ri ting

Culture
The Poetics and Politics
of Ethnography

EDITED BY JAMES CLIFFORD

AND GEORGE E. MARCUS

A School of American Research

Advanced Seminar

University of California Press

BERKELEY LOS ANGELES LONDON

PAUL RABINOW
Representations Are Social Facts:
Modernity and Post- Modernity
inAnthropology
Beyond Epistemology
In his influential book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
Richard Rorty argues that epistemology as the study of mental repre-
sentations arose in a particular historical epoch , the seventeenth cen-
tury; developed in a specific society, that of Europe; and eventually
triumphed in philosophy by being closely linked to the professional
claims of one group, nineteenth-century German professors of phi-
losophy. For Rorty, this turn was not a fortuitous one: " The desire for
a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint-a desire to find
foundations ' to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one
must not stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which
cannot be gainsaid" (315). Radicalizing Thomas Kuhn , Rorty portrays
our obsession with epistemology as an accidental , but eventually sterile
turning in Western culture.
Pragmatic and American , Rorty s book has a moral: modern pro-
fessional philosophy represents the " triumph of ~he quest for certainty
over the quest for reason" (61). The chief culprit in this melodrama
is Western philosophy s concern with epistemology, the equation of
knowledge with internal representations and the correct evaluation
of those representations. Let me briefly outline Rorty s argument , add
some important specifications by Ian Hacking, then claim that Michel
Foucault has developed a position that enables us to supplement Rorty
in important ways. In the rest of the paper I explore some ways in
which these lines of thought are relevant to discourses about the
other. Specifically, in the second section I discuss recent debates about
the making of ethnographic texts; in the third section , some differ-
ences between feminist anthropology and anthropological feminism;
and, finally, in the fourth section , I put forward one line of research
my own.
Representations Are Social Facts 235
Philosophers , Rorty argues, have crowned their discipline the
queen of the sciences. This coronation rests on their claim to be the
specialists on universal problems and their ability to provide us with a
sure foundation for all knowledge. Philosophy s realm is the mind; its
privileged insights establish its claim to be the discipline that judges all
other disciplines. This conception of philosophy is , however, a recent
historical development. For the Greeks there was no sharp division be-
tween external reality and internal representations. Unlike Aristotle,
Descartes s conception of knowing rests on having correct representa-
tions in an internal spa~~, the mind. Rorty makes the point by saying:
The novelty was the notion of a single inner space in which bodily
and perceptual sensations (confused ideas of sense and imagination in
Descartes s phrase), mathematical truths , moral rules, the idea of God,
moods of depression , and all the rest of what we now call ' mental'
were objects of quasi-observation " (50). Although not all of these ele-
ments were new ones, Descartes successfully combined them into a
(1979), new problematic, setting aside Aristotle s concept of reason as a grasp
of universals: beginning in the seventeenth century, knowledge be-
came internal , representational , and judgmental. Modern philosophy
was born when a knowing subject endowed with consciousness and its
representational contents became the central problem for thought,
the paradigm of all knowing.
The modern notion of epistemology, then , turns on the clarifica-
tion and judgment of the subject s representations. " To know is to rep-
resent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possi-
bility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the
mind is able to construct such representations. Philosophy s eternal
concern is to be a general theory of representations, a theory which
will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality well , those
which represent it less well , and those which do not represent it at all
(despite their pretense of doing so)" (3). The knowledge arrived at
through the examination of representations about " reality " and " the
knowing ~ubject " would be universal. This universal knowledge is, of
course, SCIence.
It was only at the end of the Enlightenment that the fully elabo-
rated conception of philosophy as the judge of all possible knowledge
appeared and was canonized in the work of Immanuel Kant. " The
eventual demarcation of philosophy from science was made possible
by the notion that philosophy s core was a ' theory Of knowledge , a the-
ory distinct from the sciences because it was their foundation " Rorty
argues (132). Kant established as a priori the Cartesian claim that we
have certainty only about ideas. Kant, " by taking everything we say to
be about something we have constituted , made it possible for epis-
temology to be thought of as a foundational science. . . . He thus en-
 ,,
236 PAUL RABINOW
abled philosophy professors to see themselves as presiding over a tri-
bunal of pure reason , able to determine whether other disciplines
were staying within the legal limits set by the ' structure ' of their sub-
ject matters " (139).
As a discipline whose proper activity is grounding claims to knowl-
edge, philosophy was developed by nineteenth-century neo- Kantians
and institutionalized in nineteenth-century German universities. Carv-
ing out a space between ideology and empirical psychology, German
philosophy wrote its own history, producing our modern canon of the
greats. " This task was completed by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The narrative of the history of philosophy as a series of great
thinkers continues today in introductory philosophy courses. Philoso-
phy s claim to intellectual preeminence lasted only for a short time
however , and by the 1920S, only philosophers and undergraduates
believed that philosophy was uniquely qualified to ground and judge
cultural production. Neither Einstein nor Picasso was overly con-
cerned with what Husserl might have thought of them;
Although philosophy departments continue to teach epistemol-
ogy, there is a counter tradition in modern thought that followed anc
other path. " Wittgenstein , Heidegger and Dewey are in agreement that
the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made possible
special mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of
representation, needs to be abandoned, " Rorty observes (6). These
thinkers did not seek to construct alternate and better theories of the
mind or knowledge . Their aim was not to improve epistemology but
to playa different game. Rorty calls this game hermeneutics. By this,
he simply means knowledge without foundations; a knowledge that
essentially amounts ti!l edifying conversation. Rorty has so far told us
very little about the content of this conversation , perhaps because
there is very little to tell. As with Wittgenstein , Heidegger , and, in a
different way, Dewey, Rorty is faced with the fact , troubling or amus-
ing, that once the historical or logical deconstruction of Western phi-
losophy has been accomplished, there is really nothing special left for
philosophers to do. Once it is seen that philosophy does not found or
legitimate the claims to knowledge of other disciplines, its task be-
comes one of commenting on their works and engaging them in
conversation.
Truth versus Truth or Fa~sity
Even if one accepts Rorty s deconstruction of epistemology,
the consequences of such a move remain very open. Before exploring
some of them , it seems important to underline the point that rejecting
epistemology does not mean rejecting truth, reason , o~. standards of
Representa~ions Are Social Facts 237
judgment. This point is made very succinctly by Ian Hacking in " Lan-
guage, Truth , and Reason" (1982). Parallel to Rorty sdistinction of
certainty versus reason , Hacking draws a distinction between those
philosophies involved in the quest for truth and those-which he calls
styles of thinking, so as not to limit them . to modern philosophy-
that open up new possibilities by proceeding in terms of " truth or
falsehood.
Hackingputs forward what is basically a simple point: what is cur-
rently taken as " truth" is dependent ona prior historical event- the
emergence of a style of thinking about truth and falsity that estab-
lished the conditions for entertaining a proposition as being capable
of being taken as true or false in the first place. Hacking puts it this
way: ' .'By reasoning I don t mean logic. I mean the very opposite, for
logic is the preservation of truth , while a style of reasoning is what
brings in the possibility of truth or falsehood. . . . styles of reasoning
create the possibility of truth and falsehood. Deduction and induc-
tion merely preserve it " (56- 57). Hacking is not " against" logic , only
against its claims to found and ground all truth. Logic is fine in its own
domain , but that domain is a limited one.
By drawing this distinction one avoids the problem of totally rela-
tivizing reason or of turning different historical conceptions of 'truth
and falsity into a question of subjectivism. These conceptions are his-
torical and social facts. This point is well put by Hacking when he says:
Hence although whichever propositions are true may depend on the
data;thefact that they are candidates for being true is a consequence
of an historical event " (56). That the analytical tools we use when we
investigate a set of problems- geometry for the Greeks;experimental
method in the seventeenrhcentury, or statistics in modern social sci-
ence- have shifted is explainable without recourse to some truth
denying relativism. Furthermore, science understood in this way re-
mains quite objective " simply because the styles of reasoning that we
employ determine what counts as objectivity. . . . Propositions of the
sort that necessarily require reasoning to be substantiated have a
positivity, a being true or false , only in consequence of the styles of
reasoning in which they occur " (49, 65)' What Foucault hasca:lled the
regime, or game, of truth and falsity is both a component and a prod-
u~t of historical practices. Other procedures and other objects could
have filled the bill just as well and have been just as true.
Hacking distinguishes between everyday, commonsensical reason-
ing that does not need to apply any elaborate set of reasons and those
more specialized domains that do. There is both a cultural and a his-
torical plurality of these specialized, domains and of historically and
culturally diverse styles associated with them. From the acceptance of
a diversity of historical styles of reasoning, of methods, and objects
238 PAUL RABINOW
Hacking draws the conclusion that thinkers frequently got things
right , solved problems, and established truths. But , he argues, this
does not imply that we should search for a unified Popperian realm of
the true; rather , a la Paul Feyerabend , we should keep our options in
inquiry as open as possible. The Greeks, Hacking reminds us, had no
concept , or use, of statistics , a fact that invalidates neither Greek sci-
ence nor statistics as such. This position is not relativism , but it is not
imperialism either. Rorty calls his version of all this hermeneutics.
Hacking calls his anarcho-rationalism. " Anarcho-rationalism is toler-
ance for other people combined with the discipline of one s own stan-
dards of truth and reason " (65). Let us call it good science.
Michel Foucault has also considered many of these issues in paral-
lel , but not identical , fashion. His Archaeology of Knowledge (1976) and
Discourse on Language (1976) are perhaps the most developed attempts
to present, if not a theory of what Hacking refers to as " truth or
falsity " and " styles of thought, " then at least an analytic of them. Al-
though the details of Foucault s systematization of how discursive ob-
jects, enunciative mddalities , concepts, and discursive strategies are
formed and transformed is beyond the scope of this paper , I several
points are relevant here. Let us merely take one example as illustrative.
In the Foucault discusses some of the constraints
Discourse on Language
, and conditions for , the production of truth , understood as state-
ments capable of being taken seriously as true or false. Among others, .
Foucault examines the existence of scientific disciplines. He says:
For a discipline to exist , there must be the possibility of formulating-and of
doing so ad infinitum- fresh propositions. . . . These propositions must con-
form to specific conditions of objects, subject, methods etc. . . . Within its own
limits ,every discipline recognises as true and false propositions, but it re-
pulses a whole teratology of learning. . . . In short, a proposition must fulfill
some onerous and complex conditions before it can be admitted within a
discipline; before it can be pronounced true or false it must be , as Monsieur
Canguilhem might say, " within the true. " (1976 :223-24)
Foucault gives the example of Mendel: " Mendel spoke of objects , em-
ployed methods and placed himself within a theoretical perspective
totally alien to the biology of his time. . . . Mendel spoke the truth , but
he was not dans le vrai of contemporary biological discourse " (224).
The demonstration of the richness of this style of thinking has been
the great strength of Foucault , Georges Canguilhem , and other French
practitioners of the history and philosophy of science, particularly the
life sciences.
It is perhaps not accidental that both Rorty and Hacking are con-
cerned with the history of physical science , mathematics, and philoso-
1. For a treatment ofthe subject see Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) PP' 44- 79.
Representations Are Social Facts 239
phy. What has been missing from their accounts is the category of
power, and to a lesser extent (in Hacking s case) society. Hacking s cur-
rent very interesting work on nineteenth-century statistics does, how-
ever , include these categories. Although compelling in its deconstruc-
tive force , Rorty s story is less convincing in its refusal to comment on
how the epistemological turning came about in Western society-ac-
cording to Rorty, like Galilean science, it just happened-or in its in-
ability to see knowledge as more than free and edifying conversation.
Not unlike Jurgen Habermas, although refusing Habermas s striving
for foundationalism , Rorty sees free communication , civilized conver-
sation , as the ultimate goal. As Hacking says: " Perhaps Richard Rorty
. . . central doctrine of conversation will some day seem as linguistic a
philosophy as the analysis emanating from Oxford a generation ago
(1984: 109). The content of the conversation and how the freedom to
have it is to come about is , however , beyond the domain of philosophy.
But conversation , between individuals or cultures, is only possible
within contexts shaped and constrained by historical , cultural , and
political relations and the only partially discursive social practices that
constitute them. What is missing from Rorty s account, then , is any
discussion of how thought and social practices interconnect. Rorty is
helpful in deflating philosophy s claims , but he stops exactly a t the
point of taking seriously his own insight: to wit, thought is nothing
more and nothing less than a historically locatable set of practices.
How to do this without reverting to epistemology or to some dubious
superstructure/infrastructure device is another question , one Rorty is
not alone in not having solved.
Representations and Society
Michel Foucault has offered us some important tools for ana-
lyzing thought as a public and social practice. Foucault accepts the
main elements of the Nietzschean , Heideggerean account of Western
metaphysics and epistemology Rorty has given us , but draws different
conclusions from these insights-ones, it seems to me, that are both
more consistent and more interesting than Rorty s. We find, for ex-
ample , many of the same elements that are in Rorty s history of philos-
ophy-the modern subject, representations, order- in Foucault s fa-
mous analysis of Velazquez s painting Las Meninas. But there are also
some major differences. Instead of treating the problem of represen-
tations as specific to the history of ideas, Foucault treats it as a more
general cultural concern , a problem that was being worked on in
many other domains. IiI The Order of Things ( 1973) and later books,
Foucault demonstrates how the problem of correct representations
has informed a multitude of social domains and practices, ranging

240 PAUL RABINOW
from disputes in botany to proposals for prison reform. The problem
of representations for Foucaultis not , therefore, one that happened
to pop up in philosophy and dominate thinking there for three hun-
dred years. It is linked to the wide range of disparate, but interrelated,
social and political practices that constitute the modern world, with its
distinctive concerns with order; truth , and the subject. Foucault dif-
fers from Rorty, then , in treating philosophical ideas as social prac-
tices and not chance twists in a conversation or in philosophy.
But Foucault also disagrees with many Marxist thinkers, who see
problems in painting as, by definition , ultimately epiphenomenal to
or expressive of, what was " really " going on in society. This brings us
briefly to the problem of ideology. In several places, Foucault suggests
that once one sees the problem of the subject , or representations , and
of truth as social practices , then the very notion of ideology becomes
problematic. He says: " behind the concept of ideology there is a kind
of nostalgia for a quasi- transparent form of knowledge, free from all
error and illusion " (1980: 117). In this sense, the concept of ideology
is close kin to the concept of epistemology.
For Foucault, the modern concept of ideology is characterized by
three interrelated qualities: (1) by definition, ideology is opposed to
something like " the truth " a false representation as it were; (2) ide-
ology is produced by a subject (individual or collective) in order
hide the truth , and consequently the analyst s task consists in exposing
this false representation; and revealing that (3) ideology is secondary
to something more real, some infrastructural dimension on which
ideology is parasitic. Foucault rejects all three claims.
We have already alluded to the broad lines of a critique of the sub-
ject and the search for certainty seen as based on correct represen-.
tations. Consequently, let us briefly focus on the third point: the
question of whether the production of truth is epiphenomenal to
something else. He has described his project not as deciding the truth
or falsity of claims in history "but in seeing historically how effects of
truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither
true nor false " (131- 33). Foucault proposes to study what he calls the
regime of truth as an effective component in the constitution of social
practiCes.
Foucault has proposed three working hypotheses: " (1) Truth is
to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the produc-
tion , regulation , distribution , circulation and operation of statements.
(2) Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which
produce and sustain it , and to effects of power which it induces and
which extend it. (3) This regime is not merely ideological or super-
structural; it was a condition of the formation and development of
,,
Representations Are Social Facts 241
capitalism " (133). We shall explore some of the implications of these
working hypotheses in the next three sections of the paper.
As Max Weber I think , once said, seventeenth-century capitalists
were not only economic men who traded and built ships , they also
looked at Rembrandt s paintings , drew maps of the world , had marked
conceptions of the nature of other peoples ,and worried a good deal
about their own destiny. These representations were strong and effec-
tive forces in what they were and how they acted. Many new possibil-
ities for thought and action are opened up if we follow Rorty and
abandon epistemology (or at least see it for what it has been: an im-
portant cultural movement in Western society) and follow Foucault in
seeing power as productive and permeative of social relations and the
production of truth in our current regime of power. Here are some
initial conclusions and research strategies that might follow from this
discussion of epistemology. I merely list them before moving on to re-
cent discussions in anthropology on how best to describe the other.
1. Epistemology must be seen asa historical event-a distinc-
tive social practice, one among many others , articulated in new
ways in seventeenth-century Europe.
2. We do not need a theory of indigenous epistemologies or a
new epistemology of the other. We should be attentive to our his-
torical practice of projecting our cultural practices onto the other;
at best , the task is to show how and when and through what cul-
tural and institutional means other people started. claiming epis-
temology for their own.
3. We need to anthropologize the West: show how exotic its
constitution of reality has been; emphasize those domains most
taken for granted as universal (this includes epistemology and
economics); make them seem as historically peculiar as possible;
show how their claims to truth are linked to social practices and
have hence become effective forces in the social world.
4. We must plm:alize and diversify our approaches: a basic
move against either economic or philosophic hegemony is to di-
versify centers of resistance: avoid the error of reverse essentializ-
ing; accidentalism is not a remedy for Orientalism.
The Writing of Ethnographic Texts:
The Fantasia of the Library
There is a curious time lag as concepts move across disciplin-
ary boundaries. The moment when the historical profession, is dis-
242 PAUL RABINOW
covering cultural anthropology in the (unrepresentative) person of
Clifford Geertz is just the moment when Geertz is being questioned in
anthropology (one of the recurrent themes of the Santa Fe seminar
th~t gave rise to this volume). So , too , anthropologists, or some of
them in any case , are now discovering and being moved to new crea-
tion by the infusion of ideas from deconstructionist literary criticism,
now that it has lost its cultural energy in literature departments and
Derrida is discovering politics. Although there are many car ders of
this hybridization (many of those present at the seminar, as well as
Paul Dumont, and
James Boon , Stephen Webster, James Siegel, Jean-
Jean Jamin) there is only one " professional
" so to speak , in the crowd.
For , whereas all the others mentioned are practicing anthropologists,
scribe
James Clifford has created and occupied the role of ex officio
of our scribblings. Geertz , the founding figure , may pause between
monographs to muse on texts, narrative, description, and interpreta-
as well as his informants , those an-
tion. Clifford takes as his natives ,
thropologists past and present whose work , self-consciously or not
has been the production of texts, the writing of ethnography. We are
being observed and inscribed.
At first glance James Clifford' s work , like that of others in this vol-
ume, seems to follow naturally in the wake of Geertz s interpretive
turn. There is, however , a major difference. Geertz (like the other an-
thropologists) is still directing his efforts to reinvent an anthropologi-
cal science with the help of textual mediations. The core activity is still
social description of the other , however modified by new conceptions
of discourse , author , or text. The other for Clifford is the anthropo-
logical representation of the other. This means that Clifford is simul-
taneously more firmly in control of his project and more parasitical.
He can invent his questions with few constraints; he must constantly
feed off others ' texts.
This new speciality is currently in the process of self- definition.
The first move in legitimating a new approach is to claim it has an ob-
ject of study, preferably an important one, that has previously escaped
notice. Parallel to Geertz s claim that the Balinese were interpreting
their cock fights as cultural texts all along, Clifford argues that an-
thropologists have been experimenting with writing forms' whether
they knew it or not. The interpretive turn in anthropology has made
its mark (producing a substantial body of work and almost estab-
lishing itself as a subspeciality), but it is still not clear whether. the
deconstructive-semiotic turn (an admittedly vague label) is a salutary
loosening up, an opening for exciting new work of major import, or a
tactic in the field of cultural politics to be understood primarily in so-
ciological terms. As it is certainly the first and the third , it is worth a
closer examination.
Representations Are Social
In his essay "
Facts 243
Fantasia of the Library " (1977) Michel Foucault plays
adroitly with the progression of uses Flaubert made throughout his
life of the fable of the temptation of Saint Anthony. Far from being
the idle products of a fertile imagination, Flaubert s references to
iconography and philology in his seemingly phantasmagoric render-
ings of the saint's hallucinations were exact. Foucault shows us how
Flaubert returned throughout his life to this staging of experience
and writing, and used itas an ascetic exercise both to produce and to
keep at bay the demons that haunt a writer s world. It was no accident
that Flaubert ended his life as a writer with that monstrous collection
Bouvard et Pecuchet. A constant commentary on
of commonplaces
Bouvard et Pecuchet can be read as a thorough domestica-
other texts,
tion of textuality into a self-contained exercise of arranging and cata-
loguing: the fantasia of the library.
For the sake of the argument, let us juxtapose Clifford Geertz
interpretive anthropology to James Clifford' textualist meta-
anthropology. If Geertz is still seeking to conjure and capture the
demons of exoticism- theater states, shadow plays, cock fights-
through his limited use of fictionalized stagings in which they can ap-
pear to us , the textualistldeconstructive move runs the risk of invent-
ing ever more clever filing systems for others ' texts and of imagining
that everyone else in the world is hard at work doing the same thing.
Lest the argument run away in directions of its own , I should stress
that I am not saying that Clifford's enterprise has up to the present
been anything but salutary. The raising of anthropological conscious-
ness about anthropology s own textual mode of operation was long
overdue. Despite Geertz s occasional acknowledgements of the ineluc-
tability of fictionalizing, he has never pushed that insight very far.
The point seems to have needed a meta position to bring home its real
force. The voice from the campus library has been a salutary one.
What I want to do briefly in this section is to return the gaze, to look
back at this ethnographer of ethnographers , sitting across the table in
a cafe , and, using his own descriptive categories , examine his textual
productions.
Clifford' s central theme has been the textual construction of an-
thropological authority. The main literary device employed in ethnog-
raphies, " free indirect style " has been well analyzed by Dan Sperber
(1982) and need not be rehearsed here. The insight that anthrop010-
gists write employing literary conventions, although interesting, is not
inherently crisis- provoking. Many now hold that fiction and science
are not opposed but complementary terms (De Certeau 1983)' Ad-
vances have been made in our awareness of the fi(:tional (in the sense
of " made, fabricated" ) quality of anthropological writing and in
the integration of its characteristic modes of production. The self-

244
consciousness of style, rhetoric, and dialectic in the production of an-
thropological texts should lead us to a finer awareness of other , more
imaginative , ways to write. .
Clifford seems , however , to be saying more than this. Substantively,
he argues that from Malinowski on , anthropological authority has
rested on two textual legs. An experiential " I was there " element estab-
lishes the unique authority of the anthropologist; its suppression in
the text establishes the anthropologist s scientific authority. 2 Clifford
shows us this device at work in Geertz s famous cockfight paper: " The
research process is separated from the texts it generates and from the
fictive world they are made to call up. The actuality of discursive situa-
tions and individual interlocutors is filtered out. . . . The dialogical
situational aspects of ethnographic interpretation tend to be banished
from the final representative text.. Not entirely banished, of course;
there exist approved topoi for the portrayal of the research process
(1983: 132). Clifford presents Geertz s " appealing fable " as para-
digmatic: the anthropologist establishes that he was there ~nd then
disappears from the text.
With his own genre Clifford makes a parallel move. Just as Geertz
makes a bow to self-referentiality (thereby establishing one dimension
of his authority) and then (in the name of science) evades its conse-
quences , so, too , Clifford talks a great deal about the ineluctability ~f
dialogue (thereby establishing his authority as .an " pen " on ~), but his
texts are not themselves dialogic. They are Written m a modified free
indirect style. They evoke an " I was there at the anthropology conven-
tion " tone, while consistently maintaining a Flaubertean remove. Both
Geertz and . Clifford fail to use self-referentiality as anything more
than a device for establishing authority. Clifford's telling reading of
the Balinese cockfight as a panoptic construct makes this point per-
suasively, but he himself makes the same omission on another level.
He reads and classifies, describing intention and establishing a canon;
but his own writing and situation are left unexamined. Pointing out
Clifford' s textual stance does not, of course, invalidate his insights
(any more than his reading of Malinowski's textual moves invalidates
the analysis of the Kula). It only situates them. We have moved back
from the tent in the Trobriands filled with natives to the writing desk
in the campus library.
An essential move in establishing disciplinary or subdisciplinary
legitimacy is classification. Clifford proposes four
2. The importance of this double move
flectionsonFiiddwOTkinMorocco(~977).
types of anthro-
is one of the central arguments of my
3. I would like to thank ArJun Appadural for his help m clanfymg this and other
points.
."
PAUL RABINOW Representations Are Social Facts
245
pological writing, which have appeared in roughly. chronological or-
der. He ~rganizes h is essay " On Ethnographic Authority " (1983a)
around this progressIOn , but also asserts that no mode of authority is
better than any other. " The modes of authority reviewed in this es-
say-experiential , interpretive , dialogical , polyphonic-are available
to all writers of ethnographic texts , Western and non- Western. None is
o?solete, none is pure: there is room for invention within each para
dlgm " (142). This conclusion goes against the rhetorical grain of
Clifford' s essay. This tension is important and I shall return to it below.
Clifford' s main thesis is that anthropological writing has tended to
suppress the dialogic dimension of fieldwork , giving full control of
the text to the anthropologist. The bulk of Clifford's work has been
devoted to showing ways in which this textual elimination of the dia-
logical might be remedied by new forms of writing. This leads him to
~ead e ::,periential and interpretive modes of writing as monological
~m~ed I
n. general terms to colonialism. " Interpretive anthropology .. .
m ItS maInstream realist strands. . . does not escape the general stric-
tures o~ those ~ritics of " colonial" representation who , since 1950
have rejected discourses that portray the cultural realities of other
peoples without placing their own reality in jeopardy " (133). It would
be easy to read this statement as preferring some " paradigms " to oth-
ers. It is perfectly possible that Clifford himself is simply ambivalenL
~wever , given his own interpretive choices he clearly does charac-
~erlZe some ~odes as ~rgent " and thereby as temporarily more
~portant. ~sIng a ~n d ofmterpretation that highlights the suppres-
SIOn o~ ~he dialogIC , It IS hard not to read the history of anthropologi-
cal wn ~mg as a loose progression toward dialogical and polyphonic
textuahty.
. Having ca ~t t?e first t~o ~odes of ethnographic authority (experi-
ential and realIst/InterpretIve) m largely negative terms, Clifford moves
on to a mu ~h more enthusiastic portrayal of the next set (dialogic and
~teroglossIC). He says: " Dialogic and constructivist paradigms tend to
disperse or share out ethnographic authority, while narratives of ini-
tiat~on confir ~ the researcher s special competence. Paradigms of ex-
p~nence and Interpretation are yielding to paradigms of discourse
, of
Re-
matters.
dialogue and polyphony " (133). The claim that such modes are tri-
umphing is empirically dubious; as Renato Rosaldo says: " The troops
are not following. " Yet there is clearly considerable interest in such
. What is dialogic? Clifford at first seems to be using the term in a
hteral sense: a text that presents two subjects in discursive exchange.
Kevin Dwye s " rather literal record" (134) of exchanges with a Moroc-
can farmer IS the first example cited of a " dialogic " text. However , a
246 PAUL RABINOW
page later , Clifford adds: " To say that an ethnography is composed of
discourses and that its different components are dialogically related
is not to say that its textual form should be that of a literal dialogue
(135)' Alternate descriptions are given , but no final definition is ar-
rived at. Consequently the genre s defining characteristics remain
unclear.
But if interpretive authority is based on the exclusion of dia-
logue, the reverse is also true: a purely dialogical authority represses
the inescapable fact of textualization " Clifford quickly moves on to
remind us (134). This is confirmed by Dwyer s adamant distancing of
himself from what he perceives as textualist trends in anthropology.
The ' opposition of interpretive and dialogic is hard to grasp-several
pages later Clifford praises the most renowned representative of her-
meneutics, Hans Georg Gadamer , whose texts certainly contain no
direct dialogues, for aspiring to " radical dialogism " (142). Finally,
Clifford asserts that dialogic texts are, after all, texts, merely " repre-
sentations " of dialogues. The anthropologist retains his or her au-
thority as a constituting subject and representative of the dominant
culture. Dialogic texts can be just as staged and controlled as experi-
ential or interpretive texts. The mode offers no textual guarantees.
Finally, beyond dialogic texts , lies heteroglossia: " a carnivalesque
arena of diversity. " Following Mikhail Bakhtin, Clifford points to
Dickens s work as an example of the " polyphonic space " that might
serve as a model for us. " Dickens, the actor , oral performer , and poly-
phonist , is set against Flaubert, the master of authorial control moving
Godlike, among the thoughts and feelings of his characters. Eth-
nography, like the novel, wrestles with these alternatives " (137). If
dialogic texts fall prey to the evils of totalizing ethnographic adjust-
ment , then perhaps even more radical heteroglossic ones might not:
Ethnography is invaded by heteroglossia. If accorded an autono-
mous textual space, transcribed at sufficient length , indigenous state-
ments make sense on terms different from those of the arranging eth-
nographer. . . . This suggests an alternate textual strategy, a utopia of
plural authorship that accords to collaborators, not merely the status
of independent enunciators , but that of writers " (140).
But Clifford immediately adds: " quotations are always staged by
the quoter . . . a more radical polyphony would only displace eth-
nographic authority, still confirming, the final , virtuoso orchestration
by a single author of all the discourses in his or her text " (139). New
forms of writing, new textual experiments would open new possibil-
ities- but guarantee none. Clifford is uneasy about this. He moves on.
Temporarily enthusiastic for dialogic, Clifford immediately qualifies
his praise. He leads us on to heteroglossia: seduced- for a para-
Representatipns Are Social
graph-until we see
Facts 247
helas wri ~g. Cli~ord closes his es-
that it too is,
say by proclaiming: " I have argued that thIS ImpositIOn of coheren
on an unruly te:)Ctual process is now , inescapably a matter of strategIC
choice " (142).
Clifford' s presentation clearly offers a progression even if, by the
end of the essay, it is a purely decisionistone. However, Clifford ex-
plicitly denies any hierarchy. At first I thought this was mere inconsis-
tency, or ambivalence, or the embodiment of an unresolved but crea-
tive tension. I now think that Clifford, like everyone else , is dans
le vrai. We are at a discursive moment in which the author s inten-
tions have been eliminated or underplayed in recent critical thought.
Rather , we have been led to question the structures and contours of
various modes of writing per se. Fredric Jameson has identified vari-
ous elements of post-modern writing (e.g. , its refusal of hierarchy, its
flattening of history, its use of images) in a manner that seems to fit
Clifford' s project quite closely.
From Modernism to Post-Modernism
inAnthropology
Fredric Jameson , in his " Postmodernism and Consumer So-
ciety " (1983), offers us some useful starting points to si ~uate r~~ent
developments in anthrppological and meta-anthropologICal WritIng.
Without seeking a univocal definition of post-modernism, Jameson
delimits the scope of the term by. proposing a number of key ele-
ments: its historical location, its use of pastiche, the importance of
images.
Jameson locates post-modernism culturally and historically not
just as a stylistic term but as a period marker. By. so ~oing he seeks . to
isolate and correlate features of cultural productIOn In the 1960s with
other social and economic transformations. The establishment of ana-
lytic criteria and their correlation with socioeconomic changes is very
preliminary in Jameson s account, little more than a place marker.
However , it is worth marking the place. Late capitalism is defined by
Nature which sur-
Jameson as the moment when " the last vestiges. o~
vived on into classical capitalism are. at last elImInated: namely the
third world and the unconscious. The 60S will then have been the mo-
mentous transformational period in which this systemic restructuring
takes place on a global scale " (207). This is not the place to defend or
critifize Jameson ~ periodization , which he recognizes as provisional.
Let us sim ply note that it gives us the possibility of discussing changes
in representational forms within a context of Western developments
 248 PAULRABINOW
that lead forward to the present situation of those writing the descrip-
tions not in a backward- looking mode establishing textual connections
with writers in very different contexts, which frequently elide differ-
ences. For this reason , let us adopt it as heuristic.
The various post-modernisms forming in the sixties surfaced, ,
least in part , as a reaction against the earlier modernist movements.
Classical modernism, to use an expression that is no longer oxy-
moronic ,. arose in the context of high capitalist and bourgeois society
and stood against it: " it emerged within the business society of the
gilded age as scandalous and offensive to the middle class public-
ugly, dissonant , sexually shocking. . . . subversive (124). Jameson
contrasts the subversive modernist turn of the early twentieth century
with the flattening, reactive nature of post-modern culture:
Those formerly subversive and embattled styles--Abstract Expressionism;
the great modernist pO,etry of Pound, Eliot or Wallace Stevens; the Inter-
national Style (Le Corbusier , Frank Lloyd Wright , Mies);Stravinsky; Joyce
Proust and Mann- felt to be scandalous or shocking by our grandparents
, are, for the generation which arrives at the gate in the 1960 , felt to be the
establishment and the enemy- dead , stifling, canonical , the reified monu-
ments one has to destroy to do anything new. This means that there will be
many different forms of postmodernism as there were high modernisms in
place, since the former are at least initially specific and, local reactions against
those models. (1l1-12)
Jameson , not unlike Habermas (1983), dearly thinks there were im-
portant critical elements in modernism. Although they would proba-
bly differ on what they were , they would agree that in an important
sense the project of modernity is unfinished , and certain of its fea-
tures (its' attempt to be critical , secular, anti-capitalist, rational) are
worth strengthening.
I would add that if it arose in the 1960s in part as a reaction to the
academic canonization of the great modernist artists , post-modernism
moving quickly, has itself succeeded in entering , the academy in the
1980s. It has successfully domesticated and packaged itself through
the proliferation of classificatory schemes , the construction of canons,
the establishment of hierarchies, blunting of offensive behavior , ac-
quiescence to university norms. Just as there are now art galleries for
graffiti in New York, so , too, there are theses being written on graffiti
break' dancing, and so on , in the mostavantc garde departments. Even
the Sorbonne has accepted a thesis on David Bowie.
, What is post-modernism? The first element is its historical location
as a counter-reaction to modernism, Going beyond the by now " classic"
4. As reported inLe Nouvel Observateur; November 16-22, 1984.
Representations Are Social Facts 249
definition of Lyotard (1979)- the end of metanarratives-Jameson
defines its second element as pastiche. The dictionary definition-
(1) An artistic composition drawn from several sources , (2) a hodge
podge is not sufficient. Pound , for example , drew from several
sources. Jameson is pointing at a use of pastiche that has lost its nor- ,
mative moorings; which sees the jumbling of elements as aU there is.
Hodge podge is defined as " ajumbled mixture, " but it comes from the
French hochepot a stew , and therein lies the difference.
Joyce, Hemingway, Woolf, et al. began with the conceit of an inte-
riorized and distinctive subjectivity that both drew from and stood at a
distance from normal speech and identity~ There was " a linguistic
norm in contrast to which the styles of the great modernists " (Jame-
son 1983: 114) could be attacked or praised, but in either case gauged.
But what if this tension between bourgeois normality and the mod-
ernists ' stylistic limit testing cracked , yielding to a social reality in
which we had nothing but " stylistic diversity and heterogeneity " with-
out. the assumption (however contestable) of relatively stable identity
or linguistic norms? Under such conditions , the contestatory stance of
the modernists would lose its force: " All that is left is to imitate dead
styles , to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles in
the imaginary museum. But this means that contemporary or pOSt-
modernist art is going to be about art itself in a new kind of way; even
more, it means that one of its essential messages will involve the neces-
sary failure of art and the aesthetic , the failure of the new , the im-
prisonment in the past " (115-16). It seems tome that this imprison-
ment in the past is quite different from historicism. Post-modernism
moves beyond the (what now seems to be an almost comforting) es-
trangement of historicism , which looked, from a distance, at other
cultures as wholes. The dialectic of self and other may have produced
an alienated relationship, but it was one with definable norms, identi-
ties, and relations. . Today, beyond estrangement and relativism , lies
pastiche.
To exemplify this , Jameson develops an analysis of nostalgia films.
Contemporary nostalgia films such as Chinatown or Body Heat are
characterized by a " retrospective styling, " dubbed" la mode retro by ,
French critics. As opposed to traditional. historical films which seek to
recreate the fiction of another age as other mode retro films seek to
evoke a feeling tone through the use of precise artifacts and stylistic
devices that blur temporal boundaries. Jameson points out that recent
nostalgia films often take place in. the present , (or , as in the case of
Star Wars, in the future). A proliferation of metareferences to other
representations flattens and empties their contents. One of their chief
devices is to draw heavily on older, plots: " The allusive and elusive

250 PAUL RABINOW
plagiarism of older plots is, of course , also a feature of pastiche " (117).
These films function not so much to deny the present but to blur the
specificity of the past, to confuse the line between past and present (or
future) as distinct periods. What these films do is represent our repre-
sentations of other eras. " If there is any realism left here , it is a ' real-
ism ' which springs from the shock of grasping that confinement and
of realizing that, for whatever peculiar reasons, we seem condemned
to seek the historical past through our own pop images and stereo-
types about that past , which itselfremains forever out of reach" (118).
This, it seems to me , describes an approach that sees strategic choice
of representations of representations as its main problem.
Although Jameson is writing about historical consciousness, the
same trend is present in ethnographic writing: interpretive anthro-
pologists work with the problem of representations of others ' repre-
sentations, historians and metacritics of anthropology with the classi-
fication , canonization , and " making available " of representations of
representations of representations. The historical flattening found
the pastiche of nostalgia films reappears in the meta-ethnographic
flattening that makes all the world's cultures practitioners of textuality.
The details in these narratives are precise; the images evocative, the
neutrality exemplary, and the mode retro.
The final feature of post-modernism for Jameson is " textuality.
Drawing on Lacariian ideas about schizophrenia, Jameson points to
one of the defining characteristics of the textual movement as the
breakdown of the relationship between signifiers: " schizophrenia is an
, experience of isolated , disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers
which fail to link up into a coherent sequence. . . a signifier that has
lost Its signified has thereby been transformed into an image " (120).
Although the use of the term schizoPhrenicobscures more than it il-
luminates, the point is telling. Once the signifier is freed from a con-
cern with its relation to an external referent it does not float free of
any referentiality at all; rather , its referent becomes other texts , other
images. For Jameson , post-modern texts (he is talking about Lan-
guage poets) parallel this move: " Their referents are other images, ,
another text, and the unity of the poem is not in the text at all but
outside it in the bound unity of an absent book" (123). We are back
at the " Fantasia of the Library, " this time not as bitter parody but as
celebratory pastiche.
Obviously this does not mean that we ca n solve the current crisis
of representation by fiat. A return to earlier modes of unselfconscious
representation is not a coherent position (although the news has not
yet arrived in most anthropology departments). But we cannot solve it
by ignoring the relations of representational forms and social prac-
. . . . .
Representations Are Social Facts 251
tices either. If we attempt to eliminate social referentiality, other
referents will occupy the voided position. Thus the reply of Dwyer
Moroccan informant (when asked which part of their dialogue had
interested him most) that he had not been interested in a single ques-
tion asked by Dwyer is not troubling as long as other anthropologists
read the book and include it in their discourse. But obviously neither
Dwyer nor Clifford would be satisfied with that response. Their inten-
tions and their discourse strategies diverge. It is the latter that seem to
have gone astray.
Interpretive Communities, Power Relations, Ethics
The young conservatives. claim as their own the revelations of a
decentering subjectivity, emanciPated from the imperatives of work and
usefulness, and with this experience they step outside the modern world.
They remove into the sPhere of the far-away and the archaic the
spontaneous powers of imagination, self-experience and emotion.
jURGEN HABERMAS, " Modernity- An Incomplete Project
A variety of important writing in the past decade has explored
the historical relations between world macropolitics and anthropology:
The West vs. The Rest; Imperialism; Colonialism; Neo- Colonialism.
Work ranging from Talal Asad on colonialism and anthropology to
Edward Said on Western discourse and the other have put these ques-
tions squarely on the agenda of contemporary debate. However , as
Talal Asad points out in his paper for this volume , this by no means
implies that these macropolitical economic conditions have been sig-
nificantly affected by what goes on in anthropological debates. We also
now know a good deal about the relations of power and discourse that
obtain between the anthropologist and the people with whom he/she
works. Both the macro- and microrelations of power and discourse
between anthropology and its other are at last open to inquiry. We
know some of the questions worth asking and have made asking them
part of the discipline s agenda.
The metareflections on the crisis of representation in ethno-
graphic writing indicate a shift away from concentrating on relations
with other cultures to a (nonthematized) concern with traditions of
representation , and metatraditions of metarepresentations, in our
culture. I have been using Clifford' s metaposition as a touchstone. He
is not talking primarily about relations with the other , except as medi-
ated through his central analytic concern , discursive tropes, and
strategies. This has taught us important things. I have claimed , how-
ever , that this ~pproach contains an interesting blind spot , a refusal of
252 PAUL RABINOW
self-reflection. Fredric Jameson s analysis of post-modern culture was
introduced . as a kind of anthropological perspective on this cultural
development. Right or wrong (more right than wrong in my view),
Jameson suggests ways of thinking about th ~ a ~pearance o~ thl ~ new
crisis of representation as a historical event with Its own specific hlsto
ical constraints. Said another way, Jameson enables us to see that m
important ways not shared by other critical sta ~ce ~ (w~ich have their
own characteristic blind spots) the post-modernIst Isbhnd to her own
situation and situatedness because, qua post-modernist , sht: is com-
mitted to a doctrine of partiality and flux for which even such things
as one s own situation are so unstable , so without identity, that they
cannot serve as objects of sustained reflection. Post-modernist pastiche
is both a critical position and a dimension of our conte ~porary w?r~d.
Jameson s analysis helps us to establish an und ~rstandmg of thelrm-
terconnections, thereby avoiding both nostalgia and the mistake of
universalizing or ontologizinga very particular historical situation.
In my opinion , the stakes in recent debates about writing are not
dirt:ctly political in the conventional sense of the term. ! hav ~ ~rgued
elsewhere (1985) that what politics is involved is academIC polItICS, and
thatthislevel of politics has not been explored. The work of Pierre
Bourdieu is helpful in posing questions about the politics of culture
(1984a , b). Bourdieu has taught us to ask in what field of p~wer , and
from whatposition in that field, any given author writes. HIS new so-
ciology of cultural production does not seek to reduce knowledge t
social position or interest per se but: rather, to, lac~ all o~ these :a ~l-
abIes within the complexconstramts- habztus-wnhm
Bourdleus
which they are produced andreceived. Bourdieu isparticula~lyatte
tive to strategies of cultural power that advance through denYIng their
attachment to immediate political ends and thereby accumulate both
symbolic capital and " high" structural position.
Bourdieu s work would lead us to sw~pect that contemporary aca-
demic proclamations ofanti"colonialism, while admirable : ~re not the
whole story. These proclamations must be seen as polItical moves
within the academic community. Neither Clifford nor any of the rest
of us is writing in the late 1950s. His audiences are neither colonial
officers nor those working under the aegis of colonial power. Our po-
litical field is more familiar: the academy in the 1980s. Hence , though
not exactly false , situating the crisis of r epresentation w~th in the con-
text of the rupture of decolonization is, given the way It IS handle~,
basically beside the point; It is true to the extent that ahthropolo
certainly reflective of the course of larger world events , and speCIfi-
5. I would like to thank James Faubion for this point.
Representations Are Social Facts 253
cally of changing historical relations with the groups it studies. Assert-
ing that new ethnographic writing emerged because of decoloniza-
tion , however , leaves out precisely those mediations that would make
historical sense of the present object of study.
One is led to consider the politics of interpretation in the academy
today. Asking whether longer , dispersive, multi-authored texts would
yield tenure might seem petty. But those are the dimensions of power
relations to which Nietzsche exhorted us to be scrupulously attentive.
There can be no doubt of the existence and influence of this type of
power relation in the production of texts. We owe these less glam-
orous, if more immediately constraining, conditions more attention.
The taboo against specifying them is much greater than the strictures
against denouncing colonialism; an anthropology of anthropology
would include them. Just as there was formerly a discursive knot
preventing discussion of exactly those fieldwork practices that de-
fined the authority of the anthropologist, which has now been untied
(Rabin ow 1977), so , too , the miCropractices of the academy might well
do with some scrutiny.
Another way of posing this problem is to refer to " corridor talk.
For many years , anthropologists informally discussed fieldwork expe-
riences among themselves. Gossip about an anthropologist s field ex-
periences was an important component of that person s reputation.
But such matters were not , until recently, written about " seriously. " It
remains in the corridors and faculty clubs. But what cannot be pub-
licly discussed cannot be analyzed or rebutted. Those domains that
cannot be analyzed or refuted , and yet are directly central to hierar-
chy, should not be regarded as innocent or irrelevant. We know that
one of the most common tactics of an elite group is to refuse to dis-
cuss- to label as vulgar or uninteresting- issues that are uncomfort-
able for them. When corridor talk about fieldwork becomes discourse
we learn a good deal. Moving the conditions of production of anthro-
pological knowledge out of the domain of gossip-where it remains
the property of those around to hear it- into that of knowledge
would be a step in the right direction.
My wager is that looking at the conditions under which people are
hired, given tenure , published , awarded grants , and feted would re-
pay the effort. 6 How has the " deconstructionist" wave differed frqm
the other major trend in the academy in the past decade- feminism? 7
How are careers made now? How are careers destroyed now? What
6. Martin Finkelstein (1984) presents a valuable summary of some of these issues
as seen in the social sciences.
7. These issues are being explored in an important doctoral thesis being written
by Deborah Gordon at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
254 PAUL RABINOW
are the boundaries of taste? Who established and who enforces these
civilities? Whatever else we know , we certainly know that the material
conditions under which the textual movement has flourished must in-
clude the university, its micropolitics , its trends. We know that this
level of power relations exists, affects us , influences our themes , forms,
contents, audiences. We owe these issues attention- if only toestab-
lish their relative weight. Then, as with fieldwork , we shall be able to
proceed to more global issues.
Stop Making Sense: Dialogue and Identity
Marilyn Strathern , in a very challenging paper (1984), " Dis-
lodging a World View: Challenge and Counter- Challenge in the Rela-
tionship Between Feminism and Anthropology, " has taken an impor-
tant step in situating the strategy of recent textualist writing through a
comparison with recent work by anthropological feminists. Strathern
makes a distinction between feminist anthropology, an anthropologi-
cal subdiscipline contributing to the discipline s advancement , and an
anthropological feminism whose aim is to build a feminist community,
one whose premises and goals differ from , and are opposed to , an-
thropology. In the latter enterprise , difference and conflict-as his-
torical conditions of identity and knowledge-are the valorized terms,
not science and harmony.
Strathern reflects on her annoyance when a senior male colleague
praised feminist anthropology for enriching the discipline. He said:
Let a thousand flowers bloom. " She says: " Indeed it is true in general
that feminist critique has enriched anthropology-opened up new
understandings of ideology, the construction of symbolic systems , re-
source management, property concepts , and so on. " Anthropology, in
its relative openness and eclecticism, has integrated these scientific ad-
vances , at first reluctantly, now eagerly. Strathern, drawing on Kuhn
much-used paradigm concept, points out that this is how normal
s.
science works. Yet the " let a thousand flowers bloom " tolerance pro-
duced a sense of unease; later , Strathern realized that her unease
stemmed from a sense that feminists should be laboring, in
fields, not adding flowers to anthropology
other
Stratherndistances her own practice from the normal science
model in two ways. First , she claims that social and natural science are
different: " not simply (because) within anyone discipline one finds di-
verse ' schools ' (also true in science) but that their premises are con-
structed competitively in relation to one another. " Second , this com-
petition does not turn on epistemological issues alone, but ultimately
Representations Are Social Facts
on political and ethical differences. In his essay, " What Makes an In-
terpretation Acceptable?" (1980), Stanley Fish makes a similar point
255
(albeit to advance a very different agenda). He argues that all state-
ments are interpretations, and that all appeals to the text, or the facts
are themselves based on interpretations; these interpretations are
community affairs and not subjective (or individual) ones- that is,
meanings are cultural or socially available, they are not invented ex
Finally, all interpretations , most espe-
~ihilo by a single interpreter.
CIally those that deny their status as interpretations, are only possible
on the basis of other interpretations, whose rules they affirm while an-
nouncing their negation.
Fish argues that we never resolve disagreements by an appeal to
the facts or the text because " the facts emerge only in the context of
some point of view. It follows , then , that disagreements must occur
between those who hold (or are held by) different points of view , and
what is at stake in a disagreement is the right to specify what the facts
can hereafter be said to be. Disagreements are not settled by the facts,
but are the means by which the facts are settled" (338). Strathern
adroitly demonstrates these points in her contrast of anthropological
feminism and experimental anthropologists.
The guiding value of those interested in experimental ethno-
graphic writing, Strathern argues, is dialogic: " the effort is to create a
relation with the Other-as in the search for a medium of expression
which will offer mutual interpretation , perhaps visualised as a common
text , or as something more like a discourse. " Feminism , for Strathern
proceeds from the initial and unassimilable fact of domination. The
attempt to incorporate feminist understandings into an improved sci-
ence of anthropology or a new rhetoric of dialogue is taken as a fur-
ther act of violence. Feminist anthropology is trying to shift discourse
not improve a paradigm: " that is , it alters the nature of the audience
the range of readership and the kinds of interactions between author
and reader , and alters the s iIbject matter of conversation in the way it
difference.
allows others to speak-what is talked about and whom one is talking
to. " Strathern is not seeking to invent a new synthesis, but to strengthen
The ironies here are exhilarating. Experimentalists (almost all
male) are nurturing and optimistic , if just a touch sentimental. Cliffon:l
claims to be working from a combination of sixties idealism and
eighties irony. Textual radicals seek to work toward establishing rela-
tionships , to demonstrate the importance of connection and open-
ness , to advance the possibilities of sharing and mutual understand-
ing, while being fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic
constraints. Strathern s anthropological feminist insists upon not los-
 256 PAUL RABINOW
ing sight offundamental differences , power relations~ips, ~ierarchi-
cal domination. She seeks to articulate a communal Identity on the
basis of conflict , separation , and antagonism: partially as a defense
against the threat of encompassment by a paradigm ?f love, mutu-
ality, and understanding in which she sees . other ~otIves and struc-
tures; partially as a device to preserve meanIngful difference per se as
a Difference
distinctive value.
is played out on two levels: betwee ~ feminists and a
thropology and within the feminist c?mmunity. FaCI ~g ~utw ~rd , re ~Is-
tance and non assimilation are the highest values. WIthIn thIS new m-
terpretive community, however , the virtues of ?ialogic relationships
have been affirmed. Internally, feminists may dIsagree and compet
, but they do so in relation to one another. " It is pre ~isely b ~cause femI-
nist theory does not constitute its past as a text that It . cann ~t . be
added on or supplant anthropology in any simple way. For If femInIsts
always maintain a divide against the Other, among th ~mselves by con-
trast they create something indeed much closer to dlscour ~e than to
text. And the character of this discourse approaches the ' mterlocu-
tionary common product ' for which the new ethnography aims.
While tropes are available for all to use, how they are used makes all
the difference.
Ethics and Modernity
The emergence of factions within a once interdicted activity is a sure sign of
its having achieved the status of an orthodoxy.
STANLEY FISH What Makes an Interpretation Acceptable?"
Recent discussions on the making of ethnographic texts have
revealed differences and points of opposition as well as important
areas of consensus. To borrow yet another of Geertz s phrases, we can
and have been , vexing each other with profit, the touchstone of inte
pretive advance. In this last sec , throu gh the dev~ce of a schematIc
juxtaposition of the three posltlons prevI ~usly outlined , I shall pr
pose my own. Although critical of dim ~nslOns of e ~ch of th ~se POSI-
tions I consider them to be members, If not of an Interpretive com-
mun ity, at least of an interpretive federation ~~ wh~ch I belong.
Anthropologists , critics, feminists, and critical m ~elle ~tuals. are. all
concerned with questions of truth and its social locatIOn; Ima ~matIon
and formal problems of representation; domination and resl ~tance;
the ethical subject and techniques for becoming one. These tOpICS a
however , interpreted in differing fashion~; differe ~t dang~rs and dIf-
ferent possibilities are picked out; and dIfferent hIerarchies between
these categories are defended.
Representations Are Social Facts
257
1. Interpretive Anthropologists.
Truth and science conceived as
interpretive practices are the commanding terms. Both anthro-
pologist and native are seen as engaged in interpreting the mean-
ing of everyday life. Problems of representation are central for
both , and are the loci of cultural imagination. Representations are
not , however , sui generis; they serve as means for making sense of
life worlds (which they are instrumental in constructing) and con-
sequently they differ in their functions. The goals of the anthro-
pologist and the native are distinct. To take one example, science
and religion differ as cultural systems in strategy, ethos, and ends.
The political and ethical positions are important , if largely im-
plicit , anchors. Weber s twin ideals of science and politics as voca-
tions would , if embodied in a researcher , yield the ethical subject
for this position. Conceptually, scientific specification concerning
cultural difference is at the heart of the project. The greatest dan-
ger , seen from the inside , is the confusion of science and politics.
The greatest weakness, seen from the outside, is the historical
, po-
litical , and experiential cordon sanitaire drawn around inter-
pretive science.
2. Critics. The guiding principle is formal. The text is pri-
mary. Attentiveness to the tropes and rhetorical devices through
which authority is constructed allows the introduction of themes
of domination , exclusion , and inequality as subject matter. But
they are only material. They are given form by the critic/writer
, be
she anthropologist or native: " Other tribes, other Scribes. " We
change ourselves primarily through imaginative constructions.
The kind of beings we want to become are open , permeable ones
suspicious of metanarratives; pluralizers. But authorial control
seems to blunt self-reflection and the dialogic impulse. The dan-
ger: the obliteration of meaningful difference , Weber s museumi-
fication of the world. The truth that experience and meaning are
mediated representationally can be over-extended to equate expe-
rience and meaning with the formal dimension of representation.
3- Political subjects. The guiding value is the constitution of a
community- based political subjectivity. Anthropological feminists
work against an other cast as essentially different and violent.
Within the community the search for truth , as well as social arid
esthetic experimentation are guided by a dialogic desire. The fic-
tive other allows a pluralizing set of differences to appear. The
risk is that these enabling fictions of essential difference may be-
come reified , thereby reduplicating the oppressive social forms
they were meant to undermine. Strathern puts this' point well:
Now if feminism mocks the anthropological pretension of creat-
ing a product in some ways jointly authored then anthropology
258 PAUL RABINOW
mocks the pretension that feminists can ever really achieve the
separation they desire.
4. Critical, Cosmopolitan Intellectuals. I have emphasized the
dangers of high interpretive science and the overly sovereign rep-
resenter , and am excluded from direct participation in the femi-
nist dialogue. Let me propose a critical cosmopolitanism as a
fourth figure. The ethical is the guiding value. This is an opposi-
tional position, one suspicious of sovereign powers , universal
truths, overly relativized preciousness, local authenticity, moral-
isms high and low. Understanding is its second value , but an under-
standing suspicious of its own imperial tendencies. It attempts to
be highly attentive to (and respectful of) difference, but is also
wary of the tendency to essentialize difference. What we share as
a condition of existence, heightened today by our ability, and at
times our eagerness, to obliterate one another , is a specificity of
historical experience and place , however complex and contestable
they might be, and a worldwide macro- interdependency encom-
passing any local particularity. Whether we like it or not, we are
all in this situation. Borrowing a term applied during different
epochs to Christians , aristocrats, merchants , Jews, homosexuals,
and intellectuals (while changing its meaning), I call the accep-
tance of this twin valorization cosmopolitanism. Let us define cos-
mopolitanism as an ethos of macro- interdependencies, with an
acute consciousness (often forced upon people) of the inescap-
abilities and particularities of places , characters, historical trajec-
tories, and fates. Although we are all cosmopolitans Homo saPiens
has done rather poorly in interpreting this condition. We seem to
have trouble with the balancing act, preferring to reify local iden-
tities or construct universal ones. We live in- between. The Sophists
offer a fictive figure for this slot: eminently Greek , yet often ex-
cluded from citizenship in the various poleis; cosmopolitan in-
sider s outsiders of a particular historical and cultural world; not
members of a projected universal regime (under God , the impe-
rium, or the laws of reason); devotees of rhetoric and thereby
fully aware of its abuses; concerned with the events of the day, but
buffered by ironic reserve.
The problematic relations of subjectivity, truth , modernity, and
representations have been at the heart of my own work. Feeling that
considerations of power and representation were too localized in my
earlier work on Morocco , I have chosen a research topic that employs
the~e categories more broadly. Being temperamentally more comfort-
able in an oppositional stance, I have chosen to study a group of elite
Representations Are Social Facts 259
French administrators, colonial officials as well as social reformers
all concerned with urban planning in the Ig20S. By " studying up " I
find myself in a more comfortable position than I would be were I
giving voice " on behalf of dominated or marginal groups. I have
chosen a powerful group of men concerned with issues of politics and
form: neither heroes nor villains, they seem to afford me the neces-
sary anthropological distance , being separate enough to prevent an
easy identification , yet close enough to afford a charitable, if critical
understanding.
The discipline of modern urbanism was put into practice in the
French colonies , particularly in Morocco under Governor- general
Hubert Lyautey (lgI2-25). The colonial architect- planners and the
colonial governmental officials who hired them conceived of the cities
where they worked as social and esthetic laboratories. These settings
offered both groups the opportunity to tryout new , large-scale plan-
ning concepts and to test the political effectiveness of these plans for
application both in the colonies and eventually, they hoped , at home.
Studies of colonialism have until recently been cast almost exclu-
sively in terms of this dialectic of domination , exploitation , and resis-
tance. This dialectic is , and was , an essential one. By itself, however, it
neglects at least two major dimensions of the colonial situation: its cul-
ture and the political field in which it was set. This has led to a number
of surprising consequences; strangely enough the group in the colo-
nies who have received the least attention in historical and sociological
studies are the colonists themselves. Fortunately, this picture is begin-
ning to change; the varied systems of social stratification and the cul-
tural complexity of colonial life-as it varied from place to place at
different historical periods- is beginning to be understood.
As a more complex view of colonial culture is being articulated, I
think we also need a more complex understanding of power in the
colonies. The two are connected. Power is frequently understood as
force personified: the possession of a single group- the colonialists.
This conception is inadequate for a number of reasons. First , the colo-
nists themselves were highly factionalized and stratified. Second, the
state (and particularly the colonial state) is something we need to
know a great deal more about. Third, the view of power that under-
stands it as a thing, or a possession , or emanating unidirectionally
from the top down , or operating primarily through the application of
force has been put seriously in question. With less than 20 000 troops,
the French , after all , ran Indochina in the Ig20s with a degree of con-
trol that the Americans with 500, 000 ,some fifty years later never ap-
proached. Power entails more than arms , although it certainly does
not exclude them.
260 PAUL RABINOW
The work of Michel Foucault on power relations provides us with
some helpful analytic tools. Foucault distinguishes between exploita-
tion , domination, and subjection (lg82: 212). He argues that most
analyses of power concentrate almost exclusively on relations of domi-
nation and exploitation: who controls whom , and who extracts the
fruits of production from the producers. The third term , subjection
focuses on that aspect of a field of power farthest removed from the
direct application of force. That dimension of power relations is where
the identity of individuals and groups is at stake, and where order in
its broadest meaning is taking form. This is the realm in which culture
and power are most closely intertwined. Foucault sometimes calls
these relations " governmentality, " and the term is a helpful one.
Following Foucault , Jacques Donzelot has argued that during the
later part of the nineteenth century, a new relational field of great his-
torical import was being constructed: DonzeIot (lg79) calls it the " so-
cial." Specific areas, frequently taken to be outside of politics, such as
hygiene , family structure, and sexuality, were being made into targets
for state intervention. The social became a demarcated and objectified
set of practices partially constructed by, and partially understood
through , the emerging methods and institutions of the new social sci-
ence disciplines. The " social" was a privileged locus for experimenta-
tion with new forms of political rationality.
Lyautey s highly sophisticated view of colonization turned on the
need to bring social groups into a different field of power relations
than had previously existed in the colonies. In his view , this could only
be achieved through large-scale social planning, in which city plan-
ning played a central role. As he said in a eulogy for his chief planner
Henri Prost: " The art and science of urbanism , so flourishing during
the classical age, seems to have suffered a total eclipse since the Set-
ond Empire. Urbanism, the art and science of developing human ag-
glomerations , is coming back to life under Prost s hand. Prost is the
guardian , in this mechanical age, of ' humanism.' Prost worked not
only on things , but on men , different types of men , to whom la Cite
owes something more than roads, canals, sewers and a transport sys-
tem " (Marrast , ed. Ig60: 11 g). For Lyautey and his architects , then,
the new humanism applied itself appropriately not only to things, but
to men , and not only to men in general- this was not Le Corbusier
humanism- but to men in different cultural and social circumstances.
The problem was to accommodate this diversity. For these architects
planners , and administrators, the task confronting th~m was how to
conceive of and produce a new social ordonnance.
This is the reason why the cities of Morocco were of such impor-
tance in Lyautey s eyes. They seemed to offer hope , a way to avoid the
Representations Are Social Facts 261
impasses both of France and of Algeria. Lyautey s famous dictum "
chantier (construction site) is worth a battalion " was meant literally.
Lyautey feared that if the French were allowed to continue to practice
politics as usual , the results would continue to be catastrophic. A di-
rectly political solution, however , was not at hand. What was urgently
required was a new scientific and strategic social art; only in this way
could politics be sublated-and power truly ordonne."
These men, like so many others in the twentieth century, were try-
ing to escape from politics. This did not mean , however , that they
were unconcerned with power relationships. Far from it. Their goal , a
kind of technocratic self-colonization , was to develop a new form of
power relations where " healthy " social , economic , and cultural rela-
tions could unfold. 111tegral in this scheme was the need to invent a
new governmentality through which the (to them) fatally decadent
and individualistic tendencies of the French could be reshaped. They
constructed and articulated both new representations of a modern or-
der and technologies for its implementation. These representations
are modern social facts.
This paper has outlined some of the elements of the discourses
and, practices of modern representation. The relationship of this
analysis to political practice has been only glancingly touched on.
What , how, and who might be represented by those holding a similar
view of things escapes from our more standard categories of social
actors and ' political rhetoric. In closing, I simply mark the space.
Foucault, responding to the charge that by refusing to affiliate himself
with an already identified and politically locatable group he forfeited
any claims to represent anybody or any values , answered: " Rorty
points out that in these analyses I do not appeal to any ' to any of
those o ' whose consensus , whose values , whose traditions constitute
the framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can
be validated. But the problem is, precisely to decide if it is actually
suitable to place oneself within a ' ' in order to assert the principles
one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not , rather , neces-
sary to make the future formation of a ' ' possible " (lg84: 385).
I would like to thank Talal Asad, James Faubion , Stephen Foster , Michael Rogin
Marilyn Strathern, and the participants in the Santa Fe seminar. The usual disclaliners
apply. Paragraphs of this article have appeared elsewhere.