Professional Documents
Culture Documents
6 August 2004
David A. Rosenberg
First Vice President
The Market Economist
Chief North American Economist
(1) 212 449-4937 Weekly Guidebook for the Global Investor
United States
200
-200
-400
01 02 03 04
Merrill Lynch does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware
that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
1
Committee members are Dave Rosenberg, Chief North American Economist, Kathleen Bostjancic,
Senior Economist, Jim Caron, Head Cross Rate Strategy and Alex Patelis, Head G10 FX Strategy.
Real GDP (annualized) 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 4.2* 3.0*
Core CPI (Year/Year) 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.9* 1.9*
Budget Balance ($ Bil. **) -450 -385
Current Account ($ Bil.**) -592 -595
Source: Merrill Lynch
* Annual Average % Change **Cumulative Balance on a Fiscal Year Basis ***Cumulative Balance on a Annual Basis
Focusing on the Fed funds rate forecast, it now looks very clear after Fed
Chairman Greenspan's mid-year Congressional testimony two weeks ago that
policymakers believe that the current 'soft patch' in the economy is transitory and
that the Fed will be looking through weak economic news. However, they will be
treating any above-expected core inflation data with concern and likely a more
We forecast Fed funds to be 2% aggressive tightening posture. While the base case is that the Fed moves in a
by year-end and peaking at 'measured' fashion, which is still its objective, we now see three more rate hikes
2.5% in 1Q05. this year (August 10th, September 21st and November 10th) which brings the
funds rate to 2% by year-end. And we see another 50 basis points of tightening
early next year bringing the funds rate to 2.5%, which we view as being a neutral
rate consistent with meeting the Fed's dual goals of nurturing a stable price
environment and achieving full employment.
We believe that with profit growth slowing and the pace of job creation likely to
follow suit with the typical 3-6 month lag, higher market rates, signals from the
equity market, and fiscal drag to replace fiscal stimulus through 2005, the
Fiscal drag to replace fiscal economy is unlikely to overheat by growing above potential. Against that
stimulus in 2005… Inflation backdrop, any inflation outbreak will probably prove short-lived. We were
particularly encouraged by the latest set of inflation data for June — PPI down
expected to remain subdued. 0.3%, core import prices flat, core CPI only up 0.1% and average hourly earnings
also rising just 0.1% on the month and a non-inflationary 2.0% year-on-year. The
money supply data have also been quite tame, with the year-to-year pace in M2
now at 3.6%, so there is no evidence of excessive monetary creation despite the
current low funds rate.
A natural starting point in the ‘normalization’ process that the Fed is embarking on
is to first estimate an ‘equilibrium’ level for the Federal funds target. Such a level
would be consistent with a variance of the so-called ‘Taylor rule,’ which
Estimating equilibrium Fed essentially tries to quantify the Fed’s dual employment and inflation mandate in an
funds rate and using the easy-to-understand framework. In the rule we assume potential GDP growth of
3.5%, which is consistent with the Fed’s recent central tendency forecasts, the
‘Taylor Rule’ forms the basis of Fed’s implicit inflation target of 2% and an equilibrium real interest rate of 1.0%.
our fundamental approach. The latter assumption is probably the most controversial; we feel it is
appropriately low given the low starting point of inflation and the high levels of
debt that currently characterize the U.S. economy.
Taken these figures as given, we create a matrix of the level of Fed funds for
various real growth and inflation forecasts (see Table 2 on the next page). The
current forecasts of the U.S. economics group (real GDP growth of 2.9% Q4/Q4
and core CPI inflation of 1.9%) for 2005 imply a nominal Federal funds rate of
around 2.5%, which is at the lower end of our 2.5% - 3.0% forecast for the neutral
Fed funds rate.
We believe the Fed only reaches the lower-end of the neutral Fed funds forecast
range since the economy will still have a negative output gap by the end of 2005
according to our GDP forecast, an indication of excess capacity. In terms of the
Fed to only reach the lower end timing, with the Fed raising rates at a ‘measured’ pace, and GDP growth likely to
of our estimated ‘neutral’ Fed decelerate to a 2.5% annualized rate by Q1 2005 on our forecasts, it is reasonable
funds level at 2.5%. to expect the peak in the Federal funds rate to be around 2.5% by that date. We
feel strongly that it is necessary to overlay a cyclical to the structural component
of our Fed funds forecast. A cyclical downturn limits the degree of the
‘normalization’ process.
On a near-term basis, economic growth will probably remain below potential in
our view — hence our belief that the Fed can still be ‘measured’ in raising interest
rates. That said, we do believe that the risk is for a more hawkish Fed near-term,
which will establish a floor under the yield curve and raise the chances that market
Economic growth is expected to rates drift to the high end of the recent 4.35%-4.90% range on the 10-year
remain below potential over the Treasury. Investor sentiment is already at bearish extremes so we would not be
next several quarters. surprised to see investors use such a move as a buying opportunity in the absence
of any renewed inflation scares. If we prove correct on our monetary policy call
that the Fed intends to move to so-called neutrality by establishing a modest
positive inflation premium to the funds rate, curve dynamics suggest that 4% on
the 10-year could be re-tested by late 2005. A full description of the methodology
and analyses behind our yield curve forecasts, please see the Interest Rate Outlook
published on August 5.
Risks to the forecast, beyond inflation surprises, would involve exogenous events
that could trigger a destabilizing decline in the dollar — such as a Chinese
revaluation or a Bank of Japan policy tightening which could affect foreign
demand for Treasuries. We are well aware of these risks, but in our view the
consumer will be soft enough to trigger a slowdown in import demand in the
coming quarters and the J-curve effect of years of dollar weakness has begun to be
Sharp dollar weakness that reflected in an improved export performance, both of which should help reduce
the current account deficit and bloated foreign borrowing requirements from
creates reduced demand for
current peak levels. The election and fiscal policy is another wild card, but no
Treasuries presents a risk to matter who emerges victorious in November, budgetary restraint and lower
our forecast. deficits are likely on their way through 2005, though a Kerry win would probably
be viewed more bond positive than a Bush victory because Senator Kerry is seen
more as a fiscal hawk.
David Rosenberg, FVP, Kathleen Bostjancic
Chief North American Economist Director, Senior Economist
(1) 212 449-4937 (1) 212-449-2650
Hot Topic
Housing: If Not a Bubble Then an Oversized Sud
Classic traits of a bubble: In this report, we assess the likelihood that the housing market has entered into a
(i) Extended valuation “bubble” phase. There are numerous shades of gray, but when we examine the
(ii) Over-ownership classic characteristics of a “bubble” (extended valuation, over-ownership,
excessive leverage, a surge in supply, complacency (denial?), and speculative
(iii) Excessive leverage behavior, it seems to fit the bill. At the very least, housing is overextended, and
(iv) Supply surge even the Fed has acknowledged as much. The next question is what pricks the
(v) Complacency “bubble” if in fact there is one, and the answer to that boils down to two words:
(vi) Speculation. interest rates. While the trend in personal income is also a key determinant of
housing demand and pricing, our research finds that the impact of mortgage rates,
basis point for basis point, is three times as powerful as household earnings
growth (for more, please see the June 4 issue of The Market Economist).
“Reports from some contacts suggested that speculative forces might be boosting
housing demand in some parts of the country, with concomitant effect on prices,
suggesting the possibility that house prices might be moving into the high end of
the range that could be consistent with fundamentals.” (FOMC Minutes —
March 16, 2004.)
Even the Fed knows that “To be sure, indexes of house prices based on repeat sales of existing homes have
housing is overextended. outstripped increases in rents, suggesting at least the possibility of price
misalignment in some housing markets. A softening in housing markets would
likely be one of many adjustments that would occur in the wake of an increase in
interest rates.” (Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan — May 6, 2004.)
“The key features of a bubble are that the level of prices has been bid up beyond
what is consistent with underlying fundamentals and that buyers of the asset do so
with the expectation of future price increases.” (NY Fed, July 2004.)
Bubble #1: Extended Valuation — This Is The P/E Ratio for Housing (Look Familiar?)
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Organization. Note: In our calculation we
assumed that rent prices would edge up by 3.1% per year (the 10-year average) and the average ratio between the two
series is 1.15 (average from 1983 to 2000).
Bubble #2: Over-Ownership Has Translated Into Record Real Estate Exposure
30 30
22 22
20 20
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00
200 200
Another defining characteristic Bubble #3: Excessive Leverage — Mortgage Market Now Over 30% Of Total Debt
of a “bubble” is extensive
leverage. The accompanying
Mor tgage Debt
chart depicts a stable series
throughout most of the 1990s, (% of D omesti c Nonfi nanci al Debt)
Bubble #3: Housing Market And Banking Sector Performance Joined At The Hip
38 38
Real estate lending for
commercial banks, a key source
of profits, is up 10% year-over- 36 36
year and now comprises a
record 37% share of total bank
credit, up from 35% a year ago,
34 34
and 33% two years ago. Now
we know why Richard
Bernstein our Chief Investment
32 32
Strategist has put Financials on
the watch list for a potential
downgrade.
30 30
00 01 02 03 04
Bubble #3: The 2001-2004 Cash-Out Craze (Poof! The House Becomes a Credit Card)
Total Home Equity Cashed Out
According to Freddie Mac, the (Billions $)
Bubble #4: Supply Taking Over — The Builders Have Gotten Restless
0.6 0. 6
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census Bureau, Merrill Lynch. Note reference line denotes average since 1990 =
0.97. The June reading was 1.206.
H VU / H S T K
0 . 13 5 0 . 13 5
In fact, the national inventory
of unsold homes as a share of 0 . 13 0 0 . 13 0
the housing stock has broken
out sharply in the past 12-24 0 . 12 5 0 . 12 5
months. The question is, with
even more supply on its way, 0 . 12 0 0 . 12 0
and affordability levels waning,
will home prices become 0 . 11 5 0 . 11 5
vulnerable?
0 . 11 0 0 . 11 0
0 . 10 5 0 . 10 5
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
7 . 50 7. 50
6 . 75 6. 75
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Sour ce: Ce nsus Bur eau /H aver Anal yti cs
Cur r ent Conditions for Buying Houses: Good: Pr ices Going Higher
%
8 8
Bubble #5: There Was Also Complacency at NASDAQ 5000 (New Era In Housing?)
class, to equities. But the Existing 1-Family Homes: Median Sales Pr ice
similarities in the price action Thous. $
5000 200
between what we saw in the 4000
stock market in the late 1990s 180
3000
and what we are seeing today in
160
residential real estate seem to 2000
trigger point.
200 80
90 95 00 05 10
Sour ces: WSJ, REALTOR /Haver
Note: NASDAQ Composite moved forward by 50 months. Scales are in log terms. NASDAQ (line) on the left hand scale.
Home prices (bars) on the right hand scale.
7.0%
Another potential sign that a 6.5%
housing “bubble” is brewing, is 6.0%
the increase in speculative 5.5%
behavior. Housing turnover
5.0%
has surged since the end of
4.5%
2003, and now stands at an all-
time high. According to 4.0%
Dataquick Information 3.5%
Services, homes that were 3.0%
bought and sold by the same 2.5%
owner within six months has 2.0%
risen 54% in the past year in
03/01/1968
03/01/1970
03/01/1972
03/01/1974
03/01/1976
03/01/1978
03/01/1980
03/01/1982
03/01/1984
03/01/1986
03/01/1988
03/01/1990
03/01/1992
03/01/1994
03/01/1996
03/01/1998
03/01/2000
03/01/2002
03/01/2004
Chicago; 83% in Fort Worth
and a near-doubling in Orange
County. The flippers are back.
Source: Census Bureau, National Association of Realtors, Merrill Lynch. Note: Turnover = total home sales/ housing
stock.
index. 2
0
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
45
0
40 ISM Index (Left)
Real GDP (Right)
35 -2
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
-3
-4
-5
00 01 02 03 04
153 153
0.07 0.07
150 150
0.00 0.00
The ML Consumer Index
147 147 Flashing Sluggish Start to Q3
-0.07 -0.07
144 144
The ML Production Index
is up 1% in July
141 141 -0.14 -0.14
JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL
2002 2003 2004 2003 2004
Source: Merrill Lynch Source: Merrill Lynch
The ML production index finished the month up by 1%. As we noted last week, the The ML Consumer Index was flat for a third week in a row. The ABC/Money Magazine
true underlying trend in production is probably weaker than the headline growth rate consumer sentiment index inched slightly higher and both initial and continuing claims
suggests. The later than usual plant closures, biased our production index upwards in fell on the week, but energy prices continued to rise, and chain store sales continued
early July (due to the seasonals). Over the last couple of weeks the seasonals have to disappoint. It looks like consumer spending is off to a slow start in Q3.
worked in the opposite direction. Momentum heading into August looks weak.
0.6 0.6
1.0 1.0
0.5 0.5
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
-0.5 -0.5
-0.6 ML Housing Index Hovering Near -0.6
Lows We Haven’t Seen Since Nov 2001
-1.0 Risk Taking -1.0
-1 Standard Deviation
-1.2 -1.2 -1.5 -1.5
AUG NOV FEB MAY AUG NOV FEB MAY AUG NOV FEB MAY AUG JAN JUL JAN JUL JAN JUL JAN JUL
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Merrill Lynch Source: Merrill Lynch
The ML Housing Index is beginning to stabilize, but the level of the index is consistent Our Financial Stress Index has shown a decline in risk aversion over the last couple of
with a deceleration in housing activity in 2H. Real estate loans have slowed sharply weeks. The main reasons for the move have been the decline in gold prices and the
now growing at 8.7% annual rate (13-week basis), the slowest growth rate since mid- Swiss Franc, and the fact that the put-to-call ratio sank to the lowest reading since late
February. In fact, real estate loan growth has been slowing for ten weeks in a row. June during the last week of July. In our view, this will most likely turn out to be a
Moreover, the MBA purchase index, while still at very high readings, seems to have temporary blip (especially in light of the most recent spate of weak economic data).
peaked. The VIX is turning higher. Corporate spreads are off their lows. Staples continue to
outperform TMT stocks. And with the market continuing to discount aggressive Fed
easing, we would expect bonds to outperform. Stay defensive.
Ron Wexler
VP, U.S. Economist
(1) 212 449-2705
We expect wholesale inventories to rise 0.5% in June, after posting a large 1.2%
Inventory accumulation gain in May. Inventory accumulation was much stronger than anticipated in the
continued through June, Q2 NIPA accounts, implying another healthy gain in wholesale inventories in
especially at the wholesale June. Moreover, imports were probably strong in June, which is another indicator
that suggests that wholesale inventories will rise.
level.
n Tuesday, August 10, 2004
Productivity should rise at a 2.0% annual rate in the second quarter. This is
weaker than the 3.8% rate we saw in the first quarter. From the annual revisions
to the NIPA data, we know that non-farm output rose at a 3.8% annual rate in the
Slower economic growth, second quarter. With hours worked rising at roughly a 1.8% rate, it left
combined with a rise in hours productivity rising at its slowest pace since the second quarter of 2002. We
worked hurt productivity in Q2. estimate that compensation per hour rose at a 4.5% rate, which is in line with the
4.6% pace we saw in Q1. The end result is that unit labor costs should rise 2.5%
for the quarter. This represents the third consecutive rise for unit labor costs and
would be the fastest gain in labor costs since the first quarter of 2001.
We expect the July budget balance to register a deficit of $61.0 billion, $7 billion
deterioration from the $54 billion shortfall recorded a year ago. The year-on-year
deterioration continues to be led by growth in outlays outstripping revenue
growth. Spending growth is running a full three percentage points ahead of the
The budget deficit rose in July pace revenues at 6.6% year-on-year versus just 3.6% for revenues. With just two
as outlays continued to outstrip months remaining before fiscal year-end, we look for the budget deficit to be $450
revenue growth. billion for the full fiscal year. Looking ahead to fiscal year 2005, we foresee a
moderate narrowing in the deficit to $385 billion as revenues rebound a strong
11%, in tandem with an improving labor market. Spending growth, despite
attempts to reign in non-defense discretionary outlays, is poised to slow only
gradually to a 5.9% pace.
Jobless claims remain range- We estimate that initial unemployment claims will edge up for the week ending
bound suggesting layoffs are August 7 to 340,000 from 336,000 in the prior week. This would nudge the four-
not accelerating. week average down to 341,000 from 343,500. Given that the factory shutdowns
have already taken place, there probably were not any major layoffs during that
week.
Import prices probably rose 0.4% in July, which would leave them 5.5% above
last July’s levels. This would represent a rebound from last month’s 0.2% decline,
but far below the 1.4% surge we saw in May. Part of the push in import prices
Higher oil prices should boost
was due to the higher cost of imported crude oil, which was up 8% in.
import prices. Commodity prices were up more modestly in July, as the CRB raw industrial
materials index rose only by 0.1% for the month.
Retail sales should rebound in July, rising 0.8%, after posting a dismal 1.1%
decline in June. Excluding autos, retail sales should rise at a more tepid pace of
Retail sales should rebound in 0.2%, which would offset the 0.2% decline we saw in June.
July, but will probably remain Most of the strength in sales in July came from the vehicle sector. New vehicle
below the 2Q average, sales jumped 12% in July. One problem is that a good part of the strength in
suggesting weak spending in vehicle sales of late has been from fleet sales, which do not necessarily get
Q3. counted in retail sales. If a fleet was purchased directly from the manufacturer, it
does not count as a retail sale. As a result, we may not see as powerful a kick
from unit vehicle sales as many are expecting.
While auto sales surged in July, Sales at gasoline service stations should be weaker given that prices were down
gas prices fell and chain store more than 3% in July. In fact, over the last few years, when gasoline prices have
sales were weak. declined in a given month, service station revenues declined 70% of the time.
However, the solid rebound we expect to see in retail sales in July, the level of
retail sales in July should still be 2.0% below the second quarter average level of
sales. Consumers will have to pick up the pace of purchases dramatically if the
economy is going to get a boost from the consumer in the third quarter.
We estimate that the trade deficit widened slightly in June to $46.4 billion from
$46.0 billion in May. Exports probably rose 2.5% to $99.6 billion in June, after
rising 2.9% in May. U.S. exporters continue to benefit from the strong global
economy and the weaker currency, as the trade-weighted U.S. dollar fell in June,
The trade deficit probably making U.S. exports more competitive. We saw evidence of this in the June ISM
widened slightly in June. report. The ISM index of export orders remained quite strong in June at a level of
56.7. This followed three consecutive months of above 60.0 readings, a period in
which U.S. exports rose by more than 6%. We estimate that imports rose 2.0% in
June. Custom duties jumped 15% and were up almost 19% from the prior June.
This is the fastest growth rate for customs duties since the 20% annualized surge
we saw in January 2003, when U.S. imports were up more than 14% on a year-on-
year basis. Another indicator of solid import growth in June was the ISM import
index, which stayed at a very strong 57.6 level from 59.8 in May.
The PPI should rise 0.2% in July, with the core rate edging up only 0.1%. On a
year-on-year basis, the PPI should be up 4.1%, in line with June’s 4.0% rise. We
expect the core rate to rise 1.8% from last July, which would represent a slowing
in the annual rate we saw in June (+1.9%).
Weaker gasoline prices and
Energy prices should have contributed to some price moderation. Gasoline prices
discounting in the auto and PC were down about 2.5% in July after seasonal adjustment, and the price of finished
businesses should keep energy products down 0.2% on the month.
producer price inflation low.
We expect to see more price declines in the vehicle sector, as probably some of
the price discounting and better incentives most likely came directly from the
manufacturers. The result of these types of programs would be felt in the PPI,
which we estimate would push new car prices down 0.2% in July. Moreover,
given the glut of chips and other computer equipment, we would not be surprised
to see price discounting in that sector as well.
Weekly surveys suggest that Consumer sentiment should rise in the early August reading to 98.0 from 96.7 in
consumer sentiment should rise July. The weekly ABC/Money Magazine survey of consumer comfort rose
in early August. meaningfully in late July/early August and stood at -6 at the end of July. This was
its highest reading since early February.
Jose Rasco
Vice President, Senior Economist,
(1) 212-449-9107
Debt Issuance
Policy Speakers
Q2 Earnings Update
The Q2 earnings season is nearly 85% done and by and large the results are
With Q2 earnings season 85% impressive. It looks like operating EPS will come in at about $16.80 (assuming
done, operating EPS should the remaining 85 companies surprise to the upside by the same margin), 30%
come in 30% higher than a year higher than year ago levels2 (note that S&P is actually looking for earnings to
come in at $16.90, up 31% year-over-year). All sectors are coming in ahead of
ago. expectations, with the largest upside surprises in materials (beating estimates by
11 percentage points), utilities and consumer discretionary (beating estimates by 7
percentage points) (see Table 1). In the aggregate, earnings are coming in about
4.5% ahead of expectations, which is larger than the historical average (3%
surprise factor) but lower than the surprise factors of the prior five quarters.
In terms of guidance, earnings estimates for Q3 came down this week, largely due
20% EPS growth in the second to some downgrades in IT and consumer discretionary. The bottom up consensus
half of the year looks is now looking for 14.7% EPS growth, down from 15% last week. In our view,
reasonable. this is not the start of a new trend. We believe earnings estimates will continue to
get ratcheted higher in the coming weeks. The revision ratios have been pretty
low by historical standards and according to First Call preannouncments are also
coming in below historical trends (Table 2). Q4 earnings expectations were left
unchanged. By the looks of things, 20% EPS growth in the second half of the year
is not out of the question.
However, earnings estimates for Earnings estimates for 2005, on the other hand, continue to get ratcheted lower
2005 are coming down... and it (downgraded for an eighth week in a row). Consensus is now looking for 10.1%
looks like there’s further EPS growth, which would represent a pretty sharp deceleration from the current
30% growth rates we’ve recently been enjoying (see Table 4 on the next page).
downside risk. By our estimates, we think earnings estimates will most likely get ratcheted even
lower, especially in the consumer related sectors (for more please see Market
Economist July 16). In our view, operating earnings will rise only 3% next year.
Next week the market will have fewer Q2 earnings releases to digest. We have
outlined the key market movers in Table 5 on page 24.
2
Note that the S&P calculates earnings growth differently than First Call. S&P uses last year’s
constituents as its base, while First Call uses this year’s constituents. As a result, the S&P growth
rate tends to be larger than the First Call’s estimate.
04Q2 04Q1 03Q4 03Q3 03Q2 03Q1 02Q4 02Q3 02Q2 02Q1 01Q4 01Q3 01Q2
Real GDP, Chain-Weighted, 3.0 4.5 4.2 7.4 4.1 1.9 0.7 2.6 2.4 3.4 1.6 0.2 -0.6
SAAR
% Change, Year Ago 4.8 5.0 4.4 3.5 2.3 1.9 2.3 2.5 1.9 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.2
Chain-Weighted Price Index, 3.2 2.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 2.9 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.7 3.1
SAAR
% Change, Year Ago 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.5
Nominal GDP, SAAR 6.3 7.4 5.7 8.8 5.3 4.9 2.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 3.6 0.2 4.4
% Change, Year Ago 7.0 6.8 6.2 5.4 4.2 3.9 3.8 4.1 3.1 3.2 2.7 2.8 3.1
Employment Cost Index, % 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
% Change, Year Ago 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0
Productivity, Nonfarm, SAAR 3.8 2.5 9.5 6.2 3.4 2.3 4.5 0.7 9.8 7.0 1.6 3.1
% Change, Year Ago 5.4 5.4 5.3 4.2 2.8 4.3 5.4 4.7 5.3 2.9 2.0 1.5
Unit Labor Costs, Nonfarm, 0.8 1.7 -4.3 -1.3 0.6 -0.1 -3.1 1.6 -7.8 -2.8 1.3 -0.7
SAAR
% Change, Year Ago -0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.0 -0.3 -2.5 -3.1 -2.0 -2.5 0.9 1.2 3.1
2004.1A 2004.2A 2004.3F 2004.4F 2005.1F 2005.2F 2005.3F 2005.4F 2003A 2004F 2005F
Real Economic Activity, % SAAR
Real GDP 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.0 4.2 3.0
% Change, Year Ago 5.0 4.8 3.7 3.5 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.9
Final Sales 3.3 2.8 3.0 3.9 2.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.8 3.2
Domestic Demand 3.9 2.7 2.9 3.6 2.4 3.5 2.9 2.7 3.4 3.9 3.0
Consumer Spending 4.1 1.0 2.3 2.8 2.5 3.3 2.5 2.4 3.3 3.2 2.6
Durables 2.2 -2.5 4.5 3.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.2 7.4 4.6 2.8
Nondurables 6.7 -0.1 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 2.4 2.3 3.7 4.0 2.7
Services 3.3 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.5
Residential Investment 5.0 15.4 4.0 2.5 1.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 8.7 9.7 3.5
Nonresidential Investment 4.2 8.8 7.0 11.7 3.5 7.1 6.0 6.0 3.3 9.0 6.9
Structures -7.6 5.2 5.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 -5.6 1.9 3.4
Equipment and Software 8.0 10.0 7.5 14.0 4.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 6.4 11.2 7.9
Government 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.2
Exports 7.3 13.2 5.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 7.0 1.9 9.7 7.1
Imports 10.6 9.3 3.5 3.3 3.9 4.9 4.7 3.9 4.4 8.6 4.3
Net Exports (billions of $) -550.1 -552.8 -553.5 -550.6 -547.1 -547.6 -544.4 -540.4 -518.5 -551.8 -544.9
Inventory Accumulation(billions of $) 40.0 47.5 46.0 38.0 35.0 25.0 22.0 18.0 -0.7 42.9 25.0
Nominal GDP (billions of $) 11,473 11,649 11,814 11,989 12,120 12,279 12,427 12,576 11,004 11,731 12,350
% SAAR 7.4 6.3 5.8 6.1 4.4 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 6.6 5.3
% Change, Year Ago 6.8 7.0 6.3 6.4 5.6 5.4 5.2 4.9
Key Indicators
Industrial Production, FRB, % SAAR 6.6 6.0 4.3 4.8 2.3 4.0 3.8 4.0 0.3 4.9 3.9
Capacity Utilization (percent) 76.5 77.3 77.7 78.2 78.4 78.8 79.1 79.3 74.8 77.4 78.9
Civilian Unemployment Rate (%) 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 6.0 5.6 5.6
Productivity, % SAAR 3.8 2.0 2.6 3.0 1.9 2.8 2.6 2.2 4.4 3.8 2.4
% Change, Year Ago 5.4 4.4 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.3
Real Disp. Personal Inc. % SAAR 3.2 2.9 3.4 4.0 2.2 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.3 3.6 3.1
% Change, Year Ago 4.2 3.9 2.7 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.8
Personal Savings Rate (%) 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 1.3 1.8 2.6
Light Vehicle Sales (Millions SAAR) 16.5 16.5 16.8 16.4 15.8 16.2 15.8 15.4 16.6 16.6 15.8
Housing Starts (Millions SAAR) 1.94 1.91 1.88 1.85 1.83 1.88 1.83 1.80 1.85 1.90 1.84
U.S. Budget Balance (billions of $ FY) -374 -450 -385
Corporate Profits and Earnings
Operating Corp. Profits After Tax (Bil $) 909.2 983.8 957.5 1034.6 953.0 1042.5 1010.1 1081.6 786.2 971.3 1021.8
% Change, Year Ago 32.1 29.2 17.0 18.0 4.8 6.0 5.5 4.5 13.8 23.5 5.2
S&P 500 Earnings Per Share ($)* 15.18 16.14 15.75 16.00 14.95 15.80 15.80 16.20 48.73 63.07 62.75
% Change, Year Ago 27.5 45.4 25.4 21.6 -1.5 -2.1 0.3 1.3 76.6 29.4 -0.5
S&P 500 Operating EPS ($) 15.87 16.88 16.50 17.50 16.20 17.30 17.30 18.20 54.69 66.75 69.00
% Change, Year Ago 27.2 30.7 14.5 17.6 2.1 2.5 4.8 4.0 18.8 22.1 3.4
Inflation
GDP Price Index, % SAAR 2.8 3.2 2.4 2.4 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.2
% Change, Year Ago 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9
CPI, Consumer Prices, % SAAR 3.6 4.7 3.0 2.9 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.8 2.4
% Change, Year Ago 1.8 2.8 3.0 3.6 3.2 2.5 2.2 1.9
CPI Ex Food & Energy, % SAAR 1.8 3.0 3.3 1.2 1.3 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.9
% Change, Year Ago 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.7
International Trade and the Dollar
Current Account (billions of $) -144.9 -148.4 -150.9 -149.9 -149.0 -149.3 -147.9 -146.0 -530.8 -594.0 -592.0
Shaded regions represent Merrill Lynch forecasts * 2005 reported EPS includes the impact of stock options expensing.
Real GDP (annualized) 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 4.2* 3.0*
Core CPI (Year/Year) 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.9* 1.9*
Budget Balance ($ Bil. **) -450 -385
Current Account ($ Bil.***) -592 -595
Source: Merrill Lynch
* Annual Average % Change **Cumulative Balance on a Fiscal Year Basis ***Cumulative Balance on a Annual Basis
Table 3: West Texas Intermediate Forecasts ($/BBL) (As of June 30, 2004)
AQ1-04 AQ2-04 Q3-04 Q4-04 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
WTI * $35.33 $38.33 $32.00 $32.00 $34.40 $28.00 $28.00 $28.00 $28.00
*Prices shown for 3Q ’04 and beyond are the values incorporated into earnings/cash flow models by the Energy Team
Source: Merrill Lynch Energy Team
Important Disclosures
Copyright 2004 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (MLPF&S). All rights reserved. Any unauthorized use or disclosure is prohibited. This report has been
prepared and issued by MLPF&S and/or one of its affiliates and has been approved for publication in the United Kingdom by Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith Limited,
which is regulated by the FSA; has been considered and distributed in Australia by Merrill Lynch Equities (Australia) Limited (ABN 65 006 276 795), licensed under the
Australian Corporations Act, AFSL No 235132; has been considered and distributed in Japan by Merrill Lynch Japan Securities Co, Ltd, a registered securities dealer under
the Securities and Exchange Law in Japan; is distributed in Hong Kong by Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Ltd, which is regulated by the Hong Kong SFC; and is distributed in
Singapore by Merrill Lynch International Bank Ltd (Merchant Bank) and Merrill Lynch (Singapore) Pte Ltd, which are regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The
information herein was obtained from various sources; we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness.
This research report is prepared for general circulation and is circulated for general information only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objectives,
financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person who may receive this report. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of
investing in any securities or investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be
realized. Investors should note that income from such securities, if any, may fluctuate and that each security’s price or value may rise or fall. Accordingly, investors may
receive back less than originally invested. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.
Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes an offer to buy or sell any securities or options or futures contracts.
Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or related investment mentioned in this report. In addition, investors in
securities such as ADRs, whose values are influenced by the currency of the underlying security, effectively assume currency risk.