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lui uries. 'Wh, bould we are about them? \'Ve care about ourselv ,of co L11 -if we Wei" stan' n g. w w uld go to almost an}' I ngtl : 10 g l food. Rut what is tine diff renee betw n U" and ther ? Doe' hung r aff ct them an ,Ie' ? A1'e the;' omehow les d· 'erving than we ar ? U \ e can find no rel vant difference betw -n us and th m, then we must admit that, if our need hould be net, so should then . It is this realizauon-c-thatv e ar on a par with one another-that i the d ep . t reason why our morahr must in lud some reo ognition of the needs of others, and wh , ultimately, -(hie;;IJ Egoi m fail a .11 moral them,.

CHAPTER

T he Utilitarian

Approach

Civen our pr ent pc pective, it i amazing that Chri aian ethics down through th centuries could hal" accepted almo tl . manimou 1 til rucntious doctrine that "the nd do not ju tify the mean .~ '11{ehave to a know, "If the end do notjllslify the means, what do "rThe an wer is, obviou 1 , - othing!" Jos :f'1I FI, :n:lu:R, MOIMi. RRSI'Ol\. ·/lJn.r:ty(1967)

6.1. The Revolution in Ethics

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ase in point, The late I th and 1'9lh cen lurk \ ime ed an .IS on ish~ng ri of upheavals. Th mod rn narion-state was merglIlIg in th afterrnatl of th· 'rench ltevolution and the wreckage of the Napoleon ic empire; the revolutions of 1848 showed the trans fonnin power of the new ideas of "liberty, equalit , fraternit "; in Ameri a, a new countr with a new ki.nd of con tiuuion wa created. and its bloody civil war would pUll an nd 0 slavcrv in V\le tern ivil izatiors; and all th while. th Industrial Revol ition was brmgmg about a 0111plete r m.1 turing of 0 j t)r.. It i. not urpri 'ing til t in th mid ·'t of all this chang people might begsn to think differently about ethics. The old wa of thinking were v II" much up in the ail", opn to challenge, gain t thi background, B mtham 's argument for a
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new conception of morality .had a powerf~l.influence. ,Mora~lt;y, l)e urged, IS not about pleasmg God, nor IS It about bemg faithful to abstract rules.Mm:ality is abon1.m"J.king the world as hapet aU?ossible. Bentham argued that there is one ultimate moral E_rincipIe, namely, the Principle of Utility. This principle requires us to always choose whatever action or social policy would have the best consequences for everyone concerned. Or, as he put it in his book 17~ePrinciples ojMrmis and Legislation~ublished in the year of the French Revolution: By the PrincipIe of Utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action wbatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question ...

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Bentham was the leader of a group of philosophical radicals whose aim was to reform the laws and institutions of England along utilitarian lines. One of his followers was James Mill, the distinguished Scottish philosopher, historian, and economist. James Mill's son, John Stuart Mill, would become the leading advocate of utilitarian moral theory for the next generation. Thus, the Benthamite movement would continue unabated even after its founder's death .. Bentham was fortunate to have such disciples.John Stuart Mill's advocacy was even more elegant and persuasive than the master's. In his little book Utilitarianism (1861), Mill. presents the main idea of the theory in the following way: First, he says, we should envision a certain state of affairs that w;Would like see come about~a state of affairs in which all people are as happy and well ofl as they can be. Then we should try to bring

of the 19th century, those of Marx and Darwin. To understan? the radicalriess 01 the Principle of Utility, we have to appreCl.ate what it leaves out of its picture of morality: ~on.e .are ~1l references to God or to abstract moral rules. WrItten I.n the 1.-" . as f;pthfulu..eavens. " Morality is nn.Ionzer tc.he.underatond . ~ . ibl ness to some divin..cl.¥-given code or some set~f mfl~xI e rules. As Peter Singer would later put it, moralIty IS not a system of nasty puritanical prohibitions,~ainl~ deSIgned to.stop p'eoele [from] having fun." Rather, the pomt. of morality IS the happiness of beings in this. world, and nothmg m?re, and we are permitted-even required-a-to .dc~ wh.atever IS n~cessary to promote that happiness. That, m Its time, was a I evolutionary idea. .. The utilitarians were, as I said, social reformers as w:11 as philosophers. They intended ~'leir do.ctrine ~o m~k~ a ~lfference, not only in thought but in practice ..To ll~ust[ate this, we will briefly examine the implications ofthe.Ir philosophy for two rather different practical issues: euthanasia and the treatment of nonhuman animals. These issues do not by any means exhaust the practical applications of Utilitarianism; nor are they necessarily the ones that utilitarians wouk~ find most pressmg. But they do give a good indication of the kind of approach that Utilitarianism provides.

6.2. First Example: Euthanasia

Matthew Donnelly was a physicist who had worked with X-rays for 30 years. Perhaps as a result of too much exposure, ~e contracted cancer and lost part of his jaw, his upper lip, hIS nose, and his left hand, as well as two fingers from his .right hand ..He was also left blind .. Donnelly's physicians told him that he had about a year to live, but he decided that he did ?-ot want to. go on living in such a state. He was in constant pam. O~e writer said that "at its worst, he could be seen lying in bed Wlt~ teeth clinched and beads of perspiration standing out on hIS f~rehead." Knowing that he was going to die ~nyv"ay, and wantm.g to escape this misery, Donnelly ?egged hIS three br~thers to kill him. Two refused, but one did not. The youn&est ~rother, 3&cyear-old Harold Donnelly, carried a .30-caliber pistol mto the hospital and shot Matthew to death.

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decldm.g what to do we should ask what COurse of conduct -wou c _promot~ the greates~ amou~t of happiness for a t ose ~ho WIllbe affected. MoralIty reqUIres that we do what is best from that point of view. _ At ~rst glance, this r:nayn~t seem like such a radical idea; fact, It may seem a mild truism. Who could argue with the proposition that we should oppose sutfering and promote happiness? Yet, in their own way, Bentham and Mill were Ieadinsr a revolution as radical as the other great intellectual revolutio~1s
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This, unfortunately, is a true story, and the question natuwheth r Harold did wrong, On the one hand, we may Wi~11I11(' Ihal II!:: was motivated by noble sentiments; he loved his I "'ollwr and wanted to relieve his misery, Moreover, Matthew had asl ('d to die. Al~ argues for a lenient judgment. On the other hand, a cordi_!!gto the dominant moral tradition in our socie!)" what Harold did was unacce.[.ltable. The dominant moral tradition in our sociery is the Christian tradition. Ch_ristianjty holds.thajhuman life is a gift from God, and only-he mz deci 'ill e d. The early church prohibited all killing, believing thatJesus's teachings on this subject permitted no exceptions to the rule. Later, some exceptions were made, chiefly to allow capital punishment and killing in war. But other kinds of killing, including suicide and euthanasia, remained forbidden. To summarize the church's doctrine, theologians formulated-a ru e saying that t te zntentwnaTRilling a/innocent people is always wmng. This conception has, more than any other single idea, shaped Western attitudes about the morality of killing. That is why we are so reluctant to excuse Harold Donnelly, even though he may have acted from noble motives. He intentionally killed an innocent person; therefore, according to our moral tradition, what he did was wrong . Utilitarianism takes a very different approach. It would have us ask, Considering the choices available to Harold Donnelly, which one wo~d have the best overall conseguences? What action would pr_?duce the great~st ~alance of haEpiness over unh<ppiness 'fOi=aIlconcerned? The er~m.n who_,wQ..u__£.e most affc:cted, of cOl!rse, would be..Mi!Jtbe~ Donne]!}: hiIl}self~lfHarold Donnelly does not kill him, he will live on, for perhaps a year, blind, mutilated, and in constant pain. How much unha iness would this involve? It is hard to say precisely; but Matthew's own testimony was that he was so unhappy in this condition that he preferred death. Killing him would provide an escape from this agony. The~, utilitarians..bay_e oncluded that euthanasia, in such a case, is lIl.o.r:allY-l'i-g-h-t. Although this kind of argument is very different from what one finds in the Christian tradition-as I said before, it depends on no theological conceptions, and it has no use for inflexible "rules"-the classical utilitarians did not think they were advocating an atheistic or anti-religious philosophy. Bentham sug~ gests that religion would endorse, not condemn, the utilitarian Hill
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viewpoint if only its adherents would take seriously their view of God as a benevolent creator. He writes:
The dictates of religion would coincide, in all cases, with those of utility, were the Being, who is the object of religion, universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and powerful. ... But among the votaries' of religion (of which number the multifarious fraternity of Christians is but a small part) there seem to be-but few (I will not say how few) who are real believers in his benevolence. They call him benevolent in words, but they do not mean that he is so in reality.

The morality of mercy killing might be a case in point. How, Bentham might ask, could a benevolent God forbid the killing of Matthew Donnelly? If someone were to say that God is kind but that he requires Donnelly to suffer for an additional year before dying, this would be exactly what Bentham means by "calling him benevolent in words, but not meaning that he is so in reali LJ. " The majority of religious people do not agree with Bentham, and not only our moral tradition but our legal tradition has evolved under the influence of Christianity. Among Western nations, euthanasia is legal in only The Netherlands, Belgium, and Colombia. In the United States it is sim ly murder, and Harold Donnelly was arrested and charged. (I do not know what happened in court, although it is common in such cases for the defendant to be found guilty of a lesser charge and given a light sentence.) What would Utilitarianism say about this? If, on the utilitarian view, euthanasia is moral, should it also be legal? This 9yestion is connected with the more eneral uestion of what the ur ose of the law ou ht to be. Bentham was trained in the law, and he thoug t of the . nnciple of Utility as a guide both for legislators and for ordinary people making individual decisions. The purpose of the law is the same as that of morality: It should promote the general welfare of all citizens. Bentham thou ht it obvious that if the law is to serve this purpose, it should not restrict the freedom of CItizens an--.:n:ore tnalli"i'ecessary. In particular, no type of activity should be prohibited unless, in engaging in that activity, one is doing harm to others. Qentham ob' ected to laws regulatin the sexual conduct of "consenting adults," for exam£, e, o~ grounds_that such conduct is not harmful to others and

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such laws diminish rather than increase happiness. But it was Mill who gave this principle its most eloquent expression, in his book On Liberty (1859):

If any passages of Holy Wrtt seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young: this is ei ther to remove marr's thoughts frorn being cruel to

other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one becomes cruel to hurnan beings: or bee use in'ur to an animal leads to the t I por;aLhurlorman eiLher the doer of the deed, or of another, Thus, people and animals ar'e in separate rrio ral categories. St.ri ctl y speaking, animals have no rrioral standing of their own; we are free to treat them in any way we please, When it is spelled out as baldly as this, the tr adi tio n al doctrine might make us a little nervous: It seerns rather extr-eme in its lack of concern for rro n h urna n arii ma ls, many of which are, afte r all, intelligent and sensitive creatures, Yet only a little reflection is needed to see how much of our conduct is actually guided by this doctrine, We eat arrirnals; we use them as experimental subjects in our laboratories; we us their skins for clothing and their heads as wall ornaments; we make them the objects of OUI" arn userrie nt. in zoos and rodeos; and we track them down and kill them for sport, If one is uncomfortable with the theological "justification." for these practices, Western philosophers have offered an abundance of secular ones. It is said, variously, that arrirn als are not rational, that they lack the ability to speak, or that they are simply not human-and all these are given as reasons why their interests are outside the sphere of moral concern, The utilitari.ans, hQ_\'!.!.e_~Quld have none of this,. On their view, what mattel"S is not whether an individual has a soul, is rational,_Qf an 0 e rest. All that luatters is whether it is ca able of ex .eri~l:cing _1appiness and u~lh~ppiness, p eaSlue and pain. If an irrd ivid ual IS capable of suffering, then we have a duty to take that into account when we are deciding what to do, even if the individual in question is not hurnari. In fact, Bentham argues, whether" the individual is human or nonhuman is just as irrelevant as whether he is black or white. Ben tharn writes: The day may corne when the rest of the a.nirnal creation may acquire those rights which nev r could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The Fre nch have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without r d ress to the capt"ice of a tormentor, It lllay one

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Thus, for the classical utilitarians, laws prohibiting euthanasia are not only contrary to the general welfare, they are also urijustifiable restrictions on people's right to control their own lives. When Harold Donnelly killed his brother Matthew, he was helping him end his life in a manner that Matthew had chosen. No harm was caused to anyone else, and so it was none of their business. Most Americans now seem to agree with this point of view. In 2005, 58% of Americans said that doctors should be allowed to help patients die who have an incurable disease and are living in severe pain. Consistent with his philosophy, Bentham hirnself is said to have req~ted eJJ.thal1.asia-in-his finak.days, although we do not know ,~this request was granted.

6.3. Second Exam.ple: N orrhurnan Animals

The treatment of nonhumans has not traditionally been regarded as a serious moral issue. The Christian tradition says that man alone is made in God's image and that animals do not have souls. Thus, the natural order of things permits humans to use animals for any pm"pose they see fit. Saint Thomas Aquinas summed up the traditional view when he wrote: Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sin£ul for a man to kill dumb animals: for' by divine providence they are intended [0£ man's use in the natural order. Heric it is no wrong fOI"rria n to make use of them, either' by killing them or in any other way whatever, Butisn.'..ti' w.I:Ung_to b cruel to an.imalsz.Aqujnas.cosaced iJl,a,tit is, but he says the reasolLhas_tn...do._with hUlllatL.w.clfar.e. not the welfare of the animals:

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lay come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it t.he faculty of reason, 01perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant ofa day 01- a week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The guestiru.Lis_ot, Can they reason? nor Can they lalh? but Can they suffer? Because both humans and nonhumans can suffer, we have the same reason for not mistreating both. Ifa human is tormented, wh is it wrong? Because that person suffers. Similar y, I a nonhuman is tormented, it also suffers, and so it is e!;jually wrong for the same .reason., TOBentham and Mill, this line of reasoning was conclusive. Humans and nonhumans are equally entitled to moral concern. However, this view may seem as extreme, in the opposite direction, as the traditional view that grants animals no independent moral standing at all. Are animals really to be regarded as the equals of humans? In some ways, Bentham and Mill thought so, but they were careful to point out that this does not mean that animals and humans must always be treated in the same way. There are factual differences between them that often will justify differences in treatment. For exam Ie, because humans have intellectual capacities that anm1als lack, they are able to take pleasure inthm.gs at non umans cannot enjoy-humans ~do Inathema ICS, a reciate iterature, an so on .. And, similarly, their superior capacities might make humans capable offrustrations and disappointments that other animals are not able to experience. Thus, our duty to promote happiness entails a duty to promote those special enjoyments for them, as well as to prevent any special unhappinesses to which they are vulnerable. At the same time, however, insofar as the welfare of other animals is affected by our conduct, we have a strict moral duty to take that into account, and their suffering counts equally with any similar suffering experienced by a human. Some contemporary utilitarians have rejected this aspect of the classical doctrine, and that is not surprising. Our "right" to kill, experiment on, and otherwise use animals as we please

may seem so obvious that it is hard to believe we really are b having as badly as Bentham and Mill suggest. Other contemporary utilitarians, however, have produced powerful arguments that Bentham and Mill were right. Peter Singer, in a book titled Animal Liberation, argues that our treatment 0 maJsiSQeepI r 05 ectiona _.Singer.: ks ho: .iustify ex~riments such as this 0 e:_ In 1953 R. Solomon, L. Kamin, and L. Wynne, experimenters at Harvard University, placed forty dogs in a device called a "shuttlebox," which consists of a box divided into two compartments, separated by a barrier. Initially the barrier was set at the height of the dog's back. Hundreds of intense electric shocks were delivered to the dogs' feet through a grid floor. At first the dogs could escape the shock if they learned to jump the barrier into the other compartment. In an attempt to "discourage" one dog from jumping, the experimenters forced the dog to jump one hundred times onto a grid floor in the other compartment that also delivered a shock to the dog's feet. They said that as the dogjurnped he gave a "sharp anticipatory yip which turned into a yelp when. he landed on the electrified grid." They then blocked the passage between the compartments wi th a piece of plate glass and tested the dog again. The dog 'Jumped forward and smashed his head against the glass." The dogs began by showing symptoms such as "defecation, urination, yelping and shrieking, trembling, attacking the apparatus," and so on; but after ten or twelve days of trials dogs who were prevented from escaping shock ceased to resist. The experimenters reported themselves "impressed" by this, and concluded that a combination of the plate glass barrier and foot shock was "very effective" in eliminating jumping by dogs. The utilitarian argument is simple enou -h. We shouk!Judge actions right or wron e en mg on whether they cause more happiness or unhappiness:-The dogs in this experiment were obviously being caused terrible suffering. Was there any compensating gain in happiness elsewhere that justified it? Was greater unhappiness being prevented, for other animals or for humans? If not, the experiment was not morally acceptable. We may note that this s Ie of ar men oes t jm 1 that all such experiments are immoral-it suggests 'ud -in:.-each one indivictua11y, on its own merits. e experiment with the dogs,

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for example, was part of a study of "learned helplessness," a topic that psychologists regard as important .. Psychologists say that finding out about learned helplessness will lead to long-term b ncfits for the mentally ill. The utilitarian principle does not, by itself, teU us what the truth is about particular experiments; bu t it does insist that the harm done to the animals requir-es justi[ication. We cannot simply assume, because t.hey aren't human, that anything goes. But criticizing such experiments is too easy for most of us. Because we do not do such research, we may feel superior or selfrighteous. Singer points out, however, that none of us is free of blame in this area. We are all involved in cruelty just as serious as that perpetrated in any laboratory, because we all (or at least most of us) eat meat. The facts about meat production are at least as harrowing as the facts about animal experimentation. 0 Most people believe, in a vague way, that while the sl@ghterhou .e might be an unpleasant place, animals raised for food are otherwise treated well enough. But, Singer points out, nothing could be further from the truth, Veal calves, for example, spend their lives in pens too small to allow them to turn around or even to lie down comfortably-but from the producers' point of view, that is good, because exercise toughens the muscles, which reduces the "quality" of the meat; and besides, allowing the animals adequate living space would be expensive, In these pens, the calves cannot perform such basic actions as grooming themselves, which they naturally desire to do, because there is not room for them to twist their heads around, The calves clearly miss their mothers, and like human infants, they want something to suck-they can be seen trying vainly to suck the sides of their stalls. In order to keep their meat pale and tasty, they are fed a liquid diet deficient in both iron and roughage. Naturally, they develop cravings for these things. The calves' craving for iron becomes so strong that, if allowed to turn around, they will lick at their own urine, although calves normally find this repugnant. The tiny stalls, which prevent the animals from turning, solve this "problem." The craving for roughage is especially strong, since without it the calves cannot form a cud to chew ..They cannot be given any straw for bedding, since the animals would be driven to eat it, which would affect the meat. So, for these animals, the slaughterhouse is not an unpleasant end to an otherwise contented existence. As terrifying

as the process of slaughter must be, for them it may actually be a merciful release. . Once again, given these facts, tI'l utilitarian argument is slIr~ple enough, -r:he system of meat production causes great suffenng for the ammals. Because we do not need to eat them:,egetarian meals are also tasty and nourishing-the good that IS done ~oes not, on balance.outweigh the evil, Therefore, it is wrong, Smger concludes that we should become vegetarians. . What is most revolutionary in all this is simply the ideathat the Interes~s of nonh_u,man animals count, We normally assume, ~s the dorninant tradition of our society teaches, that human bemgs alone are worthy of moral consideration. Utilitarianism challenges that basic assumption and insists that the moral community must be expanded to include all creatures whose interests ~re affected by what we do. Human beings are in many ways. special; and an ade.uate morality must acknowle ge t at. But we are only one s12eClesamong many m.haoItmg Lns p anet; and moralIty must acknowledge that fact as well.

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