The European Union and Human Rights: An

International Law Perspective

BY
ADITI SINGH

International organisations are subjects of international law and, as

such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general
rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international
agreements to which they are parties.

Similarly Wellens writes that ‘it would be incorrect to assume that

the conduct of international organisations escapes the governance of the
international political and legal order altogether. . . . [There is] a growing
awareness they have to account for their acts, actions and omissions.’
This position ensures that states are not able to avoid the application of
international law simply by conducting their activities through IGOs.
Given the large number of activities undertaken through IGOs, to hold
otherwise would be to make international law increasingly superfluous. In
relation to the UN, White notes that:

The legal bases upon which human rights are applicable to all UN
activities can be derived first of all from the inherent nature of human
rights. Human rights are part of being a human being and therefore such
rights are automatically part of the legal framework applicable to those
with power to affect the enjoyment of those rights. Secondly, there is a
delegation by member states to the UN of their responsibilities under
human rights law. States cannot set up an autonomous international actor
that can obviate human rights standards that the states themselves are
bound by.