Casual Commitment in International Relations Inis L. Claude, Jr. Political Science Quarterly, Volume 96, Issue 3 (Autumn, 1981), 367-379. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:srwwjstor orglaboutterms.html. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, at unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of 2 journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or pfinted page of such transmission. Political Science Quarterly is published by Academy of Political Science. Please contact the publisher for further petmissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hipster stor orp/joumnals/aps tal Political Science Quarierly ©1981 Academy of Political Science JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S, Patent and Trademark Otic. For more information on ISTOR contact jstor-nfo@umnich edu, ©2001 JSTOR hup:thrwwjstor orgy Mon Nov 26 06:45:11 2001Casual Commitment in International Relations INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. In late June, 1980, the new secretary of state of the United States, Edmund Muskie, flew from Europe to a meeting of the Association of South- ‘east Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. En route, he read a draft prepared by his subordinates for him to deliver at che meeting. Referring to the recent invasion of Thailand by Vietnam, the text asserted that the United States would abide by its security commitments. When the secretary asked what his government intended to do in support of Thailand, he was startled to learn that no plans had been made. He then proclaimed his distaste for mouthing empty rietoric and insisted that “if there isn’t any substance to this, Tam not go- ing ta say the words." Urgent messages to Washington stimulated officials to develop a program of aid which, thanks t0 the magic of radio, Muskie was able to announce soon after his plane landed. ‘The Washington Post treated this episode as front-page news." One gets the impression that veteran officers of the Department of State were surprised that their new chief was naive enough to expect a seriously considered intention to be behind the assurance that he was expected to give (0 a beleaguered country. Pethaps he reminded them of Elwood P. Dowd, the hero of Mary Chase's “Harvey,” who showed his ignorance of the conventions of polite conversation by replying to “What can I do for you?” with “What did you htavein mind?" The journalists who acted on the assumption that the affair was newsworthy no ‘doubr expected the popular reaction to be favorable (o Muskie, who appeared \ Don Oberdorfes, US. To Rush Mare Aid To Thailand,” Washington Post, 28 Fure 1980; idem, “Muskie Rejects Shapworn Diplomacy,” Washingzon Post, 29 June 1980, INISL. CLAUDE, IR, Edward R, Stedajus, Sr, Professor of Goveinment and Foreign Airs atthe University of Vtsnia, His wetings on nteraional afairs include Swards Paco Plowshares, and Power in fnernatianal Relations Foleetscene Guan Vala Mater 8H) eo368 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (0 the outsider as a prudent rather than a naive fellow, a businesslike amateur set on challenging the meaningless routines of diplomatic professionals. Should ‘not the public be disturbed to learn that the custodians of American foreign policy were astonished by the secretary's unwillingness to utter empty words, and that these officials had to be forced to supply substantive filling for the rhetorical shell that they had contrived? ‘The matter that aroused Muskie’s concern was not an isolated or exceptional ‘case, This affair calls attention to a persistent phenomenon in foreign relations, that of casual commitment: the acceptance arid. astertion of obligation without the seriously considered resolve to perform the actions that may be required to Fulfill the obligation. This is one of three varieties of overcommitment: states may promise to do more than they should, more than they ean in fact do, or, a8 im this case, more than they ceally éntertd to do. In practice, the three types of ex- ‘cess may be mingled. For instance, a state may exhibit no setious intention to back up a commitment hecause it realizes its incapacity to do so and concludes that the effort would be foolish. For analytical purposes, however, the three can be distinguished, and the incidence, the causes, and the consequences of states’ promising without intention to deliver can be examined. In this article, attention ‘will be devoted primarily to this phenomenon in the practice of the United ‘States, although it is by no means a peculiarly American phenomenon, ‘Tie TENDENCY TOWARD Casuat ComnaTMENT Concern about American overcommitment of any variety is relatively new, for the United States has long been considered excessively and even disastrously reluctant to accept international engagements. Before 1945, the United States did not always avoid involvement in international politico-military affairs, but it studiously avoided the obligation ta become involved. Only since the end of World War IT have American commitments been sufficiently numerous and ex- tensive (a make overcommitment, casual or otherwise, a significant possibility In the early postwar period, reluctance to accept obligations gave way (o an cn thusiasm for commitment that inevitably stimulated doubis, at home and. abroad, about the meaningfulness of some of the United States’s formal engagements ‘Such uncertainty was expressed as early as [948 by Senator J. William Falbright, in the Senate debate concerning approval of the United Nations Charter. Fulbright deplored the failure of senators whom he believed to be un. willing to accept the obligations entailed by membership in the United Nations to state their opposition; arguing that joining che new organization ought to be treated not as a mere gesture but as 2 solemn undertaking (o bear onerous, responsibilities, he challenged his colleagues to speak and to vote in conformity with their attitudes toward those responsibilities. 2 US, Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 75th Coag., Is sss, 23 Suly 1945, 9, pe. 7962‘CASUAL COMMITMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS | 369 ‘Skepticism about the seriousness with which the ratification af the United Na- tions Charter was regarded in the United States is reinforced by the fact that President Harry S. Teuman described the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and the conchision of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Pact, nof the accep- tance of membership in the United Nations, as definitive evidence of America’s abandonment of its traditional refusal to serve as a dependable bulwark of world order.? In taking this position, Truman implied that the United States had ‘Rot meant what it said when it had ratified the Charter, although he presumably intended not so much fo impugn the sincerity of the United States's acceptance of the obligations of United Nations membership as to emphasize the significance of the later undertakings, which substantially duplicated those stated in the Charter. One might argue, however, that promises tend ta be undermined rather than buttressed by reiteration, with its implicit suggestion hat “this time—unlike last time—we really mean it.” Alliances, no less than international organizations, may be affected by uncer- tainty about the intentions of their members. NATO’s turn came as the Saviet Union developed a thermonuclear capacity that made the United States vulnerable to devastation. The question of whether the United States is—or should be— willing to defend its allies at the risk of losing its own major cities fhas haunted NATO ever since that development. The same Senator Fulbright who demanded in 1945 that commitments be taken seriously confessed in 1966 that when te had voted to approve the Southeast Asia Treaty and the pratocol extending its protection to South Vietnam, “I did nat anticipate ... that this was serious matter, I mean anything like it is. I thought it was just one other coun- try among many to whom we were giving aid, and I really never became con- cerned about this matter until about the time of the Bay of Tonkin, and [ paid no particular attention to it.” It became evident during the Vietnam War that Senator Fulbright had not been alone in promising to defend South Vietnam. without in fact resolving to do so. The Johnson administration insisted that the performance of the United States in that case would be widely regarded as a measure of the reliability of its peomises, The ultimate American reaction against this involvement encouraged the belief that American commitments tend to be casually undertaken, without a careful accounting of the potential cost of fulfilling them and a considered decision to pay that cast should the ac- casion arise. ‘The Vietnam experience challenged Americans ta think more soberly about what cheic country should, could, and would do in the global arena and to tailor the United States's commitments to their answers. Prominent amang the public worriers about overcommitment was Walter Lippmann, who had elegantly for- mulated the principle that commitments should he geared to national interest > Hany 8. Truman, Memos, vol. 2, Year af Trial and Hoge (arden City, N.¥.: Doubleday ard Co,, 1956), pp. 106, 230 “J. Willam Bulbrigh, The Viernam Hearings (New York: Random: Howse, Vintage Books Ed tion, 1968), p42.370 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY and balanced by national power, in a book published during World War I1.* In. late 1968, Lippmann argued that it was essential for the United States to retreat, from the “grandiose idea” of “global commitment,” the emergence of which he attributed to American leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, from Truman to Johnson.* Less than two months later, he had traced the origins of this excess to Woodrow Wilson, and he identified the reversal of the “Wilsonian inflation” of foreign commitments as the central task of the new Nixon administration.” ‘The overcommitment that Lippmann deplored consisted of “wild promises” unwarranted by American interests and unsustainable by American power. He ‘was concerned not about the United States’s neglecting to honor these promises, for lack of serious intent, but about the reverse; he criticized Lyndon Johnson because he “staked everything he had on validating these foolish promises, which he took literally." Lippmann would have preferred that what he re- garded as unnecessary and imprudent commitments not be made at all, but, if they were made, he preferred that they be made without the intention to uphold them. ‘Although Lippmann did not, in his later years, addvess the problem of casual ‘commitment, it can be argued that he had earlier contributed to the develop- ment of that practice. There is a certain lack of generosity in his condemning, Wilson as the foolish inflator of the foreign policy of the United States, for in 1916 Lippmann himself tad both urged Wilson to adopt the policy of organiz~ ing a collectively enforced world order and praised him as a man of vision and courage when Wilson proclaimed that policy.’ Moreover, some two years earlier, Lippmann had warned against casual commitment, insisting that the United States should “make no treaties which we are not ready to maintain all our resources.” lence, when he wrote about rejecting the “damnable thing” of using American strength “for purely national purposes” and commit ting it instead co the defense of the community of nations,'* Wilson had every reason fo fake him seriously, If Wilson was the initiator of foreign-policy infla- tion, Lippmann was one of its instigators. In defense of Lippmann, it must be noted that within months after writing the passages cited above he was suggesting that liberals —including himself —would agree ¢o American pasticipation in an international arrangement to enforce the peace only if the settlement were, from their point of view, a just and reasonable ‘one. An even more striking qualification of his earlier position appeared in a piece published on 17 February 1917, in which Lippmann elaborated the notion + Yialter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Poteye Shild ofthe Republie Boston, Mass: Ltde, Brown and Co., 198%), pp. S10 “Se his ealumn, “Relapse ito Isolation?” Newsweok, 16 December 1968, p. 27 * Lippmann, Washington Post, 9 February 1969. “tid 9 Walter Lippmann, Early Writings (New York: Liveriaht, 1970), pp. 31-4 Ibid, p14 Ibid pp. 38,38 Mei, Be. AS, 6667CASUAL COMMITMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS [ 371 ‘of an Atlantic community and asserted that the United States should dedicate its power, both then and for the future, to the defense of the Western world.” Henee, the mature Lippmann might have argued that, during World War I, he hhad advocated an American commitment (0 uphold only a liberaf settlement within the Western world, whereas Wilson had imprudently expanded the scheme to global proportions and dropped the insistence on a peace that men of good will could acknowledge as worthy of support. Perhaps the early, like the late, Lippmann was in fact a liberal Atlancicist, and he can be acquitted of the charge of having first approved the global com- ‘mitments that he subsequently deplored. In that case, he stands convicted of having promoted casual commitment. He may have intended that the United ‘States confine its endeavors to the Western world, but he used the vocabulary of alabalism. Lippmann encouraged Wilson to talk about the world while hoping that he would mean Europe, and about upholding the status quo while hoping that he would help to sustain only a morally acceptable settlement In this apparent advocacy of ambitious rhetoric supported by modest intent, ippmann showed himself afflicted by pseudoabsolutism, the common tuman tendeney to overstate one's positions. People in all walks of life frequently mean, less than ciey say, and Lippmann’s connections with intellectualism, jour- nalism, and politics may have contributed (a the strength of that tendency in his, case. Despite his well-expressed aversion to abstract principles, be could not avoid the temptation to cloak a regional specific in global abstraction. He was nicither the first not the last co say “mankind” when he meant “our kind af peo- ple,” or “the world” when hte meant “the West.” Indeed, Lippmann illustrates the perennial tension in American thought between globalism and Atlanticism, American liberal internationalists of the cwentieth century have been, by and. large, Atlanticists who have thought that they were globalists. They have tensed to use the language of globalism, but their Atlanticism has shown itself in ‘moments of tcuth, The liberal internationalists’ tendency to intend less than they promise owes something to Lippmann. This conviction of Lippmann does not exonerate Wilson. The man who pre- sided over American foreign policy during World War I clearly set out ta com- ‘mit the United States to play a major role in maintaining order throughout the world. His effort, frustrated during his lifetime, succeeded a generation later. Lippmann was correct in attributing to Wilson a great deal of the praise or blame for the expansive course of American foreign policy after World Wat II, If the United States has veered toward overcommitment, the continuing in- fluence of Wilson’s thought must be counted as a factor in that shift. Leaving aside the issue of whether Wilson advocated commitments irrelevant or inimical to American interests, or incompatible with the limits of American power, itis instructive to consider whether he encouraged casual commitment. 9 thid., pp. 69-75.372. | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Castiat, ComnarMeNT AND Woapzow Wits ‘The centerpiece of Wilson's plan for world order was the League of Nations. ‘The key requirement for the success of the organization was, as he saw it, the loyal and vigorous participation of the United States. Indeed, one might argue that Wilson and his Britisti and French colleagues at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 conceived the League as the necessary vehicle for the exercise of American leadership in the management of the international (European?) system. The heart of the League Covenant for Wilson was, as he frequently asserted, Article X, which embodied the essence of the theary of collective security. In summary, Wilson's scheme was to have the United States accept the commitment to take a Jeading part in the collective enforcement of world order. ‘Aggression, conceived by Wilson as the effort (0 achieve change by violent means, was to he prevented or squelched by the predictable opposition of members of the League, led by the United States, Article X, providing that “the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League,” was the heart of the mat= ter for critics and opponents of the League, as well as for Wilson and his sup- porters. This was an extraordinary commitment, breathtaking in the audacity of its demands, The least of its requirements was that states should refrain from aggression; it pledged states to regard aggression against each ather as aggres- sion agaisst themselves and to defend all others as they would defend themselves. Not surprisingly, a number of prominent Americans cautioned against the casual acceptance of such an obligation. One of these was former president William Howard Taft, a leading champion of the League, who said: “the League will involve momentous consequences, and . . . he people of the United States ought to understand exactly what those consequences are and the burdens that they would assume in entering such a League. IC would be a great deal better not to enter such a League than to suffer the humiliation of having made an agreement and then repudiate it.”"* Another was a prominent critic of the League, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who said: “I bez my fellow country- men to consider well before they give this promise to invoke the mighty power of the United States in order to enforce a guaranty which extends to the bound- aries of every State on the face of the earth. I is @ tremendous promise, and if ‘we aive it this country must carry it out.” ‘As otte might expect, those who were skeptical of or opposed to the League tended to make more of this cautionary theme than those who strongly adva- cated American membership. Among the participants in the political struggle concerning the establishment of the League, the most conspicuously forthright ‘were the senators who came to be known as the “irteconcilables.” They read Ar- ‘Theodore Marburg and Horace E, Flack, eds, Pa Papers om Leogue af Nations (New York: Mactuillan Ce., 1920), 2.76. © Henry Cahoe Ledge, The Sonote and ihe League of Nations (New York: Charles Seribrer's Sons, 1925), p. 244