iron and steel accounted for an increase in the growth of output per hour of a modest .29 percentage

and lumber industries caused by late nineteenth century railroad construction. That points. In fact the growth of output per hour rose 1.09 percentage points, from 1.37 to

emphasis obscured the fact that, once we are at potential output, these resources had 2.46 percent per year. Almost all of the balance – about three fourths of the total - was

alternate uses, and the enormous costs of constructing the railroads raised the hurdle they due to MFP acceleration.13

had to overcome to make a positive contribution to GDP. They managed to do so, as A second approach is to ask what portion of labor productivity growth (2.46 percent

Fogel and Fishlow demonstrated, by speeding up the turnover of inventories in the per year) each is responsible for. Between 1995 and 2000 MFP growth was 1.14 percent

economy and by enabling a superior exploitation of regional comparative advantage. But per year. The rate of capital deepening was 3.28 percent per year. Multiplied by .32, this

it was close.
12
BLS capital share for 1995 is .3268; for 2000, .3109.
13
MFP Growth vs. The Capital Deepening Effect Alternately, converting everything to an adjusted hours basis, we can calculate a 1.06 percentage point
increase in the rate of capital deepening (capital growth less adjusted hours growth), implying the increase
in the rate of capital deepening should have been responsible for a .36 percentage point increase in the
growth in output per adjusted hour (.34*1.06). Adding in the increase in MFP growth (.76 percentage
points) we conclude that output per adjusted labor hour should have increased a total of 1.10 percentage
points (.36.+.76).

27 28
yields a capital deepening contribution of 1.05 percent per year. The remainder, about the century. First, in spite of some initial skepticism (see Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000), it

.27 percent per year, is the contribution of labor quality improvement. Looked at from is clear that MFP growth, and, largely because of it, labor productivity growth, did

this perspective, we can say that MFP growth accounted for less than half -- about 46 accelerate between 1995 and 2000. Second, it is generally agreed that an important

percent (1.14/2.46) -- of labor productivity growth between 1995 and 2000. Table 5 contributor to labor productivity growth and its acceleration was MFP advance associated

summarizes these calculations. with technical change in the semiconductor industry and in the manufacture of such

products as computers, networking devices, and telecommunications equipment that

Table 5 embodied them. This shows up in very rapid (and accelerating) rates of MFP growth in
MFP Contribution to Labor Productivity Growth and Acceleration, 1995-2000
SIC 35 and 36.
Labor Productivity Growth, 1995-2000a 2.46
MFP a 1.14 Table 6
Capital deepening a 1.05 Contribution to Labor Productivity Acceleration (percentage points)
Labor Composition a .26
McKinsey (2002) Nordhaus (2002):
Labor Productivity Growth Acceleration, 1995-2000 vs. 1973-95b 1.09 1995-99 over 1987-95 1995-2000 over 1975-89
MFP b .76 Total Acceleration 1.33 1.61
Capital Deepening b .32 Wholesale Trade .37 .27
Labor Composition b -.01 Retail Trade .34 .46
SIC 35 (includes semiconductors) .12 .23
a
percent per year SIC 36 (includes computers) .17 .08
b
percentage points Securities Trading .25 .32
Note: Components do not sum exactly to aggregates due to rounding errors.
Sources: McKinsey Global Institute (2002); Nordhaus (2002), Table 6, p. 233.

There is no hard and fast guide to what metric we should prefer here, although for
Third, it is likely, although the inferences are more indirect and the statistical
an individual country it seems to me that the more meaningful measure is IT’s
support weaker, that some of the IT using sectors, in particular wholesale and retail trade
contribution to the rate of improvement, not the rate of improvement of the rate of
and securities trading, began to throw off significant MFP growth. Two analyses of the
improvement, of labor productivity. For comparisons between countries, we should also
contributions to the acceleration of labor productivity growth (McKinsey Global Institute
be interested in levels.
2002, and Nordhaus 2002; see also the 2001 Economic Report of the President) are
MFP Growth in the IT Producing and Using Sectors
suggestive. The McKinsey study focuses on four years (1995-99) whereas Nordhaus
In spite of the various frameworks that researchers have used to measure the overall
covers five (1995-2000), and the base periods on which the acceleration is calculated
impact of IT on productivity growth, there is now enough consensus to make some

noncontroversial statements about trends in MFP growth and their sources at the end of

29 30
differ. Both rely on BEA value added data in the numerator, although the McKinsey (1987-95) to 3.72 percent per year (1995-2000). So labor productivity growth in

study uses persons employed rather than hours in the denominator. distribution did accelerate.

Both nevertheless find that distribution contributed substantially to the acceleration The problem for the residual, however, is that assuming a capital share of .32, the

of labor productivity growth, and substantially more than did manufacturing, although the very high rates of capital deepening more than account for the labor productivity growth,

two studies reverse the relative contribution of wholesale and retail trade on the one hand, implying negative MFP growth in both sectors overall. Moreover, this negative growth

and SIC 35 and 36 on the other. Of course we can’t reason directly from decompositions accelerates in the 1995-2000 period, along with the acceleration in capital deepening.

of labor force acceleration to conclusions about MFP acceleration. Rates of capital The bottom line is that while heavy capital deepening in distribution did cause an

deepening may have been exceptionally rapid in these sectors, explaining much of the acceleration in labor productivity growth in the sector, it is uncertain whether the results

acceleration of labor productivity growth. Indeed, at least through 2000, the data support through 2000 fully justify the massive IT expenditure.

this view. Some of this uncertainty and pessimism may be due to an overestimate of how

Distribution was an extremely heavy user of IT capital. Largely as a consequence, much “true” computer prices dropped, and thus an overestimate of how much real IT

its overall use of capital services soared. An index of capital services input in wholesale output (and investment) grew. This is a controversial view, since a number of economists

distribution rose 18.8 percent a year between 1973 and 1995 and 20.5 percent a year have actively pressured the BLS to make more use of hedonic methods to estimate the

between 1995 and 2000. Hours in wholesale rose only 1.32 percent per year from 1995 rate of quality improvement (and implied price decline) and praised it for what efforts it

to 2000. So capital deepened in the sector at a rate of 19.2 percent per year over the last has made (see, e.g., Nordhaus, 1997).

five years of the century, far higher than the average for the economy. Similar The most compelling argument for why these methods might be leading to some

calculations for retail distribution show capital deepening at 15.3 percent per year over overestimate of real product growth is that in products whose quality has improved, users

these years.14 are typically forced to purchase bundles of attributes, not all of which they may actually

The BLS Industry Productivity Indexes and Values Table shows labor productivity desire or value. No one disputes that the issues of quality improvement and the

growth in wholesale trade rising from 2.82 percent per year (1987-95) to 4.17 percent per introduction of new products are important challenges in constructing realistic estimates

year (1995-2000). In retail trade the comparable numbers are 1.95 percent per year of real product growth. But some of the resulting estimates do not seem to satisfy a

reasonableness test.

14
Sources for capital are Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Capital and Related Measures from the two Digit
Database, 1948-2001”; for hours, “Industry Productivity and Values Table”, November 5, 2003.

31 32
 Hedonic price techniques have yielded end of century estimates in the range of -27 overestimate of real IT output growth will increase the former component, while it will

percent per year for the rate of decrease of quality adjusted computer prices (Berndt, reduce the latter. The two effects may largely cancel out. 15

Dulberger, and Rapaport, 2000). This rate of price decrease would reduce a 1999 For analysis of smaller subsectors of the economy, however, the effects will not

computer priced at $2000 to $500 over 5 years. Thus, if I used a five pound laptop in cancel out, and the standard value added approach as applied to subsectors has been

1999 and another in 2004 selling at the same nominal price, the BEA would conclude, criticized precisely because it can be so sensitive to errors in deflation (see Basu and

based on the price data received from the BLS, that there has been a four fold increase in Fernald 1995). For subsectors the BLS prefers its KLEMS methodology which uses a

the ratio of capital services to hours in my intellectual work. I leave it to readers to judge gross output rather than value added measure, and subtracts weighted input growth rates

whether or not this is reasonable. for purchased materials, energy, and business services as well as hours and capital input.

For the sake of argument, grant that the BLS may have given us estimates of the Their MFP estimates for the sector are unpublished and incomplete. But the unofficial

rates of decline of IT capital prices that have resulted in an overestimate by the BEA of data show MFP rising at .8 percent a year in wholesale although not at all in retail

real product growth in the sector. Although this would of course boost MFP growth in between 1992 and 1997.16 It is likely that, were data available through 2000, calculated

the IT producing sectors, it has the effect of worsening it in IT using industries. One of rates of growth of MFP between 1995 and 2000 would be higher.

the advantages of adopting the framework for reckoning the importance of IT proposed in With respect to retail distribution, the McKinsey study argues that virtually all of

this paper is the elimination of the possible “incentive” to push for more rapid rates of the gains in labor productivity have been attributable to “big box” retailers such as

estimated price decline to make IT’s contribution appear larger. Costco, Walmart, and Circuit City. And it is the relative ease with which these can be put

Overestimating the real growth of IT services will, of course, also overestimate the in place in the United States, as compared with the relative difficulty with which this can

capital deepening component of its contributions within what has become the be done in Europe and other parts of the world, that Gordon has cited as a principal

conventional triadic approach. Since the framework I advocate credits most of the effect explanation of cross country differences in MFP growth in distribution, and, perforce, the

of capital deepening on labor productivity to saving, rather than the availability of IT economy as a whole (Gordon, 2003).17

technology, we are left with the effect on MFP growth in the IT producing sectors, plus

the effect in the IT using sectors, such as distribution, if it can be demonstrated. An 15

Overestimating the real flow of IT goods increases the estimated growth of real output and of real output
per hour, as well as the capital stock and thus the rate of capital deepening. IT goods are, however, a much
larger fraction of investment than they are of output; the effect on estimated MFP growth is ambiguous,
although it is likely to reduce it.
16
I am grateful to Larry Rosenblum of the BLS for making these data available to me.
17
In a paper broadly consistent with this view, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan have argued that most of the
productivity advance in retail trade has been the result of “more productive entering establishments
displacing much less productive exiting establishments” (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan, 2002).

33 34
 Although the McKinsey group is willing to lay at IT’s doorstep only about half the no growth in retail. Allowing for some acceleration towards the end of the decade in

gains in wholesale and retail distribution (assuming we can demonstrate them), it is both wholesale and retail, and considering the relative weights of wholesale and retail, we

important to keep in mind that these are gains in labor productivity. The evidence for can hazard an estimate of .7 percent per year for the sector between 1995 and 2000.

uncompensated productivity spillovers – increases in value added attributable to IT that Multiplying sectoral shares by sectoral MFP growth rates, we can estimate that of

aren’t captured by the equipment or software manufacturers - is still weak. There are the 1.14 percent per year growth of MFP within the private nonfarm economy between

enough straws in the wind, however, to speculate that we are in fact in the middle of a 1995 and 2000, .45 percentage points originated in manufacturing, most of it due to the

second IT revolution in distribution, a revolution whose trace on sector MFP data has IT producing industries, and .14 percentage points in distribution. Given the rest of the

been temporarily clouded or even obliterated by overdeflation of IT prices.18 PNE’s weight of .563, we can back out an implied MFP growth within it of .94 percent

Summary: The 1990s and the 1930s per year contributing the remaining .53 percentage points. This “other” category includes

Let’s now try and bring together what we can say about the 1995-2000 episode and standout sectors such as securities trading as well as laggards such as construction and

how it relates to the 1929-41 period. In this instance, because of paucity of trucking. Table 7 above summarizes these calculations.

disaggregated sectoral data outside of manufacturing, I divide the private nonfarm Table 7
Sectoral Contributions to MFP growth, 1995-2000
economy into three subsectors: manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and other.
Share of PNE Sectoral MFP Contribution to Share of PNE
Excluding agriculture, government, nonfarm housing, and the non-profit sector, the Growth PNE MFP MFP Growth
Growth
private nonfarm economy accounts for 72.4 percent of value added. Using year 2000 Manufacturing .214 2.08 .45 .39
Trade .223 .70 .16 .14
sectoral shares, we can calculate a manufacturing weight (share of PNE) of .214 and a Other .563 .94 .53 .47
TOTAL 1.00 1.14
wholesale and retail trade weight of .223. Sources: Sectoral Shares:
Note: Private Nonfarm economy excludes nonfarm housing, health, agriculture, and government,
Again, we commence with BLS numbers for MFP growth for the private nonfarm which leaves 72.4 percent of value added. This is approximately the BLS’s current definition of the PNE.
MFP growth Manufacturing: see Table 2
MFP growth Trade: see text
economy between 1995 and 2000 (1.14 percent per year), and the BLS estimate for

manufacturing as a whole of 2.08 percent per year (see Tables 1 and 3). For wholesale Suppose now we credit all of the MFP growth in manufacturing between 1995 and
and retail trade, we lack data on MFP growth. As noted, unpublished estimates using the 2000 to the enabling technologies of the IT revolution, and a third of that in distribution
KLEMS methodology show .8 percent per year between 1992 and 1997 in wholesale, and

18
For discussion of an earlier revolution associated with the simultaneous deployment of the telegraph and
the railroad, see Field (1987, 1992a, 1996) and Chandler (1977).

35 36
and the rest of the economy 19 We would then conclude that .68 percentage points of the Of their 2.02 percent per year growth in labor productivity between 1995 and 2000,

1.14 percent MFP growth between 1995 and 2000 could be credited to IT innovations. they attribute .85 percentage points to IT capital deepening and .45 percentage points to

Thus, we would attribute about 28 percent of labor productivity growth between 1995 IT related MFP growth . In other words they “attribute” about two thirds of labor

and 2000 (.68 / 2.46 percent per year) to the enabling technologies of the IT revolution. productivity growth (1.30/2.02 = .64) to IT. Conceptually, their analysis is more

How does this analysis compare with the recent decomposition by Jorgenson, Ho, favorable to IT because, like Oliner and Sichel (2000), they credit the sector with a

and Stiroh (2003)? First, the BLS data for the private nonfarm economy cover less than (large) portion of the effect on labor productivity of capital deepening. But in another

three fourths of their aggregate. Jorgenson et. al. include what the BLS excludes: the respect their approach is less favorable than that advocated in this paper, because they

farm sector, government, housing, and (presumably) the non-profit sector.20 These credit IT innovations with none of the MFP growth outside the IT producing sectors,

excluded sectors were slower growing, and as a consequence their output aggregate even though, in contrast to some of their earlier analyses, they now do acknowledge some

grows at 4.07 percent between 1995 and 2000, vs 4.54 percent for the BLS private MFP growth in the rest of the economy. If one applied my framework to their data, one

nonfarm economy. Their hours series grows at 1.99 percent vs. 2.09 percent for the PNE. would add the .45 percentage points of IT related MFP growth and a third of the “other”

Their labor quality adjustment is also lower, .22 percent vs .37 percent per year. Finally, MFP growth (.17/3 = .056) to obtain .51 out of a total of 2.02 percent per year

their MFP growth estimate is much lower (.62 vs 1.14) and their output per hour rises attributable to the enabling technologies of IT. This is approximately one fourth of the

more slowly (2.07 percent vs. 2.46 percent) (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003, Table 2). total.

The difference in labor productivity growth rates is less than the difference in MFP Comparing new economy economic growth with the MFP boom period of the

growth rates because their implied rate of capital deepening (3.88 percent per year) is interwar years the following conclusions stand out. The 1920s, the 1930s and the 1990s

higher than for the BLS private nonfarm economy (3.28). all saw contributions to MFP growth from manufacturing but the percentage point

All of these comparisons speak to the extent to which the sectors excluded by the contribution to PNE growth in the recent episode was much lower (.45 percentage points

BLS and added back in by Jorgenson et al. tended to be slower growing and, in the per year vs. 1.24 percentage points per year between 1929 and 1941, and 1.71 percentage

aggregate, relatively unprogressive technologically. points in the 1919-29 period. Although rapid MFP advance within manufacturing was

19
The McKinsey study places a great deal of emphasis on the Wal-Mart effect, both in terms of its growing somewhat more localized in the 1930s than it has been in the 1920s, it was very narrowly
share of retail and through its role as an object of imitation by such firms as Target. But although it grants
that much of the company’s success is based on advanced inventory control methods obviously enabled by concentrated at the end of the century.
IT investment, it also stresses that much is based on management innovations such as worker cross-
training. In other words, within manufacturing it is defensible to credit virtually all of the MFP growth to
IT; outside of manufacturing this is not defensible. Many of the productivity enhancing management
improvements could and probably would have been implemented in the absence of new IT technology.
20
Their output measure also includes an estimate of the imputed service flow from consumer durables.

37 38
 Distribution played an important role in both the 1930s and the 1990s, although its after 1995, as the interval required to double performance dropped from 18 months to 12

percentage point contribution was three times larger in the Depression. Perhaps most months. The revolutionary character of what has been happening in the IT industries

striking, however, in comparison with the 1930s, the 1990s lacked the broad based and shows up as higher and accelerating MFP and, perforce, labor productivity growth in SIC

very rapid advance in transportation and public utilities which characterized the 1930s. 35 and 36. Even allowing for the possibility of some overshooting in the estimate of

Although sectoral MFP estimates are not available across the board, labor productivity output growth resulting from the use of hedonic techniques, we can happily and

data, such as that contained in the 2001 Economic Report of the President, show growth uncontroversially credit the revolution with these gains, which flow directly through to

rates declining, comparing 1995-99 with 1989-95, in trucking and warehousing, improvements in the material standard of living.

communications, and electric, gas, and sanitary services. For trucking and warehousing, It is also likely that some – although by no means all -- of the MFP advance in

labor productivity actually fell (2001 Economic Report of the President, Table 1.2). wholesale and retail distribution, securities trading, and some other sectors of the

Finally, we need to reemphasize that for the private nonfarm economy as a whole, economy has been made possible by IT investments, and we should credit the enabling

aggregate MFP advance in the 1929-41 period was more than twice as fast as 1995-2000, technologies of the IT revolution with an appropriate share of these gains as well, where

more than three times as fast as 1989-2000. For the 1930s, the question of whether or not we can demonstrate them. But because the IT producing sectors are small in relation to

to include a technology driven capital deepening effect on labor productivity is moot, the aggregate economy, and because the gains in the using sectors have been relatively

since there was effectively no capital deepening, at least in the private sector. more modest, the boost to the growth of overall output per hour remains modest in

Taking the Measure of the IT Revolution comparison, for example, with the impact of MFP growth in the 1930s

What has been incontrovertibly revolutionary about the IT revolution has been the This accounting does not attribute a portion of the effect of capital deepening to IT

operation of Moore’s law: the ability to manufacture computers, peripherals, and innovation – arguing that this is attributable to saving. An objection is that technical

telecommunications equipment in such a fashion that output has risen much faster than improvement, whatever its sources, might have affected saving behavior by raising the

inputs conventionally measured. The plummeting costs of producing quality adjusted rate of return to incremental investments and thus, assuming there were a positive

CPUs, memory, mass storage and display devices have been for the late twentieth century elasticity of the saving rate with respect to the real after tax interest rate, an increase in

what spinning jennies and water frames were for the late eighteenth century in Britain, saving flows. Or because of a bias in technical change, capital’s share might rise, leading

although the rates of productivity advance have been far more dramatic. There is some to a redistribution of income to households with higher saving propensities. Versions of

evidence that the rate of technical progress in semiconductors accelerated even further these arguments have been made for the post Civil War period in the United States

39 40
where, it has been suggested, such innovations as the railroad and Bessemer/ Siemens saving flows would have been congealed in a set of not quite as good capital goods, an

Martin steel elicited an upward surge in aggregate saving behavior which propelled the argument that can be, and has been made, for the railroad in the nineteenth century.

economy on a “grand traverse” to higher labor productivity levels as predicted by the Many of the frameworks used to guide thinking about the impact of the IT
21
Solow model (David, 1977; Williamson, 1973, p. 591). revolution were developed during a period of sustained stock market exuberance when

There was indeed an acceleration of gross capital formation in the last half of the there was enormous pressure among academics and within government statistical offices

1990s, associated with a more than doubling of real investment in computers, telecom to resolve the Solow paradox (computers were showing up everywhere but in the

equipment, and software between 1995 and 2000.22 And the national saving rate did productivity statistics.) We need to make sure that our vision is not clouded by the

rise, barely, although no thanks to the private sector. It is doubtful that private saving legacies of the IT public relations offensives of the 1990s.

rates would have risen had tax rates not been raised, since saving rates have fallen One manifestation of the effectiveness of that campaign has been that a change in

steadily in recent years through both deficit and surplus periods. No one claims that the the way government statistics on fixed assets are collected, classified, and presented. In

changes in fiscal policies were a response to IT innovations, as a rise in the private saving the BEA’s Fixed Asset Tables, the assets produced by information technology industries

rate might have been. Finally, the gap between private saving and national investment are now listed first, in separate and detailed categories. But why are saving flows

not filled by the increase in government saving was filled by a diversion of saving flows congealed in IT goods and software more or less important than those congealed in

from outside the country towards the United States, not necessarily an augmentation of structures, machine tools, vehicles, nuclear fuel rods, or any of the other fixed asset

the world saving rate. categories? One might reply, because IT is a special type of capital good, one with a

These are the grounds for attributing the effect of capital deepening on labor greater propensity to carry or embody or stimulate technical innovation within using

productivity largely to the forces of thrift rather than innovation. In the absence of IT, sectors. Perhaps this is true, although Field (2004b) suggests that, at least for the United

States, it is not necessarily so.23 To the degree that it is true, we will pick up this effect in
21
David is clear that the nineteenth century traverse was “set in motion by Thrift, that is, by a pronounced MFP growth within the IT using sectors.
rise in the proportion of output saved.” In some passage he appears to treat it as exogenous, as opposed to a
response to an upward movement in the real interest rate. In Abramovitz and David (1973), the authors Another intellectual legacy of the IT boom has been the widespread and largely
speak of “technologically induced traverses.” The implied argument seems to be that new blueprints lead
to an increase in real returns to investment, which induces an upsurge in the saving rate, propelling one to a
different steady state involving higher output per hour. In Abramovitz and David (1999) the authors uncritical acceptance of the usefulness of the concept of a general purpose technology
suggest that the bias in technical change led to an increase in capital’s share, which redistributed income to
households with higher propensities to save, and this is the mechanism that leads to the upsurge in the (GPT) and the recognition of IT or computers as its principal instantiation (Bresnahan
saving rate. Williamson’s 1973 paper is more explicitly based on analysis of the consequences of an
upward shift in saving propensities: “For still unknown reasons the saving rate rose markedly during the
Civil War decade” (1973, p. 593)
22 23
Some of this surge was driven by Y2K concerns, presumably a one time event. Some of it was wasted, For example, the rising share of equipment to structures in investment flows and the capital stock, which
or as in the case of fiber optic cable in the telecom sector, vastly overbuilt. begins after the Second World War, coincides with a long term downward trend in MFP.

41 42
and Trajtenberg, 1995). While it is undoubtedly true that some advances are more inputs in many other sectors, with the potential to generate spillover effects in using

important than others, to call something a GPT has in many instances been to suggest sectors. These processes, products, or complexes are the consequence of many separate

about a class of innovations or industries that there was more to them than apparently met breakthroughs as well as learning by doing, much of which has been sector specific. IT

the eye, or showed up in aggregate statistics. The enthusiasm for the concept runs the for example, has required advances in software, sector specific semiconductor

danger of placing too much emphasis on specific innovations awarded this coveted manufacturing, and the thin film technology and mechanical engineering that underlies

designation. most mass storage.

One of the difficulties with GPTs is the potential multiplicity of candidates. Steam, Because of the potential for multiplying GPT candidacies and the lack of an

electricity, and IT are most frequently identified, but chemical engineering, the internal authoritative tribunal applying uniform rules passing judgment about which ones qualify,

combustion engine, radio transmission and the assembly line have also been mentioned. economic and technological history may well be better off without the concept. Our

The identification of one or several GPT’s often offers an appealing narrative hook, but enthusiasm for GPTs suggests that we may still not have absorbed entirely the lessons of

the criteria for designating them are not universally agreed upon, in spite of continuing the Rostow – Fogel – Fishlow debate about the “indispensability” of the railroad.

efforts to nail them down. For example, why isn’t the railroad also a GPT? Gordon Whereas IT has probably been responsible for a larger increase in MFP growth between

(2004) suggests that use by both households and industry is a criterion. This works for 1995 and 2000 than was the railroad in the 25 years after the Civil War (compare here the

electricity and the internal combustion engine. But steam? estimate of .15 percent per year for the railroad with the .68 percent per year I attribute to

Here is another concern. Bessemer and Siemens Martin processes were industry IT between 1995 and 2000), overall MFP advance at the end of the century was still

specific, and would clearly not pass muster as GPTs. They offered, to use David’s much slower than it had been during the 1930s.

words, “complete, self-contained and immediately applicable solutions” (2004, p. 22). It is important to distinguish between the proposition that it sometimes takes a long

This was not the case for the product whose production they enabled. Does that make time for the productivity benefits of new technological complexes to be reaped, and the

steel a GPT? It took Carnegie and others time to persuade users they should make concept of a GPT. One can accept the former without necessarily embracing the

skyscrapers, plate ships, and replace iron rails with it. Cheap steel in turn encouraged usefulness of the latter. The full benefits of IT may indeed involve considerable delays

complementary innovations such as, in the case of taller buildings, elevators. before they are realized. My intent in this paper, however, has been to focus on what the

If one follows the impact of product and process innovations far enough through the statistical record allows us to conclude has actually been achieved, not on what might

input-output table, one will eventually find products or technological complexes used as happen, or what we would like to believe will happen, in the future. The end of century

43 44
productivity revival needs to be understood on its own terms. We should give the IT
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50
 NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
The US Productivity Slowdown, the Baby Boom, and Management Quality
James Feyrer
NBER Working Paper No. 15474
November 2009
JEL No. E0,E25,J1,J11,O33,O4,O47,O51

THE US PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN, THE BABY BOOM, AND MANAGEMENT ABSTRACT

QUALITY
This paper examines whether management changes caused by the entry of the baby boom into the
James Feyrer workforce explain the US productivity slowdown in the 1970s and resurgence in the 1990s. Lucas
(1978) suggests that the quality of managers plays a significant role in determining output. If there
Working Paper 15474 is heterogeneity across workers and management skill improves with experience, an influx of young
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15474 workers will lower the overall quality of management and lower total factor productivity. Census
data shows that the entry of the baby boom resulted in more managers being hired from the smaller,
pre baby boom cohorts. These marginal managers were necessarily of lower quality. As the boomers
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH aged and gained experience, this effect was reversed, increasing managerial quality and raising total
1050 Massachusetts Avenue factor productivity. Using the Lucas model as a framework, a calibrated model of managers, workers,
Cambridge, MA 02138 and firms suggests that the management effects of the baby boom may explain roughly 20 percent
November 2009 of the observed productivity slowdown and resurgence.

James Feyrer
Department of Economics
Dartmouth College
6106 Rockefeller Hall
Hanover, NH 03755-3514
and NBER
james.feyrer@dartmouth.edu

I am grateful to Pete Klenow, Jon Skinner, Doug Staiger, Jay Shambaugh and participants at the Population
Aging and Economic Growth conference at the Harvard School of Public Health for their helpful comments
and advice. All errors are my own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

© 2009 by James Feyrer. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.
Introduction returns to the scale of the firm.
If we assume some distribution of managerial talent those with the most man-
Annual productivity growth fell by approximately one percentage point in the 1970s
agerial talent will take managerial positions and those with less talent will become
relative to the preceding decade. It was not until the mid 1990s that productivity
workers. The heterogeneity in management talent combined with decreasing returns
growth returned to the level of the 1960s. The causes of the slowdown and re-
to scale results in tension between firm size and managerial quality. In order to re-
covery have been much debated. Interestingly, discussions of the resurgence have
duce the size of firms, additional managers are needed. The additional managers
often failed to talk about what caused the slowdown in the first place. This paper
will be lower quality than the existing managers.
will investigate one potential cause of both the slowdown and subsequent recovery,
Given this structure, it should be clear that an influx of workers that have low
demographic change. The channel through which demographic change will impact
levels of managerial talent will require changes on both margins. The number of
productivity is management quality.
workers per manager will rise for existing managers – reducing their effectiveness
The slowdown in the US roughly corresponds to the entry of the baby boom
– and some workers will be drawn into the ranks of management. These marginal
into the workforce. The recovery occurred as the mass of the baby boom entered
managers will obviously lower the overall talent of management.
their prime working years. Feyrer (2007) finds that there is a strong and robust
The entry of the baby boom into the US workforce presents us with precisely
correlation between relative cohort sizes and total factor productivity. In particular,
this situation. When the baby boomers entered the workforce, they were not im-
the proportion of workers aged forty and older is positively correlated with total
mediately useful as managers, either through a lack of experience or institutional
factor productivity. The magnitude of the effect is an order of magnitude larger
restrictions on younger workers managing older workers. The managers for these
than one would expect from the returns to experience measured at the micro level.
new workers necessarily came from the smaller and older cohorts of workers. This
In other words, the social return to experience appears to be much larger than the
dynamic is evident in the data.
private return.
An examination of census data shows that the entrance of the baby boom into
This paper looks to management quality as one possible source of externalities
the US workforce caused significant changes in the age structure of management.
to experience. The argument that follows formalizes and calibrates a mechanism
First, workers in cohorts born before the boom were drawn into management in
that was initially described in Feyrer (2008). Lucas (1978) proposes a model where
larger numbers. Second, workers in the baby boom cohort were called upon to
the quality of the manager of a firm maps directly into firm output differences.
manage at earlier ages than in previous generations. This implies that from 1960
Given the same quantity of labor and capital, firms with more talented managers
until 1980, firms had to go deeper into the management distribution causing a fall
will produce more output. The effectiveness of management is also affected by the
in average management quality. This trend reverses by 2000. This implies falling
scope of the enterprize. Given a firm with a particular manager, there are decreasing
management quality from 1960 until 1980 and rising quality thereafter.

2 3
 The timing of this change in management structure roughly parallels the slow-
down in US productivity growth. This paper examines how important the demo-
graphic change in management quality was compared to the overall US productivity

slowdown. Using the Lucas model as a framework, we calibrate a model of man-

agers, workers and firms and examine how changes in the observed age distribution
of workers in the US affects productivity. The results suggest that the management
Figure 1: Growth in US Labor Productivity 1960-2005
effects of the baby boom may have caused productivity growth in the 1990’s to be

0.15-0.25 percentage points higher than in the 1970s. This represents roughly 20%

4
of the observed slowdown.

Labor Productivity Growth (%)

1 Background

2
Productivity growth slowed in the US and other industrialized nations during the
1970’s and remained below the earlier trend until the mid 1990’s. Figure 1 shows

0
yearly growth in output per hour in the nonfarm business sector for the US.1 The
yearly data are overlaid with a five year moving average. The fall in average growth

−2
rates from 1975 until 1995 is obvious.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
There has been enormous debate about the causes of the US productivity slow- Year

down and the recent resurgence in productivity growth. Interestingly, these two
events are treated somewhat separably in the literature. In a 1988 symposium on the
productivity slowdown in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fischer (1988) sug-
Gray bars are yearly observations. Five year moving average in bold.
source: The Economic Report of the President 2007.
Table B50 Growth in output per hour, nonfarm business sector.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/B50.xls

gests that the main causes were oil price increases, as argued by Jorgenson (1988) in
the same issue, and a slowdown in the rate of new technology production. Griliches

(1988) expresses skepticism of the latter view. Interestingly, the productivity resur-
gence debate is a bit disconnected from the slowdown literature. Debate has largely
1
(Lazear, Baicker and Slaughter 2007)

4 5
revolved around the role of computer technology.2 generate large externalities.
This paper will examine one potentially overlooked determinant of both the
productivity slowdown and resurgence, demographic change. To suggest that the
2 Management Quality
entry of the baby boomers into the workforce lowered labor productivity is hardly
a new idea. Standard Mincer regressions suggest that increases in experience result One way in which the externalities to experience may matter is through management

in higher wages. The entry of the baby boomers into the workforce in the 1970s quality.4 It is not unreasonable to think that lowering management quality will

certainly lowered average experience in the US. Insofar as simple labor productivity have effects on productivity that go beyond the change in private returns. Good

measures do not account for the experience of the workforce, this may be causing management may also be important for the implementation of new technologies.

part of what we see in Figure 1. However, the impact of experience is relatively There is microeconomic evidence that age matters in the adoption of technology.

modest and even accounting for it does not change the basic picture very much. Weinberg (2002) finds that both experience and age matters for technology adoption.

In addition, the baby boomers were more educated than their elders, offsetting the Since schooling tends to be concentrated early in life, young managers have the

change in experience. Baily, Gordon and Solow (1981) summarize the adjustments advantage of more recent human capital.5

one can make for demographics and finds that they generate relatively small effects. Much of the current debate on the productivity resurgence revolves around

It should be noted, however, that the standard Mincer regressions are based on whether it is due to the falling cost of information technology capital (essentially

private returns to experience and will not be capable of detecting externalities to a a capital deepening story) or through the ability of information technology to im-

more experienced workforce. Feyrer (2007) and Feyrer (2008) show that the effect prove productivity in all sectors. If management quality matters, it may be that

of demographic change on aggregate output may be much larger than suggested demographic shifts have had important effects on the ability of firms to implement

by the private returns to experience.3 The impact of an increase in the proportion computer technology. If so, the proximate cause of the productivity resurgence may

of experienced workers (aged forty plus) is found to have an effect an order of be the implementation of IT, but the ultimate cause may be the enhanced ability

magnitude larger than expected from the private return to experience. This paper of management to take advantage of the new opportunities.

is an attempt to suggest a mechanism through which changes in experience may

2
See Nordhaus (2002), Gordon and Sichel (2002), Oliner and Sichel (2000), and Fernald, Thip- 2.1 Changes in the US Workforce Age Structure
phavong and Trehan (2007) among many others.
3
Other work has also found a relationship between demographic change and output. Focusing The baby boom in the United States generated significant changes in the age dis-
on the dependency ratio, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) find that increases in the size of the
working age population can produce a “demographic dividend” to economic growth. Kogel (2005) tribution of the population. Figure 2 shows the number of live births in the US
finds a relationship between total factor productivity and the dependency ratio. Persson (2002)
finds that the age structure of US states affects output. Sarel (1995) finds a significant effect of 4
This section draws on an argument originally made in Feyrer (2008).
the age structure of the population on output in a cross section of countries. Bloom, Freeman and 5
Chari and Hoenhayn (1991) find that technologies diffuse slowly due to vintage human capital
Korenman (1988) find that being a member of a large cohort leads to lower lifetime earnings. effects.

6 7
from 1920 until about 2000. Peaking in the late 1950’s, the baby boom cohorts were
significantly larger than those preceding and following. Figure 3 shows the resulting Figure 2: Live Births in the US

changes in the age distribution of the US workforce over time. The proportion of 4.5

Live Births (millions)

twenty year olds in the workforce rose from 20 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1980 4.0
as the baby boom enters the workforce. In each ten year interval, this effect repeats 3.5
in the next age category. The number of thirty year olds peaks in 1990-1995 and 3.0
2.5
the number of forty year olds peaks in 2000.
2.0
Figure 4 shows the age distribution of full time workers in the US overlaid with
1.5
the age distribution of workers classified as managers for each census between 1960
1.0
and 2000. The underlying data for these histograms are from the Integrated Public 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
6 source: National Center for Health Statistics
Use Microdata Series of the US census. The entire workforce distribution is the
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm
solid line while the managerial workforce distribution is dashed. At the left hand

side of each distribution the dashed line falls below the solid line, illustrating that
workers in their twenties are managers at lower rates than older cohorts. In 1970, Figure 3: The Baby Boom and the Age structure of the US workforce
the entry of the baby boomers into the workforce is very apparent in the worker

Proportion of Workforce
35%
distribution, but barely discernable in the manager distribution. By 1980, however,

the presence of the baby boom in the managerial workforce is obvious. Figure 5 30%
shows the evolution of the mean and median ages of US managers over time. Over 25%
the decade of the 1970s the median age of managerial workers falls by five years.
20%
Between 1980 and 2000 the baby boom begins to have enough workers in the over

thirty distribution to manage itself. By 2000 the two distributions have returned to 15%

a pattern very similar to 1960. 10%

If the baby boomers were entering the non-managerial workforce in large numbers 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
by 1970, who was managing them? The short answer is the older, smaller cohorts. Ages 20-29 Ages 30-39
6
Ages 40-49 Ages 50-59
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. For 1980, 1990 and 2000, the data are a 5% sample. For the earlier
years a 1% sample is used. The sample is comprised of full time workers. Workers categorized as source: IPUMS, author’s calculations
“Managers, Officials, and Proprietors” under the 1950 occupational coding are coded as managers.

8 9
 Figure 6 shows the proportion of workers classified as managers by age group over
Figure 4: Age Distribution of US Workforce categorized as managers, by year
time. This data has been detrended by time to remove secular movements in the
proportion of workers classified as managers. From 1960 until 1980 the probability
1960 1970 1980
.04

.04

.04
that any given person enters management rises for all age groups. These are the
.03

.03

.03
workers called into management ranks by the entry of the baby boom into the
.02

.02

.02
.01

.01

.01
workforce. From 1980 to 2000 this trend reverses as the baby boom itself provides
0

0
the managers.
Density

20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80

1990 2000
It should be noted that this is not due to a secular increase in workers classified
.04

.04

as management – though this is also happening. As long as young cohorts manage at

.03

.03
.02

.02

a lower rate than older cohorts, it is possible for all cohorts to see an increase in the
.01

.01

proportion managing despite the management to worker ratio staying constant in

0

20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80

Age the aggregate. Imagine that there are two groups of workers, the old and the young.

Solid Line - Entire Workforce, Dashed Line - Managers The overall proportion of workers to managers is constant at 10 percent. In year one,
source: IPUMS, author’s calculations
there are an equal number of young and old workers, but only the old workers take
on management roles, so 20 percent of the old cohort manages. In year two a large
cohort enters such that the young cohort is now twice the size of the old cohort. If
Figure 5: The Mean and Median Ages of US Managers, 1960-2000
no one from the young cohort is allowed to manage, the proportion of the old cohort
44
43 managing will need to rise to 30 percent in order to keep the aggregate proportions
42
41
constant. The overall proportion of managers will remain constant despite the fact
40
that the proportion of managers went up in the older group.
39
38 Figure 7 shows the change in management proportions over time. The overall
37
36 numbers rise dramatically from 1960 until 1990 and subsequently fall. Nothing
35
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 discussed so far gives an answer to whether the entry of the baby boom should
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Median Age 43 43 38 39 42 ceteris paribus raise or lower the proportion of managers in the economy. It is almost
Mean Age 43.5 42.9 40.1 40.1 42
certainly true that the large rise is due to secular changes in the US economy or
source: IPUMS, author’s calculations
changes in the way forms classify jobs. However, we will return to this question

10 11
 with the calibrated model. In particular, we will look for suggestions that the fall
Figure 6: Proportion of US Workforce categorized as managers (detrended), by age
between 1990 and 2000 is related to the aging of the boomers.
group
Intuitively, the baby boomers were entering the workforce in large numbers and
20 30 40
needed to be managed by someone. Since young workers tend to be managers in

12.4

15.5
8.5

lower numbers than older workers, the additional managers needed to come from the

12.2
Percentage Managing (detrended)

15
8

12

14.5
7.5

older and smaller cohorts. The additional managers are necessarily of lower talent
11.8

14
7

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 than the existing managers, otherwise they would have been managing already.
50 60
This leads to an overall drop in management quality and a fall in TFP. After 1980,
15.4

15
15.2

when the baby boomers enter the years when workers normally enter management
14.5
15

14

roles, the situation reverses. At this point the baby boom can manage itself and
14.8
14.6

13.5

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 has a relatively small group of young workers to manage. This results in a fall in
Census Year
the proportion of 40 year old workers managing over time and an increase in the
source: IPUMS, author’s calculations
overall quality of management. The following section will make this argument more
formally in an attempt to estimate how large these effects could be.

Figure 7: Proportion of US Workforce categorized as managers over time

3 The Lucas Span of Control Model

16
Percentage classified as management

This section presents a simplified version of the model from Lucas (1978) and is a
14

formalization of the arguments made in Feyrer (2008) and in the previous section.

By developing the model more completely it is possible to run calibration exercises

12

to determine the plausibility of the mechanism and possible magnitudes.

Each firm consists of a single manager and a number of homogeneous workers.
10

There is heterogeneity in management talent and management talent has a mul-

8

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

tiplicative effect on firm output. There are decreasing returns in the number of
Census year
workers employed by a firm.
source: IPUMS, author’s calculations
More formally, a firm with a manager of quality x managing L workers and K

12 13
units of capital will produce the following amount of output, equal to the output minus the cost of inputs

Y (x) = xg[F (K(x), L(x))] (1) π(x) = Y (x) − K(x)r − L(x)w (4)

where F () is a standard neoclassical production function, and g[] has decreasing where r is the real return to capital and w is the real wage. Firms maximize profits
returns. The decreasing returns to g[] imply that larger firms will have lower per subject to the first order conditions

worker output given a fixed level of management talent, x. As the ‘span of control’
dY (x)
of a manager gets larger, their effectiveness diminishes. =r (5)
dK(x)
Assume a heterogeneous distribution of managerial talent, Γ(x). All individuals
and
will be either managers or workers. Individuals with the highest level of management
dY (x)
= w. (6)
talent will become managers while workers of lower talent will be employed by dL(x)

firms. Smaller firms are more productive, but since each firm needs a manager, The production function F (K(x), L(x)) from (1) is taken to be Cobb-Douglas
the additional managers needed to reduce firm size will be of lower quality. This with capital share of α ∈ (0, 1). Lucas shows that if firm size is independent of
tradeoff drives the equilibrium level of firm size and management quality. There firm growth rates (Gibrat’s Law), the function g[] must take on the following simple
will be a cutoff level of managerial talent, z, below which individuals will not be parameterization,
managers. If the total quantity of labor is normalized to one and the quantity of Y (x) = x(K(x)α L(x)1−α )β , (7)
labor employed by a firm managed by a manager of talent x is L(x), the resource
where β ∈ (0, 1) defines the degree of diminishing returns to firm size.7 The first
constraint on labor is

∞ order conditions imply the following optimal capital labor ratio, which is identical
1 − Γ(z) = L(x)dΓ(x) ≤ 1. (2)
z
for all firms, regardless of management talent, x.
Total output is

∞ K α w
Y = Y (x)dΓ(x). (3) = (8)
z L 1−α r

Firms choose levels of capital and labor to maximize profits subject to exogenous
Combining (8) with either of the first order conditions results in the following
wage and capital rental rates. The profit of a firm with a manager of talent x is
optimal level of workers for any given level of management talent, x, wage rate, w,
7
Lucas (1978), p. 514-515

14 15
and rate of return to capital, r. managerial talent. The basic method is to generate a large number of discrete agents

  and aggregate. These agents are distributed into groups by age, with the number of
 αβ 1
1−β
α
L∗ = L(r, w, x) = (1 − α)β r −αβ w αβ−1 x (9) agents from each age group reflecting the observed workforce proportions in the US
1−α
(see Figure 3). Each age group has a different managerial talent distribution, Γi (x).
The number of workers for any given firm is increasing in the talent of management
The overall distribution of management talent, Γ(x) is generated through summing
and decreasing in the rental rate of capital and the real wage. Combining the profit
the distributions for each age group.
function with (8) and (9) you can solve for the profit level of a firm with management
Each of these agents has a managerial talent, x, taken from an age specific
talent x in terms of the real wage and real return on capital. For simplicity we can
distribution of talent.8 Each agent takes the rental rate of capital, r, and the wage
assume that the real rental rate of capital is exogenously determined (US firms
rate, w, as given. The output for a firm headed by a manager of talent level x
can borrow in world markets). The wage, however is going to be endogenously
can be calculated from (7) subject to the profit maximizing conditions (5) and
determined subject to the resource constraint (2). Consider the choice of a individual
(6). Equations (9) and (8) give the profit maximizing levels of labor and capital.
between working for wages at an existing firm and managing their own firm. They
Plugging these values into (4) gives the profit level of a firm headed by a manager of
will choose to manage only when the profit of the firm will exceed their wages as
talent x. If the profits are greater than the wage, the firm is viable and will operate
a worker. There will be some cutoff level of management talent where a worker is
with L(x) employees and one manager with the manager receiving the profits. If
indifferent between managing and working.
the profits are less than the wage, the agent will work for one of the viable firms.
Aggregate demand for workers at any given wage w can be determined by sum-
π(z) = w (10)
ming L(x) + 1 over the agents where π(x) ≥ w.9 The solution of the model requires
finding the wage which equalizes supply and demand for workers. As the wage in-
Where this cutoff falls will be a function of the distribution of management tal-
creases, the labor demand will fall along two margins. First, a higher wage results in
ent, Γ(x), and the resource constraint (2). The following section will outline the
a lower number of firms, since the profit threshold is higher. Second, any firm which
parameterization of this basic model and the algorithm for a numerical solution.
remains above the profit threshold will employ fewer workers. There is therefore a
downward sloping labor demand function with a fixed supply.
4 A Numerical Solution 8
These talent levels are deterministic and not stochastic. The solution technique should there-
fore be seen as a numeric integration rather than a Monte Carlo exercise. To be more concrete, if
there were 99 agents, the first would be assigned the first percentile cutoff of the distribution, the
In this section we will take the basic structure outlined above and describe the
second the second percentile and so on to the 99 percentile.
9
This is the numerical equivalent to performing the integration in equation (2) where z is a
steps needed to generate numerical estimates of the behavior of the US economy
function of a given wage and exogenous interest rate, r. The term L(x) + 1 is the number of
workers plus the manager.
based on the model. To simulate the model we first must specify the distribution of

16 17
 The equilibrium wage is the wage for which the total desired employment is this implies that the share of labor income going to managers should be roughly in
equal to the total number of agents in the economy. This can easily be found the range of 35-45 percent. The share of labor income going to managers is
∗
numerically. Once the equilibrium wage, w , has been determined we can calculate
1−β
total output by summing up individual firm output. Other metrics are also easily manager’s share of labor income = . (14)
1 − βα
calculated including the proportion of managers from each age cohort and the profit
Given a share of capital in total income and a managerial share of labor income
distribution of managers.
appropriate values of α and β can be calculated from (11) and (14).
To generate the distribution of management talent, agents in the economy are
4.1 Parameterization of the Model
split across five age groups, 15-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 and 60 and older. The number
To complete the parameterization of the model we need to specify the coefficient on
of agents from each group is generated such that the proportions match the data.
capital in the production function, α, the degree of decreasing returns at the firm
The variation in these proportions over time will generate our results. Within each
level, β, the exogenous rate of return to capital, r, and the age specific distributions
age group the distribution of managerial talent is Pareto, a distribution commonly
of management talent.
associated with the distribution of income. Since firm profits will be proportional
The exogenous rate of return to capital is set to the risk free rate of return,
to management talent, a Pareto distribution of management talent will tend to
5%. We can rely on relative income shares to determine the production function
generate similarly distributed management income.
parameters, α and β. It can easily be shown that the following shares of total income
The Pareto distribution has pdf
hold.
capital’s share = α × β (11) kxkm
pdf = . (15)
xk+1
nonmanagerial labor’s share = (1 − α) ∗ β (12)
The shape parameter of the distribution, k, is common across all distributions and
managerial labor’s share = 1 − β (13) is chosen so that the proportion of managers in equilibrium roughly matches the
observed proportions in the data overall given the values for α and β derived from
We choose α and β to produce income shares that roughly match the actual
income shares. The lower support of the distribution, xm , will vary by age group.
economy. We set capital’s share of income to match the standard figure from national
Differences in xm result in proportional differences in the means of the resulting
income and product accounts, 40 percent. Piketty and Saez (2003) show that the
distributions, so a 10% difference between the xm between two age groups shifts the
wage share of the top 10 percent of wage earners ranges from 25-35 percent over the
average managerial talent for that group by the same amount. These shifts in the
period of interest. Since the proportion of managers in the dataset is 10-15 percent,
talent distribution will generate different proportions of managers from the various

18 19
age groups. Since the forty year old cohort has the highest proportion of managers
in the data, it is used as a benchmark with xm = 1 . The values of xm for each
of the other age groups are chosen so that the equilibrium proportion of workers in

management from each age group roughly matches the data.

With these parameters in place the observed age proportions can be run through
the model from 1960 until 2000. The only variables that change over time are
these age proportions. The calibration parameters k, α, β, and xm are all fixed
Figure 8: Simulated Response of output per worker to Demographically Induced
as the model is marched forward through time. For each year the model is solved Management Changes (1960==100)
numerically and equilibrium wages, the proportion of managers in each group and
101.0
total output can be determined. The size of the changes in output generated by k=6.0, ms=0.35
100.5 k=4.7, ms=0.40
these demographic shifts in the model should be informative about how large the k=3.9, ms=0.45
100.0
effects may have been in the real economy.
99.5

5 Results 99.0

98.5
Figure 8 shows the progression of income from 1960 to 2000 in the simulated economy
98.0
under three different parameter assumptions. The parameter sets were chosen by
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
first varying management’s share of labor income between 35 and 45 percent. The source: IPUMS, author’s calculations
k is the shape parameter for the Pareto distribution.
value of the Pareto distribution shape parameter, k, was then adjusted until the ms is managements share of labor income.
overall percentage of workers in management roles matched the data. The values Given ms, k is chosen to match the data illustrated in Figure 6.

for the lower supports of each distribution, xm were then adjusted to get the relative
managerial proportions of the age groups correct. Output per worker is falling from
1960 until 1980 with the more dramatic fall happening between 1970 and 1980.

Since the simulated model has no underlying productivity growth this fall in the
growth rate should be interpreted as a deviation from some constant underlying
trend growth rate. Output per worker drops by 1 to 2 percentage points over

20 21
this period. After 1980 this reverses with output per worker in 2000 higher than group in management generated by the model for the central scenario overlayed with
in 1960 under all parameterizations. Table 1 shows the yearly effect on growth the actual data. The model does a good job of matching the overall proportion
rates simulated by the model under the three different parameters sets. The model of managers from each group and also generates about a one percent increase in

the proportions managing from each group between 1960 and 1980. This compares
Table 1: Percentage Change in Growth Rate Relative to Trend
quite well with Figure 6.
ms=0.35 ms=0.40 ms=0.45
Year k=6.0 k=4.7 k=3.9 The average proportion of managers from each group is a direct consequence
1960-1970 -0.034 -0.046 -0.057 of the parameterizations and was intentionally designed to match the data. The
1970-1980 -0.077 -0.095 -0.113
1980-1990 0.081 0.108 0.135 changes over time, however, are entirely the result of changing cohort sizes, The
1990-2000 0.064 0.081 0.099
source: Author’s calculations fact that the changes over time match the data indicates that the model and pa-
rameterization are capturing some of the dynamics in a reasonable way.

generates a fall in yearly growth rates of 0.05-0.15 percent relative to trend from The differences in average management proportions across the age groups are the

1970 until 1980. From 1980 until 2000 the growth rates reverse and are 0.05-0.15 result of adjusting the lower support, xm of each group’s distribution. These values

percentage points above trend. The simulated difference between growth rates in are constant over time for each of the parameterizations. As mentioned earlier, the

the 1970’s and the 1990s is between 0.14 and 0.21 percentage points depending on lower support is proportional to the mean for the group, so a 10% lower value for

the specific parameterization. This compares to a swing in the actual data of about xm lowers the group mean by a similar amount. Table 2 shows the values of xm

one percentage point. The model is therefore generating effects that are 15 to 20 for each of the parameterizations. The parameters necessary to generate the proper

percent of the effect measured in the actual economy. Table 2: Relative Managerial Talent, by age group
The most significant discrepancy with the model relative to reality is the timing.
Age ms=0.35 ms=0.40 ms=0.45
The simulated economy predicts an increase in labor productivity growth in both Group k=6.0 k=4.7 k=3.9
15-29 0.927 0.907 0.889
the 1980’s and 1990’s while the actual productivity slowdown continued into the 30-39 0.986 0.982 0.978
1980’s (though the 1970’s were certainly the low point). Part of the difficulty is 40-49 1.000 1.000 1.000
50-59 0.995 0.994 0.992
that the census years match poorly with turns in the productivity series and the 60 plus 0.994 0.993 0.992
source: Author’s calculations
productivity series is quite noisy.
The model matches other moments of the economy reasonably well. Each of the
management proportions suggest that workers under the age of 30 have 7-11 percent
parameter sets were chosen such that the proportion of managers from each group
lower management talent than their elders. The 30-39 age group is about 2 percent
matches the detrended data from Figure 6. Figure 10 shows the proportions of each

22 23
 lower in talent than the older groups. There is no significant difference between the
Figure 9: Simulated Manager Proportions, by age group
over 40 groups.

20 30 40

.155
.142
.098

6 Conclusions

.14
.096
Percentage Managing (detrended)

.138

.15
.094

.136
This exercise obviously does not capture the US productivity slowdown perfectly,
.092

.134

.145
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
though this is likely not a reasonable expectation. We can show that the Lucas
50 60
.15

model is capable of generating movements in labor productivity that are large. This
.15

.148
.148

suggests that there are external effects of changes in experience which are larger than
.146
.146

.144
.144

we should expect from an examination of micro returns to experience. Changes in

.142
.142

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Census Year
management talent due to demographic changes are potential factor contributing

source: Author’s calculations to US productivity movements. The magnitudes suggest that these movements are
insufficient to explain the entire US slowdown, but may be causing one fifth of the
observed effect.
Figure 10: Simulated Manager Proportions, by age group
It is obviously true that the management story offered here is incomplete. The
composition of the US labor force changed in a number of dramatic ways during the
20 30 40
15.5
9.8

14.2

1970’s. In addition to the entry of the baby boom, participation rates for women
9.6

14
Percentage Managing (detrended)

15

rose dramatically. If we assume that women were systematically barred from some
9.4

13.8
13.6
9.2

14.5

management roles during the 1970s is seems possible that there was an additional
13.4
9

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

50 60
drain on management quality in the 1970s which reversed as women took on more
15.5
15

management responsibility. If true, it may be that the effects in our simulated model
14.8

15
14.6

are understated.
14.5
14.4

Additionally, the experience level of managers was necessarily changed by these

14
14.2

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Census Year demographic movements. In the 1970s, the marginal forty and fifty year old man-
solid – actual data, dashed – simulated agers had no managerial experience since they were only managing due to the entry
source: Author’s calculations
of the baby boom. Conversely, when the boomers hit these ages, the average man-

24 25
ager had more experience in management roles than in previous generations since
they had typically been called on to manage at earlier ages.
Understanding the role of demographic change in productivity movements is of
interest for more than historical reasons. Many developing countries have large
demographic bubbles in the wake of fertility declines. As these cohorts age, their
impact on productivity will be significant.
26
References
Baily, Martin Neil, Robert J. Gordon, and Robert M. Solow, “Produc-
tivity and the Services of Capital and Labor,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1981, 1981 (1), 1–65.
Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla, “Economic Growth
and the Demographic Transition,” NBER Working Paper, December 2001,
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, Richard B. Freeman, and Sanders D. Korenman, “The labour-market
consequences of generational crowding,” European Journal of Population, 1988,
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Chari, V. V. and Hugo Hoenhayn, “Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and
the Diffusion of New Technology,” Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 99 (6),
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Fernald, John, David Thipphavong, and Bharat Trehan, “Will Fast Pro-
ductivity Growth Persist?,” FRBSF Economic Letter, April 6 2007, 2007 (9).
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Statistics, February 2007, 89 (1), 100–109.
, “Aggregate Evidence on the Link Between Demographics and Productivity,”
Population and Development Review, December 2008, 34 supplement, 78–99.
Fischer, Stanley, “Symposium on the Slowdown in Productivity Growth,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2 (4), 3–7.
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Economy]. Comments and Discussion,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity, 2002, 2002 (2), 245–265.
Griliches, Zvi, “Productivity Puzzles and R&D: Another Nonexplanation,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2 (4), 9–21.
Jorgenson, Dale W., “Productivity and Postwar U.S. Economic Growth,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2 (4), 23–41.
Kogel, Tomas, “Youth dependency and total factor productivity,” Journal of De-
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nomic Report of the President, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
February 2007.
27
Lucas, Robert E., “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” The Bell Journal
of Economics, Autumn 1978, 9 (2), 508–523.

Nordhaus, William D., “Productivity Growth and the New Economy,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2002, 2002 (2), 211–244.

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States, 19131998,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, February 2003, 118 (1),
1–39.

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Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ron-
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28
El problema energético: análisis global
CAPÍTULO 4
LA INVERSIÓN EXTERIOR DIRECTA EN 2008
4.1 El mundo
4.1.1. Las cifras del año 2008
En un mundo inmerso en una recesión econó-
mica global, con menguantes beneficios empresa-
riales, restrictivas condiciones crediticias, escasa
liquidez y pesimistas perspectivas, muchas empre-
sas han anunciado planes para disminuir la pro-
ducción, despedir trabajadores y cortar gastos de
capital, todo ello tiende naturalmente a reducir la
inversión directa extranjera, cuyos flujos que al-
canzaron la cifra récord de 1,8 billones de dólares
en 2007, han disminuido más de un 20 por 100 en
2008.
A diferencia de la crisis financiera de 1997, que
se inició en algunos países asiáticos en desarrollo
y emergentes, la crisis actual empezó en el mundo
desarrollado aunque se está extendiendo rápida-
mente a las economías en desarrollo y en transi-
ción. Los países ricos han sido ya directamente
golpeados, mientras que los efectos de la crisis
sobre las economías en desarrollo han sido indi-
rectos, más lentos y con variados grados de severi-
dad. Esto ha afectado al patrón de localización de
la inversión directa y a sus flujos.
En países ricos, los flujos de inversión directa
han caído un 33 por 100, y los flujos de entrada han
sido especialmente bajos en Finlandia, Alemania,
Hungría, Italia y Holanda, incluso comparándolos
con niveles de dos años antes. Las fusiones y adqui-
siciones transfronterizas cayeron un porcentaje
similar. Aunque se ha producido una fuerte desace-
leración del ritmo de crecimiento de los flujos inver-
sores de entrada a los países en desarrollo de un 20
BOLETÍN ECONÓMICO DE ICE Nº 2967
DEL 16 AL 30 DE JUNIO DE 2009
por 100 a un 4 por 100, estos han mantenido, en su
mayoría, cifras positivas. Así en África se alcanza un
nivel de 62 mil millones de dólares con un 16,8 por
100 de crecimiento sobre el 2007 y en Latinoa-
mérica y el Caribe el crecimiento es de un 13 por
100 (142,3 miles de millones), como resultado de un
fuerte aumento a Sudamérica, mientras Centroa-
mérica y el Caribe muy dependientes de Estados
Unidos se van a ver afectados por una caída.
Después del récord del año anterior y debido a una
menor demanda y precio de petróleo, la inversión en
Asia Occidental va a caer por encima del 20 por 100
(56,3 miles de millones), mientras se mantiene con
números positivos reducidos de crecimiento del 3
por 100 el resto de Asia para alcanzar la cifra de
256,1 mil millones de dólares de entradas de inver-
sión directa este año. Finalmente las inversiones que
se han dirigido a las economías en transición
(Europa del Sureste y Estados Independientes de la
URSS –CIS–) han registrado un incremento del 6
por 100 superando los 91 mil millones de dólares.
En resumidas cuentas, aunque la caída inversora
se ha dejado sentir con especial fuerza en los países
desarrollados, algunos en desarrollo, con sistemas
financieros abiertos pero débiles se han mostrado
muy vulnerables a los choques externos. Así las in-
versiones directas han caído acusadamente en paí-
ses como Indonesia, República de Corea, Pakistán,
El sector exterior en 2008
y Turquía.
Las perspectivas a corto plazo para 2009, nos
llevan a creer que la severidad de la crisis actual su-
perará posibles factores compensadores como el
atractivo de las economías emergentes para la in-
versión directa, las oportunidades de comprar ac-
tivos a precios de saldo y el incremento de la 쑱
83
 El sector exterior en 2008
estrategia de internacionalización de las empresas,
de forma que predominará la tendencia negativa.
Luego, una caída adicional de la inversión directa
para 2009 puede esperarse, con la probabilidad de
que las inversiones directas a los países en desa-
rrollo, que han mostrado durante 2008 resistencia
al descenso, se desacelerarán más marcadamente
de lo que lo han hecho hasta ahora.
4.1.2. Características de las corrientes
inversoras de 2008
La disminución de la inversión directa extranje-
ra es el resultado de dos factores que han afectado a
la inversión internacional y nacional: 1) La capaci-
dad de las empresas para invertir se ha visto re-
ducida por una caída en el acceso a los recursos
financieros, internamente debido a menores benefi-
cios empresariales y externamente debido a una
menor disponibilidad y a un más alto coste de
financiación. 2) La propensión a invertir se ha visto
afectada negativamente por unas perspectivas muy
negativas especialmente en el mundo desarrollado.
La percepción muy alta del nivel de riesgo lleva a
las empresas a cortar sus programas de inversión
para hacerse más resistentes a un deterioro adicio-
nal del clima de negocios. Esta situación ha afecta-
do especialmente a las fusiones y adquisiciones en
el exterior, cuyo valor ha declinado mucho en com-
paración con el nivel histórico del año anterior. Al
mismo tiempo una caída a nivel mundial de más de
un 40 por 100 en los mercados de acciones ha redu-
cido las posibilidades de maniobra de las multina-
cionales de utilizar las Bolsas para financiar sus
operaciones, mientras que muchos proyectos de pri-
vatización se detenían.
El sector exterior en 2008
Si diferenciamos tres tipos de inversión según
sus motivos: buscadora de mercados, buscadora de
eficiencia y buscadora de recursos, sin duda la pri-
mera es la que se ha visto afectada más seriamen-
te por la crisis, especialmente la dirigida a los mer-
cados desarrollados. El impacto de la situación
económica sobre los proyectos buscadores de efi-
84
ciencia es más difícil de valorar. Muchas empresas
pueden estar obligadas a reestructurar sus activida-
des internacionales cerrando instalaciones obsole-
tas y no competitivas, a menudo localizadas en
países desarrollados pero abriendo instalaciones
eficientes en costes en las economías emergentes.
Finalmente, en lo relativo a proyectos buscadores
de recursos estos sufrirán a corto plazo por descen-
sos en la demanda mundial y en los precios. Nor-
malmente, siguen a los periodos de euforia, des-
equilibrios en la demanda que impulsan los pre-
cios y el lanzamiento de nuevos proyectos. Es pro-
bable que estos desequilibrios vuelvan a aparecer
una vez que la presente recesión termine, impac-
tando positivamente en la inversión que se realiza
con esta motivación.
En cuanto a las industrias en las que la crisis se
está cebando más fuertemente con importantes
descensos de inversión extranjera están: los servi-
cios financieros, las industrias del automóvil, de
los materiales de construcción y de bienes inter-
medios. Sin embargo, los efectos de la crisis se
están extendiendo ahora a otras actividades desde
el sector primario a los servicios no financieros.
Antes de que la crisis apareciera, hubo algunos
signos de actitudes restrictivas hacia la inversión
extranjera directa. Aunque la situación difiere
según regiones, el porcentaje de cambios regulato-
rios negativos en comparación con los positivos se
ha incrementado significativamente desde 2003.
Las diversas medidas adoptadas por los Gobiernos
para afrontar la crisis han tenido efectos positivos
y negativos sobre la atracción de inversiones. Entre
los primeros cabe mencionar los planes de garantías
y fianzas, los paquetes de rescate para el sector
financiero y la búsqueda activa de inversores ex-
tranjeros para su participación directa en estos pa-
quetes, programas de inversiones públicas, medi-
das de estímulo fiscal o monetario, préstamos para
las filiales que operan en países en desarrollo, etcé-
tera. Por el contrario, como medidas negativas para
la Inversión Directa en el Exterior (IDE) se pueden
señalar: nacionalizaciones parciales o totales de
empresas del sector financiero, restricciones en 쑱
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 CAPÍTULO 4. LA INVERSIÓN EXTERIOR DIRECTA EN 2008
el pago de dividendos, medidas de ayuda a la in-
dustria nacional con impactos negativos para la
inversión en el exterior, etcétera. En conclusión,
para tratar efectivamente esta crisis y sus conse-
cuencias económicas es importante que los hace-
dores de políticas mantengan un clima favorable a
los negocios y a la inversión evitando caer en ten-
taciones proteccionistas.
4.2. Inversiones extranjeras en España
La economía internacional ha intensificado su
deterioro durante 2008, especialmente en el segun-
do semestre, cuando el colapso del sistema finan-
ciero alcanzó proporciones sistémicas, con un
fuerte impacto en la economía real que ha sumido
a las principales economías en una profunda rece-
sión que se prevé duradera, según las autoridades
económicas nacionales y organismos internacio-
nales, que han revisado sus previsiones a la baja. A
pesar de los planes de salvamento del sector finan-
ciero, unidos a políticas monetarias y fiscales fuer-
temente expansivas, el PIB de las principales eco-
nomías se ha contraído en los dos últimos trimes-
tres de 2008 en proporciones históricas, con fuer-
tes caídas en el consumo y en la inversión, aumen-
to del paro, contención de precios y fuerte desca-
pitalización de las empresas cotizadas en un con-
texto de gran incertidumbre.
En España la crisis ha seguido un modelo simi-
lar. Según datos de la Contabilidad Nacional el PIB
comenzó a contraerse en el tercer trimestre (-0,2),
acelerando esta tendencia en el cuarto (-1,0) en
tasas intertrimestrales. En términos anuales la con-
tracción del PIB –la primera en muchos años– fue
del 0,7 por 100. Dada la importancia del sector de
la construcción en España, el deterioro del empleo
ha sido muy importante; también han sufrido las
finanzas públicas, cuyo déficit se situó por encima
de los límites de Maastricht después de registrar
superávit en 2007. De los componentes del PIB
sólo mejoró la contribución del sector exterior,
registrándose importantes caídas tanto en el con-
BOLETÍN ECONÓMICO DE ICE Nº 2967
DEL 16 AL 30 DE JUNIO DE 2009
sumo como en la inversión –al igual que en la
inversión española en el exterior– en un marco de
marcada estabilidad de precios, fuerte corrección
tanto del déficit comercial como del de cuenta
corriente en la última parte del año, en un escena-
rio de poca disponibilidad de crédito y pérdidas o
reducción de los beneficios empresariales.
Según datos de la Balanza de Pagos, que recoge
los flujos en términos netos, en 2008 la inversión
directa extranjera en España fue de 43.967 millo-
nes de euros, un 4,17 por 100 más que en 2007,
representando un 4,01 por 100 del PIB, igual que
en 2007. La inversión directa de España en el exte-
rior, que acusó más claramente el deterioro de la
economía, alcanzó los 49.049 millones de euros, un
46,5 por 100 menos que en 2007, lo cual supone un
4,47 por 100 del PIB desde un 8,73 por 100 en
2007.
La inversión extranjera en España y española
en el exterior en participaciones de capital, que son
los datos de flujos que elabora el Registro de In-
versiones Extranjeras, han seguido una pauta muy
parecida, como se detalla a continuación.
4.2.1. Evolución general
La inversión extranjera bruta en participaciones
de capital ascendió a 37.715 millones de euros en
2008, ligeramente por encima de 2007, siendo
estas cifras las mejores desde 1993, con la excep-
ción del 2000. Las liquidaciones cayeron casi un
70 por 100 en relación a 2007 por lo cual la inver-
sión neta aumenta un 26,7 por 100 situándose a
niveles de récord histórico. Si descontamos la
inversión en Entidades de Tenencia de Valores
Extranjeros (ETVE), la inversión en sociedades no
El sector exterior en 2008
cotizadas mantuvo buenos incrementos tanto en
términos brutos como netos, particularmente en
estos últimos debido a las escasas desinversiones
en relación con 2007, mientras que la inversión en
sociedades cotizadas se contrajo y concentró las
liquidaciones presentando la parte más negativa
(Cuadro 4.1).
85
 El sector exterior en 2008

CUADRO 4.1
INVERSIÓN TOTAL
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Porcentaje
Importe
Bruta Neta Bruta Neta variación 08/07
Bruta Neta Bruta Neta
Inversión total en participaciones en el capital............. 13.774 3.469 37.554 27.261 37.715 34.543 0,4 26,7
Inversión descontadas ETVE ....................................... 9.853 -232 29.538 19.342 28.793 25.679 -2,5 32,8
En sociedades no cotizadas................................... 9.272 -73 11.329 1.470 14.777 11.726 30,4 697,6
En sociedades cotizadas ........................................ 581 -159 18.209 17.872 14.016 13.954 -23,0 -21,9
Inversión de ETVE........................................................ 3.920 3.700 8.017 7.919 8.922 8.864 11,3 11,9
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.2
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA EN ESPAÑA. SERIE HISTÓRICA
(Millones de euros)

Años Inversión bruta Porcentaje variación Inversión neta Porcentaje variación

1993 5.435 – 3.584 –

1994 6.524 20,1 3.235 -9,7
1995 5.405 -17,2 3.564 10,2
1996 5.633 4,2 2.928 -17,9
1997 6.833 21,3 4.033 37,8
1998 9.331 36,6 4.158 3,1
1999 18.538 98,7 13.767 231,1
2000 38.385 107,1 29.451 113,9
2001 35.174 -8,4 28.207 -4,2
2002 32.748 -6,9 28.660 1,6
2003 18.305 -44,1 14.784 -48,4
2004 18.917 3,3 9.160 -38,0
2005 17.628 -6,8 10.842 18,4
2006 13.774 -21,9 3.469 -68,0
2007 37.554 172,7 27.261 686,0
2008 37.715 0,4 34.543 26,7
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

Los datos anteriores merecen ser matizados por ción al anterior, concentrándose éstas en sociedades
trimestres debido a la contracción que empezó a ex- cotizadas y, por último, agotamiento de la actividad
perimentar el PIB español a partir del inicio del inversora en los dos últimos trimestres del año.
segundo semestre y que ha continuado hasta el La cifra de inversión neta aumenta un 26,7 por
final del periodo analizado, manteniéndose esta 100 sobre 2007, estableciendo un récord desde el
tendencia durante el presente año. La inversión en inicio de la serie en 1993, mientras que la inversión
los dos primeros trimestres representó el 83 por bruta aumenta sólo marginalmente pero alcanza
100 del total anual, mientras que la cifra del tercer cotas también históricas con la excepción del año
trimestre de este año cayó un 53,47 por 100 y la 2000. Hay que tener en cuenta que, en el año 2007
del cuarto un 84,73 por 100 sobre los mismos se dan los mayores aumentos de las tasas de varia-
periodos de 2007. No obstante, hay que destacar ción interanual tanto en inversión bruta como en
que, la cifra del cuarto trimestre de 2007 fue una neta, impulso que prosigue en la mitad de 2008
El sector exterior en 2008

de las mejores de la historia y supuso el 75 por 100 (Cuadro 4.2).

de la de todo ese año. Las operaciones entre no residentes y reestruc-
En resumen, excelentes cifras en 2008 debido a turaciones de grupo no constituyen inversión efec-
la continuación del impulso inversor del cuarto tri- tiva porque no implican variación de posición
mestre de 2007 y a las grandes operaciones que con- acreedora ni deudora de España frente al exterior y
tinúan en los dos primeros trimestres del año si- por lo tanto, no se contabilizan en los flujos de
guiente, escasas liquidaciones en el ejercicio en rela- inversión total del ejercicio. No obstante, el Re- 쑱

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 CAPÍTULO 4. LA INVERSIÓN EXTERIOR DIRECTA EN 2008

CUADRO 4.3
(1)
OTRAS OPERACIONES REGISTRADAS
(Millones de euros)

2007 2008
Transmisiones entre no residentes de distinto grupo.................................................................................... 1.161 1.779
Reestructuraciones de grupo
Transmisiones entre no residentes del mismo grupo ........................................................................................ 33.225 38.901
Otras operaciones de reestructuración
Inversiones............................................................................................................................................. 3.301 3.607
Desinversiones....................................................................................................................................... 8.164 5.162
(1)
Operaciones entre no residentes que suponen un cambio en el titular de una inversión en España.
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.4
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE. TIPO DE OPERACIÓN
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
Nueva Producción ................. 6.402 65,0 9.800 33,2 4.906 17,0 -49,9
Constituciones ................... 737 7,5 1.262 4,3 286 1,0 -77,3
Ampliaciones ..................... 5.665 57,5 8.538 28,9 4.619 16,0 -45,9
Adquisiciones......................... 3.451 35,0 19.738 66,8 23.887 83,0 21,0
TOTAL ................................... 9.853 100,0 29.538 100,0 28.793 100,0 -2,5
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

gistro recoge estas operaciones, que suponen flu- La compra-venta de acciones existentes frente
jos inversores y desinversores y que producen a la compra o suscripción de acciones de nueva
cambios de grupos inversores extranjeros y cam- emisión tiene diferentes resultados desde el punto
bios en el origen geográfico del inversor que afec- de vista de impacto económico. Dentro del primer
tan a las características de la posición inversora. tipo de operaciones hablamos de adquisiciones,
Las trasmisiones entre no residentes de distinto que pueden suponer tomas de control (más del 50
grupo han aumentado un 53,3 por 100 respecto a por 100) o tomas de participaciones minoritarias
2007. También se han incrementado las operacio- en empresas españolas por inversores extranjeros y
nes de transmisión entre no residentes del mismo dentro del segundo podemos distinguir: nuevas
grupo en un 17 por 100. Asimismo se recogen en inversiones, ampliaciones de capital e inversiones
este apartado, las operaciones de fusión y adquisi- para reestructuraciones financieras (para pago de
ción que los grupos extranjeros inversores en deudas o reducción de pérdidas). Naturalmente, estas
España llevan a cabo en el extranjero (Cuadro 4.3). últimas no tienen el mismo impacto sobre la pro-
En otras operaciones de reestructuración se ducción, ni sobre el incremento de activos de las
incluyen la transmisión entre no residentes de par- empresas residentes que el de las dos primeras.
ticipaciones de empresas residentes del mismo En el Cuadro 4.4 se observa que siguen siendo
grupo de la que se derivan reestructuraciones de las adquisiciones el tipo de operación predominan-
El sector exterior en 2008

los grupos extranjeros en España, pasos de una te en 2008 con un crecimiento del 21 por 100,
inversión directa a indirecta para una empresa y mientras que constituciones y ampliaciones regis-
paralelamente de una inversión indirecta a directa tran tasas de variación negativas, especialmente las
para otra, así como fusiones de grupos extranjeros constituciones que se desploman con una reduc-
en España. En el origen de la operación está el ción del 77,3 por 100 respecto a 2007.
deseo de llevar a cabo una reestructuración econó- Las desinversiones, excluidas las ETVE, se han
mica del grupo, o razones de conveniencia fiscal. reducido fuertemente con una tasa de variación 쑱

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 El sector exterior en 2008

CUADRO 4.5
DESINVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE. TIPO DE OPERACIÓN
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Porcentaje variación
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
08/07
Liquidaciones ........................... 990 9,8 1.047 10,3 495 15,9 -52,8
Liquidación total ................... 105 1,0 588 5,8 87 2,8 -85,2
Liquidación parcial ............... 885 8,8 459 4,5 407 13,1 -11,3
Ventas ...................................... 9.095 90,2 9.148 89,7 2.619 84,1 -71,4
TOTAL...................................... 10.085 100,0 10.196 100,0 3.113 100,0 -69,5
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.6
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA SIN LAS ETVE. PAÍS DE ORIGEN INMEDIATO
(Millones de euros)

2007 2008 Porcentaje

País
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje variación 08/07

Reino Unido ................................................. 995 3,4 13.198 45,8 1.227,0

Alemania...................................................... 840 2,8 7.492 26,0 791,9
Países Bajos................................................ 2.796 9,5 2.552 8,9 -8,7
Francia......................................................... 569 1,9 2.178 7,6 282,7
Luxemburgo................................................. 3.331 11,3 1.220 4,2 -63,4
Suiza............................................................ 709 2,4 391 1,4 -44,9
Italia ............................................................. 18.141 61,4 272 0,9 -98,5
Portugal ....................................................... 281 1,0 227 0,8 -19,1
Estados Unidos de América ........................ 325 1,1 156 0,5 -51,9
Bélgica ......................................................... 95 0,3 133 0,5 39,0
México ......................................................... 120 0,4 103 0,4 -14,5
Libia ............................................................. 100 0,3 100 0,3 0,0
Dinamarca ................................................... 72 0,2 91 0,3 25,8
Suecia.......................................................... 611 2,1 80 0,3 -86,9
Andorra ........................................................ 35 0,1 62 0,2 76,6
Egipto........................................................... 0 0,0 40 0,1 565.074,8
Uruguay ....................................................... 37 0,1 40 0,1 8,5
Polonia......................................................... 0 0,0 38 0,1 29.449,3
India ............................................................. 10 0,0 35 0,1 237,1
Austria.......................................................... 55 0,2 28 0,1 -48,8
Resto ........................................................... 417 1,4 359 1,2 -13,9
Áreas geográficas
País inmediato: OCDE ................................ 29.047 98,3 28.254 98,1 -2,7
País inmediato: UE-27................................. 27.870 94,4 27.578 95,8 -1,0
País inmediato: UE-15................................. 27.837 94,2 27.493 95,5 -1,2
País inmediato: Latinoamérica .................... 284 1,0 229 0,8 -19,3
País inmediato: Paraísos fiscales................ 168 0,6 198 0,7 17,6
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

cercana al 70 por 100 lo que explica que el creci- 4.2.2. Distribución geográfica
miento de la inversión neta haya sido mucho mayor
que el de la bruta (Cuadro 4.5). El origen de las inversiones está altamente
Las liquidaciones ya sean totales (quiebra, diso- correlacionado con las OPA o altas tomas de par-
lución) como parciales (reducción de capital) consti- ticipación en el capital de grandes empresas espa-
tuyen el 15,9 por 100 del total de desinversiones ñolas, por lo cual la distribución geográfica de la
El sector exterior en 2008

excluidas las ETVE, mientras que las ventas de par- inversión extranjera en España, en un momento
ticipaciones de capital suman el 84,1 por 100 de la dado, está muy condicionada por el origen de las
cifra total. empresas inversoras actoras en grandes operacio-
Las ventas se han contraído a un ritmo mayor nes durante ese periodo. El principal inversor en
que las liquidaciones. En general, se observa una 2008 fue el Reino Unido, que sustituyó a Italia,
contracción generalizada de las desinversiones en seguido de Alemania y Países Bajos. Por áreas no
todos los frentes y en todos los epígrafes. existente variaciones significativas (Cuadro 4.6). 쑱

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CUADRO 4.7
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA SIN LAS ETVE. PAÍS DE ORIGEN ÚLTIMO
(Millones de euros)

2007 2008 Porcentaje

País
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje variación 08/07

Reino Unido ................................................. 1.358 4,6 13.344 46,3 882,4

Alemania ...................................................... 1.014 3,4 7.560 26,3 645,3
Francia ......................................................... 654 2,2 2.250 7,8 243,9
Países Bajos ................................................ 732 2,5 1.181 4,1 61,4
España ......................................................... 340 1,2 880 3,1 158,7
Luxemburgo ................................................. 877 3,0 558 1,9 -36,3
Suiza ............................................................ 171 0,6 499 1,7 191,0
Estados Unidos de América......................... 1.816 6,1 448 1,6 -75,3
Italia.............................................................. 18.929 64,1 272 0,9 -98,6
Portugal........................................................ 292 1,0 225 0,8 -22,9
Bélgica ......................................................... 62 0,2 195 0,7 216,3
Suecia .......................................................... 581 2,0 163 0,6 -72,0
Canadá......................................................... 76 0,3 134 0,5 76,8
Libia.............................................................. 100 0,3 100 0,3 0,0
México.......................................................... 735 2,5 99 0,3 -86,6
Dinamarca.................................................... 72 0,2 77 0,3 6,4
Japón ........................................................... 35 0,1 73 0,3 105,7
Andorra ........................................................ 34 0,1 63 0,2 82,1
Mauricio........................................................ 1 0,0 48 0,2 3.211,5
Egipto ........................................................... 0 0,0 40 0,1 565.074,8
Resto............................................................ 1.656 5,6 584 2,0 -64,7
Áreas geográficas
País último: OCDE....................................... 28.037 94,9 28.134 97,7 0,3
País último: UE-27 ....................................... 25.034 84,8 26.844 93,2 7,2
País último: UE-15 ....................................... 25.010 84,7 26.764 93,0 7,0
País último: Latinoamérica........................... 866 2,9 229 0,8 -73,5
País último: paraísos fiscales ...................... 176 0,6 323 1,1 84,0
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

Como países de origen último de la inversión, agua con un 27,3 por 100. Otros sectores relevan-
el Reino Unido con un 46,3 por 100 confirma su tes, aunque en menor medida, son el de interme-
posición de liderazgo que obtenía como país inme- diación financiera, banca y seguros, con un 9,4 por
diato, seguido de Alemania con un 26,3 por 100. 100 del total y las actividades inmobiliarias y de
Sin embargo, en tercera posición aparece Francia servicios, con un 6,8 por 100 (Cuadro 4.8).
que desplaza a los Países Bajos, país que es utili- A tenor de lo anterior, puede afirmarse que la
zado como tránsito en algunos casos. La aparición inversión extranjera en España tuvo un alto índice
de España con un 3,1 por 100 de la inversión total de concentración ya que los sectores mencionados
se debe a que inversiones realizadas es España suman un 90,5 por 100 de todas las entradas en
desde otro país son realizadas por filiales de em- participaciones de capital español, excluidas las
presas españolas en el extranjero (Cuadro 4.7). ETVE.
A destacar la caída de la inversión desde Italia Si ahora pormenorizamos por sectores, descen-
debida a una fuerte inversión de carácter puntual rea- diendo a una clasificación de cuatro dígitos de la
lizada por una empresa de ese país; también caen las CNAE, podemos afinar más el sector receptor de la
inversiones desde Estados Unidos que pasa de ocu- inversión: el comercio al por mayor y producción de
par el segundo puesto en 2007 al octavo en 2008. tabaco y la producción de energía eléctrica son sec-
El sector exterior en 2008

tores muy destacados de los demás ya que entre ellos

dos suponen el 68,8 por 100 del total invertido. Del
4.2.3. Sectores de destino resto de los sectores sólo otros tipos de intermedia-
ción financiera supera los 1.000 millones de euros.
Destaca el sector comercio con una inversión A pesar de la alta concentración en esos dos secto-
que supone el 47 por 100 del total del año, y la pro- res, el resto de la inversión extranjera está bastante
ducción y distribución de energía eléctrica, gas y repartida entre el resto de los sectores. 쑱

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CUADRO 4.8
SECTOR DE DESTINO EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE
(Millones de euros)
2006 2007 2008
Sector de destino
CNAE (Clasificación Nacional Inversión bruta
Inversión Inversión
de Actividades Económicas) bruta bruta Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
01 al 05 Agricultura,ganadería, caza, selv. y pesca ................ 70 58 61 0,2 4,48
Produc./distrib. eléctrica, gas y agua......................... 177 18.582 7.864 27,3 -57,68
40 al 41 40 Produc.y distrib.energía eléctrica, gas............. 78 18.580 7.434 25,8 -60
41 Captación, depuración y distrib. agua ............. 99 2 429 1,5 20.087
10 al 14 y 23 Indust. extractivas, refino petróleo ............................. 166 29 93 0,3 226,23
15 al 16 Alimentación/bebidas y tabaco .................................. 299 702 60 0,2 -91,51
17 al 19 Industria textil y de la confección............................... 86 21 35 0,1 68,86
21 al 22 Industria papel, edición, artes gráficas ...................... 357 502 31 0,1 -93,78
Ind. química y transf. caucho y plásticos................... 417 1.050 196 0,7 -81,37
24 al 25
24 Industria química............................................. 341 995 127 0,4 -87
20 y 26 al 37 Otras manufacturas ................................................... 791 1.405 370 1,3 -73,6
45 Construcción .............................................................. 143 1.397 412 1,4 -70,50
Comercio.................................................................... 1.055 479 13.542 47,0 2.728,05
50 al 52 51 Comercio mayor e intermed.comercio............ 877 283 13.134 45,6 4.542
52 Comercio por menor, exc.vehículos motor ...... 89 172 346 1,2 102
55 Hostelería................................................................... 538 335 216 0,7 -35,6
Transportes y comunicaciones .................................. 2.281 678 783 2,7 15,37
60 Transporte terrestre; transp. por tubería.......... 11 327 234 0,8 -28
60 al 64
64 Telecomunicaciones......................................... 1.456 84 444 1,5 425
63 Actividades anexas a los transportes .............. 675 221 103 0,4 -53
Intermediación financ., banca y seguros ................... 619 1.915 2.705 9,4 41,24
65 al 67 65 Banca y otros interm. financieros .................... 528 1.684 1.372 4,8 -19
66 Seguros y planes pensio., exc. seg. social...... 83 127 1.290 4,5 915
Actividades inmobiliarias y servicios.......................... 2.387 1.993 1.964 6,8 -1,42
70 al 74
70 actividades inmobiliarias................................. 1.476 1.303 1.274 4,4 -2
(excepto 7415)
72 actividades informáticas ................................. 92 106 141 0,5 33
Resto 467 393 462 1,6 17,60
75 al 93
92 Activid. recreativas, culturales y deport ........... 403 159 288 1,0 81
TOTAL ........................................................................................................... 9.853 29.538 28.793 100,0 -2,52
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.9
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA SIN LAS ETVE
LOS VEINTE PRIMEROS SECTORES DE DESTINO
(Millones de euros)
2007 2008
CNAE Sector de destino
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
5135 Comercio al por mayor prod. del tabaco ............. 0 0,0 12.616 43,8
4011 Producción de energía eléctrica .......................... 41 0,1 7.198 25,0
6512 Otros tipos de intermediación monetaria ............. 1.495 5,1 1.068 3,7
6603 Seguros no vida ................................................... 0 0,0 783 2,7
7011 Promoción inmobiliaria por cuenta propia ........... 548 1,9 567 2,0
6601 Seguros de vida ................................................... 127 0,4 507 1,8
6420 Telecomunicaciones............................................. 84 0,3 444 1,5
4100 Captación, depuración y distribución agua.......... 2 0,0 429 1,5
7012 Compraventa bienes inmobiliarios cta. pro.......... 242 0,8 298 1,0
7020 Alquiler bienes inmobiliarios cta. propia............... 316 1,1 253 0,9
El sector exterior en 2008

6522 Otros tipos de actividades crediticias .................. 92 0,3 236 0,8

4523 Construc. autopistas, carreteras, vías férr........... 3 0,0 213 0,7
4010 Produc. y distribución energía eléctrica............... 18.537 62,8 194 0,7
7414 Consulta y asesor. sobre dirección y gest ........... 89 0,3 171 0,6
6030 Transporte por tubería ......................................... 0 0,0 168 0,6
5155 Comercio al por mayor productos químicos ........ 19 0,1 162 0,6
7032 Gestión y admon. propiedad inmobiliaria ............ 195 0,7 153 0,5
7484 Otras actividades empresariales.......................... 88 0,3 147 0,5
9220 Actividades de radio y televisión.......................... 98 0,3 136 0,5
5211 Comercio por menor, predominio alimentos ........ 0 0,0 132 0,5
Resto.................................................................... 7.562 25,6 2.918 10,1
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

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CUADRO 4.10
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA, EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE, POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE DESTINO
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Comunidad Autónoma Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
Comunidad de Madrid ......................... 4.218 42,8 22.714 76,9 23.803 82,7 4,8
Cataluña .............................................. 2.593 26,3 2.598 8,8 2.124 7,4 -18,2
En todo el territorio nacional................ 1.386 14,1 183 0,6 1.131 3,9 519,1
Islas Baleares ...................................... 117 1,2 144 0,5 505 1,8 249,5
Comunidad Valenciana........................ 163 1,7 1.740 5,9 256 0,9 -85,3
País Vasco........................................... 306 3,1 1.351 4,6 240 0,8 -82,3
Andalucía............................................. 244 2,5 246 0,8 196 0,7 -20,2
Región de Murcia ................................ 113 1,1 42 0,1 189 0,7 346,5
Aragón ................................................. 91 0,9 209 0,7 99 0,3 -52,6
Castilla-La Mancha.............................. 262 2,7 22 0,1 89 0,3 299,8
Cantabria ............................................. 4 0,0 59 0,2 47 0,2 -21,7
Castilla y León ..................................... 36 0,4 23 0,1 46 0,2 97,1
Galicia.................................................. 96 1,0 50 0,2 23 0,1 -55,0
Islas Canarias...................................... 41 0,4 128 0,4 18 0,1 -86,3
Navarra ................................................ 137 1,4 10 0,0 16 0,1 65,1
Principado de Asturias......................... 33 0,3 8 0,0 7 0,0 -16,3
Extremadura ........................................ 4 0,0 4 0,0 5 0,0 32,5
Ceuta y Melilla ..................................... 9 0,1 3 0,0 1 0,0 -75,9
La Rioja ............................................... 1 0,0 3 0,0 0 0,0 -86,2
TOTAL ................................................. 9.853 100,0 29.538 100,0 28.793 100,0 -2,5
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

La alta concentración sectorial es debida a opera-
ciones de compra de importantes empresas españo-
las en los sectores citados por empresas extranjeras
radicadas en países que también ocupan el ranking de
país de origen último de las inversiones (Cuadro 4.9).
4.2.4. Distribución por comunidades autónomas
Al realizarse el reparto de los flujos inversores
extranjeros según la sede social de las empresas ob-
jeto de inversión receptora (grandes empresas que
han sido objeto de grandes operaciones de adqui-
sición o toma de participación mayoritaria) la con-
centración en la Comunidad de Madrid alcanza un
82 por 100 del total. Ya en 2007 su porcentaje de
participación casi había duplicado su participación
respecto al año anterior por idénticos motivos a los
señalados anteriormente (Cuadro 4.10).
nes de euros con una caída del 64,6 por 100 res-
pecto a 2007, año que fue excepcionalmente posi-
tivo con cifras récord (Cuadro 4.11). Esta contrac-
ción es la mayor desde que se elaboran estos regis-
tros. La inversión española en el exterior se man-
tiene por encima de la extranjera en España como
ha venido siendo habitual desde 1998, recuperan-
do una tendencia que se quebró en el primer
semestre de este año. No obstante, las cifras de
2008 suponen sólo un 2,44 por 100 más que la
inversión extranjera en España, desde un 290,8 por
100 de 2007.
Las liquidaciones se han concentrado en las em-
presas no ETVE siendo porcentualmente mayores
en las sociedades cotizadas. No obstante, la mayor
concentración (64,1 por 100 del total) y también la
mayor contracción (73 por 100) de los flujos inver-
sores se ha dado en las sociedades no cotizadas.
El análisis por trimestres arroja tasas de varia-
ción negativas en todos ellos respecto a igual
El sector exterior en 2008

periodo del año anterior. Las mayores caídas se

4.3. Inversiones españolas en el exterior concentran en el segundo y cuarto, donde se tienen
registros negativos por encima de la media.
4.3.1. Evolución general En resumen, la inversión española en el exterior
se ha contraído de forma aguda en términos anua-
La inversión bruta española en participaciones les en todos los epígrafes analizados desde el ini-
de capital en el exterior ascendió a 38.636 millo- cio de 2008. 쑱

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CUADRO 4.11
INVERSIÓN TOTAL
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Porcentaje variación
Importe
Inversión Inversión Inversión Inversión 08/07
bruta neta bruta neta Inversión Inversión Inversión Inversión
bruta neta bruta neta
Inversión total en participaciones en el capital............. 65.457 55.019 109.212 91.109 38.636 30.819 -64,6 -66,2
Inversión descontadas las ETVE.................................. 61.201 54.290 95.712 80.253 28.903 22.018 -69,8 -72,6
– En sociedades no cotizadas ................................. 30.968 25.399 91.016 75.864 24.801 19.851 -72,8 -73,8
– En sociedades cotizadas ...................................... 30.232 28.891 4.696 4.389 4.102 2.166 -12,7 -50,6
Inversión de las ETVE .................................................. 4.256 730 13.499 10.857 9.734 8.802 -27,9 -18,9
No incluye ni transmisiones entre residentes ni reestructuraciones de grupo.
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.12
EVOLUCIÓN DE LA INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR, SERIE HISTÓRICA
(Millones de euros)

Años Inversión bruta Porcentaje variación Inversión neta Porcentaje variación

1993 1.879 – 828 –

1994 4.236 125,4 3.117 276,4
1995 5.991 41,4 2.941 -5,7
1996 5.015 -16,3 3.372 14,7
1997 10.513 109,6 9.082 169,3
1998 15.410 46,6 12.277 35,2
1999 51.528 234,4 43.751 256,4
2000 60.278 17,0 48.500 10,9
2001 47.860 -20,6 43.041 -11,3
2002 46.967 -1,9 31.384 -27,1
2003 31.712 -32,5 25.752 -17,9
2004 49.283 55,4 43.345 68,3
2005 34.197 -30,6 26.558 -38,7
2006 65.457 32,8 55.019 26,9
2007 109.212 66,8 91.109 65,6
2008 38.636 -64,6 30.819 -66,2
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

Las tasas de variación trimestrales anualizadas ción de España frente al resto del mundo, no incre-
son todas fuertemente negativas especialmente a mentan sus activos en el exterior, ni mejoran su
partir del segundo trimestre, concentrándose las posición acreedora. Las transmisiones entre resi-
inversiones en sociedades no cotizadas. dentes de distinto grupo que comportan una inver-
En el Cuadro 4.12 se sigue la evolución de la sión (adquisición del nuevo inversor) y una desin-
inversión española en el exterior desde 1993. En versión (venta del anterior titular), registraron un
estos dieciséis años España ha multiplicado su incremento del 14,65 por 100.
inversión exterior extraordinariamente, convirtién- Las trasmisiones entre residentes del mismo
dose en emisor neto en 1997 y manteniendo esa grupo experimentaron una fuerte contracción –el
situación hasta el presente. 61,2 por 100– respecto de 2007, mientras que el resto
La cifra de inversión bruta del ejercicio 2008 de las operaciones registradas de reestructuración
El sector exterior en 2008

cae por debajo de los niveles alcanzados en 2006, aumentaron fuertemente durante el ejercicio analiza-
presentando la tasa de variación negativa inter- do, respondiendo estas últimas al deseo por parte de
anual más alta de toda la serie desde 1993 tanto en los inversores españoles de lograr una estructura de
términos brutos como netos, aunque la caída es sus inversiones que permita una mayor optimización
mayor en este último epígrafe. fiscal y de gestión empresarial (Cuadro 4.13).
Como indicábamos al hablar de las inversiones Por tipo de operación y dentro del marco contrac-
extranjeras estas operaciones no alteran la posi- tivo antes señalado, las adquisiciones de acciones 쑱

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CUADRO 4.13
OTRAS OPERACIONES REGISTRADAS
(Millones de euros)

2007 2008
Transmisiones entre residentes de distinto grupo ......................................................................................... 1.453 1.666
Reestructuraciones de grupo
Transmisiones entre residentes del mismo grupo................................................................................................ 10.558 4.092
Otras operaciones de reestructuración
Inversiones............................................................................................................................................... 9.516 19.642
Desinversiones ........................................................................................................................................ 11.491 16.679
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.14
INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA BRUTA EN EL EXTERIOR EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE POR TIPO DE OPERACIÓN
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
Nueva Producción ................. 18.168 29,7 40.025 41,8 13.361 46,2 -66,6
Constituciones ................... 4.558 7,4 1.388 1,5 1.095 3,8 -21,1
Ampliaciones ..................... 13.610 22,2 38.637 40,4 12.265 42,4 -68,3
Adquisiciones......................... 43.032 70,3 55.688 58,2 15.542 53,8 -72,1
TOTAL ................................... 61.201 100,0 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.15
DESINVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE POR TIPO DE OPERACIÓN
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Porcentaje variación
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
08/07
Liquidaciones ........................... 1.870 27,1 2.997 19,4 1.809 26,3 -39,6
Liquidación total ................... 596 8,6 759 4,9 76 1,1 -90,0
Liquidación parcial ............... 1.274 18,4 2.239 14,5 1.733 25,2 -22,6
Ventas ...................................... 5.041 72,9 12.462 80,6 5.076 73,7 -59,3
TOTAL...................................... 6.911 100,0 15.460 100,0 6.885 100,0 -55,5
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

existentes se han contraído por encima del total, 4.3.2. Distribución geográfica excluidas las ETVE
mientras que las inversiones de nueva producción lo
han hecho por debajo del mismo, a la vez que han La distribución geográfica de las inversiones
aumentado su porcentaje de participación sobre el españolas en el exterior –al igual que la de las inver-
total siendo esta la tendencia general en los tres últi- siones extranjeras en España– está condicionada por
mos años. Las constituciones presentan la menor las grandes operaciones puntuales que se hayan pro-
tasa de variación negativa (Cuadro 4.14). ducido durante el periodo analizado, así como por las
El sector exterior en 2008

La desinversión en 2008 ha sido menos de la preferencias de países y áreas de los inversores espa-
mitad de la registrada en 2007, predominando las ñoles. Como consecuencia de esos dos factores, los
ventas de acciones existentes que caen por encima Estados Unidos se sitúan en cabeza de la lista, segui-
de la media, frente a las liquidaciones, sean éstas dos del Reino Unido y Países Bajos, siendo estos tres
totales por quiebra o disolución de la empresa par- países, aunque en distinto orden, los que estaban a la
ticipada, o parciales, por reducción del capital cabeza de la lista en 2007 (Cuadro 4.16).
(Cuadro 4.15). La distribución por áreas geográficas o grupos 쑱

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CUADRO 4.16
DISTRIBUCIÓN GEOGRÁFICA DE LA INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE
(Millones de euros)
2007 2008
Porcentaje
País
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje variación 08/07

Estados Unidos de América ............... 9.820 10,3 6.516 22,5 -33,6

Reino Unido........................................ 29.987 31,3 4.652 16,1 -84,5
Países Bajos....................................... 23.252 24,3 3.564 12,3 -84,7
México ................................................ 2.412 2,5 3.306 11,4 37,1
Grecia ................................................. 909 0,9 1.116 3,9 22,7
Portugal .............................................. 825 0,9 1.042 3,6 26,3
Francia................................................ 2.447 2,6 966 3,3 -60,5
Bélgica................................................ 309 0,3 837 2,9 171,0
Hong Kong.......................................... 35 0,0 738 2,6 2.012,7
Austria ................................................ 6 0,0 696 2,4 12.316,9
Turquía ............................................... 1.120 1,2 651 2,3 -41,9
Brasil................................................... 3.054 3,2 573 2,0 -81,2
Marruecos........................................... 142 0,1 551 1,9 287,2
Italia .................................................... 4.894 5,1 372 1,3 -92,4
Perú .................................................... 89 0,1 366 1,3 313,0
Luxemburgo........................................ 180 0,2 282 1,0 56,7
Alemania............................................. 2.931 3,1 222 0,8 -92,4
Rusia .................................................. 332 0,3 197 0,7 -40,7
Colombia ............................................ 157 0,2 193 0,7 22,6
Uruguay .............................................. 146 0,2 190 0,7 29,9
Argentina ............................................ 489 0,5 161 0,6 -67,0
Resto .................................................. 12.177 12,7 1.711 5,9 -85,9
TOTAL ................................................ 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8
Áreas geográficas
OCDE ................................................. 89.266 93,3 24.806 85,8 -72,2
UE-27 ................................................. 74.617 78,0 14.234 49,2 -80,9
UE-15 ................................................. 66.436 69,4 13.805 47,8 -79,2
Latinoamérica ..................................... 6.824 7,1 5.056 17,5 -25,9
Paraísos fiscales ................................ 218 0,2 974 3,4 349,8
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.17
SECTORES DE DESTINO EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

CNAE Sector de destino Inversión bruta

Inversión Inversión
bruta bruta Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
01 al 05 Agricultura,ganadería,caza,selv.y pesca ...................... 138 280 91 0,3 -67,5
Produc./distrib. eléctrica, gas y agua............................ 1.485 21.032 4.928 17,0 -76,6
40 al 41
40 Produc. y distrib. energía eléctrica, gas ............. 951 21.017 4.798 16,6 -77,2
10 al 14 y 23 Indust.extractivas, refino petróleo................................. 396 142 16 0,1 -88,6
15 al 16 Alimentación/bebidas y tabaco ..................................... 1.418 1.323 97 0,3 -92,7
17 al 19 Industria textil y de la confección.................................. 95 52 19 0,1 -63,5
21 al 22 Industria papel, edición, artes gráficas ......................... 944 211 29 0,1 -86,2
24 al 25 Ind. química y transf. caucho y plásticos...................... 1.332 1.456 121 0,4 -91,7
Otras manufacturas ...................................................... 2.754 6.111 2.635 9,1 -56,9
20 y 26 al 37
26 Fabricación otros prod. minerales no metál. ...... 930 2.415 2.118 7,3 -12,3
45 Construcción ................................................................. 2.928 1.928 379 1,3 -80,4
Comercio....................................................................... 1.656 2.045 2.114 7,3 3,4
50 al 52 52 Comercio por menor, exc. vehículos motor ........ 795 684 1.079 3,7 57,7
51 Comercio mayor e intermed. comercio.............. 859 1.305 1.024 3,5 -21,5
El sector exterior en 2008

55 Hostelería...................................................................... 962 1.116 129 0,4 -88,5

60 al 64 Transportes y comunicaciones ..................................... 30.463 15.208 446 1,5 -97,1
Intermediación financ., banca y seguros ...................... 9.598 41.368 15.024 52,0 -63,7
65 al 67 65 Banca y otros interm. financieros ....................... 8.678 38.925 11.293 39,1 -71,0
66 Seguros y planes pensiones, exc. seg. social.... 683 2.011 3.465 12,0 72,3
70 al 74 Actividades inmobiliarias y servicios............................. 4.123 2.993 2.641 9,1 -11,8
(excepto 7415) 70 Actividades inmobiliarias..................................... 3.359 2.542 2.123 7,3 -16,5
75 al 93 Otros ............................................................................. 2.909 448 234 0,8 -47,7
TOTAL........................................................................... 61.201 95.712 28.903 100,0 -69,8
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

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CUADRO 4.18
PRINCIPALES SECTORES DE DESTINO EXLUIDAS ETVE
(Millones de euros)

2007 2008
CNAE Sector de destino
Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
6512 Otros tipos de intermediación monetaria .............................. 22.171 23,2 6.147 21,3 -72,3
4011 Producción de energía eléctrica............................................ 1.275 1,3 4.766 16,5 273,8
6523 Otros tipos de intermediación financiera............................... 16.358 17,1 4.091 14,2 -75,0
6603 Seguros no vida .................................................................... 954 1,0 3.106 10,7 225,4
2651 Fabricación de cemento ........................................................ 2.149 2,2 1.862 6,4 -13,4
6522 Otros tipos de actividades crediticias.................................... 111 0,1 1.055 3,6 854,1
7011 Promoción inmobiliaria por cuenta propia............................. 1.741 1,8 1.035 3,6 -40,6
7020 Alquiler bienes inmobiliarios cta.propia................................. 266 0,3 853 3,0 220,5
5211 Comercio por menor, predominio alimentos ......................... 136 0,1 719 2,5 428,9
6602 Planes de pensiones ............................................................. 25 0,0 359 1,2 1.344,6
5242 Comercio al por menor prendas de vestir............................. 495 0,5 319 1,1 -35,7
5137 Comercio al por mayor café, té, cacao y espec.................... 0 0,0 313 1,1 No consta
6321 Otras activid. anexas al transporte terrestre ......................... 164 0,2 310 1,1 89,4
2742 Produc. y transformación aluminio........................................ 0 0,0 184 0,6 245.971,5
7414 Consulta y asesor. sobre dirección y gestión........................ 81 0,1 162 0,6 99,3
Resto ..................................................................................... 49.786 52,0 3.623 12,5 -92,7
TOTAL ................................................................................... 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores

de países muestran una caída de la participación de tor de holdings domina la distribución en origen lo
los países de la UE en favor de Latinoamérica, mien- que viene a significar que la actividad inversora que
tras que se observa un fuerte aumento del flujo ha tenido como destino un sector productivo deter-
inversor hacia los paraísos fiscales que, aunque su minado se ha instrumentado en algunos casos a tra-
participación sobre el total sigue siendo pequeña, ha vés de una sociedad holding. No obstante, esta clasi-
dejado de ser marginal. ficación debe corresponderse a grandes rasgos con
la clasificación por destino ya que resulta lógico
pensar que las empresas que están especializas en un
4.3.3. Sectores de destino y de origen sector en el mercado nacional realizan su actividad
en el mismo sector en el mercado exterior al que
Los Cuadros 4.17 y 4.18 explican la distribu- acuden (Cuadro 4.19).
ción del flujo inversor español en el país de recep-
ción o destino. En el primer caso a dos dígitos de
la clasificación CNAE y en el segundo a cuatro. 4.3.4. Comunidades autónomas de origen
Correspondiéndose con las operaciones de compra excluidas las ETVE
más cuantiosas del año, son los sectores de banca,
energía eléctrica y seguros los destinos principales Cuatro comunidades autónomas concentran el
de la inversión española en el periodo. 86,4 por 100 de la inversión total emitida. El orden
Los cinco primeros sectores o subsectores refe- de importancia de las comunidades emisoras tiene
renciados acaparan casi el 70 por 100 del total de pocas variaciones respecto a 2007, con excepción de
El sector exterior en 2008

la inversión española del periodo, estando pues la Cataluña, que asciende del cuarto al segundo lugar.
inversión española en el exterior bastante concen- Hay que tener de nuevo en cuenta la sede social de
trada en unos pocos sectores de destino. las grandes compañías inversoras para explicar la
Si clasificamos los sectores según las empresas distribución por comunidades autónomas.
de las que procede la inversión española e incluimos Es significativo que estas cuatro comunidades
las sociedades holding y también las ETVE, tene- ven decrecer fuertemente sus cifras de inversión en
mos el reparto total por sector en origen del total de el exterior, siendo Cataluña la que lo hace a tasas
la inversión bruta. Vemos ahora que este nuevo sec- más moderadas y de ahí su ascenso en la clasifi- 쑱

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CUADRO 4.19
SECTORES DE ORIGEN
(Millones de euros)
2006 2007 2008

Inversión bruta
CNAE Sector de origen Inversión Inversión
bruta bruta Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
Persona física.......................................................... 98 408 195 0,5 -52,3
01al 05 Agricultura, ganadería, caza, selv. y pesca ............ 147 92 109 0,3 18,2
Produc./distrib. eléctrica, gas y agua ...................... 1.229 19.769 4.623 12,0 -76,6
40 al 41
Produc. y distrib.energía eléctrica, gas ............... 817 19.753 4.529 11,7 -77,1
10 al 14 y 23 Indust. extractivas, refino petróleo .......................... 265 154 105 0,3 -31,4
15 al 16 Alimentación/bebidas y tabaco ............................... 937 846 392 1,0 -53,6
17 al 19 Industria textil y de la confección ............................ 434 320 222 0,6 -30,6
21 al 22 Industria papel, edición, artes gráficas ................... 484 48 321 0,8 563,5
24 al 25 Ind. química y transf. caucho y plásticos ................ 854 1.309 130 0,3 -90,1
Otras manufacturas................................................. 1.673 2.328 2.640 6,8 13,4
20 y 26 al 37 Fabricación otros prod. minerales no metáli. ...... 587 819 1.527 4,0 86,5
Fabric. otro material de transporte ...................... 32 412 923 2,4 124,0
45 Construcción............................................................ 1.096 455 443 1,1 -2,6
50 al 52 Comercio ................................................................. 1.184 1.034 427 1,1 -58,7
55 Hostelería ................................................................ 557 131 821 2,1 527,6
60 al 64 Transportes y comunicaciones................................ 27.022 14.655 333 0,9 -97,7
Intermediación financ., banca y seguros ................ 7.369 23.308 6.915 17,9 -70,3
65 al 67
Banca y otros interm. financieros........................ 6.984 23.273 6.835 17,7 -70,6
70 al 74 Actividades inmobiliarias y servicios ....................... 2.835 2.134 2.335 6,0 9,4
(excepto 7415) Actividades inmobiliarias ..................................... 2.561 1.772 1.702 4,4 -4,0
Gestión de sociedades y tenencia de valores ........ 16.717 42.075 18.557 48,0 -55,9
7415 Empresas tenencia val. extranjeros .................... 4.256 13.499 9.734 25,2 -27,9
Holdings de sociedades ...................................... 12.461 28.575 8.824 22,8 -69,1
75 al 93 Otros........................................................................ 2.556 146 67 0,2 -53,8
TOTAL ..................................................................... 65.457 109.212 38.636 100,0 -64,6
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.20
COMUNIDADES AUTÓNOMAS DE ORIGEN EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE
(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Comunidad Autónoma
Porcentaje
Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje
variación 08/07
Comunidad de Madrid ......................................... 44.616 72,9 34.450 36,0 9.370 32,4 -72,8
Cataluña .............................................................. 6.224 10,2 6.908 7,2 5.898 20,4 -14,6
Cantabria ............................................................. 4.573 7,5 21.208 22,2 5.225 18,1 -75,4
País Vasco........................................................... 2.735 4,5 28.243 29,5 4.483 15,5 -84,1
Islas Baleares...................................................... 395 0,6 1.464 1,5 1.425 4,9 -2,7
Comunidad Valenciana........................................ 260 0,4 747 0,8 1.311 4,5 75,5
Galicia.................................................................. 1.236 2,0 1.525 1,6 644 2,2 -57,7
Andalucía............................................................. 433 0,7 483 0,5 156 0,5 -67,7
Castilla y León..................................................... 71 0,1 102 0,1 126 0,4 22,9
Castilla-La Mancha.............................................. 11 0,0 157 0,2 90 0,3 -42,8
Región de Murcia ................................................ 148 0,2 107 0,1 65 0,2 -39,8
Aragón ................................................................. 79 0,1 150 0,2 50 0,2 -66,3
Islas Canarias...................................................... 77 0,1 5 0,0 48 0,2 877,5
Navarra................................................................ 206 0,3 16 0,0 5 0,0 -67,1
El sector exterior en 2008

Principado de Asturias......................................... 120 0,2 15 0,0 4 0,0 -75,8

Extremadura ........................................................ 10 0,0 131 0,1 2 0,0 -98,8
La Rioja ............................................................... 4 0,0 1 0,0 1 0,0 -44,5
Ceuta y Melilla..................................................... 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 -
TOTAL ................................................................. 61.201 100,0 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8
Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

cación. De las comunidades con más de 50 millo- munidad Valenciana y Castilla y León mejoran las
nes de euros de inversión emitidas sólo dos, la Co- cifras del ejercicio precedente (Cuadro 4.20). 쑱

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 CAPÍTULO 4. LA INVERSIÓN EXTERIOR DIRECTA EN 2008

NOTA SOBRE METODOLOGÍA

Inversión Directa
De acuerdo con las directrices y prácticas recomendadas a nivel internacional por el 5º Manual de Balanza de
Pagos, se consideran operaciones de inversión exterior directa, aquellas en las que el inversor pretender conseguir
un control o influencia en la dirección y administración de una empresa que opera fuera del territorio en el que resi-
de. En la práctica se estima que se consigue ese control cuando la participación del inversor en el capital de la
empresa alcanza o supera el 10 por 100.
En la Balanza de Pagos de España las operaciones de inversión exterior directa se clasifican según la natura-
leza del instrumento en que se materializa la inversión en: acciones y otras formas de participación, beneficios rein-
vertidos, financiación entre empresas del grupo y inversión en inmuebles.
Los datos, que recoge este Registro de Inversiones Exteriores (RIE) son los declarados por los inversores de
acuerdo con lo establecido en la legislación sobre inversiones exteriores: RD 664/1999, OM de 28 de mayo de 2001
y Resolución Ministerial de 21 de febrero de 2002, donde se fija para su presentación, el plazo máximo de un mes
contado a partir de la fecha de la formalización de la inversión. Por lo tanto, registramos todas las formas de parti-
cipación en el capital de las empresas (acciones y otras formas de participación), pero no incluimos: la financiación
entre empresas, los beneficios reinvertidos (excepto cuando se capitalizan los préstamos y/o los beneficios) y la
inversión en inmuebles.
Las inversiones recogidas se asignan al período correspondiente de acuerdo con la fecha de realización de las
mismas. No obstante, como consecuencia de indeseables retrasos en su presentación, en las actualizaciones tri-
mestrales, se modifican datos correspondientes a períodos anteriores como resultado de operaciones declaradas
en el último período pero cuya realización corresponde a un período anterior.
Téngase en cuenta que, aquí, estamos midiendo flujos de inversión que representan las aportaciones al capi-
tal social de las empresas y que nos proporcionan la historia de la inversión a lo largo del periodo, que debemos
diferenciar de la posición (stock) de las inversiones extranjeras directas en España y de las inversiones españolas
directas en el exterior en un momento determinado.

Inversión Bruta

En el caso de la inversión extranjera en España recoge las operaciones de no residentes que supongan:

• Participación en sociedades españolas no cotizadas.

• Participación superior al 10 por 100 en sociedades españolas cotizadas.

• Constitución o ampliación de dotación de sucursales de empresas extranjeras.

• Otras formas de inversión en entidades o contratos registrados en España (fundaciones, cooperativas, agru-
paciones de interés económico) en las que el capital invertido sea superior a 3.005.060,52 euros.
En el caso de la inversión española en el exterior recoge las operaciones de residentes que supongan:

• Participación en sociedades no cotizadas domiciliadas en el exterior.

• Participación en sociedades cotizadas domiciliadas en el exterior (superior al 10 por 100 del capital).
El sector exterior en 2008

• Constitución o ampliación de dotación de sucursales.

• Otras formas de inversión en entidades o contratos registrados en el exterior (fundaciones, cooperativas,

agrupaciones de interés económico) en las que el capital invertido sea superior a 1.502.530,26 euros.

Inversión Neta

Es el resultado de restar a la inversión bruta las desinversiones, por causa de transmisiones entre residentes y
no residentes, liquidaciones parciales (reducciones de capital) o totales (disoluciones o quiebras).

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 El sector exterior en 2008

Entidades de Tenencia de Valores Extranjeros. Operaciones tipo ETVE

Las Entidades de Tenencia de Valores Extranjeros son sociedades establecidas en España cuyo «principal»
objeto es la tenencia de participaciones de sociedades situadas en el exterior. Las ETVE son sociedades instru-
mentales cuya existencia obedece a estrategias de optimización fiscal dentro un mismo grupo empresarial y en
muchos casos sus inversiones carecen de efectos económicos directos.
Las operaciones de inversión llevadas a cabo por este tipo de sociedades generalmente consisten en la trans-
misión dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial de participaciones en sociedades radicadas fuera de España.
Formalmente la transferencia a una sociedad domiciliada en España de la titularidad de una empresa radicada
en el exterior genera simultáneamente dos anotaciones en el Registro: una inversión extranjera en España al pro-
ducirse un aumento de capital no residente equivalente al valor de los activos financieros aportados, y una inver-
sión española en el exterior por la misma cuantía, al adquirir una empresa domiciliada en España la titularidad de
unos activos situados en el exterior.
En un principio se optó por separar las operaciones de inversión de las ETVE del resto de las inversiones, sin
embargo, al irse modificando la normativa fiscal la separación entre las ETVE y el resto de empresas ha ido per-
diendo significado. Por una parte, las ETVE pueden ampliar su objeto social hacia actividades más allá de la mera
tenencia de valores y, por otra parte, empresas no ETVE llevan a cabo operaciones de transmisión de tenencia de
participaciones empresariales al poder acogerse a las ventajas fiscales inherentes a este tipo de operaciones.
Por este motivo se han diferenciado las inversiones atendiendo no solamente al tipo de empresa sino también
a la naturaleza de la operación. Se separan así las operaciones tipo ETVE, del resto de las operaciones de inver-
sión, clasificándose como tales:

• Operaciones de transmisión no dinerarias (por ej.: acciones) dentro del mismo grupo empresarial de partici-
paciones del grupo en empresas extranjeras, sean o no llevadas a cabo por empresas fiscalmente acogidas
al régimen de ETVE.

• Todo tipo de operaciones llevadas a cabo por empresas fiscalmente registradas como ETVE, cuando la acti-
vidad de la empresa sea únicamente la tenencia de valores extranjeros.
Las operaciones de ETVE controladas por residentes en España no se incluyen bajo este epígrafe.
Conviene separar las operaciones tipo ETVE porque pueden tener un valor efectivo muy elevado y un resultado
económico muy limitado. Una operación de esta naturaleza puede valorarse en miles de millones de euros y al mismo
tiempo no generar inversión en activos fijos ni puesto de trabajo alguno en el país que figura como receptor.

Otras operaciones registradas

Se incluyen en este apartado una serie de operaciones que implican cambio de titularidad de la inversión pero
que no suponen variación en la posición inversora frente al exterior.
En el caso de la inversión extranjera son operaciones como las siguientes:
• Transmisiones entre no residentes, de activos o participaciones en empresas residentes.
• Reestructuración de activos en España dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial cuya matriz es no residente.
En el caso de la inversión española en el exterior son operaciones como:
• Transmisiones entre residentes, de activos o participaciones en empresas no residentes.
• Reestructuración de activos en el exterior dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial dominado por una empre-
sa residente.
El sector exterior en 2008

Sector

El sector de inversión corresponde al sector de actividad de la empresa receptora de la inversión.

En el caso de la inversión española en el exterior se especifica también el sector de origen que corresponde al
sector de actividad de la empresa inversora española.
Los sectores se clasifican según la Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas (CNAE).
Las inversiones en/o desde cabeceras de grupo o holdings empresariales se han asignado, en la medida de lo
posible, al sector de destino final.

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País
En la inversión extranjera en España se diferencia entre:
País inmediato: país donde reside el titular directo de la inversión.
País último: país de residencia del titular último de la inversión, es decir, en el que se agota la cadena de
titularidad.
En la inversión española en el exterior se hace referencia a:
País inmediato: país de primer destino de la inversión.

Comunidad autónoma

La inversión extranjera en España se asigna a la comunidad autónoma donde está previsto se lleven a cabo las
actividades generadas por la inversión. Las inversiones de ámbito general se asignan al apartado «Todo el territo-
rio nacional».
La inversión española en el exterior se atribuye a la comunidad autónoma donde radica la sede social de la
empresa inversora.

Diferencia con los datos publicados por el Banco de España

Los datos sobre inversión directa publicados en la Balanza de Pagos por el Banco de España difieren de los
datos del Registro de Inversiones en los siguientes aspectos:
• Los datos de la Balanza de Pagos incluyen, como ya hemos dicho: reinversión de beneficios, inversión de
particulares en inmuebles y flujos de financiación entre empresas relacionadas. Estos conceptos no están
incluidos en los datos del Registro.
• En la Balanza de Pagos se contabiliza la inversión a medida que se producen los desembolsos: pagos e
ingresos. El Registro contabiliza la inversión de una sola vez en el momento de formalizarse la operación, es
decir, de acuerdo con el principio del devengo. La forma de financiación de una operación de inversión direc-
ta puede implicar diferencias temporales entre la contabilización de las operaciones por su devengo y su liqui-
dación efectiva.
• En la Balanza de Pagos no se diferencian las operaciones de inversión en función de su naturaleza (ETVE
y no ETVE). En cuanto a la asignación geográfica y sectorial, el Banco de España utiliza siempre el país y
sector de primera contrapartida, mientras que el Registro obtiene datos de la inversión extranjera en España
en función del país de primera contrapartida y en función del país del inversor final. Para la inversión espa-
ñola en el exterior también se utiliza el país de primera contrapartida o inmediato. En lo que se refiere a los
sectores la inversión española al exterior dispone de información sobre el sector de origen de la empresa
española inversora y sobre el sector de destino de su inversión en el exterior, mientras que en la inversión
extranjera en España sólo se conoce el sector de la empresa participada es decir el sector de destino.

En la Balanza de Pagos, los datos recogen sólo las transacciones netas-adquisiciones por residentes de acti-
vos frente a no residentes, menos sus ventas y sus amortizaciones, en los activos y las adquisiciones por no resi-
dentes de activos emitidos por residentes, menos sus ventas y sus amortizaciones, en los pasivos. El Registro reco-
ge valores brutos y a través del conocimiento de las desinversiones calcula los valores netos.

Para ver estas diferencias en la práctica hagamos un análisis de las cifras.

Veamos para la inversión extranjera en España:

El sector exterior en 2008

CUADRO 1
INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA EN ESPAÑA
(Millones de euros)
2006 2007 2008
Importe Importe Importe
Inversión neta en participaciones en el capital según el RIE ....................... 3.469 27.261 34.543*
Inversión neta en participaciones y beneficios reinvertidos de BE ............... 11.748 26.535 33.581*
Inversión neta directa total según el BE ....................................................... 21.434 42.205 43.967*
* Datos estimados.

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 El sector exterior en 2008

En el Cuadro 1 hemos estimado cantidades netas del RIE para permitir una comparación con las del BE.
Lógicamente todas las cifras de las estadísticas del BE superan a las del RIE pues su cobertura es más amplia
como señalábamos anteriormente. Lo interesante sería contar con un elemento común que nos permitiera la com-
paración entre las estadísticas del BE y las recogidas de datos del RIE de las declaraciones de las empresas espa-
ñolas. Desgraciadamente, no es así, pues mientras el RIE calcula el componente «acciones y otras formas de par-
ticipación» el BE separa «otras formas de participación» de las «acciones» e incluye aquellas con los beneficios
reinvertidos. No obstante, si a la cifra de inversión neta total del BE le restamos la financiación a empresas relacio-
nadas y la inversión en inmuebles, las diferencias ahora, entre las cifras del BE y RIE sólo radicarían en que las
primeras recogen también los beneficios reinvertidos y deberían ser mayores en su cuantía.

En 2007 y 2008 las cifras de cualquier tipo de participación en el capital del RIE superan a las del BE que inclu-
yen además de esa participación, los beneficios reinvertidos. Estas diferencias pueden deberse a que el RIE contabi-
liza la inversión de una sola vez en el momento del devengo mientras que el BE lo hace en el momento en que se
producen los desembolsos y puede haber importantes diferencias temporales entre la contabilización de la operación
y su liquidación: Por otra parte el RIE recoge todas las participaciones en sociedades no cotizadas, mientras que el
BE sólo cuando el importe de la participación es igual o superior al 10 por 100 de la sociedad emisora.
Las cifras para la inversión española en el exterior son:

CUADRO 2
INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR
(Millones de euros)
2006 2007 2008
Importe Importe Importe
Inversión neta en participaciones en el capital según el RIE ....................... 55.019 91.109 30.819*
Inversión neta en participaciones y beneficios reinvertidos de BE ............... 76.463 84.627 42.287*
Inversión neta directa total según el BE ....................................................... 79.913 91.722 49.049*
* Datos estimados.

Aquí llama la atención la cifra muy superior del RIE para el año 2007 de 91.109 millones que hace un año era
de 73.996 millones ya un récord absoluto en la inversión española en el exterior. Pues bien, ésa importante dife-
rencia se explica por operaciones muy cuantiosas que tuvieron entrada en el Registro después de que se cerrara
el plazo para la medición de los flujos de ese periodo anual. No obstante, la cifra recogida por el RIE supera amplia-
mente la calculada por el BE para ese año.

INFORMACIÓN EN INTERNET

A través de la página web de la Secretaría de Estado de Comercio www.comercio.es es posible acceder a los
datos históricos sobre inversiones exteriores desde 1993.

La dirección URL completa para la consulta de dichos datos es:

http://www.comercio.es/comercio/bienvenido/Inversiones+Exteriores/Estadisticas/pagEstadisticas.htm

Tanto los datos que aquí se presentan como los incluidos en la página www.comercio.es tienen carácter provi-
sional y por lo tanto pueden sufrir modificaciones como resultado del permanente proceso de depuración e incor-
poración de nueva información.
El sector exterior en 2008

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100 DEL 16 AL 30 DE JUNIO DE 2009
Undécima Sesión
 La globalización de la
producción. Empresas
transnacionales.

Economía política internacional.

Merigg 2009-10

Empresas transnacionales
„ Posiblemente, uno de los “rasgos” más identificativos de la
globalización
„ Definición: “una empresa transnacional es una firma que tiene poder
para coordinar y controlar operaciones en más de un país, aún sin
poseerlas”
„ Las importancia de las TNC descansa en tres características
básicas:
… Capacidad para coordinar y controlar varios procesos y
transacciones dentro de sus redes de producción, tanto dentro
de un país como en diferentes países
… Capacidad potencial para aprovechar las ventajas de las
diferencias geográficas en la distribución de los factores de
producción (mano de obra, recursos naturales…) como de las
políticas estatales (impuestos, barreras comerciales…)
… Potencial flexibilidad geográfica: capacidad para modificar sus
recursos y operaciones, incluso a escala global.
¿Por qué la “transnacionalización” y
no sólo la “exportación” de bienes?
Según la teoría microeconómica tradicional, el objetivo de
cualquier empresa es: maximizar beneficios (ingresos –
gastos).
Según lo anterior, para mejorar los resultados existen
varias opciones:
A) aumentar los ingresos
B) reducir los gastos
C) ambas

La transnacionalización facilita cualquiera de dichas vías.

Además la economía es cada vez más competitiva.

ENFOQUE MACRO:
internacionalización del capital
„ Se basa sencillamente en explicar la internacionalización de
la actividad económica como un paso más del proceso de
desarrollo del capitalismo; por tanto, el fin es buscar
maximizar beneficios y acumular capital (a través de la
apropiación del excedente de producción, visión “marxista”).
„ El circuito del capital sería, aproximadamente:
… Dinero (capital) Æ Capital productivo (mano de obra,
materias primas…) Æ Tras la utilización en el proceso
productivo el capital inicial incrementa su valor Æ bienes
de capital Æ …
Desde esta perspectiva se enfatiza que FINANZAS,
PRODUCCIÓN Y COMERCIO de ciertos bienes están
totalmente INTERCONECTADOS.
ENFOQUE MICRO: teorías
diversas
„ Hymer: pionero

„ Vernon: el ciclo de vida del producto

(conducta oligopolística de las ETN)

„ Dunning: paradigma ecléctico

Tipos de producción transnacional

„ Producción “market-oriented”

„ Producción “asset-oriented”
Producción Market-oriented
„ Tiene en cuenta:
… El tamaño del mercado (medido por nivel de
renta per cápita, por ejemplo)
… La diferente estructura de la demanda
(elasticidad renta) según la renta de los
países.

Producción Asset-oriented (1)

„ Tiene en cuenta la diferente localización
de los activos necesitados por las
empresas.
… Las mejoras en tecnología y transportes han
reducido la importancia de la localización de
los recursos, pero sigue siendo crucial la
localización de la:
… Mano de obra con capacidades y
conocimientos diversos.
Producción Asset-oriented (2)

„ En la mano de obra influyen:

… Costes salariales
… Productividad
… Posibilidad de control
… Menor movilidad
……
Comercio y Cooperación al desarrollo
 MERIGG, 2009-
2009-10

EL PROBLEMA ENERGÉTICO.
ENERGÍA Y GEOPOLÍTICA.

ALGUNOS CONCEPTOS PREVIOS (I)

z Energía primaria / secundaria

z Unidades de medición
– Energía: Julios
– kJ = 103J
– kWH = 36·105J
– Potencia: Vatios
– CV = 736 W
– kW = 103W
– MW = 106J
– GW = 109J
– TW = 1012J

1
 ALGUNOS CONCEPTOS PREVIOS (II)

z Otras unidades
z Poder energético: kcal/kg, tec (tonelada
equivalente de carbón) y tep (tonelada
equivalente de petróleo, 4,18710J)
z Formas de la energía (química, térmica,
mecánica, nuclear...)
z Fuentes de energía
z Renovables (no agotables por su uso)
z No renovables (agotables por su uso)

Dónde encontrar información general

z http://www.iea.org/
h // i /
z http://www.eia.doe.gov
z http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy
_transport/index_en.html

2
 EL PROBLEMA ENERGÉTICO

z Creciente demanda
z Oferta concentrada geográficamente
(hidrocarburos)
z Imposibilidad almacenamiento
((electricidad))
z Mercados regionales
z Dependencia energética

ENERGÍA PRIMARIA
ALGUNOS DATOS

3
Primary energy consumption per capita

Consumo mundial de energía primaria

4
Patrón de consumo por regiones

PETRÓLEO

10

5
 Reservas probadas de petróleo

11

Distribution of proved (oil) reserves 1986,1996, 2006

12

6
Oil consumption by area

13

7
Oil reserves-to-production (R/P) ratios
- - ( / )

Precios del petróleo

-

16

8
Refinery utilisation
Percentage

( )

9
GAS NATURAL

19

20

10
,

21

22

11
 23

( )

12
Carbón, nuclear e
hidroelectricidad

25

26

13
 27

Nuclear energy consumption by area

28

14
 Hydroelectricity consumption by area

29

Los ciclos energéticos

z Las fuentes energéticas se han ido

sustituyendo a lo largo de la historia
z Ciclos conocidos: madera, carbón,
petróleo, gas natural
z ¿C
¿Cuál será el p
próximo?

30

15
Evolución (1973-
(1973-2003) de la oferta de energía primaria total
mundial por combustible (Mtep). AIE.

32

16
 33

GEOPOLÍTICA Y ENERGÍA

ANÁLISIS POR FUENTES ENERGÉTICAS

34

17
 GEOPOLÍTICA Y ENERGÍA

z La visión geopolítica de las

relaciones internacionales
z La importancia de la energía en la
sociedad
z Necesidad de diversificación de
abastecimiento para algunas fuentes
principalmente
z El papel clave en petróleo y gas

35

GEOPOLÍTICA Y ENERGÍA

z Alg nos conceptos previos

Algunos pre ios
– Discontinuidad e interrupciones
– Riesgos físicos, económicos, sociales y
medioambientales.
– Sistema de confianza
– Crisis energética

36

18
 El caso de la UE

Crisis energética definida en términos

de petróleo y gas
Seguridad de suministro/seguridad
energética
Posibles
os b es causas de crisis
c ss

37

Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (I)

z Estados Unidos es una

superpotencia también en términos
energéticos
z Sus relaciones internacionales están
continuamente motivadas por
cuestiones relativas a la energía...
energía
z ... Bajo la apariencia de “lucha contra
la tiranía”

38

19
 Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (II)
¾Los aliados “iniciales” de USA
9Arabia Saudí
9Irán
9Israel

¾El auge de la OPEC

¾Las crisis del p
petróleo
¾Diversificación (Caspio y Rusia)

39

Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (III)

• EE. UU. clasifica los países según su
nivel de amistad,
independientemente del nivel de
democracia o falta de ella
• Actualmente sus objetivos son unos
13 países (Cuba, Myanmar, Siria,
Sudán Argelia,
Sudán, Argelia Malasia
Malasia, Bielorrusia,
Bielorrusia
Zimbabwe, Somalia, Yemen,
Indonesia, Filipinas y Corea del
Norte)
40

20
LA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA DE EE.UU.
LA GUERRA DE IRAK

41

LA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA DE LA UE

COMPETENCIA

SEGURIDAD

MEDIO
AMBIENTE

42

21
LA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA DE LA UE

Políticas de demanda
9 Fiscalidad + armonización
9 Ahorro energético
9 Reestructuración del
sector de transporte
9 ...

Políticas de oferta
9 Estudio energía nuclear
9 Fomento renovables
9 Interconexión
9 ... 43

LA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA DE LA UE

• Predominio de las
políticas internas frente
• Poca influencia en la
a las externas
geopolítica de la energía
• Mayor competencia en
los mercados mundiales

• Necesidad de una política

energética común

• Tiempo de actuar y no de
debatir (libro blanco,
verde, etc.)
44

22
LA ENERGÍA EN
INTERNET
Directorio de páginas web

ALEJANDRO V. LORCA CORRONS

MARÍA ANGELES FERNÁNDEZ LÓPEZ
ENRIQUE SAN MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ
Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo
Doctorado de Economía y Relaciones Internacionales
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

LA ENERGÍA EN INTERNET
Directorio de páginas web

INTERNACIONAL

1. Información general sobre la energía

http://www.energy.gov/
Department of Energy del gobierno de los Estados Unidos.
A este departamento pertenecen la OTT y la EIA de cuyas páginas hablamos más adelante. En esta página
se encuentran un buen número de enlaces con las dos abajo mencionadas así como bastante información
sobre las diferentes fuentes de energía, incluyendo las alternativas renovables.

http://www.eia.doe.gov
Energy Information Administration del Department of Energy del gobierno de los Estados Unidos.
Información abundante y exhaustiva sobre energía tanto de Estados Unidos como a nivel mundial. Análisis
de situación a corto y largo plazo. Toda la información es de libre acceso. Destacan el International Energy
Outlook 2020, las cronologías de acontecimientos relacionados con la energía, así como otros muchos
estudios e informes sobre el sector.

http://www.iea.org/
Agencia Internacional de la Energía.
Los últimos anuarios de esta agencia no son de libre acceso, no están colgados en la red, aunque los de
años anteriores sí. Ofrece bastante información mensual, así como estadísticas mensuales. Destacan el
World Energy Outlook 2000 Highlights (versión resumida de la publicación completa) así como las Key
World Energy Statistics 2001.

http://www.shared-analysis.fhg.de/Pub-fr.htm
Pagina de un proyecto de la Comisión Europea sobre estudios relacionados con la energía en la UE.
Destaca el European Union Energy Outlook to 2020.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/public.html
Publicaciones del Directorado General de la Energía y el Transporte.
Publicaciones diversas y resúmenes de otras publicaciones. Destacan los datos estadísticos de la UE y el
Libro Verde de la Energía en Europa.

http://www.encharter.org/
Energy Charter Treaty.
Tratado internacional para lograr unos mercados energéticos abiertos, eficientes, sostenibles y seguros.
Han ratificado el tratado prácticamente toda Europa, mientras que Australia, Japón y Rusia lo tienen
pendiente de aprobar por el Parlamento. USA no forma parte de él. Información relativa al tratado e
informes sobre su aplicación, donde destacan los relacionados con la eficiencia energética (datos de la
IEA). También hay una tabla interesante donde se destacan todas las normas del tratado que son
incumplidas por los países firmantes (Blue Book).

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.eccj.or.jp/index_e.html
The Energy Conservation Centre Japón.
Información y presentaciones sobre la situación y el futuro del abastecimiento energético en Japón.

http://www.ferc.fed.us/
Federal Energy Regulatory Comission.
En esta página se publican diariamente las decisiones de este organismo que es el que regula a nivel
federal el sector energético de USA. También dispone de algunos informes propios sobre temas
relacionados con la energía.

http://www.iiasa.ac.at/
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
No se dedica exclusivamente a la energía pero dispone de unos cuantos informes relacionados con ella,
sobre todo relacionados con el cambio climático. Sin embargo, lo más destacado de esta página es la
posibilidad de consultar on line y de forma interactiva el executive summary y los gráficos del informe de
1998 Global Energy Perspectives, con escenarios sobre la evolución del sector energético hasta el 2100.

http://lfee.mit.edu/
Laboratory for Energy and the Environment del Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Artículos de opinión sobre temas de actualidad energética y medioambiental como puede ser el cambio
climático o la desregulación de los mercados eléctricos.

http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research del Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Tiene bastante documentos de libre acceso sobre temas energéticos en general. Lo más destacable es la
importancia de la sección referida a permisos de emisión negociables.

http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/
Energy Model Forum de la Universidad de Standford.
La mayor parte de la documentación no está en formato electrónico, pero los últimos documentos
publicados sí. La mayor parte de ellos se refieren a los marcados eléctricos.

http://www.platts.com/
Esta dirección sustituye a www.ftenergy.com. Portal sobre la energía con abundantes informes diarios y
semanales sobre los mercados energéticos. La mayoría de los artículos o informes especiales son de pago,
pero existen algunos artículos libres sobre la OPEC. Lo mejor de esta página es la amplísima sección de
enlaces, tanto internacionales, nacionales o empresariales.

http://www.energyreview.com/
Energy review.
Portal sobre noticias de la energía con enlaces a sitios exclusivos de las diferentes fuentes energéticas.

http://www.iaee.org/en/index.asp
International Association for Energy Economics.
En Recursos dispone de un amplio listado sobre páginas web de empresas e instituciones relacionadas con
la energía. Todos los contenidos son mediante suscripción.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.nera.com/
National Economic Research Associates (NERA).
Consultora que le dedica una atención especial al sector energético y de la que se pueden consultar unos
cuantos documentos sobre temas energéticos de actualidad, como por ejemplo sobre la liberalización del
sector energético en Europa.

http://www.global-competition.com/main_fs.htm
The site for international competition policy and regulation.
Informes especiales sobre temas relacionados con la liberalización y la competencia –no sólo de energía -
específicos por países y noticias de última hora. Para algunos temas legales relativos a la competencia
reenvían a http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/home.cfm

http://www.me3.org/projects/dereg/nonmn.html
Minnesotans for an energy-efficient economy.
Aparece un listado de organizaciones que forman parte del mercado eléctrico (por áreas geográficas) así
como información relativa a utilities. Disponibles muchos datos y ranking (pero casi todos de EIA). En
algunos casos reenvía a la página de la EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/consumer.html). Links a
gobiernos, asociaciones (de comercio, estadísticas internacionales) y compañías energéticas. Bastante
completa.

http://relcom.website.ru/wfs-moscow/eng/
Energy centrer, worl federation of scientists.
Página del Energy Center, organización semi-autónoma dentro del World Federation of Scientists (WFS).
Elabora informe sobre energía, problemas futuros, perspectivas, etc. y el papel de Rusia en este entorno.

http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/
World energy council.
Organización con más de 90 países miembros, localizada en Londres. El último informe de previsión
disponible on-line es de 1998 (con una proyección hasta 2020). El último realizado es de 2001 (pero no es
de libre acceso). Diversos papers con temas interesantes. Tratan todas las fuentes de energía.

http://www.ecn.nl/main.html
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands.
Informes y publicaciones sobre los distintos tipos de energías “limpias” (solar, biomasa, eólica, renovables y
nuclear). Enlace a diversos sitios web sobre energía (energy on the internet). Muy completo.

http://www.energy.ru
Moscow Centre for Energy Policy.
Para temas de energía en general. Trata la posición de Rusia principalmente en temas medioambientales y
de tecnologías “limpias”. Pocos datos, informes, etc. Algunos de los artículos en colaboración con la IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency). Página pobre en contenidos.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

2. Petróleo

http://www.opec.org/
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Cuontries.
Gran cantidad de información sobre la OPEC, incluyendo historia, acuerdos, estadísticas y anuarios, así
como publicaciones mensuales electrónicas de libre consulta.

http://www.opec.com/
Sitio con noticias de la OPEC y de la energía en general, recopiladas de otras fuentes.

http://energy.usgs.gov/
Página de la energía del United States Geological Survey.
Información exhaustiva y detallada sobre los yacimientos petrolíferos. Estimaciones sobre las reservas de
petróleo existentes y por descubrir por campo de petróleo o por país. Te puedes descargar a Excel la mayor
parte de las tablas de datos, aunque los campos petrolíferos vienen referidos por nombre o código, lo que
dificulta su uso a nivel país. El principal problema de esta información es que se centra mucho en los
aspectos geológicos.

http://www.ott.doe.gov/
Office of Transportation Tecnologies del Department of Energy del gobierno de los Estados Unidos.
Información exhaustiva y de libre acceso referida al transporte y al desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías de
transporte. Destacan las más de 150 hojas informativas sobre cuestiones relacionadas con el transporte,
que incluyen numerosas referencias al petróleo, así como varios informes y presentaciones relacionadas
con la evolución futura de los mercados petrolíferos.

http://www.api.org/
American Petroleum Institute.
Tiene bastantes documentos con análisis del sector petrolífero estadounidense, así como bastantes datos
estadísticos de USA e informes sobre problemas relacionados con la energía (protocolo de Kyoto), No
obstante, parece que los temas se tratan de forma superficial, lo que puede ser debido a que los informes
de libre consulta son extraídos de unas publicaciones más detalladas que no se encuentran disponibles en
Internet.

http://www.petroleum.co.uk/
United Kingdom Institute of Petroleum.
Lo más interesante de este sitio son los artículos del pasado año de su revista mensual Petroleum Review
que se pueden consultar libremente y cubren una amplia gama de temas tanto técnicos como económicos o
geopolíticos. El resto de la información existente es previa suscripción.

http://www.ifp.fr/
Instituto Francés del Petróleo.
Empresa de servicios petrolíferos. Tiene mucha información sobre las actividades y servicios que realiza
pero dispone de muy escasa información de interés de libre acceso.

http://ekofisk.stanford.edu/
Petroleum Research Institute de la Universidad de Standford.
En esta página hay un buen número de documentos técnicos sobre extracción de petróleo y métodos de
exploración.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.fe.doe.gov/education/index.html
Página educativa sobre combustibles fósiles. Descripción sencilla y fácil de entender de los procesos de
producción de petróleo, carbón y gas natural.

http://www.cges.co.uk
Centre for Global Energy Studies.
A pesar de su nombre se dedica casi en exclusiva a petróleo y gas. Elabora estudios y análisis de mercado
muy interesantes, aunque sólo las publicaciones periódicas atrasadas están disponibles en la red. También
tiene una buena muestra de artículos de opinión sobre el sector de libre disposición.

http://www.hubbertpeak.com/
Página sobre la presunta crisis del petróleo en ciernes. Multitud de enlaces y artículos de opinión sobre el
agotamiento de los recursos petrolíferos. Bastante interesante.

http://hubbert.mines.edu/
M. King Hubbert Center for Petroleum Supply Studies.
Informes de expertos sobre el mundo del petróleo relacionados con los puntos de vista de Hubbert. Muy
interesante.

http://www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/index.html
Heuristic Oil Forecasting Method World Oil Forecasting Program.
Te puedes descargar un programa de ordenador con predicciones acerca de cuando el mundo alcanzará el
pico máximo de producción de petróleo. También te permite jugar con algunas variables para realizar tus
propias predicciones.

http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/caspian/
Energy Politics In The Caspian And Russia de Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.
Noticias, comentarios y artículos sobre los desarrollos energéticos del Mar Caspio. Algunos muy
interesantes.

http://www.slavweb.com/eng/Russia/econ-e.html
Enlaces con páginas sobre la energía en Rusia.

http://www.bp.com/
British Petroleum.
Hay colgados unos anuarios estadísticos sobre para el mundo y para los Estados Unidos. Además es
posible bajarse los datos de los anuarios en formato Excel para poder trabajar con ellos.

http://www.shell.com
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Shell).
Entre las publicaciones del grupo se encuentran proyecciones sobre el mundo de la energía a largo plazo
(2020 y 2050), aunque son más cualitativas que cuantitativas. Las dos publicaciones se llaman: People and
Connections - Global scenarios to 2020 y Energy Needs, Choices and Possibilities - Scenarios to 2050.

http://www.chevrontexaco.com/
Crevron-Texaco. Información a nivel compañía principalmente. Destaca un artículo en la revista de la
empresa sobre la energía en el Caspio.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.exxonmobil.com
Exxon-Mobil.
Muy orientada a la empresa. Lo único de interés es alguna comunicación sobre temas energéticos.

http://www.statoil.com/
Compañía Noruega de Petróleo.
Se puede acceder a bastantes números de la revista así como a las comunicaciones de los directivos sobre
temas energéticos de interés.

http://www.pemex.com/
Petróleos de México.
Información estadística de la compañía y comparaciones internacionales con otros países.

http://www.pdvsa.com/
Petróleos de Venezuela.
Únicamente hay información relacionada con la empresa.

http://www.totalfinaelf.com
Total – Elf.
Únicamente hay información relacionada con la empresa.

http://www.eni.it
ENI italiano.
Anuario estadístico sobre Gas y Petróleo bastante completo (World Oil & Gas Review 2001). En ingles e
italiano.

http://www.nioc.com/
National Iranian Oil Company.
Anuarios sobre la industria iraní del petróleo.

http://www.saudiaramco.com
Compañía de Petróleos de Arabia Saudi.
Numerosas revistas y libros que se pueden consultar en Internet. No están exclusivamente dedicados al
mundo del petróleo y también tienen publicaciones sobre el mundo árabe en general.

http://www.knpc.com
Kuwait National Petroleum Company.
Únicamente información sobre la compañía. Página web extremadamente lenta.

http://www.meed.com/
Middle East Economic Diggest.
Servicio de noticias sobre Oriente Medio. No es una publicación centrada exclusivamente en la energía,
aunque esta es bastante importante. Menos las noticias todos los demás servicios e informes necesitan
suscripción. Tiene informes sobre el sector petrolífero por países.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.mees.com/
Middle East Economic Survey.
Noticias sobre petróleo y gas centradas en la OPEC. De forma gratuita tan sólo se puede acceder a lo que
son las noticias, además de a datos de producción de petróleo y precios de la OPEC de los últimos años.

http://www.nymex.com/
New York Mercantile Exchange.
Mercado de futuros sobre metales y productos energéticos. Datos sobre los últimos precios de los productos
energéticos (petróleo, gas y carbón) así como las conferencias y charlas que se pronuncian allí sobre
mercados, regulación, perspectivas, etc.

http://www.barchart.com/
Portal financiero con información sobre mercados de valores y de bienes. Prácticamente toda la información
es de pago, aunque los últimos datos se pueden visualizar.

http://www.ipe.uk.com/
International Petroleum Exchanges.
Mercado londinense sobre futuros del petróleo. Se pueden consultar de forma gratuita los valores de futuros
y opciones dándose de alta. Interesante si se trabaja en mercados financieros de futuros sobre la energía.

http://www.slb.com
Schlumberger.
Compañía de servicios técnicos para el sector petrolífero. Tiene una gran cantidad de enlaces con
instituciones y empresas, así como con revistas especializadas. La mayor parte del contenido disponible en
la red se enfoca a aspectos técnicos.

http://www.oillink.com
Se ha convertido en un portal comercial con noticias sobre Gas y Petróleo y poco más. Sin interés.

3. Gas natural

http://www.igu.org/
International Gas Union.
La información más relevante en esta página web son los informes existentes sobre el desarrollo mundial
del sector, aunque tampoco son muy detallados.

http://www.ifp.fr/cedigaz
Cedigaz.
Asociación internacional dedicada a estudiar el gas natural, fundada en colaboración con el Instituto
Francés del Petróleo. Tiene unos anuarios interesantes sobre el sector pero no están disponibles en la red.
Así mismo, dispone de una breve reseña sobre el sector en el año 2000, que puede ser útil a modo de
resumen. También posee una sección de noticias sobre temas relacionados.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.ofgas.gov.uk/
Office of Gas and Electricity Market del Reino Unido.
Tiene muchísima información sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados domésticos de gas y electricidad,
aunque los informes se refieren a cuestiones excesivamente específicas.

http://www.igt.org/
Institute of Gas Technology.
Dispone de una buena cantidad de documentos técnicos relacionados con el gas, aunque no son de libre
acceso. También dispone de un análisis bastante detallado del sector del gas en estados unidos, y aunque
no se puede acceder a la publicación completa existen resúmenes de libre acceso bastante detallados.

http://www.ngsa.org/
Asociación de empresas productoras y distribuidoras de gas de USA.
En esta página se encuentran los principales datos del sector en USA, aunque a un nivel muy básico y
resumido.

http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/default.htm
Gazprom.
La mayor empresa rusa de hidrocarburos. No hay mucha información pero ofrece los principales datos de la
empresa. Da la impresión de que el sitio está vacío de contenidos por haber sido desarrollado relativamente
hace poco tiempo.

4. Carbón

http://www.wci-coal.com/web/bl_content.php?menu_id=0.0
World Coal Institute.
Amplia información de todos los temas técnicos relativos al carbón, medioambiente, usos, etc. Informes con
datos globales sobre reservas, etc. de libre acceso (pero sin mucho detalle, casi todos los datos son de
fuentes que también estamos utilizando –BP, IIASA, etc.-)
Enlaces a organizaciones del carbón, por países.

http://www.abare.gov.au
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Agencia de investigación y consultoría económica de carácter oficial (depende del Department of
Agriculture, fisheries and Resource Economics (http://www.dpie.gov.au). Datos sobre todos los sectores
energéticos en Australia. Publicación de informes pero la mayoría no son gratuitos. Enlaces a numerosos
sitios relacionados.

http://www.iea-coal.org.uk/iea1.htm
IEA Coal Research. The clean coal centre.
Vende publicaciones sobre todos los temas relacionados (prospecciones, medioambiente, política, etc.) de
los distintos países. Parece que sí es de libre acceso el “Clean Coal Compedium”, pero se necesita clave de
acceso. La página no es demasiado interesante. Links a un amplio número de organizaciones relacionadas.

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http://www.energy.ru
Moscow Centre for Energy Policy.
Para temas de energía en general. Trata la posición de Rusia principalmente en temas medioambientales y
de tecnologías “limpias”. Pocos datos, informes, etc. Algunos de los artículos en colaboración con la IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency). Página pobre en contenidos.

http://www.rosugol.ru
Página específica del carbón. Informes con datos y estadísticas (supuestamente), pero con precio (acceso
vía Internet con suscripción).

http://www.eia.doe.gov
Energy Information Administration
Información completa y accesible de todos los temas relacionados con el carbón en USA. Fácil de usar, bien
organizada, con buscador, por temas, etc. Muy buena.

http://d1.dir.dcx.yahoo.com/business_and_economy/business_to_business/energy/coal/
Información sobre sitios de la web relacionados con el carbón, así como directorios.

5. Electricidad
http://www.etso-net.org/
European Transmission System Operators.
Pertenece a ella Red Eléctrica Española. Centrada exclusivamente en este campo de la energía y en temas
relacionados con el mercado energético Europeo. Hay abundantes documentos sobre la posición de la
Asociación en temas relacionados con el mercado eléctrico. Lo más interesante es la cuantificación de las
transferencias energéticas de los estados europeos.

http://www.theapex.org
Association of Power Exchanges.
Asociación de empresas que participan en intercambios de energía, ya sea produciéndolos o
financiándolos. A ella pertenece OMEL (Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad). Abundante
documentación sobre mercados eléctricos, transacciones de energía y las reformas existentes para
liberalizar el sector. También hay exposiciones de la situación del sector eléctrico en algunos países
(Australia y Argentina, por ejemplo).

http://www.efet.org
The European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET)
Asociación de empresas europeas para fomentar el intercambio de energía. Entre las empresas españolas
están asociadas Unión Fenosa, Endesa, Iberdrola e Hidrocantábrico. Abundantes documentos sobre la
liberalización del sector energético en Europa y la posición de esta organización.

http://www.eurelectric.org
Eurelectric.
Es una asociación europea, con socios a nivel mundial, que trata de crear una industria eléctrica única en
Europa. Entre sus miembros de pleno derecho, por España, UNESA.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

Informes de libre acceso on-line sobre un variado conjunto de temas relacionados con la electricidad:
mercados, redes, medioambiente, harmonización fiscal, entre otros.

http://www.ucte.org
The union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity.
Es la organización que coordina la transmisión de energía en más de 20 países, por lo que sus informes y
documentos son los relativos a dicha transmisión. También datos de intercambio de energía eléctrica,
consumo, producción, etc. Links a las páginas de los miembros en los distintos países (por España REE)

http://www.electricity.org.uk/
Página de la asociación de empresas eléctricas de Reino Unido. Toda la información –estadísticas,
informes, etc. –que es de libre acceso parece limitada (algunos datos son de publicaciones que venden).
Información general sobre la industria –historia, miembros, mercados, organización –en Reino Unido.
Dirigida a ciudadanos, para la divulgación de información general.

http://www.open.gov.uk
Información y servicios on-line del gobierno de Reino Unido.
Muy general. Información difícil de encontrar. A partir de la página puede encontrarse otra dirección mucho
más útil (http://www.dti.gov.uk/epa/) donde hay información estadística de energía (en general), muy
completa, sistematizada y de libre acceso.

http://www.energysearch.com/
Página del EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute).
Algunos artículos son de libre acceso, pero la mayor parte de las publicaciones requieren contraseña (sólo
disponible para miembros de EPRI) y además no son gratuitas.

http://www.ferc.fed.us
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Información de la Comisión reguladora relativa a oil, energía hidroeléctrica, eléctrica en general y gas:
requisitos, procedimientos de actuación en mercados, regulación relativa a cada uno de los sectores, etc.
Enlaces a otros sitios relacionados.

http://dir.yahoo.com/Science/Energy/
Direcciones de organismos, publicaciones, etc. clasificados por fuentes de energía (incluida eléctrica, pero
también otras)

http://www.cba.ufl.edu/eco/purc/
Public Utility Research Centre. (Escuela de negocios de la universidad de Florida)
Acceso a numerosos working papers y documentos relativos a temas variados: desregulación y política, en
electricidad, pero también, petróleo, cambio climático, etc. Herramienta de búsqueda de artículos en
colaboración con otra universidad. Muy académico.

http://www.aeecenter.org/
The Association of Energy Engineers
Artículos disponibles por suscripción, resúmenes de libre acceso. Casi toda la información disponible es
relativa a la organización, poco interesante. Gran número de enlaces a otras páginas.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

6. Energía Nuclear

http://www.wano.org.uk/
World Association of Nuclear Operators
Tiene interesantes datos sobre la energía nuclear a nivel mundial, así como una publicación bianual de libre
acceso sobre la energía nuclear en el mundo. A esta asociación pertenece UNESA. También posee un
amplio directorio de páginas web relacionadas con la energía nuclear.

http://www.world-nuclear.org/
World Nuclear Association
Dispone de un amplísimo fondo documental de editoriales y artículos de opinión, así como explicaciones
acerca del funcionamiento de las centrales nucleares y el papel de la energía nuclear en el mundo. Muy
completa.

http://www.iaea.org/
International Atomic Energy Agency
Dispone de abundante información sobre la energía atómica a nivel mundial, incluyendo anuarios de libre
consulta en muchos idiomas (castellano incluido). También dispone de los acuerdos auspiciados por esta
organización a nivel mundial, artículos, publicaciones periódicas, y explicaciones sobre las aplicaciones de
la energía nuclear, todo ello de libre acceso.

http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/
Power Reactor Information System
Programa de la International Atomic Energy Agency donde se ofrece información sobre las centrales
nucleares en funcionamiento en el mundo. Lo más destacable de esta página es que puedes seleccionar un
país y te muestra todas sus centrales nucleares con sus principales datos y estadísticas de producción de
energía eléctrica.

http://www.nea.fr/
Nuclear Energy Agency de la OCDE
Dispone de un buen número de publicaciones anuales, periódicas, informes, regulación etc., la mayoría de
ellos de libre acceso.

http://www.foratom.org/
European Atomic Forum
Patronal europea del sector. Dispone de unas cuantas publicaciones de libre acceso, pero lo más destacado
de esta página es una buena cantidad de artículos donde se expone la opinión de la industria nuclear
europea ante cuestiones que afectan al sector, como pueda ser el cambio climático o la seguridad en el
abastecimiento energético.

http://www.nei.org/
Nuclear Energy Institute
Sitio con bastante información sobre energía nuclear, sobre todo en USA. Además de los artículos e
informes relacionados con el sector en USA destacan una serie de presentaciones donde se describe el
funcionamiento de las centrales nucleares y otros temas relacionados. Bastante interesante.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://web.mit.edu/canes/
Center for Advance Nuclear Energy Systems del Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Hay poca información que consultar. Lo más destacado es el informe del Simposium Internacional sobre el
papel de la energía en el desarrollo sostenible. También ofrece una serie de enlaces con páginas dedicadas
a la energía nuclear, aunque se centra casi exclusivamente en USA.

7. Energías alternativas

http://www.crest.org/index.html
Renewable energy policy project (Centre for renewable energy and sustainable technology)
Temas de política, implicaciones gubernamentales (países en desarrollo), impacto medioambiental, fuentes
de generación, etc. Bien organizada, enlaces por materias. Buscador bastante útil (por materia, zona
geográfica y tipo de consulta). Parece las estadísticas y datos son muy escasos.

http://www.geothermal.org/
Geothermal resources council (depende del DOE)
Prácticamente la totalidad de las publicaciones no son gratuitas. Enlaces a otras páginas.

http://www.seia.org
Solar Energy Industries Association
Información relacionada con la asociación y links a otras páginas. Poco interesante.

http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/index.html
Institute for Global Communications
Artículos de opinión y noticias sobre temas relacionados con el medioambiente, de ámbito internacional (y
otros temas, algo cajón desastre). No muy interesante. (además de pocos recientes) (Problemas para
acceder a algunas zonas de la página)

http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelrenewable.html
Ya comentada, muy buena.

http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/
Worl Energy Council
El último informe general no es gratuito. Página ya comentada en el apartado general.

http://www.ecn.nl/main.html
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands
Página muy interesante, comentada en el apartado general.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

NACIONAL

1. Información general sobre la energía

http://www.cne.es/
Comisión Nacional de la Energía. Recoge toda la legislación relativa a electricidad, petróleo y gas. Dispone
de muchas estadísticas, informes, organización de mercados (agentes que participan, funciones, empresas,
funcionamiento, ...), etc. de los tres sectores antes mencionados. Muy completa. También dispone de una
serie de enlaces a sitios de interés.

2. Petróleo
http://www.cores.es/
Corporación de Reservas Estratégicas de Productos Petrolíferos. Órgano dependiente del Ministerio de
Economía encargado del mantenimiento de las reservas estratégicas españolas de petróleo. Edita el Boletín
Estadístico de Hidrocarburos, publicación imprescindible para conocer el consumo de productos petrolíferos
en España.

http://www.repsol.es
Página web muy comercial, con una gran cantidad de contenidos que no siempre están relacionados con el
petróleo y el sector energético, y que hace la navegación un poco complicada. Dispone de una gran
cantidad de información sobre la empresa, pero se echa en falta más información sobre coyuntura y
perspectivas del sector a escala mundial. Posee una serie de publicaciones interesantes derivadas de la
celebración de congresos y conferencias, aunque no se encuentran disponibles en la red. Por último, el
Instituto Superior de la Energía dependiente de la Fundación Repsol-YPF tiene una biblioteca especializada
en petróleo a la que se puede acceder previa solicitud.

http://www.cepsa.es
Existe abundante información sobre la empresa, tanto a nivel de actividades como a nivel financiero, de
productos y servicios, pero al igual que le sucedía a Repsol, se echa de menos algún tipo de informe
estratégico que sitúe a la empresa en el contexto internacional del sector.

http://www.clh.es/
Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos. Compañía heredera del monopolio de CAMPSA que se dedica
exclusivamente al transporte de hidrocarburos, ya sea por oleoducto o por otros medios. En esta página
existe abundante información referida a las infraestructuras y medios de transporte de la compañía, así
como información sobre los servicios que presta y su funcionamiento.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

3. Gas natural

http://www.gasnatural.com
Además de tener una gran cantidad de servicios para los clientes disponibles en la red, dispone de
abundante información en el sitio corporativo, presentando de forma clara, sencilla y resumida las
perspectivas del sector en España y en el mundo, las ventajas del gas frente a los otros combustibles
fósiles, las principales aplicaciones, la tecnología que se está utilizando, las implicaciones
medioambientales, etc. Bastante completa para una aproximación inicial al sector.

Empresas eléctricas
La mayor parte de las empresas eléctricas que vamos a tratar a continuación tienen ofrecen datos sobre sus
actividades relacionadas con el gas.

4. Carbón

http://www.hunosa.com/
Información detallada de la compañía pudiendo bajar hasta el nivel de pozo, pero poco más.

http://www.incar.csic.es/
Instituto Nacional del Carbón. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones científicas.
La página está aún en construcción, por lo que apenas tiene contenido. Aparece un listado de las
publicaciones pero sólo es accesible la “Memoria Anual” que tiene información únicamente del propio
instituto. Tampoco funcionan los enlaces.

5. Electricidad
http://www.omel.es
Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad. En esta página se encuentra toda la normativa
y regulación relacionada con el mercado eléctrico, incluyendo estructura, agentes y funcionamiento.
También se puede acceder a todos los informes mensuales sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados así
como a los precios negociados en el prácticamente a tiempo real.

http://www.ree.es/
Red Eléctrica Española. Además de la preceptiva información sobre la compañía, dispone de un amplísimo
número de publicaciones que pueden ser consultadas electrónicamente de forma gratuita. Entre estas
publicaciones destacan los Informes Anuales sobre Operación del Sistema Eléctrico y los Boletines
Estadísticos Mensuales editados en colaboración con el Ministerio de Economía. También es de destacar
que la mayoría de los datos estadísticos de sus publicaciones se pueden obtener en formato Excel.
Imprescindible para conocer el sistema eléctrico español, ya que este se aborda desde una perspectiva
integral, que no tiene cada empresa por separado.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.unesa.es
Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica. Tiene una gran cantidad de información disponible
electrónicamente de forma gratuita, organizada en diversas publicaciones, entre las que se cuentan las
revistas Electricidad, Cuadernos Jurídicos de la Electricidad, Energía Eléctrica Informe Internacional,
Boletines Informativos, Memorias Estadísticas Anuales, Producción Anual de Centrales Nucleares, etc. Esta
página tiene información muy valiosa, tanto desde un punto de vista estadístico, como jurídico o de opinión,
aunque a veces los contenidos son demasiado superficiales.

http://www.endesa.es/
La mayor parte de la información de la página web está orientada únicamente a proporcionar datos de la
compañía. Las principales excepciones a este hecho se encuentran en la descripción de la tecnología PLC
que permite la transmisión de datos a través de las líneas y cables eléctricos, lo que constituye el último
escalón de las eléctricas en su posicionamiento en el sector de telecomunicaciones. Es curioso que no
exista ninguna mención en la página web sobre el debate existente a nivel europeo sobre la liberalización
del sector eléctrico.

http://www.iberdrola.es
Dispone de bastante información sobre la compañía, productos y servicios. En su informe anual realiza un
análisis muy esquemático de los principales acontecimientos ocurridos en el sector, tanto a nivel nacional
como internacional, pero lo más interesante es la posibilidad de acceder a las intervenciones de los
directivos de la compañía en diferentes foros, explicando sus posturas relativas a hechos de actualidad del
sector, como la liberalización del sector energético en Europa.

http://www.unionfenosa.es/
Tiene una gran cantidad de información bastante detallada sobre la empresa, pero escasa información
sobre el sector eléctrico en general. En la memoria se menciona brevemente la situación actual del sector
eléctrico enmarcándolo en la economía nacional y mundial.

http://www.h-c.es
Hidrocantábrico. La página no tiene excesiva información excepto en lo relativo a sus actividades de
generación, donde si que vienen bastante detalladas sus instalaciones. Por lo demás, lo más destacable es
el resumen del sector energético que aparece en la memoria.

http://www.viesgo.es/
La página web de esta sociedad es la que menos información tiene de las grandes eléctricas, aunque esto
se debe principalmente al poco tiempo transcurrido desde la venta de la compañía por Endesa al grupo
ENEL italiano (Enero 2002).

6. Energía Nuclear

http://www.csn.es/
Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear. Esta página web no se encuentra actualmente disponible,
posiblemente debido a la saturación del servidor provocada por el envío masivo de correos electrónicos
sugerido por Greenpeace como protesta por el mantenimiento en funcionamiento de la central nuclear de
Zorita a pesar de sus problemas técnicos.

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Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

http://www.foronuclear.org/
Foro de la industria nuclear al que pertenecen las empresas relacionadas con el uso de la energía nuclear
con fines pacíficos. Tiene unas cuantas publicaciones de libre acceso con información general sobre
energía y específica de centrales nucleares, y también dispone de un centro de documentación abierto al
público. Además tiene bastantes enlaces con páginas relacionadas.

7. Energías alternativas

Empresas eléctricas
La mayor parte de las empresas eléctricas tratadas con anterioridad ofrecen datos sobre sus actividades en
el campo de las energías alternativas o renovables.

Madrid, 26 de Abril de 2002

 16 
Decimocuarta Sesión
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

I.1. Main market features

b. ELECTRICITY I.1.1. Overview

(318) During 2003, the countries today forming EU25 consumed 2605 TWh of electricity. This
I. Introduction represents approximately 19.4 % of all final energy consumption in the EU186. The
largest markets are, respectively, Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain. Less than
Figure 38 0.2% of the electricity required to meet this consumption was imported from outside the
EU. In contrast to gas, the EU is thus essentially self-sufficient in the production of
Electricity prices on the rise all over Europe
Wholesale electricity price developments 2000-2006
electricity and increasingly so as net imports decreased 81% over the period 1990-2003.
90
year-ahead base load in €/MWh Primary fuels for electricity generation are of course often imported.
Germany
80
The Netherlands UK
(319) Within the EU, cross-border trading of electricity is more important than exchange with
UK
France third countries. Luxembourg, Latvia and Hungary have net imports of respectively 62%,
70
The Netherlands 51% and 22% of their domestic consumption. At the other end of the spectrum sit the
France
60 Czech Republic and Estonia that have net exports amounting to 31% and 41% of their
Nord Pool
domestic consumption whereas Lithuania’s net exports are, at 106%, even higher than its
50
domestic consumption. In terms of volumes the largest net exporter of electricity is
€/MWh

40
France, which exported 67 TWh in 2003, 4 times more electricity than the next largest
net exporter, the Czech Republic, whose exports, however, have grown 23-fold since
Germany
30 1990. Poland is third in this ranking. Italy was by far the most important net importer of
Nord Pool electricity, importing approximately three times as much as the Netherlands with Sweden
20
being the third largest net importer.
10
(320) A clear and important link between the functioning of the gas and electricity markets
0 exists. The prices for gas significantly affect electricity price levels, since in many
Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06 Jul-06
Member States, gas-fired power plants are responsible for setting the price level of
Source: information received within the scope of the Sector Inquiry from Argus Media, Platts184, and electricity, in particular during peak hours. Moreover, a considerable and increasing
Nord Pool. quantity of gas is used in thermal power plants. During 2004, gas fired power plants in
EU25 consumed approximately 4000 PJ GCV (gross calorific value) of gas
(315) Following market liberalisation, electricity wholesale prices were initially relatively corresponding to 22,1 % of the entire consumption of natural gas in the EU187. Hence,
stable185. electricity generators rely heavily on competitive gas markets. Malfunctioning gas
markets thus adversely affect the price of electricity.
(316) Around the summer of 2003, however, electricity wholesale prices started to rise on most
markets. Not only did prices increase, they also diverged strongly between Member I.1.2. Essential features of electricity markets
States suggesting a lack of market integration. Price rises have been strong especially
since the beginning of 2005. (321) The electricity industry chain involves five main activities: (1) the production or
generation of electricity, (2) the transport of electricity on high voltage levels
(317) As wholesale prices directly impact supply prices offered to final customers (especially (transmission), (3) its transportation on low voltage levels (distribution), (4) the
to industrial users) in a number of Member States, their increase gave rise to wide-spread marketing of electricity to final customers (supply), and (5) the selling and buying of
concerns about the overall functioning of the electricity markets. In addition many electricity on wholesale markets (trading). Sometimes services such as metering are
industrial consumers complained about the difficulties to secure competitive offers by mentioned as additional activity.
different suppliers. These and other concerns expressed by market participants triggered
the initiation of the Sector Inquiry into the European electricity sector. (322) Prior to liberalisation, vertically integrated companies executed these activities serving
exclusively certain regions or even a whole Member State, and prices were regulated.
This has profoundly changed with European-wide market opening and the electricity
business has been split up into regulated and competitive segments. Because transport
186
Eurogas, Annual Report 2004-2005, p. 27.
184 187
Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved. Eurogas, Annual Report 2004-2005, p. 28.
185
Prices for certain end users even showed a downward trend after 2000.

111 112
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
activities are considered to be a natural monopoly, they remain regulated. However,
generation, wholesale trading, and retail supply have been progressively opened to
competition. A number of Member States have, however, retained regulated supply
tariffs.
(323) Like the gas industry, the electricity sector is a network industry. Without access to the
network customers cannot be reached. Third Party Access to the network is thus
essential. The existing network is often a natural monopoly that cannot be duplicated in
an economic manner and/or in a reasonably short time frame.
(324) An important feature of electricity is that, unlike gas, it cannot be stored economically
once produced. In order to ensure network stability electricity generation and
consumption have to be in balance at all times. Electricity demand fluctuates significantly
during the day and seasonally. Also the price elasticity of the electricity demand is very
low, especially over the short term, i.e. price fluctuations do not give rise to large changes
in electricity consumption.
(325) A specific feature of electricity production is that it can be produced by using a large
variety of technologies and on the basis of different fuels resulting in different cost
structures (nuclear, hydro, coal, gas, renewables etc.). Cost structures have important
implications for the price formation on short term electricity markets (concept of a
marginal plant setting the price).
(326) All these features render electricity markets vulnerable to the exercise of market power,
be it through withdrawing generation capacity or be it by pricing above competitive
levels at times when the generator is indispensable to meet demand (for further details
see below chapter B.b.II.1).
(327) As electricity cannot be stored, balancing and reserve regimes exist to settle market
participants’ real-time imbalances resulting from discrepancies between scheduled and
actual electricity demand, and production188. Although the volumes involved are
relatively small compared to overall consumption, properly operating balancing markets
are crucial for proper functioning of the electricity market as a whole. These markets tend
to be as or more concentrated as the underlying wholesale markets, as balancing requires
additional technical characteristics of plants that some plants are not equipped to meet.
As such, balancing markets are potentially exposed to the exercise of market power as
much as wholesale markets, although the exercise of market power in balancing markets
may be considerably more complicated, since oversupply is potentially as costly as
undersupply. The balancing markets will be analysed in more detail in the chapter C.c.II.
(328) Various business models as well as various structures due to the liberalisation process
exist on electricity markets in the EU, ranging from stand-alone generators and
independent supply companies to fully integrated utilities. In more recently liberalised
Member States vertically integrated companies, or very strong ownership and/or
contractual links between generators and suppliers, are predominant. In areas that were
liberalised earlier, such as the UK and Nord Pool, business strategies seem to be
somewhat more diverse. In the UK, as well as the larger integrated companies, a number
of independent generators with their own business strategies exist. On the Nordic
188
Producers can create imbalances as well as consumers if the supply more or less than they have scheduled in
advance.
113
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
market(s) consisting of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark independent suppliers
are relatively important.
(329) Typically, within fully integrated utilities, specialised affiliates are dedicated to the
different activities, such as generation, trading, supply and network operations. Usually,
the entire output of the generation affiliate is sold under intra-firm arrangements to the
affiliated trading entity189 which in turn manages the undertaking’s overall portfolio i.e.
sells electricity to the supply affiliate(s) and sells it to or buys it from third parties
through bespoke bilateral contracts or traded wholesale markets. Integrated companies
can produce more or less electricity than is required for their own customer portfolio. The
larger integrated companies often generate more electricity than they need for their final
customers.
I.2. The regulatory framework
(330) EU energy policy pursues three objectives: (1) the achievement of an efficient and
competitive integrated energy sector (higher growth rates and increased competitiveness);
(2) maintaining an adequate level of security of supply; and (3) increasing the
effectiveness of environmental protection. The creation of the internal market is expected
to contribute strongly to all of these objectives and this section provides a brief
description of the relevant EU legislation in this area.
I.2.1. Liberalisation
I.2.1.1. The beginning of the liberalisation process:
(331) The first important piece of Community legislation aimed at liberalising the electricity
sector was Directive 96/92/EC190 (“First Electricity Directive”). The Directive removed
legal monopolies by requiring Member States gradually to allow large electricity
customers to choose their suppliers (concept of “eligibility”). It also obliged vertically
integrated companies to grant third parties access to their transmission and distribution
networks (“third party access”). Furthermore, for vertically integrated companies active
in generation, transmission and supply it finally mandated a minimum level of separation
of the network business from the other activities (“unbundling”). In a nutshell the
Directive introduced the distinction between a regulated part of the market (network) and
competitive parts of the market (generation and supply).
(332) The gradual market opening introduced by the First Electricity Directive resulted in
significant differences between Member States regarding the level of market opening.
The existence of negotiated third party access regimes, the limited level of unbundling
obligations and the lack of an obligation to establish a national energy regulator were also
viewed as obstacles to creating competitive markets. To address these concerns, further
measures were proposed by the Commission leading to the adoption of Directive
2003/54/EC191 (“Second Electricity Directive”) and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003192
(“Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation”).
189
Important exceptions are Spain and to some extend Italy and the Nordic markets around Nord Pool. In all these cases
there is an obligation or incentive to trade through the pool (see further section B.b.I.3.4).
190
Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity (OJ 1997 L 27/20).
191
Directive 2003/54/EC European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the
internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92, (OJ 2003 L 176/37).
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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
I.2.1.2. The Second Electricity Directive
Full market opening
(333) The Second Electricity Directive aimed at complete market opening. It required that all
non-household electricity customers became eligible by 1 July 2004. This will be
followed by the opening of the electricity markets for all household customers by 1 July
2007193. This approach will remove the discrepancies in the level of market opening
between Member States.
(334) Market opening by legislation does not, however, automatically lead to the introduction
of competition in supply markets dominated by incumbent players. Whilst the Second
Electricity Directive is silent on the issue, some Member States introduced (temporary)
measures such as market share caps for incumbent operators to address concentration
while others (Italy) went so far as to require capacity divestiture. In the UK, the existing
state owned generation company was split up into competing undertakings, which
facilitated the creation of competitive markets.
Regulated third party access and creation of regulators
(335) The Second Electricity Directive obliges Member States to introduce a “regulated third
party access” regime under which third parties have a right to access the network in a
non-discriminatory manner based on published tariffs. The Directive removes the
possibility of negotiated third party access regimes, which were considered not to
sufficiently mitigate the market power of networks owners, vis à vis the alternative of
regulated third party access regimes.
(336) In order to ensure efficient and constant supervision of fair network access, the Second
Electricity Directive mandates the appointment of a national regulator that is independent
from the electricity industry (but not necessarily independent from governments). The
regulators must monitor the overall activities of the network companies, deal with
complaints, and control network tariffs194, a key element in creating competitive
conditions.
(337) Some market participants raised concerns that, despite this, the powers of regulators vary
and that there are significant differences in market design. The regulators recognised the
need for close cooperation – in particular for cross border trade – and formed an
association for discussion and the development of common positions (CEER). They play
an essential role when it comes to the creation of an efficient third party access regime.
They also give advice to the Commission on legislative and other projects through
ERGEG.195
192
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for
193
access to the network for cross-border exchanges of electricity, (OJ 2003 L 176/1).
Several Member States have already opened their markets for all electricity customers.
194
The regulator must approve the terms and conditions for network connection and tariffs, or at least the method of
calculation the tariffs, prior to their entry into force. This power also exists with regard to balancing services.
195
Commission Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003 establishing the European Regulators Group for
Electricity and Gas (OJ 2003 L 296/34).
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
Unbundling
(338) In order to limit further the risks of discrimination and cross subsidies associated with the
existence of vertically integrated companies the Directive requires legal unbundling - in
addition to accounting and management unbundling - between network activities
(transmission and distribution) and all other activities. In practice this means that
transmission and distribution system operators must be independent in their legal form,
organisation and decision making. However a holding company is still entitled to approve
the annual financial plan and to set global limits on the level of indebtedness.
(339) The Directive permits the postponement of legal unbundling of distribution companies
until 1 July 2007 and allows Member States to exempt them from the legal unbundling
obligation altogether if the distribution companies serve less than 100,000 connected
customers.
(340) The Directive does not impose that the network operator must own the network assets or
that there is ownership unbundling196 from the affiliated supply activities. Nevertheless,
several Member States have introduced ownership unbundling for transmission systems
arguing that only this form of unbundling removes the incentives in vertically integrated
companies for the transmission branch to favour the supply branch.
(341) The issue of structural integration between generation and retail is also not addressed in
the Second Electricity Directive. The same applies to long-term power purchase
agreements, which can also lead to a reduction of liquidity of wholesale markets.
However, this form of vertical integration may violate EC competition law (antitrust rules
or state aid rules).
Conclusion
(342) The Second Electricity Directive, where Member States have properly implement it – not
only in form, but also in spirit, has significantly contributed to the creation of a common
electricity market. The Commission is actively pursuing the lack of adequate
implementation of the Directive in certain Member States.197
(343) On the other hand it is worth recalling that the Directive only contains minimum
requirements, leading to different market designs between Member States. Some market
participants raised concerns in this respect as the differences in market design can amount
to entry barriers and undermine the level playing field for operators located in different
Member States.
I.2.1.3. The Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation
(344) The legislative measures for electricity adopted in 2003 included a second element: the
Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation. This Regulation addresses issues relating to
cross-border trading in electricity, such as harmonised principles for payments between
transmission system operators and for tariff setting as well as congestion management
196
Ownership unbundling means that a supply company is prevented from owning an entity that operates a network.
197
IP/06/430 of 4 April 2006 and MEMO/06/152 of the same day.
116
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
and the allocation of cross border capacity. The Regulation entitles the Commission to
adopt and amend legally binding guidelines for more detailed rules.
(345) The Regulation’s rules on congestion management198 are of central importance, as
mechanisms to allocate congested interconnection capacity play a crucial role in market
integration199. The Regulation requires that congestion problems on interconnectors be
addressed through non-discriminatory, market-based solutions. The Guidelines on
congestion management200 have recently been amended, and the new Guidelines identify
both explicit and implicit auctions as methods complying with this requirement201. The
Preliminary Report’s chapter on market integration examines these methods in more
detail.
(346) The Regulation also contains provisions to allow private investment in interconnectors
(“merchant lines”), as the existence of sufficient interconnector capacity is essential for
the development of an integrated market. To this end, new interconnectors (DC lines
only) may be exempted from the rules on how revenues from capacity allocation are
spent as well as from provisions relating to non-discriminatory network access. For the
exemption to be granted, it must be shown that the interconnector enhances competition
and that the investment would not take place in the absence of an exemption. Whereas in
the gas sector several applications for an exemption of a similar type were notified to the
Commission, the Commission has so far received only one notification regarding an
exemption for an electricity interconnnector (a second is under preparation).
I.2.2. Security of Supply
(347) EU energy policy also aims at maintaining a high level of supply security. Security of
supply comprises of two elements: the need for system security as well as the need for
balance between supply and demand of electricity in the medium and the long term.
Whilst the issue of security of supply is already addressed in the Second Electricity
Directive and in the Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation, in 2003 the
Commission made a proposal for a more comprehensive set of rules regarding this
matter.
(348) The recently adopted Directive on Electricity Security of Supply and Infrastructure
(2005/89/EC) requires Member States to ensure that an appropriate level of network
security is maintained202 and that stable and transparent market based rules are in place
regarding any action taken to balance supply and demand. In addition, networks must set
198
Regulators are also given tasks under the Second Electricity Directive regarding cross-border electricity trading as
they must monitor rules on the allocation of interconnector capacity in cooperation with the other regulators of
Member States connected by the interconnector.
199
Congestion problems are aggravated by long-term contracts for capacity reservations on interconnectors which were
concluded before liberalisation. In a recent judgment (C-17/03, Vereiniging voor Energie, Milieu an Water) the ECJ
stated that preferential access based on such contracts amounted to discrimination prohibited by the First Electricity
Directive and was, as such, contrary to EC law. The Member States concerned in this case had not applied under
Article 24 of the First Electricity Directive for a derogation from relevant provisions of that Directive.
200
Guidelines on the management and allocation of available transfer capacity of interconnections between national
systems, (OJ 2003 L 176/9).
201
In an explicit auction, market participants bid for available interconnector capacity which is purchased separately
from the electricity that is the subject of the transaction. In an implicit auction, interconnector capacity would be
made available to the power exchanges, and a market clearing procedure would determine the most efficient use of
such capacity. Explicit auctions are already provided for in the existing Guidelines.
202
Operational security rules for TSOs on continental Europe are also described in the Union for the Co-ordination of
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)’s Operation Handbook
117
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
performance objectives and the regulatory framework must provide appropriate signals
for network development and facilitate appropriate network maintenance. The Directive
will enter into force in February 2008.
I.2.3. Environmental protection
(349) Last but not least EU energy policy must take into account the need to improve
environmental protection and sustainable development. To that end, and to help comply
with the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has adopted a number of important legislative measures.
(350) Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC203 (the “Emissions Trading Directive”), Member States
must ensure that all plants with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW emitting CO2
only operate if they have greenhouse gas permit. Member States decide periodically in
national allocation plans about the number of allowances allocated for free to each plant.
Allowances are normally allocated free of charge although a small proportion may be
sold in an auction process. The Directive established the European Union Greenhouse
Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which, since 1 January 2005, serves as a
trading framework for emission allowances. Plants emitting below the level of
allowances allocated can sell their excess, and those exceeding their allocation must
purchase additional allowances. The ETS which allows for internalising external costs
and in particular the alleged effects on electricity prices is discussed below in the chapter
on price formation.
(351) Directive 2001/77/EC204 (the “Renewable Electricity Directive”) is an important step in
the development of power generation from renewable sources. It mandates that Member
States set national targets to meet the Community target of increasing the share of
electricity consumption from renewable sources to 21% by 2010205. It also encourages
Member States to apply various support mechanisms206 in favour of green electricity
production. The Directive permits Member States to require priority access to the grid for
producers of green electricity and mandates that priority is given to green electricity
when dispatching electricity as the operation of the national systems permits. Directive
2004/8/EC on the promotion of cogeneration207 contains provisions on network access for
such electricity similar to those in the Renewable Electricity Directive. Electricity
produced from a renewable source or from cogeneration is also promoted by the
Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection208, which explains the
conditions under which such State aid will be deemed to be compatible with the common
market. Some market participants claimed that electricity produced from renewable
sources lead to new challenges for network operations.
203
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, (OJ
2003 L 275/32).
204
Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of
electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market (OJ 2001 L 283/33).
205
An analysis of progress reports of Member States shows that measures currently in place will probably lead to a 19%
of renewable share on electricity by 2010. Report on the progress in renewable electricity of 10 January 2007.
206
These support schemes include green certificates, feed-in tariffs, tendering and tax incentives.
207
Directive 2004/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on the promotion of
cogeneration based on useful heat demand in the internal electricity market and amending Directive 92/42/EEC (OJ
2004 L52/50).
208
OJ 2001 C 37/3.
118
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(352) In 2006 the Community adopted a Directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy
services209 to address environmental concerns relating to energy consumption. According
to the Directive, Member States will be required to achieve an overall national indicative
energy savings target of 9% for the ninth year following the entry into force of the
Directive by measures improving energy efficiency.
I.3. Electricity wholesale markets
(353) Wholesale trading, which is the main focus of this report, is the selling and buying of
electricity in bulk. On wholesale markets generators can sell their output and suppliers
can source the energy they need to supply end consumers. Trust in properly functioning
wholesale mechanisms and the prices formed on these markets is of the utmost
importance, not just for generators and suppliers, but also for electricity consumers
whose energy bills are strongly affected by the prices formed on these markets.
I.3.1. The benefits of competitive wholesale markets
(354) Competitive wholesale markets generate efficiencies in the overall performance of the
electricity sector by providing price signals to market participants210. In particular, the
main benefits of efficient wholesale markets are:
1. effective competition in generation and retail, because competitive wholesale
markets reduce the entry barriers for independent generators and retailers.
Otherwise new entrants might be obliged to enter both the generation and the
retail markets at the same time;
2. efficient investment and improved security of supply, because competitive
wholesale markets provide price signals for both demand and supply and, for
example, encourage new investment when necessary and give the signals to
potential investors on the type of investment (e.g. base-load or peak) or choice
of technology that is most required in the market;
3. efficient operation, because well-functioning wholesale markets will give
signals to the market to dispatch low cost plant and to plan maintenance at times
with the lowest demand. On the other hand price signals can encourage flexible
customers to reduce their demand at times of peak consumption etc;
4. efficient risk management, because wholesale markets allow suppliers and
consumers to hedge their portfolio of electricity at a minimum volume and price
risk if markets have sufficient depth; and,
5. efficient use and expansion of transmission infrastructure, because
competitive wholesale markets provide the price signals necessary for the TSO
and regulatory agencies to identify when market participants should transmit
energy from one zone to another and furthermore to identify when and where
additional interconnection capacity would be cost effective.
209
Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency
and energy services.
210
See for example, EFET Position Paper: Transparency and Availability of Information in Continental European
Wholesale Electricity Markets, July 2003.
119
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
6. unsustainability of subsidies and other inefficiencies as the decision making
process is driven by economic considerations.
I.3.2. Basic features of wholesale markets
I.3.2.1. Wholesale market participants
(355) There are different reasons to be active on electricity wholesale markets. Generally
speaking, market participants can be divided in two groups: players with inherent
physical positions (generators and suppliers) and participants without inherent physical
positions (traders).
(356) The interest for generators to trade stems mainly from the need to sell their generation
output and optimise the operation of their generation portfolio. In a number of Member
States this selling is predominantly executed on forward markets, whereas optimisation
of the power plant portfolio is carried out on spot markets i.e. day-ahead or within-the-
day markets. By selling electricity forward, generators can hedge themselves against spot
price drops.
(357) Retailers, on the other hand, trade on wholesale markets to procure the electricity needed
for their customers. The vast majority of the electricity is contracted forward in a number
of Member States. By doing so, retailers limit their risk exposure that would arise from
rises in spot prices.
(358) In comparison to generators and retailers, (financial) traders buy and sell to exploit price
differences, e.g. between two geographical areas (arbitrage). Traders also may take
speculative positions, aggregate and disaggregate purchases and sales over different time
horizons, or locations, thus offering to others the chance to manage their risks.
(359) Our analysis shows that larger electricity companies take part in active trading for all the
reasons mentioned above. They do not just sell their surplus generation or cover their
supply commitments but engage in arbitrage deals or take speculative positions. On the
other hand smaller companies tend to be active on the wholesale market only to optimise
their physical portfolios.
I.3.2.2. Market places
(360) The inquiry has looked at wholesale trading in standardised contracts which takes place
on two different marketplaces. Transactions are either executed via power exchanges or
over the counter (‘OTC’).
(361) Power exchanges are organised and standardised marketplaces. Market participants
transact anonymously using the exchange as central counterparty. Trades are cleared by
the power exchange or its appointed clearing house, thereby greatly reducing
counterparty risk, i.e. the risk that a party defaults on its contractual obligations. Power
exchanges that have gained some significance include Nord Pool, EEX in Germany, APX
in Holland, Powernext in France, OMEL in Spain and GME in Italy.
(362) Unlike exchange trading, OTC transactions do not per se involve organised marketplaces.
Rules governing the trade are typically derived from practice and based on industry
120
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

agreements.211 Transactions are carried out bilaterally and counterparty risk is born by the Table 15
market participants. Increasingly, transactions on traded OTC electricity markets are also Traded contracts on the French electricity wholesale market
cleared by third parties, such as brokers or power exchanges, thus helping liquidity Powernext French OTC market as assessed by platts

develop. Most standard transactions are facilitated by brokers’ telephone or screen-based day-ahead 24 single hours and 11 different blocks of hours base & peak
week-end - base
services. The main brokers included in the inquiry are GFI, ICAP, Prebon, Spectron and week-ahead - base & peak
TFS. The prices of such transactions are reported/estimated on an anonymous basis by months 3 consecutive months, base & peak 3 consecutive months, base & peak
industry price reporting companies. quarters 4 consecutive quarters, base & peak 2 consecutive quarters, base & peak
years 3 consecutive years, base & peak 2 consecutive years, base & peak
Source: Platts213, Powernext
(363) Apart from standardised exchange and OTC trading there are also bespoke bilateral
transactions. These deals can be very different in terms of products delivered or services
(367) As a result of continuous arbitrage, prices of identical products traded on different
included ranging from back-up agreements to full supply contracts including volume
marketplaces (i.e. on power exchanges or OTC markets) develop in parallel. Indeed,
flexibilities and balancing energy. The prices for these types of transactions are usually
Figure 39 shows that, for instance, prices for day-ahead baseload delivery observed on
not reported.
the EEX, the German power exchange, and the German OTC market are very closely
correlated both in terms of development and levels.
Table 14

Selected features of power exchange and OTC markets Figure 39

Power Exchange OTC Prices on exchanges and OTC markets go hand in hand
Day-ahead baseload prices observed on the EEX and the German OTC market in €/MWh
anonymity of trading yes no
120
counterparty central counterpart bilateral trading
counterparty risk no yes (if not cleared)
spot trading single auction continuous trading
100
price and volume transparency directly indirectly
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
80

I.3.2.3. Traded products, time horizons

€/MWh
60
(364) Depending on the delivery period, bulk electricity can be traded on spot or forward
markets. Spot markets are mainly day-ahead markets on which electricity is traded one
40
day before physical delivery takes place. On forward markets, power is traded for
delivery further ahead in time.
20

(365) Typical spot products on continental European markets are single hours or groups of
hours, whereas forward products include weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly products. 0

Forward electricity can either be traded as a ‘base’ or a ‘peak’ contract. The term ‘base’ Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05

implies a continuous delivery throughout the delivery period (e.g. a month), whereas OTC day-ahead base EEX day-ahead base

‘peak’ typically only involves a delivery on business days from 08:00 till 20:00. The
Source: EEX, Argus Media
definitions and contract specifications may differ between countries.
I.3.2.4. Price formation on short term markets
(366) Electricity for spot and forward delivery can be traded on both power exchanges and
OTC markets. Standardised forward contracts traded on exchanges are called futures.212
(368) As noted above electricity can be produced in many ways using a variety of fuels and
Contract specifications of exchange traded and OTC products are in practice very similar
applying different technologies. This diversity also results in different cost structures.
or identical allowing for efficient arbitrage. To illustrate this, Table 15 shows the
Generation technologies that use low-cost fuels (e.g. nuclear fuel, lignite) often require
different spot and forward/futures contracts which can be traded on Powernext, the
relatively large capital investments214. On the other hand, generation technologies
French power exchange, and the French OTC market.
requiring relatively expensive fuels (e.g. gas turbines) have relatively low fixed costs.
These differences in cost structures have important implications for the price formation
on short-term electricity markets.
211
e.g. ‘Standard Electricity Contract’ of the European Federation of Energy Traders.
212
Depending on the contract specification of the power exchange in question, futures contracts can be settled physically
213
or financially. The later means that during the delivery period of the contract no physical electricity delivery takes place Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.
214
but a difference is paid between the prevailing spot price and the contract settlement price. Including run-of-river plants that do not use fuels to generate electricity

121 122
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(369) On 'perfectly competitive' short term (day ahead/spot) markets, and in absence of
generation capacity constraints, economic theory suggests that prices would be set by the
short run marginal cost (‘SRMC’) of the plant producing the last unit of electricity
required to meet demand at that time of day. SRMC are mainly the fuel costs and some
other, less substantial, variable production costs. The last, or marginal, unit needed to
meet demand is also the one with the highest SRMC of all units running at a given point
in time. The logic of this process ensures that only those power plants operate that have
the lowest SRMC among all generation units available to operate215. As a consequence, it
can be expected that nuclear or lignite fired power plants will be dispatched continuously
and serve as base load units. They may set prices at off-peak period, for example during
the night. For other periods the marginal and therefore price setting units – depending on
the market in question, would be expected to be fuelled by natural gas, light fuel oil, or
black coal.216
(370) In this respect it is important to underline that the SRMC of the price setting unit
determines not only the revenues of the owner of the marginal plant, but also of all other
operators with e.g. nuclear, lignite or run-of-river units. Whilst their marginal costs are
often significantly lower, it is generally argued that they need a higher price than the
marginal costs to recover the higher fixed costs217 associated with base load generation.
Figure 40 also explains this concept graphically using a schematic ‘merit order’.218
Figure 40
Prices are set by the marginal plant
Price formation on competitive short-term electricity markets
Marginal Cost
Demand
Market price
GT
CCGT
coal
nuclear lignite
hydro
Capacity
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
Note: This graph is only an abstract representation. It does not necessarily reflect actual cost relations
between different types of generation and equally does not include the value of CO2 allowances.
215
This price mechanism only applies for short-term markets and not for the price formation on forward markets.
216
In some markets, such as the Nordic market, hydro storage plants might often be on the margin. The SRMC of these
plants is based on the alternative value of the water in storage
217
As regards fixed costs, some comments made in the public consultation point to the “specific situation” of peak
plants operating during a limited number of hours. They argue that the price at which the power of such plants
should be offered could not be strictly based on the marginal costs of the plants but should take in account that the
fixed costs can only be amortised during those hours where these plants are among the last one called along the merit
curve.
218
The term ‘merit order’ refers to the sequence of generating units according to their SRMC.
123
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(371) Spot prices on power exchanges are usually set in auctions, separately for 24 individual
hours.219 Each market participant hands in price-quantity pairs for its selling and
purchasing plans, from which the exchange derives aggregate supply and demand curves.
The market price and the corresponding clearing quantity are then set as a result of the
matching process. Prices and volumes for the individual hours are publicised and made
available by the power exchange. In this respect it is important to note that generators
may decide to offer electricity from their plants also at price levels other than SRMC.
(372) In comparison, on OTC markets spot transactions are carried out in continuous trading.
Bids and offers are communicated to the market by brokers, usually by entering them into
brokers’ internet-based trading platforms. Since trading is done by using a number of
brokers or directly between parties, prices are not directly known to all participants. Price
discovery is the work of price reporters, such as Argus or Platts, which assess the market
based on market participants’ voluntary reporting of prices and traded volumes. A variety
of these assessments and indices are sold to the wider public.
I.3.2.5. Price formation on forward markets
(373) Wholesale electricity prices are influenced by both supply and demand factors. However,
factors influencing prices in the short run can be somewhat different from those in the
long run. According to the answers of market participants in the Sector Inquiry, short
term prices are mainly influenced by plant availability, fuel prices, precipitation, wind
speed, interconnector availability, temperature and, since 2005, CO2 certificate prices.
Prices in the long run are predominantly determined by forward fuel prices, (new) cost of
generation capacity (or capacity retirement), water reservoir levels, weather trends,
interconnector capacities, CO2 prices and economic growth.
(374) Whereas forward prices are or should be primarily influenced by supply-demand
fundamentals that are expected to prevail in the future, spot prices are determined by the
out-turn of these fundamentals. In this way forward prices can give an indication of the
overall market expectation about future spot prices220. The role that individual
expectations play in the setting of forward prices also implies that no explicit price
benchmark (similarly to the one that was introduced in the chapter B.b.I.3.2.4. for short-
term markets) can be used to determine what the price of a certain forward product
should be at a given point in time.
(375) In addition, forward prices are not only influenced by the expected supply-demand
balance. Sellers and buyers engage in forward contracts because they prefer price
certainty to unknown spot prices in the future. Therefore forward prices will also include
a risk element. Depending on whether buyers or sellers attach a higher value to price
certainty this will be a premium or a discount – though in practice it appears often be a
premium. The buyer’s willingness to pay for price certainty depends – amongst other
factors – on the volatility of spot prices. The more volatile spot prices are, the fewer
buyers will be likely to rely on spot transactions and turn to forward markets instead.
(376) Therefore, generators with market power on spot markets have ample opportunity to also
exercise their influence on forward prices. For example dominant operators could
219
On most of the power exchanges different blocks of hours can be traded as well.
220
This does not mean of course that forward prices should at any time necessarily be equal to out-turn prices.
Expectations as regards future fundamentals might be very different from their outcome.
124
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

withhold a part of their generation capacity. This would not only raise spot prices but also I.3.4. Traded volumes on spot markets
change market participants’ expectations of the development of this fundamental supply
side factor resulting in higher forward prices. Generators could also increase the volatility Figure 41
of spot prices (without changing the overall level of prices), which would increase the
Spot volumes are developing
value of hedging them in advance on the forward market and may raise the premium of Development of spot traded volumes on selected power exchanges
as a percentage of national consumption
forward prices over expected spot prices. While pursuing these strategies might seem 18%

costly for generators, it could be outweighed by higher revenues on their total portfolio. 16%

14%
I.3.3. Wholesale market outcome and end-customer pricing
12%

(377) Especially in Member States where generators sell a considerable part of their generation 10%

months or even years ahead of actual delivery and where traded forward markets exist 8%
(e.g. Germany, France, UK, The Netherlands), it is a common practice for suppliers to
offer fixed price supply contracts to their large business or industrial customers. Fixed 6%

price contracts also appear to reflect industrial energy users’ preferences. 4%

2%
(378) The inquiry shows that suppliers have fairly similar ways to set prices for fixed term
contracts. The prospective consumers’ hourly consumption over the contract duration 0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(most often 1 to 2 years) is estimated on the basis of past consumption patterns assuming Powernext APX EEX

that these are indicative also for the future. The cost to serve this expected consumption
is assessed with the help of an hourly forward price curve derived from relevant forward
wholesale price quotations prevailing at the time the offer is prepared. The result is the
actual cost of covering forward the customer’s consumption on the wholesale market.
The final price quoted to the customer will in addition contain other cost components
such as expected cost of balancing or the supplier’s own margin.
Source: Powernext, APX, EEX
(380) Figure 41 shows the development of traded spot volumes relative to the consumption in
the relevant geographical area for some selected markets. Over the whole period, traded
volumes developed positively.221

(379) The described pricing practice applies irrespective of whether the customer will in reality Table 16
be supplied from the supplier’s own generation portfolio or covered by electricity Spot traded volumes as a percentage of national electricity consumption (June 2004 - May 2005)
purchases on the market. Business units (i.e. generation and supply units) of integrated Power exchanges OTC brokered
electricity companies generally act as profit centres and their performance is measured OMEL - Spain 84,02% negligible
against the best alternative opportunity on the market. GME - Italy 43,67% n.a.
Nord Pool - Nordic region 42,82% n.a.
EEX -Germany 13,24% 5,40%
APX - The Netherlands 11,88% 5,90%
Belgium no power exchange 0,04%
Powernext - France 3,37% 1,50%
EXAA - Austria 2,96% n.a.
UKPX - UK 2,17% 8,60%
Pol PX - Poland 1,28% n.a.
Source: exchanges’ and brokers’ data
Note: This table does not contain an exhaustive list of all power exchanges in Europe. OTC brokered
numbers refer to volumes reported to us by major energy brokers.

(381) Table 16 shows spot volumes traded on power exchanges and on OTC markets relative to
electricity consumption in the relevant geographical area. It is evident that large
differences exist between geographical areas. These differences are partly the result of
diverging national wholesale market frameworks. According to their design, power
exchanges can be divided into two broad groups. In the first group members of power
exchanges have some kind of obligation or incentive to trade via the exchange (OMEL,

221
Some respondents noted that the (temporary) decrease in traded spot volumes on APX during 2003, was to be
ascribed to the distrust of market participant after strong price spikes had occurred when some power plants shut
down due to cooling water constraints in the summer

125 126
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

GME, Nord Pool).222 In the second group exchange members have no such incentives or Figure 42
obligations. In this group EEX and APX saw significantly higher spot volumes traded Forward trading has developed differently across countries
than Powernext, EXAA, Pol PX and the UKPX. For reasons mentioned above, a direct Development of total traded volumes on OTC forward markets as a multiple of national electricity consumption
8
comparison between the two groups of exchanges is not reasonable.
7

multiple of national electricity consumption

(382) From this table it also emerges that traded spot volumes on exchanges are larger than
6
brokered spot markets in most of the Member States examined. Thus market results on
power exchanges seem to be setting the pace for the overall traded spot market. 5

4
I.3.5. Traded volumes on forward markets
3

(383) As can be seen from Table 17, total traded volumes in standardised forward contracts
2
show large variations among countries, suggesting varying degrees of market
development. Yet again, market design appears to be an important factor. Forward 1

trading in Spain is insignificant, reflecting the de facto mandatory nature of the pool 0
system on OMEL223. In contrast, the Dutch and German OTC forward markets traded by 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
far the highest volumes (relative to consumption) on the continent as data received from
brokers suggest. Germany France UK Netherlands Belgium Spain

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.

Table 17
Traded volumes in futures/forward contracts as a percentage of national electricity consumption (June 2004 - May 2005)
(385) The UK is the only market in the comparison where traded volumes have significantly
power exchanges OTC brokered power exchange + OTC declined during the last two years. This is often ascribed by respondents to ongoing
OMEL - Spain no exchange trading negligible n.a.
GME - Italy no exchange trading n.a. n.a.
vertical reintegration of the industry, i.e. the trend to bring independent generation and
Nord Pool - Nordic region (2005) 196% 327%* 523% supply businesses into a single operation under the same ownership. Volumes continue to
EEX -Germany 74% 565% 639%
Endex - The Netherlands (since dec. 2004) 39% 509% 548% be quite low in France and in Belgium owing to the high level of concentration and
Belgium
Powernext - France
no exchange trading
6%
22%
79%
22%
85%
vertical integration in these countries.
EXAA - Austria no exchange trading n.a. n.a.
Pol PX - Poland no exchange trading n.a. n.a.
UKPX - UK 0% 146% 146%
I.3.6. Number of market participants
Source: exchanges’ and brokers’ data
Note: OTC brokered numbers refer to volumes reported to us by major energy brokers. (386) Wholesale markets do not only need electricity for their functioning but also a large
* This figure only includes bilateral contracts cleared by Nord Pool number of market participants trading actively. The numbers in Table 18 are based on the
data received from major brokers.
(384) Figure 42 depicts the development of total traded volumes as a proportion of national
electricity consumption. The figures are derived from assessments of respondents in the
Table 18
Sector Inquiry that actively trade on European wholesale markets. In terms of trades a
number of continental markets saw their volumes rise. Especially, the German and the
Number of active market participants on forward and futures markets
Dutch markets experienced increasing OTC volumes.
total number of participants
local generators pure financial traders
trading
Nord Pool 36 16 8
Germany 34 8 10
UK 23 12 7
France 20 2 4
222 The Netherlands 18 5 5
In the period reported upon, in Spain only electricity traded via OMEL was entitled to receive capacity payments.
Belgium 5 1 0
The situation has changed in the meantime and new rules have resulted in a lower percentage of total consumption
being traded on Omel at the time of publication of this report. In Italy the Single Buyer (Acqirente Unico) apparently Source: exchanges’ and brokers’ data
covers an important share of its energy requirements to supply the captive market segment on GME. This contributed Note: The number of participants in the table represents companies that are reported to have traded yearly
largely to a rise in spot traded volumes from 29 % in 2004 to 64% in 2005 (January – May). On the Nordic market or seasonally benchmark contracts over the period January-May 2005 and represented at least 0.5 % of the
there is a need for market participants to transact via Nord Pool once crossing different price areas, since the market total volumes traded in those contracts.
mechanism applied there is also implicitly used to allocate limited transmission capacities between different price
regions.
223
Only some minor transactions are executed one-year ahead of generation or more. This concerns output from
cogeneration and renewable unit. Some generators reported however that also this electricity is increasingly sold day
ahead.

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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

(387) The total number of participants in the comparison given in the table includes not only
local utilities and financial players but also trading affiliates of incumbents established in
other Member States and major oil and gas companies. All market participants act on the
market as both sellers and buyers. The number of active participants on the power
exchanges (EEX, Powernext) trading futures products is significantly lower than on the
respective OTC markets.
(388) Nord Pool, together with the German OTC forward market, has the highest number of
participants and also attracts the largest number of financial traders, followed by the UK,
France, Netherlands and Belgium. The number of pure financial traders is a useful
indicator, since such traders only enter markets once they are comfortable with the level
of activity and consider that they can get in and out of trading positions relatively easily.
(389) It is interesting to note that although the total number of trading participants is very
similar in the UK and France, the UK forward market has six times as many local
generators and suppliers as the French. In France there are also relatively few pure
financial traders. These relations suggest that in France trading is mostly pursued by
affiliates of incumbents in other European countries and – to some extent – by oil and gas
companies active in the electricity business.
II. Issues
(391) Whilst the electricity markets underwent significant changes over recent years (e.g.
creation of power exchanges in many Member States) and some significant progress has
been made in the creation of a single market place, it is currently the overall perception of
many market participants, policy makers, professional observers and analysists, that
significant efforts are still needed to create a competitive common market for electricity.
(392) It is not the purpose of this report to downplay the progress made in the liberalisation
exercise, but to analyse where many market participants currently see major deficiencies
that still need to be overcome. The focus is thus on problem identification. As for gas the
issues identified by market participants can be grouped into five large areas:
1. concentration and market power,
2. vertical foreclosure,
3. lack of market integration,
4. lack of transparency, and
5. prices.
II.1. Concentration and market power

Table 19
II.1.1. Introduction

Number of active market participants trading electricty day-ahead on selected power exchanges (393) One of the main concerns expressed by market participants in the Sector Inquiry is the
Number of sellers Number of buyers concentration in national wholesale markets (whether in terms of ownership of generation
Germany - EEX 35-26 31-36 assets or in terms of trade in a given product) which gives scope for exercising market
France - Powernext 27-28 29-32 power. In general the larger generators in a given national market found that the market
The Netherlands - APX 23-24 24-22
Austria - EXAA 21 22 was competitive whereas smaller generators, retailers without generation, traders and
Sweden - Nord Pool 24 7 industrial customers found that there was scope for exercising market power and disputed
Denmark West - Nord Pool 19 16
Finland - Nord Pool 14 9 that the prices were at competitive levels.
Denmark East - Nord Pool 7 7
UK - UKPX 18-19 15-19
Spain - OMEL 15-13 6-7
(394) The following customers’ views on the functioning of the spot and forward markets
Italy - GME North 15-14 26-21 illustrate their concerns and allegations about concentration:
Italy - GME Sicily 7-8 9
Source: power exchanges’ data
Note: The number of participants in the table represents companies that are reported to have traded spot Customers’ views on the functioning of spot and forward markets
electricity over the period January-May 2005 and represented at least 0.5 % of the total volumes traded.
The values are given in ranges, since the number of participants change depending on the hourly product in “There is an oligopoly on the supply side (…) accounting for 80% of generation output.”
question. The first values in the range represent the number of participants traded ‘Hour 3’, the second
ones the number of participants traded ‘Hour 12’. For data availability reasons no such distinction is made
for EXAA and Nord Pool
“French and Belgian markets are dominated by single players – thus distortions can
easily occur there.”
(390) The number of market participants trading spot electricity on power exchanges is
presented in Table 19. The number of participants trading in spot markets compares well “Forward and futures prices [at the power exchange] do not react to supply and demand.
with those trading forward contracts on OTC markets. On most power exchanges the vast A very dry summer such as 2003 drives up prices, the end of the dry period should thus
majority of participants act in general as both sellers and buyers of electricity. It is result in a price decrease. However a downward trend after a price peak is not observable.
important to note that on most power exchanges a relatively small number of market Obviously the few players at the power exchange are able to prevent price decreases by
participants accounts for a large part of the overall spot volume traded on both the selling limiting the offer.”
and buying side. This is especially true for OMEL of Spain, GME of Italy and Denmark
West on Nord Pool. Reference is also made to the chapter B.b.II.1. (395) The Sector Inquiry was launched to carry out a competitive assessment of electricity
markets notably in order to investigate the above allegations and to assess the reasons for
rigidity in prices. This chapter starts the competition assessment of electricity markets by

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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
looking, in line with traditional competition assessment, at levels of concentration using
conventional indicators such as market shares. However, due to the characteristics of the
electricity markets such indicators are insufficient to assess the scope for market power.
Hence, this chapter will present results from a set of additional indicators that could
reveal to what extent players are able (unilaterally or collectively) to influence prices.
This set of indicators does not exclude the use of other possible indicators and further
indicators related to concentration and its impact on price formation are provided in
chapters B.b.II.1 and C.c.III.
(396) The organisation of this chapter is as follows. After explaining in section 2 how the
Commission traditionally defines electricity markets, section 3 will present concentration
in generation using conventional indicators. Results of similar indicators in the level of
concentration in trade on forward markets and power exchanges are presented in
section 4. Subsequently, section 5 presents additional indicators for power exchanges and
generation aimed to assess in more detail the extent to which electricity markets are
vulnerable to manipulation based on market power. A conclusion ends this chapter.
II.1.2. The relevant markets
II.1.2.1. Product market
(397) The relevant product market in this analysis is wholesale trade in electricity. Previous
analysis of the Commission224 has defined wholesale supply of electricity to cover the
production of electricity at power stations and the import of electricity through
interconnectors for purpose of resale to retailers or, to a lesser extent, directly to large
industrial end-users.
(398) Some market participants have indicated that product markets could be further narrowed
according to the time of delivery. For instance, one could distinguish between peak and
off-peak periods because of the different nature and level of demand in those periods.
Others suggested even narrower markets down to hourly markets. However, for the
purpose of this report it is not necessary to take any position on further refinements of the
relevant product market.
(399) When analysing whether operators have market power giving them scope to influence
prices, the Commission looked in particular at two specific products (one year forward
products and day ahead products) sold on power exchanges and brokers’ platforms since
they provide the main public price indicators in electricity markets. In this respect, it is
important to underline that these contracts are analysed below as different segments of
the same product market i.e. do not constitute a relevant market under EC competition
law.
224
See i.a. cases COMP/M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP, COMP/M.3696 E.ON/MOL, COMP/M.3729 EdF/AEM/Edison,
COMP/M.3867-Vattenfall/Elsam and Energi E2.
131
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
II.1.2.2. Geographic market
(400) As regards the geographic market, despite efforts by the Community to reduce barriers
between the different markets in the EU, the Commission has usually found that the
geographic markets are most of the time national in scope225, but that they may
sometimes be smaller226 or larger227.
(401) Relevant elements which support the existence of a smaller or larger market include
system design, the existence of congestion at points in the grid, the existence of price
correlations and price differentials and the differing nature of supply and demand on both
sides of congestion points (in particular the existence of an operator that is indispensable
to meet demand228).
(402) Annex A that is attached to this report includes a preliminary analysis of the regional
scope of certain wholesale markets. A complete analysis would have to include further
assessment of supply and demand substitution, in particular the systematic assessment of
whether there are operators who are indispensable to meet demand (calculation of
residual demand). Given the need to do such an assessment on a very detailed basis, it
was possible to do such an assessment only for some markets, without prejudice to the
conclusions that could be reached by further investigation in individual cases on these
and other markets. All in all, on the basis of the analysis carried out for this report
(including analysis detailed in chapter B.b.II.1 and the corresponding annex), all markets
will be considered to be national in scope, except Denmark and Italy, where sub-national
regional markets clearly exist.
II.1.3. Concentration in generation
(403) Many market participants complain about price distortions linked to the degree of
concentration in generation. It is often argued that generators’ ability to influence the
electricity price levels are due to the characteristics of electricity - the non-storability of
electricity, the high inelasticity of demand, a very wide spectrum of costs of production
and a price equal to the most expensive of the offers selected in power exchanges.
According to market participants generators can influence prices in two main ways229:
• either by withdrawing capacity (which may force recourse to more expensive
sources of supply); or,
• by imposing high prices when they know that their production is indispensable
to meet demand.
225
See i.a. cases COMP/M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP, COMP/M.3696 E.ON/MOL.
226
See case COMP/M.3729 EdF/AEM/Edison
227
See cases COMP/M.3268 Sydkraft Graninge and COMP/M.2847 Verbund/Energie Allianz.
228
An operator is theoretically indispensable to meet demand if total demand (D) in the area is larger than the sum of the
capacity (SC) of the other generators in the area and of the import capacity (IC) of the area. Given the little flexibility
of demand and provided that the capacity of this operator is much larger than (D-SC-IC), such an operator would be
able to raise prices without constraint.
229
This does not preclude other practices: some comments in the public consultation underline that dominant operators
can also deter entry by selling at low prices or even below costs during certain hours in the day to affect the prospects
of a business case for a new power plant. Obviously, one can also not exclude the possibility of anti-competitive
agreements by market participants to raise prices or efforts by market participants to increase prices by purchasing
significant volumes at times when the market is expected to be tight (see section on forward markets).
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(404) In the first scenario, the withdrawal of capacity is profitable if the “loss” on electricity Figure 43
not being produced is exceeded by the increase in profit for the remaining electricity sold. France
Available installed capacity
France
2004 Effective generation

Large capacity portfolios (in particular large low marginal cost generation capacity Undertaking A

portfolios) can have such an effect because the higher price that results from the 0,5% 8,2%
2,2%
7,9%

7,4%
withdrawal of capacity will more than compensate the lost profit from not running a 2,5%
Undertaking A
Undertaking B

plant230 and create substantial additional profits from the generation assets being used. Undertaking B 7,8%
VPP
Assessing overall concentration of generation assets thus helps to identify the scope for Undertaking C 1,5%

such profitable withdrawals of capacity. Undertaking D Undertakings

owning drawing
rights in plants
Other of undertaking
undertakings A
(405) In the second scenario, it is possible to raise prices (“excessive pricing”) even with a 75,4%
Other
undertakings

relatively small portfolio because the structure of the generation assets and 86,7%

indispensability of certain assets to meet demand at parts of the merit curve, or in certain Spain Spain

locations in the network. The higher the concentration in the relevant parts of the merit Available installed capacity 2004 Effective generation

curve concerned the greater is the scope for influencing prices231 (as presented in chapter
2,2%

6,5% 2,4%
3% 2,6%
B.b.I.3). Comments made in the public consultation point at the level of concentration of 3,4%
Undertaking A
6,1% Undertaking A

4,1%
certain categories of plants (by fuel and technologies) in certain market, as these will 35,6% Undertaking B
Undertaking B

10,4% Undertaking C
represent a specific segment of the merit curve. This will be elaborated later in this Undertaking C

Undertaking D Undertaking D
chapter. 14,7%
Undertaking E
48,3%

Undertaking E

Undertaking F
Undertaking F

(406) Although the extent to which generators may successfully influence the price level, may Other
undertakings Other
undertakings
not (always) correlate with the level of concentration, it is a necessary element of the 28%

analysis of electricity markets across Member States. Figure 43 shows the share of
available capacity and of effective generation of the main operators in France232 and
Spain. Charts for other Member States can be found in annex B.
(407) The charts show that the production assets remain largely in the hands of one or a few
32,7%
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
large operators. This stems from the pre-liberalisation concentration of generation, which
was rarely mitigated by decisions to force divestitures of the incumbent operators.
Further, the strong position of incumbent operators has not been eroded in a significant
way by investments in generation by new entrants. Indeed, there has been little new build
of generation facilities across Europe233, especially in the initial liberalisation phase. In
the past few years some new gas-fired plant has been constructed in Italy, Spain and the
UK and investment of this type is now being planned in other Member States. In
addition, some new wind and other renewable generation facilities have shown
significant growth in Spain, Italy, Germany, and Denmark.234

(408) The charts also point to the possibility that companies with a limited share in generation
capacity might have market power at certain moments. For instance, in Spain, the second
largest operator has almost the same size of installed capacity as the largest one (and both
of them represent one third of total capacity respectively). However, the second largest
one accounts only for a quarter of the effective output of the largest operator (while the
two of them represent three quarters of the total production). This is because the main
operator predominantly operates base load plants (essentially nuclear and coal), as can be
seen in Figure 44, whilst the second largest operator is likely to serve more peak load
demand (especially with hydro plants). Whilst further analysis would certainly be
necessary, this indicates that the largest producer might have scope for profitable
230 withdrawals of capacity according to the first scenario mentioned above, whereas the
The plant which is not run will likely not be one of the cheapest plants but a more expensive one (typically some
mid-merit plant) to minimise the cost of the withdrawal.
231
Some comments in the public consultation also note that when generation is concentrated in the hands of a single or
few operators, then such operators can also impose directly higher prices in the bilateral contracts that are negotiated
233
outside of the power exchange. Some market participants have noted that a number of factors contribute to a lack of investment: the lack of visibility
232
For France the VPPs are plotted separately since this share is not controlled by the major generator. That being said, on the long-term for the EU ETS mechanism, the availability of sites, etc.
234
it is unclear to what extent VPPs limit the scope of market manipulation. New wind power represents 33% of the new electricity generating capacity in the EU.

133 134
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

second largest operator might rather have scope for charging high prices at times of peak
load235. II.1.4. Concentration in trade

Figure 44 II.1.4.1. Introduction

Production portfolios of generators can differ substantially (example: Spain) (411) Analysing concentration in traded forward and spot markets is important because many
100% retailers wish to procure their demand through these markets, be it partly or entirely.
Similarly, many generators wish to secure their sales through these forward markets. In
90%
addition forward (and sometimes spot prices) established on observable markets
80%
Other (broker’s platform and power exchanges) provide an index for bilateral wholesale
Wind
contracts and for retail sales to large users. Further, the spot market outcome is decisive
70%
for the forward market according to a number of market participants, as it constitutes the
60%
Hydro market of last resort for purchases of electricity236 and will thus set the direction for
Fuel oil forward prices. So these markets serve as an important means of sale and purchase and
50%
develop reference prices.
Mix Fuel-gas
40%

Gas (412) Below we analyse first forward trading and then spot trading.
30%

Coal
20%
II.1.4.2. Forward markets
Nuclear
10%
II.1.4.2.1. Degree of concentration in forward markets
0%
Undertaking A Undertaking B Undertaking C Undertaking D Undertaking E Undertaking F
(413) The most traded product by far on forward markets is the yearly contract for base load
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 hours. An exception is the UK market where products for different seasons are the most
traded products237. Figure 45 shows for example the proportion of trade of the
(409) The different possibilities to influence prices by the two generators concerned can be different forward products in Germany. Further, the yearly forward prices are the main
further explained by recalling the analytical concept of the merit order explained in forward price indicator in all markets, for both wholesale and downstream retail
chapter B.b.I Figure 44 shows the technologies used in the portfolios of the different contracts.
generators. As regards the largest operator, most of its plants will be on the left of the
merit curve, representing generation with low marginal costs. If it withdraws capacity (414) Thus, it seems that yearly base load products are a good candidate to investigate
(i.e. limits its production), the curve will shift to the left and force recourse to more concentration in trade in forward markets. For this purpose the Sector Inquiry has
expensive plants to meet demand. Given its very large portfolio, this operator may collected and aggregated the sales and purchases per operator on all OTC trading
compensate fully the lack of production with the increase in prices. platforms and on the power exchanges which trade forward products. Buying and selling
have been assessed separately.
(410) The example of the second largest operator shows on the other hand the scope for market
power resulting from control over fewer plants which are more on the right of the curve
or which are based on hydro. If an operator owns most of the plants on the right of the
curve, then it can increase prices with little risk of being replaced by another operator. It
is precisely for this reason that the distribution of the power generation technologies
becomes relevant. It is, however, important to underline that having scope for influencing
prices does not automatically mean that market power is being abused in an
anticompetitive manner, as many market participants claim. Rather, this first step in the
analysis serves to identify possible scope for influencing prices.

235
The operator concerned has commented in the public consultation that it would not have market power, but its
statement cannot be reconciled with the results of the analysis of bidding on the power exchange, as will be shown in
section cII.1.5.1.
236
This is true for many new entrants who are short of electricity (i.e. they have less electricity generation capacity than
they need to supply to final customers) as is shown in the chapter cII.2.
237
This was also the case in Nord Pool until 2004 when yearly forward products started to be traded much more.

135 136
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

Figure 45 Figure 46
France 2004 France 2004
Germany: monthly trade of all categories of forward products Shares of the main SELLERS of yearly foward products Shares of the main BUYERS of yearly foward products

500.000 other 7% 6%
1% 1% 13% 1% 1% 14%
1% 1% 1%
2%1% 1% 1%
2%
450.000 2%
week ahead 3%
3%
2%
2%
12%
peak 3% 3%
12%
400.000 3%
3%
week ahead 3%

350.000 base 4%
4%

12% 10%
6%
all months peak 4%

300.000 6%
5%
GWh/month

10% 10%
6% 7%
7% 7%
250.000 all months base

200.000 all quarters Germany 2004 Germany 2004

Shares of the main SELLERS of yearly foward products Shares of the main BUYERS of yearly foward products
peak
150.000
all quarters 8%
12%
base 8%
100.000 24%
29%
all years peak 10%
7%
50.000

all years base 2%

7% 7%
0 2%
Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul-04 Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May- 2% 2%
04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 05 05 05 05 05 3% 2% 6%
7%
3% 3%
3% 3% 6%
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 3% 3%
3% 5%
6%
3%
3% 4%
5%
5% 3% 3%

(415) Figure 46 illustrates for France and Germany in 2004 the trade in yearly forward
contracts (indicating the shares of the main sellers and the main buyers separately238).
Charts for other forward markets can be found in Annex C. The charts represented here
and in the annex show that, except for Belgium, the degree of concentration is not
comparable to that in generation. Given the many transactions that take place, the trading
affiliates of main generators in any given market usually represent together between 30%
and 40% of all sales. Furthermore, trading affiliates of the main generators represent
together between 20% and 30% of all purchases. The other large market participants are
usually the trading arms of the large European generators located in other markets as well
as some “pure traders” (i.e. operators without generation assets). The top five players on
the selling side are usually the top five players on the buying side, though not in the same
order.
(416) That being said, it is important to note that in all markets (except Belgium) there are at
least two participants without generation assets and without retail activity in that market,
which can be found among the top five players. Further, at least one of these two players
is a “pure trader”239. This may suggest that some “pure traders” have reached a sufficient
degree of knowledge and confidence in the markets to provide liquidity and arbitrage in
the markets.
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
Note: The pattern represents in each Figure the category “other undertakings”, i.e. the
aggregation of all undertakings which have not been represented individually in the Figures.
(417) An important result, shown in the charts, is that shares in trade do not reflect shares in
generation. Furthermore, for the markets analysed, almost no trading platform has been
identified where operators systematically have a dominant position on supply or demand
as is claimed by a number of market participants240.
II.1.4.2.2. Evolution of concentration in forward trade over time
(418) Whilst the overall concentration levels may look reassuring in the yearly forward market
contract, at certain moments in time there may be a high level of concentration which is
not shown in the static presentation in the previous chart. Figure 47 therefore shows the
monthly evolution of sales and purchases in Germany during the period January 2004 –
May 2005 (see Annex D for all other forward markets). Though more detail may be
required for a more thorough analysis, such as hourly evolution, it gives a preliminary
insight into concentration at different times.

240
In that respect, it is important to note that in most markets, there are more than ten very active participants which
trade on all platforms and can thus arbitrage between them. Thus even if there had been a main operator on a given
238
Note in that respect that the same colour does not correspond to the same undertaking in both pie charts (for sellers platform, it would have been arbitraged against other platforms. That being said, if there had been a main trader
and buyers). behind a given platform it might have been able to give signals through its bids and offers on that platform: that is the
239
In one market, this pure trader is even the biggest trader overall (in terms of total and purchases). reason why it was useful to check this allegation.

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Figure 47 remain rather constant, though in December 2004 and April 2005 the evolution of the
Germany - monthly sales of the main SELLERS of yearly forward products market shifts significantly. As regards December 2004, this decrease is due to the fact
that at the end of the year the trading of the product of the following year stops. As
400000
regards April 2005, this peak may be related to the change that occurred in CO2 trading.
The Nord Pool market is growing fast because of the replacement of the seasonal
350000
products by yearly products, though this has hardly altered the relative proportions of
300000
trade per player. The UK market on the other hand is drying up and trade of all operators
seems to be reducing similarly. In France, there are important variations but trading
250000
shares of most operators change accordingly. In the Netherlands on the other hand, at
times of decreasing trade, the main sellers are becoming fairly important and the two
main sellers can reach up to 50% of total sales, which is a fairly high level and creates
GWh

200000

room for those operators to move the market. In Belgium, the concentration can become
150000 even more acute in certain months than the figures in the preceding section suggest.

100000 (420) It is also clear from the data gathered that in the beginning of the year 2005 a number of
new pure traders entered the market. An increase of trading activity by some of the main
50000
players was also observed in that period.
0
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05
(421) In addition, the evolution of the net position (sales minus purchases) of the main
operators active on each forward market was studied, as it shows their underlying sales
and buying strategies (e.g. financial traders avoiding large open positions). For obvious
confidentiality reasons, the corresponding graphs cannot be reproduced here242. However
Germany - monthly purchases of the main BUYERS of yearly forward contracts
it can be said that in certain markets the main generators have so far been able to take
400000 much larger net positions in the forward market than all other participants. Chapter
B.b.II.2 confirms that only a limited number of operators have excess generation
350000 compared to their retail sales (they have a “long position”) and thus control the supply of
the market. It remains to be seen if the generators in those markets could affect the trade
300000
in forward products by changing abruptly their net positions.
250000
II.1.4.3. Concentration in spot markets
GWh

200000
(422) Power exchanges, where one can trade day-ahead on an hourly basis, often functions as a
150000
last resort to close an open contractual position before gate closure. Alternatively one
may be exposed to balancing market prices that in some Member States are highly
100000
unpredictable and are reported as (economically) punitive by certain market
participants243. Hence, in contrast to forward markets, there are fewer possibilities to
50000 substitute away from the product concerned, e.g. by delaying the purchase. Therefore
high levels of concentration on power exchanges may indicate substantial scope for
0 exercising market power. Some market participants have also claimed in their answers
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05

242
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 The inquiry has in particular studied the evolution of the cumulative net position up to the moment of delivery, for
Note: The pattern represents in each Figure the category “other undertakings”, i.e. the instance the cumulative net positions (sales-purchases) of each operator in yearly forward products all through the year
aggregation of all undertakings which have not been represented individually in the Figures. 2004 until all Calendar 2005 products have either been physically delivered or turned into shorter-term contracts. The
graphs presenting the evolution of the cumulative net positions show three categories of operators in all markets during
2004: first there were a number of operators (usually retailers with or without generation) who gradually increased their
(419) The monthly evolution of relative trading positions for the annual contract during the net buying position during the year, second there were a few operators (usually generators) who increased gradually
period January 2004 – May 2005 shows that, except in Belgium241 and in the Netherlands their net selling position during the year, and thirdly there were a number of operators whose net position varied in both
directions but who remained (except for a few of these “traders”) in absolute terms usually far below the cumulative net
at certain moments in time, there does not seem to be concentration at a monthly time value of the operators in the two other categories. This seems to indicate that there was a rather cautious approach on
scale. In Germany the relative proportions of trade on both sides of the market per player both the buying and selling side during 2004, which avoided the rush that would happen if for instance all buyers had
increased their net purchases at the same time. That being said, some of the net positions in trading did not correspond
to the net positions studied in the chapter B.b.II.2 on vertical foreclosure. Further, in a number of markets, the
241
The charts for Belgium cannot be shown given the very few operators actively involved: it would reveal the strategy categories and the behaviours were much less straightforward in the first half of 2005.
243
of those operators. See section C.c.II on electricity balancing mechanisms.

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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

that generators may “dictate prices” on power exchanges. Thus, this section measures the
level of concentration on power exchanges.
(423) As explained above, it is important to keep in mind that not all power exchanges with
spot markets have the same underlying design. Some thrive on regulatory constraints
(OMEL, GME, Nord Pool), others are of a more voluntary nature (APX, EEX,
Powernext). Thus the volumes traded on the respective market places might vary
considerably. Figure 48 shows the degree of concentration of the various power
exchanges in 2004 and during the first five months of 2005 (further graphs in Annex E).
Figure 48
APX - Shares of spot sales in 2004
Undertaking A
(425) In the second category of power exchanges (France, Germany and Netherlands) the
power exchanges display a lower level of concentration and also less correlation with
concentration in generation. Also the stability of the shares is low in these power
exchanges for the different operators245. However further assessment in the form of
additional indicators is necessary.
II.1.5. Additional indicators
(426) In this section a more detailed analysis is presented of the scope for market power on
power exchanges (possible excessive pricing) and generation (possible withdrawals of
APX - Shares of spot sales in January-July 2005
capacity)246.
Undertaking A

17%
Undertaking B 20%
Undertaking B (427) In this respect it should be kept in mind that there are a number of objective factors that
25%
Undertaking C 30%
Undertaking C may influence electricity prices (cost of fuels, pricing-in of CO2 certificates, constraints
Undertaking D
Undertaking D
on interconnections, etc), as explained in other chapters. These factors and constraints
13%
Undertaking E
Undertaking E

Undertaking F
make it more difficult to identify the final effect of an anti-competitive practice as some
Undertaking F

5%
Undertaking G
12%
Undertaking G
of these constraints are reported to have a very large impact on prices. The assessment
6% Undertaking H 4% Undertaking H that follows does not at this stage aim to quantify the impact of such practices, but tries to
6%
12%
Undertaking I 4% 9% Undertaking I identify whether they were possible.
Other operators 7% Other operators
8% 8% 7%
7%

II.1.5.1. Possible scope for excessive pricing

Omel - Shares of spot sales in 2004 Omel - Shares of spot sales in January-August 2005
(428) As indicated above, a relatively low market share on a power exchange does not
13%
necessarily mean that an operator cannot influence the price level. Indeed, it all depends
1% Undertaking A
19%

Undertaking A
on the price level of offers of the other operators. For instance, if one operator owned
2%
Undertaking B 34% Undertaking B
most of the more expensive plants required to meet demand at times of higher demand
6% 41%
Undertaking C
3%
2%
Undertaking C (concentration in the right of the merit curve), this operator would make most of the
9%
Undertaking D
6%
Undertaking D
offers determining the clearing price at times of peak demand and would face few
competitive constraints247. In other words, the residual demand is supplied by a few or
Undertaking E
Undertaking E
Undertaking F
Undertaking F

Other undertakings
10% Other undertakings just one operator. The focus of the assessment below aims to identify for all exchanges
whether some operators are in such a position. Accordingly, it is the aim at this stage to
28% 26%
identify if the operators had the scope for excessive pricing but not to check if they
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 actually used it.

(424) In the first category of power exchanges (Spain, Italy and Nord Pool) the concentration in
generation finds – with one exception (Italy’s North zone) - direct expression in a rather
stable equivalent concentration in the power exchanges244. This situation does not reduce
the concerns that there is scope for market power.
244
For this analysis, it is necessary to take into account the electricity sold by TSOs on certain exchanges (TSOs appear
as a separate undertaking in the corresponding graphs). Electricity is sold by TSOs on exchanges in particular in Italy
and Denmark. Regulation in Italy mandates the TSO to sell on the power exchange the large amounts of electricity
under regulated pre-liberalisation contracts (so-called “CIP 6” contracts). In Denmark, the TSOs sell wind power on
the exchange: the corresponding amount of electricity has varied substantially between 2004 and 2005.
245
It shows in particular in the difference of aggregated shares between 2004 and 2005. It has also been checked that
variations month by month and the variations of shares of sales of generators month by month are larger in this
second category of power exchanges.
246
As indicated earlier, some market participants note that the scope for excessive pricing may also exist outside
exchanges in case a single generator dominates the market and is able to impose directly higher prices in contracts
negotiated bilaterally with other operators. Such comments by market participants particularly relate to markets
which do not have a power exchange or whose exchange represents only a low percentage of total consumption.
247
In that respect it is important to note that the merit curve will not be perfectly reflected in the power exchanges:
especially in smaller exchanges, it is only a very small part of the merit curve that is reflected by the offer curve in
the power exchange. However, since generators usually try to optimise their most expensive plants on the basis of
spot prices, the right of the merit curve will be much better reflected in the offer curve on the power exchange than
the left of the merit curve. Further, some market participants underlined in the public consultation that the price of
the offers made by generators on an exchange may not be exactly equal to the marginal cost of the plant (operating
costs including fuel cost) that they intend to run as some plants may have high start-up costs to be added to the
marginal costs or may benefit from some subsidies: this is taken into account in the analysis presented because it
deals with offers made rather than the underlying costs.

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II.1.5.1.1. Price setting frequency
(429) As a first rough measurement of concentration at the right end of the merit curve, in all
exchanges for each operator the number of hours were identified when this operator “set
the clearing price”, meaning the hours when its selling bid was equal to the clearing
price248. This does not mean that this operator has unilaterally set the price of the market
(which is determined by the aggregated supply and demand curves249) but this gives an
indication of how often an operator makes selling bids at the clearing price.
Hypothetically, if only one operator “sets the price” most of the time, it means that there
plants of the main generator(s)252. Also, some of the price-setters are traders which
arbitrage between market segments such as spot exchanges and OTC trade. This
measurement does not indicate thus that there was a single operator very much
influencing the spot price in those markets, although the situation may need some further
monitoring, particularly for Powernext. In addition, it would be important to verify also
the buying side as generators may also influence the price through purchases253.
Table 20
Frequency of "price setting" in the m ain exchanges in 2005

are very few, if any, alternative offers around the clearing price most of the time. The Number of Maximum
operator builds-up knowledge about the inelasticity of demand on a specific part of the N°1 N°2 N °3 operators percentage in
supply curve where he operates by comparing his bids with the exchange clearing price. above 5% one month

If demand is relatively inelastic, he can increase his selling price without the risk (or with Omel 32% 25% 10% 5 44%
little risk) of being replaced by another operator.
G M E N o rd 86% 5% 5% 3 100%
(430) The frequency of price-setting on the main EU exchanges has been checked month by
month for 2004 and for the first eight months of 2005. Table 20 shows the frequency of GME Centre South 96% 2% 1% 1 97%

price setting of the three main “price-setters” in each of the exchanges (or area of the G M E S a rdinia 80% 19% 1% 2 98%
exchange when the relevant market is smaller) in the first eight months of 2005; the
number of operators with an average frequency above 5%; as well as the maximum GME Sicilia 87% 10% 2% 2 98%
percentage of the most frequent price setting company in any given month during 2005.
For zones in Nord Pool and GME, the frequency is calculated only on hours during Nord Pool W D K 50% 10% 2% 2 89%

which the zone is isolated from other zones250. This naturally produces higher figures
Nord Pool EDK 60% 3% 1% 1 100%
than for other exchanges. In order to provide a complete picture for Nord Pool, the
calculation has also been made for the most common aggregation of zones (all zones Nord Pool SNO 40% 30% 21% 10 63%
together), which leads to lower percentages.
Nord Pool FIN 85% 12% 3% 2 100%

(431) This indicates that in EEX, APX and Powernext, there are a fairly large number of
Nord Pool all zones together 34% 35% 27% 15 57%
operators making offers of electricity resulting in setting the clearing price. The figures
for 2004 in those exchanges further show that the shares of the main operators vary over EEX 17% 13% 11% 8 25%
time and that even the positions of the main operators have varied. The figures presented
in the above table are usually similar but sometimes higher when only including peak APX 15% 14% 9% 8 18%

hours251. The fact that there are many operators involved in price setting despite
Powernext 20% 15% 12% 7 33%
concentration in generation is possible because there are smaller generators which
apparently have “marginal plants” and because a number of market participants have Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
bought electricity from the main generators in VPP auctions or own drawing rights in Note: all percentages are rounded, totals can exceed 100%.

248
Depending on the clearing system used by the power exchange, the price for a given hour may be established by
interpolation between selling bids. In such cases, the “operator setting the price” was defined as the operator(s)
whose selling bid had a price closest to the clearing price. It may also be possible that several operators had the same
selling price equal to the clearing price or were as close to the clearing price: this leads to totals exceeding 100% in a
few cases. Finally, during some hours all sellers who had been selected had made offers at zero (the price was then
not equal to zero because of interpolation with the first bid at a non-zero price): in those cases no operator was
identified.
249
In that respect, there is also a “price setter” in the same meaning on the demand curve, i.e. an operator buying energy
whose price bid is equal to the clearing price of the market. The analysis in this chapter is focused on the supply
curve.
250
The zones selected are the ones in the EU which are most often isolated (Sweden is almost never isloated) as well as
South Norway (another often-isolated zone) for comparison purposes.
251
Peak hours have been defined for that purpose as the hours covering the period 8:00-20:00 on working days.
252
These operators are different from traders who do not have any retail business in a given market. Such traders, have
to sell the electricity that they still have remaining the day before delivery (e.g. if they have bought that electricity in
the forward market), either in the spot trading of the market where they bought it or in the spot trading of a
neighbouring market if they can export the electricity or sell it OTC. Accordingly, such traders are present in the
statistics of price-setting usually less than in those of shares of sales presented in B.b.II.1.3, depending on the
possibilities of arbitrage between markets.
253
Indeed, generators often combine buying and selling bids as part of their optimisation process: for instance, an
undertaking A with a 50MW plant of a marginal cost of 15 €/MWh, a 50MW plant of a marginal cost of 35.1 €/MWh
and needing 150 MW for its retail needs would place a buying bid for 100MW up to the price of 35MW and 50MW
above. In other words, that operator would make no selling bids. If the clearing price was (due to interpolation), say,
35.05€/MWh, the measurement above will determine that it is another operator that “set the price”, whereas at least
both operators influenced the price.

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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

(436) The same analysis was also carried out on other exchanges. It revealed that in EEX, the
(432) On the other hand, in all macro-zones of GME, in West Denmark, East Denmark, and concentration around the clearing price has been increasing rapidly in 2005, reaching
Finland, when they were isolated, there was in 2005 one operator which set the clearing levels of up to half of the peak hours in a month. This may be a sign that the growth of
price almost all the time254, meaning that there was very little alternative offer around the EEX is now leading to similar characteristics as discussed for OMEL where a larger part
clearing price. With one exception (Sardinia) the figures were roughly the same for 2004. of the “peak plants” are being optimised through power exchanges. A similar trend seems
The same statistics were also calculated for the period of peak hours and it provided to be occurring in Powernext, though at much lower level as the largest price-setter there
similar results255. This means that there might be room for the main price-setter in each started in the summer 2005 to offer more than 50% of the quantity around the clearing
zone to increase its price without having the fear to be replaced by another operator, in price for a non-negligible percentage of the time (up to 17% of peak hours).
other words there seems scope for market power. In the case of Omel, as expected in the
section on concentration in generation, the largest price setter happens to be the second
Table 21
largest operator in terms of total capacity, i.e. the one with by far the largest amount of
hydro power. Furthermore, the percentage of price setting of this operator reached high Percentage of peak hours when the largest "price setter" controlled more than 50% of the
offers of electricity offered at a price around the clearing price
proportions (up to 58%) during the summer months of 2005. This would at least give
some scope to this operator to exercise market power. Maximum in a month Monthly average in Maximum in a month M onthly average
in 2004 2004 in 2005 January-August 2005
(433) All in all, the price setting frequencies indicate a substantial scope for influencing the
prices on certain power exchanges. GME Nord 68% 42% 66% 28%

GME Centre South 100% 100% 100% 100%

II.1.5.1.2. Quantity offered around the clearing price
GME Sardinia 79% 41% 11% 4%

(434) In addition to analysing who set the clearing price, the Sector Inquiry analysed in more GME Sicilia 55% 36% 56% 40%
detail which operators placed bids around the clearing price. For this purpose the interval
+/-10 percent around the clearing quantity along the power exchange supply curve was Omel 50% 17% 66% 33%

analysed to establish whether any operator offered more than 50% of the quantity in that Nord Pool W DK 100% 80% 100% 87%
interval. This goes further than the previous measurement by checking how much the
largest operator on the right of the merit curve controls of the bids. This approach is Nord Pool EDK 100% 74% 100% 92%

rather conservative given that the +/-10 percent interval represents 20% of the clearing Nord Pool SNO 83% 32% 88% 50%
quantity and that some of these exchanges represent a fairly large part of total
consumption. For zones in Nord Pool and GME, the frequency is calculated only on Nord Pool FIN 73% 27% 95% 31%

hours during which the zone is isolated from other zones. This naturally produces higher Nord Pool all zones together 63% 25% 100% 50%
figures than for other exchanges. In order to provide a complete picture for Nord Pool,
the calculation has also been made for the most common aggregation of zones (all zones APX 12% 6% 10% 5%

together), which leads to lower percentages.

EEX 25% 11% 52% 25%

(435) The results shown in Table 21 confirm that the largest price setters in Omel, in the Nord Powernext 1% 0% 17% 6%

Pool zones included in the table when they are isolated, and in all GME zones except Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
Sardinia are also those placing most bids around the clearing price. At certain levels of Note: all percentages are rounded.
demand (particularly in certain months), the main price-setter seems to be in a position to
raise prices, provided that it can forecast well enough the separation of zones in the cases II.1.5.2. Impact of generation on prices: a preliminary assessment of the possibilities to
of Nord Pool and GME256. withdraw capacity

254
The percentages for the main price setter are much higher than the largest share of trade (seen in 2.4.1.3). This is (437) Generators, due to the characteristics of electricity markets, may also be able to influence
possible because other participants have less expensive plants (as explained in the Spanish case under 2.1.3), or prices through withdrawals of physical capacity. This can be done by fully withdrawing a
because some other participants even bid at zero (so-called “price takers”). Bids at zero maybe due to the fact that a plant or, more discreetly, by making it produce at less than its capacity (partial
plant is heat-driven or due to regulatory constraints (the TSO sells into the power exchange wind-power in Denmark
and the TSO sells into the power exchange the large amounts of electricity produced under regulated legacy contracts withdrawals).
“CIP6” in Italy).
255
The proportion remained the same between operators but, in certain zones the percentage of the main operator in (438) The analysis focuses thus on the level of utilisation of power plants of the main
“peak hours”could be one or two points above or below that for “all hours”.
256
In general, it can be said that such a forecast is easier when the isolation of the zone occurs frequently (e.g. more than generators over a sufficiently long time period. Disregarding special circumstances one
45% of the time for West Denmark, Sardinia or Sicilia) than when it occurs less frequently (8% of the time for would expect plants with relatively low marginal costs to run all hours and plants with
Finland and 11% of the time for East Denmark in 2005).

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relatively (very) high marginal costs only to run at (super) peak hours. If this relation Figure 49
between marginal costs and utilisation does not appear from the data one may suspect Load factors 2000 on working hours - Plants of four main operators in Germany

that competitive pressure is too low, and that (partial) withdrawal of generation to 100% 140

manipulate the price level during some hours must be further investigated. 90%
120

Marginal cost (€/MWh)

80%

(439) In order to identify plants, which are not run at their maximum capacity (partial 70%
100

Load factor
withdrawals), so-called load factors have been calculated (see the definition below) of the 60%
80
main generators for a number of years in Germany and France. In order to identify full 50%

withdrawals, a similar calculation has been done257. It has produced graphs similar to 40%
60

those below (please see annex I) but their interpretation is less straightforward as one 30% 40

must take into account the maintenance schedules of the plants. 20%
20
10%

(440) The load factor of a plant is the ratio between effective production and the maximum 0% 0

amount of electricity that this plant could have produced in a period, all market terms 1288 12336 17411 20184 30890 40469 46459 51485
Cumulated capacity (MW)
56025 62936 66646 71505

remaining equal. For this purpose, for each plant and in each period, the number of hours Load factor 2000 on working hours Marginal cost 2000

were calculated when it was generating electricity. Multiplying these effectively Load factors 2004 on working hours- Plants of four main operators in Germany
operational hours with the plant’s maximum capacity yields the maximum potential 100% 140

output258. The load factor is then equal to the effective measured output during the period 90%

divided by its (potential) maximum. 120

Marginal cost (€/MWh)

80%

100
70%
(441) Figure 49 shows the results of the calculations for the main operators in Germany and

Load factor
60%
cover the years 2000, 2004 and the first trimester of 2005. The year 2000 corresponds to 80

50%
the beginning of liberalisation, the year 2004 and the first trimester of 2005 represent the 60
40%
situation after liberalisation and before the full effects of CO2 emission trading were felt.
30%
The first line which starts low and increases continuously is the aggregated merit order of 40

all plants of the four main German generators, i.e. the line ranking the marginal costs of 20%
20

all the existing plants. The second line shows the load factor for each plant in the order of 10%

their marginal cost (so that points on both curves correspond to one another vertically). 0%
1284 12960 18198 20051 33759 43285 49703 56081 60101 65032 69810 72610
0

The horizontal axis provides the aggregated value of capacity of the plants in the order of Cumulated capacity (MW)

Load factor 2004 on working hours Marginal cost 2004

their marginal cost.
Load factors 2005 on working hours - Plants of four main operators in Germany

(442) Figure 49 indicates that the correlation between marginal costs and load factors has 100% 140

increased overall throughout the period investigated. Especially, the load factor of the 90%
120

Marginal cost (€/MWh)

relatively low marginal cost plants is overall on the rise. 80%

100
70%

Load factor
(443) Figure 49 shows that within the groups of plants with marginal costs usually below the 60%
80

spot market level (on average around 28-30€/MWh in 2004 and around 36-38€/MWh in 50%

the first trimester of 2005) some were used extensively whilst others were characterised 40%
60

by low load factors. In other words, some plants ran significantly more than other plants 30% 40

with similar or higher marginal cost. There is a variety of possible explanations for this 20%
20
phenomenon: for instance, a plant may be producing heat as well as electricity and needs 10%

to run according to the need to produce heat. 0% 0

52 12960 18198 20051 32417 41959 49064 54134 60778 64708 69855 72820
Cumulated capacity (MW)

Load factor 2005 on working hours Marginal cost 2005

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006

257 Note: Some corrections have been made to the values of the marginal costs of certain plants to protect
Whilst the calculation of load factors for full withdrawals have been made in relation to “all hours of each year”, the
confidentiality, but it still gives a fair and representative picture of the actual situation.
partial withdrawals calculations were made on “working hours” only.
258
This maximum capacity is usually the capacity stated by the generator in its answer to DG COMP questionnaires.
However, in a number of cases (especially the cheap plants), the plant is run for a very large number of hours above
the nominal capacity. In those cases, the maximum capacity the maximum output of the plant during the period is
taken.

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(444) Figure 50 shows the same calculations as those in Figure 49, but it plots the marginal
costs to compare the merit curve across the years (with on the horizontal axes the
accumulated capacity for the main German operators). One should keep in mind that, in
this chart the plants on the horizontal axis need not necessarily be the same for all years.
Figure 50
Marginal costs for accumulated capacity from main German generators
for the years 2000, 2004 and first trimester 2005
180
160
some less expensive coal-fired plants in the period 2000-2005 while de-mothballing some
more expensive fuel oil fired plants.
(447) More generally as regards withdrawals of capacity, some comments made in the public
consultation argue that certain power exchanges may have enough resilience to withstand
a withdrawal of capacity. In that respect, one power exchange computed that 500MW of
additional demand during a given winter month (January 2006) would have generated an
averaged increase of a bit less than 4€/MWh. Whatever conclusions are drawn from this
figure, it could be useful for regulators and competition authorities to know what kind of
resilience power exchanges have in order to identify the scope for withdrawals of
capacity.

140
(448) Further indices are presented in chapter C.c.III.

120
Marginal cost (€/MWh)

100
80
60
40
20
0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Cumulated capacity (MW)
2000 2004
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
(445) As regards the shifts to the left of the merit curve over the years, the evolution of the
portfolio of the main generators has been studied. It is interesting to note that the total
generation capacity of the four main German generators decreased between 2000 and
early 2005 by 2149MW (addition of 960MW of capacity, and retirement of 3109MW of
capacity). The retirement of a plant may be explained by the age of the plant and the need
for an operator to replace its old plants. In that respect it is to be noted that in the
preceding years some new plants were switched on by these operators, although net
additions in the preceding years were still of a lesser scale than these retirements259. In
any event, this decrease of total capacity is likely to have had an adverse effect on the
balance of supply and demand. Furthermore, out of all the plants which have been retired,
most of the capacity retired (2679MW) had low variable costs. This had an impact on the
merit curve. At the same time – according to Eurostat - there was an increase in overall
demand in Germany from 2000 to 2004 of approximately 5.5%.
(446) Similar graphs have also been prepared for France. However these graphs cannot be
reproduced as there is one main operator and the graphs would reveal its costs. They
show a similar situation in terms of increased usage of the plants but are different in
terms of the overall merit curve due to the specificity of the operator’s portfolio. Some
respondents in the public consultation note in that respect that this operator has retired
Conclusion
Customers have little trust in the functioning of wholesale markets. They suspect market
manipulation on the spot and forward markets by large generators to be the main reason
for recent price increases. Concentration is a key factor in the proper analysis of the price
developments. Other factors are the developments in fuel prices and the impact of the EU
Emission Trading System.
60000 70000 80000 Most wholesale markets have remained national in scope. The level of concentration in
generation has remained high in most Member States giving generators scope for market
2005
power. The level of concentration in trading markets is less striking than in generation,
particularly on forward markets where electricity can be traded several times before
delivery. However, all spot and forward markets, even the most developed forward
markets, remain dependent on the few players which enjoy a net excess of generation
compared to their retail supplies.
Further, an analysis of who determines the clearing price at certain power exchanges
indicates that there is scope to directly influence prices by excessive bidding prices for
operators in Italy, Spain and Denmark. Possibilities to move prices might also exist in
other markets.
In addition to excessive bidding, large operators can push up prices by withdrawing
capacity. In that respect, it appears that load factors of generation units have increased
over time in Germany and in France suggesting higher efficiency levels and a tighter
supply/demand balance. However, significant generation capacity – most of it with low
marginal costs – was retired in Germany despite slowly increasing demand. Also, certain
plants with rather low marginal costs did not operate fully at all times.

259
In the year 1999, the four operators added little net capacity, but in 2000 they added around 1500MW.

149 150
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

II.2. Vertical foreclosure and vertical integration260

(449) Vertically integrated electricity companies have traditionally been active in generation,
network and retail activities. This chapter assesses the effects of this vertical integration.
It starts with vertical integration of generation and retail activities and continues with
vertical integration of network and supply activities. The Sector Inquiry confirms that
both forms of vertical integration, whilst also bringing about certain economic benefits,
have adverse effects for the liberalisation process. The magnitudes of these adverse
effects are empirically assessed.
(454) Cross-border entry in electricity markets is facilitated to an important degree if entrants
do not have to enter as vertically-integrated companies acquiring simultaneously
generation capacity and a customer portfolio, but can choose to enter as purely a supply
company or generation company. This reduces the risks and costs of entry. However, this
is only possible if a liquid wholesale market exists. Liquid wholesale markets are
therefore key for the erosion of incumbent’s market power.
II.2.1.2. Comparison of net positions

(450) Exclusive long-term contracts may also result in vertical foreclosure. They have similar
effects to vertical integration of generation and retail activities, as independent suppliers
have (almost) no access to uncommitted generation and independent generators cannot
supply electricity directly to the wholesale market. This will also be assessed.
II.2.1. Vertical integration between generation and retail activities
(455) An undertaking can have a long or a short position, meaning that it, respectively,
produces more electricity than is required to supply its retail customers or, less. In both
cases a company will have to trade262 in order to balance its position. The sum of long
and short positions (“net positions”) of all market participants represents the minimum
amount of sale and purchase transactions that must be concluded in order for all short and
long positions to clear.263

II.2.1.1. Introduction Figure 51

Net positions vary considerally across the EU
(451) Vertical integration of generation and retail within the same group reduces, all other
things being equal, the need to trade on wholesale markets. In turn, this can lead to a 30.000
Germany
reduction of liquidity of wholesale markets. In a market without any vertically integrated
companies, all electricity will necessarily be traded between generators and suppliers. In 25.000
contrast, when all companies are vertically integrated, each vertically integrated group in
the sector would meet (part of) its respective demand from final customers with own
generation capacity and so would have less need to enter into wholesale transactions261. 20.000 United Kingdom

Poland

(452) Lack of liquidity can have many negative effects, such as: high volatility of prices, which

GWh
15.000

increases costs for hedging (this can be an important barrier to entry) and a lack of trust
that the exchange price reflects the overall supply and demand balance in the wholesale 10.000
market (reduced reliability of the price signal).
France
Portugal
Netherlands
Hungary
(453) A lack of liquidity may also initiate a vicious circle by creating further incentives to 5.000
Czech Republic
Slovakia
vertical integration because operators do not want to rely on the wholesale market for Belgium

their electricity supply. New entrants face higher risks when markets are volatile and 0
Jan-02 May-02 Sep-02 Jan-03 May-03 Sep-03 Jan-04 May-04 Sep-04
consequently may not be able to match, at least not in the short run, market offers from Belgium Czech Republic Germany France Netherlands
their vertically integrated competitors and may only be able to attract capital at higher Poland Slovakia United Kingdom Hungary Portugal

costs. Similarly, incentives to integrate vertically may result from balancing markets
where the regime foresees an economic penalty for imbalances. In such cases, incentives
for self-balancing (i.e. to vertically integrate) also exist. Thus, vertical integration limits
exposure to volatile wholesale markets and balancing markets.
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
(456) Figure 51 shows that the aggregated net positions vary significantly from Member State
to Member State. At one extreme there is the German market with some 25 TWh/month
of positions that need to be closed. At the other extreme there is Belgium, where this
volume has been below 2 TWh/month for most of the period analysed. It must be noted

260
The title was chosen in order to ensure consistency with the gas part. Contrary to gas the chapter mainly deals with
vertical integration.
261
Vertically integrated companies continue to have incentives to trade on the wholesale markets, in particular to
optimise their generation portfolios. A vertically integrated company that owns the generation capacity to produce all
the electricity needed to cover its customers requirements will benefit from buying instead of producing electricity if
the wholesale market electricity price is lower than the short run marginal cost of the last generation unit in the merit
order of its own generation capacity. For “pools” see footnote 263 below.
262
The analyses here cannot be directly translated to the manner in which contracts are traded (OTC, power exchange,
bespoke bilateral contracts) or the time horizon over which contracts are traded (a given long or short position can be
closed immediately before gate closure or any time before.)
263
The design of certain wholesale markets, in particular the Spanish organised market OMEL and to a lesser extent the
Italian organised market, GME and Nord Pool result in vertically integrated companies trading all or part of the their
generation output through the (organised) wholesale market only to purchase subsequently on the same market the
amounts needed for their retail operations. For this reason, the analyses performed in this chapter are not pertinent for
these market places.

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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

that the existence of the French VPP programme contributes strongly to liquidity on the because (a part of) this energy will flow to foreign customers. For the importing
French market. Indeed, the auctioned 6000 MW capacity translates into about 3.5 countries, the opposite is true. In many instances, this theoretical pattern is confirmed by
GWh/month. the Figure 53. The pattern is visible in Member States like France and the Czech
Republic, which are large exporters, or Belgium, where substantial quantities of energy
(457) To demonstrate the real extent of vertical integration between generation and retail per are sourced from abroad. On the other hand, some of the existing discrepancies in Figure
Member State, the figures on net positions have been compared with the total size of 53 can be explained by the fact that the Commission inquiry did not cover entities falling
respective national markets (see Figure 52). The inquiry reveals that in countries such as below certain thresholds.265
the Czech Republic264, Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom, the positions that
need to be cleared by trading electricity represents 25-40% of the market. In Belgium and Figure 53
France, this percentage is substantially lower.
Cross border flows can have a considerable impact on national markets

Figure 52 United Kingdom

Different levels of vertical integration in Member States

Slovakia
100%

Portugal
90% Portugal
Poland

80% Poland
Slovakia

70% Netherlands
Hungary
% of the total market

60%
France

50%
Germany
40%
Netherlands
Czech Republic
Czech Republic
30% United Kingdom
Germany

20% Belgium

Belgium
10% Long positions Short positions
France

0%
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
Jan-02 May-02 Sep-02 Jan-03 May-03 Sep-03 Jan-04 May-04 Sep-04
Belgium Czech Republic Germany France Netherlands
Poland Slovakia United Kingdom Hungary Portugal (460) The impact of vertical integration on the net positions can be demonstrated by the Czech
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 example. In 2003 the Czech incumbent, CEZ, acquired control over five of the seven
retail companies active at the time. The integration of long (CEZ) and short positions
(458) In Poland, the positions to be cleared by trading almost equal the total size of the Polish (retail companies) within the same group led to a 40-50% drop in the net positions. On
market, i.e. hardly any generators were selling to final customers. This is however the other hand, the widely held belief by market participants that the drop in wholesale
primarily due to the Government’s previous policy not to allow vertical integration. The market liquidity in the United Kingdom is related to an increased vertical integration
same comment can be made as regards the markets in Hungary and Slovakia, where could not be confirmed by this analysis.
generation companies are, in general, not active at the retail level (for further comments
on these markets see below). For Portugal, the picture is disturbed due to the existence of (461) The current discussion in Poland about the envisaged vertical integration is another
a single buyer regime at the wholesale level. interesting example. It shows that that the level of net positions would drop dramatically
(40%) if the planned restructuring around the two largest groups active predominantly in
(459) In a closed system, where neither imports nor exports take place, one would expect to generation goes ahead (see Figure 54).
observe that the total amount of long positions equals the total amount of short positions.
In a liberalised market with cross border flows this equilibrium no longer exists.
However, undertakings in the exporting countries need to have overall larger positions

264
In its comments to the Preliminary Report, CEZ a.s., the Czech incumbent, informed that as of 1 January 2006 its
generation and retail activities are carried out by two separate entities: CEZ a.s. and CEZ Prodej s.r.o., respectively.
265
The latter entity is acting as a retail arm of CEZ a.s. and maintained that it would source, on an independent basis, all Suppliers with the annual sales to final customer below 1TWh were not obliged to reply to the questions relevant for
its electricity needs from the wholesale market. However in the context of the Sector Inquiry it was not possible to this chapter. This in particular means that small retailers in countries like Germany (for instance, smaller
verify whether the separation is effective in practice. ‘Stadtwerke’) or small independent generators from the UK are not included in the study.

153 154
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

Figure 54
(463) Figure 55266 provides a first indication how entrants might evaluate the risks that they
would be exposed to when entering a market by assessing the number of established
Simulations show the adverse effects of vertical integration for wholesale markets generators and suppliers operating with short or long positions in the market. From
12
Figure 55 it may be deduced that the situation in the UK is relatively favourable, whilst
10
for Germany the situation is less advantageous for new suppliers, in particular due to the

number of companies in Poland

Pre-merger situation

8 lack of independent generators.

6

4
(464) The likelihood that an undertaking has an interest in increasing electricity prices on spot
Post-merger situation
(simulation)
2
markets also depends on whether it is long or short as a group. A group that is normally
short has to source part of its own supplies from the electricity wholesale markets.
0
0 50.000 100.000 150.000 200.000 Independent
generators
Integrated players
with long positions
Integrated players
with short positions
Suppliers without
generation assets
Therefore, if an integrated company is net short, its generating branch has less or no
Imbalanced positions in total in GWh (Poland)

Pre-merger situation Post-merger situation (simulation) incentives to increase artificially wholesale prices as the company as a whole would not
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 benefit from such a strategy. Figure 55 illustrates that, ultimately, the number of
companies in a given market that may have incentives to raise prices above the
II.2.1.3. Market participants competitive level is fairly limited267.

(462) Vertical integration not only reduces the overall volumes of net positions but may also (465) An even better indicator for new entrants to assess their risks when entering new markets
have an impact on the number of actively trading companies and the size of long or short is the “concentration levels” in net positions, in other words an analysis that not only
positions of the remaining active participants. This is important because, as a general takes into account the number of players that are short or long, but also the degree to
rule, it can be said that the more actively trading players on the supply and demand side which they are long or short. In this respect it goes without saying that a high degree of
of the electricity wholesale market the more liquid the wholesale markets. Moreover, concentration in long positions is not a favourable condition for competitive wholesale
non-physical or financial players are, all other things being equal, more inclined to markets. A high concentration in short positions is also not conducive to competitive
participate in markets with higher numbers of physical participants. markets although the impact of ‘buying power’ may be of less immediate concern from a
pure competition point of view.
Figure 55
(466) For the purpose of calculating the concentration levels, indices based on sums of
The number of companies trading actively varies substantially across the EU squares268 have been calculated on total production and retail sales as well as the long and
short positions of market participants. In almost all cases, the indices calculated on the
14 30
basis of market positions have higher values than the respective indices calculated on the
basis of generation or retail shares (see Figure 56). On the supply/long positions side, the
12 most striking is the effect of this analysis in Belgium and Slovakia. It must also be noted
that this analysis affects strongly the German situation. On the demand/short positions
side of the market, the effects on the Czech, French, Dutch and Portuguese269 markets
number of companies

10

8
stand out. Furthermore, it should be noted that due to the capacity auctioned under the
VPP, the index calculated for long positions in France dropped considerably.
6

4 266
Figure 55 does not include suppliers with the annual sales (to final customers) below 1TWh and those of independent
generators which have less than 250MW of capacity.
267
2 This observation depends on downstream contractual relations. The disincentive for vertical integrated companies to
use market power in spot markets disappears if retail prices are largely dependent on short-term wholesale prices.
0 However, although spot market indexed supply agreements exist, the Sector Inquiry shows that contracts with final
Belgium Czech Germany France Hungary Netherlands Slovakia Poland Portugal United customers normally have a fixed price. Moreover, no strong link between wholesale prices and those for final
Republic Kingdom consumers can exist where retail prices for non-eligible customers remain regulated.
268
Independent generators Integrated players with long positions The mathematical formula used is the same as in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI index’). Indices have
Integrated players with short positions Suppliers without generation assets therefore the well-described mathematical properties of the HHI index and can take values from 0 to 10,000, where
the latter value indicates that all “observations” are attributed to one source. The term ‘HHI’ has however been
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 avoided in the main text as the indices are here used in a context where they are usually not applied. Moreover
concentration and therefore the HHI index is not a very appropriate indicator for the electricity sector, where, for
reasons explained elsewhere, market power can exists at lower levels of concentration then in other industries.
Having said that the figures presented here can certainly provide guidance about a Member State’s relative position.
For the use of HHIs in the context of competition law application, see the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (OJ C 031 ,
05/02/2004 p.5-8) which provide some guidance as to the meaning that can be attached the value of the index.
269
As regards Portugal, the present situation can be explained by the existence of the single buyer at the wholesale level.

155 156
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

Figure 56 Figure 57
High levels of concentration in actual market positions in many Member States Long-term contracts also reduce liquidity of wholesale markets

Generation index (2004) Long positions index (2004)

80.000
10.000 10.000
9.000 9.000
8.000 8.000 70.000
7.000 7.000
6.000 6.000
5.000 5.000
60.000
4.000 4.000
3.000 3.000 50.000
2.000 2.000
1.000 1.000
0 0 40.000

l
y

ry

y
m

ry

m
nd

nd
lic

lic

s
s

s
kia

kia
ce

ce
m

m
ga

ga
an

an
PP

PP
nd

nd
do

do
ga

ga
iu

iu

GWh
ub

ub
an

an
la

la
rtu

rtu
va

va
m

m
rla

rla
lg

lg
-V

-V
Po

Po
ng

ng
un

un
ep

ep
Fr

Fr
Slo 30.000

Slo
er

er
Be

Be
Po

Po
he

he
Ki

Ki
H

H
R

R
G

G
ce

ce
et

et
d

d
ch

ch
an

an
N

N
te

te
ze

ze
Fr

Fr
ni

ni
C

C
U

U
20.000

Retail index (2004) Short positions index (2004) 10.000

10.000 10.000
9.000 9.000 0
8.000 8.000
7.000 7.000
6.000 6.000
-10.000
Belgium Czech France Hungary Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia United
5.000 5.000 Republic Kingdom
4.000 4.000
-20.000
3.000 3.000
2.000 2.000
Domestic LT contracts Net exports (LT contracts)
1.000 1.000
0 0
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
l

l
y

ry

y
m

ry

m
nd

nd
lic

lic

s
s

s
kia

kia
ce

ce
m

m
ga

ga
an

an
PP

PP
nd

nd
do

do
ga

ga
iu

iu
ub

ub
an

an
la

la
rtu

rtu
va

va
m

m
rla

rla
lg

lg
-V

-V
Po

Po
ng

ng
un

un
ep

ep
Fr

Fr
Slo

Slo
er

er
Be

Be
Po

Po
he

he
Ki

Ki
H

H
R

R
G

G
ce

ce
et

et
d

d
ch

ch
an

an
N

N
te

te
(469) In France the bulk of long-term contracts are export contracts, which further increased
ze

ze
Fr

Fr
ni

ni
C

C
U

U
the impact of the domestic contracts. As such a large proportion of potentially traded
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
volumes in France are apparently unavailable for the price formation process, the
volumes auctioned under the VPP remain the only significant source of liquidity on this
II.2.1.4. Long-term power purchase agreements
market.
(467) Long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) are another factor which may affect the
(470) In Portugal, Rede Eléctrica Nacional (‘REN’) is the single buyer at the wholesale level. It
volumes that are traded on a regular basis on wholesale markets. Clearly, electricity sold
purchases electricity mainly on the basis of long-term ‘PPAs’ signed with the domestic
under longer term contracts270 is also traded. But it has only a limited effect on the price
generators. This energy is sold to non-eligible clients connected predominantly to the
formation process on spot electricity wholesale markets. In certain countries PPAs are
distribution network of the EDP group. As long as the present situation prevails, the
believed to be among the main causes for the low volumes of electricity traded on the
scope for wholesale trading in Portugal will remain very limited.
wholesale markets. The effects of such agreements were therefore analysed for a
selection of countries (see Figure 57).
(471) In Poland, the long-term arrangements have predominantly a domestic character. A large
number of long-term contracts exist, which were signed mainly in the 1990s between
(468) First of all, it must be noted that not just the existence but also the nature of long-term
generators and the former national incumbent company, Polskie Sieci Energetyczne
contracts plays a role here. Long-term contracts between parties with opposite market
(‘PSE’). PSE resells this energy to the local distribution companies, who are under
positions in the same Member State will always tend to reduce the amount of open long
obligation to buy each year from PSE a certain percentage of their own sales to non-
and short positions that need to be closed by wholesale market trading. Import and export
eligible customers. The fact that power is sold on a long-term basis to the incumbent
contracts however will add or reduce the amount of electricity that is available for trading
downstream operators means that the relatively favourable picture drawn above as
in a given Member State. Import contracts may therefore mitigate the effects of domestic
regards volumes available for wholesale trading must be qualified. Even if the degree of
contracts whereas long-term export agreements may aggravate them. In the table below
vertical integration in Poland stays for the time being very low, ‘PPAs’ restrict severely
these distinctions are therefore analysed. In particular the Belgian and Dutch markets,
the volume of electricity that contributes to the price formation process. Hence, they may
considering their size, benefit from imports under long-term contracts, mitigating the
well constitute a significant barrier to the development of the Polish wholesale market,
effects long-term contracts may have on these countries. In France, the opposite is true.
even if the currently discussed vertical integration should be abandoned.

(472) A similar situation exists in Hungary, where Magyar Villamos M• vek (‘MVM’) is the
270 public utility wholesaler and acquires electricity by means of long-term PPAs that is
For the purposes of this analysis, long-term contracts were taken to mean contracts of a duration longer than three
years and/or that are tacitly renewed. subsequently sold to the local retailers. The Hungarian PPAs cover the vast majority of

157 158
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

the Member State’s electricity needs (see Figure 57), which may have effects on
wholesale trading similar to, or even going further than, those described above in the
context of the Polish wholesale market.
(473) Potentially traded volumes appear to be less affected by the long-term contracts signed in
Member States like the Czech Republic or United Kingdom. However, in the former
case, such a conclusion may be partly misleading. The Czech PPAs were concluded
between the vertically integrated incumbent and independent generators, and their impact
was further upstream. Consequently, although these contracts do not immediately affect
the volume of electricity that needs to be traded they do affect the number and degree of
parties with long positions and add to the already high degree of concentration at the
generation level, as is shown by Figure 58271.
Figure 58
Long-term contracts can de facto increase concentration
(Example: Czech Republic)
Generation
Long positions
(475) A company active in electricity generation and/or supply that owns at the same time
transmission or distribution network assets has, however, an incentive to use its
monopoly position as network owner to prevent or limit competition in other areas of the
value chain. This can happen in many ways such as: raising rivals’ costs, price squeezes,
withholding essential information and by providing the information only to affiliated
companies. All of these practices distort a level playing field and render market entry
more difficult. This in turn can reinforce the market power of incumbent
generators/suppliers. With the same token the market power of incumbent operators can
be prolonged through the failure to invest in network expansion.
(476) It is to limit the risk of such behaviour from occurring that the Second Electricity
Directive contains unbundling rules for transmission and distribution networks. The
transmission system operator (‘TSO’) must be independent at least in terms of its legal
form, organisation, and decision making from other activities not relating to transmission.
For distribution system operators (‘DSO’) the rules are similar. However, Member States
are not obliged to implement fully the unbundling rules until 1 July 2007. They can also
decide not to impose certain unbundling obligations on distribution companies that have
less than 100.000 customers.
(477) Unbundling requirements for gas and electricity companies are essentially the same. To
avoid further repetition, reference is therefore made to the Chapter on vertical foreclosure
in the gas part, which contains a more detailed description of what full implementation of
the unbundling rules entails.

(478) As regards TSOs most Member States have by now implemented the Second Electricity
Generation including long term Directive’s requirements for unbundling. Approximately half of them have gone further
contracts than the legal obligations and implemented forms of ownership unbundling. As regards
DSOs, compliance is less advanced272. It is true that Member States only have to comply
fully with the unbundling requirement for DSOs by 1 July 2007. However, at the time
Long positions including long when the Preliminary Report was written a significant number of Member States still has
term contracts
not introduced accounting and management unbundling. Management unbundling was
supposed to be implemented by 1 July 2004 whereas accounting unbundling was already
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
required by the First Electricity Directive of 1996 and had to be implemented by 19
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006 August 1999 by most Member States273. For those Member States, for which the
Commission reached the view that they had not respected the obligations under the
II.2.2. Vertical integration between supply and network activities Directive, infringement procedures were launched in April 2006.
Inefficient unbundling
(479) It is interesting to note that the conduct discussed in more detail below concerns without
(474) Effective access to the existing network is considered indispensable for competition to exception TSOs and DSOs that have, even if unbundled in accordance with the legal
develop. This is due to the fact that the network generally constitutes a natural monopoly requirements, remained part of a vertically integrated group. Indeed, unbundling
that is uneconomic to duplicate. Competitors thus need effective access to the existing measures may render discriminatory practises in the exploitation of the network
network. monopoly more difficult, but do not eliminate the incentives for vertically integrated
companies to engage in such conduct. The experiences of full ownership unbundling
suggest that it significantly changes the behaviour of the network undertaking: fully
unbundled Transmission System Operators (‘TSOs’) and Distribution System Operators
271
In the public consultation of the Preliminary Report, CEZ a.s., the Czech incumbent, informed that, in 2006, the
electricity volumes tied in its upstream PPAs with the independent power producers decreased by 24 per cent in
272
comparison with the year 2005. CEZ also referred to two contracts signed for indefinite periods that must be Source: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 2005 Report on the
extended for the following calendar year by means of a revision. In the company’s view, these two contracts should Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market.
273
not be classified as long-term PPAs. As regards of the Sector Inquiry analysis, the exclusion of the two contracts in See Art. 27 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning
question would only result in a slight shortening of the two bottom bars in Figure 58 and thus would not alter the common rules for the internal market in electricity. (OJ L 027 30/01/1997 p. 20, - 29).
paragraph’s general conclusion.

159 160
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(‘DSOs’) will no longer have the incentive to favour affiliated companies –since there are
none-, but can focus on optimising the use of the networks.
(480) This chapter mainly describes the obstacles to effective unbundling as reported by market
participants in reply to the Commission’s information requests of summer 2005. In
reaction to the Preliminary Report certain operators – particularly vertically integrated
companies opposing ownership unbundling - claimed that the information presented in
the report is outdated taking into account that the unbundling provisions under the
Electricity Directive were only implemented into national law shortly before the Inquiry.
Accordingly it is also maintained that only little experience existed with the new
unbundling regime and more time should be given to prove that the unbundling regime
foreseen in the Second Electricity Directive works in practice.
(481) In this respect it suffices to say that the Commission services continued to gather
information about existing unbundling practices also after the Preliminary Report. The
new information confirmed the earlier assessment that the current level of unbundling is
insufficient (for details see below). In certain areas the concerns expressed earlier were
even reinforced. It is therefore submitted that the behaviour described below still reflects
current realities.
(482) This subsection is structured as follows: In its first part it sets out a number of practical
problems with unbundling as reported to the Commission. The chapter then goes on to
describe the obstacles for market participants with new generation projects to connect
their power plants to the net (essentially to the TSO network). It concludes that vertically
integrated companies have an incentive to delay market entry and in practice take certain
measures leading at least to delays for new power projects. The third part deals with
access to the network from the perspective of network users (e.g. traders). Again the
incentive structure for vertically integrated companies is at the heart of the findings. The
fourth part deals with obstacles to switching at the distribution level. For all parts (as well
as the parts described in other chapters) it transpired from the analysis that the current
level of unbundling is not satisfactory and calls for further action.
II.2.2.1. Practical problems in the implementation of the unbundling provisions
(483) Taking into account the historic development of vertically integrated electricity
companies it is not surprising that legal and functional unbundling of network activities
and supply/generation activities is taking significant time and effort to implement in
practice. There are a number of obstacles of a practical nature.
(484) For example, the Sector Inquiry confirmed that the unbundled network and supply
branches are - in many instances - still located in the same building. This also means that
the personnel of the supply branches have “better access” to the employees working in
the network branch. The employees of these branches still share a large number of
common facilities. For instance they go to the same company restaurant, which allows for
an informal exchange of views. They also attend the same training programmes/facilities
allowing for the same exchange of information. In certain companies network and
supply/generation branches also share the same IT services274. All these seemingly small
274
Vertically integrated companies maintain however that Chinese Walls exist within the IT system. As a consequence
employees of the supply branch do not have access to the data stored for the network business.
161
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
factors contribute to the continuation of a close cooperation between the formally
unbundled branches (special relationship). In some instances it has been confirmed that
the “special relationship” leads to a (systematic) copying of e-mails to the other formally
unbundled, but affiliated branch (lack of “information unbundling”), whilst obviously
third parties do not get access to such information or only at a later stage.
(485) Another important concern stems from the fact that the personnel still perceives
themselves as employees of one and the same group, and that there are a number of
factors reinforcing the group identity. It was thus brought to the attention of the
Commission that in certain companies the head of TSOs systematically participates in the
strategic discussions of the holding company. Accordingly he/she is well informed about
the group’s generation and supply interests and can/will report about them to his
colleagues in the network business. At the same time the management of these vertically
integrated companies are not limited in their career prospects to the branch, for which
they currently work. Moving from one affiliated branch to the other seems to be current
practice and will have an impact on the decision making process in the network branch. It
will certainly not give the management in the network operation the incentive to take
decisions, which are likely to harm the generation and supply interests of the group or
favour new entrants over the affiliated branches. The obligation to have compliance
programmes and annual reporting in place has not adequately changed the assessment.
(486) In the light of the above described practical problems regulatory oversight is very
difficult. Particularly in Member States with a high number of transmission and
distribution companies it is virtually impossible for the regulator to verify in all
companies that the unbundling provisions are fully respected, even if the Directive is
correctly implemented into national law. Generally the regulator will simply not have the
resources to ensure that unbundling requirements are complied with.
II.2.2.2. Grid connection for new power plants
(487) In order to replace Europe’s ageing generation facilities significant investments into new
power plants will be needed in the coming years. Taking into account that in many
Member States the Sector Inquiry has confirmed a high degree of concentration in
generation, it would clearly be preferable for the future market structure if new power
projects were not only developed by incumbent operators, but also – or even primarily -
by new entrants275. However the Sector Inquiry has confirmed the existence of a number
of obstacles to connecting new plants to the TSO network. When the network is owned
and operated by vertically integrated electricity companies, the TSO is unlikely to have
an incentive to connect potential competitors in the generation/supply business to their
network.
(488) The actual number of network access applications by owners of new generation assets
was relatively low during the period investigated (2000 to 2005). In fact, during this
period only few investment projects in generation capacity were undertaken and so only a
few applications for network access were submitted. With this qualification, it is fair to
say that blatant refusals for access to networks appear rare. In this respect it is important
275
For the avoidance of doubt it should be underlined that the investment into a new power plant located in Member
State A by incumbent from Member State B would also be considered to be a market entry by a “new entrant”.
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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
to underline that network operators can only refuse access to their networks if no or
insufficient capacity exists.
(489) This does not mean however that the access to networks is unproblematic. Despite an
obligation to motivate such refusals, the existence, location, and degree of congestion is
often not transparent. Respondents in Belgium, Ireland, and Germany claimed that it was
impossible to verify whether and to what extent the congestion that was claimed to exist
by the network operator was real.
(490) When constraints exist in the network, applicants can often only be connected if they are
ready to compensate the network operator for the costs of reinforcing the net, measures
that have allegedly be introduced by certain vertically integrated TSOs. Costs for
reinforcing networks can be substantial when compared with the overall investment in
generation capacity and may render any project unviable. The request by a TSO for
compensation for network reinforcements is particularly problematic, if the alleged
congestions cannot (exclusively) be attributed to the new plant(s).
(491) Evidently, a lack of transparency as regards network constraints combined with the
obligation on applicants to contribute to network reinforcement creates considerable
leeway for vertically integrated companies to raise their rivals costs for bringing new
capacity online or even to make this de facto impossible without an outright refusal of
network access. In principle, it is a task of national regulatory and competition authorities
to address these issues.
(492) Nonetheless the Sector Inquiry confirmed that in a Benelux country a project to build
generation capacity was abandoned solely because the compensation demand from the
developer to remedy capacity constraints rendered the project unviable. Allegedly, no
insight was however provided by the TSO as to the causes of this congestion. Similar
allegations have been made against German TSOs as well as one regional network
operator.
(493) Obstacles can also stem from delays in the grid connection process caused by/attributable
to the TSO. Market participants have reported that TSOs require significant
documentation before a first application for grid connection for the new power plant can
be made. This is time consuming and cost intensive at an early stage of a project. Others
have maintained that grid connection can only be applied for once all necessary
administrative permits have been received. It has also been reported that the assessment
of the first application can take many months (up to 18 months), which delays the
planning process. Finally it has been maintained that TSOs only agree to the final
connection of the new plant to the network after all congestion is removed, even if the
generation company has paid the required amounts in this respect. These delaying tactics
are of a particular concern in the light of the fact that new power plants are reported in
some countries to receive free emissions allocations only if they are up and running by
the end of 2012 (end of NAP II).
(494) Often the works related to building new network connections can only be undertaken by
the network operator itself, who also chooses the best geographical location of the grid
connection. A vertically integrated network operator has no incentive to choose the
shortest connection or to make attractive offers for building network extensions and
reinforcements that will serve its competitors. Indeed, concrete examples from Ireland
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
suggest that costs for network connections by the network operators were significantly,
(between 17 and 51%) higher compared to earlier connection offers or offers to execute
the building works made by third companies. Repeatedly respondents made calls for
rendering the building of network extensions and reinforcements contestable, i.e.
providing the applicant for a network connection with a choice to contract construction
work with a third party. A network operator’s ability to raise costs for its rivals would
then be curtailed by the existence of competing bids276.
(495) Whilst the main focus of this chapter was connection to TSO networks it should be
stressed that similar issues have been raised with regard to the connection to distribution
networks. In this respect it needs to be underlined that decentralised generation capacity
(linked to distribution networks) which permits a certain degree of auto-production
having also a stabilising effect on grids, is expected to increase in the coming years.
II.2.2.3. Access to the TSO networks
(496) Article 20 of the Second Electricity Directive lays down the requirements for non-
discriminatory access to networks at regulated tariffs. A refusal to grant access is only
possible in case of capacity constraints and must be duly substantiated. Third party access
is thus a statutory obligation, which can only be refused under specific conditions.
However it should not be forgotten that TSOs also have other means than straight
forward refusals which can amount to obstacles for other network users to use the
existing network.
(497) Supply companies and traders complained in particular about problems relating to
interconnectors. Issues brought to the attention of the Commission services in the
framework of the Sector Inquiry included: (1) the lack of adequate investments into
interconnectors; (2) use of allocation procedures that do not bring about maximum use of
interconnector capacity; and (3) long-term capacity reservations in favour of incumbent
operators. These issues are reported in more detail below, but the examples demonstrate
that vertically integrated network operators, in practice, appear to favour the interests of
the affiliated generation/supply interest.
(498) A particular problem is related to the lack of incentives for vertically integrated TSOs to
remove bottlenecks in the network (most prominently at cross-border points), if these
bottlenecks are assumed to favour the supply branches of the network operator.
Following the adoption of the Preliminary Report a number of examples were brought to
the attention of the Commission services demonstrating this. Amongst other things it was
maintained that certain interconnector expansions did not take place or were delayed
despite repeated requests from third parties to expand the capacity. The situation only
changed after the vertically integrated supply branch itself expressed an interest in
interconnector expansion. The expansion which was previously reported to be impossible
was then achieved within a few months. It has also been suggested that vertically
integrated companies carry out a detailed study on the financial implications of any
expansion for its affiliate supply business.
276
Experience in the UK has shown that, in order for this to function properly, arrangements have to be made to ensure
that TSOs (and DSOs if connections are at medium or low voltages) provides technical information concerning the
point of connection (needed to design the network extensions) and design approvals in a non-discriminatory manner.
(See for instance, SP Manweb – Decision to accept the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority to accept commitments
pursuant to section 31A(2) of the Competition Act 1998 of 27 October 2005.
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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(499) Traders/network users also expressed concerns with respect to the provision of
information. It was argued that information was only available to vertically integrated
companies or was made available to them at an earlier stage, which undermined the level
playing field and/or increased risks for new entrants. Obviously these concerns could be
addressed by stricter unbundling rules. For further details on transparency reference is
made to the chapter B.b.II.4 below.
(500) Concerns were also raised with respect to allegedly excessive access tariffs, which raise
competitors’ costs. In this respect it is noteworthy that network tariffs differ significantly
between Member States, even though they are subject to regulatory oversight. Even if in
some instances there might be a valid explanation for the discrepancies, it would appear
unlikely that the differences can be fully explained by them. The fact that tariffs have
historically been too high has also been confirmed by the decisions of regulators to
reduce the tariffs submitted for approval by TSOs. For example, the German regulator
reduced the requested tariffs of the German TSOs by up to 18% in summer 2006.
(501) Finally reference is made to the issues set out in the next section dealing with the
distribution networks. The issues raised there apply mutatis mutandis to transmission
networks.
(502) It seems fair to conclude from the above that vertical integration of network and supply
activities strongly influences the incentive structure for network operators. Despite the
obligation not to discriminate between network users there is a risk that investments do
not take place if they would favour competitors of the affiliated supply branch. For a
concrete example see the ENI case referred to in chapter B.a.II.2. Vertically integrated
TSOs also have an incentive to favour their affiliated supply branch when it comes to the
provision of information (transparency) or the fixing of network charges.
II.2.2.4. Access to distribution networks
(503) Problems with respect to effective unbundling between network and supply also exist at
the distribution level. This is also reflected in the relatively low level of switching rates.
(504) In the framework of the Sector Inquiry, DSOs were asked to provide information on the
new connections to their networks during 2004. The Sector Inquiry confirmed that the
vast majority of these customers, which happen to be the most likely to accept offers
from alternative suppliers due to low "switching costs”, concluded a supply contract with
the affiliated supply branch of the network operator.
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
Table 22
Even new customers conclude supply contracts with the supply branch of the DSO
% of new connections contracting with a
Member State
supply company affiliated to the DSO
97,5% - 100%
France, Poland, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland, Estonia
95% - 97,5% Austria, Germany, Spain
90% - 95% Italy
< 90% Netherlands, United Kingdom
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
Note: The figures in this table cannot be compared with those published in Commission Communication of
progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, COM (2005) 568 and technical annex
(SEC(2005) 1445) as the latter are cumulative and use different customer categories.
(505) Even if the figures in Table 22 should be taken with some caution, it is clear that the
“switching rates” are very low. Only in the UK, and to a lesser extent, the Netherlands,
did newly connected customers chose suppliers unaffiliated to the DSO to which it was
being connected.
(506) Low switching rates can be due to various factors. Indeed, in the chapter on prices below
it will be discussed how the co-existence of regulated tariffs with market based prices
may eliminate probably the most important incentive to switch supplier: price. The low
rates reported here may well be attributed to this factor. In this respect it is emphasised
that in view of these low switching rates, any barrier, even those that do not immediately
appear to be significant, may nonetheless have significant effects on entrants’ ability to
acquire customers. It is therefore very important that switching procedures work properly
and do not impose barriers to customer changing supplier.
(507) In a number of Member States, however, substantial problems have been reported with
respect to the exchange of customer data needed for switching. In particular, information
needed for connection and billing purposes was not provided within the statutory
deadlines or not at all, or was simply wrong in a significant number of cases. Such
problems have been reported for many countries, including Finland, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Such problems may be inevitable to a certain
degree during a transition to liberalised markets, especially in the mass market segments.
(508) Many German respondents reported very heavy administrative procedures, information
exchange protocols and payment conditions, so onerous in certain cases that they appear
designed to increase switching costs. Procedures of a voluntary nature existed that were
claimed to be inadequate and, in addition, widely disregarded by DSOs. The legislation
that was recently adopted in Germany provides powers to the German energy regulator to
impose data exchange procedures and protocols, which should help to improve the
situation.
(509) Even if rules exist, however, they may not be sufficient. Most Member States have
legislation on, for instance, the maximum duration of switching procedures and the
respective responsibilities of parties. For example, such rules exist in Belgium. However,
contractual relationships are geared towards the interest of the network monopolies in
ways that effectively mean that non-compliance does not have any consequences for the
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 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
DSO and shifts the associated costs and risks to suppliers. As a result, even if statutory
rules exist, much metering data in Belgium is still communicated later than the statutory
deadlines or is wrong. Many Belgian respondents complain and have substantiated that
for a significant number of connection points no metering data is received before the
statutory deadline. In reaction to these complaints, the network operators in Flanders
have now committed to performance standards.
(510) Respondents have also expressed significant concerns about discriminatory conduct in
switching procedures. In Belgium and Germany, but also Finland and Austria, there are
allegations about preferential information for affiliated supply companies. Repeatedly,
respondents complain that affiliated supply companies approach customers with
improved offers when their intention to switch is reported to the network branch. The
lack of Chinese walls between the supply and network branch was also largely criticised
in the public consultation.
(511) Examples have also been provided where distribution companies appear to have
deliberately withheld historical consumption data to companies competing with their
supply affiliates. In the Walloon region of Belgium, many DSOs still have subcontracted
operational matters to a subsidiary of the incumbent. The latter manages these operations
on the same IT systems that are used by its supply affiliate which therefore currently has
privileged access to information on customers, even those of its competitors. A similar
situation continues to exist in Germany. Information advantages can also be abused in
other ways. Late, or even, no announcements of changes on network charges to
competing suppliers also unduly increase administrative costs and commercial risks for
competitors. Such practices have been reported in Belgium and Germany277.
(512) German, Polish and Czech respondents also report cases where network related charges
were increased when a customer switched or where, which amounts to the same thing,
customers were not invoiced the entire network charges due as long as the customer was
supplied by the supply company affiliated to the DSO.
(513) German and Portuguese respondents mention practises rendering it difficult if not
impossible for customers that are new to the network to be supplied by parties other than
the supply company affiliated to the DSO. These practices may be particularly harmful as
they concern customers that may be more easily acquired by entrants.
(514) Inadequate unbundling also maintains the incentives for vertically integrated companies
to raise costs for competitors. Respondents have provided detailed information on a very
substantial number of German distribution network companies that are said to cross-
subsidise supply activities with revenues from (monopoly) network charges. On the basis
of the new energy law the German regulator (including the regional regulators) should
however now have adequate powers to set appropriate network tariffs which would
remedy this situation.
277
The new German energy law should limit these possibilities in future.
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(515) The fact that of the approximately 150 supply companies that entered the German market
when customers became eligible in 1999 only a handful have survived until now was
attributed by a market participant to the damaging impact of the various practices on the
German market reported above.
II.2.2.5. Way forward
(516) It is fair to conclude that unbundling measures required under the current Directives may
render discriminatory practices in the exploitation of the network monopoly more
difficult, but do not eliminate the incentives for vertically integrated companies to favour
the affiliated supply branch in network issues (including investment decisions). Indeed, it
must be noted that the conduct described above concerns without exception TSOs and
DSOs that have remained part of a vertically integrated company. Moreover, it regularly
concerns DSOs and TSOs that are already unbundled in accordance with the
requirements in the Second Electricity Directive.278
(517) Respondents to the questionnaires therefore often argued that changing DSO’s and TSO’s
incentive structures by introducing ownership unbundling would be the preferred solution
to address the issues. A number of respondents from, for instance, Belgium (where
vertically integrated and ownership unbundled DSOs coexist) confirmed that the DSOs
that are ownership unbundled perform significantly better in facilitating competition279
than those that are still part of a vertically integrated company.
(518) Similarly some network companies have expressed the view that ownership unbundling
contributed to clarifying their role and purpose as grid operators towards market players.
Through ownership unbundling, independent network operators would indeed have
greater incentives to maximise the use of their infrastructure and to invest into further
expansions. They would have less incentive to favour certain network users over others.
Only incumbent operators contest this view, whilst a number of regulators support the
call for full ownership unbundling.
278
Two of the three TSOs referred to are unbundled in accordance with the Second Electricity Directive. Six out of the
ten Member States from which allegedly unfair conduct by DSOs was reported have already completely transposed
the unbundling requirements for DSOs.
279
Belgium’s transposition of the Second Electricity Directive has not postponed the implementation of legal
unbundling for DSOs until 2007. Similarly Belgium did not make use of the 100.000 connections threshold to
exempt smaller DSOs from the unbundling requirements. For more details see: Newbury (2005) Electricity
Liberalisation in Britain: The quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design. The Energy European Special Issue,
IAEE, 2005.
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Conclusions II.3. Market integration

Vertical integration of generation and retail reduces the incentives to trade on wholesale
markets. This might lead to a drying up of wholesale markets. Illiquid wholesale markets
are a barrier to entry as they are characterised by higher price volatility. Volatile
wholesale markets might oblige new entrants to enter as a vertically integrated generator
and supplier, which is more difficult.
The degree of vertical integration between generation and retail differs significantly
between Member States. In most Member States there are few companies with long
positions leading to high “levels of concentration”. VPPs (auction of electricity) assist in
some Member States (e.g. France) to improve the level of concentration. Long-term
power purchase agreements (PPAs) have similar effects to vertical integration.
II.3.1. Introduction
(519) Interconnectors are essential for market integration. Through interconnectors generators
and suppliers on both sides of the border are exposed to an additional source of
competition. Imports should drive prices down to the level of the minimum required cost
to serve the required electricity in all EU Member States. However, as illustrated in
Figure 59, prices differed substantially during 2005 between geographical regions. The
figures for 2006 also reflect significant divergence.
Figure 59
Overview of price differences in EU member state countries, 01 January - 15 November 2005

Vertical integration of supply and network (transmission and distribution alike) reduces
the economic incentives for the network operator to facilitate third parties access and to
expand the network in the interest of all network users. In the views of many respondents
the existing rules on legal unbundling do not ensure that vertically integrated companies
do not engage in practices favouring their supply affiliates to the detriment of their
competitors.

With respect to transmission networks, a number of respondents raised concerns as

regards obstacles to connect new power plants to the network. No means exists to verify
whether claims of congestion or costs for network reinforcements are valid. With respect
to the distribution networks, respondents reported amongst other things inappropriate
switching procedures, a lack of Chinese walls between network and supply branches and
discriminatory access tariffs.

Day ahead price levels 2005

More than 51 Euro 41 – 50 Euro 31 – 40 Euro Under 30 Euro NA
280
Source: Platts , Power exchanges.

(520) Imports should also play a role in eroding the market shares of major generation
companies in wholesale electricity markets. However, in most Member States the
incumbent’s market shares have remained high. The need for imports is even more
important knowing that market entry by new players who started supply or generation
activities in countries in which they were previously not present has, as yet, hardly been
observed in EU Member States.

280
Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.

169 170
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

II.3.3. Insufficient interconnecting infrastructure

(521) The Sector Inquiry leads to the preliminary findings that the lack of electricity market
integration281 mainly results from:
- insufficient interconnecting infrastructure between national electricity systems,
- insufficient incentives to improve cross border infrastructure,
- inefficient allocation of existing capacities, and
- incompatible market design (e.g. differences between balancing regimes,
nomination procedures, differences in opening hours of power exchanges)
between TSOs and/or spot market operators.
II.3.2. Institutional setting
(522) Before liberalisation, integrated companies, who where responsible for supply of
customers and their electricity grids, decided to connect their grids through cross border
links (interconnectors) in order to be able to assist one another in case of temporary
shortages caused by unexpected high demand or generation outages. For continental
Europe the UCTE-synchronous282 area includes 22 countries (also non-Member States).
Another synchronous zone is the NORDEL area in Scandinavia. Additional DC-links
(direct current-links) connect (other) grids further.
(523) Today the role of interconnectors has changed significantly. Under third party access
rules, participants must now be able to access interconnector capacity in order to deliver
power in neighbouring countries, trade on wholesale markets in other Member States and
hence potentially benefit from price differentials between regions. In order to facilitate
(526) Since the liberalisation of the electricity markets the need for interconnector capacity has
increased substantially. This is of particular importance for players who have entered
other markets and become active in cross border trade. Their arbitrage activities
constitute buying (in low price regions) and selling (in high price regions) of electricity in
different markets. This process will shift the generation pattern in the grid toward lower
cost production facilities.
(527) Demand for interconnector capacity at many borders has increased and often exceeds the
available transmission capacity. This level congestion is illustrated in the subsequent
Figure 60 per border. The bars, for each border, show the number of hours (sorted in
ascending order) reported by TSOs when capacity requested exceeded the available
capacity as a percentage of all hours in the period January – May 2005. Note that this
situation can be independent from the physical flows in the grid.
(528) Figure 60 reveals that almost all borders are congested to some degree, except a small
number of borders such as e.g. IT to FR, BE to FR and DE to AT. Congestion depends of
course on the direction since there is a clear incentive for traders to deliver electricity
from low to high price regions. Some borders were congested in all hours during the first
five months of 2005. Examples are the interconnectors from SK to HU, DE to DK, NL to
BE and FR to CH.
Figure 60
Estimated hours of congestion as a percentage of all hours, Jan - May 2005
100

Proportion of hours when requested capacity exceeds ava

the use of cross border capacity by participants several procedures have been introduced.
This topic will be examined later.
75

(524) It is important to remember that the overall flow load pattern in the EU integrated
synchronized network is not determined by the contractual arrangements but results from
50
production and consumption locations, and network topology. The combined decisions
made by generators, traders, suppliers and consumers result in electricity transports from
one region to another. TSO manage these flows through a set of administrative rules, 25

most importantly requesting players in the market to report in advance their expected
production and load schedules, as well as the extent to which they intend to use
interconnectors. This enables the TSOs to manage commercial transactions and physical

DE - CH (1)
DE - FR (1)

DE - CZ (1)
DE - NL (1)

NL - DE (1)

ES - FR (1)
0

SK - HU

FR - CH

DE - DK

CH - FR
FR - UK

CZ - DE

UK - FR

FR - DE

ES - PR

PR - ES
FR - ES

FR - BE

SK - CZ

CZ - SK

BE - FR

DE - AT
NL - BE

BE - NL

CZ - AT

AT - CZ
PL - SK

PL - CZ

CZ - PL

FR - IT

IT - FR
flows in a secure manner in the high voltage grids.
Borders

(525) The TSOs’ main task is to provide a secure and stable grid facilitating the integrated
electricity market. This includes activities to balance the equilibrium between supply and
demand in their so-called control area and between control areas of other TSOs. Ensuring
that the TSOs perform their work at minimum cost is commonly the task of regulators
who are part of the institutional setting in the EU. Clearly, any change in the
(administrative) rules may alter the extent to which cross border trade in the EU is
possible.
(529) Congestion has increased on most borders. Table 23 compares the percentage of
281
At this stage cross border market power issues have not yet been assessed.
282
Synchronous meaning that all members of UCTE work on the same 50 Hz frequency.
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
Note: Most TSOs reported congestion per interconnector, but some TSOs reported congestion aggregated
over several interconnectors between adjacent markets. In some cases the reported data deviate per border
between TSOs. This means that the involved TSOs do not have a common clear statement whether the
requested capacity exceeded the available capacities or not. This suggests that the approach to capacity
allocation is not sufficiently coordinated and needs improvement. (1) Refers to an average of more than one
interconnector between two adjacent borders.
congested hours in the first five months in 2004 with 2005. Congestion increased on
almost 60 percent of the listed borders. The cause of increasing congestion has to be
further studied.

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(530) It is likely that persistent price differences between Member States markets are amongst
the main causes for congestions. Changes in wind speed can also cause unforeseen flows (531) At some borders the increase of congestion has been dramatic. For instance, from the
that might reduce the capacity available and increase congestion. Germany to France congestion has increased from almost 0% in January 2004 to 100% in
the month May 2005. Figure 61 shows this development of congestion per month
Table 23 between January 2003 and May 2005. Further investigation is required to explain the
differences in the level of congestion between the period before and after January 2005.
Hours with congestion as a percentage of all hours
(selection of borders) Figure 61
Congestion from Germany to France, as a percentage of all hours, Jan 2004 - May 2005,
Border 2004 2005 including data from two German TSOs
100
Jan-May Jan-May

SK --> HU 100,0 100,0

FR --> CH 100,0 100,0
75
DE --> DK 99,3 100,0
NL --> BE 96,4 100,0
FR --> UK 94,6 95,6
DE --> NL (1) 87,9 90,1
50
FR --> ES 34,6 81,1
CZ --> DE 69,2 68,0
NL --> DE (1) 62,9 63,9
BE --> NL 63,3 63,1
DE --> FR (1) 0,0 41,3 25

CZ --> AT 0,0 37,0

DE --> CZ (1) 30,0 35,7
UK --> FR 31,5 35,0
FR --> DE 48,4 33,3 0
ES --> FR (1) 30,0 32,8 Jan 04 Feb 04 Mar 04 Apr 04 May 04 June 04 July 04 Aug 04 Sept 04 Oct 04 Nov 04 Dec 04 Jan 05 Feb 05 Mar 05 Apr 05 May 05

PL --> SK 0,0 19,1 Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.

ES --> PR 7,8 17,5
PL --> CZ 15,8 16,1
(532) The consequence of the substantial and increasing congestion on interconnectors between
PR --> ES 26,7 11,7
FR --> BE 30,4 11,0
Member States is that many electricity markets are separated from each other. As a result
CZ --> PL 0,2 10,1 imports are limited and their ability to counter market concentration in national markets
SK --> CZ 1,4 6,6 and exert competitive pressure on (dominant) generators is reduced and consumers pay
CZ --> SK 2,1 1,1 more for their electricity than strictly necessary.
DE --> CH (1) 0,0 1,0
FR --> IT 0,7 0,8 (533) The questions that arise from the above are:
AT --> CZ 0,0 0,3
CH --> FR 0,0 0,0
- Is existing interconnector capacity used efficiently?
IT --> FR 0,0 0,0
BE --> FR 0,0 0,0
- Are incentives to invest in new interconnector capacity set properly and what
DE --> AT 0,0 0,0 are other obstacles to increasing interconnection capacities?
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006. - How can the problem of lengthy and bureaucratic authorisation procedures be
Note: Hours when requested capacity exceeded available cross border capacity as a solved?
percentage of all hours. The arrows indicate the direction per border, in some cases
reported by different TSOs. II.3.4. Level of interconnector capacity
(1) Refers to an average of more than one interconnector between two adjacent borders.
(534) Investing in the expansion of interconnector capacity is one way to lower congestion on
the borders between Member States. At present the level of interconnectors as a
percentage of installed capacity is listed in Table 24.

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(535) The Barcelona Council 2002 set a broad target for (import) interconnector capacity of at
least 10% of production capacity per Member State by 2005. Using the Sector Inquiry
data the current percentages for some MS have been calculated. The results (average
2004 NTC value as a percentage of installed generation capacity) are shown in Table 24.
It confirms earlier reporting by the Commission that several countries, such as Italy283,
Portugal, Spain, Ireland and UK, do not meet the 10% threshold. However, meeting the
“Barcelona target” does not necessarily result in resolving congestion and concentration
in generation. For instance, the Dutch interconnector remains congested though the
import capacity is 17%. Neither does this target resolve concentration in generation. For
remained almost unchanged over the last 30 months. The movements of the curve relate
to expected capacity in summer and winter periods. NTC values may also change on a
short term basis as a result of production factors such as changes in wind speed, outages
and (unforeseen) maintenance of power plants or internal grid outages. In addition
consumption factors, such as changes in demand, may affect the level of NTC values.
Figure 62
Indexed quarterly aggregation of hourly NTC values for a selection of 38 interconnectors (2003Q1=100)
125

instance, Denmark, which has a relatively high level of interconnection, still has in some
circumstances high levels of concentration in generation and scope for the exercise of
market power as shown in the chapter Concentration and Market Power.

Table 24
Average hourly total import capacity NTC
relative to installed generation capacity 100
for a selection of countries, 2004

Country %

UK 2
Italy 6
Spain 6
Ireland (1) 6 75
2003Q1 2003Q2 2003Q3 2003Q4 2004Q1 2004Q2 2004Q3 2004Q4
Portugal 9
Poland (1) 10 Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
Greece (1) 12
Finland (1) 14 (537) NTC-levels may be affected by the way TSOs manage grid congestion in their control
France (2) 14 area. At this stage no assessment has been made of TSO’s behaviour regarding the
Germany (3) 16
different treatment of congestion on internal lines and interconnectors. Table 25 shows at
first glance that such an assessment may be relevant since a low level of congestion on
Netherlands (1) 17
internal lines may be indicate that the problem is being pushed to the border. It is unclear
Czech Republic (1) 23
at this stage if TSO’s relieve congestion on their internal lines at the expense of lower
Austria (1) 24 cross border capacity and, if so, whether it is done for sound cost efficient reasons.
Belgium 25
Sweden (1) 29
Hungary (1) 38
Slovakia (1) 39
Denmark (1) 50
Estonia (1) 66
Slovania (1) 68
Luxembourg (1) 90
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006, UCTE and ETSO.
Note :(1) NTC values from ETSO used for calculation
(2) For Italian-French NTC value is estimated
(3) For Polish-German NTC and Czech-German NTC is estimated.

(536) Availability interconnector capacity is related to the performance of TSOs who are
responsible for system integrity in their control area and hence calculating the NTC (Net
Transport Capacity) for import and export. Figure 62 illustrates that the values have

283
Import capacity from Switzerland is excluded.

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Table 25 Figure 63
NTC values in summer and winter per interconnector
ES - FR
NL - DE
Congestion of lines other than interconnectors, selection of TSOs DE - FR
DE - FR
FR - DE
NL - BE
SL - IT
Number of lines congested for more than 10% FR - BE
IT - AT

Country of the hours in one calendar year during 2003 - AT - IT

BE - NL

Selection of interconnectors
FR - IT
May 2005 FR - ES
CZ - PL

Austria none NL - DE
AT - DE
CZ - PL
Austria (1) 4 PL - SL
CZ - DE
SL - HU
Denmark none CZ - DE
HU - AT

Denmark n.a DK - DE
CZ - AT
CZ - SL
France none NL - DE
DE - NL
DE - DK
Germany none HU - SK
SL - AT

Germany none CZ - AT
AT - HU
CZ - DE
Germany none FR - DE
DE - NL

DE - AT
Germany none DE - AT

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Italy (2) 5 Average NTC value for hours in December, January and February minus the average NTC value for hours June, July and August
as a percentage of the average observed NTC value during these months (including 2003 and 2004)

Netherlands none Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.

Spain none
United Kingdom none
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
Note: Some countries appear more than once because they have several control areas.
(1) 2003.
(2) April 2004 – March 2005.
(538) During relative cold months, ignoring other factors, NTC values may increase compared
to relatively warm periods due to the physical characteristics of electricity wires. Several
TSOs explain this in their answers to the questionnaires. Figure 63 demonstrates that the
performance of TSOs to maximise the amount of cross border capacity delivered to the
market differ substantially between TSOs. For instance the difference in the NTC value
for the Spanish – French border between winter and summer month exceeds 55 percent.
This is positive for the market as during relatively cold periods more capacity is available
for cross border trade. However, at some borders (marked area in Figure 63) the NTC
values seem to be insensitive to temperature changes and remain at the same level
throughout the year.
Note: Differences between the average Net Transport (NTC) in relative cold and warm months relative to
the average NTC value in % - 2003 and 2004. In some cases borders appear two or three times in Figure
63 which is due to the fact that each TSO reports on export and import NTC values per interconnector.
(539) The results for some interconnectors in the marked area of Figure 62 are difficult to
explain. They seem to suggest that there was very little difference in the level of NTC
values between summer and winter. The results of negative bars (below the marked area
in the figure) are also difficult to explain since they show that during winter periods the
NTC values are lower than in summer periods. However, it is important to note that there
are also other factors than outside temperature that affect NTC levels. For instance,
maintenance on the network occurs often off winter periods. Additionally as is explained
above, local generation and consumption events play an important role determining NTC
levels. These may have a stronger effect than the temperature. However, the figures
illustrate that the differences between the performances of the TSOs are substantial.
Clearly, on borders where high price differences persist the need to optimise the level of
available interconnector frequently is more important than elsewhere.
II.3.5. Incentives for TSOs to build more capacity

(540) A precondition for building additional interconnector capacity is that incentives to

expand the net are properly set by regulators both for “regulated” and “merchant
lines”(unregulated lines) which may arise from estimated future revenues primarily
reflecting the absolute price differences between adjacent geographical wholesale
markets.

(541) TSOs, who in the past had a monopoly on building additional interconnectors, are likely
to be the main developer of new or additional interconnection, especially for regulated
lines, and hence it is important that TSOs have correct incentives. For example, Article 6
(6) of the Regulation 1228/2003 states that revenues resulting from the allocation of
congested interconnector capacity shall be used for: (a) guaranteeing the actual
availability of the allocated capacity; (b) network investments maintaining or increasing
interconnector capacities, or; (c) as an income to be taken into account by the regulatory

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authorities when approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs, and/or in
assessing whether tariffs should be modified. Table 26 shows that many TSOs obtain
congestion revenues284 and that these revenues are not fully invested on projects to
increase interconnector capacity.
Table 26
Congestion revenues and total investments in interconnectors during 2001 - 2005 in mln-euro
Congestion Revenues Interconnection Investments
TSO
(2001 - 06/2005) (2001 - 06/2005)
A 200-300
B 0-20
C 80-150
D 200-300
E 200-300
F 80-150
G 20-80
H 80-150
J 0-20
K 0-20
Total 1000-1300
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
Note: Excluding spending on congestion relief.
(542) The table shows that only about one quarter of the congestion revenues is used to build
new interconnections or to reinforce existing grid elements. This result from the Sector
Inquiry demonstrates that incentives need improvement.
(543) According to answers from TSOs these revenues are mainly used to reduce national grid
tariffs. Since the existing interconnections were financed in the past by tariffs paid by the
local consumers it could be justified to allocate the welfare resulting from auctions to
these consumers. On the other hand consumers in the importing Member States would
also profit from increased generation efficiency gained from additional cross border trade
and enhancement of the markets. That being said, it should be clear that based on current
(cross border electricity) regulation TSOs are allowed to spend congestion revenues on
lowering transmission tariffs for electricity in their control area.
(544) In the Sector Inquiry some TSOs also provided information on recent studies on new
interconnection lines. Most of these studies conclude that building a new line is a difficult
and lengthy procedure and in some cases the impact on the available interconnector
capacity would be low compared to the efforts required. The replies to the Sector Inquiry
also confirmed that planning procedures for building new interconnectors are
complicated, not least due to local resistance as regards visual impact and fears of
electro-magnetic fields. This is partly due to the fact that in many cases increasing the
level of cross border capacity also requires substantial internal grid reinforcements.
284
Congestion revenues refer to the additional revenues (e.g. auction proceeds) the TSOs receive due to congestion for the
interconnectors.
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
Congestion revenues of German TSOs in 2001 to 2005 and use of the revenues
In the period 2001 to 2005 three German TSOs managing interconnectors generated
congestion revenues of [400-500] million Euro. Of these revenues only [20-30] million
Euro were used to reinforce/build new interconnectors (one TSO said that it does not
know how much of the investment into the net had the effect of reinforcing
interconnectors). All TSOs maintained that the remaining revenues were used to reduce
the transmission tariffs. One TSO declared that the extension of a 380 KV line with a
length of 50 km and a capacity of 1400 MVA costs [1-10] million Euros. The building of
new lines or subsea cables is significantly more expensive.
25-35
0-10
II.3.5.1. Utilisation of existing interconnector capacity
0-10
0-10
50-100 (545) The congestion mechanisms to allocate existing interconnector capacity play an
0-10 important role in market integration. The word (congestion) mechanism refers to a set of
0-10 actions and measures that are applied to handle network access in the presence of
80-150 congestion. Table 27 lists from the questionnaires the most commonly used mechanisms
10-40
and divides them into market based and non-market based methods. Table 27 also
10-40
200-300
explains briefly the different mechanisms.
Table 27
Overview of the most common interconnector allocation mechanism
First-come-first-served (Priority list)
Capacity is allocated according to the order in which the
transmission requests have been received by the TSO. Starting
from the earliest request, all requested amounts of capacity are
Not market based, fully granted until the available capacity is used up.
discriminatory and often Pro-rata rationing
not transparent All requests are partially accepted so that each applicant is
methods granted a fixed share of his requested capacity amount, the share
being equal to the amount of available capacity divided by the sum
of all requested capacity amounts.
Retention A proportion of the available capacity is granted in long-
term contracts (also) based on grand father rights
Explicit auction
Along with the requested capacity amount, the applicants have to
declare how much they are willing to pay for this capacity. These
bids are ordered by price and allocated starting from the highest
one until the available capacity is used up. Usually the price for the
capacity is set to the bid price of the lowest allocated bid.
Alternatively, each successful bidder pays the amount bid.
Market based and non- Implicit auction
discriminatory methods Transmission capacity is managed implicitly by two or more
neighbouring spot markets: network users submit purchase or sale
bids for energy in the power exchange in the geographical zone
where they wish to generate or consume, and the market clearing
procedure determines the most efficient amount and direction of
physical power exchange between the market zones. Hence,
separate allocation of transmission capacity is not required, cross
border capacity and energy are traded together.
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
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Table 28
II.3.5.2. Non market based mechanisms O verview of allocation m echanism
of the main EU interconnectors - selection
(546) Mechanisms that allocate interconnection capacity which are not market based,
discriminatory and not (always) transparent result in inefficient use of interconnector Allo cation m echanism Border
capacity. This is due to the fact that in contrast to auctions, first-come-first-served, pro-
rata rationing and retention do not necessarily allocate capacity to participants that value Explicit auction Denmark - Germany
United Kingdom - France
interconnection capacity the highest. Partly it could be allocated to some who do not
G erm any - Netherlands
value it at all. For example, responses from some large energy consumers indicate that
G erm any - France
they would be interested in booking capacity on interconnectors. However, most
Poland - Germ any
customers consider that transaction costs are too high for them to become directly
Poland - Czech Republic
involved in cross-border trade.
C zech Republic - A ustria
C zech Republic - G erm any
(547) Quite a number of questionnaire responses criticize the existence of non-market based Austria - Hungary
mechanism not only because they are not market based and discriminatory, but also Austria - Slovenia (1)
because they are often not transparent resulting in unclear allocation and sometimes F rance - Italy (2)
favouring incumbents. In addition these methods are anyway incompatible with Belgium - N etherlands
Regulation 1228/2003, but still seem to be practised for certain interconnectors as is F rance - Belgium
shown in Table 28. This table lists the different allocation mechanisms per interconnector Im plicit auction Sweden - Finland
through which existing interconnector capacity is commonly allocated to the market – Denmark - Sweden
F rance - Spain (3)
excluding long-term contracts.
First com e - first serve F rance - Switzerland (4)
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
Notes:(1) On this border Slovenia has been exempted from Regulation 1228/2003 (requiring that cross
border capacity is to be allocated using a market based method) until 2007. The explicit auction here
is just conducted for the Austrian half of the interconnection capacity.
(2) For the French - Italian border there does not exist a joint capacity allocation. The explicit
auction is just conducted for the French half of the interconnection capacity.
(3) Per January 2006 the allocation mechanism has been changed from “first come first serve” to an
explicit auction principle. It will be coordinated with the Spanish TSO before the end of the first
semester of 2006 according to RTE.
(4) This relates to a border between the EU and a third country. It is planned to implement an
explicit auction by the end of 2006.

(548) In addition, Table 29 illustrates that a significant proportion of existing interconnector

capacity is still allocated on the basis of priority rights or “pre-liberalisation” contracts.
These capacity reservations often relate to some of the most congested interconnectors.

Table 29
Long term reservations on a selection of interconnectors, 2005
Border France- Spain - France - Czech Rep. - Austria - Czech Rep. - Poland - Slovakia -
Spain France Italy Austria Italy Germany Slovakia Hungary

Current NTC value (1) [1-1000] [1-700] [1-2300] [1-600] [1-190] [1-950] [1-800] [1-1000]

Long term contracts as % NTC 60-70% 70-80% 60-70% 60-70% 50-60% 20-30% 40-50% 30-40%

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.

Note: (1) The NTC values used for percentage calculation represent 2004 data, since for 2005 they were
not available for the entire year

(549) From a legal point of view these ongoing grandfathered capacity rights are problematic.
The ECJ stated in a recent case (C-17/03, Vereniging voor Energie, Milieu en Water,
judgment of 7 June 2005) that a preferential treatment for pre-liberalisation capacity
reservations is incompatible with the Electricity Directive 96/92/EC if the Member State

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concerned failed to request an exemption pursuant to Article 24 of that Directive. Pre- Figure 64
liberalisation contracts may also be assessed under Articles 81 and 82 EC.

(550) It cannot be excluded that long-term contracts could result in efficient allocation as
secondary trade could in theory employ efficient redistribution means. However the
holder of the contract would still profit from the money paid in the secondary market and,
more importantly, the conditions to obtain these long-term contracts in the past were
largely unequal. Also it is often not transparent who “owns” the capacity and how long
the underlying contracts last. This raises search cost (transaction costs) for any player
interested in buying this interconnector capacity, since “secondary capacity markets”
remain immature. This raises barriers to entry and may harm liquidity in several
wholesale markets. Hence, both the Court and the Commission has concluded that long-
term contracts should, with certain exceptions, be disqualified as a method for allocating
scarce interconnector capacity. In April 2006 the Commission launched a number of
infringement cases against Member States which were still allocating capacity on the
basis of long-term reservations. Recent reports indicate that efforts to dismantle these
contracts are in progress. For example, the Netherlands have directly reacted to the ECJ
decision and the French Regulatory Authority decided not to grant priority rights any
more for long-term contracts on the interconnection with other EU Member States. A
similar decision has now been taken in Germany.

II.3.5.3. Market based methods

(551) On many congested interconnectors TSOs make use of explicit auctions for allocations.
Examples of interconnectors that are explicitly auctioned are listed in Table 28 and
include e.g. NL – DE and FR – UK. This mechanism is considered not to be satisfactory
by a number of respondents in the Sector Inquiry, because it suffers from the time lag
between capacity allocation and wholesale market clearance.

(552) Figure 64 focuses on these comments. It shows for each hour in 2004 the spot price
differences between the Netherlands and Germany, e.g. APX price minus the EEX price
(horizontal axis) and correlates the sum of nominations from Germany toward the
Netherlands (vertical axis). Each dot in the figure represents a unique hour with a price
difference and the result of the nomination. It reveals that in many hours (40 percent of
all observed hours) during 2004 capacity was nominated from Germany to the
Netherlands while prices in Germany where higher than in the Netherlands. This result is
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006, ECB Exchange rate Pound vs Euro.
intuitively not rational since the wholesale electricity price in the Netherlands is typically
higher than in the German wholesale market. Such an arbitrage ‘mistake’ is shown in the
(553) One of the explanations for these economically inefficient outcomes is that the deadline
upper left area (diagonally marked) in Figure 64. All markers in this area constitute an
for the day-ahead interconnector auction ends before the German (EEX) and Dutch
irrational (non-economic) outcome. The area in the bottom-right (also marked) also
(APX) energy market clears. A similar coordination issue occurs on the interconnector
represents irrational outcome.
between France and the UK (England and Wales), where the deadline for interconnector
nominations occurs after the French (Powernext) energy market clears, while the UKPX
(the leading UK power exchange) is open and prior to gate closure in respect of the UK
balancing mechanism. The consequence is that explicit auctions do not lead to an optimal
use of scarce interconnector capacity especially if allocation sessions are not co-ordinated
with the deadlines for trading.

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(554) From the responses from the questionnaires market participants confirm that they face
uncertainty due to the fact that they have to place auction bids based on expected
wholesale market prices. As intraday and balancing markets (after the day-ahead stage)
are often illiquid, players cannot if the outcome is different to that expected easily resell
acquired electricity in the market A where they initially had bought the electricity, and
buy in the market B where they would have liked to use the acquired electricity. This
would be desirable if, for example, they had anticipated a positive price difference in an
hour between two markets, but after market closure it turned out that the price difference
was negative.
(555) In addition, although it might appear to be unreasonable for transactions to be nominated
in two directions if the price spread between the two energy markets was small,
participants might even prefer to transfer electricity from the high to the low prices
markets in order to avoid exposure to balancing prices. This is particularly relevant where
interconnectors connect relatively illiquid markets.
(556) Due to the arbitrage errors systematically made by the market participants, incorrect
signals prevail regarding the value of interconnector capacity. This also leads to incorrect
incentives to attract new investments into interconnector capacity.
(557) Table 30 shows that the financial loss resulting form underutilisation plus incorrect
utilisation (wrong sign nominations) of interconnector capacity is significant per border.
For instance, in 2004 capacity worth almost 50 million Euro was not utilised in the Dutch
- German border which is 46 percent of the total value (107 million Euro) of this
interconnector capacity. Due to the relatively high Dutch spot price volatility in 2003 the
result in 2003 was more than 20 million euro higher. A similar calculation is done for the
French-UK border. The results are presented in Table 30.
Table 30
(558) Furthermore, there remain a few borders where the allocation of interconnector capacity
is not carried out according to a harmonised and economic-based mechanism. The French
– Spanish border is an example and Table 30 shows that financial loss is also significant
on this border.
(559) The result of the above analyses illustrates that, although explicit auctioning is
theoretically and with perfect foresight an efficient mechanism and it is in practice
compatible with Regulation 1228/2003, it has efficiency deficits compared to implicit
auctioning especially where intraday and balancing markets are illiquid. With implicit
auctions results of trade are less likely to have economically irrational use of the
interconnector capacity as is the case for explicit auctions as demonstrated in Figure
64.285
(560) An additional advantage of implicit auctions is that netting, which has not been discussed
in this chapter, will become more feasible. For instance, on the Dutch – German border
import and export capacity is auctioned separately. Hence, introducing implicit auctions
may increase the available capacity significantly.
II.3.6. The need for harmonization
(561) One of the key complaints from the respondents in the Sector Inquiry is that parties
involved in arbitrage between borders face important differences between the
administrative rules underlying the electricity markets. For instance the imbalance
settlement period (for TSOs to balance the market) limits the possibility to alter
schedules. These differences in settlement periods result into increased risks and are
therefore barriers to trade. The different time periods for which imbalances are settled are
shown in Table 31.

Estimated value of unused cross border capacity (selection) in mln. euro

Borders 2004 2003

49,4 70,8
NL to DE

64,4 (1) …
UK to FR

41,8 140,3
FR to ES
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
Note: The estimated amounts are calculated as follows. For each hour the estimated day ahead available
import capacity is reduced with nominations. This is the estimated unused capacity. Summed with
wrong sign nominations they are multiplied with the absolute hourly spot market price difference.
NTC values day ahead used in this figure represent an ex-ante estimation of the seasonal
transmission capacities of the joint interconnections on a border between neighbouring countries,
assessed through security analyses based on the best estimation by TSOs of system and network
conditions for the referred period.
(1) Includes July 2004 – May 2005. Also this result does not include cost of the losses of the DC
transfer nor cost for balancing.
285
In this context is should be mentioned that new important congestion management guidelines are currently being
discussed
(see http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/legislation/doc/congestion_management/cm_guidelines_en_v1.pdf)

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Table 31 II.4. Transparency

Different time windows in which imbalances are settled by control area - 2004
(563) Efficient wholesale electricity markets can bring significant benefits to the electricity
Country, responsible TSO(s) Time unit sector, in terms of greater operational efficiency, improved signals for investment, greater
security of supply, better allocation of risks and increased scope for competition.
Netherlands (TenneT)
II.4.1. Transparency is needed for electricity markets to develop
Italy (GRTN)
Austria (APG, TIRAG, VKW-UNG) 15 minutes
Germany (EnBW TNG, E.On Netz, RWE TS, Vattenfall ET) (564) For efficient wholesale markets to develop it is essential that all market participants have
Belgium (Elia) access to the information considered necessary to trade, in particular as regards expected
Luxembourg (Cegedel) demand, supply and network issues. The Sector Inquiry confirms, however, that there is
a lack of transparency in most Member States. There is a general perception that
France (RTE) 30 minutes generation data of vertically integrated incumbents is first shared with affiliates and not
England & Wales (NGT)
necessarily at all with other market participants, which undermines confidence in the
Poland (PSE-Operator)
wholesale markets. The inquiry also revealed examples where operators seem to have
Sweden (SK) 60 minutes withheld information regarding generation outages until after markets have closed, which
Norway (Statnett) may have allowed them or their affiliates to trade on electricity markets on an unfair
Denmark (Energinet.dk) basis.
Slovenia (ELES)
Spain (REE)
(565) More transparency is needed essentially for three reasons. First the publication of more
Greece (HTSO/DESMIE)
Source: ETSO (2004), DG Comp. information would allow all players to take informed action on the markets, which
minimises their commercial risks and reduces entry barriers. Secondly it ensures a level
(562) The rules for nominating transactions and the rules relating to changes (if needed) of playing field by avoiding a situation where certain parties have access to commercially
nominations before gate closure also differ between countries. Because of these sensitive information (e.g. from generation affiliates), but others do not. If the
differences, nominations for cross border transactions - if possible - require separate transparency obligations are not sufficiently strong, some market participants will be able
administrative procedures per border. Conditions for nominations also differ between to profit unfairly at the expense of other market participants. Thirdly, lack of
countries. These differences increase the complexity for market players to trade across transparency undermines the trust in the wholesale markets and with it its price signals as
borders and may reduce the scope for competition. a reliable benchmark.

Conclusion
Imports do not yet adequately play their role to counter market concentration in national
markets and exert competitive pressure on incumbent operators. Hence consumers may
pay more for their electricity than strictly necessary. Important reasons for inadequate
market integration include:
- Insufficient levels of cross border capacity,
- Inefficient congestion management methods (including explicit auctions),
- Important differences in rules that manage the electricity markets administratively
within and between control areas,
- Long-term cross border capacity reservations, partially given under discriminatory
conditions, and
- Lack of adequate incentives to invest in additional capacity.
(566) The need for transparency to promote the development of the wholesale markets is not
only the view of the European Commission but has been widely recognised, both in
answers to the questionnaires and outside the context of the Sector Inquiry. For example,
the Florence Forum286 concluded at its September 2005 meeting that “participants also
highlighted the need for increased transparency, in view of creating a functioning and fair
market”. Specific action to improve transparency was agreed following the meeting in
September 2006 and there is a growing consensus on this subject.
(567) European Energy Regulators (CEER) emphasise that the transparency of information
about the physical situation of the European electric system is one of a number of
conditions that must be met to facilitate the development of a single energy market, as
specified by the directive of 26 June 2003. Although some initial progress has been
recorded in many Member States, the degree of transparency of information about the
physical situation of the European electric system remains weak.

(568) Eurelectric state287 that “the development [of wholesale electricity markets] must be
underpinned by solid involvement by all market participants and by a common body of
available information. (…) It is essential that market places fulfil at least the following
286
Conclusions of the Florence Forum of 1-2 September 2005, section 2(d), page 4.
287
Eurelectric report of June 2005 “Integrating Electricity Markets through Wholesale Markets: Eurelectric Road Map
to a Pan-European Market”.

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criteria: (…) provide transparent access to common sets of market information.” In the
same report it went on to say “another prerequisite for the development of liquid
wholesale markets is the trust of the market participants in the market. Therefore, market
transparency and information exchange in the wholesale markets must be harmonised to
ensure that all market participants have the same information at their disposal”.
(569) The European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) published a paper on
transparency288 which focuses on the provision of information to TSOs to allow them to
manage the network as efficiently as possible. However, in the paper it also states that
“ETSO believes that data from generators and market participants is of particular
importance to achieving improvements in transparency and facilitating fair and efficient
markets”. It should be noted in this context that the full implementation of the congestion
management guidelines that are currently being adopted should increase transparency as
regards cross-border congestion.
(570) The European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) state289 “an efficient wholesale
market for power is crucial to meeting the aims of liberalisation and offers the prospect of
considerable benefits to consumers. The development of an efficient wholesale market,
however, is currently being hindered by the lack of information being released to the
market”.
(571) Barclays Capital, an important electricity trader, stated in its reply to the Sector Inquiry
questionnaires “information release is the key non-structural measure that could be
implemented to improve competition in EU electricity markets. Greater information
release would allow participants to understand the underlying supply and demand events
that drive prices which in turn facilitates better price forecasts, increased liquidity and
hence an increased ability for a wider range of participants to compete to supply
customers. Greater information release will also result in better price signals for
maintenance, closure and investment decisions which in turn enhances system reliability
and security of supply”. It further went on to say that “the cost to EU energy consumers
of poor information transparency alone is therefore likely to run into tens of billions of
Euros”. This figure seems very high at first glance, but it represents just over 5 percent of
the total turnover in the electricity sector in the EU of approximately €180 billion in 2004
(and with significant increases since).
II.4.2. The risk of collusion does not outweigh the advantages of more transparency
(572) It has been noted that there is a risk that excessive transparency, particularly in an
oligopolistic market as many electricity markets are, could facilitate collusion between
the major suppliers. However, given the current state of the electricity markets and the
low level of transparency in many markets, this does not in practice appear to be a likely
at this stage. Indeed, the principal problem at the moment is that the lack of transparency
in most markets undermines the development of the wholesale markets. In any case, the
risk of facilitating collusion could be reduced by only publishing figures on an
aggregated rather than individual basis (at least in advance of trading). Therefore, in the
current state of the electricity markets and as long as, where necessary, information is
288
ETSO paper “List of data European TSOs need to pursue optimal use of the existing transmission infrastructure” of
December 2005.
289
EFET Position Paper: “Transparency and Availability of Information in Continental European Wholesale Electricity
Markets”, July 2003.
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
published to all market participants on an aggregated basis, the risk of facilitating
collusion – whilst requiring monitoring- does not outweigh the benefits of more
transparency.
II.4.3. The level of transparency varies widely between Member States
(573) Despite the widespread recognition of the need for transparency in order for wholesale
markets to develop, the Sector Inquiry has provided evidence that the level of
transparency in the wholesale markets in the EU is not satisfactory. It is also widely
divergent. In the context of the Sector Inquiry national regulators were asked whether
adequate information was made publicly available in their Member State on 49 precise
issues290 covering:
- technical availability of TSO network (10 issues covering inter alia frequency
and causes of congestion, net and available transfer capacity, prices and physical
flows)
- technical availability of interconnectors (11 issues addressing similar issues to
those asked regarding the TSO network)
- load (5 issues covering inter alia day ahead and week ahead aggregated load
forecasts and actual load)
- balance and reserve power (5 issues covering inter alia demand for balancing
power, system balance status and actual use of reserve power)
- generation (production) (4 issues covering inter alia actual generation and
outages)
- generation (capacity) (14 issues covering inter alia production portfolios).
(574) 21 national regulators replied. According to the regulators, information is published in
the Member States on between zero and 38 of these issues. On average information was
published on just under 20 issues. Table 32 shows the range of information published in
the Member States according to the regulators.
(575) It can be seen from Table 32 that the markets in which most information is published (eg
Nord Pool and the UK) are generally perceived as more competitive than those where
little information is published.
290
The list of 49 issues is attached in annex H.
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Table 32 II.4.5. The information that market participants believes ought to be published
Number of issues for which information is published by Member state
Member State Issues for which information is published (out of 49) (577) The replies to the Sector Inquiry indicate the broad types of information that market
participants believe should be made public. The questionnaires sent in the context of the
UK 38
Spain 34
Sector Inquiry to generators, traders and suppliers (“suppliers”) asked them to identify
Denmark 31
how they assess the importance/relevance of different issues to trade. Table 34
Finland 30
summarises291 their replies (on the same of a comprehensive analysis of the replies to
Sweden 27
Sector Inquiry).
Portugal 26 Table 34
Poland 25 Importance of information according to suppliers
Lithuania 24 indispensable important useful not useful
Germany 23 TSO network 36.1% 24.5% 34.6% 4.8%
Slovenia 21 Interconnectors 30.5% 30.8% 30.5% 8.2%
Italy 20 Load 24.8% 32.9% 36.9% 5.5%
Hungary 18 Balancing 22.2% 30.1% 38.4% 9.3%
Czech Republic * 17 Generation (production) 20.0% 33.5% 32.7% 13.8%
Belgium 17 Generation (capacity) 26.7% 29.9% 37.5% 5.9%
Netherlands 16 Source: Energy Sector Inquiry2005/2006
Greece 16
France 14 (578) Table 34 suggests that for market participants the issues on which information is most
Ireland 13 important are (in decreasing order):
Austria 12
Slovakia 8 1. Technical availability of interconnectors
Estonia 1 2. Technical availability of TSO network
Latvia 0 3. Generation (capacity)
Luxembourg - 4. Balancing and reserve power
Cyprus - 5. Load
Malta - 6. Generation (production)
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006
Note: * Information received from the Czech Republic following the publication of the Preliminary Report (579) It is surprising that generation (production) is stated to be the least important issue. This
could be because currently this information is not widely available and so market
II.4.4. Market participants not satisfied with level of transparency participants are not used to receiving it. Another possible explanation is that the
information is perceived as commercially sensitive by the generators concerned. In this
(576) In the Sector Inquiry, suppliers were asked about the information that must be available respect it is interesting to note that almost all suppliers who said that generation
to trade within acceptable risk levels on electricity wholesale markets. For each of the 49 (production) information was “not useful” were local or regional incumbents, who might
issues suppliers were asked whether information was made publicly available, and were be expected to be able to benefit from the refusal to release the information, whilst
asked how important this issue was. Table 33 summarises their replies: possibly sharing relevant information between affiliates.
Table 33
(580) In a similar vein, some market participants have stated that they should not be required to
Suppliers' views on whether information is available publish confidential information. Instead they propose that in advance they should only
suppliers saying that "indispensable" information was not available 43% reveal the information to a third party (normally the TSO or a power exchange) who
suppliers saying that "important" information was not available 16% should publish the information in an aggregated form combining similar information
suppliers saying that "useful" information was not available 25% from parties in the same position. Disregarding the situation of a tight oligopoly (risk of
collusion) this would not seem to pose a problem as long as more detailed information on
suppliers saying that "all useful" information was not available 17%
Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.
a disaggregated basis was published once the trading had taken place. In any event, there
is a strong presumption that as much information as possible should be published,
In a nutshell more than 80% of market participants are not content with the current level because otherwise market participants possessing market sensitive information would be
of transparency arguing that indispensable, important and useful information is not made able to profit from this information. As this profit would be at the expense of other
available.
291
Information on the views of suppliers on the importance of each of the 49 precise issues is attached in annex H.

191 192
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
market participants, acceding to the request not to publish this information would
increase risks for market participants and confuse the price signals from the market.
(581) It should be noted that in the most liquid and efficient wholesale electricity markets,
including in particular Nordpool and the UK, the transparency requirements are high and
so commercially confidential information is limited. It should also be noted that in
Nordpool (as stated below) market participants with insider information are not allowed
to trade until the relevant information has been disclosed to the market. This suggests that
if an exemption for confidential information is to be allowed it must be very restricted. It
could, for example, be to allow some very sensitive information to be published in
aggregated form in advance and the detailed information to be published following an
appropriate delay rather than in real time. This would still allow the possessor of the
information to benefit from it, but replies to the Sector Inquiry indicate that even delayed
publication of information is of importance to market participants as it allows them to
understand price movements in the past and so to model price movements in the future.
II.4.6. Responsibility for publication of information
(582) Responsibility for revealing relevant information should primarily lie on the market or
network participant responsible for the relevant activity. For example, generators should
ensure that the required information on generation capacity and actual generation is
revealed, and TSOs should ensure that the required information on congestion is
revealed. However, in some cases, it might be appropriate for a third party to be
responsible for the publication of the information. For example, if it was decided that
information on generation schedules should only be published in an aggregated form
before gate closure then generators might be made responsible for providing the TSO or
another third party with their generation schedule and the TSO would be responsible for
publishing aggregated figures. This issue should be further considered by the European
Commission and the market participants during the discussions on precisely which
information should be published and when.
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
II.4.7. The transparency requirements under EC law
(583) EC financial services rules, in particular the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID)292, the Prospectus Directive293, the Transparency Directive294 and the Market
Abuse Directive (MAD)295 and its implementing rules296, impose various transparency
obligations on financial markets.
(584) The aim of these Directives is to regulate the trade of securities, including derivatives on
commodities, and related financial services. Commodity trading, including electricity and
gas trading, is generally not covered by these Directives unless it is considered to be
trading in derivatives on commodities. Some but not all power exchanges and brokers
platforms in the EU are covered by the national rules implementing these directives. For
example, in the Netherlands the APX exchange is not seen as falling within the scope of
the directives, while Endex297 is.
(585) Furthermore, the sector-specific rules only impose limited transparency obligations on
electricity wholesale markets or their participants.
II.4.8. Transparency requirements under national law or market conditions
(586) In addition to the requirements under EC law, there exist transparency requirements
under national law or self-imposed transparency requirements in individual markets (e.g.
it can be a condition of trading on the market concerned to subscribe to certain
transparency rules).
(587) The following examples from the most important wholesale markets are representative.
• Trading in Nord Pool is subject to regulation both by the authorities in
accordance with national law and by Nord Pool pursuant to the private law
market conditions. In particular, Nord Pool prohibits insider trading under its
292
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 2004 L 145/1). The MiFID allows
investment firms, banks and exchanges to provide their services across borders on the basis of their home country
authorisation. The Directive also harmonizes the requirements for the provision of investment services and the
operation of regulated markets by imposing several pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements..
293
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 2003
L 345/64). The Prospectus Directive lays down several requirements for the prospectus to be published when securities
are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market.
294
Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 2004 L
390/38). The Transparency Directive covers periodic and ongoing information requirements for issuers whose
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market.
295
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market
manipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96/16). The main aim of the MAD is to establish harmonised rules prohibiting
market abuse, in particular insider dealing and market manipulation which harm the integrity of financial markets and
public confidence in securities and derivatives.
296
In particular Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the
definition of market manipulation (OJ 2003 L 339/70) and Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices,
the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the
notification of managers’ transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions (OJ 2004 L 162/70).
297
Endex European Energy Derivatives Exchange operating an electricity futures exchange.
194
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
conditions to trade on the financial market. Market participants must notify
Nord Pool of any insider information, which is defined as “any matters related
to the relevant entity’s business in the electricity markets that is likely to have a
substantial impact on the prices in listed products”. This is further specified to
include any planned outages or maintenance concerning more than 200MW.
Participants possessing such information may not trade on Nord Pool until the
relevant information has been disclosed to the market by Nord Pool298.
• In the UK the main transparency requirements are imposed in accordance with
the Grid Code and the Balancing and Settlement Code. Compliance with these
codes is a condition for obtaining a licence as generator or supplier.
Implementation is monitored by the regulator OFGEM. The existing rules
require market participants to publish information such as intended generation,
contractual positions and outage plans to National Grid Company (NGC), the
TSO. Most of this information is circulated to market participants via the
internet. NGC also circulates its outage plans to market participants. With
respect to unplanned events, participants must provide an oral and written
account, the latter within two hours of receiving original notification of the
event.
• In Germany it appears that the main transparency requirements as regards
trading on EEX are due to national legislation (national competition law and the
German Securities Trading Act supervised by the EEX trade monitoring office,
the State Ministry for the Economy and Labour in Saxony and the German
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)). The TSOs also impose transparency
obligations including use of interconnectors and congestion problems.
• In France, the national and EC legislation on market abuse is not applied to
Powernext. However, Powernext has inserted provisions into its market rules to
prohibit market abuse. Furthermore, the national legislation has recently been
amended to grant the regulator the power to carry out surveillance of
“transactions carried out on organised electricity markets as well as on the
interconnectors”299.
(588) Experience of enforcement of these rules appears to be extremely limited, with the
exception of Nord Pool which has carried out eight detailed investigations since 2000,
and in a number of cases found that the rules had been breached. In the UK there have
been no formal investigations in the generation market relating to competition law or
OFGEM’s regulatory controls since 2001 (although there were previous investigations
into the Pool prices). The Financial Services Authority investigated the trading activity
of an energy producing and trading company in 2003 but found that allegations that its
conduct in the short term power markets may not have been for legitimate commercial
purposes were unsubstantiated. In France there have been no allegations of breaches of
rules on proper market conduct. In Germany no formal investigations have been carried
out.
298
Nord Pool Market Conduct Rules (in particular, section 4.1) and Disclosure Rules (in particular, section 2.1).
Furthermore, Nord Pool Ethical Guidelines state that market participants shall never compete in an unfair manner.
299
Article 3 of the Law of 10 February 2000 on the modernisation and development of the public service of electricity
as modified by article 51 of Law 2005-781 of 13 July 2005 on the orientation of energy policy.
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ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
II.4.9. Developments since the Preliminary Report was prepared
(589) Since the Preliminary Report was prepared, there have been significant developments in
transparency in electricity wholesale markets due to the revised congestion management
guidelines, the revised EC financial sector rules, voluntary initiatives from electricity
generators, and an intensive exchange of views between market participants, TSOs and
regulators on precisely what information should be published, when and at what level of
detail.
(590) The Commission Decision C(2006)5303 of 9 November 2006 amended the annex to
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border
exchanges in electricity. The amended annex obliges TSOs to provide significant
information to the market including: network availability, access and use; a report on
where congestion exists and the methods applied to manage the congestion; cross-border
transmission capacity available to the market; total capacity allocated and an indication
of prices paid; total capacity used; aggregated commercial and physical flows;
information on planned and unplanned outages; forecast and actual demand; forecast and
actual generation. Market participants shall provide TSOs with the relevant data where
necessary.
(591) Implementing provisions for the MiFID were adopted in August 2006. Commission
Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006, in particular in Articles 37 and 38, will help to clarify the
scope and effect of the MiFID and related financial service legislation with regard to
electricity wholesale markets.
(592) On a voluntary basis, the four largest electricity generators in Germany decided to
publish information on installed capacity, available capacity and actual quantities
generated each hour at the EEX electricity exchange from April 2006. Even though this
step was widely seen as a progress, it was claimed that it is still not sufficient as the
information is only published in an aggregated form and not complete for all of the
country but only for a part of generation. In June 2006, the conference of German
Economics Ministers in both the Federal and Länder Governments welcomed the
publication of this information and called for further work on the issue of transparency in
the electricity wholesale markets. In September 2006 it was announced that Austrian
electricity generators would publish at the EEX similar information to the German
electricity generators.
(593) Finally, ETSO300, Eurelectric301, ERGEG302 and EFET303 have all published detailed
proposals for the information that they believe should be published by market
participants, the time at which it should be published (eg in advance, in real time, or
afterwards) and the appropriate level of aggregation. The Florence Forum of 7 and 8
September 2006 concluded that the Commission would organise a working group to
discuss guidelines on transparency, on the basis of the ERGEG proposal, and how best to
300
List of data European TSOs need to pursue optimal use of the existing transmission infrastructure of December 2005.
301
Eurelectric Position Paper on market transparency of 16 February 2006.
302
ERGEG Guidelines for Good Practice on Information Management and Transparency in Electricity Markets of 15
March 2006.
303
EFET updated position on transparency of information about the availability and use of infrastructure and the
promotion of competition in European wholesale power markets of May 2006.
196
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

implement them quickly, possibly on a voluntary basis at first. The working group met
for the first time in November 2006.
(594) The voluntary publication of information in Germany and Austria and the rapid
development of a detailed debate on the precise information that need to be published
show how the issue of transparency in electricity wholesale markets has received greater
priority since the launch of the Sector Inquiry and in particular since the preliminary
report was published. This is a welcome first result of the Sector Inquiry and it is hoped
that further improvements, for example the adoption of guidelines on transparency, will
occur soon.
Conclusions
II.5. Price issues
(595) Whilst the formation of electricity prices on wholesale markets has already been
explained in some detail in this report, three issues relating to the overall price level of
electricity deserve particular attention. First, it needs to be analysed which external
factors might explain – wholly or in part – the price increases over the last years such as
increases in fuel costs or the introduction of the CO2 emission trading scheme (ETS)304.
Secondly, the effects of publicly set supply tariffs for competitive electricity wholesale
and retail markets need to be assessed. And thirdly, special support schemes – currently
under consideration in certain Member States - to support large energy intensive users are
presented and assessed.

The need for greater transparency is widely recognised and has been identified as the key
non-structural measure that could improve competition in EU electricity markets. Lack of
transparency amounts to an entry barrier, undermines the level playing field between
market participants and adversely affects trust in the functioning of the wholesale
markets.
In practice in most Member States the level of transparency remains low. There are also
significant differences between Member States undermining the level playing field. More
than 80% of all market participants are not satisfied with the current level of transparency
arguing that not all indispensable, important and/or useful information is made public.
More information should be published on technical availability of interconnectors and
TSO networks, on generation, balancing and reserve power and load.
The EC financial services legislation, even when it applies to electricity wholesale
markets, imposes only limited transparency obligations on these markets or their
participants. The same applies to the sector-specific rules.
The transparency requirements under national rules or market conditions appear to be
II.5.1. External factors possibly explaining price increases
II.5.1.1. Electricity prices and fuel price developments
(596) Coal and natural gas are commonly used primary energy sources to generate electricity
throughout Europe. It can therefore be expected that their price development will affect
electricity prices.
(597) Recent strong price increases of natural gas (themselves subject of the Gas Sector
Inquiry) had a significant impact on wholesale electricity prices especially in the UK,
where natural gas constitutes the fuel that is predominantly used by generators on the
margin. Figure 65 demonstrates this relationship showing the development of the UK
forward natural gas and electricity prices. It is characterised by a high correlation
between the price levels.
Figure 65
Gas prices push UK power prices
Wholesale electricity and gas price developments in the UK
90 45

widely divergent, with for example only Nord Pool explicitly banning trading before the
80 40
relevant information has been passed to the market. Furthermore, experience with UK power year-ahead base in €/MWh (left scale)

enforcement of the national rules and the market conditions are even more divergent, with 70
UK NBP natural gas year-ahead in €/MWh (right scale)
35

only Nord Pool having a broad experience enforcing its rules 60 30

There is therefore an urgent need to ensure that all market participants publish more 50 25

€/MWh

€/MWh
information, which may require Community legislation (e.g. clarification or modification 40 20

of existing legislation or new legislation), also in line with the recent ERGEG advice on
30 15
that issue in October 2006. Transparency requirements can also have a role as remedies in
competition cases, given that improved transparency can help to limit the possibility to 20 10

abuse market power. 10 5

Since the Preliminary Report was prepared, there have been significant developments in 0
Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Feb- May- Aug- Nov- Feb- May- Aug- Nov- Feb- May- Aug-
0

01 01 01 01 02 02 02 02 03 03 03 03 04 04 04 04 05 05 05 05 06 06 06
transparency in electricity wholesale markets. Some of these improvements appear to be a
result of the Sector Inquiry, and it is hoped that further improvements, for example the Source: information received within the scope of the Sector Inquiry from Argus Media, and Platts305.
adoption of guidelines on transparency, will occur soon.

304
For further details on this issue see also chapter C.c.III on the Electricity Study
305
Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.

197 198
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

(598) In other parts of Europe coal (instead of gas) plays a major role in electricity generation.
It is generally understood that coal is often used by generators operating on the margin
(e.g. in Germany). Thus coal price developments – all other factors being equal – should
have a major impact on electricity prices. However, this was not the case in recent years.
Whereas the relevant benchmark coal price has decreased (from 63 €/t in July 2004 to 51
€/t in September 2006), the year-ahead base load electricity price has risen significantly
in Germany (from 34 €/MWh in July 2004 to 56 €/MWh in September 2006). Although
electricity prices are also influenced by factors other then fuel prices (e.g. CO2 prices,
trade with other countries) the reasons for this development require some explanation
(see also C.c.III Electricity Study). This is all the more important since the German
market lacks the transparency that would allow market participants to identify the
marginal generator or take an informed view on the development of supply fundamentals.
Figure 66 shows the development of forward electricity and coal prices in Germany.
Figure 66
German power prices do not follow coal prices
Wholesale electricity and coal price developments in Germany
60
German electricity year-ahead base in €/MWh (left
scale)
50 Coal ARA 90 day forward in €/t (right scale)
between 47% and 55% at off-peak times. In Germany between 42% and 46% of the value
is priced in during off-peak times and between 69% and 73% during peak times. Other
studies reached higher figures showing pass-on rates of up to 100% which is in line with
the statements received from generators in the context of the Energy Sector Inquiry.
(601) The European Commission Directorate-General for Environment closely follows the
overall impact of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. It commissioned and published two
corresponding studies in this respect.308 The Commission also adopted a communication
with the title: Building a Global Carbon Market – Report pursuant to Art. 30 of Directive
2003/87/EC309, which summarises the first experiences with the ETS.
(602) The possible impact of CO2 certificates trading on power prices – all other factors being
equal – can be demonstrated using the concept of spark spreads (see also Chapter C.c.III).
The spark spread is the difference between the price of one unit of electricity and the
price of the same unit of gas adjusted for plant efficiency. It gives an idea about the
revenue of generators burning gas and selling the generated electricity on the market. As
long as gas constitutes the marginal fuel in a market one would expect a relatively stable
120 development of the spark spread (apart from possible price distortions or short term
supply/demand imbalances). A spark spread graph thus allows isolating the impact of the
gas price on the electricity price.
100

Figure 67
80
40 CO2 allowance prices influence electricity prices
Development of the spot spark spread and the CO2 price in the UK
€/MWh

30

€/t
60
30
Spark
30 daysspread in average
moving GBP/MWh (30spark
over daysspread
moving average)
25

20 40
CO2 in GBP/t

20

GBP/MWh -GBP/t
10 20

15

0 0
Aug-01 Jan-02 Jun-02 Oct-02 Feb-03 May-03 Oct-03 Feb-04 Jun-04 Oct-04 Mar-05 Jul-05 Nov-05 May-06 Sep-06
10
Source: information received within the scope of the Energy Sector Inquiry from Argus Media, and Platts306

II.5.1.2. Electricity prices and CO2 certificates 5

(599) In addition to rising natural gas prices, generators – as they explain in their answers – 0
have started to factor in the value of CO2 allowances in their pricing decisions as an

04

05

06

6
4

6
l-0

-0

r-0

l-0

l-0

-0
r-0

-0

r-0
n-

n-

n-
ct

ct
ct
Ju

Ju

Ju
Ap
Ap

Ap
Ja

Ja

Ja
O

O
additional factor of production.
Source: information received within the scope of the Sector Inquiry from Argus Media.
(600) There is no consensus yet among analysts to what extent prices for CO2 allowances are Note: for the calculation of the spot spark spreads we used spot NBP prices and adjusted them for 50%
plant efficiency. The spark spread is not corrected for the value of CO2.
included in wholesale prices and/or whether in all Member States the same developments
can be observed. Most argue however that the value of the allowances is at least partially
priced in. A study by the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands307 concluded that in
the Netherlands between 39% and 44% of the value is priced in at peak times and 308
‘Review of EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Survey Highlights’, European Commission Directorate-General for
Environment, McKinsey & Company, Ecofys, November 2005.
306
Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved. ‘Interactions of the EU ETS with Green And White Certificate Schemes’, European Commission Directorate-General
307
‘CO2 price dynamics: The implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity’, Energy Research Centre Environment, NERA Economic Consulting, 17 November 2005.
309
of the Netherlands, September 2005. COM(2006) 676 final of 13 November 2006.

199 200
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
(603) Figure 67 shows that the spot spark spread in the UK remained low and relatively stable
(apart from a short period with tighter margins between demand and available capacity)
during 2004 and started to rise from the beginning of 2005. This is also when the 1st
phase of the EU Emission Trading Scheme began. It can be observed that the spark
spread followed the pattern of the CO2 certificates price development suggesting that
generators – at least to some extent - include the value the CO2 allowances into their
pricing decisions.310
(604) CO2 allowance prices rose sharply during the first half of 2005 tracking the development
of rising gas prices relative to coal prices. Because of high gas prices generators preferred
to burn coal instead of gas to produce electricity. Since power plants using coal emit
approximately twice as much CO2 as those burning gas as primary fuel, increased coal
usage raised the demand for additional CO2 allowances. This in turn resulted in rising
CO2 certificate prices as can be seen in Figure 67. The prices remained high, at close to
30€ per ton, until April 2006, when they suddenly fell sharply to around 12€ per ton. The
reason was the publication of emission data for 2005 by Member States, which were
lower than expected. Subsequently prices for CO2 allowances have fallen below 10€ per
ton CO2 (state of play November 2006).
(605) The practice of including the value of CO2 allowances in the cost calculations is seen -
by certain industrial customers - as evidence for generators’ market power
(predominantly in Germany) and the non-functioning of electricity markets. The critics
underline that companies subject to global competition are not able to pass on costs
associated with CO2 allowances to their customers (e.g. steel or aluminium producers)
whilst electricity producers can do so. Industrial companies also request a differentiated
allocation between sectors, with a view to taking into account the external aspects of
competitiveness. Critics mention that the vast majority of the allowances were given for
free to generators. Customers claim further that generators would not only benefit from
higher electricity prices for their marginal plant but for their entire production portfolio
resulting in ‘windfall profits’.
(606) Furthermore companies that intend to enter the generation market are concerned that the
current allocation scheme favours incumbents over new entrants, for example if old
plants (normally owned by incumbents) are closed and replaced by a new plant with less
emissions, this may lead to an excess of allocations. However it needs to be mentioned in
this context that the allocation plans of all 25 Member States as approved by the
Commission for the period 2005-2007 contain new entrant reserves. This implies that
new power plants will be given free allowances in accordance with the rules governing
these reserves. New entrants argue, however, that some insecurity still persists in some
Member States as to the extent of the allocation methods and the likely amounts to be
attributed.311 In the public consultation on the preliminary report it was also underlined
by a number of commentators that the period post-2012 is crucial for any investment
decision in new generation, and that therefore further clarity on this aspect is important.
Moreover some commentators called for a harmonisation of rules between Member
States to ensure a level playing field. Finally, some commentators argued for a change in
the allocation procedure. A possible alternative would for example be the full auctioning
310
Similar trends can be observed when analysing forward spark spreads.
311
The new national allocation plans for the period 2008 to 2012 which are in the process of being reviewed/approved
by the Commission should address these concerns.
201
ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)
of CO2 allocations for the post-2012 period.312 All these issues will be addresses in the
EU ETS review.
(607) In the view of electricity generators and traders, CO2 allowances are like any other
variable factor of production. As such, CO2 allowance prices have to be included in the
short run and long run marginal cost calculation of the generating units. In this context –
generators argue - it would not matter whether CO2 allowances were allocated for free or
had to be bought on the market. It is claimed that the market value of the allowance is
what ultimately matters. If the value of the CO2 allowance would not be taken into
consideration the generator on the margin would lose revenues that it could realise if it
decided not to generate but sell the CO2 allowances and buy the electricity instead
(opportunity cost principle)313. In any event pricing in costs for CO2 allowances would
be in line with the objectives of the EU ETS.
(608) It can be noted in this respect that the German competition authority is currently
investigating whether German electricity producers are entitled to pass on the price for
CO2 allowances to their customers or whether such pricing practice amounts to an abuse
of dominant position. No final decision has, as of 10 January 2007, been taken.
(609) The Commission will continue to monitor the effects of the EU ETS (including the effect
of the ETS on electricity prices), which is a major element in its strategy to achieve the
Kyoto obligations. It also takes note of the recommendations of the High Level Group on
competitiveness, energy and the environment on the issue of the EU ETS314 in the context
of the ongoing EU ETS review process. In this respect it supports in particular the
requests of new entrants that the EU ETS must not create barriers for market entry.
II.5.2. Regulated supply tariffs
(610) In a number of markets that have been examined, the liberalised supply market with its
freely negotiable energy prices between suppliers and customers coexists with a system
of regulated final customer tariffs315 (e.g. Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, Hungary,
Poland). Parallel regimes are no threat to a liberalised supply market and its participants
as long as regulated energy prices are comfortably above the level implied by wholesale
market price levels. This differential allows for (new) suppliers without any local
generation to source on the wholesale market and make attractive supply offers compared
to the regulated energy tariff.
(611) However, Member States could be tempted – especially in periods of rising wholesale
prices – to set the supply tariffs below the corresponding wholesale benchmark to ensure
lower price levels for customers. Whilst there may be short run benefits to (certain
categories of) consumers, such supply tariffs have adverse effects for competition and
312
The Commission will pay particular attention to put in place a more harmonised allocation method beyond 2012. See
in this context the Commission Communication “Building a Global Carbon Market” COM(2006) 676 final of 13
November 2006.
313
This argument is not entirely convincing as it takes a rather static approach. The generator has to consider that it will
also need allowances for the next period. If all allowances were sold during the reference period, the generator would
be obliged to buy new allowances in the subsequent period. In addition, if all generators were to sell simultaneously
their allowances on a large scale, this would have a depressing impact on the price of the allowances given that the
electricity sector represents more than half of total CO2 allowances.
314
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/environment/hlg/hlg_en.htm
315
See also Second Electricity Directive, Art.3, Public service obligations and customers protection. Another issue is the
exclusive rights or compensation granted to incumbents to supply within regulated markets.
202
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity) ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

thus for consumers in the longer run. New suppliers with no access to own generation are Figure 68
effectively squeezed out from the market, as they can no longer market electricity Regulated supply tariffs are below wholesale prices
purchased on wholesale markets. Accordingly no competition based on merits can take Comparison of Spanish regulated electricty tariffs for certain large industrial customers with Spanish wholesale prices

70
place for these customers freezing the market position of incumbent operators. Also the
tariffs distort the necessary price signals for investment into new generation capacity and 60
are consequently damaging to security of supply. Many commentators in the public
consultation as well as electricity suppliers, in particular from Spain and France, 50

complained about the level of regulated tariffs being too low and their effects for the
wholesale markets316. 40

€/MWh
(612) In May 2006 the UK operator Centrica, which had gained significant market share in the 30

eligible customer segment in Spain, lodged a formal complaint to the Commission

20
concerning the regulated electricity tariffs in Spain, and the corresponding tariff deficit
system (compensation scheme for loss making local distributors supplying on the basis of 10
public tariffs). In the view of Centrica, the Spanish system has squeezed out their Spanish
subsidiary and other newcomers from the electricity supply market. The Commission is 0

currently analysing whether any violations of state aid or antitrust rules have taken place. June July August September October November December January February March April May

2004 2005

(613) In April 2006 the Commission opened infringement proceedings against a number of average final price - OMEL regulated bundled tariff for large customers - G.4

Member States for failure to correctly implement the Second Electricity and Gas
Directives317. The inexistent or inadequate justification for regulated tariffs – in particular
for eligible customers – was one of the key elements for certain of these infringement
procedures. Taking into account the adverse effects of regulated tariffs for competition
in particular for the non-household segment, it is recommended that these tariffs are
discontinued without delay.
Source: OMEL, CNE (Spanish Regulator)
Note: The G.4 bundled tariff depends on a capacity and consumption element and also includes network
usage
II.5.3. Special support schemes for energy intensive users
(614) In the light of increasing electricity prices a number of Member States are also
considering special support schemes for large energy intensive users. Whilst a number of
different concepts seem to exist, one of the most advanced relates to the formation of
purchasing consortia for energy intensive users under criteria set by national legislation.
The consortia would enter into long-term supply contracts with electricity producers.
Essentially the consortium would make a significant initial down payment corresponding
to the investment costs for a new power plant in return of continuous supplies of base
load electricity on a marginal cost basis. These purchasing consortia may give rise to
antitrust and possibly also state aids concerns.

(615) From an antitrust point of view the main questions are: a) Do the long-term contracts
have foreclosure effects? This may be the case if the companies which acquire electricity
under long-term contracts account –together with other customers- for a good part of the
overall electricity demand in the market concerned and if the selected supplier has a
dominant position in the market (for further details on this issue cf. chapter C.c.I.b). Are
the participants in the consortia free to market the electricity? The electricity supplier or
the consortium might have an interest in preventing the buyers from marketing unused
electricity at low prices (as a quid pro quo to the electricity generator). However, such a
use restriction may also raise competition concerns.

(616) The major concerns as regards state aid are that any such aid exceeding the de-minimis
thresholds would be viewed as operating aid which is normally not compatible with EU
316
It can be noted that the French Constitutional Council on 30 November 2006 declared non-conform with the French state aids rules. It would in any case not be possible for the Commission to authorise such
Constitution the Amendments to the Energy Sector law 13 July 2005 with respect to regulation of energy and gas aid based on any existing State aid guideline. It can also be questioned whether there
prices.
317
Commission Press Release IP/06/430 of 4 April 2006.

203 204
 ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

would be a need to provide such aid since the mere effect of the establishment of a
consortium is supposed to trigger a reduction in price.

(617) Further analysis will be required as regards these special support schemes.

Conclusion

In certain Member States the recent increases of electricity prices can be explained by the
rise of gas prices used in marginal plants. However coal prices have remained relatively
stable thus not explaining the price increases observed. Analysts cannot yet agree to
which extent the value of CO2 allowances is priced into electricity prices. It needs to be
ensured that the ETS does not amount to an entry barrier for companies that want to
become active in power generation.

Industrial users claim that electricity producers should not be entitled to factor in the
value of CO2 allowances, as they were largely distributed for free. Generators claim that
the value of CO2 allowances is an opportunity cost, which can be factored in legitimately.
An antitrust investigation is ongoing in Germany dealing with this question.

Public tariffs for electricity supply have adverse effects for the development of
competitive markets if set very low compared to wholesale prices and if they cover a
large part of the eligible customer market. Support schemes for large energy intensive
users – currently considered in a number of Member States – need to be compatible with
antitrust and state aid rules.

205
 01/11/2010

UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID
MERIGG, 2009‐‐10
MERIGG, 2009

REGULACIÓN Y COMPETENCIA. EL 
SECTOR ELÉCTRICO
ESPAÑA Y EUROPA

EL SECTOR ELÉCTRICO ESPAÑOL
• Producción
– Régimen ordinario
– Régimen especial
• Transporte
• Distribución – venta final

MONOPOLIO‐LIBRE COMPETENCIA

1
 01/11/2010

–CARACTERÍSTICAS
- Oferta = Demanda
- No identificable
- No dirigible
- Demanda variable a lo largo de
diversos horizontes temporales
(valle-pico)
–“ Servicio público”

Esquema funcionamiento

2
 01/11/2010

Generación
• TIPOS DE TECNOLOGÍAS
– Régimen ordinario
– Régimen especial
• POTENCIA INSTALADA
• BALANCE ENERGÉTICO
• CURVA DE CARGA
CURVA DE CARGA

3
01/11/2010

4
01/11/2010

5
 01/11/2010

Evolución potencia instalada SEE 2002‐07
Evolución potencia instalada.
SEE.

Año 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

MW % MW % MW % MW % MW % MW %
Tecnología
Hidráulica 16.586 28,37%
, 16.657 27,21%
, 16.657 24,34%
, 16.657 22,52%
, 16.658 21,15%
, 16.658 18,36%
,
Nuclear 7.816 13,37% 7.876 12,86% 7.876 11,51% 7.867 10,64% 7.716 9,80% 7.716 8,51%
Carbón 11.565 19,78% 11.565 18,89% 11.565 16,90% 11.424 15,44% 11.934 15,15% 11.867 13,08%
Fuel/gas 10.288 17,60% 6.930 11,32% 6.930 10,13% 6.647 8,99% 9.425 11,97% 8.758 9,65%

Ciclo
Combinado 0,00% 4.934 8,06% 8.258 12,07% 12.224 16,53% 16.410 20,84% 22.097 24,36%

Total Régimen
ordinario 46.255 47.422 51.313 54.829 62.144 67.096
Eólica 0,00% 5.361 8,76% 8.351 12,20% 9.800 13,25% 11.279 14,32% 13.606 15,00%

Resto Régimen
especial 0,00% 8.440 13,79% 8.761 12,80% 9.342 12,63% 9.669 12,28% 10.021 11,05%

Total Régimen
especial 12.214 13.801 17.112 19.142 23.626
Total 58.469 100,00% 61.223 100,00% 68.425 100,00% 73.970 100,00% 78.754 100,00% 90.722 100,00%

6
 01/11/2010

Variación potencia instalada

Crecimiento anual potencia instalada

Año 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

% 03/02 % 04/03 % 05/04 % 06/05 %07/06
Tecnología
Hidráulica 0,43% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00%
Nuclear 0,77% 0,00% -0,11% -1,92% 0,00%
Carbón 0,00% 0,00% -1,22% 4,46% -0,56%
Fuel/gas -32,64% 0,00% -4,08% 41,79% -7,08%

Ciclo Combinado 67,37% 48,03% 34,24% 34,66%

Eólica 55,77% 17,35% 15,09% 7,97%

Resto Régimen
especial 3,80% 6,63% 3,50% 20,63%
Total 4,71% 11,76% 8,10% 6,47% 3,64%

Balance eléctrico nacional (2002‐07)

Balance eléctrico nacional

Año 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh %
Tecnología
Hidráulica 22.560
22 560 10,08%
10 08% 38.774
38 774 16,11%
16 11% 29 777 11,59%
29.777 11 59% 19 170 7,13%
19.170 7 13% 25 330 9,13%
25.330 9 13% 26 381 9,21%
26.381 9 21%
Nuclear 63.016 28,15% 61.875 25,70% 63.606 24,76% 57.539 21,41% 60.126 21,68% 55.046 19,21%
Carbón 82.310 36,77% 75.796 31,48% 80.097 31,18% 77.393 28,80% 69.326 25,00% 74.946 26,15%
Fuel/gas 30.286 13,53% 17.703 7,35% 17.912 6,97% 10.013 3,73% 14.432 5,20% 10.771 3,76%
Ciclo
Combinado 0,00% 14.990 6,23% 28.974 11,28% 48.840 18,17% 67.012 24,16% 72.461 25,28%
Régimen
ordinario 198.172 88,52% 209.138 86,87% 220.365 85,79% 212.955 79,24% 236.226 239.606
- Consumos en
generación -9.155 -4,09% -8.886 -3,69% -9.550 -3,72% -9.080 -3,38% -9.770 -3,52% -9.460 -3,30%
Eólica 0,00% 12.140 5,04% 15.916 6,20% 20.377 7,58% 22.924 8,27% 27.026 9,43%
Resto Régimen
especial 34.858 15,57% 28.351 11,78% 30.143 11,73% 29.987 11,16% 27.959 10,08% 29.416 10,26%
Generación
G ió
neta 223.875 240.743 256.874 268.756 277.339 286.588
- Consumos en
bombeo -6.957 -4.678 -4.605 -6.709 -5.261 -4.421
+ intercambios
internacionales 5.329 1.264 -3.027 -1.343 -3.280 -5.803
Demanda 222.247 237.329 249.242 260.704 268.799 276.365
En % de demanda se refleja el crecimiento respecto al año
anterior

7
 01/11/2010

Variación anual por tecnologías y demanda

Variación anual por tecnologías y demanda

Año 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

% 03/02 % 04/03 % 05/04 % 06/05 %07/06
Tecnología -38,47% 32,13% 32,13% 4,15%
Hidráulica 71,87% -23,20% -35,62% 32,13% 4,15%
Nuclear -1,81% 2,80% -10,42% -10,42% -8,45%
Carbón -7,91% 5,67% 44,13% 44,13% 8,11%
Fuel/gas -41,55% 1,18% 37,21% 37,21% -25,37%

Ciclo Combinado 93,29% 10,93% 10,93% 8,13%

Eólica 31,10% 12,50% 12,50% 17,89%

Resto Régimen
especial -18,67% 6,32% -6,76% -6,76% 5,21%
Demanda 6,79% 5,02% 3,11% 3,11% 2,81%

Curva Monótona de carga

Nuclear Carbón Fuel-Gas

Ciclo Combinado Hidráulica Régimen Especial
Importaciones
p Demanda
45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10 000
10.000
5.000
0

horas

8
 01/11/2010

Puntos a destacar: 
Puntos a destacar
1. la potencia instalada de un determinado tipo de
tecnología será fundamental a la hora de
asegurar la efectiva atención de la demanda
2. pero la cobertura de la demanda dependerá de
la posibilidad de utilización de esa tecnología, lo
cual, por su parte, depende de factores
incontrolables como la climatología
(fundamental para la energía hidráulica y eólica)

TRANSPORTE

Km de circuito 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

400 kV
15.782 16.308 16.547 16.808 17.005

220 kV y menor

11.219 11.243 11.308 16.288 16.498

Total
27.001 27.551 27.855 33.096 33.503

Cuestiones clave del transporte:
‐El problema de la propiedad de las líneas
‐El sistema de tarificación de peajes

9
 01/11/2010

Comercialización vs. distribución
Marco Fecha
Niveles de consumo Apertura Mercado
Jurídico efecto

01/01/ 26%
Ley 54/1997 Superior a 15 GWh
1998 700 suministros

01/01/ 33,4%
Superior a 5 GWh
1999 2.300 suministros

01/04/ 37%
Superior a 3 GWh
RD 2820/1998 1999 3.800 suministros

01/07/ 39,6%
Superior a 2 GWh
1999 5.600 suministros

01/10/ 43,4%
Superior a 1GWh
1999 10.000 suministros

01/07/ 52,3%
RD-L 6/1999 Tensión de suministro superior a 1000 V
2000 65.000 suministros

01/01/ Todos los 100%

RD-L 6/2000
2003 consumidores 21.500.000 suministros

Cadena energética en el caso de mercado a tarifa (distribuidor)

10
 01/11/2010

Cadena energética en el caso de mercado libre 
(comercializador)

Cambio de sistema; problemas para la 
introducción de competencia
Anterior a la ley
REE Æ O Ordenación
de ac ó por cos
po costes
es Æ
Liquidación (generación y distribución)

Situación actual: Mercado mayorista

Pujas de compra/venta (agentes) Æ OMEL
(casación económica) Æ REE (casación
técnica) Æ OMEL (liquidación)

11
 01/11/2010

EL MERCADO ESPAÑOL DE PRODUCCIÓN 
ELÉCTRICA: FUNCIONAMIENTO Y 
POSIBILIDADES DE COMPETENCIA

Objeto del trabajo: 
Objeto del trabajo:
Análisis del comportamiento del 
mercado eléctrico con el fin de 
determinar la existencia de competencia 
y factores limitadores de la misma.

Datos empíricos: 
D íi
Publicaciones OMEL 
Pujas presentadas de adquisición y venta 
de energía para cada sesión del mercado 
(MWh y c€/kWh)

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

SITUACIÓN ANTERIOR A LEY 54/97

REE

Ordenación costes

Liquidación (producción y 
distribución)

12
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

SITUACIÓN ACTUAL. 
MERCADO MAYORISTA

OFERENTES: RÉGIMEN ORDINARIO Y

OTROS
DEMANDANTES: DISTRIBUIDORES,
COMERCIALIZADORES Y OTROS

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

PUJAS DE COMPRA/VENTA (Pr y cantidad)

Variable estratégica: Precio mercado

Casación Económica (pr. eq. = 
OMEL marginal)

REE Casación Técnica

OMEL Liquidación

13
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Hora Fecha Unidad Tipo Energía Precio Ofert/

Oferta Compr/ Compr/ Casada
Venta Venta

1 14/01/03 BPC01 C 0,4 18,03 O

1 14/01/03 ABO1 V 220 0 O

14
01/11/2010

15
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Organización: 
¾I Marco teórico
I Marco teórico
¾II Comportamiento de la oferta
¾III La demanda
¾IV El mercado
¾V Conclusiones

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Modelo teórico: 
Modelo de Sweezy o de demanda 
y
quebrada.
¾ Función de demanda con 
punto de vértice y distintas 
elasticidades
¾ Distinta actuación de 
oligopolistas ante subidas o 
bajadas de precios

16
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Adaptación del modelo de Sweezy al 
mercado eléctrico español

P (c€/kWh)
Pmax
OA’
OA
Pα

D D’

qα q’α q (MWh)

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

¾ Marco teórico 
Marco teórico
¾ Comportamiento de la oferta
¾ La demanda
¾ El mercado
¾ Conclusiones

17
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Análisis de la industria
¾ Agentes vendedores
¾ Datos agregados:
• Elevado número de agentes
• Volumen mayor de ofertas no casadas 
en horas de baja demanda
en horas de baja demanda
¾ Unidades de producción
• Comportamiento observado
• Tipología por tecnologías

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Tipología de comportamiento
¾ Participación
¾ Número de ofertas
¾ Precios
¾ Variabilidad de precios
¾ Número de ofertas casadas

18
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Nuclear Participación
1

0,5
Ofertas casadas Nº de ofertas

Variabilidad precios Precios

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Hidráulica Participación
1

0,5
Ofertas casadas Nº de ofertas

Variabilidad precios Precios

19
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

¾ Marco teórico 
Marco teórico
¾ Comportamiento de la oferta
¾ La demanda
¾ El mercado
¾ Conclusiones y nuevas líneas de 
investigación

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Análisis de la demanda
Análisis de la demanda
¾ Agentes
¾ Características
¾ Datos empíricos y forma de la curva
¾ Consideraciones sobre el punto de 
quiebro

20
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

C. de demanda hora 22 (24-03-03)

20

15

10

0
0 5.000 10.000 15.000 20.000 25.000 30.000 35.000

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

P (c€/kWh)

Pmax

OA’

OA
Pα

D D’

qα q’α q (MWh)

21
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

¾ Marco teórico 
¾ Comportamiento de la oferta
¾ La demanda
¾ El mercado
¾ Conclusiones y nuevas líneas de 
investigación

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

El mercado:
¾ Datos de clientes y energía
¾ Características
¾ Funcionamiento

22
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Factores que limitan la existencia de 
competencia (I):
i (I)
¾ Concentración horizontal
¾ Forma de la curva de demanda
¾ Separación precios de mercado‐tarifas
¾ Límites artificiales al precio de 
equilibrio: Los CTCs

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

Factores que limitan la existencia de 
competencia (II):
i (II)
¾ Disminución del margen de reserva
¾ Asimetría de información. Integración 
en grupos empresariales
¾ El operador de la red
El d d l d

23
 01/11/2010

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...

¾ Marco teórico 
¾ Comportamiento de la oferta
¾ La demanda
¾ El mercado
¾ Conclusiones

El mercado español de producción

eléctrica...
Conclusiones

¾ Numerosos factores limitadores de la 
competencia

¾ Necesidad de establecer cambios             
profundos en la organización y 
funcionamiento del mercado

¾ La coexistencia de dos sistemas en venta 
La coexistencia de dos sistemas en venta
minorista debe ser transitoria

¾ Medidas para fomentar cambios en la 
demanda

24
 01/11/2010

EL PASO A UN MERCADO 
SUPRANACIONAL: 
El MERCADO ELÉCTRICO 
EUROPEO, 
PROBLEMAS PARA LA 
INTEGRACIÓN

Mercado eléctrico europeo

Guión: 
Guión
1. El mercado de electricidad
2. Problemas para la integración
3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de 
futuro

25
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo

Guión
Guión: 
1. El mercado de electricidad
2. Problemas para la integración
3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de 
futuro

Mercado eléctrico europeo

Mercado eléctrico
-Obligación servicio público y
protección al consumidor
-Gestión red de transporte
Disociación contable
-Disociación
-Apertura del mercado y reciprocidad

26
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo

1. El mercado de electricidad
2. Problemas para la integración
3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de 
futuro

Mercado eléctrico europeo
¿Por qué no se logra la
integración?
-Falta de interconexión internacional
-Falta de competencia a nivel nacional
-Protección de “sectores estratégicos”
-El grado de cumplimiento nacional
Documentos relativos al mercado eléctrico
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full_report_part2
.pdf
- Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento
(CE) n° 1/2003 en los sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad
(Informe final) {SEC(2006) 1724}

27
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo

¿Por qué no se logra la

g
integración?
-Falta de interconexión internacional

-VENTAJAS DE LA INTERCONEXIÓN
-INFORMES UCTE
UCTE. ESTADO ACTUAL
-PROYECTOS PRIORITARIOS UE

Proyectos prioritarios interconexión UE

28
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo

¿Por qué no se logra la integración?

-Problemas de falta de competencia a nivel
nacional

Obstáculos Estados Cambio de compañía

por parte de grandes
usuarios
Sin problemas importantes Suecia, Finlandia, Más del 50%
Dinamarca, Noruega y
Reino Unido
Desregulación/ regulación Luxemburgo, Austria, Entre 10% y 35%
Alemania

Estructura del mercado o falta de Francia, Bélgica, Grecia, Entre 0% (Grecia) y

integración Irlanda, España, 35% (Holanda)
Holanda, Italia
Acuerdos de compra de energía a Portugal
largo plazo/precios al consumo
regulados

Mercado eléctrico europeo

Número de empresas de Número de emrpesas de

País transporte distribución

Austria 3 133
Bélgica 1 27
Dinamarca 2 125
Finlandia 1 104
Francia 1 166
Alemania 4 950
Grecia 1 1
Irlanda 1 1
Italia 1 170
Luxemburgo 2 11
Países Bajos 1 20
Port gal
Portugal 1 11
España 1 308
Suecia 1 180
Reino Unido 2 15
Noruega 1 150

Fuente: UE, Infrome de la Comisión (2004) 863

29
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo
Tamaño del
mercado
Apertura abeierto en Umbral de
País mercado TWh cualificación Separación redes
Transporte Distribución
Austria 100 55 Jurídica Jurídica
Bélgica 90% aprox
aprox. 60 Jurídica Jurídica
Dinamarca 100 33 Jurídica Jurídica
Finlandia 100 80 Propiedad Contable
Francia 70 275 ND Jurídica Gestión
Alemania 100 500 Jurídica Contable
Grecia 62 29 ND Jurídica No
Irlanda 56 12 1GWh Jurídica Gestión
Italia 79 225 ND Propiedad Jurídica
Luxemburgo 57 3 20 GWh Gestión Gestión
Países Bajos 100 100 Propiedad Jurídica
Portugal 100 42 Propiedad Contable
p
España 100 210 Propiedad
p Jurídica
Suecia 100 135 Propiedad Jurídica
Reino Unido 100 335 Propiedad Jurídica
Noruega (1) 100 110 Propiedad Jurídica/contable

(1) Se hace el análisis para la UE-15 más Noruega por tener un mercado único con los países nórdicos

Fuente: UE, Infrome de la Comisión (2004) 863

Mercado eléctrico europeo

¿Por qué no se logra la

integración?
g
-La protección de sectores estratégicos
-El diverso grado de cumplimiento
nacional

30
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo
Tamaño del
mercado
Apertura abeierto en Umbral de
País mercado TWh cualificación Separación redes
Transporte Distribución
Austria 100 55 Jurídica Jurídica
Bélgica 90% aprox
aprox. 60 Jurídica Jurídica
Dinamarca 100 33 Jurídica Jurídica
Finlandia 100 80 Propiedad Contable
Francia 70 275 ND Jurídica Gestión
Alemania 100 500 Jurídica Contable
Grecia 62 29 ND Jurídica No
Irlanda 56 12 1GWh Jurídica Gestión
Italia 79 225 ND Propiedad Jurídica
Luxemburgo 57 3 20 GWh Gestión Gestión
Países Bajos 100 100 Propiedad Jurídica
Portugal 100 42 Propiedad Contable
p
España 100 210 Propiedad
p Jurídica
Suecia 100 135 Propiedad Jurídica
Reino Unido 100 335 Propiedad Jurídica
Noruega (1) 100 110 Propiedad Jurídica/contable

(1) Se hace el análisis para la UE-15 más Noruega por tener un mercado único con los países nórdicos

Fuente: UE, Infrome de la Comisión (2004) 863

Mercado eléctrico europeo

CAMBIO DE SUMINISTRADOR

Grandes consumidores Pequeñas

industriales cualificados empresas/hogares
País Desde la apertura del mercado
Austria 22% 3%
Bélgica 35% 19%
Dinamarca >50% 5%
Finlandia >50% No conocido
Francia 22%
Alemania 35% 6%
Grecia 0%
Irlanda >50% 1%
Italia 15%
Luxemburgo g 10%
Países Bajos 30% 35%
Portugal 9% 1%
España 18% 0%
Suecia >50% No conocido
Reino Unido >50% >50%
Noruega >50% >50%

Fuente: UE, Infrome de la Comisión (2004) 863

31
 01/11/2010

Mercado eléctrico europeo

Guión: 
Guión
1. El mercado de electricidad
2. Problemas para la integración
3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de futuro

32
 ES COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS

Bruselas, 10.1.2007
COM(2006) 851 final

COMUNICACIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN

Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los

sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad (Informe final)

{SEC(2006) 1724}

ES ES ES ES

COMUNICACIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN
Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los
sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad (informe final)
1. INTRODUCCIÓN
1. Unos mercados de la energía que funcionen correctamente y garanticen el suministro
seguro de energía a unos precios competitivos son clave para el crecimiento y el
bienestar de los consumidores de la Unión Europea. Para lograr este objetivo la UE
decidió abrir a la competencia los mercados del gas y de la electricidad de Europa y
crear un mercado único europeo de la energía. El proceso de apertura del mercado ha
modificado considerablemente el funcionamiento de los mercados, ha ofrecido
nuevas oportunidades de mercado y ha dado lugar a la introducción de nuevos
productos y servicios. La competencia provocó inicialmente un descenso de los
costes de la energía en Europa en línea con las condiciones de mercado.
2. Sin embargo, aunque han hecho progresos, todavía no se han alcanzado los objetivos
de la apertura de mercado. A pesar de la liberalización del mercado interior de la
energía, subsisten obstáculos a la libre competencia. Las subidas significativas de los
precios al por mayor del gas y la electricidad, que no se explican exclusivamente por
los mayores costes primarios del petróleo y las obligaciones de índole
medioambiental, las reiteradas denuncias sobre los obstáculos a la entrada y las
limitadas posibilidades de elección para los consumidores llevaron a la Comisión a
iniciar en junio de 2005una investigación del funcionamiento de los mercados
europeos del gas y la electricidad. Esta investigación, basada en el artículo 17 del
Reglamento 1/20031 relativo a la aplicación de las normas de competencia del
Tratado, pretendía evaluar las condiciones actuales de competencia y establecer las
causas del incorrecto funcionamiento del mercado. El Informe final (Comunicación
de la Comisión) resume los resultados de la investigación, que se presentan más
detalladamente en el Anexo técnico2 del Informe final.
3. Si bien la investigación del sector se inició con la sensación de que los consumidores
no se beneficiaban plenamente de la liberalización, debe subrayarse desde el
principio que el objeto de la investigación no era describir los avances logrados en el
proceso de liberalización y las ventajas que de él se derivaban. Los logros son
muchos y, en aquellos mercados en los que la liberalización se ha efectuado con
éxito, los consumidores son unos de los que se benefician de la mayor posibilidad de
elección entre proveedores y servicios. También pagan – en comparación con los
consumidores de otros Estados miembros – unos precios que por término medio
corresponden más a los costes. La Comisión sigue pues convencida de que no hay
alternativa al proceso de liberalización. Es, por lo tanto, esencial velar por que las
1
Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002, relativo a la aplicación de las
normas sobre competencia previstas en los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE (DO L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1),
tal como fue modificado por el Reglamento (CE) n° 411/2004 (DO L 68, 6.3.2004, p. 1).
2 5
Documento de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión, Informe de la DG Competencia sobre la
investigación del sector de la energía SEC (2006) 1724.
ES 2 ES
directivas de liberalización existentes se transpongan de forma completa y efectiva3.
Sin embargo, aún queda por hacer antes de que los consumidores puedan obtener el
máximo beneficio.
4. La investigación del sector de la energía se ha centrado en la identificación de las
áreas en donde la competencia todavía no funciona bien y de los ámbitos en los que
hay que intervenir cuanto antes para que la liberalización dé sus frutos. Con vistas a
la investigación, los aspectos fundamentales se agruparon en los siguientes temas (1)
concentración de mercado/poder de mercado, (2) exclusión vertical del mercado
(fundamentalmente desagregación inadecuada de la red y del suministro), (3) falta de
integración del mercado (incluida la falta de supervisión normativa de los aspectos
transfronterizos), (4) falta de transparencia, (5) formación de precios, (6) mercados
en sentido descendente, (7) mercados de equilibrado y (8) gas natural licuado (GNL).
5. Las deficiencias identificadas en estos ámbitos fundamentales hacen necesario actuar
de forma urgente en cuatro ámbitos que deben considerarse prioritarios: (1) lograr la
desagregación efectiva de las actividades de red y suministro; (2) eliminar las
diferencias reguladoras (en especial en los aspectos transfronterizos); (3) resolver la
concentración del mercado y los obstáculos a la entrada y (4) incrementar la
transparencia de las operaciones de mercado. La Comunicación de la Comisión sobre
"Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad"4, que se presenta
paralelamente al Informe final, define las intenciones de la Comisión por lo que se
refiere a las propuestas reguladoras necesarias a este respecto.
1.1. Contexto de la investigación
6. La introducción de la competencia en los mercados del gas y la electricidad de
Europa es parte integrante de la política energética europea que pretende lograr tres
objetivos estrechamente relacionados: un sector de la energía competitivo y eficiente,
la seguridad del suministro y la sostenibilidad. Todos los consumidores europeos, es
decir, los hogares, los usuarios comerciales y los usuarios industriales, dependen en
gran medida del suministro seguro y fiable de energía a precios competitivos.
Asimismo, la consecución del objetivo de la Unión de proteger de forma adecuada el
medio ambiente es de importancia fundamental tal como demuestra el compromiso
de reducir la emisión de gases de efecto invernadero en aplicación del Protocolo de
Kioto. Por lo tanto, la investigación del sector debe situarse en este contexto político
de mayor alcance.
7. La política energética europea se estableció en la Comunicación de la Comisión al
Consejo Europeo de primavera de 20065 referente a la estrategia renovada en favor
del crecimiento y el empleo. Esta Comunicación sitúa la creación de una política
energética eficiente e integrada en el centro de las prioridades de la Comisión. Este
objetivo se volvió a subrayar en el Libro Verde de la Comisión "Estrategia europea
3
La Comisión ha iniciado procedimientos de infracción a este respecto contra varios Estados miembros –
para más detalles véase la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre las perspectivas del mercado interior del
gas y la electricidad, mencionada a continuación.
4
COM (2006) 841, Comunicación de la Comisión, Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la
electricidad.
Ha llegado la hora de acelerar – Informe anual de situación en materia de crecimiento y empleo, 25 de
enero de 2006.
ES 3 ES
 para una energía sostenible, competitiva y segura"6 adoptado por la Comisión en
marzo de 2006.
8. El informe final de la investigación sectorial se presenta en paralelo con la Revisión
estratégica del sector de la energía de la UE de la Comisión7 y con el paquete de
medidas en el sector de la energía que incluye la Comunicación "Perspectivas del
mercado interior del gas y la electricidad" antes mencionada y el seguimiento del
Libro Verde. También se tiene en cuenta el trabajo realizado en el Grupo de alto
nivel sobre competitividad, energía y medio ambiente, que, en su primer informe
adoptado en junio de 2006, destacó la necesidad de que los mercados de la
electricidad y el gas funcionen mejor.
9. De todos estos documentos se desprende que los tres objetivos políticos de
"competitividad, seguridad del suministro y sostenibilidad" están estrechamente
relacionados y son complementarios. Los mercados competitivos ofrecen las señales
necesarias para la inversión, que lleva a la seguridad del suministro de la manera más
rentable. Del mismo modo, la creación de un mercado interior competitivo permitirá
a las empresas energéticas de la Unión operar en un mercado más amplio, que
mejorará su capacidad de contribuir a la seguridad del suministro. Al mismo tiempo,
las fuerzas del mercado obligan a los operadores europeos a utilizar los métodos de
producción más rentables, que, en un marco regulador apropiado, pueden contribuir a
la sostenibilidad. Los consumidores podrán elegir entre distintos proveedores y
modalidades de contrato y de esta manera podrían reducir sus costes de electricidad y
adaptar su consumo a la evolución del mercado. Unos precios competitivos que
reflejen los costes de producción contribuirán a fomentar el rendimiento energético,
lo que puede reducir la dependencia de los proveedores exteriores y contribuye al
objetivo de la Unión de sostenibilidad y seguridad del suministro.
10. El Informe final se centra en los aspectos de competencia de la política energética de
Europa y en los obstáculos que subsisten para crear un mercado único europeo de la
energía. Si bien este aspecto merece por sí mismo un análisis exhaustivo, la prioridad
también procede del marco normativo (Reglamento 1/2003), que constituyó el telón
de fondo de la investigación. Esto no significa que, por ejemplo, no se tengan en
cuenta los objetivos de la seguridad de suministro al evaluar los probables efectos
beneficiosos y perjudiciales para la competencia en el contexto de la aplicación de
las normas comunitarias de competencia en casos individuales. Efectivamente, un
mercado interior competitivo es un instrumento clave para la consecución de este
objetivo. Sin embargo en el contexto de la investigación sectorial se ha prestado
especial atención a la competencia.
1.2. Procedimiento hasta la adopción del informe
11. La investigación del sector de los mercados europeos de la energía se puso en
marcha el 17 de junio 2005. Los resultados iniciales se presentaron en un documento
de discusión publicado el 15 de noviembre de 2005. Tras la publicación del informe
preliminar el 16 de febrero de 2006 la Comisión inició una consulta pública. En sus
contribuciones los interesados acogieron con satisfacción el informe, elogiando por
lo general su objetividad así como la riqueza de la información. Las contribuciones
6
COM (2006) 105 final, 8.3.2006, SEC (2006) 317.
7
COM (2007) 1, Comunicación de la Comisión, Una política energética para Europa.
ES 4 ES
procedían de empresas del sector, ya fueran operadores tradicionales como nuevos
participantes, reguladores nacionales, autoridades de competencia, empresas
consultoras, despachos de abogados, comerciantes de energía, operadores de red,
clientes, asociaciones industriales y organismos públicos nacionales.
12. La mayoría de los interesados está de acuerdo con las conclusiones, aunque existan
variaciones en la evaluación de la gravedad de la situación y de si esta está o no
mejorando. Por lo que se refiere a las posibles maneras de avanzar hubo división de
opiniones en cuanto a las ideas presentadas en el informe preliminar tales como la
desagregación estructural, mientras que algunos abogaron por unas soluciones aún
más radicales. Hablando en términos generales, las empresas tradicionales integradas
verticalmente no eran favorables a otras medidas, mientras que los consumidores, los
comerciantes y los nuevos participantes así como las autoridades apoyaron la
propuesta de iniciativas legislativas.
2. CONCLUSIONES
13. Las principales conclusiones de la investigación del sector pueden agruparse - según
se ha indicado antes - en ocho epígrafes. Aunque hay algunas diferencias obvias
entre los sectores del gas y de la electricidad, las numerosas semejanzas y
correlaciones entre ambos sectores respaldan una presentación común.
2.1. Concentración del mercado
14. Al nivel mayorista, los mercados del gas y la electricidad siguen siendo de
alcance nacional y mantienen por lo general el alto nivel de concentración del
período anterior a la liberalización. Esto ofrece un margen para ejercer el poder
de mercado.
15. El comercio mayorista de gas se ha desarrollado lentamente y los operadores
tradicionales siguen siendo dominantes en sus mercados tradicionales, gracias en
gran parte a que controlan las importaciones ascendentes de gas y/o la producción
nacional de gas. Los operadores tradicionales sólo venden una pequeña proporción
de su gas en intercambios de gas ("hubs"). Dado que se producen pocas entradas
nuevas en los mercados al por menor, las posibilidades de elección de los
consumidores son limitadas al igual que lo es la presión competitiva. El marco
general para los nuevos participantes se caracteriza por la dependencia de los
operadores tradicionales integrados verticalmente para los servicios en toda la cadena
de suministro.
16. Aunque el comercio de electricidad está más desarrollado, las ventas en los mercados
al por mayor de electricidad reflejan por lo general el importante nivel de
concentración en la generación de electricidad. El análisis del comercio de las bolsas
de energía muestra que, en algunos de ellos, los generadores tienen margen para
ejercer su poder de mercado subiendo los precios, preocupación que también
expresaron muchos clientes. El análisis de las posiciones de negociación en los
mercados a plazo, que por lo general muestran una menor concentración, demuestra
que los mercados de la electricidad dependen de pocos proveedores con posiciones
largas (es decir, producen más de lo que revenden). El análisis de las carteras de
producción también muestra que los principales productores pueden retirar capacidad
para provocar una subida de precios.
ES 5 ES
 17. En el contexto de la investigación, se ha llevado a cabo un estudio de los niveles de
concentración en el sector de la electricidad8. Un análisis de la concentración por
horas muestra que, incluso durante las horas valle, los mercados están muy
concentrados y los niveles de concentración, incluso en los mercados menos
concentrados, alcanzan niveles significativos en las horas punta. El análisis basado
en la medición de la estructura del mercado en cada hora también revela que, en
ciertos mercados, los contratos a largo plazo y, en menor medida, los requisitos
relativos a las reservas pueden reforzar los niveles de concentración. Además, el
análisis muestra que el nivel de capacidad de interconexión existente no es suficiente
para reducir considerablemente la concentración.
2.2. Exclusión vertical
18. El nivel actual de desagregación de la red y el suministro tiene repercusiones
negativas en el funcionamiento del mercado y en los incentivos para invertir en
redes. Esto constituye un obstáculo importante para la nueva entrada y también
amenaza la seguridad del suministro.
19. Los nuevos participantes carecen a menudo de acceso efectivo a las redes (en el
sector del gas, esto vale también para el almacenamiento y los terminales de gas
natural licuado) a pesar de las disposiciones sobre desagregación existentes. Se
sospecha que los operadores de redes e infraestructuras favorecen a sus propios
asociados (discriminación). La integración vertical también da lugar a que las
decisiones operativas y de inversión no se tomen en interés de las operaciones de red
o infraestructura, sino en función de los intereses de suministro de la empresa
integrada (incluida la conexión a la red para las centrales eléctricas competidoras) lo
cual es sumamente perjudicial para la seguridad del suministro.
20. Se descubrió que existía otra forma de exclusión vertical consistente en la
integración de la generación o de las importaciones con los intereses de suministro en
un mismo grupo. Esta forma de integración vertical reduce los incentivos para los
operadores tradicionales de comerciar en los mercados al por mayor y lleva a niveles
deficientes de liquidez en estos mercados. En especial, el predominio de contratos de
suministro a largo plazo entre los productores de gas y los importadores tradicionales
hace muy difícil que los nuevos participantes tengan acceso a gas en los mercados
ascendentes. Del mismo modo, las instalaciones de producción de electricidad están
en manos de algunos proveedores tradicionales o controladas indirectamente por
estos mediante acuerdos a largo plazo de compra de energía que dan a los operadores
tradicionales el control de los insumos esenciales en los mercados mayoristas. Los
bajos niveles de liquidez constituyen un obstáculo a la entrada tanto en el mercado
del gas como en el de la electricidad.
2.3. Integración del mercado
21. Las ventas transfronterizas no imponen actualmente ninguna presión
competitiva significativa. Los operadores tradicionales casi nunca se introducen
en otros mercados nacionales como competidores. La insuficiencia o
indisponibilidad de capacidad transfronteriza y los diversos modelos de
mercado obstaculizan la integración del mercado.
8
Este aspecto se presenta en un capítulo aparte del Anexo técnico del Informe final.
ES 6 ES
22. En el sector del gas, la capacidad disponible en los gasoductos de importación
transfronterizos es limitada. Los nuevos participantes no están en condiciones de
garantizar capacidad de transporte en las rutas clave ni capacidad de entrada en los
nuevos mercados. Muy a menudo, la capacidad primaria en los gasoductos de
tránsito está controlada por los operadores tradicionales merced a contratos
heredados anteriores a la liberalización que no están sujetos a las normas habituales
sobre acceso de terceros. Los operadores tradicionales tienen escasos incentivos para
expandir la capacidad con objeto de satisfacer las necesidades de los nuevos
operadores. Esto queda reforzado por unos mecanismos ineficaces de gestión de la
congestión, que hacen difícil garantizar en el mercado secundario incluso pequeños
volúmenes de capacidad a corto plazo interrumpible. En muchos casos, los nuevos
participantes ni siquiera han podido obtener una cantidad suficiente de capacidad en
los casos en que se ha registrado un crecimiento de la capacidad de los gasoductos de
tránsito. Por lo general las expansiones se han realizado a la medida de las
necesidades de las actividades de suministro de los operadores tradicionales.
23. En el sector de la electricidad, la integración se ve obstaculizada por la insuficiente
capacidad de interconexión y por la falta de incentivos adecuados para invertir en
capacidad adicional para eliminar los cuellos de botella existentes desde hace mucho
tiempo. Además, en ciertas fronteras, aún existen reservas de capacidad a largo plazo
anteriores a la liberalización a pesar de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las
Comunidades Europeas según la cual estas reservas no son compatibles con el
derecho comunitario, a menos que se hubieran notificado conforme a la Directiva
96/92/CE. La mejora del acceso a los interconectores existentes necesita unos
mejores métodos de gestión de la congestión. Sin embargo, a menudo la mejor
gestión de la capacidad no interesa a los operadores de red integrados verticalmente.
2.4. Transparencia
24. Falta una información fiable y oportuna sobre los mercados
25. Los usuarios de la red necesitan una mayor transparencia que vaya más allá de los
actuales requisitos mínimos fijados en la legislación de la UE. Son especialmente
importantes los datos relativos a la disponibilidad de la red, en particular para las
interconexiones de electricidad y gas y los gasoductos de tránsito. Los datos sobre el
funcionamiento de la capacidad de generación y sobre el almacenamiento de gas
también deben ser accesibles más ampliamente. Para la electricidad, concretamente,
se observó que las normas sobre supervisión y comportamiento adecuado en el
mercado difieren considerablemente entre los Estados miembros, pues hay poca
armonización de los requisitos de transparencia a nivel de la UE.
26. Para garantizar unas condiciones de competencia equitativas, es necesario que todos
los participantes en el mercado dispongan de la información en igualdad de
condiciones y a tiempo. Actualmente existe un desequilibrio informativo entre los
operadores tradicionales integrados verticalmente y sus competidores. Una mejor
transparencia reduciría los riesgos para los nuevos operadores del mercado con lo
que disminuirían los obstáculos a la entrada y mejoraría la confianza en los mercados
al por mayor y en las señales de precios. Evidentemente hay que garantizar que no
hay colusión alguna basada en la información publicada y, aunque la
confidencialidad comercial sea importante, no se debe permitir que menoscabe la
transparencia efectiva si se le da una interpretación demasiado amplia.
ES 7 ES
 2.5. Información sobre precios
27. Es necesario que la formación de precios sea más eficaz y transparente con
objeto de que los consumidores se beneficien plenamente de la apertura del
mercado. Muchos usuarios tienen una confianza limitada en los mecanismos de
formación de precios, mientras que las tarifas de suministro reguladas por
debajo de los precios de mercado disuaden a los nuevos participantes.
28. Los contratos de importación de gas utilizan índices de precios vinculados a los
derivados del petróleo (por ejemplo combustible ligero o combustible pesado) razón
por la cual los precios han reflejado la evolución de los mercados del petróleo. Esta
vinculación da lugar a unos precios al por mayor que no pueden reaccionar a los
cambios en la oferta y demanda de gas, lo cual es perjudicial para la seguridad del
suministro. No puede observarse en los contratos de importación a largo plazo una
tendencia clara hacia unos mecanisos más basados en los precios de mercado. Es
fundamental garantizar la liquidez para mejorar la confianza en la formación de
precios en los centros gasistas, lo que hará posible que la vinculación con el petróleo
se relaje.
29. La formación de los precios de la electricidad es compleja. Indudablemente, los
aumentos del precio de los combustibles primarios han influido en las últimas
evoluciones de los precios de la electricidad, especialmente en las instalaciones
marginales. Sin embargo esto no parece explicar por completo las recientes subidas
de precios. Del mismo modo, todavía no está del todo claro el efecto del sistema de
intercambio de emisiones de CO2 en la UE sobre los precios de la electricidad.
30. En varios Estados miembros, las tarifas reguladas han generado efectos nocivos para
el desarrollo de unos mercados competitivos, puesto que se han fijado en unos
niveles muy bajos en comparación con los precios de mercado y abarcan una gran
parte del mercado, lo que da lugar a una nueva regulación. Del mismo modo, en
varios Estados miembros se han examinado unas medidas especiales para reducir las
facturas de electricidad de las industrias grandes consumidoras de energía. Estas
medidas deben ser compatibles con las normas sobre competencia y sobre ayudas
estatales.
2.6. Mercados descendentes
31. La competencia al nivel minorista suele ser limitada. La duración de los
contratos al por menor para los clientes industriales y las empresas locales de
distribución puede tener un impacto sustancial en las oportunidades de que los
proveedores alternativos se incorporen con éxito al mercado.
32. El efecto acumulativo de las largas duraciones de los contratos, de los contratos de
duración indeterminada, de los contratos con cláusulas de renovación tácita y
períodos largos de vencimiento puede ser fundamental. El análisis muestra que los
clientes industriales están ligados a largo plazo con los proveedores obligatorios en
muy diferente medida según los Estados miembros.
33. Los consumidores desean que los proveedores no obligatorios realicen unas ofertas
más competitivas y lamentan la falta de ofertas de suministro paneuropeas. El
número de ofertas competitivas que reciben los consumidores es particularmente
ES 8 ES
insatisfactorio en algunos Estados miembros que se caracterizan por un alto nivel de
concentración.
34. Para el gas, las restricciones del modo en que los clientes pueden utilizar su gas, en
combinación con las prácticas restrictivas de los proveedores relativas a los puntos
de entrega, restringen la competencia e impiden que estos clientes se aprovechen de
las eficiencias. En el sector de la electricidad, ciertos contratos tipo contienen
restricciones que también pueden plantear problemas de competencia.
2.7. Mercados de equilibrado
35. Actualmente, los mercados de equilibrado suelen favorecer a los operadores
tradicionales y crean obstáculos para los recién llegados. El tamaño de las zonas
de equilibrio actuales es demasiado pequeño, lo que lleva a costes cada vez
mayores y protege el poder de mercado de los operadores tradicionales.
36. Para el gas, el pequeño tamaño de las zonas de equilibrio actuales aumenta la
complejidad y los costes del transporte de gas en Europa. Los costes aumentan
debido a las normas muy complejas y divergentes de cada zona y a la obligación de
reservar capacidad en cada punto fronterizo. Estos problemas se ven agudizados por
el factor temporal: cuanto menor es el período de compensación, mayor es el riesgo
de desequilibrio para el proveedor. Todos estos aspectos crean obstáculos
importantes para la incorporación al mercado de nuevos proveedores, obstáculos que
los operadores tradicionales integrados verticalmente tienen poco interés en eliminar.
Además, las tarifas de compensación, los costes de equilibrio y las multas no son
transparentes y a menudo las multas son injustificadas, lo que beneficia a los
operadores tradicionales. La desagregación efectiva es necesaria para crear unas
condiciones de competencia equitativas en los mercados de equilibrio y para reducir
los obstáculos a la entrada.
37. En el sector de la electricidad, los mercados en los que los operadores de sistemas de
transmisión tienen que adquirir la energía de equilibrio y de reserva están muy
concentrados, lo que da a los generadores un margen para ejercer su poder de
mercado. Esto puede dar lugar a obstáculos a la entrada para los nuevos proveedores
que se enfrentan a un considerable riesgo de encontrar altos precios de desequilibrio
y/o altas tarifas de red (en la medida en que los costes de equilibrio están incluidos
en los costes de la red). La concentración en los mercados de equilibrado podría
reducirse si se ampliase el tamaño geográfico de las áreas de control. La
armonización de los regímenes de equilibrado del mercado sería un paso importante
para aumentar el tamaño de dichas áreas, para mejorar la integración del mercado y
para simplificar el comercio. En algunos Estados miembros la relación estructural
entre los gestores de redes de transporte y la empresas de generación afiliadas a éstos
ofrece un incentivo para que el gestor de redes de transporte compre una capacidad
de reserva excesiva y/o pague precios elevados, lo que beneficia a su filial de
producción. Los resultados indican que el volumen de reservas de capacidad
compradas difiere sustancialmente según los gestores de redes de transporte.
2.8. Mercados del GNL
38. Los suministros de GNL amplían la base de proveedores ascendentes de Europa
y por lo tanto son importantes tanto para la seguridad del suministro como para
ES 9 ES
 la competencia entre proveedores ascendentes. Aún no se ha aprovechado la
posibilidad de que los suministros de GNL beneficien a los mercados en sentido
descendente menos concentrados.
39. Tradicionalmente el GNL ha sido importado por los operadores tradicionales
nacionales que también poseen terminales de GNL y esta situación ha impedido que
las importaciones de GNL incrementen la competencia en sentido descendente. Sin
embargo, las últimas tendencias apuntan a que llegará más capacidad a los nuevos
participantes y a los propios productores. Es probable que esto tenga un impacto
positivo que incentive la competencia en sentido descendente a menos que tales
efectos se vean frustrados por normas o conductas anticompetitivas. Se ha realizado
una fuerte inversión en terminales de GNL y se prevé que continúe en los próximos
años. Las inversiones en algunos terminales de GNL han gozado de exenciones de
obligaciones de acceso de terceros merced a una prueba efectuada por los
reguladores nacionales con la supervisión de la Comisión. Esta prueba intenta lograr
un equilibrio entre los incentivos previos a la inversión y la competencia una vez
efectuada la inversión. Aunque la experiencia es positiva en gran medida, todavía
cabe mejorar.
3. REMEDIOS
40. Para resolver el funcionamiento incorrecto del mercado puesto de manifiesto en la
investigación sectorial y mejorar perceptiblemente el alcance de la competencia, es
esencial aplicar soluciones tanto en términos de competencia como de regulación. La
aplicación de la normativa de competencia puede contribuir de forma significativa,
aunque no suficiente, a abrir los mercados y resolver todas las deficiencias
descubiertas por la investigación del sector: por lo tanto, también son necesarias
diversas medidas reguladoras.
3.1. Aplicación de la normativa de competencia
41. La utilización plena y combinada de los poderes de la Comisión en virtud de las
normas en materia de antitrust (artículos 81, 82 y 86 CE), de operaciones de
concentración (Reglamento 139/2004)9 y de control de las ayudas estatales
(artículos 87 y 88 CE) es necesaria para obtener el máximo impacto de la acción de
la Comisión en aplicación del derecho de competencia. La Comisión persigue con
denuedo las infracciones del derecho comunitario de competencia (antitrust) allí
donde lo exige el interés comunitario, en estrecha colaboración con las autoridades
nacionales de competencia.
3.1.1. Concentración del mercado
42. La concentración del mercado resulta ser una traba importante para el éxito del
proceso de liberalización. El poder de mercado de los monopolios existentes antes
de la liberalización se mantiene intacto. Esto hace que sea esencial la acción
comunitaria conforme al reglamento sobre operaciones de concentración a fin de
garantizar que la estructura competitiva de los mercados de referencia (que
actualmente son como mucho de alcance nacional) no se deteriore más. En recientes
9
Reglamento (CE) n° 139/2004 del Consejo, de 20 de enero de 2005.
ES 10
asuntos de concentraciones se han aplicado remedios tales como desinversiones y
cesiones de contratos y/o de gas. Además, ha cobrado importancia el aspecto de la
repercusión de los contratos ascendentes a largo plazo sobre la concentración en
sentido descendente.
43. Los programas de cesión de energía (es decir, las subastas en «centrales eléctricas
virtuales» y los programas de cesión de gas) son un medio para desarrollar la
liquidez de mercado y aumentar las oportunidades de entrada. Constituyen remedios
adecuados para las preocupaciones de competencia no sólo en el campo de las
operaciones de concentración sino también con arreglo a las normas antitrust. Para
ser plenamente eficaces deben estar bien concebidas y ser de gran alcance. Las
autoridades de competencia y reguladoras a nivel nacional (por ejemplo en España,
Francia, Austria, Alemania) y la Comisión Europea (en casos de concentraciones)
han obtenido gracias a estos programas una experiencia sustancial que ha hecho
posible que las autoridades eviten errores y garanticen su eficacia. Para el gas, estos
programas de cesión tienen la ventaja adicional de que es probable que aumenten la
liquidez de los centros gasistas lo que contribuye a la introducción de señales de
precios no afectadas por el vínculo de precios entre el gas y el petróleo.
44. En ciertas circunstancias la legislación antitrust aplicable también permite aplicar
medidas estructurales de mayor alcance como remedio para las infracciones de las
normas de competencia. Esto ocurre cuando los remedios que se refieren a la
conducta sean menos eficaces para poner fin a la infracción, cuando exista un riesgo
sustancial de que la infracción dure o se repita derivado de la propia estructura de la
empresa, o cuando los remedios referentes a la conducta sean más gravosos10.
3.1.2. Exclusión vertical
45. Siempre que la integración vertical del suministro y la generación, y la
infraestructura de las empresas y la insuficiente desagregación faciliten las
infracciones de competencia, es necesario aplicar con toda su fuerza los poderes
de la Comisión para impedir abusos futuros.
46. La investigación sectorial también ha confirmado que la vinculación vertical de los
mercados debida a los ratos descendentes a largo plazo constituye una prioridad al
examinar los asuntos conforme a la ley de competencia y para proporcionar
orientación cuando sea necesario. Cuando tales contratos concluidos por empresas
dominantes dan lugar a una exclusión del mercado pueden constituir una infracción
del artículo 81 u 82 CE a menos que existan unas eficiencias que actúen como
contrapeso y beneficien a los consumidores11. Del mismo modo, los acuerdos de
compra de energía en el sector de la electricidad pueden tener efectos de exclusión.
47. Además, la concentración de los contratos de importación de gas en manos de unos
pocos operadores tradicionales es una de las razones principales por las que no
despega la competencia en el nivel comercial siguiente. Aunque esto no cuestiona en
10
Véase el artículo 7, apartado 1, y el considerando 12 del Reglamento 1/2003.
11
En el análisis de los contratos a largo plazo, se tienen en cuenta las inversiones a fondo perdido, en caso
de que las partes hayan hecho alguna; véanse las Directrices de la Comisión relativas a la aplicación del
artículo 81, apartado 3, del Tratado (DO C 101 de 27.4.2004, p. 97, punto 44).
ES ES 11 ES
 sí mismo los contratos ascendentes existentes y futuros, es necesario prestar atención
a sus efectos en los mercados descendentes.
3.1.3. Integración del mercado
48. La exclusión puede también producirse en otros niveles de la cadena de valor,
sobre todo por lo que se refiere al acceso a la infraestructura (redes de
transmisión y distribución y/o instalaciones de almacenamiento),
particularmente cuando afecta al acceso transfronterizo, lo que impide la
integración del mercado. Dicho acceso puede quedar bloqueado por contratos a
largo plazo de transmisión y debido al riesgo asociado de acumulación de capacidad.
La acción en este ámbito debería incluir un análisis de los efectos desde el punto de
vista de la competencia de los contratos a largo plazo anteriores a la liberalización y
de la compatibilidad de tales contratos con las normas de competencia.
49. Además, la falta de inversión o su aplazamiento por parte de las empresas de
transporte que tienen empresas de suministro integradas verticalmente son otras
fuentes graves de preocupación. Cabe recordar que una autoridad nacional de
competencia descubrió que un operador de red integrado verticalmente detuvo
deliberadamente un proyecto de inversión para beneficiar a su empresa de suministro
privando a los competidores de tener acceso a más capacidad12.
50. La división del mercado sigue siendo uno de los obstáculos más importantes para
la integración del mercado. La lucha contra la colusión entre operadores tradicionales
sigue siendo una prioridad de las medidas de aplicación en materia de antitrust y
responde a la prioridad general de la Comisión de luchar contra los intentos de las
empresas de coordinarse en lugar de competir.
3.2. Aspectos estructurales y marco regulador procompetitivo
51. Los resultados de la investigación del sector permitirán que la Comisión centre su
acción de aplicación en los aspectos más preocupantes puestos de manifiesto en el
informe. También contribuyen a que la Comisión identifique más fácilmente los
remedios eficaces que permiten resolver los problemas de competencia identificados
en asuntos concretos.
52. Sin embargo, los aspectos claves relativos a la estructura del mercado y al marco
regulador tendrán que examinarse en paralelo, para poner remedio al
funcionamiento incorrecto de los mercados demostrado en la investigación.
La investigación sectorial ha identificado las siguientes principales deficiencias
fundamentales de la estructura competitiva de los mercados actuales de la
electricidad y el gas:
– Conflictos de interés estructurales: un conflicto sistémico de interés
causado por la insuficiente desagregación de redes de las partes del sector
sujetas a la competencia;
12
La autoridad italiana de competencia ha tomado recientemente medidas contra la táctica de un operador
tradicional consistente en aplazar la expansión de un importante gasoducto de importación.
ES 12
– Vacíos del marco regulador; un vacío regulador persistente particularmente
en lo que respecta a aspectos transfronterizos. Los sistemas reguladores
vigentes tienen cabos sueltos que no se atan
– Falta crónica de liquidez, tanto en el mercado mayorista de la electricidad
como en el del gas: nuestros mercados carecen de dinamismo y se mantiene el
poder de mercado de los monopolios anteriores a la liberalización;
– Falta general de transparencia en las operaciones de mercado en el sector.
En su comunicación sobre las "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la
electricidad" la Comisión examina las distintas posibilidades de acción reguladora a
nivel de la CE. Los resultados de la investigación del sector y las deficiencias
resultantes antes señaladas apoyan y confirman el análisis presentado por la
Comisión en dicha Comunicación.
3.2.1. Desagregación
53. La investigación del sector confirma la conclusión de que es esencial resolver el
conflicto sistémico de interés inherente a la integración vertical de las
actividades del suministro y de red, que ha dado lugar a una falta de inversión en
infraestructura y a una discriminación. Es crucial garantizar que los propietarios y/o
los operadores de red no tengan incentivos falseados por los intereses de sus
empresas de suministro. Esto es particularmente importante en un momento en que
Europa necesita inversiones muy importantes para garantizar la seguridad del
suministro y crear mercados integrados y competitivos.
54. Para lograrlo, será necesario reforzar con decisión el actual nivel inadecuado de
desagregación. Esto, a su vez, facilitaría también la cooperación entre los operadores
de red.
55. Las pruebas de índole económica demuestran que la plena desagregación de la
propiedad es el modo más eficaz de garantizar la posibilidad de elección de los
usuarios de la energía y de fomentar la inversión. Ello se debe a que las empresas de
red separadas no se ven influidas por los intereses de suministro y generación a la
hora de decidirse a invertir. También evita una regulación excesivamente detallada y
compleja y unas cargas administrativas desproporcionadas. El sistema de operadores
independientes mejoraría la situación actual pero exigiría una regulación más
detallada, más rígida y más costosa y sería menos eficaz a la hora de resolver los
desincentivos a la inversión en redes.
56. Además, la consulta pública no ha revelado ningún efecto de sinergia importante
relacionado con la integración vertical. En efecto, cuando se ha procedido a la
desagregación de la propiedad, la experiencia muestra que tanto la actividad de red
como la de (producción y) suministro continúan prosperando tras la separación.
3.2.2. Marco regulador
57. Si bien la desagregación de la propiedad contribuiría sustancialmente a reducir los
problemas de poder de mercado y de falta de liquidez, está claro que también se
necesitarán otras medidas. Tal como queda confirmado en la investigación del sector,
Europa necesita reforzar sustancialmente los poderes de los reguladores y una
ES ES 13 ES
 mayor coordinación a escala europea. Esto concuerda con los resultados
presentados por la Comisión en su Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado
interior del gas y la electricidad". Solamente un marco regulador reforzado puede
proporcionar el marco transparente, estable y no discriminatorio que el sector
necesita para que la competencia se desarrolle y para que se realicen las inversiones
futuras.
58. Los principales elementos de este marco reforzado deberían ser:
– mayores poderes para los reguladores nacionales independientes de la energía,
– coordinación reforzada entre los reguladores nacionales de la energía,
– cooperación reforzada entre los gestores de redes de transporte, y
– incremento considerable de la coherencia de la regulación en temas
transfronterizos.
59. La coordinación reforzada entre los reguladores nacionales de la energía, con
una supervisión mayor de la Comunidad que vele por los intereses del mercado
interior, particularmente por lo que se refiere a los problemas y aspectos
transfronterizos más críticos para la entrada en el mercado, será necesaria para
superar el actual vacío regulador transfronterizo que no puede solucionarse con la
simple aplicación de las normas de competencia. Las opciones de medidas
reguladoras se examinan en la Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado
interior del gas y la electricidad".
3.2.3. Falta crónica de liquidez
60. Unas normas más estrictas sobre desagregación y en especial un mejor marco
regulador de los aspectos transfronterizos deben, a medio plazo, reducir
sustancialmente los problemas de poder de mercado y de falta de liquidez de forma
duradera, introduciendo suministros adicionales en los mercados nacionales
concentrados. Sin embargo, subsisten graves problemas a corto plazo por lo que
se refiere a la falta de liquidez suficiente y al poder de mercado sostenido en los
mercados al por mayor, que dan lugar a unos precios más elevados en los mercados
al por menor justo en vísperas de la liberalización completa que debe realizarse el 1
de julio de 2007.
61. Como ya se indicó antes, la aplicación del derecho de competencia será una
herramienta importante para hacer frente a cualquier conducta anticompetitiva en
este aspecto, aunque puede que no sea suficiente. Como los niveles de concentración
en los mercados del gas y la electricidad han seguido siendo altos, reflejando a
menudo los monopolios anteriores a la liberalización, los reguladores nacionales de
la energía deberían analizar las condiciones imperantes en sus respectivos mercados
en cooperación con las autoridades de competencia y presentar las propuestas
apropiadas. Entre las medidas tomadas en el pasado por varios Estados miembros
figuran los programas de cesión, (es decir, las subastas en «centrales eléctricas
virtuales» y los programas de cesión de gas).
62. También cabe recordar que ciertos Estados miembros han introducido en su derecho
nacional unos límites a la propiedad de la producción eléctrica y al control de
ES 14
contratos ascendentes de gas a largo plazo (importaciones y producción nacional),
como medida eficaz para reducir rápidamente el poder de mercado. Para la
electricidad, unas medidas de esta índole podrían consistir en desinversiones o
permutas de activos de centrales eléctricas a escala europea. Para el gas, podrían
consistir en cesiones de contratos, permutas de contratos y/o desinversiones de
plantas nacionales de producción, tal como se han aplicado en casos recientes de
operación de concentración. Si se ampliasen las zonas de los pequeños gestores de
redes de transporte y se implantasen procedimientos de licitación más abiertos y
flexibles para equilibrar la energía se podrían reducir los elevados niveles actuales de
concentración de los mercados de equilibrado y eliminar los obstáculos a la entrada,
lo que a su vez produciría un efecto positivo en los mercados al por mayor.
63. Además, la investigación sectorial ha destacado la importancia de aumentar la
posibilidad de entrada en el mercado mediante la inversión en nueva infraestructura
de importación y producción de gas así como mediante la aplicación estricta de las
disposiciones por las cuales o se utilizan la infraestructura y las instalaciones de
producción adecuadas o sino se pierden ("use it or lose it").
3.2.4. Falta de transparencia de las operaciones de mercado
64. Se admite de forma general que el acceso a la información de mercado debe
mejorar. Toda la información de mercado relevante debería publicarse a tiempo
permanentemente. Cualquier excepción debería limitarse muy estrictamente a lo
necesario para reducir el riesgo de colusión. Las directrices y la supervisión y
eventual adaptación de la regulación vigente deberían servir en último término para
aumentar la transparencia en el sector del gas y de la electricidad. Las propuestas
previstas se resumen en la Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior
del gas y la electricidad".
3.2.5. Otros aspectos importantes
65. Además de estas cuatro áreas fundamentales, hay que tener en cuenta otros aspectos
relacionados con un entorno de mercado procompetitivo. La Comunicación de la
Comisión sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad" presenta
sugerencias específicas de acción reguladora a nivel de la CE referentes a estos
aspectos.
66. Las tarifas minoristas reguladas pueden producir importantes efectos de
falseamiento y en ciertos casos impedir la creación de mercados liberalizados. Es de
importancia crucial evaluar el impacto sobre el desarrollo de la competencia de las
tarifas de suministro reguladas que aún subsisten y eliminar los falseamientos13.
67. Para lograr que el acceso a las nuevas infraestructuras no se vea restringido
indebidamente, la Comisión debería continuar velando por que las exenciones de las
disposiciones de acceso no perjudiquen el desarrollo de la competencia. Es
importante seguir examinando los proyectos uno por uno aplicando estrictamente los
principios de competencia que permiten logran un equilibrio adecuado entre los
13
En el segmento del mercado doméstico, es necesario lograr un equilibrio adecuado entre la competencia
y las obligaciones universales de servicio público.
ES ES 15 ES
 incentivos a la inversión a priori y la competencia a posteriori, y simplificar los
procedimientos de exención.
68. Para llegar a una red europea única desde la perspectiva del usuario de la red, es
necesario armonizar convenientemente el patrón de mercado, especialmente en lo
que respecta a los métodos que surten un efecto en el comercio transfronterizo.
Hay que tomar medidas allí donde la capacidad actual sea insuficiente para
desarrollar la capacidad de interconexión como condición necesaria para el desarrollo
de la competencia y la integración de los mercados. Estos objetivos solamente
pueden lograrse mediante una cooperación cada vez mayor entre los reguladores
nacionales que induzca a incrementar la cooperación entre los gestores de redes de
transporte por encima de las fronteras nacionales en un marco procedimental bien
definido.
corroboran las conclusiones de la Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado
interior del gas y la electricidad", presentada por la Comisión como secuela del Libro
Verde y en el camino de la preparación de la Revisión estratégica del sector de la
energía de la UE. Estas iniciativas exponen las intenciones de la Comisión en cuanto
a las propuestas de reforma de la regulación, destinadas a lograr un mercado interior
de la energía que contribuya a la continuidad, competitividad y seguridad del
suministro. Además, y paralelamente, el Informe final también presenta conclusiones
en cuanto a las medidas de aplicación del derecho de competencia de la CE. Ambos
documentos pretenden identificar y suprimir los obstáculos a la creación de un
mercado único europeo de la energía, en el que los consumidores se beneficien
plenamente de la apertura de los mercados a la competencia.

69. Para introducir más capacidad de transporte de gas en el mercado, será

importante aclarar la posición legal de los contratos a largo plazo de transmisión de
gas anteriores a la liberalización conforme a la segunda Directiva del gas14, que ya
están sujetos a normas estrictas de aplicación del principio "use it or lose it" y a la
normativa del derecho de competencia.

70. Se necesitan nuevos cambios en el método de asignación de la capacidad de

interconexión limitada. Para la electricidad se deberían fomentar lo más posible las
subastas implícitas con un día de antelación o las medidas equivalentes para velar por
la máxima utilización posible de los interconectores. Los gestores de redes de
transporte también deberían tener incentivos para poner a disposición del mercado la
máxima cantidad posible de capacidad transfronteriza15.

71. Para ofrecer unas garantías suficientes de acceso efectivo, debe revisarse el acceso
de terceros a las instalaciones de almacenamiento de gas a fin de lograr un
equilibrio adecuado entre la necesidad de acceso efectivo y la de mantener los
incentivos para desarrollar nuevas instalaciones de almacenamiento.

72. Un sistema de supervisión del comercio en los mercados mayoristas (por

ejemplo las bolsas de energía) aumentaría la confianza en el mercado de los
participantes en él y limitaría el riesgo de manipulación del mismo. Los reguladores
deberían estar autorizados para recopilar e intercambiar la información conveniente a
este respecto. Deberían estar facultados para recomendar medidas de aplicación de la
normativa o para aplicarla ellos mismos.

4. CONCLUSIÓN

73. La investigación del sector ha puesto de manifiesto varias deficiencias graves que
impiden que los usuarios y los consumidores europeos de energía se beneficien
plenamente del proceso de liberalización. Los resultados de la investigación

14
Directiva 2003/55/CE, de 26 de junio de 2003, sobre normas comunes para el mercado interior del gas
natural por la que se deroga la primera Directiva del gas.
15
Por ejemplo la escasa capacidad que los gestores de redes de transporte guardan en reserva para
situaciones de urgencia puede ofertarse en el mercado como capacidad interrumpible y puede
readquirirse cuando sea necesario, utilizando por ejemplo los ingresos procedentes de la congestión
transfronteriza.

ES 16 ES ES 17 ES