Running Head: GROUPTHINK THEORY

“Just another Face in the Crowd”

An Analysis of Groupthink Theory and its Societal Presence

Meghan Dahnke

Valley City State University

7/22/10
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“When we all think alike, then no one is thinking.”- Walter Lippman. In other words, if

everyone was to think the same way, then no one is thinking for themselves. Instead of asserting

and owning one’s opinion, at times it can be simpler to conform to those around us; a similar

concept to the term groupthink. Groupthink is a “type of thinking that occurs when a group

strives to minimize conflict, maximize cohesiveness, and reach a consensus without critically

testing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas” (Beebe & Masterson, 2009, p.168). If a group

experienced no conflict, it would have little to discuss. The presence of conflict provides the

opportunity for a group to test and challenge ideas. Critical factors otherwise absent when a

group shares the same cognition. Understanding groupthink theory can prove a beneficial

investment. As this theory concerns communication rules that can influence outcomes such as

satisfaction with group processes, an important principle that may alleviate poor decisions which

often result from groupthink. The present paper will examine Groupthink Theory and establish

practical application.

Groupthink.

For nearly 40 years, sociologist Irving Janis’ (1972) groupthink model has provided

theoretical explanation as for illusions of agreement that exist when a group reaches decisions

too quickly. Groupthink theory is best defined as, “a process by which a small group of decision

makers subjected to intense stress may become more concerned with achieving concurrence

among their members than in arriving at carefully considered decisions” (Hensley, & Griffin,

1986, p.497). Janis who first coined the term groupthink in his book: Victims of Group think

(1972), revealed groupthinks presence in national decision making events. For example: the US

government’s failure to foresee the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) or the Bay of Pigs
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fiasco (1961) and the overthrowing of Fidel Castro’s Cuban government. The nature of these

events highlighted a cohesive pattern in which group decision making lead to poor quality

outcome. Today, groupthink is still associated with similar events of crisis. Fuller and Aldag

(1998) argued that the concept of groupthink has become almost synonymous with bad group

decisions (p.163). Outcomes that have resulted in such events like Pearl Harbor (1941) and Bay

of Pigs (1961) illuminate the frequency in which such decisions appear to fit the group think

model.

Principles of theory.

Groupthink as conceptualized by Janis is best described in a five step model:

“antecedents of groupthink, concurrence seeking, and symptom’s of groupthink, decision-

making defects, and poor decision outcomes” (Henningson, Henningson, Eden, & Cruz, 2006,

p.38-39). The first step of the model- antecedents of groupthink, outlines a number of necessary

conditions including, “powerful cohesiveness, structural defects within the group, lack of

leadership and procedural norms within the group, and member homogeneity” (p.39).

Cohesiveness is recognized as the most threatening antecedent challenge. The second step-

concurrence seeking best describes when a group openly agrees upon a unanimous position even

if in the event a group member privately disagrees with such decision. The third step- symptoms

of groupthink, emerges in the decision making process once a group demonstrates concurrence

seeking behavior. The symptoms detail that group members will exhibit, “an illusion of

invulnerability, collective efforts to rationalize, an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent

morality, stereotyped views of rivals and enemies, direct pressure on members to contradict

group stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, self censorship deviations from apparent group

consensus, and a share illusion of unanimity” (Johnson & Weaver II, 1992, p.99). Symptoms of
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groupthink produce extreme pressure among group members to favor majority decisions, falsely

supporting the impression that group conclusions can successfully result. Ultimately this will

encourage the group to create and reach decision making defects. The fourth step- decision

making defects, maintains that several flaws in decision making occur in groupthink groups:

“incomplete survey of alternatives, incomplete survey of objectives, failure to examine risks

associated with the preferred choice, poor information search, selective bias in processing

information, failure to reappraise alternatives, and failure to provide contingency plans”

(Henningson, Henningson, Eden, & Cruz, 2006, p. 40). Defects of groupthink work to decrease

the quality of decision making, and will ultimately hinder a group’s ability to conclude

thoughtful and careful decisions. Lastly, the fifth step- poor decision outcomes, is best described

as the final piece to the groupthink formula. The outcome of this stage arrives, “when the chain

of events from the antecedents of groupthink through the decision-making defects leads to bad

group decisions” (p.40). Janis’ groupthink model is reason for cause as to how groups are more

likely to conclude poor decisions rather than higher quality ones. The model also illustrates the

pressures for uniformity and loyalty that can build up within groups. In summary, the model

confirms three critical assumptions that guide the groupthink theory: “conditions in groups

promote high cohesiveness, group problem solving is a primarily unified process, groups and

group decision making are frequently complex” (West & Turner, 2010, p.242).

Although groups can easily fall victim to the manipulative nature of groupthink, it can be

just as easy of task to avoid groupthink in the first place. How can group members learn to

prevent groupthink? Miranda (1994) argues the following suggestions can help a group engage

in vigilant decision making: appoint a member the role of devil’s advocate, encourage everyone

to be a critical evaluator, do not state or confirm preferences up front, organize and utilize
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independent groups, divide into subgroups, share external pressures, propose that members voice

concerns rather than restrain, and lastly be proactive in monitoring group ventures (p.115).

Critique of theory.

Though the scientific approach of groupthink theory has been invoked to explain faulty

decision making, it has received wide scrutiny. Researchers (Aldag & Fuller 1993; Bernthal &

Isko, 1993; Park, 1990; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve 1992) suggest that there is a need

for extensive revision to the theoretical framework of groupthink theory as there is a lack of

empirical support for the model. Street (1997) states that there exist a couple of theoretical

considerations related to groupthink: group cohesion variable, nature of groupthink, and

additional variables. Street’s (1997) study presents the following:

Janis was not the first to view cohesion as strong interpersonal attraction among group

members. Researchers have long recognized the central role Janis attributed to cohesion,

and consistently maintain high level of group cohesion was necessary, but not sufficient,

condition for the development of groupthink. Although he was empathetic about the

importance of cohesion in the model he was not specific as to which conception (uni- vs.

multidimensional) is the most important to the development of groupthink (p.77).

The above argument claims that Janis’s use of cohesion is far too ambiguous for the

groupthink theory. t’ Hart agrees and states that, “Janis appears to have adopted the dominant

view of literature at that time- that is that group cohesion is unidimensional” (p.247).The

problem underlying the term cohesion has also proven difficult for researchers (Bernthal & Isko,

1993; and Park 1990) to replicate experimental studies. Park (1990) argues that given the

ambiguous definition of cohesion it should not be surprising and that its understanding will

confuse and implicate future research (p.235).

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Not only has Janis’s interpretation of cohesiveness received attention so has the nature of

groupthink. There is some question as to whether the groupthink model is meant for strong or

weak interpretation, “Janis clearly intended a strong interpretation, although some scholars, in

response to the lack of empirical support for the model, have argued that a less restrictive

explication is needed” (Street, 1997, p.90). This is similar to Bernthal & Isko (1993), who state

that, “scholars need to analyze the multiple antecedent variables in groupthink. Research directed

towards such can shed light upon the nature of the variables to determine the relevant perspective

in which to view the groupthink model” (p.83).

Personal assessment of theory.

A lot of interpretation can be taken into account from this theory. From researching the

ins and outs for this paper I came to discover that groupthink has not received recent attention

within the past decade. Searching for scholarly peer reviewed journals lead me to older but

informative material utilized in this paper. I was most surprised by the lack of modern sources. I

anticipated before beginning this paper, that I would find material closer to present date. Thus,

this leads to my first suggestion, and that is that current research re-examine the evolution of

groupthink and its accuracy to applicable situations. My assessment of the groupthink theory is it

does prove useful. The implication of the concept is and will be of great value to various entities

involving decision making groups . I enjoyed Park’s (1990) opinion that, “most people who

study groupthink take the theory for granted and use the theory either to warn readers of

groupthink’s detrimental effects or to claim ways of preventing its occurrence. It is indeed

important to become wary of and prevent groupthink” (p.237). I found this to be a similar

understanding between all authors I encountered in research purposes and myself.

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Criticism of this theory heavily focused on the interpretation of terminology. I found this

frustrating and over examined at times. The main criticism in regards to groupthink was that it

was ambiguous in nature. However, when overlooking this material it was complex, repetitive,

and limited in scope. It would have been practical to have found material that did not constitute

the problems above.

Societal presence.

A cinematic example of groupthink is seen in Sidney Lumet’s directorial of “12 Angry

Men.” There were many instances in which the groupthink phenomenon was illustrated. The

most recognized example is in the beginning of the film in which the 12 jury men voted a

majority verdict- one in which a young Spanish-American slum would be convicted of

murdering his father. Due to a weak alibi and witnesses to the case, the young man appears to be

guilty when in actuality he is not. There existed extreme pressure for the jurors to conform a

guilty verdict, which ultimately would sentence the defendant to death. Until one of the jurors,

Henry Fonda’s character, decided to oppress the majority opinion by asking his fellow jurors to

look at the facts of the case. However, the jurors chose to ignore Fonda’s request as they were

fixed in discussions unrelated to the case but rather their busy lives and schedules. One of the

facts that supported the majority opinion was the alibi; a knife the young man claimed to have

lost is located at the scene of his father’s murder. The majority of the jurors felt the evidence

presented by the prosecution was indisputable. For them to examine the facts, as Fonda wanted,

would serve a misuse of time. N one but Fonda desired to challenge the moral correctness of the

group’s decision.

A real-life example of groupthink transpired in the disaster of NASA’s 1986 space shuttle

Challenger. The shuttle was set for launch January 22, 1986. A series of problems arose pushing
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back the launch date. As an engineer had expressed concerns about the booster rockets o-rings- a

critical component to the success of the launch. Internal calls were made within NASA to

address the problem, but an eager decision to go ahead with the mission was chosen rather than

prolonging the launch date due to mechanical repairs. On January 28, 1986, NASA released the

shuttle and within a matter of seconds the o-ring failed at liftoff, causing the space shuttle to

destroy itself and collapse above the Atlantic Ocean. Killing seven astronauts and questioning

the effectiveness of the NASA program. This example illustrated the impact groupthink. First,

due to the original delays, NASA ignored the engineer’s warnings that resisted the group’s goal.

NASA also failed to re-evaluate the threats in their decision by rejecting the seriousness the

situation posed; judgment was clouded by feelings of invulnerability since NASA maintained a

perfect record. Another factor in which groupthink shaped NASA was in part the pressure

exerted from Congress; large funding had been made available to NASA given the national

attention on the Teacher in Space program.

A more recent real-life example of groupthink can be seen in British Petroleum’s (BP)

Gulf Oil Disaster. Similar to Challenger, BP CEO executive- Tony Hayward and officials

overlooked warning signs that might have hinted peril ahead. On April 29, 2010, an oil rig

located in the offshore Gulf of Mexico, exploded with hundreds of millions of gallons spilled. A

cement plug set was cited for the error. The disaster has been called the worst offshore oil spill in

U.S. History, and currently lingers large national frustration. On July 15, 2010 a cap was

successfully placed on the gushing oil wellhead. The presence of groupthink impacted this event

and can be explained in a couple ways. The first is the lack of oversight is a key reason. A BP

operator had reported that one of the crew men carried a handful of rubber material to a superior

concerned that his findings showed the well had been damaged. The operator was told that the
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rubber material was not due damage in a seal but rather material that comes up all the time

around the rig. Additionally, several other platform workers and supervisor addressed similar

concerns regarding the well. With an already spotty safety record and a history of blasts the

disaster showed the recklessness and poor planning on behalf of the company. Parallel to the

Challenger, the notion of invulnerability was illustrated by BP

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References

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Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill Companies.

Bernthal, P. R., & Insko, C. A. (1993). Cohesiveness without groupthink: the interactive effects

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doi:10.1177/1059601193181005

Henningsen, D., Henningsen, M., Eden, J., & Cruz, M. (2006). Examining the symptoms of

groupthink and retrospective sensemaking. Small Group Research, 37(1), 36-64.

doi:10.1177/1046496405281772.

Johnson, S., & Weaver II, R. (1992). Groupthink and the classroom: Changing familiar patterns

to encourage critical thought. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 19(2), 99. Retrieved

from Academic Search Premier database.

Miranda, S. (1994). Avoidance of groupthink. Small Group Research, 25(1), 105. Retrieved

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Park, W. W. (1990). A review of research on groupthink. Journal of Behavioral Decision

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t’ Hart, P. (1991). Irving L. Janis’ victims of groupthink. Journal of Political Psychology, 12(2),

247-278. Retrieved from JSTOR database.

West, R, & Turner, L. (2010). Introduction Communication Theory: Analysis and application.

New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Companies.

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