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    5 views32 pages

    Non-Cooperative Games Nash

    Uploaded by

    Vivek Godan

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 32
    A DISSERTATION Presented to the Youlty of ?rincetan University in Candidscy for the Degree of Doctor af Philosophy ‘Recomended for Acceptance by the stays 1960 Abstract: ‘This paper introduces the concopt of a non-cooperative gaxo and develops methods for the mathenatical analysis of such games. the ganee considered are nmporson gumes represented by means of pure stra= togies and payoff functions defined for the combinations of jure stratesiess ‘The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative canes is unrelated to the uathematical doseriztion by means of pure strategies and peyeoff functions of a game. Rather, it depends on the possibility or impossibility of coalitions, commnication, ani cide-paymontss ‘The concepta of an equilitriim point, a solution, a strong solution, fa sub-solution, and valuas ere introduced by natheuntical definitions. and in later sections the interpretation af those concepts in non-cooper= ative gamee is discussed. The min mathematical result is the proof of the existence in any kane of at least one equilibrium poimte Other results concern the geo~ 4 mrtrioat structure of the set of equilthriun pointe of « guns with « son f lution, the geometry of sub-solutions, and the existence of « symetrical equilibrim point in a symmetrical game As on illustration of the possibilities for application «, treatasnt : of « sinple three-man poker model 1s includede S + 26 50 ~ Bocterel Dees ota Tablo of Contents Sectton Le Introduction. s+ eee ee rere teens Qe Formal reftnitions and Torninology ++ eee eres Se Extatonce of Equilibrium Yointa +++ eee eres es de Symotricn of Cams se se ee tere ere tee Ge colutions sree eee rece cere eee eres Ge Ceonetrical Zorn of Solutions +++ seers eees Te Dominance and Contradiction vethoda + +ee sess Qe A Throceiian voker Gamo se eee eee cress Os Motivation and Interpretations + ++seseeree We Applications. +s eeeerer eer eer reese UL. Bibliography ee eee ee eee ere rete tees 12. Acknowlodgemnts se see ereesercrcreee SERBEEBRowone ff Introduction Von Neusann and Norgenstern have develoced a very fruitful theory of twoeverson sero-eum games in their book Theory of Ganes and Zconomte Bokoviors This bock also conteins a thecry of nenerson canoe of a type which wo would call ccoverativos This theory is based on an analysis of the interrelaticnshins of the various coalitions which can be formed by the players of the gape. our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalt~ tions in that it is ascuned that cach varticipant acts indenendent! without collaboration or communi ybion with any of the others. ‘The notion of an equilibrium point is the baste incrediont in our theory. This notion yielda a soneralization af the concost of the solu= tion of @ two-neraon sero-cum cane. It turns out that the set of equili- brium points of a two-person zero-sum cone is cinply the sat of all pairs of opposing “good strategie In the innediately following sections we shall define equilibrium points and prove that a finite non-cooperative came always has at least one equilibriua point. we shall also introduce the notions af solvability and strong solvability of a non-cooperative came and prove a theares on the geoustrical structure of the set of equilibrium points of a solvable game. Aa an axomple of the application of our theory we include a solution of a simplified three person poker came. ‘The motivation and interpretation of the aathenatical concepts em ployed in the theary are reserved for discussion in a special section of this papers Pornal Definitions and Tersinology In this section we define the besic concerts of this paner and set uy standard toraizology and notation. inportazt definitions will ve preceoded by a cubetitle inéicating the concept defined. The ron-cocy= erative izea will be implicit, rather than explicit, below. Finite Gene: For us an menerson sane will be a set of n nlayers, or rositions, each with an associated finite set of gure stratogtoas and corresponding to each player, | , a payoff function, P, s which maps tho sot of alt netuples of sure strategies into the real musbera. when we uso the tora netuple wo shall clways nean a sot of x ‘tons, with oach itex associated with a different players ced Stratesy, Sj + A mixed strategy of playor {will be a collection of non-negative mmbers which have unit sum and are in one to one correspondence with his pure strategic : He write Si EH Tia wm Zews! ant Cie2o to represent such a nixed atrategy, where the “T[ia.’S are the pure strategies of player | + We regard the © Si’s_ ax points ine sim plex whose vortices are the © TTict’S «This simplex say be regarded es a convex subset of a real vector space, civing us « natural process of Linear combination for the nixed atrategies+ We shall use the suffixes i,j,k for players and XB, 0 Indicate various pure strategios af a players The symbole Sj ott and Yj , ato. will indicate mixed stratecioss [I jod —w#11 indi~ ae cate the {th player's Odth pure strategy, oto. eayecry function, P, t Tho sayeéPo function, P; » used tx the doe emo chore, hes & unicue extonaton to the a-tuoles of tized stratesios which 4c Linear in the mixed stratey of each playor Lrelinoar]s this extonston we shall also denote by P- » writing PUS,Su--+ Sn)« tro 2 or AZ to denote an neturle of mixed stratecios te shall ang tg -<2= CS+,--+ $9) then iC) shalt sean P; (S, -Sn) Such an neturle, 2 , will also ve regarded a8 a point in a vector ennce, Si aeuld be chteired ty ultinlyine tocather the vector snaces the mixed atratosiess And the st of all such net containiny; oles forms, of courae, a convex polytope, the product of the eiaplicos rem ting ‘the alzed stratertess For convenience we introduce the substitution notation (45 ti) to etm tor Gy Se 0-2 Sitgti Sie, o--Sa) wnere = (51/505 stone (C452) 5 ty) wo indicate by (astz5 t5) a: Se) «the effect of successive substitun Equilibriua Points An netusle 2 fa an equilibrium point if and only if for every i @ Pa) = ma Pes +] : ‘Thus en oquilibrium point is an o-tuple 4 such that each player's nixed stratery maxinizes his pay-off if the atratestes of the others are held fixede Thus cach player's strategy is optimal against those of the others. Ye shall cocastonally abbreviate equiiiurium point by oqe pte a te y Siz Tce Ta ant Cig >O 6 EE -ae(S.5,- and Sz usos TTiot wo also cay that 4 wes it 6 ea mixed atratosy Sj uses a pure strate y Tig if + Sn) rea the Ltneartty of PGS, s--Sn) tn Sie @) met (plas sta] = marl pets a. me defize Pl) = Prl4a Tria) + Toa ve obtain the following trivial necessary and sufStetent condition for AL tore fan equilibriun point: (3) PG) = 2% Pa Ge) . (5,,Se,-c2 5m) and 7 Zia Tk shor aca) = Ecia Pakd) — 5 conmoquentty for (3) to hold we mut tee Cit =O stoner Pry Ct) < ean ro which 1s to aay that <2 doos not use TTio{ unless St ip an optinal pure stratery for player i. Sowe wite (4) Tg fe used in 2 then Prac 2) = man P. (4) as ancther necessary end sufficient condition for an equilibrium pointe Since a criterion Q) for an eqs pte can be expressed as the equating of two continuous functions on the space af n-tuples —< the fogs pte obviously fora a closed subset of thin spaces Actually, this number subset 1s formed fron a tee of pieces af albegraic varieties, cut out by other algebraic varieties. Uxistence of Zquilibriun 7oists 1 have previously published J Proc 36 (1950) 49-69 7 & proof of tho result Lolox basod on Lekutanis generslised fixed point theorene ‘The proof given here uses the Srouvar theorems the nethod is to set us a sequence cf continuous mmpp Lagss 2 0'(4s1) 5d 2/C4,1)5 2° whose fixed pointe have an equilibrium point ae limit point. A lintt mapping exists, but Le discont: aed not have any fixed pointes ‘THbO. 1s very finite come has an equilibrium pointe Proofs Using our standard notation, let 2 be an ntuple of mixed strategies, ant Pie (¢) the payoff to ployer / if be wes his pure strategy TTig and the others use their respective mixed atrate~ gies in -d . For each integor 2 ¥e define the following continuous functions of 2 + 9:4) = "2" Prald) , Pial-2) = bd) - 1) +, ana Piken= wax (0, Fiala] . Yow 5 ptr» = mex Bice =Yn>O 50 that in ; . ad a an rot ta contour Tef'ine Si(a,rn= EMax Ge Cer) end A2E4,r) = (Si, 8% ++ 84) + Shace all the operations pave preserved continuity, the napping <> -

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