Oblicon digested cases: 1174-1206

Missing: Lim vs. People

ANGELES VS. CALASANZ

135 SCRA 323

FACTS:
On December 19, 1957, defendants-appellants Ursula Torres Calasanz and plaintiffs-appellees Buenaventura Angeles and Teofila Juani entered into acontract to sell a piece
of land located in Cainta, Rizal for the amount of P3,920.00 plus 7% interest per annum. The plaintiffs-appellees made a downpayment of P392.00 upon the execution of the
contract. They promised to pay the balance in monthly installments of P41.20 until fully paid, the installment being due and payable on the 19th day of each month. The
plaintiffs-appellees paid the monthly installments until July 1966, when their aggregate payment already amounted to P4,533.38.

On December 7, 1966, the defendants-appellants wrote the plantiffs-appellees a letter requesting the remittance of past due accounts. On January 28, 1967, the defendants-
appellants cancelled the said contract because the plaintiffs failed to meet subsequent payments. The plaintiffs’ letter with their plea for reconsideration of the said
cancellation was denied by the defendants.

The plaintiffs-appellees filed a case before the Court of First Instance to compel the defendant to executein their favor the final deed of sale alleging inter alia that after
computing all subsequent payments for the land in question, they found out that they have already paid the total amount including interests, realty taxes and incidental
expenses. The defendants alleged in their answer that the plaintiffs violated par. 6 of the contract to sell when they failed and refused to pay and/or offer to pay monthly
installments corresponding to the month of August, 1966 for more than 5 months, thereby constraining the defendants to cancel the said contract.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Has the Contract to Sell been automatically and validly cancelled by the defendants-appellants?

RULING:
No. While it is true that par.2 of the contract obligated the plaintiffs-appellees to pay the defendants the sum of P3,920 plus 7% interest per annum, it is likewise true that
under par 12 the seller is obligated to transfer the title to the buyer upon payment of the said price.

The contract to sell, being a contract of adhesion, must be construed against the party causing it. The Supreme Court agree with the observation of the plaintiffsappellees to
the effect that the terms of a contract must be interpreted against the party who drafted the same, especially where such interpretation will help effect justice to buyers
who, after having invested a big amount of money, are now sought to be deprived of the same thru the prayed application of a contract clever in its phraseology,
condemnable in its lopsidedness and injurious in its effect which, in essence, and its entirety is most unfair to the buyers.

Thus, since the principal obligation under the contract is only P3,920.00 and the plaintiffs-appellees have already paid an aggregate amount of P4,533.38, the courts should
only order the payment of the few remaining installments but not uphold the cancellation of the contract. Upon payment of the balance of P671.67 without any interest
thereon, the defendant must immediately execute the final deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and execute the necessary transfer of documents, as provided in par.12 of
the contract.

Angeles vs. Calasanz 

G.R. No. L-42283, 18 March 1985.
 
The contract of adhesion, must be construed against the party causing it. The terms of a contract must be interpreted against the party who drafted the same, especially
where such interpretation will help effect justice to persons who would be deprived of their rights thru the application of a contract clever in its phraseology, condemnable
in its lopsidedness and injurious in its effect which, in essence, and in its entirety is most unfair to the other party.

ANGELES vs. CALASANZ

FACTS: Plaintiffs-appellees and defendants- appellants entered into a contract to sell apiece of land located in Rizal for the amountof P3, 920 plus 7% interest per annum.
Theplaintiffs-appellees paid in monthlyinstalments and defendants-appellants toldplaintiffs-appellants to remit past dueaccounts. On January 28, 1967, defendants-
appellants Calasanz cancelled the contracton the basis of failure of Angeles to securepayment. Plaintiff-appellant Angeles filed acase with the CFI of Rizal on the basis that
they had discovered they already paid P4,533.38, including all surcharges andexpenses. The lower court ruled in favour ofplaintiffs. The CA then brought the case fordecision
before the SC.

ISSUE: WON the contract was validly cancelled by the defendant-appellants Calasanz.N O

RATIO: Defendant appellant received the

delayed payment of plaintiffs-appellees onseveral occasions. They have then waivedand are now estopped from exercising theiralleged right to rescind the contract. Article
1234 of the Civil Code also says that if anobligation has been substantially performed ingood faith, the obligor may recover as thoughthere had been a strict and complete
compliance and fulfillment

ROQUE VS. LAPUS

96 SCRA 741

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement of sale covering Lots 1, 2 and 9, Block 1, of said property, payable in 120 equal monthly installments at
the rate of P16.00, P15.00 per square meter, respectively. In accordance with said agreement, defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of P150.00 as deposit and the further sum
of P740.56 to complete the payment of four monthly installments covering the months of July, August, September, and October, 1954.

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On January 24, 1955, defendant requested plaintiff that he be allowed to abandon and substitute Lots 1, 2 and 9, the subject with Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the Rockville
Subdivision, which are corner lots, to which request plaintiff graciously acceded. The evidence discloses that defendant proposed to plaintiff modification of their previous
contract to sell because he found it quite difficult to pay the monthly installments on the three lots, and besides the two lots he had chosen were better lots, being corner
lots. In addition, it was agreed that the purchase price of these two lots would be at the uniform rate of P17.00 per square meter payable in 120 equal monthly installments,
with interest at 8% annually on the balance unpaid. Pursuant to this new agreement, defendant occupied and possessed Lots 4 and 12, and enclosed them, including the
portion where his house now stands, with barbed wires and adobe walls. However, aside from the deposit of P150.00 and the amount of P740.56, which were paid under
their previous agreement, defendant failed to make any further payment on account of the agreed monthly installments for the two lots in dispute, under the new contract
to sell. Plaintiff demanded upon defendant not only to pay the stipulated monthly installments in arrears, but also to make up-to-date his payments, but defendant refused
to comply with plaintiff's demands.

On or about November 3, 1957, plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate the lots in question and to pay the reasonable rentals thereon at the rate of P60.00 per month
from August, 1955. On January 22, 1960, petitioner Felipe C, Roque filed the complaint against defendant Nicanor Lapuz  for rescission and cancellation of the agreement of
sale between them involving the two lots in question and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale, the
defendant to vacate the two parcels of land and remove his house therefrom and to pay to the plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 a month from
August 1955 until such time as he shall have vacated the premises, and to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, costs of the suit and award such other relief or
remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

 The Court of Appeals rendered its decision that the defendant Nicanor Lapuz is granted a period of ninety (90) days from entry hereof within which to pay the balance.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Can private respondent be entitled to the Benefits of the third paragraph of Article 1191, New Civil Code, for the fixing of period 

RULING:

No. Respondent as obligor is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 3 of Art. 1191, NCC Having been in default and acted in bad faith, he is not entitled to the new period
of 90 days from entry of judgment within which to pay petitioner the balance of P11,434.44 with interest due on the purchase price of P12,325.00 for the two lots. To allow
and grant respondent an additional period for him to pay the balance of the purchase price, which balance is about 92% of the agreed price, would be tantamount to
excusing his bad faith and sanctioning the deliberate infringement of a contractual obligation that is repugnant and contrary to the stability, security and obligatory force of
contracts. Moreover, respondent's failure to pay the succeeding 116 monthly installments after paying only 4 monthly installments is a substantial and material breach on
his part, not merely casual, which takes the case out of the application of the benefits of pa paragraph 3, Art. 1191, N.C.C.

Pursuant to Art. 1191, New Civil Code, petitioner is entitled to rescission with payment of damages which the trial court and the appellate court, in the latter's original
decision, granted in the form of rental at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955 until respondent shall have actually vacated the premises, plus P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the same to be fair and reasonable. The Court also sustained the right of the petitioner to the possession of the land, ordering thereby
respondent to vacate the same and remove his house therefrom.

AYSON-SIMON VS. ADAMOS 131 SCRA 439

FACTS:
On December 13, 1943, Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria defendants-appellants herein purchased two lots from Juan Porciuncula. Porciuncula’s successor in interest
sought for the annulment and cancellation of the sale which the court a quo favorably ruled.In the meantime during the pendency of the above mentioned case,
defendants-appellants sold to Generosa Ayson Simon the lots in question. Due to the failure of defendants appellants to comply with their commitment to have the
subdivision plan  of the lots approved and to deliver to deliver the  titles and possession to Generosa, the latter filed suit for specific performance. As a result of the sale of
the lot to said defendants sppellants being null and void, there is impossibity that they can comply with  their commitment to Generosa, the latter then seek the rescission of
the contract plus damages.The defendants-appellants  contend that Generosa’s action had prescribed, considering that she had only four years from May 29, 1946 to
rescind the transaction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed.

HELD:
Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that an injured party may also seek rescission  if the fulfillment should have become impossible. The cause of action to claim rescission
arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became imppossible when the court declared that the sale was null and void. The Generosa cannot be assailed on the  ground
that she slept on her rights.

AYSON-SIMON VS. ADAMOS AND FERIA

G.R. NO. L-39378 AUGUST 28, 1984

FACTS:
Defendants, Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria, purchased two lots forming part of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City, from Juan Porciuncula. Thereafter, the successors-in-
interest of the latter filed Civil Case No. 174 for annulment of the sale and the cancellation of TCT No. 69475, which had been issued to defendants-appellants by virtue of
the disputed sale. The Court rendered a Decision annulling the saleThe said judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court and had attained finality.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case above, defendants sold the said two lots to Petitioner Generosa Ayson-Simon for Php3,800.00 plus Php800.00 for facilitating
the issuance of the new titles in favor of petitioner. Due to the failure of the defendants to deliver the said lots, petitioner filed a civil case for specific performance. The trial
court rendered judgment to petitioner’s favor. However, defendants could not deliver the said lots because the CA had already annulled the sale of the two lots in Civil Case
No. 174. Thus, petitioner filed another civil case for the rescission of the contract.

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Defendants were contending that petitioner cannot choose to rescind the contract since petitioner chose for specific performance of the obligation. Also, even though
petitioner can choose to rescind the contract, it would not be possible, because it has already prescribed.

ISSUES:
1. Can petitioner choose to rescind the contract even after choosing for the specific performance of the obligation?
2. Had the option to rescind the contract prescribed?

RULING:
1. Yes. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of
fulfillment. If, as in this case, the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 allows the injured party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment.

2. No. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the injured party may also seek rescission, if the fulfillment should become impossible. The cause of action to claim
rescission arises when the fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 174 declared the sale of the land
to defendants by Juan Porciuncula a complete nullity and ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69475 issued to them. Since the two lots sold to plaintiff
by defendants form part of the land involved in Civil Case No. 174, it became impossible for defendants to secure and deliver the titles to and the possession of the lots to
plaintiff. But plaintiff had to wait for the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 174,
According to the certification of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Exhibit "E-2"), the decision in Civil Case No. 174 became final and executory "as per
entry of Judgment dated May 3, 1967 of the Court of Appeals." The action for rescission must be commenced within four years from that date, May 3, 1967. Since the
complaint for rescission was filed on August 16, 1968, the four year period within which the action must be commenced had not expired.