Measuring the Affective and Cognitive Properties of Attitudes: Conceptual and Methodological Issues

Stephen L. Crites, Jr. Leandre R. Fabrigar Richard E. Petty Ohio ,S'{atR University

I )I'sln/t' renewed interest in the affective and cognitive properties (If altitudes, assessment of these constructs is plagued try a number of problems. Some techniques for overcoming these problems are outlined, and scales for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes are reported. Two studies examint' the reii(!bility and validity of these scales. Study 1 assesses the internal consistency and the discriminant and convergent validity of these scales and indicates that the scales are useful for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes toniard a wide range of objects. In Study 2, the ability of the scales Ii) differentiate attitudes that are based primarily on affective versus cognitive information is examined by experimentally creating afftctive or cognitive attitudes in subjects. Analyses reveal that the scales can differentiate between people whose attitudes are bawd primarily on either affective or cognitive information.

I t will be conceded at the outset that an attitude is a complex affair which cannot be wholly described by any single nurnerical index. For the problem of measurement this statemen t is analogous to the observation that an ordinary table is a complex affair which cannot be wholly described by any single numerical index.

Thurstone, J 928, pp. 530-531

Although Thurstonc (1928) realized that an attitude was a multifaceted construct, he nevertheless conceptualized an attitude as a combination of an individual's evaluative judgments about a given object. This view was adopted in whole or part by most subsequent researchers and has guided research on attitudes for more than 65 years_ Even though this conceptualization of attitudes has been quite valuable, theorists have come to realize that it. is also useful to consider properties of attitudes other than their global evaluative nature, One feature of

attitudes that has received considerable attention is the notion that attitudes can be based on a number of distinct foundations. In particular, the tripartite theory of attitudes postulates that altitudinal responses can be classified broadly into affective, cognitive, and behavioral categories (see Katz & Stotland, 1959; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960; Zanna & Rempel, 1988).

There is a long history of support for the no lion that evaluative judgments can be reflected in affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses (e.g., Breckler, 1984; Kothandapani, 1971; Ostrom, 1969). Recent research, however, has focused primarily on the affective and cognitive antecedents of attitudes (e.g., Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Chaiken, Pomerantz, & CinerSorolla, in press; Millar & Tesser, 1986, 1989), and severa! interesting findings have resulted from this focus. For example, the relationship between attitudes and behavior has been shown to be moderated by the extent to

Authors' Note: This article is dedicated to Thomas M. Ostrom, who taught each of us about the importance of attitude measurement. Preparation of this article was supported by a National Institute of Mental Health Traineeship (T32MH19728) to Stephen L Crites, a National Science Foundation Fellowship to Leandre R. Fabrigar, and National Science Foundation Grant BNS-9021647 to Richard E_ Petty, We thank Curtis Haugtvedt for his assistance in data collection, and we thank two anonymous reviewers and members of the 1990-1993 Groups for Altitudes and Persuasion at Ohio State University for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Preliminary report.' of this research were presented at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, May 1991. Stephen L Crites is now at the D e partrnent of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso. Address reprint requests to Richard E. Petty, Department of Psyc hology, Ohio State University, 1885 Neil Avenue Mail, Columbus. OH 43210·1222.

PSPB, Vol. 20 No.6, December 1994 619--634

© 1994 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

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62() PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL I'SYCHOLOGYBULLETIN

which the salient affective or cognitive bases of all attitude m.uch those of thr- behavior (Millar & Tosser, 1986, 1989; S('(' also Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lislr-, J 989), When the ~a!i('lIt affective or cognitive properti"" of auitudcs do II( )\Inatch ow affective or cognitive II<lll11C of the behavior, the correlation between attitudes ami behavior is attenuated (\1illar & Tesser, 1986, 1989). Additionally, altitudes t hat arc primarily either affectively or cognitively based might he differentially susceptible to persuasive appeals that are either affective or cognitive in nature. Research 011 this topic, however, has yielded conflicting results, as some research suggests that persuasion is greater when the aiTcctive/cognitive nature of the persuasive communication matches the affective/cognitive basis of the attitude (Edwards, 1(90) whereas other research suggests the opposi tc (M i llar & M i llar, 1(90).

Although a substantial amount of research has been condllcted cxamining the im plicatious of attitudes that are based primarily on affect or cognition, considerably less attention has been paid to the assessment of these altitudinal bases. One problem resulting from this neglect and from lack of consistency in procedures across studies is that existing measures suggest alternative conceptualizations of the affective properties of attitudes. For exam pie, the end poi n Is of the affcc rive scale used by Nor m an (1975), very favorable and very u nfauorable, equate the affective properties of attitudes Wi01 general evaluation, whereas the emotional terms (e.g.,fear, anger, ha/1Jiness, and disgust) used by Abelso n et al. (1982) equate the affective properties of attitudes with discrete emotional states. Thus, the conceptualization of the affective properties of attitudes suggested by measures that lise general evaluative terms (e.g., Granberg & Brown, 1989; Norman, 1975; Rosenberg, 1968) is different from that suggested by measures that use specific emotional terms (e.g. , Abelson et al., 1982; Breckier, 1984; Breckier & Wiggins, 1989; Millar & Millar, 1990; Ostrom, 1969).

A second problem with the literature on the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes is that researchers have sometimes failed to take into account the effect that structural characteristics of the measures can have on individuals' responses. A substantial literature exists suggesting that subtle differences in the wording or response format of questions can dramatically influence responses (e.g., Loftus, Fienberg, & Tauur, 1985; Poulton, 1989; Schuman & Presser, 1981; Turner, 1984). In fact, when Bagozzi (1978) reanalyzed data from Ostrom (1969) and Kothandapani (1971) using structural equation modeling, he found that the response format of the scales and the affective or cognitive properties of the attitude both influenced subjects' responses. This is a problem with much of the previous research on the affecrive ,' cognitive properties of artitudes because struc-

tural (harMt eristics of the measures (e.g" H~spollse format of the s(,lks) have sometimes been confounded with the construct Iwillg II uasurcd (e.g., Abelson (~1 al , ! ~IH2; Granberg & lsrown , 1989; Stanger, Sullivan, & Forrl, 1991). Granberg and Brown (1989), for instance, assessed the affective properties of attitudes with a bipolar scale and assessed the cognitive properties of attitudes with a thought-listing procedure. For studies that have used diffcrcn t response formats to assess the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes, therefore, it is difficult to determine t be extent to wh ich the findings are a function of differ en t bases of the aui tudes or of the structural characteristics of the measures.

Another problem with the literature on the affective and cognili\T properties of attitudes is that researchers have often f:liled to assess the reliability and/or validity of their scales. For example, a number of studies (c.g., Abclso net a I_, ! 9H~, Gran berg & Brown, 1989; S tan go r et al., 1991) have examined the extent to which attitudes and behaviors are differentially predicted by affer uve and cognitive informational bases without fully assessing the reliability and validity of the scales. Other studies have controlled for the effects of differential reliability but have not provided evidence for the validity of the affective and cognitive measurement procedures used (e. g., Breckler & \Vi ggi n s, 1989; Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1994). Failures to assess the reliability and/ or validity of scales are potentially problematic because differences in the reliability or validi ty of the affective and cogn i live scales can cause the scales to be differentially predictive of attitudes. Thus, one scale could be a better predictor of attitudes not because the attitude is based primarily on the construct being assessed by the scale but, rather, because the scale is more reliable and/or valid.

One final limitation of the literature on the affective and cogn i rive bases of atti tudes is that the scales that have been used to measure these properties are often idiosyncratic to specific attitude objects (e.g., Abelson ct al., 1982; Breckier, 1984). That is, scales are design ed to assess the affective/ cognitive properties of a single object and are not readily applicable to other objects. Although tailoring scales to specific attitude objects can be a reasonable approach, it has some unfortunate consequences. First, because developing and validating new scales is costly in time and resources, researchers might confine their research to a small set of objects for which scales exist, and findings based on this restrictive set might not generalize to other objects Second, because some affective and cognitive dimensions of attitudes toward an object might be unique to that object, the affective and cognitive dimensions assessed by auitudespecific scales might not he comparable.

The primary pmpose of this article is to explore empirically the feasibility of constructing reliable and

valid indexes of the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes that can be used to assess these properties for a variety of attitude objects (i.e., scales that are not specific to a particular attitude object). In addition, we will examine the extent to which using existing (unvalidated) measurement procedures can be problematic. Because there is an interdependence between the conceptualization of a construct and the measures used to assess that construct (Ostrom, 1989), the first step in developing general scales for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes is to acknowledge explicitly the theoretical assumptions underlying these properties. Once these assumptions have been specified, items that meet these assumptions can be identified and used to construct the affective and cognitive scales.

The efficacy of the scales for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes must then be established. To establish the efficacy of general (l.e., not attitude-specific) affective and cognitive scales, one should demonstrate that (a) the reliability of the affectivc scales is consistently high across various attitude objects, (b) the reliability of the cognitive scales is consistently high across various attitude objects, and (c) the reliabilities of the affective and cognitive scales are comparable. The next step in establishing the efficacy of general affective or cognitive scales is to demonstrate that across various attitude objects, each scale is a relatively pure index of the affective or cognitive pro perties of attitudes, respectively. Finally, the efficacy of the scales can be assessed by experimentally manipulating the bases of attitudes to determine whether the scales can differentiate between attitudes that are based on affective and those based on cognitive information. We report some pilot research and two studies that address these issues.

PILOT STUDY

A set of theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of the affective and cogni tive properties of atti tudes was formulated by examining the implicit conceptualizations underlying the procedures used in previous research (e.g., Abelson et al., 1982; Breckler, 1984; Breckler & Berman, 1991; Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Chaiken et al., in press; Eagly et aI., 1994; Granberg & Brown, 1989; Kothandapan i, 1971; Millar & Millar, 1990; Millar & Tesser, 1986, 1989; Ostrom, 1969; Stanger et al., 1991 ). Proceeding from these implicit conceptualizations, we made several assumptions that guided the present studies. First, consistent with most current views of the attitude concept, attitudes are assumed to be evaluative summary judgmen ts tha t can be derived from qualitatively different types of information (e.g., affective and cognitive; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Peuv & Cacioppo, 1986; Zanna & Rempel, 1988).

Crites et <II. / PROPERTIES OF ATTITUDES 621

With regard to the attitude-relevant affective information, it is assumed that (a) affect is not all undifferentiated component but consists of discrete, qualitatively different emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1972, 1977; Ostrom, 1969; Pluchik, 1962; Tomkins, 1962,19(3), (b) affective information varies along an evaluative dimension (e.g., Brecklcr, 1984; Russell, 1980), (c) affective information can potentially be associated with any attitude object (Greenwald, 1968; Zajonc, 1980), (d) the evaluative implications of the emotions arc invariant across attitude objects,' and (e) affective information is, at least in part, accessible to the verbal system (e.g., Brec kl cr, 1984; Lan g, 1981). Th esc ass U m p ti 0 lIS are consistent with a variety of theoretical perspectives and appear to reflect the implicit conceptualization of many previous measures of the affective properties of at ti tudes. ~

Although the implici t conceptualization of the affective properties of attitudes suggested by existing scales is relatively st.raightforward, it is more difficult to link previous measures of the cognitive properties of attitudes with the theoretical assumptions that underlie these measures, because researchers have typically exam ined the cognitive bases of attitudes using idiosyncratic objectspecific measures. Thus, there has been no attempt to reduce the purview of potential characteristics that can be associated with an object to a set of basic dimensions tha t can apply to many atti tude objec 15, as has been done with affective information. This is potentially problematic because the distinction between affective and cognitive information is, therefore, confounded with level of representation. That is, affective information is assessed at a very general level (e.g., happiness, sadness), whereas cognitive information is assessed at an object-specific level (e.g., "Snakes are slimy"). To overcome these difficulties, assumptions concerning the nature of attituderelevant cognitive information were adopted such that they generally paralleled the assumptions regarding affective information. That is, it is assumed that (a) cognitive information consists of traits or attributes of an object, (b) traits vary along an evaluative dimension, (c) the trails can be associated with virtually any attitude object, (d) the evaluative implications of the traits are invariant across attitude objects, and (e) the traits are accessible to the verbal system.

A pilot study was conducted to determine the utility of developing general scales for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes. Items that had previously been used to assess affective/cognitive properties of attitudes (e.g., Abelson ct aI., 1982; Breckler, 1984; Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Nowlis, 1965; Osgood, Suci, & Tan ne n baum, 1957; Russell, 1980) and were consistent with our theoretical assumptions were selected for examination. In addition, items were pre-

m2 PERSO,,:AUTI' AND SOCIAL PSYCl{OI.OG'l BULLETIN

TABLE i: Cronbaeh Alphas for Scales in 1';101 Studv

s''''''lmlir ni//17mlw/

Dichotomou» eli,., Ii/HI

AI/plud,. Ol'}"'i "V/niil'" {.or-'JH1<'~ ;1{F'iPl'" G'K'lili,,~ At/nl;,," (:oKmtl:ut" AI/,'dll'" (;""n;I;""
Snake-s ,7,1 .~-1 _i~j ,74 .7') 71 "I .67
Yale Uni\,('J~;I\' .G3 .Wl .:lk .63 .61 _101 _(i:! _33
Microwave oven, .59 _78 _6:! .49 .61 _'I'l .ei .59
Pina ,77 ,K7 _75 6c .68 .:J2 ,~:.! .:33
. "
Television .85 .'j:! _Ii:' .81 ,n .70 57 ,71
Cows .68 ,7() 7::' .69 .75 _57 ,7() ,Ii
Median alpha .71 .!:\1 _70 .67 .71 .59 ,62 .46 senten III their original response format (e,g-. semantic differential) whenever possible, All tlfIi.'rliv(' and a cognuivc scale were constructed for each response format, however, hecallse respollse formal call illlhl<"llc(' subjeers' responses. Because it was not alwavs posxibk- to find existing affective or cognitive scales ill I he S,Hl1e format (e_g., the Mood Adjective Checklist [Nowlis, 1965 J has no cognitive counterpart), new items were g-cllcrated so that parallel affective and cognitive scales were available for each response format.

Seven ty--eigh t su bjec IS respo n dcd to six di ffc rcn t attitude objects on affective and cognitive scales in each of four response formats (semantic differential, rnultiresponse checklist, dichotomous checklist, and word variation)." In addition, a thought-listing measure was taken (see, e.g" Peny& Cacioppo, 1979).4Two types of analyses were then performed to determine whether these scales could be used to assess affective and cognitive properties of altitudes toward various objects.' First, the reliability of the affective and cognitive scales was assessed by computing Cronbach alpha scores as an index of their internal consistency. An examination of Table I reveals that the internal consistencies of the scales are not constant across all attitude objects, For instance, (he internal consistency of the affective multiresponsc checklist is rather high for "snakes" (,79) but quite low for "Yale" (.38). Additionally, the internal consistencies of several of the affective and cognitive scales are very disparate. For example, the median Cronbach alpha for the affective semantic differentials is ,71, whereas the median alpha for the cognitive semantic differentials is .84, These differences in the internal consistencies of the affective and cognitive scales are even more extreme for some attitude objects. For instance, the internal consistency of the cognitive word variation for "cows" was .11, whereas the internal consistency of the affective word variation for "cows" was .70, Disparities such as these are problematic because the scales, selected to be typical of those used in much prior research, might show differential predictive power because of differences in internal consistency rather than in the affective and cognitive constructs per se.

Second, to assess whether tile affective and cognitive scales are relatively pure indexes of each construct, exploratory factor analyses wen' conducted." For each of the six attitude OhJCClS, faOol" analyses were performed on the affective and cog-niti\'\' scales, scree plots of the eigenvalues were examined, and a two-factor solution was selected as the most plausible model for these data, Because the two factors were bighly correlated, oblique rotation solutions were used (see Table 2). An examination of Table 2 reveals that the factor loadings for three of the six attitude objects provide some indication that the scales assess the affective,' cognitive properties of attitudes. For two of these three attitude objects (snakes and cows), the affec tive scales te nd to load heavi lyon the first factor and less so on the second, whereas the cognitive scales tend to load more strongly on the second factor than on the first. For the third altitude object (Yale), this pattern is reversed. Thus, some of the scales seem to demonstrate convergent validity because the affective scales tend to load on one factor and the cognitive scales tend to load on the other factor, Although these results provide some evidence (hat the scales are assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes, it should be noted that the scales sometimes load substantially on both factors. In fact, for two of the attitude objects (television and pizza), affective and cognitive scales both load on the first factor, and the second factor for these two attitude objects is not readily interpretable. Thus, the scales do not appear to consistently provide relatively pure indexes of either the affective or the cogn itive properties of a tti tudes. 7

Our pilot study, primarily using scales from prior research, is a useful first step in developing general measures of the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes because it represents an attempt to empirically evaluate previous measures that are consistent with a set of explicitly stated theoretical assumptions, Although the results of this study are encouraging in that some of the scales demonstrated good internal consistency and convergent validity, the scales were inconsistent across attitude objects and did not demonstrate good discriminant validity.

Crites et "I / PROPERTIES OF ATITfVDES 623

TABLE 2: Scale Factor Loadings for a Two-Factor Oblique Solution in Pilot Study
Snnk\ 1'" ..... Mi(."mwflve~
,\"dr F"I/",'1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Fador 2 1'''''/11,1 F"dltT2
St>1l1 an I i( differential affccrive 0,76 0.15 (1.20 0.51 0.31l -0.16
~1l!11 ir '''J)(J!lS'' checklist affective o.so --0.03 --0.10 O.HI 0,01 --D.S8
I lil how, nous checklist afkctil'c 0,72 --0.09 0.10 0,G5 0.06 -U.75
VI", d var i.uion allcniw 0,73 --0,12 OS:I O,:!{j 0.31 -0,31
Thought listing affective (L73 0.12 0.:14 0.20 0.13 ·-D.26
Seman tic di fferential cognitive 0.21 0.61 U.5H 0,09 0.78 --{I. 06
]1.1,,11 in"I'<.m<;e checklist cognilive 0.19 0.69 0.59 0,24 0.16 029
Dir horomous checklist cognitive --O.J3 1.00 0.60 0,]1 0.64 -0.08
VI'", d v.u i.uion cognilive 0.51 0.38 0.74 ·0.U7 0.72 0,11
Thoughl lisling <,ognitive 0.11 -0.37 0,72 --{J.IIl 0.55 O,O'J
(_ •• H "'[;j lion between factors ,79 50 -.60
Pian Telansion COWl
Fartor l Factor 2 Pal'll" I Factor 2 Faelm I Fiu/IIT 2
Srmanric differential affective 0.88 -054 0.80 0.02 0.87 -0.02
\1 L ,It iresponsc checklist affective 0.78 -0.09 0.H1 0,]1 0.H7 --{)_]4
I lr('hotornous checklist affective O.G:) 0.08 0.63 --{).20 0.76 0.02
\N()rd variation affective 0.35 0.15 0.32 -OAO 0.54 0.24
Thought listing affective 0.07 -0.25 OAI -0.22 0.28 0.01
Semantic differential cognitive 0.61 0.04 0,66 ",(),25 0.12 0.53
1\1,,11 iresponse checklist cognitive 0.61 0.17 0,81 --f). 03 0.46 0,32
l iirhotomous checklist cognitive 0,23 0.21 056 --0.35 0.15 0,51
Word variation cogni(ive 0,21 0,57 0.02 -0.96 ..{l.16 0.92
Thoughr li<;ling cognitive 0.13 0,31 0.31 0.04 0.09 (l.09
Correlauon between factors .21 -.61 .54 STUDY I

In an altempt to improve the internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of the affective and cognitive scales used in our pilot study and much prior research, the affective and cognitive items used in these scales were examined, and the most promising items were selected for further investigation. Study I, therefore, was conducted (a) to empirically exami ne the new scales developed from the results of our pilot study and (b) to extend the findings of the pilot study in two ways. First, in the pilot study, parallel response formats (e.g., dichotomous checklist) for each of the affective and cognitive scale types were used to control for the effects of response format on subjects' responses. However, because the items used in these scales differed, direct comparisons could not be made across the different response formats, For example, the items used in the affective semantic differential were different from those used in the affective multiresponse checklist bcca use of our attem pt to use i terns and formats that had been used in previous research. As a consequence, any differences between the scales could be due to either differences in response format or differences in tbe items used in each of the scales. To assess the impact of

response format on the reliability and validity of the measures, the same subset of items was used in each response forma t in Study 1. This allowed direct comparisons of response format without confounding the conten t of the items with response format. Second, the pilot study did not include measures of attitude toward the objects, and so it was not possible to examine the relations between attitude and the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes. In Study 1, multiple measures of general evaluation were included to address this issue.

Method

SUBJEcrs

Subjects were 200 introductory psychology students at the Ohio State University who participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a class requirement. As in the pilot study, missing scores were replaced with the group mean (see Note 5). This never involved the replacemen t of more than 19 scores for any scale out of the 200 scores for each scale,

PRO(1,l){!RE

Subjects participated in the experiment in groups of 30 to 80. After all subjects arrived for a session, they were

621 PERSONAlJTYA~D S()(JAI. I'SYCHOLOGYBULLETI:\

told that the purpose of the experiment was to assess their reactions to six attitude nhj('cl<;, The experimenter then explained that six different types of scales would be used to assess their reactions. An experimental booklet was distributed to subjects, and the experimenter went through an example of how to complete each of the six scale types. Subjects were then allowed 1.5 hr to complete the question naire.

The experimental booklet contained (a) affective, cognitive, and attitude seman lie diffcrcn tial 'scales for eac h of six a tti tude objects, (b) aff ectivc, cognitive, an d at titudc multircsponse checklist scales for each of six a tti tude objects, (c) affec ti vc, cogt1 i tivc, and attitude dichotomous checklist Kales for each of six attitude objects, (d) a word-variation scale for each of six attitude objects from which affective and cogilltive word-variation scales were computed, (e) a thought-listing procedure for each of six attitude objects Irorn which affective and cognitive thought-listing scales were computed, and (f) a Thurstonc Equally Appearing Interval (EA.I) attitude scale for each of five attitude objects and a Thurstone EAI affective and cognitive scale for the remaining attitude object. These 73 scales were presented in one of three random orders, and subjects were randomly assigned to receive one of the orders. The attitude objects used in this study were the church, snakes, birth control, capital punishment, math classes, and literature classes."

Semantic differential. The affective, cognitive, and attitude semantic differential scales required subjects to indicate their reactions to each stimulus object on several bipolar continua described by word pairs. For the affective scales, subjects indicated the position that best described their feelings toward the object. For the cognitive scales, subjects indicated the position that best described the traits or characteristics of the object. For the attitude scales, subjects indicated the position that best desc ribed their glo bal eval uation of the object. Eigh t affective word pairs (love/hateful, delighted/sad, happy/ an n oyed, calm / tense, exci ted/ bored, re laxed/ angry, acceptance / disgusted, and joy/sorrow) and seven cogn i tive word pairs (useful/useless, wise/foolish, safe / unsafe, beneficial/harmful, valuable/worthless, perfect! imperfect, and wholesome/unhealthy) constituted the affective and cognitive versions of these scales, respectively. Four pairs of very general evaluative terms that did not describe affective states or traits of an object (positive/negative, like/dislike, good/bad, and desirable/ undesirable) were used for the attitude scales. Subjects responded to each item by checking one of seven intervals along an unnumbered, 7-point bipolar continuum that was described by the word pair. Responses were assigned values that ranged from -3 to 3, with negative

scores representing the cvaluativcly neg;ltivc end of the bipolar continuum and positive scores rcprcsrming the cvaluativelv positive end. Subjects' responscs to the eight affective items, seven cogn itive items, and four general eval native items were Slimmed to deterrnine the value for the affective, cogn i live, an d atti tude sernan tic di ffcrential scales, respectively.

Multiresponsc rhecklis t. The affective, cog-muve, an d attitude scales required subjects to indicate whether a word described their feelings toward the object (affective scale), described traits of the object (cognitive scale), or described t heir general evaluation of the object (attitude scale). For each term, subjects indicated whether the term definitely described, slightly described, did not describe, or did no t apply to either their feelings toward the object, traits of the object, or their attitude toward the object for the affective, cognitive, and altitude scales, rcspecti vel y. Respo n scs we re given a val ue of 0 if su bjec ts reponed that the word did not describe or apply, a value of 1 or -1 if the word sl igb tly described, or a val ue of 2 or -2 if the word definitely described their feelings toward the object, the traits of the object, or their attitude toward the object. Positive numbers were assigned to words that reflected a favorable evaluation of the object, negative numbers to words that reflected an unfavorable evaluation. The same words were used as in the semantic differential scales. Subjects' responses to the 16 affective, 14 cognitive, and 8 general evaluative terms were summed to determine the value of the respective multiresponse checklists.

Dichotomous checklist. This scale type was identical LO the multiresponse checklist with the exception that subjects could only indicate whether each word did or did not describe their feelings toward the object, traits of the object, or their attitude toward the object for the affective, cognitive, and attitude scales, respectively. Responses were given a value of 0 if subjects reported that the word did not describe their feelings, the object, or their attitudes and a value of lor -1 if they reported that it did.

Word variation. Subjects were asked to indicate whether a given sentence described or did not describe the attitude object (cognitive scales) or their feelings toward the object (affective scales)." The affective version of this scale type was in the form "I feel [noun or adjective such as disRllit] ", and the cognitive version was in the form "It is [adj ectivc sue h as di.sgu.lting)." These scales differed from the semantic differential, multirespome checklist, and dichotomous checklist scales in three important ways: (a) There was no attitude wordvariation scale, (b) the items for the affective and cognitive scales were intermixed on the same page of the experimental booklet, and (c) the words used ill these

scales were a subset of the words used in the other scales because a number of words could not be meaningfully translated into this format. The following keywords were used for the affective and cognitive scales, respectively: exci ted / exci ting, love /lovab!e, liking/likable, de Iigh t/ de Iigh tfu I, sad/saddening, disli kef dislikable, negative/ negative, annoyed/annoying, bored/boring, bad/bad, relaxed/relaxing, acceptance/acceptable, positive/ positive, wholesome/wholesome, good/good, disgust/ disgusting, joy / enjoya ble, safe/safe, hate/ hateful, calm/ calming, and angry/angering. Subjects' responses were given a value of 0 if they reported that the sentence did not describe the attitude object or their feelings toward it. A value of I was given if subjects reported that a positive word described the object or their feelings toward it, and -I if they reported that a negative word described the object or their feelings toward it. Responses to the ~J affective and cognitive items were summed to determine the value of the affective and cognitive versions of the scale, respectively.

Thoughi Iisting. Subjects were asked to write down all the thoughts and/or feelings that came to mind when they thought about each attitude object. After they finished all the scales in the experimental booklet, they were asked to go hack to the six thought-listing scales (i.e., one for each attitude object) and indicate whether each of their responses was a thought or a feeling and whether the thought or feeling was positive, negative, or neutral (see Note 4 for a description of how the thought listings were scored). 10

Thurstone EAl. Attitudes for five of the six attitude objects (the church, capital punishment, birth control, math classes, and literature classes) were assessed by Th urstone Eq ually Appearing In terval scales drawn from Shaw and Wright (1967). Affective and cognitive pmperties of the sixth attitude object (snakes) were assessed using two Thurstone EAI scales taken from BredJ.er (1984). 1m portan tiy, the affective and cognitive Thurstone scales for snakes have no item overlap with the other scales used to assess the affective and cognitive properties of snakes. This is noteworthy because the affective and cognitive Thurstone scales can be used to assess whether the factor solutions for the other scales are due to idiosyncrasies in the items in these scales. Thus, the affective and cognitive Thurstone scales serve as a validity check to ensure that the emerging factor pattern does not resul t from use of the same target words on the various scales. If the affective and cogni tive Th urstone scales are found to load with the other affective and cognitive scales, respectively, then the factor structure is likely to be a result of the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes. No Thurstone scale for measuring attitudes toward snakes was available.

Crites et al. / PROPERTIES OF ATTITUDES 625

Results

Internal consistency. Cron bac h al ph as were cal cu iated to determine whether (a) the scales showed adequate levels of internal consistency, (b) the scales demonstrated comparable levels of internal consistency across attitude objects, and (c) the affective and cognitive versions of each scale type had similar levels of internal consistency. Table 3 reveals that all three criteria were achieved, as the Cronbach alphas for the various scales were of comparable magnitude and consistently high across objects.

Importantly, the larger Cronbach alphas obtained in this study than in the pilot study cannot be explained merely by an increase in sample size, because we conducted analyses on smaller subsets of the subjects and found virtually no change in the magnitude of the Cronhach alphas. Additionally, the Cronbach alphas for the one attitude object that is common to both studies (snakes) showed considerable increases across studies, suggesting tha t the increase in in ternal consistency cannot be attributable to the fact that different attitude objects were used. Given that neither sample size nor differences in attitude objects can account for the differences in internal consistency between the pilot study and this study, it seems reasonable to assume that the observed increase reflects meaningful improvement in the scales.

Convergent and discriminant validity. As in the pilot study, a series of exploratory factor analyses were conducted (see Note 6). The results of these analyses were examined across all six attitude objects, and the factor analysis solu lion that best represen ted all atti tude objects was selected. An iterative principal axis factor extraction method (SPSS-X Version 4.1) was used, and scree plots of the eigenvalues were examined to determine how many factors should be retained (see Gorsuch, 1983, for a description of this procedure). On the basis of the eigenvalue plots and the interpretability of the solutions for all six attitude objects, a two-factor solution was selected as the best model for these data. II A direct oblimin rotation was used because the two factors were found to be highly correlated."

The results of the factor analyses suggest that the affective and cognitive multiresponse checklist, dichotomous checklist, and semantic differential scales show good convergen t and discriminan t validi ty (see Table 4) . That is, for five of the six attitude objects, the affective scales all load on the same factor, and the cognitive scales all load on a differen t factor. This pattern of discriminan t and convergent validity, however, is not evident for the word-variation scales, as both the affective and cognitive word-variation scales tend to load on the affective factor.

The attitude multiresponse checklists, dichotomous checklists, and semantic differentials tend to show simi-

52!) PERSONAUTYAND SO(:IAI. PSYUIOI.OGYBHJ.ETI:\,

TABLE 3: Cronbach Alphas for Scale .• in Study I

II 1l;/1lIU ()iJinl

:1/1",'1",,, ( .. of....'ll!lill,r. :\lIil",i~
. ~)(; ,91 ')4
.95 1<7 .94
.9~ ,9~ .95
.'Jl A2 .90
.9,1 .94 .96
,92 .91 ,96
.~H .91 .ss
W,,,,I ";j)-jal;()n
Itff"r/;lJe (~)J.,"";I;vp
.~I:' ,~}2
.91 .'.11
.H9 Xi'
.AR .87
.,)1 ':14
WI .41
.')0 .'JI Literature Math

Capital punishment Birth control Church

Snakes

Median alpha

Literature Math

Capital punishment Birth control Church

Snakes

Median alpha

/Ji,./wlmnm,,\ C/",,_.klnl

Affedi,,,, O'{;,l;l!!Ie A II; I",}, .1fj~di,·, ( .·~'~rni(iljt' Attitud»
.93 .8i .92 .91 .Hi ,93
.91 .79 .91 .90 .85 .93
.H4 .89 .92 .81 .8A ,93
.HR .80 .A7 ,82 .77 .A6
.91 .91 .90 .92 .90 .92
.86 .88 .91 .82 ,A7 .92
.90 .88 .91 .86 .H7 ,\12 lar patterns ofloadings in that.all three always load most highly on the first factor whether this factor is affective or cognitive. The Thurstone EAl attitude scales, in contrast, sometimes load more highly on the second factor.

Although the scales tend to behave consistently across attitude objects, the relationship among the affective, cognitive, and attitude scales differs across the objects. There arc three patterns of factor loadings across the six attitude objects. In the first pattern (for snakes, literature classes, math classes, and birth control), the affective scales and the attitude scales load on the first factor, whereas the cognitive scales load on the second factor. This suggests that for these objects, attitudes are associated m ore strongly wi th affec tivc aspects of the objects. I n the second pattern (for capital punishment), the cognitive scales and the attitude scales load on the first factor, and the affective scales load on the second factor, which suggests that attitudes are associated more strongly with cognitive aspects of the object. In the third pattern (for the church), Factor 1 comprises all affective, cognitive, and attitude scales, whereas Factor 2 has no strong factor loadings. For this object, therefore, it appears that the attitude is based on both affective and cognitive aspects."

Associations of affect and cognition with attitudes. To assess the relation between the affective and cognitive scales and attitudes, a series of structural equation models was tested. In each analysis, a single affective scale (e.g., affective seman tic differential) and a single parallel cogn i live scale (e.g., cogn i tivc sernan ti ( differential) were used to predict a latent variable that represented attitude. The four attitude scales were used as indicators of the latent variable with the exception of the attitude object snakes, where there were only three attitude measures.

The structural equation models reveal a numher of in teresting findings (see Table 5). First, th ese analyses demonstrate that for every attitude object, both the affective and cognitive scales arc independently predictive of attitude except for the word variation scales. Second, as expected, the results of the structural equation models generally parallel those of the factor analyses. That is, for attitude objects in which the affective and attitude scales loaded on the same factor in the factor analyses (e.g., sn akes), the affective scale was generally a better predictor of attitude than the cognitive scale. Al ternatively, for the atti tude object for which the cognitive and attitude scales loaded on the same factor (i.e., capital punishment), the cognitive scale was a better predictor of attitude than the affective scale. Finally, when the affective, cognitive, and attitude scales loaded on the same factor (i.e., the church), the affective and cognitive scales were generally similar in the extent to whic h they predicted attitudes. As noted above, however, the word-variation results did not parallel the factor analyses or the other scales. Interestingly, although the affective and cognitive word-variation scales loaded on the same factor in the factor analyses, they showed differential predictive power in the structural equation models. In generai, the cognitive word-variation scales tended to perform better than the affective wordvariation scales at predicting attitude. This occurred even when other scales suggested that affective information rather than cognitive information was a better predictor of atti tude. Th us, it does not appear that the wordvariation procedure, at least as used in past research and in the current study, provides a valid assessment of the affective and cognitive bases of attitudes. At a minimum,

Crites et at / PROPERTIES OF ATTITUDES 627
TABLE 4: Scale Factor Loadings for a Two-Factor Oblique Solution in Study I
Liln'atur-e Math Capital Punishment
Scal« Factor I Fador2 Factor I Factor 2 Factor I Factor 2
Seman ric differential affective 0.95 ~l05 0.93 0.01 0.02 0.88
Multiresponsc checklist affective 0.96 -0.04 0.95 -0.06 0.00 0.87
Dichotomous chc<klist affective 1.02 -0.13 1.01 -0.12 -0.05 0.87
Word variation affective 0.95 -0.06 0.98 -0.08 0.04 0.86
Semantic differential cognitive 0.12 0.76 0.07 0.83 0.99 -0.06
Multiresponse checklist cognitive -0.07 0.98 0.02 0.85 0.91 0.03
Dichotomous checklist cognitive 0.10 0.71 -0.05 0.89 0.88 0.01
Word variation cognitive 0.85 0.10 0.83 0.10 0.08 0.81
Semantic differential attitude 0.82 0.11 0.63 0.31 0.81 o.n
Mulurcsponse checklist attitude 0.75 0.22 0.71 0.19 0.81 O.H
Dichotomous checklist attitude 0.70 0.26 0.66 0.30 0.77 0.12
Thurstone EAl attitude 0.52 0.33 0.32 0.48 0.76 0.09
Correlation between fauoI' .72 .70 .86
Birth Control Church Snaks
Faaor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor Z Far/or I Factor 2
Semantic differential affective 0.87 -0.04 0.88 0.08 0.75 0.17
Multiresponse checklist affective 0.89 -0.07 0.82 0.09 0.90 0.02
Dichotomous checklist affective 0.77 ---0.09 0.84 0.18 0.84 0.05
Word variation affective 0.75 0.15 0.76 0.43 0.92 -0.04
Thurstone FA! affective 0.67 -0.12
Semantic differential cognitive 0.26 0.68 0.95 -0.15 0.07 0.88
Mu1tiresponse checklist cognitive 0.33 0.52 0.84 ---0.20 -0.06 0.99
Dichotomous checklist cognitive -0.02 0.88 0.93 -0.14 0.05 0.85
Word variation cognitive 0.75 0.14 0.75 0.39 0.90 0.01
Thurstone EAI cognitive 0.09 0.55
Semantic differcntial attitude 0.70 0.17 0.92 -0.01 0.71 0.24
Multiresponse checklist altitude 0.80 -0.06 0.93 -0.02 0.82 0.12
Dichotomous checklist attitude 0.41 0.34 0.88 0.00 0.75 0.18
Thurstone EAl attitude ---0.04 0.38 0.73 0.00
Correlation between factors .57 .27 .79 it provides a picture that is discrepant from the consislent results produced by the other scales.

Discussion

The results of this study suggest that the affective and cogni ti ve sernan tic differential, m ul tiresponse checklist, and dichotomous checklist scales are applicable to multiple attitude objects and have good and stable psychometric properties across different attitude objects. The affective and cognitive scales showed uniformly high and comparable levels of internal consistency that were constant across different attitude objects. In addition, the affective scales demonstrated high levels of convergent and discriminant validity, as most of the affective scales loaded on the same factor but not on the other factor, and the cognitive scales demonstrated similar levels of convergent and discriminant validity.

In this study, the affective, cogmuve, and attitude items were held constant across the different scale types to examine whether response format influenced subjects' responses to the affective, cognitive, and attitude scales. Because a common set of items was used in each of the scale types, however, it is conceivable that the scales could cluster together on the basis of characteristics of the items that are unrelated to the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes (e.g., frequency of use in the language). Several pieces of evidence, however, suggest that the scales are assessing the affective and cogni tive properties of attitudes and not other, unrelated properties of the items. First, the affective and cognitive Thurstone EAI scales (Breckler, 1984) for snakes were included explicitly because they do not share any items with the other affective and cogni tive scales. If the factors did not represent affective and cognitive properties of attitudes, one would not expect the affective and cogni-

62R PER..I)O:"iALITI'AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULl..ET[:,\'

TABLE 5: Standardized Coefficients of Affect and Cognition Predicting Overall Attitude in Study 1

C"t"wi
Seal» lsterature Mfllh I'll ni,lhmenl
Seman tic differc 1l1;~1
Affertiv« .{i<)4* .674' .314*
Cognitive .314* .297' .G74'
Multin"lx,",c checklist
Affecuve .735' .604- .203*
Cognitive .248' .ses- .763·
Dirhoromous checklist
Affective .727* .632' .334*
Cogniti\'e .266* .316' .636*
Worn variation
AfTecti"e .095 .257* ,~57*
COjl,nitivtc .821>' .631 • ,,71>"
IJ;,lh tontro! Church Snake"
Semantic differeruial
Afknive 560· .14.5* ':,96'
Cognitive .:;91' .554* .382*
Multiresponse checklist
Affective . 635' .532' .691'
Cognitive .263· .380' .286"
Dichotomous checklist
Affective .491* .495* 553*
Cognitive .361 * .496* .402*
Word variation
Affcruv« .305 .019 .222'
Cognitive .477' .891' .676*
Thurstone EAl
Affective .408*
Cognitiv<:" .510*
.p « .05. tive Thurstone scales to show the same pattern of factor loadings as the other affective and cognitive scales. The Thurstone scales, however, show the predicted loadings on the two factors. That is, the affective Thurstone scale loads only on the affective factor and the cognitive Thurstone scale loads only on the cognitive factor, despite the fact that these scales are composed of items not found in the other scales (see Table 5---Snakes).

Second, the word-variation scale used items that were found in the affective, cognitive, and attitude scales of the other scale types. We conducted alternative factor analyses in which affective, cognitive, and attitude versions of the word-variation scales were constructed that were based on the target word rather than the sentence stem. For example, the items that appeared in the cognitive scales were used to construct a cognitive wordvariation scale irrespective of whether the sentence stem suggested affect ("I feel ... ") or cogn i tion ("It is ... ") . If our results were a function simply of common terms, one would expect these word-variation scales to load on the factor that had the same terms (i.e., cognitive word variation with the other cognitive scales). This did not

occur, however, as all three worrl-v.u i;!tH)t I scales always loaded on the sam« LiOor.

Third, if scales were clust tTillg together solely because they sharer! items, a three-factor so lutiun would he expeered, because the measures olau iturlc Call rain a set of items that are indepelldent of the affective and cognitive scales. However, the attitude scales sometimes loaded with the affective scales (e.g., snakes), sometimes loaded with the cognitive scales (i.e., capital punishment), and sometimes loaded with both (i.c., the church) even though the attitude scales did not share any items with either the affective or the cognitive scales. This suggests that the general evaluation is sometimes morc closely associated with afkn, is so me Li III cs more clcsclv associated with cognition, and is sometimes quite balanced,

Fourth, the corrclatiou s between factors are consistent with the affccti\'e/ cognitive in terprctarion (e .g., Bagozzi, 1978; Brccklcr, 1981). If the two factors were a result of structural differences between the two sets of words (c.g., frequency of usc in the language). one would not necessarily expect the factors to be correlated .

Fifth, the pattern of the factor loadings varies across thc different attitude objects. This suggesL" that subjects were responding to the items on the basis of the particular attitude object being rated, because one would expect to see different affective and cognitive structures for different attitude objects. One would not necessarily expect such differences if the common factors were structural in nature, because presumably these constructs would be independent of the object being rated.

Eagly et al. (1994) argued that another potential problem with the usc of different items in affective and cognitive scales is that one set of items might be more saturated with evaluative meaning than the other set. If this were the case in the present studies, either the affective or the cognitive scales (whichever were more highly saturated with evaluation) should always be more predictive of attitudes. This was not found. Sometimes the affective scales were more highly associated with attitudes, and sometimes the cognitive scales were more highly associated with attitudes.

Finally, three ancillary analyses were conducted to assess whether the scales demonstrating good psychometric properties (i.e., semantic differential, multircsponse checklist, dichotomous checklist) potentially can be used to identity individuals whose attitudes toward an object are primarily affective or cognitive in nature. In each of these analyses, subjects were first classified into four groups for each attitude object on the basis of the discrepancies between affect and attitudes and between cognition and attitudes (see Chaiken et aI., in press; Rosenberg, 1968). An affective/attitude discrepancy score was computed for each subject as the absolute value of the difference between that. subject's

mean scores on the affective semantic differential scale and the attitude semantic differential scale. Subjects were classified as having a low affective/attitude discrepaucv if their discrepancy score was less than the median discrepancy score and a high affective/attitude discrepancy if their discrepancy score was greater than the median discrepancy score. A cognitjve/altitude discrepancy score was then computed for each subject as the absolute value of the difference between that subject's mean scores 011 the cognitive semantic differential scale and the attitude semantic differential scale. Subjects were then classified as having a low cognitive/attitude discrepancy if their discrepancy score was less than the median discrepancy score and a high cognitive/attitude discrepancy ilthcir discrepancy score was greater than the median discrepancy score. Using these discrepancy scores, subjects were classified into four groups: (a) high affective/attitude discrepancy and high cognitive/attitude discrepancy, (b) high affective/attitude discrepancy and low cognitive/ attitude discrepancy, (c) low affective/ attitude discrepancy and high cognitive/attitude discrepancy, and (d) low affective/attitude discrepancy and low cognitive/ attitude discrepancy.

In the first set of ancillary analyses, separate factor analyses were conducted on subjects in each of the four discrepancy groups. These factor analyses were identical to those reported in Study I (see Table 4) with the exception that each analysis included only subjects from one of the four discrepancy groups. For subjects who had high cognitive/attitude discrepancies and low affective/ attitude discrepancies, the affective and attitude scales loaded on the first factor for all six attitude objects. For subjects who had low cognitive/auitude discrepancies and high affective/attitude discrepancies, the cognitive and atti tude scales loaded together on the first factor for four of the six attitude objects. In general, these results suggest that affective information and attitudes are more closely related for some people whereas cognitive information and attitudes are more closely associated for other people. One other interesting result of the factor analyses was that a one-factor solution was the best solution for subjects who had low cognitive/attitude discrepan ci e s and low affective/ atti tude discrepancies, indicating that affective information, cognitive information, and attitudes arc all closely related for these individuals. For subjects who showed high discrepancies on both dimensions, the factor patterns looked similar to those for the en ti re sam pie of su bjects (i.e., affective and cognitive scales loading on separate factors and attitude scales loading on either the affective or the cognitive factor). Finally, because the semantic differential scales were used as the basis of classifying individuals into the discrepancy groups, parallel analyses were conducted in which the semantic differential scales were not included

Crites ct al. / PROPERTIES OF ATTITUDES 629

in the factor analyses. Results from these analyses were very similar to the resultsjust reported.

In a second set of analyses, the consistency of su bjects' reported attitudes as assessed by the semantic differential, rnultircsponse checklist, and dichotomous checklist scales was examined wi thin eac h of the four discrepancy groups. These three scales were used because they included a common set of items assessing attitudes. Because su bjec ts com pleted all th rce measures of atti tudes, these measures could be treated as independent assessments, and the consistency of subjects' attitudes across the three attitude scales could be computed. Previous theorists have argued that attitudes that are affcctively and cognitivelv consistent should be stronger and more stable than those that arc not (see Petty & Krosnick, in press, for reviews). To examine this issue, subjects' scores on the three attitude scales were transformed so that they ranged from -1 to + 1. To examine consistency across the three attitude scales, scores on the semantic differential were subtracted from scores on the dichotomous checklist, scores on the semantic differential were subtracted from scores on the multiresponse checklist, and scores on the dichotomous checklist were subtracted from scores on the multiresponse checklist. Then the absolute values of these differences were summed to arrive at 0 n e overall index of consistency in responding across the different scales for each subject (higher numbers indicate greater inconsistency). The consistency values revealed that the variability of reported attitudes across the multiple measures of attitude was lowest for subjects who had low affective/ attitude discrepancies and low cognitive/ attitude discrepancies and highest for subjects who had high affective/attitude discrepancies and high cognitive/ altitude discrepancies.

In a third set of analyses, regression analyses were conducted using the affective and cognitive rnultirespome checklist scales as predictors of the multiresponse attitude scale for su bjects within each of the four discrepancy groups. The pattern of results from these analyses generally supports the notion that the scales can identity individuals whose attitudes are based primarily on either affective or cognitive information. That is, when the results from each of these four discrepancy groups were compared with the results from the entire group of subjects, the affective scales became better predictors of attitudes for subjects who had low affective/attitude discrepancies, and the cognitive scales became better predictors of attitudes for subjects who had low cognitive/ attitude discrepancies.

The findings of Study 1, therefore, suggest that the scales might be useful in assessing the affective and cognitive properties of existing attitudes. More compelling evidence for the validity of the scales would be provided if it were shown that the scales could differentiate between

630 PERSONALITY AND SOClAl.I'SVCHOL()(;YBULl..ETlN

;IlTedively anrl cognitivdy based .mi links thJ I were newlv established with an cxpcrimcnral manipulation. A second study was conducted to address I his issue

STI T])\' 2

The primary purpose of our second study was to provide direct evidence that the scales can assess affecti vc lv an d cogn i rive Iy based atti tudes. We ex perim en tally created attitudes by giving people information that was primarily affective or cognitive in nature. After creating either affcctivelv based or cogniLive1y based attitudes, we administered t he affective, cognitive, and attitude scales developed ill Study 1 to determine whether these scales could be used to assess whether general evaluation is based more on affect or cognition.

Method

Subjf'C/I_ Subjects were 145 introducior v marketing students at the Ohio State University who participated in (he experiment to receive extra credit for their course.

Procedure. All subjects participated in one cxpcrimcntal scssio Il. Alte r all the su bjects arrived, they were told that they would be reading a passage about an animal and that they should form an impression of this animal on the basis of the information in the passage. Subjects read a passage that was approximately one pag-e long and then completed Kales assessing their attitudes toward the animal as well as their affective and cognitive reactions to tbe animal. Finally, subjects completed 1\\10 introspcctivc manipulation checks in which they reported the extent to which they believed that their attitudes were based on emotion versus knowledge. Each manipulation check asked subjects to indicate either the amount of "emotion you experienced when thinking about the animal" or the amount of "knowledge you learned about the ani mal" on a I O-poin t scale with eridpoin ts of 1, none at all, and 10, a great deal.

Subjects were randomly assigned to receive one of four different passages describing a fictitious animal. Two of these passages were cognitive in nature and presented information about the animal in the form of an encyclopedia entry. Each passage contained a brief description of the animal as well as information concerning its habitat, behavior, diet, and reproduction. One of these 1\\'0 cognitive passages presented predominantly positive information about the animal (e.g., "swift and graceful swimmers"), whereas the other passage presented predominantly negative information (e.g., "slow and ungainly swimmers"). The other two passages were of an affective nature. These affective passages, presen ted in the form of a short narrative that described an encounter with the animal, were designed to elicit positive or negative emotional reactions. Both passages con-

rained Ii t tie Ltct ual ill format ion about the anirnal hut described a vivid SCI in ()!'·W~llts_ For example, the posirive affective pas~ag-e described the animal frolic king with a swimmer, whereas the ncgative affective passage described the animal attacking a swimmer.

The attitude, affcruve , and cognitive scales used in th is study we re the m lilt i lespon se chec klists dcscri bed for Study 1.14 The ani tude scales were always presen ted first, and the order of the affective and cognitive scales was counterbalanced across subjects.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation cherk«. To assess the efficacy of our affective and cognitive manipulations. a 2 (Passage: affective vs. cognitive) x 2 (Manipulation Check: affective manipulation check vs. cognitivc manipulation check) mixed-model analysis 01 variance was performed with the first factor mall i pul.ucd he tween subjects. As expected, there was a sign ificant interaction between passage and the mall rpulat ion check, P( I, 117) = 62.65, P < .01. This interaction revealed that subjects who read the affective passage reponed their attitudes as being based more on emotions (M = 6.96) than on knowledge (M = 5.36). In contrast, subjects who read the cognitive passage reported their attitudes as being based more on knowledge (M'" 7.44) than on emotions (M = 5.41). No other effects were significan t. Th us, th is analysis suggests that we successfully created affcctivcly and cognitivcly based attitudes.

Additionally, Cronbach alphas were computed to examine the internal consistency of the scales. These analyses revealed that the affective (a = .93), cognitive (a = .94), and attitude (a = .96) scales all had very high levels of internal consistency.

Predictive utilit}' of the affeclive and cognitive scales. As in Study 1, the individual items within each of the scales were summed to create a single value for each construct, and regression analyses were conducted to assess whether the scales differentiated between affectively and cognitively based attitudes. Separate regression analyses were conducted on subjects who read the affective and cognitive passages. If these scales are effective at differentiating affectivcly and cognitivcly based attitudes, the affective scale should be a more powerful predictor of attitudes when subjects' attitudes are based on an affective passage rather than a cognitive passage, and the cognitive scale should be a more powerful predictor of attitudes when subjects' attitudes are based on a cognitive passage rather than an affective passage. These results were obtained, as tests of the standardized regression coefflcients revealed that the affective scale predicted attitudes significantly better for subjects who read an affective passage (~= .73) than for subjects who read a cognitive passage (Il = .28), z = 3.(14, f! < .01.

Si III i lady, !lw (Ugll i ti vc scale pred ic t cd .rt ti 1 ur ks sign ifiellllly better for su hjccts who read a cOgllllJ\'(' flOlssage (1'1 '"' .6!)) than for subjects who rcarl ;111 afkclin.:' passage (~ = .21), z --' 2.97, j) < .01.1\

III a second analysis, we examined Ill(' absolute discrepancy between subjects' responses Oil the affective and attitude scales and the cognitive and attitude scales. That is, as in Stlldy 1, we first set subjects' cogllitive, affective, and attitude scales to a common metric and then subtracted subjects' affective or cognitive scores from their attitude scores and took the absolute value. These discrepancy scores were analvzcd ill a 2 (Passage: affective vs. cognitive) X 2 (Discrepancy index: aunude.' affective discrepancy vs. attitude/ cognitive discrepancv) mixed analysis of variance. This resulted in a significant interaction pattern, F(I, 143) = 6.16, ji < .01. such that for subjects who read the affective pasqgc, at tiltlde/ affect ivc discrepancy (M = 0.29) was less than altltude/ cognitive discrepancy (M == 0.~5), but for subjects who read the cognitive passage, atutude /vognitivc discrepancy (M'" 0.25) was less than attitude/affective discrcpaucv (At = 0,30). That is, in the affective condition, the attitude scales were more closely aligned with the affective than the cognitive scales, but in the cognitive condilion, the altitude scales were more closely aligned with the cognitive than the affective scales.

In sum, the regression and discrepancy analyses provide evidence that our scales are useful for differentiating the affective versus cognitive bases of attitudes. These analyses revealed that subjects who read an affective passage had attitudes more strongly based all affective in for rna tio n than su bjects who read a cogni ti ve passage. Similarly, subjects who read a cognitive passage had attitudes more strongly based on cognitive information than subjects who read an affective passage. Thus, these scales appear to be able to detect differences in the informational basis of attitudes between groups.

GE!':ERAL D!SCU5S10:-l

A potential problem with research on the affective and cognitive foundations of attitudes is that little attention has been given to the construction of the scales used to assess these constructs. In the present article, this shortcoming was addressed by explicitly outlining a set of assumptions concerning the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes, developing affective and cognitive measures tbat reflect these assumptions, and empirically validating the measures. The results of our two studies suggest that this approach bas been useful.

01\e shortcoming of the literature on the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes, alluded to earlier, has been a failure to acknowledge the interdependence he tween the theoretical conceptualization of a construct

Crites et al. / PROPERTIES OF AlTITUDES 631

and the measures used 10 assess t hat construe!. When constructing (J111 scales, we examined previous research and derived a number of assumptions concerning the nature of affective and cognitive properties of attitudes that were implicitly suggested by previous measures. Although others might disagree with some of our assumptions or even our opcrationalization of these assumptions, these studies nevertheless demonstrate that there is utili ty in th i s a pproac h . For exam pIe, as di scusscd previously, some researchers have equated the affective properties of attitudes with general evaluation. In contrast, we conceptualized affective information as consisting of discrete emotional states that are theoretically and empirically distinguishable from general eval uatio n, The pattern of results III these studies suggests that til is conceptualization of the affective properties of at t it urlcs is a reasonable 011(' (see also Breckler, 19R4; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petry & Cacioppo, 1986; Zanna & Rempel, 19R8). General evaluation as assessed by our attitude scales is in some cases more strongly predicted by cognitive scales and in other cases more strongly predicted by affective scales. Such a pattern of results would seem extremely unlikely if affective information and general evaluation represent the same construct. Importantly, by stating the assumptions that underlie our measures, we have provided a framework for others to assess the adequacy of our opcrationalizations, to make comparisons wi th 0 ther measures/ conce ptual iza tions, and to eval uate the merit of these assumptions.

In addition to outlining the assumptions that underlie our measures, another significant advancement of this article over past research is the demonstration that general scales for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes can be reliable and valid. That is, previous research bas, for the most part, used scales that are specific to a single attitude object, whereas our scales can be applied usefully to a wide range of attitude objects. One interesting avenue for future research is to explore the relations between these general scales and well-established object-specific scales. Comparable results between these two lypes of scales would provide further evidence for the validity of both scales, Although the purpose of our article was not to obtain this type of validation, Study 1 does suggest that our general cogn irive and affective scales are comparable to the objectspecific Thurstone cognitive and affective scales for snakes developed by Breckler (1984).

A third contribution of this article is that we have systematically examined the reliability and validity of scales for assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes. Much of the previous research on assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes focused on demonstrating that these constructs were distinct rather than focusing on the adequacy of the

6:·t~ PERSONALITY A:'\D S()( J AI. PSY(:H OLOGY BULLET]!\

individual scales per se (e,g., Brnklcr. I ~IS4; Ostrom, I <Jb9). Furthermore, previous studies ()f Spt'cil](' substantive ISS\le~ in (he cognitive .mrl ,lfl(~(t in' bases of attitudes have used mcasurernen t prru.eciurc-x wi I hOI1\ reporting reliahili Iy and validity data. L~i ng ex pi01<ilory factor analyses, we have demonstrated that I he cogni tive and affective scales we developed each provide a reasonably distinct index of the construct they were designed to assess, \Vc also demonstrated by expcrirncrual manipulations that the scales can diffcrcn tiate between groups that differ in the cxten t to which their attitudes are based on affective or cognitive information. Finally, we have demonstrated that the reliahilitv of the affective and (ogn itive scales is comparabk and (onsis(('1 \ I across attitude objects. It is important to note, howrve r, that we have assessed reliability using a measure of internal consistency rather than other forms of reliability, becmv' our studies were conducted il \ a si Ilgle testing session. I t would be useful 10 explore other types of reliability (e.g., test-retest) in future research.

J II addition, the results of our research highlight some problems that can arise when researchers omit empirical validation of measures of the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes. For example, mallY of the affective and cognitive scales in our pilot study that were drawn from previously published studies varied in levels of internal consistency. These differences in internal consistency could produce differences in the predictive power of the two scales that are independent of the constructs being assessed. That is, either t he cognitive or the affective properties of attitudes might be found to be more predictive of attitudes simply because one of these properties is being measured more rei iably, Addi tionally, a number of the scales in the preliminary study and two scales in Study 1 failed to show discriminant validity. This could lead to misleading results because neither scale is a pure index of the affective or cognitive properties of attitudes,

One particularly useful example of the im portance of empirically validating affective and cognitive scales can be seen by examining the findings in Study I involving the word-variation scales. The affective and cognitive word-variation scales were differentially predictive of attitudes. If these were the only measures used in a study, a researcher would be tempted to draw conclusions about the affective and cognitive bases of attitudes. The word-variation scales, however, always loaded on the same factor in the factor analyses (i.c., failed to demonstrate discriminant validity). These scales, therefore, do not appear to be assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes but instead are upping some other construct that causes them to be differentially predictive of all it udcs. J 6 Th e resu I ts of til e factor analyses for the word-variation scales do not seem to be attri-

butablc JJ\lTeiV to the fad thai these scales do not share identical sets of WOlds with the scrnan tic differential, multiple response checklist, and dichotomous checklist scales. Other scales that do not share the same i terns nonetheless show the expected pattern of discriminant validity (i.e., the affect and cognitive Thurston« EAt scales for snakes) . Th us, if the word-variation scales had not been empirically validated, a researcher who assumed that the differences in the predictive ability of I he two scales were due to the fact that the scales were assessing the affective and cognitive properties of attitudes could have been making an error.

In conclusion, the studies in this article provide a first step in the development of scales 10 assess the afknjve and cognitive properties of attitudes. A considerahle num bel' of prior studies have attempted to assess the affective and/or cognitive bases of attitudes with scaks that were not validated or equated in reliability. The current research has shown that the use of such unproven scales call lead to erroneous conclusions, Lsing reliable and valid scales, the present studies have supported the idea thai attitudes can have affective as well as cognitive bases and that for any attitude object, individuals may differ in the strength of the association between the affective and cognitive information and the attitude. It should be noted, however, that although these scales should be useful in assessing affective and cogn itive bases of attitudes tha t call be reported vcr bally, they might not be sensitive to other nonverbal affective processes (e.g., mere exposure, classical condi tio n i n g). This should be explored in future research. Finally, this research has revealed a basic set of affective and cognitive dimensions that arc applicable across multiple attitude objects. Future research, however, might suggest that measurement can be improved by including additional dimensions of the affective and/ or cogni tive pro rertics of attitudes that are not assessed by the present scales.

NOTES

I. One goal of this research is to design scales that can gent:ra!ize across many attitude objects. The assumption that the evaluative i mplications of emotions are invariant across attitude objects is necessary to achieve this objective. We realize, however, that there can be exceptions to this assumption (e.g .. a frightening movie can be regarded as enjoyable),

2. We realize thai some of the sources that we have used a, support for a particular assumption might not agree with all our assumptions. For instance, some emotion theorists might argue that tlu-re are discrete emotions but that Ihey cannot be assessed accurately using verbal reports. Although we recognize that there are limitations in "sing verbal reports 10 assess emotional states, we have been ,a",'ful to emphasize that we are assessing the semantic representation of the affective properties of attitudes, nOI emotional states per se.

3. Descri ptions of these response formats and items (h,u wn c used in each of them art" nor presented here because of space con str ,Ii nts. See Stud), I, however, for a detailed description of I hesc response formats.

,\fI I'< 'I i \" '!nu '''gn iuve [houg h thsu "R ",\I", ".,.,,' ,-ulT' plu"d tl~~nl tlu- !IHJll-q-h!-lisfing p]On~dlLn- ( -, ~'(' ,~ ~{.,,_ ~ohnt.I;,~IIL Tool(', 8.:

T('ng. 1'11'1;', TI". vali u ' I< rr Ill<" ,,(k"I\'" tho"!!:i" Ii,t;ng I( ,tI" ["r cacb .n riuuk- "hi'" I \\';IS (mnpuI('d I" ;"Idi ITg II,,· IlIHILI",.-, ,11"";1;",, allcctive ,\" '''f':lns ,tn'\.",hT, ;>ning Ih,. ruuut x-r ,,1 11,·);;"i,',. "ll", lin' thouglu" and 1 h,' ql",. f,,, Ill" n)gnill\'<'IIH)uglu·li;lmg ,,,,Ii,, I,), (';>d, atliuuJp object ,,',"" 'J!"I'",,"<I hy "dding rhe numlxr "I' po,im',· (O);II'li\'l' tho"g\Hs~nd ",I'lr:tCling 11,(' numb« of n('gati"" '()gn'lin' Ihoughl-,.

0), Ik, :1"\(" of the laIg<' number ofitems in Ill(' 'Tud}', man)' subjects hikd 10 (Olllplrtc ,,1 least one irr-m . If;> ,<:al(' roruaincd at least one '''i''ing re.'ponw, the scak 1'.-0111 which that iu-ru rarne was considered mi<\in\_\, ,md tJw gnHl1' mean for 110<11 5Glk was u,,,d as an approximalion of lh(" ~lIl)itTt 's resl,onse ,0 that rhr- remainder ol'the subject's data «lUld he included in rl1e analysis.

h. E.xploralOry factor analyses ""'re per lorrncd 10 determ ine ",Iwliwr Tlw ,,1'kcTi\'e and cognmv- scales provided " relativclv pure iml,'" or" 'mgk consrr uct 01 reflected multiple «onstr ucts. Fxplora- 1(\)" rot' I w' t h.m r onfirruatorv far tor an a 11",,' , W(,1 " u"',1 because i I was 1,,", ,.,,'" v If) "'amin(' the loadings "I each ,,,al,, ,.n all the faCIOI', to ""'-" wl)(', h ("I' ('~,'h ,;ca k 1";,,If'd su 1,,[ ""l''' II\' on on I)" On .. factor. (:.. n Ii, Illot It'' v fa ('I or a" alvsc 5 w,", {' ",., " ""'h!l ",..1 hud of I(·-.i ng this 'I'" ',II, .n. Iwe,,,,(' 111<">{' analvses would n-qun ,. " mod .. 1 in which each ""I<- "':1S an irulir.uor of all bnors in II", ",,,(kl. Su"h ;1 model would ""'I"ir<' "'\'t'Lt! model nln'l1';lim, to 11<' l\lcmi{i,'d 'Ind wouill produce ;t ",I,lIion that w'" nOI rotated for simple '!)'\I('III],('.

., B<.','am(" lIlt' factor analyses did nol demonsrrure ,d("al discrirnin.tru validirv, item analyses were conducted to ,ktnmirl<' whether the ,uk, rould Iw improved. Zen}--()rder correlations lx-twecn each item om,] rlu: rorrecrcd IOlal SCOTe on the scale {i.c., lhe tOI,,1 of TIle scale 11(")", ('xciliding that item) wert- computed TO idcnrifv items th a 1 did ,,," <,urn, larr- with thr- 101 al score of the scale. For ""ch scale, ite-ms that h ,,,'I low ror r c lations with the toral scale "'ten' 'k leTed. \Ve (he n rcpli,.OI('d I he f;\C1o]' .inalvscs ",ing (he revised ,(',ties, Th"'e f~C1or a nalyses prod IIl'nl "ig-e nvalue plots and factor loadi n~, 1 h;!l were very similar I{) lIHJ-," obtained in our origi nal an a 1)'S<:'s ,

H, Although other scale lYP'" .md altitllde objects could have becn r-x.uni ned, on Iy a lirni ",d 'C I of at ritudr- obj("u., and sui" lilleS was ;ncluded so as nOll() laX subiecL<. The scale ')1)('5 Weft' ,,,It"Cled because 11t<,\, allowrd comparisons "ith the pilol >tudy ,,-' w('1i as wilh much of I h f pre\'ious research. Addilionally, five of lh" six aUi I ",It' objects were s.:ku('d occause Thurslone F.AI <lllilmk '(';lies exiskd for these objects (Sh"w & W'ight, 19(7), The ;mi lude ()1~eC1 s,uk," was used 10 provide A poi 111 of comparison belween ,he pi lot study and Sludy I and because aJknive and cognitive Thurstone EAI scales wn~ aVJilab],> for this obien (Breck ler, 19H1).

9, Although Ihi, scale did nOt demonslrale guod convergenl and di-'nilllinam validity in the pilol "udy and il W<lS nOl possible to construct a gf'neral evaillation scd" using lhi, method, it .... 'a,5 relained beGlLl.'" pre\ious ,-esearch ha, demon-,trated lhaT lhe affective and (O"nilive versions of scales similar 10 I h("se scale, are differentially pr('diClil'c of ;ttlitudes (Bre<:kler & Wiggins, 19R9), Therefore, further i fl\nl ;gation of the validily of this scale l}l)t' seenwd justified.

10. i\ccause " large numll('1 of ,uhJ"(ts faikll to respond to this i I<',n, it ",a-, nOl feasihle (0 include (he though I-listing ,,,Ales in the an "Iy'''s, Ilowner, a ,ubse I of Ihe subject' who adequate 11' compleled Th.- IhoughT-ii'ling scales w"re examined in supplf'mentary analyses. Th('se an;liy'es revealed thal (a) tire thoughl-li'ling scales did not (klllOnslra(e good di'cnminanl validit), and (b) the pauern of results rrl'oTl("d in Til i, article was nol ,ubstanli"lly ~ llen~d when the Though IIi,,;,,\,; sell(', wne incl"ded in the analv'es,

I I. Altho, 'gh The eig,'m'alue pi ()t5 indiraled Ih "t a two-faoor solulIun "'''-' (he most plausible rqm~>{'nTalion of 11r(" dala, Ihr .. e- and k",,.-fa,, or sohlliom ,,'ere abo ('xamin{"(l. N('ilh('r of (hese sollllions "i,' Irk, I" d<.'ar and co"",I('n l pau,., n of femll-, for (he lhird ,md fourth !':In"r" That i>, 110" Ihird and fOllrth !;\ClOr, w("re Ilsll"lIy represenled hI' " ,i nlik scale, and lh(" sr;de I h al lua(kd on t Iwse buors \'aried aC!'o .. ~ allit"de ohj("ct-'.

j:>, \'ar;max rota lion r"-'Itlts wetl" ,!I 50 examim'd and [(mod 10 oc WI\' ,i 111; 1",-. although di,,-,iminant \'ahdil\' wa, 1~'lln in th .. direct "bli'll;n rOl;lIioo,

j :1, AI in Ihe pilo! "lUd\" ,,'e usnl il('n) ;Ul;tly"" 1" idemit}' inomsis"-,,,I itt'll), Ih~1 did not {'o1Tel;u(" "ilh Ihe corr('ded IOtal seal .. 'cores.

(:'110:', ct ~ll. / PROPERTIES (>F XITITl I)ES 633

'1'1,,'''' """1\,,," iru lirau«! lhJ' vu t uallv ,,\I ,1<''''' 'HT<' 'I\'i'" good, 0:C\ ~'J ~ lit' ic:-.. .... , ~ h~ 1:"(' i a·IIIS • h at \ -, "!_' r t: t (' b .. u u .. ' l~ lLI1n.: h~lbk \'. .. -t'r.t.:. (it> l(·tcdt arid " i ,.j", llel b. 'I Of an "I\-,i, "',,' ,'oml ur In!. Th r- ,. ig('n\';o I L ". pi, '1-, and f,j( 10'- [o"ding., II'< 'Ill tl",,(' an"I\'\," w("n' w, ,. sirml,n In lil, os .. in the an~dys..':', 'l'ported.

J --I. 1'.<'(;1<"" 11,,· I "-,,,Its ,-,I' Siudv j ITI' .. "kd f(.-w dilk"'1Kc, among til .. multircsponse checklist: S('lI"lTllic dilkn·11Ii;d. ,md <IiI \ LOIO"'OUS (ht'('kli~1_. ~IW of these scak-s could have b,~('" ust-d.

I :), We ;tl;" tested the unstandardizcd codl; c icn IS, and dJe~" "n~ ly" ses prod uccd results I h at were virtuallv ide-nrica [_

1 (i, The intern al consistenrv and varian re of (he affen iw' and cogniuvc ":;'\('5 wer .. , examined to determine whether either or rnese two factors cou Id account for the differcn I ial predictive 1'0'1'('" of the affcr.tive a nd (ognil ive word-variation scales. Ncit he r xplan .uion, however, was rcnahk-.

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Received OCtober 5, 1992

Revision received December 31, 1993 Accepted February 3, 1991