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Disclosure Notice: Due to the competitive nature of Objective Force Warrior Phase I (Concept and
Technology Development), requests for this product shall be referred to the Technology Program Manager,
Natick Soldier Center, Natick, Massachusetts, 01760-5011.
Exhibits iv
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Development 1
1.2 Inclusiveness 2
1.3 Purpose 3
1.4 Context 5
2. Overview 8
2.1 Mission 8
2.2 Assumptions 9
2.3 Limitations 13
2.4 Background 13
2.4.1 UA/FCS OA Products 13
2.4.2 LW OA Products 24
2.4.3 SBCT OA Products 26
2.4.4 LF OA Products 28
3. Methodology 29
3.1 Operational Architecture Development Method 29
3.2 Metrics 31
4. OFW OA Products 31
4.1 OFW OA DOTMLPF Implications 31
4.1.1 Doctrine 31
4.1.2 Organizations 32
4.1.3 Training 32
4.1.4 Materiel 32
4.1.5 Leadership and Education 36
4.1.6 Personnel 37
ii
5. Use of OA Products 52
5.1 Wolfpack OFW System of Systems Architecture 52
5.2 Wolfpack OFW System/Technical Architectures 52
5.2.1 Wolfpack OFW System Architecture 52
5.2.2 Wolfpack OFW Technical Architecture 53
6. Summary 53
Endnotes 55
iii
iv
vi
vii
viii
The Wolfpack OFW OA Document uses a variety of sources as its basis: Wolfpack’s
OFW SoS and O&OC documents’5 descriptions of OFW DOTMLPF implications;
concepts for OFW soldier and leader systems, SoS, and Family of Systems (FoS) from
the Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept Document6; and O&OCs for OF small units, soldiers,
and leaders from the Wolfpack OFW O&OC Document7. The inclusion of OFW
DOTMLPF implications in the Wolfpack OFW OA, SoS, and O&OC documents, and
other Phase I deliverables, embraces the synergy of parallel advances to support the
development and application of advanced soldier and other technologies.
Maneuver Support
Soldier
The evolving SaaS concept speaks to the core capability of the OF, its soldiers, leaders,
and units, and focuses on the need for all soldiers to be able to perform certain common
tasks, regardless of specialization, and the commonality of the equipment to perform the
tasks.
As described by Wolfpack’s OFW SoS Concept8 and O&OC documents, the most
difficult DOTMLPF problems confronting the OFW Concept and Technology
Development effort are well characterized by the needs of those OF soldiers who must
seize and control key terrain by direct action and close with and destroy enemy forces by
assault—mounted or dismounted. In particular, the most challenging, dramatically
expanding—and most likely for future adversaries to exploit—environment for the OF
will be complex terrains: urban, jungle, and mountain. It is in these environments that
achieving the ability to see first, act first, and finish decisively becomes most difficult and
in which dismounted assaults will predominate.
While stopping short of the United States Marine Corps’ notion that “…every Marine is
an Infantryman…” Wolfpack embraced the idea, exemplified by recent Army decisions
1.3 Purpose
The purpose of the final edition of the Wolfpack OFW OA Document is to develop the
broadest possible foundation for development of the system, technical, and SoS
architectures during Phases II and III of the OFW Program, and post OFW development,
by the OFW LTI. In particular, the OA provides robust and holistic descriptions of
concepts and linked DOTMLPF implications relevant to OA products for OF
organizations, especially the UA, UA subordinate formations, and OFW equipped
soldiers and leaders to help the following developers and other agencies:
• Army and TRADOC training and leader developers in their understanding of the
training and leadership and education implications of potential OFW impacts on
OA products to identify changes to or development of new Individual Training
Plans (ITP), System Training Plans (STRAP), Training Support Packages (TSP),
Course Administrative Data (CAD), Programs of Instruction (POI), Combined
Arms Training Strategies (CATS), and Leader Development Action Plans
(LDAP).
1.4 Context
“The Joint Forces must get C4ISR right. It is critical that they get this right. We
cannot go to the battlefield and continue to put things together on the fly. Our soldiers
are bright, they're wonderful, they'll ride jackasses to get to the fight, and I appreciate
that, but we've got to do better.”16
Exhibit 3. Director OF Task Force Briefing Extract
OFW OA products will require almost constant modification given the evolution of
strategies, guidance, policies, directives, enterprises, concepts from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for Joint Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR),
Dominant Maneuver (DM), Precision Engagement (PE), Focused Logistics (FL), Full
Dimension Protection (FDP), etc.17, and changes in the Defense Acquisition System
• The AKE construct describes the Army's process to enable improved strategic and
tactical information distribution and collaboration. Integration and refinement of
existing Army networks is to be the first step in achieving a network-centric,
• The Army Tactical Internet and the Warrior Information Network – Tactical
(WIN-T) system are the core of the Army Tactical InfoSphere. The High Level
Operational Concept (OC) Graphic (Operational View [OV] 1) for the OF
Tactical InfoSphere is shown below in Exhibit 5.24
2. Overview
2.1 Mission
OFW OA products must robustly and holistically address the following questions:
• How do OFW-equipped soldiers, leaders, and small units influence the Integrated
Processes (IPs) and Distributed Systems (DSs) developed for the FCS and how do
the FCS’s IP and DS influence OFW-equipped soldiers, leaders, and small units?
2.2 Assumptions
Exponential advances in the capabilities of soldiers, leaders, and small units will allow
OF soldiers, leaders, and small units to see first, understand first, act first, finish
decisively, survive and endure through all dimensions of the future battle space. The
objective of the OFW Concept and Technology Development effort is to develop and
demonstrate the technologies that would provide these advances through the fielding of
systems to equip OF soldiers, leaders, and small units implementing the SoS Soldier-
Centric Architecture for the OF as described by the Program Executive Officer (PEO)
Soldier (Exhibit 6).
• OF soldiers, leaders, and small units will overmatch all adversaries using
enhanced, networked and collaborative organic capabilities while leveraging
company, battalion, UA, UE, and Joint combat multipliers that enable the
collaborative application of massed effects.
10
11
12
2.3 Limitations
To date no facts or situations (U.S. public law, international law, religious laws, or
treaties) have been identified that would limit the application of the OFW OA in any area
of the world.
2.4 Background
2.4.1 UA/FCS OA Products
TRADOC OF OA products completed to date include a draft UE HQ design and its
database. 31
TRADOC to date has not completed any OF OA products. However, the FCS-equipped
UA is envisioned as a network-centric unit featuring full interactions between its systems
to permit integrated operations and realize innovative Concepts of Operation (CONOPS).
The system is to have no hardware, software, or information stovepipes and no hardwired
features. It is to be fully integrated for information dominance and to make maximum
coordinated use of the capabilities of its “warfighters,” its sensors, and its weapon
systems. The warfighter is to interface with other UA systems, Joint and LFs through an
integrated C2 system that leverages an open SA and modern modular, services-based
design. All C2 systems are to be common to all warfighting systems and will share a
common framework to achieve the goal of an integrated and interoperable system. The
warfighter’s interfaces and C2 systems are to be tightly integrated into each FCS vehicle
system with its subsystems through Vetronics architecture, achieving a system that is
integrated top to bottom. Dismounted warfighters are envisioned as using a Joint
Tactical Radio System- (JTRS-) compliant small form factor radio derived from the Small
Unit Operations program and to fully participate in the wideband network – not as a
appliqué or adjunct net but as a fully participating set of dismounted subnets. Ubiquitous
13
14
The UA is to be designed to be fully interoperable with other Army forces—the UE, LF,
and Army forces at Theater command—and the full spectrum of Joint/Theater, National,
coalition, and interagency forces. The JTRS software-defined radio is to permit direct
communications over most DoD standard radio and link formats, permitting close
interoperability with Navy and Air Force units and Special Operations Forces (SOF).
The UA is to integrate with Theater entities of all kinds through the WIN-T system. This
is to permit fully interoperable information environments and data communications at
higher levels. Ordinary VHF/UHF radio voice and data formats are to be supported to
permit a wide range of communications with civilian, law enforcement, and international
authorities. The UA is to be engineered to link into Ethernet Local Area Networks and
Wide Area Networks to allow use of civilian, federal, and DoD networks when the
opportunity arises.36
The FCS Lead System Integrator (LSI) has defined IPs that span the functional
requirements of FCS at a level of detail described as “appropriate for functional views”
and mapped Unit of Action Mounted Battlespace Lab (UAMBL) Mission Threads (MT)
to the IP. In the FCS LSI’s view, the IPs are “…enduring processes that can be applied
across many MTs and scenarios. They reflect the way the warfighter thinks when
preparing for and conducting operations. The IPs lend themselves to decomposition for
finer views. The IPs are ‘Architecturally Significant.’ Some of the MTs are not. The MT
were not written by system architects and should not be expected to be optimal for
architectural views…” For the FCS Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers Integrated Support Plan (C4ISP), OVs were created for MTs that illustrate the
six missions from the FCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) Appendix G—
Early Entry Operations, Combined Arms Operations for Urban Warfare to Secure Portion
of Major Urban Area, Rapid Advance to Enemy Center of Gravity, Mounted Formation
Conducts Pursuit and Exploitation, Airmobile/Air Assault Operations, Defensive
Operations.
FCS LSI, together with TRADOC and UAMBL, has established an Architectural
Working Group (AWG) to establish direction, schedules, and to review progress for the
development of UA/FCS architectures. The collaboration is reflected in Exhibit 10.37 The
AWG has decomposed 19 MTs resulting in over 8,000 operational Information Exchange
Requirements (IER) and developed a High Level OC Graphic (Exhibit 11) and a System
View (SV) (Exhibit 12) for the FCS ORD. The FCS LSI and TRADOC have committed
15
16
17
• Sensor Network
• Sensor Fusion
• Communications
• COP
• Netted Fires
• Battle Command
18
• Training.
The FCS LSI has also defined eight DSs that provide the capability needed to support the
OV. For the DS, each related to platforms and IP, a set of SVs is to be generated. The
DSs are listed below and define the FCS’s SoS (Exhibit 13). At present, the “Weapons”
DS is solely associated with a “Soldier Combat System.” Further, the FCS LSI stipulates
the employment of Use Cases below the DS to allow for more detailed views.44 Also, IPs
are used to define functions performed by DS.
• C2
• FCS Management
• Communications
• Sensing
• Weapons
• Vehicle Management
• Support
• Training.
19
20
21
C4I System Requirements (Annex H of the FCS ORD49) contains the following:
• Vertical and Horizontal Integration. The annex states that C4I systems in the
FCS FoS will be vertically and horizontally integrated with Army legacy and IF
platforms, tactical and logistics C4I systems, individual Battlefield Functional
Area (BFA) systems and SOF. Also, as a full-spectrum force, the FCS-equipped
UA will be required to interoperate with Joint, U.S. Government agencies,
multinational coalitions, local authorities and other non-governmental, and private
volunteer organizations.
22
• CRD and ORDs. The annex lists CRDs and ORDs, including the SaaS CRD
(draft), the Mounted Warrior (MW) ORD (draft), the LW ORD, and the Air
Warrior (AW) ORD, which it describes as applicable to FCS and identifies that
the listing continues to be refined. It also states that other CRDs and ORDs that
are applicable to the FCS-equipped UA will be identified and added, and that
some CRDs and ORDs may be removed if Army doctrine specifies that
interoperability with those systems will be achieved solely through UE systems.
• Army JIM Interoperability. The annex also provides a description of the likely
Army and JIM interoperability requirements for FCS.
IER. Appendix J of the FCS ORD50 provides an IER matrix of 41 IER. The ORD states
they are to describe information that is exchanged between FCS UA and the
UE/Joint/Allied/Coalition elements. The matrix describes the general characteristics of
the information exchanged and not specific messages, report formats, or database
exchanges and that the IER are information exchanges that are so significant that if they
do not occur, the warfighter mission accomplishment will be severely and adversely
affected.
• Current Location of Sending and Receiving Nodes. All of the sending and
receiving nodes listed in the IER are at the UA level or above except for IER #14,
“Fire Mission, Clearance of Fires,” which lists “UA Sensors and Platforms” as the
sending node: #15, “Targets Acquired by Sensor,” which lists “All firing
platforms” as the sending node; #35, “Conduct civil affairs ops,” which lists “SOF
LNO” and “SOF TM” as sending and receiving nodes; #39, “Exchange
Information between designated link-up forces,” which lists “SOF TM” as a
sending node; and #40, “Situation Change, Routine Rpts, Analysis Spt,” which
lists “SOF LNO” as a receiving node.
• Formation of the COP. The ORD also states that the IER are used to form the
COP that is derived from a series of MTs and analyses based on guidance
documents and warfighter inputs, and that further analysis of these information
elements to arrive at a set of lower level, discrete information elements will be
done to support FCS UA ORD development. The appendix is to evolve as analysis
efforts continue thru Milestone (MS) B, dependent upon Joint, UE, and other
systems still in development, ultimately supporting a MS C FCS production
decision.
23
The LW ORD51 provided the OV1 for a “LW Phased Approach for TI System Interface”
(Exhibit 16). The accompanying description in the ORD states:
• The approach for LW interoperability with the ABCS will follow the three
phases. Although interface/interoperability between LW and ABCS is a LW
Block II requirement, it will not be required in Block I due to an Army-wide
problem with the lack of definition of interface between cleared and uncleared
user communities, i.e., the ABCS at Secret High, and the LW system at Sensitive
but Unclassified (SBU). Seamless electronic interface between generally
uncleared soldiers using the LW weapons system and the ABCS C2 system is not
possible under current policy guidelines. Key leadership elements of the LW
community will retain legacy C2 capabilities through the use of existing secure
voice equipment.
24
• A capability for the timely and accurate exchange of information between sender
and recipient is required. The threshold system will incorporate the information
exchange capability defined below. Objective capability or capability aligned with
subsequent blocks will be defined based on refining the IER of LW in the specific
unit type. The Block I system established digital interoperability within the LW
equipped architecture. Secure voice communications is provided by currently
fielded combat net radios. Block II will establish interoperability with ABCS
systems based on removal of previously stated security issues. It is expected that
the LW equipped system will interface with the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system on other vehicles or in command centers as
well as systems currently comprising the operational design of the light force and
Initial Brigade Combat Team Battalion Tactical Operations Center.
25
The Army and OSD appear to have recently reached an agreement that will allow the
Army to field six SBCTs54. OSD had demanded that the final two SBCTs55 not simply
replicate the first teams fielded. Instead, OSD wants to see a capability that looks more
like an OF UA and less like a “souped up” remnant of the current force. Part of OSD’s
concern is that the current development and fielding time lines of the OF and the SBCTs
appear to overlap (the last SBCT is due in FY07). The Army must develop a refined
SBCT design and submit it to OSD for approval. The SBCT “plus” concept would affect
both the materiel and operational and organizational (O&O) aspects of the unit. It likely
would include improved C4ISR capabilities. The OFW OA must seamlessly link with the
both the OA of the initial four SBCTs and the OA to be developed for the final two
SBCTs.
26
LW-SI Version 2.0 system is the LW-SI Version 1.0 system with additional functionality,
such as FCS communication interoperability, voice control, achievement of full LW-SI
system performance specification mission duration and system weight requirements, and
processor/memory type improvements as part of the spiral development process with the
eight required SBCT IAV vehicle variants56. TRADOC has completed a variety of OA
products for the “Interim Division,” the Interim Combat Service Support (CSS)
Company, 172nd Light Infantry Brigade (Separate) and the 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment (Light). Both of the latter product sets include the LW as individual soldiers
and leaders with associated equipment but neither addresses the OFW.
• The “Horseblanket” document lists LW-Leader (BLK II) and LW System Soldier
(BLK II) as “not TO&E supported” items, each described as including a CID
Device, a computer processor, a Global Positioning System (GPS)/navigation
system, a handheld display/keyboard, a helmet display, a soldier radio, and a
thermal weapon sight. The LW systems are depicted down to the individual
soldiers and leaders of the Combat Engineer Squad of the Engineer Company, the
Fire Support teams, mortar sections, sniper teams, and rifle and weapons squads
of the companies of the Infantry Battalions, and the Reconnaissance (Recce)
squads of the ground troops and the Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR)
Recce platoon of the Surveillance troop of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance
Target Acquisition Squadron. The netViz document mirrors this arrangement.
• The “netViz” document top level view for the brigade depicts ten formations
within the brigade down to company sized organizations, including its five
battalion level formations, 16 voice and data nets, and the connectivity among the
formations and nets; the battalion level view in the document depicts seven
elements within the battalion, including its four company level formations, and
six voice and data nets, but not their connectivity; the rifle company level view of
the document depicts six elements with the company, including the three rifle
platoons and the Mobile Gun System Platoon, and three voice and data nets but
27
• The “Architecture Business Rule” document that states LW nets are not depicted
in the network view (netViz file) of the architecture and LW availability is
uncertain but is depicted as a requirement, and lists the LW System – Leader
(BLK II) and LW System Soldier (BLK II) as potential C4I equipment for the
regiment.
• The “Horseblanket” document lists LW-Leader (BLK II) and LW System Soldier
(BLK II) each including CID Device, a computer processor, a GPS/navigation
system, a handheld display/keyboard, a helmet display, a soldier radio, and a
thermal weapon sight. The LW systems are depicted down to the individual
soldiers and leaders of Combat Engineer Squad of the Engineer Troop, the Fire
Support teams, mortar sections, and scout squads and the CBR Recce platoon of
the regiment’s squadrons.
In FY03 TRADOC plans to address OA products for 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry
Division and the 56th Brigade 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized).
2.4.4 LF OA Products
TRADOC has completed a variety of OA products for III Corps Troops, the 1st Cavalry
Division, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 82nd Airborne Division. Both of the latter
product sets include the LW as individual soldiers and leaders with associated equipment
in a similar fashion to the 172nd Light Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment (Light).
28
3. Methodology
3.1 Operational Architecture Development Method
Given the complexities implicit in developing an OA, Wolfpack has employed a method
that provides a building block approach to be performed over time in the development of
a compete small unit OA down to the soldiers that make up the unit. Since the OA for
the current UA is in the early stages of construction, one can only conjecture at this point
about the construction of any given small unit component of the OA once completed. As
the UA gains precise definition, tools such as netViz permit the development and
refinement of an OA for the UA’s small units.
CAT considered the threat, terrains (open/rolling, urban, complex, restricted, jungle,
mountains, and desert), seasons of the year, types of weather conditions, political
situations, media situations, infrastructure, tactical situations, health conditions, industrial
chemicals (toxic) and decay, mixes of non-combatants/combatants, friendly situations,
and a baseline TRADOC MOC57 in defining the OE for their sessions.
The set of military operations considered by CAT included high-end Small Scale
Contingencies (SSC) to restore peace and stability; major combat operations; and low-
end SSC. CAT sessions produced a series of vignettes that describe the range of terrains,
warfighting intensity levels, types of threats and engagements, and small unit tasks and
supporting activities likely to be encountered by OF individual soldiers, leaders, and
small units. CAT vignettes provide a frame of reference for high, mid, and low levels of
conflict. See Wolfpack OFW O&OC Document for the vignettes.58
The set of tactical operations considered by CAT included “Combined Arms Operations
for Urban Warfare to secure Portions of Major Urban Area” and “Rapid Advance to
Enemy Center of Gravity.”
29
The Use Cases assisted internal Wolfpack communication between its Concept Working
Group and Technology Working Group and will be refined during OFW Phase II,
particularly as OFW’s training strategy is developed.
Relationships between functional needs and technology enablers were developed through
a systematic analysis. Each use case is “walked through” and potential technology
enablers are identified at each “step.” Attaching technologies in this manner facilitates
construction of a system design trade space where different levels of technology
implementation may be assessed in light of operational need, size, weight, power, as well
as cost (perceived or estimated). In many cases, the technological enablers (and their
variants) are the direct result of the Wolfpack technology search process.
Technology enablers have been broken down into two classes: primary and secondary. A
primary enabler provides a basic level of implementation. For example, directed fires
(squad-level fire concentrated on a single target) may be achieved using conventional
tools (a rifle, a means with which the squad members may see one another to coordinate
targeting and fire, a weapon sighting system, as well as the possibility of a voice radio).
This may impose constraints on how far apart individual squad members may be.
Secondary enablers consist of tools that may enable a less conventional means of
achieving an operational function. In the directed fires example, this may include remote
targeting capabilities such as a laser range finder and a digital compass coupled to
positioning information, a data radio capable of transmitting target coordinates across the
squad, and sensory enhancements such as image intensifiers and thermal imaging
systems.
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept Document provided the conceptual basis for the
Wolfpack OFW O&OC, which serves as the infrastructure and architectural basis for the
Wolfpack OFW OA; when taken together, the Wolfpack OFW O&OC and OA answer
questions about:
• The capabilities the systems provided by the OFW program must have and the
functions they must perform, the Basis of Issue (BOI) for the systems, and the
who, how, and why interaction with other systems takes place so as to achieve the
needed level of JIM or intra-Army interoperability.
• The missions and tasks the individual soldiers and leaders of the OF must
accomplish, the benefits or contributions these soldiers and leaders provide to the
OF, the purpose for and description of key systems with which the OF’s
individual soldiers and leaders will interact and interface, the typical geographical
positions on the battlefield of the individual soldiers and leaders of the OF, and
the types of support that the individual OF soldiers and leaders will need in order
to perform their tasks and missions.
30
3.2 Metrics
The Wolfpack OA development methodology is based on the straightforward proposition
that missions can be reduced to two fundamental elements: tasks (what needs to be done)
and DOTMLPF (what capabilities are required to do it). Both elements have equally
important roles in mission accomplishment; tasks provide requirements for DOTMLPF,
and DOTMLPF provides the ability to execute the tasks. Since the ultimate goal is to
achieve mission success, it is necessary to start at the top with mission utility and define
success succinctly and unequivocally. Then one can work down and infer the capabilities
at lower level that are required to achieve mission success. Completing this top-down
process, one can then infer the DOTMLPF solutions at the levels that can best (e.g., least
expensively and most quickly) meet the required capabilities. This process also implies
that Wolfpack must define what constitutes operational effectiveness, then the key
supporting capabilities, and then the robustness of individual soldiers and leaders, squads,
and platoons which support those capabilities.
What can be modeled, but not measured, is the military effectiveness of individual OF
soldiers and leaders, squads, and platoons. Therefore, Wolfpack has sought warfighter
input to infer how performance forms the basis for effectiveness and what defines the
military environment(s). Wolfpack initiated the CAT deliberations to compute Measures
of Performance (MoP) under prescribed conditions and compare to task-based fault tree
standards to determine the mission outcome of a combat process following a combat
interaction, and to determine effects on other Combat Processes.
4. OFW OA Products
4.1 OFW OA DOTMLPF Implications
4.1.1 Doctrine
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept and O&OC documents provide a robust and holistic
conceptual description of the DOTMLPF implications. See Wolfpack SoS and O&OC
documents for a complete description of OFW doctrine implications, especially those
derived from the FCS Mission Area Analysis (MAA), Mission Needs Analysis (MNA)
and ORD, and the UA O&O.
31
4.1.3 Training
OF Infantry squad members must be cross-trained in all the positions and weapons within
the squad.
In the future, “information and knowledge soldiers” will be required at every echelon.
These soldiers will need to be multi-functional and trained to be able to:
• Assist leaders in setting profiles and filters for specified applications, recommend
appropriate sensor mix to users of sensor information, establish and follow
reporting criteria
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept and O&OC document provide a robust and holistic
conceptual description of the DOTMLPF implications. See Wolfpack SoS and O&OC
documents for a complete description of OFW training implications, especially those
derived from the FCS MAA, MNA and ORD, and the UA O&O.
4.1.4 Materiel
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept and O&OC document provide a description of OFW
materiel implications, especially those derived from the FCS MAA, MNA and ORD, and
the UA O&O. A list of the materiel elements of the Wolfpack proposed OFW Family of
Lethality, Mobility, Training, Task Directed and Organized, Situational Awareness,
Sustainment and Survivability Systems examined in the Wolfpack’s Quick Look and
Technology Search Events and to be evaluated in the OFW program’s Concept and
Technology Development Phase I Culminating Demonstration is described in detail in
Wolfpack’s SoS Concept Document.
32
Network operations at brigade and below must not be segmented from those above
brigade. For this reason, UA and UE network concepts and solutions must be closely
aligned to form a single GIG-compliant network. 60
The system must be secure but must also simplify the user and management processes
required for implementing security. Keying/re-keying must be performed automatically
and remotely with minimal or no operator intervention. The system must accommodate
access to all security levels, complying with GIG guidance to enable “one terminal with
multiple security modes, ‘colorless’ backbone, data labeling, allied/coalition, unclassified
through Top Secret (TS)/Special Classification Instructions (SCI).” This drives us toward
adoption of an application-based security structure in which the need to encrypt network
traffic is removed.61
Information Data Management (IDM) is the technical means for providing the correct
information to the correct person or system at the necessary time and in the proper
format. It addresses the awareness, access, and delivery of information, ensuring
management of information flow to users in accordance with the commander’s
information policy. IDM will sort and filter information as specified in a preprogrammed
user profile. IDM is not a separate stand-alone system, but rather a set of integrated
information tools, applications, processes and services residing on all GIG-enabled
systems. These tools must address the following IDM issues: timely distribution of time-
critical information, delivering information in ways that optimize the use of GIG
resources, packaging, storing, and “advertising” information so it is accessible to a
widely dispersed community of users with a variety of needs; implementation of
individual user and system “profiles” so information can be intelligently and
automatically pushed or pulled; dynamic methods to allow flexible updating of user
profiles as the situation changes; and restricting access to classified information to ensure
information security is maintained. The OF Battle Command System facilitates adequate
protection of information in accordance with security policy for information at different
classification levels and provides for the secure exchange of information between
networks at different classification levels. It must accommodate access to all security
levels, enabling one terminal with multiple security modes that will support a “colorless”
backbone, data labeling, and allied/coalition access. The objective is adoption of an
application-based security structure in which the need to encrypt network traffic is
removed. 63
33
• The situation should be displayed over topographic details selected by the user
from a menu of available mapping features. The user will tailor the detail and
scale of the display. In general, the tailoring options will be extremely simple.
Interfaces with ABCS and its successor OF system. OFW OA products will be
required to address interface requirements for several versions of the ABCS and as well
as the successor OF Battle Command System. Similarly, OFW OA products will have to
address a mix of new and old, high- and low-tech capabilities.
• The ABCS has been developed in stages using a numbering system to describe
periodic increments of functionality added to the FoS. Full fielding of ABCS
Version 7.0 has been limited to the 4th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division,
the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the SBCTs. Decisions for fully fielding
34
• For the OF, the Army wants to cover all the necessary battlefield functionalities
through a single battle command system, or perhaps two or three systems
together. The Army is in the process of designing this OF Battle Command
System in accordance with the timeline established for FCS.
• All ABCS functionality will not necessarily be migrated to the successor system.
The current Army strategy is to start with a requirement for the OF and then pull
in what is needed against that requirement from ABCS.
• The Army is considering whether to expand the traditional mission of the UAV—
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S)—to include the often-perilous job of
medical resupply.
• Under an operational scenario developed for the concept, soldiers forward on the
battlefield would call back to troops located away from the battle and request a
certain set of supplies. The items would be loaded into an air-droppable pod,
equipped with a deceleration device (such as a parachute), stabilizing fins, a
crushable nose and, if required, a guidance system. The pods would be inserted
into special holders that, due to the aerodynamics of the Shadow airframe (the
current system being tested is the Shadow 2000 Tactical UAV but other
unmanned vehicles, such as a rotorcraft or ground system, also are under
consideration), likely would be located under the wings. Soldiers would pre-
program Quick-MEDS with GPS coordinates for the forward unit and launch the
air vehicle. Upon arrival at a waypoint near the troops in need of resupply, the
Quick-MEDS GPS trigger would release the individual pods; the fins and
guidance system would help steer the pods during the final leg.
• Crucial triage items that could be transported include blood, fibrin bandages, fluid
infusion sets, ceramic oxygen generators, emergency airway supplies, burn packs,
the Critical Care System for Trauma and Transport, vaccines and other
pharmaceuticals such as anti-venom, and medical CBR defense materiel.
• DoD is planning to roll out an advanced version of the Internet that would allow
commanders to give every weapon system its own protocol address.
35
Urban Warfare Master Plan. OFW OA products may be required to address the
implications of the DoD Urban Warfare Master Plan and Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine
for Joint Operations for OFW soldiers and leaders, squads and platoons.
• The draft master plan contains a DoD-wide strategy with MSs for enhancing joint
urban capabilities. The plan contains direction for Defense agencies and the
services, and describes in detail how to achieve the vision for joint urban
operations outlined in an already completed road map for that mission. The road
map states that DoD must address the following issues: policy; coordination with
other U.S. Government agencies and U.S. allies; research, development and
acquisition; concept development (CD) and experimentation; the development of
modeling and simulation capabilities; military operations on urban terrain training
and experimentation facilities; and the development of joint doctrine.
• The master plan includes timelines and MSs for achieving certain goals, such as
operating in cities with fewer casualties and less infrastructure damage, the key to
which is enhanced C4ISR capabilities. Exploring C4ISR opportunities will be at
the top of the Center for Joint Urban Operations’ agenda. Improved C4ISR in
urban environments could give U.S. forces better means to engage enemies and
deny them sanctuary—using both lethal and non-lethal “precision effects”—and
identify their critical vulnerabilities, officials say. An important aspect of
operating more successfully in cities will be a better understanding of a given
location's geography, infrastructure and culture, and looking at the city as if it is
something like a living organism.
• Among the potential capabilities the Master Plan says should be investigated
include: sensors that look through walls and that “tag” target individuals or
vehicles, and three-dimensional maps that include an urban area’s subterranean
structures, as well as the interiors of key buildings, and activity levels.
36
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept and O&OC documents provide a description of OFW
leadership and educational implications, especially those derived from the FCS MAA,
MNA and ORD, and the UA O&O.
4.1.6 Personnel
Unit Manning. OFW OA products must address the impacts of the current Army
Personnel System’s manning policies and may be required to address the implications of
a new manning configuration. The centerpiece of the Army’s Personnel Transformation
is a comprehensive effort focused on a potential Army-wide implementation of unit
manning and unit rotation. The Army is examining the feasibility of a unit manning and
rotation system that would better support the new national defense strategy, improve
cohesion and combat readiness within the operational Army, provide highly cohesive
well-trained units to Combatant Commanders, and improve well-being for families by
providing greater stability and predictability in assignments. The Army currently uses
unit rotations in support of operational missions in the Balkans, Sinai, and Afghanistan.
The Army is studying the use of unit rotations for other locations and in the war on
terrorism.
In August 2002 the Army established a task force to explore how such a unit manning
system might work. The Army Staff is to identify a brigade as a “pilot” program to help
prepare the Army for the switch and begin moving other brigades to unit manning before
the program is completed over the next three years. Based on current schedules, senior
Army leadership decisions are to be made for unit manning and unit rotation in July
2003.
A unit rotation based manning system has the potential to create the biggest cultural
change in the Army in decades. Such a system would have significant second and third
order effects across the force—training and leader development, recruiting and retention,
how the Army assigns and deploys soldiers and units, unit readiness levels, promotions,
command assignments, and total Army end-strength, among others.
The Army is considering various potential “unit rotation options” both with regard to the
level of rotation—brigade, battalion or lower levels—and the types of units to be rotated.
A unit rotation based manning policy may, in fact, facilitate implementation of the OFW
OA. A key issue is how well, and in what ways, the members of a unit are personally
known and connected to each other. This is the classic level of social network analysis,
where strong personal ties, often ones that rest on close friendship or bonding
37
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept and O&OC document provide a robust and holistic
conceptual description of the DOTMLPF implications. See Wolfpack SoS and O&OC
documents for a complete description of OFW personnel implications, especially those
derived from the FCS MAA, MNA and ORD, and the UA O&O.
4.1.7 Facilities
The FCS ORD states that the ability for the FCS to conduct fully embedded training
across the UA in an interactive and constructive environment will bring a new dimension
to facility support. The reliance on separate training devices will be for the most part
eliminated. This will place additional demands on the use of the base system for
individual, crew and collective training events. To support the use of the OFW in this
mode, security and frequency management issues in a home-station environment will
drive a need to provide electronic connectivity to each OFW system, SoS, and FoS
without requiring organic power or using organic communications (emissions) systems
by plugging into a Local Area Network-like system.
The Wolfpack OFW SoS Concept and O&OC document provide a description of OFW
facilities implications, especially those derived from the FCS MAA, MNA and ORD, and
the UA O&O.
38
Such a capability becomes essential when the UA is engaging in large scale operations in
urban or other restricted terrain in which UE and UA sensors are limited in their ability to
penetrate the environment or limited in their availability to cover aspects of ongoing
combat operations. Moreover, if the sensors are unable to penetrate the environment,
netted fires may not be applied with the rapidity with which they would perform in more
open terrain. Early analytical work by TRADOC in examining UA designs has begun to
identify the difficulties some kinds of terrain pose for UA sensors and netted fires
operations. These difficulties must be addressed and are resolvable in our opinion
through the introduction of technology and other changes:
• Additionally, early analytical work will tend to play netted fires with a limitless
amount of ammunition and without the necessary realities of time and space
relationships (relevance of shooter-target equation to the need of forces on the
ground in contact particularly in restricted terrain).
• While embracing the power of sensors to see most of the battlefield and netted
fires to attack many if not most targets in open terrain, the Wolfpack concepts and
associated technology approach takes on the difficulties of restricted terrain,
which historically has provided a central need for Infantry in combat over the past
50 years.
4.2.2 Missions
The following OF Small Unit Mission statement was created by the Wolfpack CAT:
“OFW small units conduct violent close combat across the spectrum of conflict under
any conditions of light, weather or geography at the direction of the unit of action and
in support of the Joint or combined force commander.”
39
c. All types of weather (extreme cold, heat, wet, dry, windy, high altitude)
DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE
DEPLOY/CONDUCT MANEUVER
40
41
DEFEND
42
OF Infantry squads and platoons require on-demand logistics support to ensure rapid
response or the units will outrun logistics arrangements as practiced in the LF.
OF Infantry squad can perform all missions of a LF Infantry platoon in all conditions but
the capabilities resident at the LF Infantry platoon level will have to be pushed down to
the OF Infantry squad level. This direction is being implemented in the Infantry rifle
squads of the SBCTs.
OF Infantry squads must have the means to perform some missions currently performed
by the LF Infantry platoon. These missions include attack, ambush, and raid. The size and
complexity of some targets or objectives will necessitate the combining of OF Infantry
squads into a platoon formation to overwhelm the enemy.
OF Infantry squads must be designed to carry out missions separated from other units in
space and time and or separated from the platoon (or its higher HQ).
• The first set comprises a 44-man OF Infantry platoon (Exhibit 19) for OF Infantry
organizations not equipped with FCS manned platforms and a 53-man OF
Infantry platoon for OF Infantry organizations equipped with FCS manned
platforms (versus the 49-man UA O&O design). The difference between the two
CAT types of platoons within the set is nine vehicle drivers70 (the platoon HQ is
transported in a FCS manned platform and each squad is transported in two FCS
manned platforms in Infantry organizations equipped with FCS manned
platforms).
43
OFW
Sniper
2 NCO/2EM
44
The first set of CAT alternative OF Infantry platoons optimally would provide a 44-man
dismounted strength versus the typical 40-man dismounted strength of the UA O&O
design—a 10% increase. The second set of CAT alternative OF Infantry platoons
optimally would provide a 56-man dismounted strength versus the typical 40-man
dismounted strength of the UA O&O design—a 25% increase.
• The first alternative (Exhibit 21) is very similar to the UA O&O design, but
comprises four nine-man squads that subsume the LF and UA O&O rifle and
weapons squads’ capabilities and functions. The CAT recommended OF Infantry
squad organization contains a Sergeant First Class/ Staff Sergeant (SFC/SSG)
squad leader, weapons (direct and indirect), communications, fire support,
medical, sapper and sniper capabilities.
• The second alternative (refer to Exhibit 22) comprises four 12-man squads (versus
the four nine-man squads proposed by the UA O&O design), which also subsume
the LF and UA O&O rifle and weapons squads’ capabilities and functions. The
CAT-recommended OF Infantry squad organization contains an SFC/SSG Squad
Leader, an SSG Deputy Squad Commander/Intelligence Sergeant,
communications, fire support, medical, sapper, sniper, and enhanced and weapons
(direct and indirect) capabilities.
45
46
The Wolfpack designs assume two robotic multi-functional vehicles per OF Infantry
squad.
47
OF small unit leaders must be able to command from LF, SBCT, and FCS C2 or combat
vehicles, or dismounted. When dismounted OF Infantry squad and platoon leaders must
maintain connectivity to the network to integrate ISR, maneuver, and fires.
The OF will employ combined arms at lower tactical levels to maximize versatility and
agility and improve capabilities for the close fight. OF units are being designed with
functional capabilities that currently reside in higher echelons.
48
The Army regards the individual soldier as possessing the ability to become the ultimate
sensor for the UA. A soldier observes, listens, feels, and processes information. He
analyzes, judges, thinks, prioritizes, decides, and communicates what he knows and does
so in real time. The soldier is a shooter, who designates, directs, or calls for PE. He does
this from inches away to the limit of his technology—enhanced Line of Sight (LOS) with
his eyes, laser, or gun sight on the target, in all weather conditions and terrain sets. Most
importantly, he is disciplined and trained, understands purpose and intent, and can assess,
firsthand, the battle damage and the effects of PE. In effect, the soldier on the ground is
the ultimate precision weapon.
Through programs like OFW the Army intends to make every Infantry soldier a shooter
in his own right and capable of providing a decisive component of an assault but also a
sensor, shooter, and assessor for the full range of Joint Fires, and to provide the means
and methods to master future military operations.
The OFW fusion architecture, operating over integrated communications networks, must
be capable of accepting data from all Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) sources (organic and external). This includes sensors on board combat vehicles and
soldiers, organic manned and unmanned R&S platforms, and external sensor
constellations. Three distinct links must be supported by fusion for OF soldiers, leaders,
and small units. These are sensor to shooter, sensor to decider and maneuver, and sensor
to analysis node.
The OFW ISR architecture needs to fuse artificial and human intelligence coming from
many sources in such a way that it is fused at the source and provided directly to the
action agent. It is required to provide data directly to weapon systems with tight sensor-
to-shooter links, satisfy Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), and
empower squads and platoons with responsiveness, agility, and an ability to operate with
greater competence, confidence, and purpose.
At each echelon, from soldier to platoon to the UA, information must be processed and
fused to contribute to a localized and relevant COP. A series of intelligent agents,
profiles, and filters built into the processors and modified to suit specific situations during
pre-combat preparations ensures actionable information reaches the proper points of
fusion at other echelons.
49
Brigade and battalion capabilities are to be responsive to squads and platoons in contact.
Sensor coverage is to be maintained throughout an assault to see enemy reactions, exploit
enemy vulnerabilities, and confirm Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
Squads and platoons in contact are to provide spot reports, which are immediately shared
with adjacent units and higher commanders. Platoons, and squads are to be able to
conduct decentralized execution of mission orders to finish engagements.
Squads and platoons are to operate as lethal teams and prepared to respond against enemy
engagement from hide positions. Dismounted squads and platoons are to maintain
overwatch with precision fires within the building as they enter and clear rooms.
Additionally, squads and platoons in the building are to receive mutual support by precise
Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) fires. The network must ensure that LOS, BLOS, and
external and internal Non Line-of-Sight (NLOS) fires as well as close support by RAH 66
are available on demand to support the squads and platoons as they move through the
objective. Force cohesion is to be maintained through a reliable network that provides
C4ISR communications within the building and in the subterranean spaces below the
building and streets where squads and platoons may need to maneuver.
Squads and platoons are to operate as lethal teams and prepared to respond against enemy
engagement from hide positions. Dismounted squads and platoons maintain are to
overwatch with precision fires within the building as they enter and clear rooms.
Additionally, squads and platoons in the building are to receive mutual support by precise
BLOS fires. The network must ensure that LOS, BLOS, and external and internal NLOS
fires as well as close support by RAH 66 are available on demand to support the squads
and platoons as they move through the objective. Force cohesion is to be maintained
through a reliable network that provides C4ISR communications within the building and
in the subterranean spaces below the building and streets where squads and platoons may
need to maneuver.
Squads and platoons focus on most dangerous targets, using networked external and
organic fires and determine CID to prevent fratricide. The combination of situational
awareness, organic sensors, and forward presence by squads and platoons leaders enables
them to make CID decisions.
50
The integration of sensors down to the squad level with precision LOS, BLOS, and
NLOS fires enables immediate reaction to surprise fire from the enemy.
The UA’s aviation detachment and other supporting Army and joint aviation can
communicate with and collaborate with UA squads and platoons.
Networked squads and platoons use massed effects to create lethal overmatch.
The C4ISR architecture must include embedded training from individual soldier and
leader to collective (squads and platoons). Training implications include: Software to
support training must be “as capable” as how to fight doctrine—very adaptable and
updateable; the training model must support combinations of virtual, constructive, and
live training; and training to order—a National Simulation Center capable of providing
scenario, threat, terrain, weather—full spectrum.
• OV3 Operational IER Matrix – OFW Equipped OF Small Unit; see Appendix F
51
The Wolfpack approach to OFW has been to define capabilities at the small unit level,
which is enabled by a modular and distributed approach. This enables the small unit to
configure itself across the spectrum of perceived need, from the very specialized to the
very broad, minimizing the need to “leave capabilities behind.” This perspective allows
for analysis and definition of which systems must interact to achieve the given
operational function. This level of analysis will effectively provide architecture of
systems required to perform given functions. It will become clear that certain
technologies/systems become critical across multiple areas of combat function. Beyond
the identification of relationships between systems/subsystems, this analysis potentially
enables a quantification of the increased combat effectiveness provided by the given SoS.
SoSs provide increased capabilities due to their synergistic interactions. Systems and
subsystems act in concert, enabling a completely new function. A unique differentiation
from a system is that SoSs tend to avert catastrophic failures and retain a base level of
function represented by the individual functions of the core components.
The Wolfpack SoS Architecture identifies the systems required to achieve the functional
needs described in the Wolfpack SoS Concept and O&O Concept documents, as well as
their relation to one another.
52
6. Summary
The Wolfpack OA Document provides an unambiguous DOTMLPF basis for completion
of the Concept and Technology Development phase of the OFW program. It, however,
only represents a first step in an iterative development process integral to the spiral
development of OFW system concepts and designs, and corresponding TRADOC
products.
OFW OA product refinement, via the TRADOC OA development process, database, and
tools must be expanded to accommodate not only maturation of proposed OFW program
technologies, but also the contextual influences of the other concepts, plans and
architectures, the external programmatic and technological influences of Army and Joint
programs, and evolving changes to the DoD DAS and JCIDS.
The evolving DoD DAS guidance concerning concept and technology development
efforts requires in-depth analysis of the implications described by Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 2, Operation of the DAS, 30
October 2002 about development of joint integrated architectures by the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD [AT&L]), the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD
[C3I]), the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, the Combatant
Commanders, and other appropriate DoD Components for capability areas agreed to by
the Joint Staff especially concerning the OV.
53
Development of a closer relationship to the FCS LSI and Program Management Office
(PMO) and TRADOC OA product effort appears key to success for the OFW program.
Access by the OFW LTI to the FCS ACE and other databases, and sharing of work
completed by the FCS LSI and PMO and TRADOC should be leveraged to provide OFW
program acceleration and cost savings. It is clear that the functional decomposition work
and architecture work performed to date in the FCS program requires detailed interaction
with the OFW CD effort. A key concern is that the FCS system, including its supporting
communications network, is still in the process of being defined and detailed designs are
not scheduled to be finalized until FY05. Therefore, it will be necessary to closely
monitor future FCS developments to ensure interoperability between OFW and FCS.
Finally, representatives of the OFW program must actively participate in FCS working
groups and IPTs to ensure that the overall FCS SoS will serve the needs of the OFW
equipped soldiers, leaders, squads, and platoons.
54
1
Wolfpack Enterprise (Wolfpack) Operational Architecture (OA) Document (Interim),
SLIN 2BR, 27 January 2003.
2
Wolfpack System of Systems (SoS) Concept Document (Interim) (Revision 1), SLIN
2AB, 16 December 2002 and Operational and Organizational Concept (O&OC)
Document (Final) SLIN 2AF, 24 February 2003.
3
Included, to a degree, as elements of TRADOC OA products.
4
Ibid.
5
Wolfpack SoS Concept Document (Interim) (Revision 1), SLIN 2AB, 16 December
2002 and O&OC Document (Final) SLIN 2AF, 24 February 2003.
6
Wolfpack SoS Concept Document (Interim) (Revision 1), SLIN 2AB, 16 December
2002.
7
Wolfpack O&OC Document (Final) SLIN 2AF, 24 February 2003.
8
Wolfpack SoS Concept Document (Interim) (Revision 1), SLIN 2AB, 16 December
2002.
9
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, Operational and Organizational Plan (O&OP) for
Maneuver Unit of Action (UA), Change 1, 25 November 2002.
10
TRADOC’s Architecture Integration and Management Directorate (AIMD) is
responsible for producing architecture plans and managing architecture development
resources, and is TRADOC's agent for the Army and Army component segments of
Joint and Coalition architectures. The AIMD has overall architecture responsibility for
policy, procedures, resourcing, and prioritization, and serves as the single point of
entry for Joint and Department of the Army directed/requested architecture support
from TRADOC.
55
Describes: Architecture context, summary, scope, purpose, products and tool sets,
environment, analytical findings, and who did/will build the architecture products.
Level of detail: Al acronyms and new conceptual terms not considered common
knowledge.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
Level of detail: One per Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), system, or
Battlefield Functional Area (BFA). For the UA: one overarching for the brigade and
one for each separate TO&E organization. For FCS: one per BFA/functional area
within each of the architectures.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
Describes requirements for OEs to exchange information directly, both internal and
external connectivity, and rollups of multiple individual information exchanges
sufficient for OV representation.
Level of detail: One per TO&E organization or BFA/function, all operational nodes
to platform or individual system level to National Command Authority (NCA),
56
Level of detail: One per TO&E organization. For the UA: down to section/team
level.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
Level of detail: Army Universal Task List (AUTL) tasks down 3-5 levels of detail,
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Pub 183 standards, inputs and
outputs to Interface Exchange Requirement (IER) level, and mechanisms to system
or OPFAC level.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
57
Level of detail: One per mission/function down to operational node and IER level.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
Level of detail: Internal and external links down to system/subsystem and platform
level.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
Level of detail: Network, platform and system level, and user nodes.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
58
Level of Detail: Nodes, OEs, OPFACs; AUTL/Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)
activity; message set/data exchange; system/software; and network.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
Level of detail: Varies; provides interface standards, Military Standards, and data
interchanges.
(Ms. Patricia Bray, Deputy Director AIMD-South, Briefing, 18 November 2002.)
11
The TRADOC Program Integration Office for the Army Battle Command System
(TPIO-ABCS) defines and integrates all battle command requirements and
59
OF Architectures:
1. Draft OF Unit of Employment (UE) Headquarters (HQ) Design OA, 13 Dec 2002
2. OF UE HQ Design Database, Dec 2002
IF Architectures:
1. Interim Division Band, V1.0
2. Interim Division Base Support Battalion V1.0
3. Interim Division Air Cavalry Support Battalion, V1.0
4. Interim Division Maneuver Sustainment Brigade, V 1.0
5. Interim Division Troops Support Battalion, V 1.0
6. Interim Division Engineer Regiment, V 1.0
7. Interim Division Long Range Surveillance Detachment, V 1.0
8. Interim Division Military Intelligence Battalion, V 1.0
9. Interim Division Military Intelligence Company, V 1.0
10. Interim Division Military Police Company, V 1.0
11. Interim Division Signal Battalion, V1.0
SBCT Architectures:
1. Interim Combat Service Support Company, V2.0 netViz
2. Interim Combat Service Support Company Horseblanket V2.0, 2 May 2001
60
LF Architectures:
1. ADA Brigade V2.0 netViz, 4 Nov. 2002
2. Civil Affairs Brigade V2.0 netViz, 4 Nov. 2002
3. Field Artillery V2.0 netViz, 4 Nov. 2002
4. Psychological Operations Battalion V2.0 netViz, 4 Nov. 2002
5. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment V2.0 netViz, 11 June 2002
6. 75th Ranger Regiment netViz V2.0, 28 Mar. 2002
7. 75th Ranger Regiment V2.0, 28 Mar. 2002
8. 82nd Airborne Division netViz V1.5, 20 May 2002
9. 82nd Airborne Division Horseblanket V1.5, 18 June 2002
10. 82nd Airborne Division Business Rules and Issues V1.5, 16 Oct. 2002
11. 1st Cavalry Division
1. SBCT-5
2. SBCT-6
3. XVIIIth Airborne Corps
4. 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)
5. 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)
15
“NetViz” is hierarchical “visual database” software provided by the “netViz
Corporation” (www.netViz.com).
16
LTG Johnny Riggs, Director Objective Force (OF) Task Force, Briefing at the Space
and Missile Defense Symposium in El Paso, Texas, 11 December 2002.
17
Joint Force Command (JFCOM) is to develop an integrated interoperability plan to
address the following interoperability priorities: Standard operating procedures and
deployable joint command and control processes, organizations, and systems for the
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63
64
65
66