The Al Qaeda Connection

Al Qaeda, Bin Laden and the New Terrorism of the 21st Century

A seminar paper submitted to

DR. CLARITA R. CARLOS
and the Department of Political Science
University of the Philippines, Diliman

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 203
(GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)

By

TAN, AVEMAR T.
MA International Studies Program 2002-05695
9 October 2009
Introduction to the Study:

The high-jacking incidents that climaxed into successive and deliberate attacks

against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, which

took place in the morning of 11 September 2001, have no doubt been the subject of a

number of articles, news reports and researches. It has sparked the resurgence of public

interest on the phenomena of terrorism that has otherwise vacillated throughout history,

between highs and lows, usually corresponding to when the acts of violence occur.

The perceived severity of the 9/11 Attacks has, however, ignited a greater sense of

fear and anger particularly among the American population and has since spread across the

region through the Bush-driven Global War on Terrorism (GWoT). In turn, this aggression

against Afghanistan, believed to be the stronghold of Osama bin Laden’s Al’Qaeda, and the

subsequent War launched in Iraq, has prejudiced against the Islamic faith, it being

identified as the religious foundation of those who perpetrated the 9/11 and a number of

other similar attacks. Far from being a religion of peace, some critics allege, Islam preaches

violence against non-believers. Criticisms such as these have profound impacts on

international response to terrorism as Muslims have now acquired a rather negative

connotation and their images are often demonized. The demonization of the enemy and the

absolute polarization of the conflict in turn triggers a sense of deep hostility and mutual

hatred, robbing the situation of any neutral ground (Smelser, 2007; Primakov, 2004). Since

it is in the interest of many to maintain relative peace, the polarization of conflicts along the

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lines of matters such as religion or culture may prove to be damaging and should be

avoided (Primakov, 2004).

As such, there is a need to explore this “new wave” of terrorism that was said to

have been brought about by Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, through

the September 11 Attacks, to determine whether there is indeed novelty in the terrorism

experienced during this 21st Century.

The alleged network of operations of Al Qaeda also need to be explored and the

implications of its existence on international response toward the threat of terrorism,

analyzed.

Hypothesis:

Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, unleashed a new and novel form of terrorism in the

international arena during this Century through its vast network of operations.

Objectives of the Study:

1. Present historical manifestations of terrorism, its motivations and the usual tactics

it employs so as to be able to compare whether or not there is novelty in the Al

Qaeda’s motivations and tactics;

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 2. Discuss how the Islamic faith has been reinterpreted to justify the perpetration of

terrorist attacks

3. Based on previous studies conducted, present the extent of the scope of bin Laden’s

network and to present evidence that disputes the existence of the Al Qaeda

Tackling the Definitio nal Abyss:

While much debate has surrounded the establishment of a general and widely

acceptable definition of the term “terrorism,” this has not prevented it from becoming the

subject of academic inquiry. Most, if not all, of the works written on terrorism have

however acknowledged the existence of a definitional abyss (Weinberg, White; Lutz and

Lutz; Enders and Sandler, Singh; Laqueur; Smelser). This abyss is attributable to the fact

that the term itself is not value neutral to begin with.1 The term “terrorism” and its root

word “terror” connote negativity, that the person terrorizing is committing some form of

socially unacceptable conduct (White, 2002; Lutz and Lutz, 2004).

Academicians and state institutions have since floated several definitions. The US,

which has adopted the frontline in the Post 9/11 Global War on Terror (GWoT), defines

terrorism, through its State Department as “premeditated, politically motivated violence

1
This is discussed in detail by the following authors in their works:
White, Jonathan R. (2002) Terrorism: An Introduction. 3rd Ed. Canada: Wadsworth Group; Lutz, James M. and
Brenda J. Lutz (2004) Global Terrorism. New York: Routledge; Laqueur, Walter (2004) No End to War: Terrorism in
the 21st Century. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group Inc; Weinberg, Leonard. (2005) Global
Terrorism: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford: Oneworld Publications; Singh, Bilveer (2007) The Talibanization of
Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists. Connecticut: Praeger Security International;
Smelser, Neil J. (2007) The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions.

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perpetuated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents

usually intended to influence and audience” (Weinberg, 2005; Whittaker, 2007).

The United Kingdom, a staunch ally of the US has its own definition of terrorism:

“the use of violence for political ends and included any use of violence for the purpose of

putting the public or any section of the public in fear” (Weinberg, 2005).

A number of academics, including Walter Laqueur, Walter Enders, Todd Sandler,

and Neil Smelser, have likewise offered their own working definitions, which have four

common elements namely:

(1) a psychological aspect, that terrorism is meant to have a psychological effect on

its audience;
(2) political aspect, that terrorism involves power relationships;
(3) irregularity as a tactic, th at terrorism is an asymmetric form of warfare, and
(4) an aspect of violence

One of the most comprehensive definitions proposed for the use of academicians

was offered by James and Brenda Lutz in their work entitled “Global Terrorism:”

“Terrorism involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens

violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends
beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an
identifiable organization. The violence involves a non-state actor or actors as
either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence or both. Finally, the acts of
violence are designed to create power in situations in which power previously
had been lacking.”

Despite the definitional conundrum that has plagued its study, it is erroneous to

conclude that terrorism is a recent phenomenon. Academics note that the word “terrorism”

first entered the vocabulary through the French language between 1793-94 during the
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regime de la terreur or the Reign of Terror under the post-revolutionary government of

Robespierre (Weinberg, 2005; Enders and Sandler, 2006; White, 2003). The execution of

thousands of those who opposed the transformation of the French Society characterized

this period in French history (Enders and Sandler, 2006; Lutz and Lutz, 2004).

Although the term itself emerged only in the 18th Century, there has been record of

terrorist attacks perpetrated in as early as the first century A. D. with the group “Zealots

Sicarri” who sought to provoke a Jewish uprising against the Romans (Laqueur, 1978;

Weinberg, 2005; Enders and Sandler, 2006). The group went about stabbing to death

Jewish leaders who were seen as collaborators with the Romans (Laqueur, 1978, Weinberg,

2005). The murders were perpetrated in broad daylight, often in public places during

feasts or when people filled the market so as the attack would have a large audience

(Weinberg, 2005).

Since then, acts which may be characterized as terrorist it nature have been carried

out in various instances, such as during the Russian Revolution (Enders and Sandler, 2006).

Weinberg and Rapoport’s Waves of Ter rorism

Leonard Weinberg (2005) and David Rapoport (1984) categorize modern terrorism

as occurring in four separate “waves”: the first between the period of 1880 to the onset of

World War II which occurred mostly within or involving the Russian Empire; the second

wave which covers the post World War II terrorist tactics used by nationalist, communist

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and ethnic separatist insurgents; the third during the decade of 1970 to 1980 wherein the

threat of terrorism had increased dramatically and the fourth, which has been

characterized as being “far more menacing than… any point in its modern history” and

had manifested beginning this 21st Century (Weinberg, 2005).

According to Weinberg and Rapoport, modern terrorism’s first wave emerged

within the context of a political arena that was still largely dominated by the aristocracy

and the Empire, more specifically during the turning point when revolutionary ideals such

as those which spawned the French Revolution were spreading across the European region

(Rapoport, 1984; Weinberg, 2005; Enders and Sandler, 2006).

In Russia for instance, the tide of nationalism, and combined with the yearning of

groups such as the Russian People’s Will to establish a liberal constitutional regime that

was to usher in socialism became the fuel which fed the people’s conviction in launching

assassinations against the aristocrats, such as Czar Alexander II in 1881 (Primakov, 2004;

White, 2003; Enders and Sandler, 2006; Weinberg 2005). These acts were greatly

influenced by the philosophies of anarchist terrorism of Mikhail Bakunin and Sergey

Nechev, who, writing with the hopes of igniting a democratic revolution, were able to spark

instead, a radical one (White, 2002). Severe repression, wherein the entire executive

committee of the People’s Will was eliminated, met the path to radical revolution (Enders

and Sandler, 2006; White, 2002).

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 Later, more violent groups such as the Socialist Revolutionaries emerged in the

beginning of the 20th Century (Weinberg 2005). The Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin who

initially opposed these kinds of tactics, eventually, when they found it convenient, engaged

in terrorist acts such as politically motivated bank robberies that funded their cause

(Weinberg, 2005). Other groups such as the anarchists also undertook such politically

motivated Spanish Foreign Minister and the King of Italy among others (Weinberg, 2005).

Groups, which sought independence for their people such as Ustascha who wanted

to create an independent Croatia, also began to employ terrorist tactics culminating in the

assassination of the Yugoslav king, Alexander and the French foreign minister in 1934

(White, 2002; Weinberg, 2005).

The Second Wave of Terrorism, as conceptualized by Weinberg (2005) and

Rapoport (1984), saw the increased diversity in the goals pursued by terrorist groups. A

number of groups sought independence from their colonizers others, usually ethnic

minorities, sought separation, while others, such as the communists desired change and

freedom from what they felt was an oppressive state.

Taking place just after the Second World War which had destroyed the trappings of

aristocratic power and which had effectively changed the power relationships in the

international arena, colonies of former empires found the grip of their European

motherland weakening (Weinberg 2005; White, 2002). In areas where the colonial power

sought to maintain its dominant posture, such as in Indonesia and French Indochina and

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British Malaya, armed struggles, which on occasion employed terrorist tactics, were

frequent (Weinberg 2005).

Terrorist tactics perpetrated by nationalist groups was not limited to Asia. In

countries such as Yemen, Cyprus, Kenya, Palestine and Algeria, terrorism was also a

dominant method employed to counter colonial rule (Enders and Sandler, 2006). In Algeria

for instance, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) who allegedly employed tactics that

were previously used by Jewish terrorists led the revolt against the French rule. (Enders

and Sandler, 2006). The use of terrorist tactics was however, more common in areas where

there were marked ethnic divides or where communist insurgents sought dominance

(Weinberg, 2005). Pockets of conflict such as those in Vietnam, Western Europe and Latin

America with their varied causes likewise showed increased propensity to use terrorism as

a tactic (Weinberg, 2005).

It was during this period that marked improvements in modern communication

such as television broadcasting occurred. This enabled terrorists to generate a wider

viewership (Kiras, n.d.). In addition to this, other technological advancements, particularly

those that involved transportation increased the frequency and volume of travelers (Kiras,

n. d.; Weinberg, 2005; Lutz and Lutz, 2004). This also opened a new avenue for terrorists

and high-jacking became one of the means through which they could air their demands

(Primakov, 2004).

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 According to Weinberg, by the 1970’s, the use of terrorism to further political ends

had become widespread and the threat had evolved into an international problem

(Weinberg, 2005). For instance, terrorist activity perpetrated by guerillas in the Latin

America continued within the context of a socialist revolt. These were opposed, with

varying degrees of success, through equally varied degrees of repression (Weinberg, 2005).

In West Asia, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which had earlier launched a

massive campaign against Israel, had changed its strategy, adopting what was essentially a

terrorist campaign against Israel and the states that supported the latter (Lutz and Lutz,

2004; Enders and Sandler, 2006). In the summer of 1970, members of the PLO, under the

tutelage of Yasser Arafat, high jacked four commercial planes using their hostages as

leverage for their demands (Lutz and Lutz, 2004; White, 2002). While negotiations had

succeeded in releasing the hostages, the PLO ended up blowing up the planes, an act that

reverberated throughout the world (Weinberg, 2005). Jordan, one of the states from which

the PLO operated responded to this event with a massive campaign to disarm the group,

expelling them (White, 2002). Known as the “Black September,” the Jordanian move

crippled PLO and it was thus forced to migrate to Lebanon where it later reestablished its

headquarters (White, 2002). Over the next few years, the PLO continued to launch massive

terrorist attacks including the one perpetrated against the Israeli athletes who were

supposed to participate in th e 1972 Olympic Games (Lutz and Lutz, 2004).

The “wave of terror” that spread during this decade did not confine itself to the

Latin American and the West Asian region. As the United States continued its increasingly

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unpopular war in Vietnam, protests from left-wing groups gained media attention after

employing terrorist acts (Weinberg, 2005). It must also be noted that terrorism

orchestrated by racist and right wing groups such as the 1995 bombing of the Murrah

Building in Oklahoma City, have generally been more prevalent (Lutz and Lutz, 2004;

Weinberg, 2005).

The violence of what has since been popularly referred to as the Oklahoma City

bombing was however eclipsed, rather permanently, by the horror witnessed on that

fateful day of September the 11th, a single incident that has brought, by far, the largest

number of casualties, not to mention the lives lost as a result of the wars waged in its wake

(Pettiford and Harding, 2003; Singh, 2007; Weinberg 2005; Primakov, 2004). It is this latter

incident, which Weinberg eventually identifies as having ushered in the new wave of

terrorism, characterized as “far more menacing” (Weinberg, 2005).

Two questions, however, beg for answers. First of all, is there really something new

in this “new” wave of terrorism? Second, could the Al Qaeda really be credited for ushering

in this new wave?

Al Qaeda, Bin Laden and the Infamous Netw ork:

Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization allegedly run by Osama Bin Laden took the

center stage when, in the aftermath of 9/11, the responsibility for the attacks were

constantly and consistently attributed to the organization as Bin Laden’s handiwork

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(Chandler and Gunaratna, 2007;Primakov, 2004). Bin Laden and Al Qaeda gave a face, a

leader and a name who can be blamed for the tragic events of 9/11.

According to most accounts, conceived in the 1980’s, the Al Qaeda (translated

simply as “the Base”) was the successor of the Maktab-al Khidamat (MAK) or the Afghan

Service Bureau, which Bin Laden and Sheik Abdullah Azzam created in 1984, to recruit

young Muslims for the war against the Soviet Red Army’s invasion of Afghanistan (Singh,

2007; Weinberg, 2005; Pettiford and Harding, 2003). Due in part to the funding and

support extended by the United States in its attempt to undermine Moscow and the spread

of Communism, training camps were set up and Bin Laden was able to train the mujahidin’s

who were instrumental in warding off the Soviets (Singh, 2007, Pettiford and Harding,

2003; Primakov, 2004; Chandler and Gunaratna, 2007).

After the latter’s defeat and the triumph of the MAK, the group metamorphosed

(Pettiford and Harding, 2003). Not only was the name changed to “Al Qaeda,” according to

Weinberg but its objective also changed (Weinberg, 2005). In addition to aiding other

Muslims who were struggling against oppression, the group now desired to establish a pan-

Islamic state that would unite all Muslims (Pettiford and Harding, 2003; White, 2002). This

was consistent with Bin Laden’s desire to cure the conflict that pitted the Sunni Muslims

against the Shiites (White, 2002).

Inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and influenced by Islamic thinkers

such as Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Mawlana Mawdudi during his early years at the

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University, Bin Laden grew to adopt these writers’ “radical rejection of Western

civilization” and their Islamic revivalist and reformist teachings (Singh, 2007). This,

combined with the influential and rising tide of pan-Islamist thinking and Bin Laden’s

adherence to the purist form of Islam called Wahhabism that has since evolved and has

been adopted by Saudi Arabia as its state religion, became the ideological foundations of his

subsequent movements to unite the Muslim world and reestablish the Caliphate (Jacquard,

2002; White, 2002, Singh 2007; Weinberg, 200; Primakov, 2004; Chandler and Gunaratna,

2007).

The immediate trigger of Bin Laden’s anger particularly against the United States

was, the refusal of the King of Saudi the use of his mujahidin as defense against the

perceived threat emanating from Iraq following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Weinberg,

2005). Refusing, the Saudis turned instead to the United States for help, a decision that

infuriated Bin Laden and drove him to condemn the Saudis openly (Weinberg, 2005). In

response, Bin Laden was stripped of his Saudi citizenship and, fearing reprisal, he and his

mujahidin fled to Pakistan and then to Sudan where they were invited by Hassan al Turabi,

the latter’s spiritual leader (Institute for Counterterrorism, 2006; Weinberg, 2005; Abuzza,

2002).

For two years, between 1994 and 1996 Bin Laden set up businesses and

infrastructure projects in Sudan from where he also controlled Al Qaeda operations

(Institute for Counterterrorism, 2006; Rabasa, 2008). Due to pressure from the United

States however, Sudanese government was forced to ask Bin Laden to leave (Institute for

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Counterterrorism, 2006; Rabasa, 2008; Weinberg, 2005; Jacquard, 2002). He left and set up

camp in Afghanistan that was by then under the Taliban regime (Institute for

Counterterrorism, 2006; Chandle and Gunaratna 2007; Jacquard, 2002). It was from his

stronghold in Afghanistan that in 1998, he and Al Zawahiri created the umbrella

organization called the Al-Jabhah al Islamiyya al-Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud Wal Salibiyyin

or the Islamic World Front for the Struggle against the Jews and the Crusaders (Institute for

Counterterrorism, 2006) .

Beginning in the 1990s, a number of terrorist attacks have been attributed to Bin

Laden and his network. These included the bombings in Riyadh in November 1995,

Dhahran in June 1996, Yemen in December 1992 and the World Trade Center in February

1993 (Institute for Counterterrorism, 2006). It was only after the capture of Mohammed

Sadiq Odeh, one of the suspects in the WTC bombing that the extent of the Al Qaeda’s

network was discovered (Institute for Counterterrorism, 2006).

Organizationally, the al Qaeda may be divided into two, the center, headed by the

Emir General and the periphery that forms his international network (Weinberg, 2005).

Some claim that the said network spans over 70 countries but this is yet to be confirmed

(Weinberg, 2005).

The Al Qaeda whose center of operations is assumed to be within the Taliban

controlled Afghanistan, by virtue of its geographical proximity and religious affinity, has

been linked with the Chechen nationalist groups operating within the Ichkerian Republic of

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Chechnya (Kramer, n. d.; Swart, 2004; Darling, 2004; Williams, 2004; Brownfield, 2003). It

was said that Bin Laden had even thought of transferring headquarters to Chechnya

(Brownfield, 2003).

Figure 1. Map showing Chechnya and Afghanistan

Source: http://www.umt.edu/cali/MapCentralAsia.jpg

Since it first infiltrated the region, it was alleged that the Chechens had begun to

employ terrorist tactics such as the attack in the Moscow theater in the fall of 2002

(Williams, 2004). Suicide bombings have also begun to be adopted by the nationalist

separatist group in their undertakings (Brownfield, 2003). It has also been reported that

Islamic extremist groups such as the Al Qaeda have provided approximately $100 Million in

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aid to rebels since 1996 (Brownfield, 2003; Williams, 2004). In addition, despite originally

being of moderate orientation the Chechens, through their frequent contact with the

Islamic mujahidins who were of the radicalized Wahhabi Islamic faith, are feared to have

undergone radicalization of their own (Brownfield, 2003). As such, the conflict shall cease

to be secular and shall be subsumed into the wider Islam against the West umbrella.

Southeast Asia, which has one of the highest concentrations of Muslim population in

Asia has also been linked with the Al Qaeda network. Groups operating within the region

such as the Jemaah al Islamiah and the Abu Sayyaf have metamorphosed from separatist

groups into terrorist organizations, which form part of the periphery of Bin Laden’s

massive network. Through the former mujahidin who trained in Afghanistan and who, after

their victory, returned to their respective countries, domestic struggles were linked with

the international network, radicalizing them also in the process (Abuza, 2002). While in

Afghanistan, these men were exposed to the works of al Banna, Madudi and Qutb that

advocated for the “reconstruction of Islam to achieve political goals” (Singh, 2007). Due in

part to the region’s porous borders, relatively large Muslim population and the long history

of insurgency and Muslim separatism in the region, Southeast Asia has become the second

front in the Global War on Terror (Singh, 2007).

Similarly, East Africa’s porous borders combined with the environment of weak

governance and collapsed states, made the region conducive to the presence of Islamist

extremists (Rabasa, 2008). In addition, its “geographical proximity and social, cultural and

religious affinities” with the Arabian Peninsula make it all the more vulnerable and

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susceptible to Al Qaeda influence and radicalization (Rabasa, 2008). As such, East Africa,

where Sudan, a state from which Bin Laden once had exercised his influence, remains a

priority area in al Qaeda’s global strategy (Rabasa, 2008). Within the East African region, al

Qaeda successfully carried out the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in

1998 (Shinn, n. d.). Since then, the authorities have foiled a number of plots, which had

been spearheaded by domestic insurgent groups linked with the al Qaeda (Shinn, n. d.).

Figure 2. Map of East Africa

Source: http://www.africa-adventure.com/images/east_africa_map.jpg

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 There are those, however, who challenge the existence of this “Al Qaeda.” According

to author Jason Burke, “al Qaeda does not exist” (Burke, 2008). While noting that the term

al Qaeda, from the Arabic root word qaf-ayn-dal has been used since the mid-1980s by

radical Muslim groups, the same, had in fact, multiple meanings ranging from: “a base, as in

a camp or a home, a foundation, such is what is beneath a house or a pedestal that supports

a column;” “the lowest, broadest layer of a large cumulonimbus-type cloud” and, also, it

could mean “a precept, rule, principle, maxim, formula, method, model or pattern” (Burke,

2008). The term was also used by Abdullah Azzam, who had been identified in other books

as the founder of the Maktab-al Khidamat (MAK/Afghan Service Bureau) when in 1987 he

was quoted as writing:

“Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and (to) put

up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither
earthly nor heavenly that does not require… a vanguard that gives
everything it possesses in order to achieve victory… It carries the flag all
along the sheer endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in
the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and
manifest itself. This vanguard constitutes the strong foundation (al-qaeda
al sulbah) for the expected society.”

According to Burke, some analysts had misinterpreted this to mean that a group

with the name al-qaeda al sulbah had been established in that year (Burke, 2008). From

Burke’s analysis, he concludes that Azzam’s writing, with its reference to “vanguards,”

which is a term that is also replete in Islamic writings, was talking of al-qaeda al sulbah

not as an organization but rather as a mode of activism, a tactic. Even in the book An

Encyclopedia of Jihad, put together between 1991 to 1993 in Pakistan, the al Qaeda

organization is notably absent according to Burke. It was in 1996 when the CIA, through

one of its reports, first used the term: “by 1985 bin Laden had… organized an Islamic

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Salvation Front, or al-Qaeda, to support mujahideen in Afghanistan.” Burke however

mentions that it is unclear whether the term al-Qaeda was made in reference to an existing

organization considering the fact that throughout the entire CIA report, the said term was

never mentioned again. It was in the following year that the US State Department used the

same term for the first time but used it to refer to “an operational hub, predominantly for

like-minded Sunni extremists.” In that sense, it was not an organization to begin with.

Analysis and Conclusion:

Despite conflicting evidence as to the existence of al Qaeda, one thing is certain, a

militant extremist group had been established at some point during the 1980s under the

auspices of Osama Bin Laden and whether or not it is called the Al Qaeda, and whether or

not it has adopted such a resilient organizational structure would be of secondary

importance in light of evidence which links local radical Islamic groups in Russia, Southeast

Asia, and East Africa among others, to the network of mujahidin created by Bin Laden in

Afghanistan where Wahhabism, Qutb’s teachings and an ideology of pan-Islamism had

taken strong root. Whether or not an organization called al Qaeda exists or did exist in the

1980s, of more concern to policy makers, state decision makers and counterterrorism

operatives, is the existence of real links between radical Muslim groups in the world. This,

coupled with the strength of their adherence to their Islamic roots, and their selective and

radical interpretations of the Quranic text, their religious motivation and justification

which makes it to a certain extent “beyond reason” (Harris, 2006).

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 In determining the novelty of this “new wave of terrorism” it is made apparent from

historic accounts that terrorism perpetrated in the name of religion is not unique to the

21st Century nor is it unique to Islam. The Sacarri, during the 1st Century A.D. undertook

their assassinations with the justification that it would usher in the end of days (Lutz and

Lutz, 2004). The trend of reinterpreting religious text to justify otherwise socially

unacceptable acts is therefore nothing novel. Suicide bombing, a tactic that has recently

been on the rise, and is what has often been used in attacks linked to Islamic extremist

groups is equally not a new phenomena, in fact, according to Robert Pape, it has been a

tactic employed by separatist groups such as the Tamil Tigers (Pape, 2006). Even the

transnational character of its operations is nothing new considering the extent of

operations carried out by the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the 1970s to the

1980s.

Where does the novelty lie then? It is concluded that terrorism in the 21st Century,

differs very little from its past manifestations. In fact, its motivations, tactics and methods

are similar to terrorist attacks occurring in other decades and in other locations. What may

be regarded as the novelty of the “Osama Bin Laden brand” of terrorism as opposed to

others before it and other groups of different ideological or religious orientation lies in the

scope of its network, whether it be al-Qaeda, or under the guise of another organization

altogether. In addition, there is novelty in Osama Bin Laden’s ability to bring together

Islamic groups of various nationalities, with numerous and varied grievances under the

single and potent banner of Pan-Islamism.

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 References:

1. Abuza, Zachary. “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,”

Contemporary Southeast Asia. 24:3 (December 2002).

2. Brownfield, Peter. “The Afghanistan of Chechnya,” The International Spectator.

March 2003.

3. Burke, Jason. Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. New York: I. B. Tauris,

2008.

4. Chandler Michael and Rohan Gunaratna. Countering terrorism: Can we meet the

threat of global violence? London : Reaktion, 2007

5. Darling, Dan. “Special Analysis: Al Qaeda in Chechnya,” Winds of Change Website.

Accessed through: http//www.windsofchange.net/archives/004893.html.

Retrieved on 8 August 2009.

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