WEARS 15-16. 417-416 BE jer the main reason why the expedition was aborted. He was therefore an enemy, So enslod this winter, and with it the fifteenth year of the war, In the following summer Alcibiades took a flect of twenty ships to Argos and arrested those Argives who were still thought sus pect and sympathetic to Sparta—three hundred men, whom the Athenians then deposited in neighbouring islands under their con trol. And the Athenians sent a force against the island of Melos, consisting of thirty of their own ships together with six from Chios and two from Lesbos, twelve hundred of their own hoplites, with. three hundred archers and twenty mounted archers, and about fifteen hundred hoplites from their allies in the islands. The Melians are Spartan colonists whe, unlike the other islanders, would not submit to Athenian demination: at first they remained neutral and took no part in the war, but later were forced into an openly hostile stance when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their land. ‘The commanding gencrals, Cleomedes the son af Lycomedes and ‘Teisias the son of Teisimachus, established their force on the ishnd, but before doing any harm to the country sent forward spokesmen to negotiate with the Melians. The Melians did not give them access to the people at large, but required them to state their business before the authorities and the privileged few. ‘The Athenian envoys began as Follows: “Since we are not to address the people at lange, presumably so that we do not have the chance to bamboozle the masses with a single uninterrupted presentation of seductive and unchallenged angu- ments (we are well aware that this is the purpose of our invitation to this gathering of the few), you gentlemen here might wish to make assurance doubly sure. We suggest that ncither of us make set speeches, but we invite you at any point te criticize and answer any proposition with which you are not happy. First of all, then, are you content with this proposal?” ‘The Melian councillors replied: “We have no objection to the rea sonable principle of a calm exchange of views, but your military presence—a fact, not just a threat—seems at odds with it. In our view you have come with your own preconceived judgement of this discussion. The result is likely to be that if we win the moral angu- ment and so do not submit, we face war; and if we grant your angu- ment, we face servitude.” 85 86is ta 3o2 ROOK FIVE Athenians. Well of course if all you can think of is your own fore cast of the future, and if you have met us here without the explicit purpose of considering how to save your city in the present cireum= stances which are plain to your eyes, we might as well stop now. But ifthat is your purpose, we can continus. ‘Medians. It is natural and understandable that people in our posi- tion should cast about for words and thoughts. But yes, this meeting is indeed about our survival, and we agree that the discussion should proceed in the way you propose. Ath, Well, we shall not bulk out cur anzument with lofty language, claiming that our defeat of the Persians gives us the right to rule or that we are now seeking retribution for some wrong done to us. That would not convince you. Similarly we de not expect you to think there is any persuasive power in protestations that though you are a Spartan colony you have never joined their campaigns, or that you have not done us any harm. So keep this discussion practical, within the limits of what we both really think. You know as wellas we do that when we are talk- ing on the human plane questions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must. ‘Mel. To our way of thinking, at any rate, there is advantage (and we must speak of advantage, since you have put justice to one side and made expediency the basis of discussion}—thers is advantage in your preserving the principle of the common good: that is, that any- one who finds himself in danger should receive fair and equitable treatment, and he ableto improve his position if he can make a strong case for something less than the full rigour of what could happen to him. This principle is proportionately in your interest much more than ours, given the massive retaliation you would face as an example to others should you fall from power. Ath. Exen if our empire is brought to an end, we are not anxious about the consequences. Itis not ruling powers like the Spartans who are vindictive ta their defeated enemies (and in any case we are not dealing with the Spartans now): the greater cause for fear is if their own subjects turn on their previous rulers and gain control, But that isa danger you ean leave to us. Right now we want to make clear to you that we are here in the interests of our own empire, yes, but what we shall say is designed to save your own city. Our desire is to take you under our rule without trouble: it is in both our interests that you should surviveYEAR 16. SUMMER 416 HC 303 ‘Mel. And how could it be in our interest to be your skves? How 92 slocs that compare with your interest in being our masters? “Arh. Because submission offers you the alternative toa much more 93 terrible fate: and because we gain by not destroying you. “Mel. Sowan we not be friends rather than enemies? Would you not 94 accept our inactive neutrality? “Ath. Your friendship is more dangerous to us than your hostility. 95 ‘To our subjects friendship indicates a weakness on our part, but hatred isa sign of our strength “Mel. And do yoursubjects see the logic of this? Do they then make 96 no distinction between those who have nodependent connection and the rest who are mostly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been put down? “Ath. Well, they certainly think that neither category is short of a 97 ‘ase in justice, but they see it asa matter of power—if the independ~ ‘nis survivs, it is bovause we arc too frightened to attack them, So quite apart from the resulting extension of our empire your subjec tion will give us greater security, It is particularly important that we, asa naval power, should not let islanders get away from us, especially you in your relatively weak position ‘Mel. Do you not think that our alternative offers you security? 98 Since you have diverted us from talk of fustice and want us to follow your doctrine of expediency, we must try again by another route and state our own intcrest, which might convince you if it happens to eoincide with yours At present there are several neutrals: do you ‘want to make enemies of them all? When they see what you are doing here they will expect an attack on themselves before Jong. And this ‘would simply serve to strengthen your existing: enemies and bring you others who, Ieftto themselves, woul have had no such intention. Ath. We do not see much danger from those mainland states 99 whose freedom will make them very reluctant to initiate defensive measures against us. The grcatsr threat is the islanders—both the few not yet in our control, like you, and those already chafing under the compulsion of empire. These are the people most likely te take an irrational risk and bring themselves andl us into entirely foresee able danger. “Mel. Surely, then, if such desperate measures are taken by you to. roo preserve your empire, and by your subject slaves to escape it, it ‘would be complete dishonour and cowardice if we who are still free do not go to any lengths rather than submit to slavery.3e4 BOOK FIVE tor Ark, No, not if you take a sensible view. You are not in an equal contest, so questions of honour maintained or shame avoided have no. relevance. You should be thinking more of your survival, and that means not resisting a foree much stronger than you 102 Mel. But we know that wars sometimes take on a more impartial fortune which belies any discrepancy in mumbers. If we yield now, all hope is gone: but with action taken there is still hope that we can stand upright. 103 rh, Hope counsels risk, When men with other resources besides hope employ her, she can harm but not destroy. But those who stake their all (and hope is spendthrift) only recognize her for what she is when they are ruined and she has left them no further chance ta act on their realization. You are weak and one throw from destruction De not let yourselves fall into this trap. Do not de what so many others do under pressure: human means can still save them, but when ‘sible hopes recede they turn to the invisible—divination, oracles, and other such sources of disastrous optimism. roy Mel, We can assure you that we do not underestimate the diffi- culty of facing your power and a possibly unequal fortune. Yet, as for fortune, we trust that our rightcous stand against injustice will not disadvantage us in divine favour; and that Spartan help will make up for our deficiency in strength—if for no other reason, they will be bound to fight for us out of kinship and a sense of honour. So our confidence is not as completely illogical as you suggest, ros Ark. Well, we do not think that we shall be shart of divine favour cither. There is nothing in our claim or our conduct which goes: beyond established human practice as shown in men’s beliefs about the divine or their policy among themselves, We believe it of the gods, and we know it for sure of men, that under some permanent compulsion of nature wherever they ean rule, they will. We did not make this law; it was already laid down, and we are not the first to follow it; we inherited it as a fact, and we shall pass it on as a fact to remain truc for ever; and we follow it in the knowledge that you and anyone else given the sime power as us would do the same So as for divine favour, we can sce no reason to fear disadvantage. As for your trusting fantasy about the Spartans, that a sense of honous, of all things, will bring them to your aid, we can only admire your innocence and pity your folly. Among themselves and under their own regulations at home the Spartans arc as virtuous as can be. But their treatment of others is a different story, and a long one, bestVEAR 16. SUMMER 416 BC 305 summarized by saying that of all the people we know the Spartans make the most blatant equation of comfort with honour, and expedi- cency with justice. Such principles are hardly conducive to-your rescue, hich does now lock an illogical preposition, ‘Mel. Bur that is the very point in which we can naw place our sgereatest trust—the Spartans’ perception of their own interest. They ‘will want to avoid the consequence of abandoning Melss—their own colony. Among the Greeks at large this would brand them faithless in the eyes of their friends and provide ammunition for their enemies. Ath. Youseem to forget that interest goes hand-in-hand with safety, while the pursuit of justice and henour involves danger, something which the Spartans are generally loath to face AMecl. On the other hand, we think that, even though there may be dangers, the Spartans will be more inclined to undertake them on our behalf, and to consider thema better investment than they would in other cases, given that for practical purposes we lie clase to the Peloponnese and our kinship offers them a surer guarantee of loyalty. Ath, Yes, but what reassures potential parties to-a conflict is obyi- ously not mere sympathy with those who have invited them but same dear superiority in practical strength. The Spartans have a particular eye for this—at any rate they have so little confidence in their own, resources that they only attack others in the company of numerous allies: soit is harelly likely that they will make their own crossing to an island when we control the sea. ‘Mel. But they can send others. The Cretan sea is a vast area, in which ships can hide and escape more easily than a superior naval power can catch them, And if that fails they can turn to invade your land and go after the remaining allies you haye—those not visited by Brasidas, Then the focus of your efforts will not be some unconnected piece of territory, bur your very own Ind and that of your allies. Ath. Some such diversion is quite possible—it has happened before: you know our record as well as we do, and you will be aware that the Athenians have never abandoned a single siege under external threat But what strikes us is that, though you agreed that this would be a negotiation for your survival, at no point in this long discussion have you said anything which people might take as grounds for thinking that you will survive. Your strongest arguments are all in the future and no more than hopes: and your present resources are too slim to have any chance against the opposition already in place. Please ask us to withdraw and then, while you still can, come ta a more sensible 106 107 08 1093 ng 300 BOOK FIVE conclusion—so far there has been no logic in your attitude. You cannot, surely, be intending to embrace that false sense of shame to which men turn when danger looms obvious and honour is threat ened: the results are almast always catastrophic. Often enough men with their eyes still open to what they are in for are lured on by the seductive power of what they call ‘honour’: victims of a mere word, they deliberately bring on themselves a real and irretrievable disas- ter, and through their own foolhardiness incur a more shameful loss of honour than pure misfortune woul! have inflicted. If you are sens- ible you will avoid this, and take the view that there is no disgrace in yielding to a great city which offers you moderate terrs—alliance and retention of your own land on payment of tribute. Given the choice between war and sccurity, you will not want ta choose the worse out of obstinate pride. The general rule of success is to stand up to equals, respect superiors, and treat inferiors with moderation. Please then consider afresh when we have withdrawn, and keep con— stantly in your minds the thought that you are deliberating for your country: you have only the one country and only the one decision on which it stands or falls. ‘The Athenians now withdrew from the conference. Left to them- selves, the Melians confirmed the general grounds of their refusal, and gave this answer: ‘Athenians, our original decision has not changed, and we shall not consent in this short time to lase the free dom of a city which has been inhabited for seven hundred years. We shall put our trust in the good fortune from the gods which has until now preserved our city, and for human help we shall look especially to the Spartans, and we shall thus try to save ourselves. But we too have terms to offer: we ask you to accept us as friends and neutrals, and to leave our land with a treaty made between us as best serves bath our interests.” Such was the Melians’ response. The Athenians’ final word as they left the conference was this: “Well then, to judge by these dlelib— erations of yours you must be the only men, it seems to us, who think the future is more certain than the evidence of your own eyes, and regard speculation as present fact, as if mere wishing will make it 50. Spartans, fortune, and hope—the mors you stake your trust in this trio, the greater will be your downfall.” ‘The Athenian spokesmen returned to the army. As the Melians showed no sign of submission, the Athenian generals immediatelyYEAR 16, SUMMER 416 BC 307 began hostilities and built a wall completely encircling the city of Melos, dividing the work among their various contingents, Later they lefe a garrison of their own and allied troops to keep guard on the place both by land and by sea, and went back with the bulk of their forces, The remainder stayed behind and kept up the siege ‘Atthissame time the Angives invaded Phliasia and Jost about eighty men in an ambush mounted by the Phliasians and their own exiles And the Athenians in Pylos carried out a major plundering raid on Spartan territory, Even so, the Spartans did net on thit account renounce the treaty and go to war, but they made it known that any~ one who wished to launch reprisal raids on the Athenians from their territory was wcleame te do so, The Corinthians did clash with the Athenians over some gricvances specific to them, but the rest of the Peloponnesians remaincal inactive. In a night assault the Melians captured the section of the Athenian wall opposite their agora, killed afew men, and brought in as much corn and other commodities as they could. ‘They then went back and took no further action: and the Athenians saw to improved security for the future So the summer ended, In the following winter the Spartans planned an expedition against the Argolid, but turned back home when theit frontier sacrifices proved unfavourable, ‘This intendexl invasion made the Argives sus- pect certain of their own citizens: they arrested some of them, but others managed to escape. Atabout this time the Mclians once more took another part of the Athenian wall which was scantily guard. In response a further force was sent out from Athens, commanded by Philocrates the son of Demeas. Now under tight siege, and also hetrayed by some inter- nal treachery, the Melians volunteered surrender to the Athenians at their absolute discretion, OF the Melian population the Athenians executed all the grown men who came into their hands and enslaved the children and women, Later they colonized the place themselves, sending out five hundred settlers of their own, 6