The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation Rita Abrahamsen The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mat., 1997), 129-152. Stable URL: hitp://lnks,jstor.org/sie¥sici=0022-278X%28199703%2935%3A l% 3C129%3A TVOPFO%3E2.0,CO%3B2-Q The Journal of Modern African Studies is currently published by Cambridge University Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.huml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hhup:/www jstor.org/journals/cup hum Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ ‘Tue Feb 14 04:58:27 2006The Journal of Modern African Staiey, 93+ (997) BP 129-852 Copyright © 1997 Cambridge Universey Pres The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo- Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation by RITA ABRAHAMSEN* Ip the flourish of literature now attempting to explain transitions to democracy in sub-Saharan Africa a curious consensus has emerged concerning the relative importance of internal and external causes. It is almost uniformly maintained that the real causes were internal, and that international factors were merely supportive. Accordingly, John Wiseman claims in the introduction to his recently edited volume on democratic reform that changes in the global political environment ‘made things marginally less difficult for those in Africa seeking to democratise their political systems and marginally more difficult for those (mainly incumbent authoritarian elites) who sought to prevent them from doing so’, emphasis added. ‘This article takes issue with such reductionism of politics to the domestic level. Internal and external causes are interlinked and intertwined in such complex ways that what at first glance appears to be internal may on closer inspection reveal strong external influences. The attempt to determine the relative importance of each is thus deemed futile and prone to ideological bias. The assertion that exogenous factors are only inspirational and supportive implies that the international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors are neutral and disinterested observers of current events, rather than active and ideologically motivated participants in global and national debates and developments. This article argues that an understanding of the recent transitions to competitive politics in Africa requires the inclusion of donors and creditors as actors in their own right, and a neo- Gramscian approach is suggested as one way of achieving a more holistic analysis of democratisation, + Journalist and Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Polis, Univesity of Wales, Swansea, 2 Jolin A. Wiemaa, ‘Introduction: the movement towarde democracy. Global, Continental and State Perspectives’ in Wiseman (ed), Demrasy and Pata! Change in SaboSehran Aftca (London and New York, 1995), P-&130 RITA ABRAHAMSEN INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL CAUSES: THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW Contemporary literature tends to construct a dichotomy between internal and external causes of democracy by examining each in isolation, with little or no attention to the way in which the two levels of politics overlap and intertwine, This review of conventional explanations of Aftica’s democratic revival will follow the same dichotomy, starting with the causal importance commonly assigned to exogenous factors. The simultaneity between the end of the cold war, the fall of communism, and the ‘democratic wave’ in sub-Saharan Africa is too striking to be ignored, and most scholars acknowledge that the collapse of the bipolar world system influenced subsequent events on the continent. Aid policy during the cold war was shaped by strategic, geo- political considerations. East and West each supported Affican régimes in a game of ideological chess, securing allies and spheres of influence. African leaders were not, however, passive victims of this contest as they did not hesitate to play the two sides of against each other in order to attract and increase their foreign support. The end of superpower rivalry signalled an abrupt decline in Africa’s perceived strategic and economic importance, and the result was a substantive reduction, reallocation, or, in some cases, elimination of external sources of economic and political support for authoritarian régimes. The Soviet Union began this process of disengagement as part of President Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to solve the country’s enormous economic problems.* No longer fearful of communist expansion, western states followed suit. The United States reduced or eliminated military aid to long-term strategic allies like Kenya, Somalia, and Zaire, while France in May 1990 retreated (at least temporarily) from its interventionist policies by turning down President Félix Houphouét-Boigny’s request for French troops to help stop an army and police mutiny in Cote Ivoire. ‘The end of the cold war is frequently portrayed as a moral release for the West; finally it was “Freed from the perceived need to turn a blind eye to the domestic excesses of cold war allies’.? Corrupt and cruel dictators could now be abandoned without fear of communists filling © Margot Ligh, ‘Soviet Policy in the Third World’, in InnationalAfrs (London), 87, 2 April 199%, pp. 26-80, and Peter Shearman, ‘Gorbachev and the Third World: an era of relorm?' in Thin World Quart (London), 4, October t987, pp. 2083-17. Wiseman (ed), op. it P.DEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 131 the political vacuum, and this is perceived as allowing for the formulation of policy along more principled, ethical lines. The emergence of the ‘good governance’ agenda and political condition- ality for aid can be located at this juncture. By 19go most bilateral as well as multilateral donors like the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had announced that henceforth aid would only be available to states which had agreed to political reform. The World Bank, which is legally prevented by its Articles of Agreement from formally linking assistance to political criteria, had nevertheless indicated an unequivocal preference for liberal democracy in its 1989 report, Sub-Saharan Africa from crisis to sustainable growth. While good governance is generally presented as a moral and developmental cause, an alternative interpretation suggests that political conditionality was brought in to Justify a decline in Aftica’s share of economic assistance. The former ‘communist states became not only successfll competitors for western aid, but also presented the West with new and lucrative investment opportunities, further intensifying Africa’s marginalisation. Seen from this perspective, political conditionality provides ‘a morally comfort- able rationale for a basically self-interested policy to abandon the continent and leave Africans to their own devices’.! Whatever the motivation for political conditionality, most writers take a rather dim view ofits effectiveness, Not surprisingly, actual aid policy has failed to live up to the declared aims of the good governance agenda. The ‘ promotion of democracy’, although highly valued, must compete with other foreign policy concerns and more often than not loses the battle, In general, donors appear to be more interested in continued economic adjustment than democracy, and have been willing to extend credits to any government that adopts an approved liberalisation programme, despite poor progress with democratisation. Western powers also favour political stability and order to chaos and unrest, a preference which has been skilfully manipulated by a number of Aftican leaders, notably President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Some influence is, however, accorded to external pressures especially in the early stages of political liberalisation, Kenya is seen as the ‘success- ‘Michael Bratton, “Intemational Versus Domestic Presues for “Democratization” in [Altea', Conference on “The End ofthe Cold War: effects and prospects for Asia and Alia", Schoo! of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 21-22 October 1904. See slo, "Commentary: Easter Europe, Afie's Needs and the U.N.” in fica Rasoay (New York, 1990, pp. 15747, and Jolin-Jean Bary, “The New Palical Conditinalites: an independent view from Aca, in ZDS Bull Beighton), 24,2, 190%, pp. 16-35,132 RITA ABRAHAMSEN story’ of political conditionality, where the withdrawal of aid funds tipped the balance in persuading President Daniel arap Moi to accept multi-party elections.* Even so, donors have exerted little influence ‘over subsequent events. The Kenyan elections were a far cry from being ‘free and fair’, albeit endorsed by international observers.* And although Moi has continued his undemocratic style of government, donors and creditors have resumed normal aid and trade relations. Given the scepticism regarding the effectiveness of political aid conditionality and direct foreign pressures, much of the existing literature pinpoints so-called democratic ‘diffusion’ as a more significant external contributor to political change. Variously referred. to as ‘snowballing’ or the domino effect, the contagious nature of the process is captured by Samuel Huntington's metaphor of the democratic wave, gathering strength and engulfing country after country, continent after continent. Diffusion is explained in terms of extensive global communications which can make distant events seem close and relevant.” Democratic movements in one part of the world can thus draw encouragement and inspiration from successful struggles elsewhere, and earlier transitions can stimulate and provide models for subsequent efforts at political change. Although democratic contagion is said to occur largely on a regional level, the dramatic collapse of communist régimes is believed to have influenced events in Africa. Whereas their existence lent some political legitimacy to African one-party states, the show of popular power in the Eastern bloc is thought to have reduced fear and demonstrated to Africans that change was indeed possible. For instance, the leader of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy in Zambia, Frederick Chiluba (now President), is reported to have asked, ‘if the owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are the Africans to continue with it?”* Similarly, the founder of Tanzania’s ® Oversea Development Fnntut, Aid and Poitial Reform’, in ODI Brigg Pape (Loni), January 1992; Mark Robinson, "Will Poieal Cnditonaity Work?’ in IDS Bali 2, 1908. pp. sb-6b, and Peter Uvin, "Do as T Say, Notas To": the limi of politcal conaitionalty' In The Exrapean Journal of Desopmet Research (Londo), 1, 1908, pp. 63-84 Shocked, Shocked Lite’ in The Bromma (London), 9 Janaary 199.47, and Gisda Geiser, "Fair? What Has Fairets Got to Do with Ie? Vagaris of Blection Observations and Democratic Standards in The Journal of Modern Afcen Sues (Cambridge), $1, 4, December 998, PP: 63-37 ‘SamvclP. Hontington, The Thin Wave: demsrticntion in he ate tact cnry (Norman, 1d Anders Uni, “Transnational Democratie Diffusion and Indonesian Democracy “Third Wovld artery (Abingdon), 14, 1998, PP. 517-4 ‘Bratton and Nicola van de Walle, “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Aten’, in Gomperaie Pas (New York), July 1992, P-425,DEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 133 one-party state, President Julius Nyerere, conceded that Africa could learn a ‘lesson or two’ from Eastern Europe.” On the African continent, some of the events which contributed to the diffusion of democratic ideas in early 1990 included the release of Nelson Mandela, the emergence of independent Namibia, and Benin’s national con- ference,” which was televised to neighbouring countries. ‘Two closely related internal causes of democratisation have been presented in contemporary literature: economic decline and a crisis of legitimacy." Inspired by post-cold war triumphalism and with relatively little regard to theoretical discussions of legitimacy, recent explorations of democratisation frequently maintain that present-day authoritarian régimes suffer from an intrinsic problem of legitimation.'* Democracy is proclaimed as the ‘new global zeitgeist’, and ‘the only model of government with any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal the world today’.!® With the end of ideologies or even the end of history, an ‘inevitable trend toward democratic growth’ is identified." Authoritarian régimes are also seen to have been undermined by their economic failure. Due to the lack of legitimation principles for authoritarianism, most régimes sought to justify their rule though promises of economic growth, development, stability, or some other desired goal or state of affairs. As such hopes were not realised, popular dissatisfaction began to mount. Unlike in democratic states where poor economic performance and broken promises discredit only the present government, in authoritarian régimes their ‘failure to deliver’ can erode the legitimacy of the political system as such." * Hunsington, op cit. p. 288 © According to Jobn R. Helbruna, "Socal Origine of National Conferences in Benin and ‘Togo’ in The Joural of Medora Afron Stade, 1 2, ue t99. 278, “Since Benin inaugurated what might be described asthe “national conference movement” in February 1990, a number of ‘other Ain sates have followed sui. See, for example, Christopher Clapham, “Democratiation in Afiea: obstacles and prospect, i Thod Weld Quarts, 14, 3, 1998 Pp-425-38 aed John A. Wiseman, “Democracy nd the New Political Phra in Africa: caueen consequences nd significance im ibid PP, 39°49. 'a!Yanry Diamond, “Beyond Authoritaranism and Totalitarianism: strategies for democra- ation’, in The Washingon Quarter, 12, 198, pp. "43-63, and Juan J Ling, “Transidens to Democracy’ in ibid T1990 BP. 143-62, Lamy Diamond, Juan J Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Demaeary in Deselaing Cours, Vo. 2, Aiea (Boulder, CO, and London, 1988), p>. * Diamond, leet p.i4i, and Francie Fukuyama, “The End of History’, in The Nationa nurs (Washington, DC), Summer igi, pp. 3-5 a0 8-15, "Fora lone voice arguing tha legitimacy i lage relevant to the survival of authoritarian régimes, ce Adam Pracworski, ‘Some Problems in the Stay of Transitions to Democracy Guillermo O'Donnel, Palippe C. Schmittr, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Trasatio frm “Aurtran Rate, Vo. ,Conparativ Prpctices (Baltimore, 1988), and Demeracy and th Markt, political ad enon refrme in Basten Bre ond Latin Amores (Cambridge, 292). Fear and134 RITA ABRAHAMSEN It has been widely observed that Africa’s prolonged economic crisis undermined the developmental ideology which underpinned and legitimised the one-party state. At independence, African leaders based their rule on the promise of improved material welfare. But as the economic predicament worsened during the 1980s, the rhetoric of development sounded increasingly hollow. The gross domestic product of sub-Saharan Africa has been declining every year since 1980, and the capacity of states to meet the welfare needs of their citizens has steadily deteriorated or collapsed altogether. ‘The living standards of most groups have been drastically reduced, and more and more are living in acute poverty. At the same time, corruption, mismanagement, and hhuman rights abuses have persisted in what have been labelled “states without citizens’; states which exist only for themselves and their own beneficiaries, excluding the vast majority of the population."® The lack of legitimacy and state efficacy, as well as the general feeling of discontent and despair, stimulated mass demonstrations and the emergence of pro-democracy movements across the continent. These incorporated wide sections of the population, but especially prominent were urban workers, trade unions, and the middle classes, including students, teachers, and civil servants. It is with these broad-based popular protests against incumbents that the literature under review locates the real cause of Aftica’s democratic revival, ‘The standard position on the relative importance of domestic and international forces has been summarised in the following claim by Wiseman: ‘internal pressures...have played the major role and...external developments have, at most, contributed relatively modestly’.!” This contention is echoed throughout mainstream litera~ ture on democratisation. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, for instance, maintain in a widely cited article that external factors served as precipitating conditions, rather than causal ones."* The dominant view is thus that in the absence of domestic pro-democracy movements, aid conditionality and changes in the global political reprvsion can render legitimacy obsolete, and state contra ofthe means of coercion relies the heed for régimes to worry too mich about peoples ele in ther moral enilement to rule ‘According to Preework, the thea to authortanan leaders not the breakdven of legitimacy, thu the organisation of countershegemony,ofcllective project foram altemadve face. For & tener dicusionoflegitimacy, see David Beetham, The Laptimatin of Pacer (Basingstoke, 1991). Jolin A.A Ayoade, "State Without Citizens: an emerging Alcan phenomenon’, in Donald Rotihidd and Naomi Charan (eds), The Prearins Balan: slate aud sc sn Aca [Boulder and London, +988), pp. 00-18. Wiseman (ed), op ct P. " firatton and van de Walle lc. cl. . 420, See ao, Bratln, International Versis Domestic Presurs for “Democratization” in Aca", and Whemaa, “Democracy and the New Political Pluralism in AfiDEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 135 environment would have made little or no impact on Africa’s autocratic leaders. This interpretation draws support from research on Latin America, and perhaps most importantly from the influential Wilson Center’s 1986 project Transitions fiom Authoritarian Rule, the most theore' wide-ranging comparative study of democratisation to date. concluding volume, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter state that ‘it seems to us fruitless to search for some international factor or context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse’, They therefore conclude that ‘the reasons for launching a transition can be found predominantly in domestic, internal factors’.*° However, Laurence Whitehead has added a vital proviso to this generalisation; it holds only fora particular geographical area, and in a specific historical period. It refers to countries in which “local political forces operated with an untypically high degree of autonomy”.?" The same can hardly be said about contemporary Africa, a point which will be elaborated later. DISPELLING A FICTITIOUS DICHOTOMY Nearly two decades ago Peter Gourevitch remarked that ‘students of comparative politics treat domestic structure too much as an independent variable, underplaying the extent to which it and the international system are parts of an interactive system’.*® As we have seen, this observation holds true also for contemporary scholarship on democratisation in Aftica, with its rigid construction of an internal external dichotomy. This separation is only instructive as a heuristic device, and even as such its usefulness is limited. Countries do not exist in isolation from each other, and polities cannot meani separated into distinct categories as national and international. The foundation of this conventional, empiricist distinction is the boundaries of the state system. Empiricist research attempts to understand social reality in terms of methodological individualism, and the real or Guilermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmiter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transioe: fom Aaterion Rule, Vos. 1-4 (Balimoe, 1986) 'S Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C.Sehmiter, i ibid. Vol. 4, Tasatie Conlon Abo Unetain Demure, p18. "Laurence Whitehead, International Aspects of Democratization’ inibid, Vol 3, Comparative Pape es eter Gourevtch, “The Second Image Reversed: the international sources of domestic pelts, in tnernational Organization (Cambridge, MA), 92, 4 1978, p. goo.136 RITA ABRAHAMSEN perceived aims, intentions, and functions of rational actors, Within the study of International Relations, the norm is to treat individual states as the central (rational) actor. This approach has been challenged by the new international political economy, which asserts that the growth. of transnational relationships renders the traditional state-centric perspective invalid.” Pethaps more than any other historical period, ours is characterised by interdependence between states and their societies.** Governmental and non-governmental institutions, transnational corporations and markets continually cross borders, and the actions taken by one actor are likely to affect the choices and possibilities of others. In a world increasingly dominated by a global capitalist system, more and more decisions lie outside the direct control of individual states. Robert Cox has noted that such key agencies of government as the finance ministry, the central bank, and the presidential office have become increasingly linked to each other, and to external institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Asa consequence, states are continually forced to adopt policies which reflect inter- national as much as domestic imperatives."* Integration into the world economy also has profound effects on state-society relations and class structures. It may enhance the position of some groups, reduce the influence of others, and introduce international capital (in the form of transnational companies) as a significant actor in national politics. Moreover, the state, and groups associated with the state, frequently use their international réle and recognition to consolidate their own position, External resources can be deployed to contain domestic threats, as exemplified by the financial and military aid extended to many African régimes lacking internal support. In this way, much of international relations can be regarded as the “internationalization of domestic conflicts’.** Both empirically and conceptually then, the internal-external dichotomy is unsound. The conventional methodological individualism and rational actor explanations of social change are not sufficient, and need to be combined with closer attention to the historical context, % See Stephen Gill and D. Lav, The Gaba! Polal Econ (Baltimore, 19), and Craig N. Murphy and Reger Toore (eds), The Neo InonatonalPaliscal Hanon (Boulder, 1991) asec, for example, Robert O, Keshane and Joreph S. Nye, Paver aad Intdipdace: wold ole i nonaion (Boston, 1977) "Robert W. Cox, Proucon, Pouer and Wold Orde sal forces inte making of tory (New York, 17), p 250, Fred Talliday, ‘State and Society in, International Relations: a second agenda’, Milton: joural of itaratinal stades (London), 1, 2, 1987, 9.223DEMOCRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 137 structural relations, and their political and cultural conditions of existence. National actors and structures have various international conditions of existence which ensure their functioning and reproduc- tion, in the same way as the global system is conditioned by complex domestic configurations and circumstances. Further, it should be noted that the conditions of existence of both the internal and the external are sustained and reproduced by the same capitalist world economy. This renders national boundaries virtually meaningless, and casts doubts on any argument for the structural or functional autonomy of the internal. Accordingly, the concept of causes of democratisation supersedes any given national borders In trying to understand and explain democratisation, international fluences must therefore be perceived in broader terms than currently fashionable, It is not sufficient simply to assess the effectiveness of political aid conditionality and direct foreign pressures, and then add @ measure of “democratic diffusion’. Our analysis must also take account of how the various countries are integrated into the international system of states, the world economy, and their place within the international division of labour. Global economic and political conjunctures shape the dynamics of domestic development, and the neglect of the interplay ofthe internal and the external severely impoverishes contemporary explanations of democratisation in Africa. In brief, we need to recall Gourevitch’s conclusion that international relations and domestic politics are so interrelated that they should be analysed simultaneously, as wholes. The many ways in which the international system affects domestic polities have in the past been illuminated by numerous scholars. For example, Perry Anderson has shown how international conflicts and wars were central to the process of state-building in Eastern and Western Europe, while Theda Skoepol’s excellent study has revealed the importance of external factors in stimulating the revolutions in France, Russia, and China. Modern warfare, the archetypical form of international politics, has frequently led to the extension of the franchise due to its incorporation of the masses.*7 ‘The effects of the world economy on domestic polities have been analysed in a number of notable studies. Late development, Alexander Gerschenkrohn argued in a well-known essay, necessitated a more See Perry Anderson, Pasig fom Anti toFadaion (New York, 1974), a Lineage of he Absaatit State (New York, 1994), nd Theda Skocpol, States and Seve Relations: comparetive nays Frc, Russa, and Cn (Cambridge, 1979) Ale, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn uber Stephens, and John D: Stephens, Capaor Deepest and Demaray (Cambridge, 1993),138 RITA ABRAHAMSEN active and interventionist economic rdle for the state,*® thus partly explaining what is now generally known as the ‘over-developed’ state. His ideas have been supported by work on import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) in Latin America, although Albert Hirschman,2? and even more so the dependency theorists, see late development as a definite obstacle to progress, not a potential advantage. They do, however, agree with Gerschenkrohn’s contention that late indus- trialisation tends to favour authoritarian rule as part of the effort to mobilise capital and repress wages. For example, O'Donnell has explained bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America as the state’s response to the class conflicts and problems engendered by dependency and import-substitution industrialisation.® The reasons why the recognition of the interconnectedness of internal and external politics has been abandoned by the democra- tisation literature are unclear, and to a certain extent baffling. One possible explanation is that the neglect of the external represents a reaction to the exaggerated claims of dependency theory which more or less derived domestic politics from the international system, Internal political forces in the periphery were given litle or no autonomy, and were seen as wholly dependent on the core which controls the international capitalist system. The peripheral countries were therefore doomed to perpetual dependency and underdevelopment, forever the slaves of the rich core. But it is not just the dependency school that is guilty of this kind of enslavement’. The dominant paradigm, modernisation theory or the ‘political development’ school, as well as the media, tend to see Africa asa passive entity acted upon, rather than actively shaping its own past and future, Coloured by Eurocentricism, much mainstream literature has perceived Africa as an object of intervention and study, not an autonomous subject possessing political will. It is as if the continent's history did not begin until the arrival of Buropean explorers and traders, and then the slave trade, colonisation, and independence happened to Africa. In a similar vein, contemporary debates make much of the colonial origins of the modern state and its lack of roots in Alexander Gerschenkrohn, Boom Baars in Hsia! Paspcve (Cambridge, MA, Albert ©, Hirschman, A Bit for Hye: sys oh decopmet of Latin America (New Haven, ©, r970) 1 Guillermo O'Donnell, Moderation and Brreauratic Atorarianism (Berkeley, 1973). Much ofthe literature dealing withthe influence of exogenous factors on domestic plc i assed in Gabriel A. Almond, "Review Arte: The Intemational-Natinal Connection yin Brith Jewel (of Paice Since (Cambridge), 19, 1984, pp 237-58DEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 139 indigenous society ~ again the fact that Africa was acted upon becomes a defining feature, There is today an expressed desire among Africanists to give Africa back its own history," to excavate its historicity and place recent developments within the Braudelian longue durée. This ambition, although timely and honourable, may contribute to the emphasis placed on internal pro-democratic movements as opposed to international dynamics. Another possible explanation for the cursory treatment of exogenous factors is perhaps a genuine democratic inclination on behalf of scholars. It is doubtful whether democracy can be given to or imposed on a people, as expressed by the Oakeshottian view that this form of government must grow organically from its own history in individual countries.*® Democracy implies by its very nature the right to self determination, democratic citizenship, and independent choice. If democracy is seen to be forced upon a country or delivered mainly from the outside in exchange for financial assistance, its essential properties are somehow reduced. Reversely, by emphasising the indigenous, popular roots of recent transitions, the process somchow appears more democratic, more authentic. Whatever the excesses of past approaches, it must be recognised that dependency is a fact for most countries in Africa. Following the economic downturn of the 1970s, African régimes have become increasingly reliant on overseas aid. Owing to poor credit ratings, they have no alternative but to deal with the IMF and the World Bank for new loans, not least since most other sources of funding, including bilateral donors, require that the borrower has an agreement with these Washington-based institutions, so that failure to achieve their support means loss of financial assistance across the board. Accordingly, the IMF has been described as a de facto receiver to African governments, able to impose mandatory conditions on its borrowers.** In recent years the effective governance of Africa has been gradually transferred from its official political leaders and formal political organs to the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, Michael Lofchie has observed that today ‘the critically important decisions that affect the lives and destinies of % atick Chabal (ed), Palital Domination in Africa: rifles om heli of pacer (Cambridge, +985); James Manor (ed) Rethinking Third Ward Pots (London, 1991); amd Jean-Frangois Bayan, The Sen dfn hep ofthe ely (London and New York, 109) *e Femnand Braudel, On Histo (Chicago, 1980) original French ext published in 196 angus that history should be examining the evaltion of clans a tealtes ofthe long inexhaustible past. Michael Oakeshott, Rtinalon in Pair and Oter Eisay (London, 16) © Trevor W, Parfitt and Stephen P- Riley, "The International Politics of Arcan Debt in Palteal Statics (Oxford 35,1987, B.5.140 RITA ABRAHAMSEN AMtica’s people are made by the officials of these institutions?.® In other words, the external environment does more than simply condition national developments; external actors actively formulate and dictate domestic policies. Dependency does not, however, as Jean-Francois Bayart has forcefully demonstrated, negate historicity. On the contrary, Africa’s “unequal entry into the international systems has been for several centuries @ major and dynamic mode of the historicity of African societies, not the magical suspension of it’ Throughout time, from the trans-Saharan caravan routes to the present, Africans have interacted with outsiders. They have not been passive puppets of world events, but actively shaped their own historicity and polities in interaction with the external environment. Contrary to common interpretations, John ‘Thornton has recently argued that Africa was not coerced into the slave trade, but that the élites took part in the trade voluntarily as a way of obtaining luxury goods.” Similarly, colonialism did not only happen to Africa, it was also used and given definition by Africans themselves. Various sections of the population used the colonial system to further their own ends and strengthen their position in relation to others. Infiuential élites were formed by their relationship to the colonial powers and external capital, and today they continue to derive much of their income and status from their links with the international system, The perception of dependency has also been skilfully manipulated by Affican leaders seeking to consolidate their own position vis-a-vis society. Development aid, for example, has enabled many dictators to cling on to power, and the image of a victimised and powerless continent has at times served to excuse them from responsibility for ‘Africa’s predicament. Dependency should not therefore be glossed over, nor taken to imply the passivity of the inhabitants. Rather we need to pay attention to ‘the capacity of Aftican societies to construct their own dependency’,** as well as the way in which external factors filter through domestic society and contribute to overall socio-economic and political developments, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Indeed, this interaction with the international system is crucial to an understanding of recent political events. Michael Loch, Perestroika Without Glanost: reflections on structural adjustment’, ia Bayynd Atoragy sn Apes (Adana, 1980), Carter Center Working Paper Serie, p 2 *WBayare op. eit. 27. John Thoraton, dic and African inthe Romation fhe Attic Wor, 10-1080 +098) Bayar, op. et px.DEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 141 LEGITIMAGY UNDERMINED BY STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT? Contemporary literature is inclined to analyse Africa's economic and political crisis with reference only to internal deficiencies. The focus is ‘on domestic political incompetence generated by the dynamics of the neo-patrimonial state. While these factors are of clear relevance, they should not be emphasised to the detriment of exogenous influences, like changes in the world economy and the pervasiveness of supernational interventions. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have been a salient feature of Africa during the past 15 years or so, and represent an important articulation of the continent's interaction with the inter- national environment, In fact, the economic crisis and the lack of legitimacy identified as the domestic causes of democratisation cannot be divorced from externally imposed adjustment programmes. Inspired. by neo-liberalism, the general design of SAPs is by now all too familiar and needs no detailed description.” Suffice to say that the emphasi ‘on privatisation, market efficiency, proper pricing policies, and so on, invariably leads to a dismantling or radical reduction of the economic and welfare role of the state. Adjustment amounts to a commodification of public services like health and education, with safety nets for the poor and vulnerable grafted on in more recent years. So far the ‘miracle of the market” has failed to materialise. On the other hand, evidence of the negative effects of SAPs continues to mount. Those few countries which have achieved some macro-economic stability have done so at the expense of growth, investment, and human welfare. ‘The adjustment programmes tend to worsen living conditions by depressing real incomes, and have been a recipe for deepening poverty, widening social polarisation, and increasing unemployment across the continent.” ‘The adjustment efforts have right from the start been accompanied by opposition, and have stimulated numerous urban riots against declining wages and soaring prices. When the Sudan devalued its * See for example, Paul Mosley, Jane Hareigan, and John Toye, Aidend Paver: th Wald Bank and oly based ling, Val. (Landa, 1991), and Fian Tarp, Salzman Sractral Adie ‘manana frome or nang teen insxbSeharan Aja (Landon and New Yor, 1998) “® Giovanni Andeea Cornia, Richard Joly, and Frances Stewart (ods). Adutnen th Huma Face Nol 1, Protecting the Vara and Pimting Groth (Ofer, 1087); Giovana Andes Corin, 1s Structural Adjustment Conducive to Long-Term Development? ‘The Case of AfFien in the Bos", Queen Elizabeth House/Centro Stas Lea d’Aeliano, Development Studies Working Paper No. 42, Oxford, 1998; and Frances Stewart, "The Many Faces of Adjustnen, in World Dasdopment (Ondo, 19, 12, 1991, PP 1847-54142 RITA ABRAHAMSEN currency in the early 1980s by 44 per cent and raised fuel and sugar prices in compliance with an IMF agreement, it caused angry protests which left several dead and resulted in the régime abandoning the programme and being declared ineligible for further loans. In 1986 violent demonstrations in Zambia against the elimination of food subsidies in accordance with adjustment policies claimed the lives of at least 20 people, while Benin’s capital suffered from public sector strikes in 1989, with central ministries being unable to pay civil servants and. teachers because the régime was bankrupt.*™ Several more examples could be listed,*? but the important point here is that the protests which swept the continent in the early t990s were of a similar economic nature, Unrest was normally sparked off by bread-and-butter issues, and most protests were started by interest groups trying to improve or defend their material condition in the face of austerity measures." While the urban poor swelled the ranks of street demonstrations, the educated middle classes made up the backbone of the democracy movements. Their purchasing power had been eroded by high inflation and devaluation made luxury imports unaffordable, causing many to search for alternatives to the existing political leadership. Given the importance of neo-patrimonial and clientelistic relationships in most of ‘Africa, economic crisis and adjustment measures are also likely to have affected the cohesion of the national élite. Austerity may have undermined the ability of régimes to use patronage to stem opposition, and reduced the opportunities for the favoured few to collect the ‘rents? their jobs previously accorded them easy access to, In some instances, ‘economic decline may have pushed political élites to oppose incumbents in order to protect their own sources of income. This effect of adjustment should not, however, be exaggerated, as state élites are in the best position to benefit from liberalisation policies so that privatisation, for instance, does not necessarily represent a radical break with the past.!® Austerity measures may also concentrate what 4 Robert HJackion, Qua Slater segs, intranets, and the Thied World (Cambridge, 1990); John O. Voll (ed), Sadon, Sate and Sai ix Criss (Bloomington, 1991) Peter Gibbon, ‘Structural Adjustment and Presnnes Toward Mlt-Partyiem in Sub Saharan Alica in Gibbon, Yuwuf Bangura, and Aeve OBtad (eds) thriarinim, Damoray, and Adina: te lis of emo reform Aiea (Uppsala 1992); and Heilbrunn, lect. pp. 285-6. 4° Sce Joti Walton and Davi Selon, Fee Market and Fand Ris: he ples goal astent (Oxford, 194) Bratton and van de Walle, loc. i See Jenifer A. Wider (ed), Eaoamic Change en Pll Libraliction in SabSaharan Ace (Baltimore and London, 199). 18 See, for example, Rosemary E_ Galli, Liberalization is Not Enough: structural adjustment and peasants in Guinea-Bisau’, in Ree of African Palital Exmomy, 4 1990, Pp. 32-68% Aled BZtck-Willns, "Sierra Leone: cre nd despair’ in ibid. pp as; and Gibbon, lo. ctDEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 143 little patronage is available in the hands of the President, thus strengthening, rather than reducing, his power and control. ‘This sketchy and generalised picture shows that SAPs have had a profound impact on Aftica’s economic, social, and political devel- opment, and the emergence of pro-democracy movements across the continent cannot be explained without reference to these programmes. The widespread feeling of disillusionment and discontent is bound up with externally imposed austerity measures, and mass demonstrations ‘were directed as much against these as against the political system. The Bretton Woods institutions, and the western donor countries which support their analyses and demands, therefore contributed to under- mining the legitimacy of Affican rulers. This is not to say that external actors are singularly responsible for Africa’s economic malaise, nor that the situation necessarily would have been much better or different without their intervention. Such statements can be nothing but guesswork, as the relevant counterfactual knowledge is wholly absent. However, the IFIs must take at least part of the blame for Aftica’s dismal economic performance and the associated lack of régime legitimacy. SAPs have not worked, and alternative strategies have been effectively blocked by the ideological commitment of the World Bank and the IMF to neo-liberalism. By actively shaping and directing the response to the economic crisis, these two institutions have become deeply involved in domestic politics. Adjustment policies have affected the power of the state zis-i-ris society and the international system, as, well as the balance of power between classes and sections of the population, The politics of adjustment have been played out in individual countries. Imposed measures have been implemented, ‘manipulated, changed, or altogether neglected by politicians. Various groups have responded to adjustment in different ways, with a variety of survival strategies and coping mechanisms. Over time, the internal and the external have become interwoven in complex ways, so much so that we cannot with any degree of certainty say where one begins and the other ends. What remains clear is that the politics of democra- tisation cannot be reduced to the domestic level, because the internal and the external are inextricably linked.*® “ Femnand Braudel, Cisization and Capitation, Vol 2, The Pepete ofthe World (London, +98).44 RITA ABRAHAMSEN OBJECTIVE TRUTHS OR SUBJECTIVE PRESCRIPTIONS? The claim that external factors are only of an inspirational, supportive character amounts to an implicit acceptance of attempts by the IFls, and in particular the World Bank, to absolve themselves from any responsibility for Africa’s economic failure and to present their policy prescriptions asa set of technical truths. A perception of the IFIs, as neutral and technocratic, as opposed to ideological and political, permeates conventional scholarship and is also enshrined in the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement. These expressly forbid the Bank from using non-economic and political criteria in its lending operations, and. from interfering in the political affairs of its members.” The authors of the early drafts of the Articles, including John Maynard Keynes, were eager (0 stress that the institution should at all times be guided by ‘technical considerations of economy and efficiency, rather than ideological and political preferences’."* It is therefore not surprising that the Bank’s ‘good governance’ terminology has a rather techno- cratic resonance, focusing on issues like effective financial accounting, public-sector management, legitimacy, and accountability, instead of arguing explicitly for liberal democracy. This undertone of manageri- alism has led several writers to infer that there are, in fact, two different “good governance’ agendas: the overtly political, liberal democratic agenda of the West, and the Bank’s managerial and administrative interpretation stressing the ‘process of government’.*? Such a separation of economics and politics is, of course, charac- teristic of much liberal discourse. Moreover, the notion that the World Bank’s recommendations can be value-free and merely technocratic is symptomatic of the empiricist/positivist epistemology of current rescarch orthodoxy. The hallmark of empiricist epistemology is an ontological distinction between subject and object, which in turn produces the possibility of objective knowledge. Empiricism treats the fact as identical with the real signified by it. Facts or evidence are seen as given, and diverse theoretical and conceptual frameworks are simply ‘means which facilitate the production of knowledge without influencing the outcome. However, the subjectivity of research and the extent to vid Bank’ Articles of Agreement, II, Section 5(b), IV, Section 20, and V, Section 5) Ibrahim FT. Shibata, The World Bank ino Changing Weld: lected erays (Dordrecht, 1991), Pp. 2 Sc, for example, Mick Moore, “Intsduction’, in IDS Balin. 24, 1909, pp. 1-93 Adrian Lefewieh, ‘Governance, Democracy and Development in the Thied World", in Thid World parent, 4 5, 1998, PP; 805-243 25d Thomas M. Callaghy, “Affica: filing of the map, in Grant Histry (Philadelphia), Jamvary 1994. PP 3DEMOCRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 145 which the intellectual is embedded within society, intimately linked to contemporary material concerns and political battles, have been established by a series of powerful critiques of conventional academic discourse. As argued by Abbas Vali, facts cannot therefore be treated as given, rather ‘facts are discursive constructs; they signify the real, and never can be identical with it. The constructive concept of the fact as such undoubtedly undermines the idea of objective knowledge’.** In ‘other words, the facts which form the basis of the Bank’s allegedly value-free theories and doctrines of development are discursive constructs, and as such are affected by socio-economic and political interests. The production of knowledge is a social process linking subject and object, and hence cannot be divorced from the identity and material interests of those who espouse it. Theory does not exist in a vacuum, and intellectual work is often directly or indirectly linked to political strategies. Cox has even argued that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’.”" It follows that SAPs and the good governance agenda must be analysed with reference to the interests of the IFIs and the western capitalist countries which dominate their policy-making. It is well- known that the Bretton Woods institutions reflect the political and economic preferences of the states that make up the bulk of their resources, as illustrated by the ideological shift which took place in the World Bank following the rise of neo-liberalism and right-wing leaders the United States, Britain, and Germany in the early 1980s. The Reagan Administration criticised the Bank for promoting socialism and undermining capitalist development, and for not being ‘vigorous in using the leverage inherent in its large lending programmes to press recipients to redirect their economies toward a market orientation’.** US pressure of this kind initiated the Bank’s conversion from Keynesian development economics to neo-liberalism and monetarism, Despite the technocratic language, the World Bank’s recommenda- tions are, of course, far from neutral, nor built on purely technical judgements regarding economic efficiency. Both SAPs and the good governance agenda contain clear ideological preferences and very Abbas Vali, “Writing Iranian History, Objective Truths and Dscunive Constructs: reply to reviewer’ in Cri oral of cal stds of Iran andthe Middle East (Hamline, MN}, Spring 1996, p. 110. Se, also, his Pre Capiali Iran> heal hry (London, 1993). Robert W. Cox, “Socal Fores, States and World Orders: beyond interational relations theory, in Robert O, Keohane (od) Naealim ad Itt Cites (New Work, 1986), p 207. Cons ‘say seas ist published in Allon 10 2, tol, pp. 126-55 SP Quoted in Robert L. Ayres, Banling 6 te Porth World Bunt and word poser (Cambridge, MA, 1983), po.146 RITA ABRAHAMSEN specific notions of what constitute the ‘good society’, notably a minimal state and a free market. Such prescriptions only generate ‘neutral’ conclusions for those who already accept the underlying liberal principles; for those who do not, the advice to cut food subs and introduce fees at health clinics is far from ‘technocrat ‘The Bretton Woods institutions share a normative réle as the promoters ofa liberal world economy, and their programmes are designed to open up national economies to international capital. The good governance agenda can be seen to represent an extension of this réle, and has an underlying economic rationale which should not be ignored. Donors and creditors have explained the failure of SAPs to generate growth on the African continent by asserting that political factors, or “poor governance’, stood in the way of the ‘right” economic policies. In the words of the World Bank, ‘a crisis of governance’ underlies the “Titany of Africa's development problems’. Good governance can thus, be seen as intended to improve the effectiveness of adjustment programmes, and political conditionality may well have more to do with enforcing free market policies than with exporting democratic principles. At any rate, the interests, values, and motivations of international actors must be analysed when discussing this agenda. It is bordering on the politically naive to treat the political and economic ideas emanating from donors and creditors as neutral and merely technocratic. This, however, is the logical conclusion of statements which assert that international factors have been merely inspirational and supportive of political change. But donors and creditors are not disinterested, detached observers of world events. They do not seck simply to understand and describe the world, but to actively shape it in their image and to maintain the hegemonic world order. ee be The above discussion suggests a need for an interpretative framework which can take sufficient account of the role of external actors in Africa’s democratisation process, without falling into the dependency trap whereby the domestic participants are treated as passive puppets A satisfactory framework must also be able to locate the democratic 5 World Hank, Subsahars Afr: fom ris anal rth A Long-Term Pespctive Say (Washington, DC, 198), p. 6, See ak, Gibbon, oe. ct and Carol Lancaster, ‘Governance and Development: the views from Washington’ in IDS Balin, 24,1, 1998, PD. 5-15DEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 147 struggle in the materie! interests of both internal and external forces, without reducing the political to the economic. The remainder of this article draws on new developments within international political economy, and in particular the emerging neo-Gramscian perspective, in an attempt to contribute to the construction of such an alternative analytical approach. DEMOCRATISATION — A CONTINUATION OF AFRICA’S PASSIVE REVOLUTION? Antonio Gramsci’s own work was primarily concerned with class (proletarian) and national (Italian) political processes, and the application of his ideas to the study of international polities is a relatively recent phenomenon. The pioneering work of Robert Cox has been followed by several innovative, neo-Gramscian approaches to international relations and international political economy which challenge the state-centric focus of realism and empiricism." The historical materialism of Gramsci stresses the totality of social systems, and invites us to consider structures and their conditions of existence, as well as agency. In his theoretical framework, ideas, culture, politics, and economics overlap and are reciprocally related. This is especially important to an understanding of hegemony, the unifying concept of his political thought. Political power for Gramsci involves both coercion and consent. Hegemony in his terminology refers to the consensual aspects of political domination, to the ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ of the dominant social group.® It signifies the success of dominant classes in persuading others to accept and internalise their views, values, and norms. Their conception of reality becomes all-pervasive, directing and informing the behaviour and thought of all groups in society. ‘The hegemonic order is constructed and reinforced by the state, as well as by the various institutions in civil society like the church, the educational system, the media, and so on. Hegemony erases the conventional distinctions between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’; structure Robert W. Co, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations an essay in metho in Mite, 12, 5 1984, pp. 162-75, “Social Forces, States and World Orders" and Prodctsn, Pour and Werid Order; Kees van det Pil, The Mating ofan Atlantic Raling Class (London, 1984); Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, Amsrica’s Quat for Supremacy andthe Third World (London, 1988); and Stephen Gil ed), Cra, Histurical Matra and Iteration Relations (Cambridge, +993) actin from the Prion Nae of Antone Gram ited and translated by Quintin Hoare ad Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London, 1971), P. 57,148 RITA ABRAHAMSEN and superstructure come together to form an organic unity, or a historic bloc, the unification of material forces, institutions, and ideologies.°* Gramsci applied the concept of hegemony to analyse relations among social groups within given societies. He regarded national boundaries as the boundaries of separate social systems, stating that “The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their history is essentially the history of States and of groups of States’. However, as the capitalist world economy continues to expand, the history of the dominant classes can no longer be said to coincide with the history of states. Given the increasing significance of transnational relationships and institutions linking the powerful states and their lites, itis germane to extend the concept of hegemony to such global relationships. This is especially so since Gramsci himself recognised that international relations intertwine with...internal relations’. ‘Translated to the international level, hegemony does not simply imply the domination of one country over others. It encapsulates global social, economic, and political structures, and draws attention to the cultural and ideological aspects of the world order. Tt refers to an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries.* World hegemony is also expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which contain the general rules of behaviour for states, and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries. World hegemony has thus been described by Cox as a ‘coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of the world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality’.® International organisations play an integral rdle in the production and maintenance of world hegemony. They are themselves products of the hegemonic order, and perform a crucial ideological role in legitimating its norms and values, as discussed above with reference to the Bretton Woods institutions and their normative role as promoters of a liberal world economy. World hegemony also entails the formation of a transnational historic bloc, which is associated with the dominant interests in the metropolitan countries and their counterparts elsewhere. ‘The relevance of world hegemony to democratisation in Africa can be further analysed by utilising the concept of the passive revolution 6 Ibid. p. 368 © bid. p52 Ibid, pa © Cox, op it 1985, FC, ta. et 1986, 235,DEMOCRATISATION: A NEO-GRAM! AN PERSPECTIVE 149 which, according to Gramsci, occurred in countries where the national bourgeoisie was too weak to establish hegemony in the sense of an ideological bond between itself and the masses. It is thus described as ‘revolution’ without a ‘revolution’,"" a process of change presided over by established élites whose use of ‘revolutionary’ change helps to consolidate their power and maintain the existing social order. Importantly, the impetus for a passive revolution arises not out of a “vast local economic development... but is instead the reflection of international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery’. Gramsci argued that the bourgeois revolutions of England and France reached Italy as a passive revolution, whereas Bayart has applied this mode of analysis to the process of state building in post-colonial Africa."™ A passive revolution leaves an uneasy balance between the old order, which is about to die, and the new élites, not yet born. A central feature is therefore trasformismo, whereby the actual or potential leaders of hostile groups or subordinate classes are incorporated into élite networks, a practice that can be regarded as a political tool to prevent the formation of counter-hegemony. According to Bayart, the concept of the passive revolution effectively synthesises the rise of the new educated classes to power, their seizure of state resources, and their compromise with the previous holders of power, as well as their refusal to enhance and radicalise the popular movements against colonialism. There is at times a striking resemblance between Gramsci’s descriptions of Risorgimento Italy and the political processes of post-colonial Africa. The concept of transformism, for instance, captures the absorption by the new classes, by stick or by carrot, of counter-élites likely to fight the cause of the poorer sections of society. Gramsci saw that this ‘absorption of the enemies” elites means their decapitation, and annihilation often for a very long time’."" This is precisely what happened in most African states. In much the same way as popular southern discontent in Italy failed to find an effective expression due to the co-optation of the movement’s potential ideological and political leaders, so African protests have lacked a clear political direction, Discontent has manifested itself as ‘anarchic turbulence’,® as sporadic rioting, looting, and delinquency, deprived of clear theoretical consciousness and a sense of an overall political purpose. It is thus important to note that the concept of the passive revolution does not so much stress the essential passivity of the 1 Grams, op tp 59. © id. p. a, © Bayar, op. it Gramsci, op. cit p30. Ibid po150 RITA ABRAHAMSEN masses, but rather their inability to challenge their energies in ways which can prevent a decisive compromise between élites."* Hegemony, on the national and/or international level, is not won once and for all but requires constant defending and reorganisation. Tt also ‘presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and. that a certain compromise equilibrium, should be formed ~in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic- corporate kind’."" The provision of welfare services can be seen as an expression of such concessions, which preserves the capitalist social order by making it more acceptable to the subordinate classes. Hegemonic ideology represents in many ways a glorified version of existing socio-economic and political arrangements, but this idealised formulation also provides subordinate groups with the ideas and symbolic tools for a critique of the social order. As regards the masses, their consent to the hegemonic order is essentially passive. They have their own conception of the world but, as we have seen, lack the theoretical knowledge to act on their discontent. However, if the gap between the hegemonic ideal and the experienced reality of the majority gets too wide, there is fertile ground for counter-hegemonic ideas. A successful hegemonic ideology must be able to absorb such ideas and prevent them from turning into a general availability of radical thought, a counter-hegemonic alternative. This argument seems to be able to explain some important aspects of the recent trend towards democratisation. The hegemonic message of national unity, development, and growth, which the post-colonial one-party state disseminated in order to legitimate its rule, became increasingly distant from the lived reality of the African majority. ‘The demand for socio-economic change and democracy as articulated by the poorer sections of society was a revolt against a leadership whose performance had caused considerable hardship and suffering. ‘The conception of democracy prevailing among the masses in Aftican countries embodied a number of social-democratic welfarist aspirations, and represented a threat to the established social order. These counter- hegemonic ideas can be seen to have been absorbed by the African leaders of the passive revolution and their partners in western capitalist states, and re-emerged in the good governance agenda. But democracy Paul Ginborg, “Gramsci and he Era of Bourgeois Revolution in Italy’, in John A, Davis (et), Gram and ahs Pie Reston (London, 1979) © Gramsci, op. ct p. 161 % Joueph V. emia, Grams Political Thought (Osford, 198%), pp. 95-45DEMOGRATISATION: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE 151 as defined by this agenda is fundamentally different; it is a liberal market democracy where the services of the state are scaled down, and the emphasis is on elections and formal political rights rather than concrete socio-economic rights. Given this interpretation, democracy becomes complementary and supportive of hegemonic goals for the expansion of the capitalist world economy. ‘The success of this act of transformism is manifested by the common perception of a world-wide democracy movement where the IFIs, the ‘western governments, and the poor are seen to share the same goals and aspirations, The practice of making aid conditional on political reform has gained legitimacy and acceptance with reference to domestic pro-democracy movements, and donors and creditors are frequently perceived as joining forces with a generally undefined civil society against the oppressive African state, The fall of the one-party state and the holding of multi-party elections are then regarded as the ultimate victory and empowerment of the people. Such an interpretation stems from a common theoretical misconception which fails to recognise democracy as a contested concept which can be the means towards different ends for the various actors involved, and also effectively conceals the fact that despite elections and sometimes a change of president and ruling party, status quo has been maintained. Some gains have been achieved in terms of civil and human rights, and this has widened the space in which popular mobilisation for future change can take place, Nevertheless, the same élites are still in power, and the same socio-economic arrangements persist. Indeed, democratisation appears to be a continuation of Africa’s passive revolution, and amounts to little more than a new popular ratification of the prevailing social order. CONCLUDING REMARKS ‘This article has argued that the conventional separation between internal and external causes of democratisation is fictitious, and that the commonplace usage of the dichotomy is ideological. An approach which can take account of how changes in the international political economy impinge on domestic developments, as well as the direct and pervasive intervention by donors and creditors, is necessary for a fuller understanding of recent political events. A neo-Gramscian perspective centred on the concepts of hegemony and passive revolution provides one, but by no means the only, way of achieving such a unification of the internal and the external. It also reveals the transnational character152 RITA ABRAHAMSEN of hegemonic forces, or the way the western/African scale, ‘The concept of the historic bloc has as its axiom that ‘the regional asymmetry of power within a society, and the involvement of this society in the world economy, constitute one and the same reality’."* It therefore allows for the integration of the international and the national, without depriving Africans and their leaders of influence, as is the case with the dependency approach. The dominant capitalist countries and the institutions they have set up become concrete actors in the neo-Gramscian analysis. The policy prescriptions of donors and. IF sare not regarded as technical truths; instead, structural adjustment programmes and the good governance agenda become part of the ideological construction and maintenance of hegemony. Africa has a long tradition of street demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, student riots, rural revolts, and more covert forms of popular protest such as non-compliance, underproduction, and withdrawal into the parallel economy have also been common throughout the post-colonial period.” Aftica has not been a continent of political apathy, and there was no sudden awakening or mass conversion to the democratic ideal ‘on behalf of the people in the early 1990s. On the contrary, the demonstrations then were not significantly different from previous protests, But when, for example, Zambians took to the streets in anger against the elimination of food subsidies in 1986, they were not supported by the international establishment. In 1990, however, donors and creditors joined in the call for an end to one-party rule, It appears that the perennial popular demands for change in a number of African countries could only be realised once authoritarian leaders had lost their external supporters. This alone should lead us to be wary of accounts which see international actors as merely supportive, as opposed to being actively involved in shaping political developments in accordance with their own interests. For those committed to change, the message is perhaps that in order to succeed, counter-hegemonic struggles must take place not only at the national but also at the international level. in which a historic bloc is formed on © Bayar, op. ct. p. 193 Robin Cahn, “Resistance and Hidden Form of Consciousnes Amongst Affcan Worker in Reine of Afrean Polen! Eemony, 1g, SeplemberDecember 198o, pp. 8-22, and John ‘A. Wiseman, Urban Roerin West Atica, 167785 yin The Journal of Modo Aican Std, 24,3, Stptember 1986, pp. 509-18