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REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Petition for Certiorari to review Sandiganbayan (SB) resolution; 1990 FACTS: July 29, 1987 Republic of the Philippines (RP) thru Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint in Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos, et al. for reconveyance, reversion, restitution & damages. Sept. 3, 1987 before case against Marcos could be set for hearing, Simplicio Palanca, in his own behalf as stockholder of Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation (BREDCO) along w/other stockholders filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, praying that they be allowed to intervene in Marcos case since they have a legal interest in the litigation & the properties for disposition in the said case. They claim that lands involved in the case are not registered in the name of any of the defendants (Marcos, et al.) but in the name of BREDCO and Marsteel Consolidated, Inc. Marsteel became involved because BREDCO stockholders transferred their shares (about 70% of subscribed capital) to help Marsteel finance reclamation & port development project. March 23, 1988 petitioner (PCGG) filed Motion to Dismiss Answer in Intervention on the ff.grounds: SB lacks jurisdiction & intervenors have no legal interest. June 6, 1988 SB granted motion to intervene. PCGG moved for reconsideration, denied. PCGG filed petition in SC complaining that by granting motion to intervene, SB violated a national or public policy embedded in EO No. 1, 2, 4 & related issuances because: 1. Intervention is a suit/counter-suit against the RP which being a sovereign state cannot be sued w/o its consent. 2. Cause of action of intervenors is not under SB jurisdiction (PD No. 1606 & EO No. 14). Its under regular courts or other forums since these are claims between and/or among Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos & their cronies. 3. Intervenors have no legal interest in matter in litigation. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON SB has jurisdiction over action for intervention. YES a. All PCGG cases re: funds, moneys, assets, & properties acquired or misappropriated by Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees, whether civil or criminal, & all incidents arising from, incidental to or related to such cases fall under SBs exclusive & original jurisdiction. (Sec. 2, Presidential EO No. 14, cited in PCGG vs. Pena) b. Intervention is not an independent action. It is supplemental to Marcos case. Since SB has jurisdiction over such case then it follows that the motion to intervene is also under its jurisdiction. 2. WON remedy sought (certiorari) is proper. NO a. It has jurisdiction over the case thus whatever error or irregularity it might have committed in its decision is an error of judgment correctible by appeal & not certiorari. An appeal requests for review of errors of judgment committed by a court of competent jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari is used to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can only be used for such purposes. b. SC can dismiss the case but because it is of public interest & a matter of public policy, it will still review alleged errors. 3. WON Palanca & company can intervene. YES a. Intervention is allowed when a party has (1) a legal interest in the matter of litigation, (2) in the success of either parties (3) interest against both parties (4) or if it will be adversely affected by distribution or disposition of property in custody of court or other officers. (Rules of Court, Rule 12) b. In 1961, BREDCO was awarded by Bacolod City a contract to undertake reclamation & port development of city. BREDCO tied-up with Marsteel in 1975, taking it in as a contractor & allotting 65% of excess of all disbursement revenues for said company. In 1977, BREDCO stockholders transferred 70% of BREDCO capital stocks to Marsteel Consolidated, Inc. (owner of Marsteel) to enable it to expand its base of negotiation for loans needed in the projects. These stockholders will be entitled to 35% in excess of all disbursement revenues. Then in Sept. 1986, PCGG sequestered all assets, properties, records & documents of Marsteel, MCI & BREDCO. Then, case against Marcos was filed alleging that Marcos & co-defendants amassed ill-gotten wealth among w/c are BREDCO lots & shares of stock & prayed that such properties be reconveyed to PCGG plus damages. BREDCO & MCI were never mentioned in the complaints. c. Palanca, being one of the stockholders of BREDCO who transferred 70% of BREDCO shares to MCI and is entitled to 35% of disbursement revenue excess, has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. His co-intervenors have the same standing too. d. Palanca and company will be adversely affected by the distribution & disposition of property currently in Courts custody. The lots & stocks sequestered belong to BREDCO. They cant just stand idly & see their property disposed of w/o asserting their rights. e. Palanca & company have legal interest in the success of either of the parties involved, thus they can intervene. There is a possibility that the judgment in this case will reconvey their properties to PCGG thus, they have legal interest in the success of Marcos & other defendants. 3. WON intervention amounts to a suit against the State. NO a. An intervenor may either join plaintiff in claiming what is sought in the complaint or the defendant in resisting plaintiffs claims by filing an answer in intervention. (Rules of Court) b. By filing its complaint in intervention, the Government in effect waived its right to non-suability. (Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) c. When an intervention merely resists plaintiffs claims w/o asking for any affirmative relief against any party, it cannot be a suit against the State. And in the event that the State intervenes, that is not tantamount to the State waiving its right to be sued. (Lim vs. Brownell Jr. and Kagawa) d. Palanca & company are merely uniting with the defendants in resisting claims against PCGG & are not asking for any relief or damages against the PCGG. They merely pray that their properties be excluded from the reconveyance of the alleged illgotten wealth of the defendants to the plaintiff. Thus, this is not a suit or counter-suit against the RP. They dont appear to have any controversy w/Marcos, et al. either. HELD: Petition dismissed.

Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. [September 20, 1954] Facts: February 3, 1951 Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental alleging that he purchased from the shipping commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000 and paying P50,000 downpayment. He executed a chattel mortgage against the vessel in favour of the Shipping Commission. The Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel due to non-payment of the instalment. Froilan appealed to the President of the Philippines and as a result the Congress restore to him all right under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Pan Oriental Shipping Corporation refused to give to Froilan the vessel. February 3, 1951 lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan. March 1, 1951 Pan Oriental Shipping Co denied the right of Froilan and it alleged that the action of the Cabinet was null and void. November 10, 1951 after obtaining the intervenor-appelle the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance, interest and the advances on the insurance premium

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excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of the vessel. November 29, 1951 Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase. November 29, 1951 Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in the amount of P162,576.93 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration February 3, 1952 lower court held that the payment made by Froilan constituted a payment and a discharge of his obligation to the Government of the Philippines. May 10, 1952 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co., against it on the ground that the purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government to deliver the vessel to Pan Oriental in the event that the Government recovers the vessel from Froilan. The motion of Pan Oriental was dismissed. As a result of the dismissal Pan Oriental appealed the case Issue: WON the case should be dismissed because the State is immune from suit. Held: No Ratio: The Governments action of filing its complaint in intervention had the effect of waiving its immunity and right on nonsuability. By taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The US SC held that no direct suit can be maintained against the US. But when an action is brought by the US to recover money in the hands of a party who has legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress. by the character of the objects for w/c the entity was organized. (Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro & Phil. Airlines, Inc.) 4. When the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity & is to be treated like any other private corporation. (Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters Bank) When the State engages in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, it divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, subjecting the corporation to rules of law governing private corporations. When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, its bound by rules governing private individuals. When it contracts with individuals, rules must be adjusted as if both parties are private persons so that they may both stand on equal grounds. (People vs. Stephens) 5. PNR in this case was not performing any governmental function. It was engaged in a private enterprise. It does not exercise sovereign functions but it exercises purely corporate, proprietary or business functions. (National Development Co. vs. Tobias). Unfair for Jaimes heirs if they cant sue negligent PNR employees. 6. Other agencies not immune from suit: SSS & PNB. ABAD SANTOS, CONCURRING All corporations organized by the govt are its instrumentalities by the very reason of their creation but that does not automatically immune them from suit. Central Bank is an instrumentality of the govt but its not immune from suit for it performs proprietary functions. *additional notes re reason for State exemption from suit: 1. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical & practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. (Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank) 2. The public service would be hindered & public safety endangered if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen & consequently controlled in the use & disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the Government. (The Siren vs. U.S.)

MALONG vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS (PNR) Petition to review order of the CFI of Pangasinan, Branch II, Aug. 7, 1985 FACTS: Oct. 30, 1977 Jaime Aquino, son of petitioners Francisco & Rosalina Malong, was on board a PNR train. He sat near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded w/passengers & baggage since All Saints Day was forthcoming. While the train was between Tarlac & Capas, Jaime fell from the train resulting to his death. Malong spouses pray that the PNR be ordered to pay damages amounting to P136,370.00. CFI dismissed complaint saying that it had no jurisdiction over the case because PNR is a government instrumentality & any action against it is a suit against the State which is prohibited under Sec. 16, Art. XV, Constitution. ISSUE: WON the PNR shares the States immunity from suit. HELD: No. CFI dismissal reversed & set aside. Remanded for further proceedings. RATIO: 1. Manila Railroad Company, PNRs predecessor, was not immune from suit under its charter, Act. No. 5440. 2. PNR charter, RA No. 4156 amended by RA No. 6366 & PD No. 741, provides that PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-year term from 1964-2014. Its under the Office of the President. Its charter likewise provides that PNR is to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law, referring to sections 81-102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporation not reproduced in the Corporation Code. Sec. 36 of the Corporation Code and Sec. 13(2) of the Corporation Law state that every corporation has the power to sue & be sued in its corporate name in every court. 3. State divested itself of sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR w/c is no different from its predecessor. It did not become immune from suit. Not all government entities whether corporate or noncorporate are immune from suits. Immunity is determined

Fontanilla v. Maliaman [February 27, 1991] Facts: Motion for reconsideration of the Courts Second Division decision in GR no. 61045. The Solicitor General maintains that NIA on the strength of PD no. 552 and the case of Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union that NIA does not perform solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent. Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of NIA. They filed a case for damages against NIA Issue: WON the NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary function Held: Yes NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It can be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. Ratio: The irrigation districts in the US are identical with the irrigation system in the Philippines. As such, it is appropriate to consider certain doctrines from the American jurisprudence. o Irrigation district is a public quasi corporation organized however to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits. They are members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited by its operations. It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in a

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proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership. o Quasi-public corporation possessed some governmental powers and exercised some governmental functions, but held that the construction and operation of its irrigation canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and hence the district was responsible in damages for negligent construction or operation of its canal system. Constituent exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. Ministrant merely the exercise of propriety function and compulsory Other corporations that brings public benefit and public welfare are basically proprietary in nature (telecommunications, electricity) NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated unions it was held that NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions rather it performs proprietary functions. The function of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of the government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society. NIA was not created for the purpose of local government. It is essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a government-function corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation project. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. Also in PD 552 it was provided that NIA can sue and be sues in court. NIA has its own assets and liabilities and it also has corporate powers to be exercised by the BOD. Separate Opinion: Padilla NIA is an agency of the government with an original charter. RA 3061 created NIA. The charter of NIA confers upon it a separate juridical personality to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. NIAs primary purpose is to undertake integrated irrigation projects, by the construction of multiple-purpose water resource projects to increase agricultural production for the financial uplifting of the people. NIA is maintained and operated by the government in the performance of its governmental function of providing the Filipino people, particularly, the farmers nationwide, improved irrigation systems to increase the countrys agricultural production. Only the government has the capacity and facilities to successfully undertake a project or venture of such magnitude. Fees collected are for cost of operation, maintenance, insurance and rehabilitation of the irrigation systems. The fact that the charter treats NIA as incorporated under the Corporation law and confers upon it a separate judicial personality is not the test in determining whether it is performing a governmental or proprietary function. It was held that were the nature of the duties imposed on an agency and performed by it does not reveal that it was intended to bring any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the government, said agency is deemed to be exercising a governmental function. The charter of NIA provides that it may sue and be sue, thus, the consent of NIA to be sued has been given. The rule of immunity no longer applies. Is the State liable for damages? No. The State would be liable for damages when it acts through a special agent. The Hugo Garcia was not a special agent rather he was NIAs regular driver. For the State to be liable Congress should enact an appropriate legislation to compensate the petitioners and to appropriate the necessary fund for it. Jan. 1971 - Ildefonso Santiago & his wife donated a land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the condition that lighting & water facilities will be installed and an office building & parking lot will be built on said land which should be ready for occupancy on or before Dec. 7, 1974. Bureau failed to meet the conditions thus, Santiago filed this case against the RP thru the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of the deed of donation. CFI granted RPs motion to dismiss on the ground that the state cant be sued w/o its consent. ISSUE: WON Santiago can sue the Bureau of Plant Industry. HELD: Yes. Petition granted. CFI ordered to proceed with case. RATIO: 1. Admittedly, state cannot be sued w/o its consent. Government departments, bureaus, agencies, offices or instrumentalities cannot be sued either if the suit would result in adverse consequences to the public treasury, whether in disbursements of funds/loss of property. (Del Mar vs. Philippine Veterans Administration) This principle has been implicit in the 1935 Constitution (Republic vs. Purisima) thus, issue of its retroactivity as raised by the petitioner is immaterial. 2. However, it would be unfair to cloak the State with immunity when it has violated an agreement wherein it has received gratuitously a certain property w/o fulfilling the terms of the agreement. This is offensive to ones sense of justice. The government should set the example. Since the State can waive its immunity from suit impliedly, the case at bar should prosper. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Ministerio vs. CFI Cebu). Thus when the State commits an injustice against a citizen, it implies waiver of its immunity. Bureau of Plant Industrys failure to abide by the conditions under w/c the donation was given presumes that it gave its consent to be sued. There being no money claim, it will not affect the States treasury. A donor, w/ RP as donee, is entitled to go to court when there is a breach of the conditions of such donation. The State benefited from the contract and when it ignores its obligations, the people might lose its confidence on the State. *additional notes: 1. The doctrine of the non-suability of the State is a corollary of the positivist concept of law w/c according to Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on w/c such a right may be predicated. It is in consideration of the vastly expanded role of the government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote general welfare. (Mobile Phil. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service). 2. A government-owned & controlled corporation has a personality of its own distinct & separate from that of the government. It may sue & be sued & may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. (National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR). 3. An action against the government officials is essentially one against the government. (Araneta vs. Gatmaitan) 4. Basic & fundamental principle of the law that the govt cant be sued before courts of justice w/o its consent covers with the mantle of its protection an entity such as the Angat River Irrigation System. (Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union) 5. Bureau of Cusotms acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service is immune from suit under the doctrine of non-suability of the State. The claimants remedy to recover the loss or damage to the goods under the custody of such service is to file a claim w/ the Commission on Audit as contemplated in Act No. 3803 & Commonwealth Act No. 327.

SANTIAGO vs. REPUBLIC Petition for Certiorari from order of dismissal of CFI Zamboanga, 1978 FACTS:

Amigable vs. Cuenca [February 29, 1972] Appeal from a decision of the COFI of Cebu Facts:

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Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 630 of Banilad Estate in Cebu City. There is no annotation (appearing at the back of the certificate) in favour of the government of any right or interest in the property in the property . Without any expropriation proceeding the government used a portion of his property to widen the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. These two avenues were already existing since 1921. March 27, 1958 Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment for his lot. His claim was indorsed to the Auditor Genral who disallowed it. February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint. The complaint was amended in April 17, 1959. Defendants Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highway. Amigable wanted to recover his property from the Government. Defendant denied the allegations on the following grounds: o Action was premature because the claim was not filed with the Office of the Auditor General o Right of action for recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed o Suit against the government and the government has not given its consent for the suit o It was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the Construction of Mango Avenue. Courts decision: no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs cause of action and that the government cannot be sued without its consent. The government in this case did not give its consent for the suit. Also, the claim for moral damages gas already prescribed. Issue: WON the Victoria Amable may properly sue the government? Held: Yes Ratio: Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent. If the constitutional mandate that the owner is compensated for property taken for public use is to be respected. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. When the government takes any property for public use which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits jurisdiction of a court. As registered owner she could bring an action to recover possession of the property in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. The property cannot be recovered by Amigable. The only relief that is available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. With regards to damages she is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. Government should also pay for attorneys fees. Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. Petitioner Maxine Bradford is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highlydiscriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993 FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in

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liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. - NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted. General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). NPDC is a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks including Rizal Park. There was no document or instrument in record to show the grantor of the verbal license to GABI. GABI was given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. GABI was to remit to NPDC, 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. (No written proof for this) February 29, 1988 Lansang (Chairman of NPDC) terminated the verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. GABI was given until March 8, 1988 to vacate the area. The notice was signed by the president of GABI Iglesias (totally blind and he claims that he was deceived when he signed the document) March 8, 1988 GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC and the court issued a TRO. The TRO expired on March 28, 1988 and the following day GABO was evicted. The RTC dismissed the claim for damages by because the complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent. GABI cannot claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since it was a mere accommodation concessionaire. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court. The CA ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority. The CA observed that the eviction of GABI came at the heels of 2 significant incidents. (1) Iglesias extended monetary support to striking workers of NPDC (2) Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26, 1987, denouncing alleged graft and corruption in NPDC. Issues: WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioners act of terminating respondent GABIs concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty. Held: (1) NO The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. RULE: Suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. (2) NO There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang. Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary.

Lansang vs. Court of Appeals[February 23, 2000] Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals Facts:

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will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen) The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA FACTS: 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent locally available. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth). Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government w/c would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law. ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces HELD: Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as moral damages, P20K for attys fees. RATIO: No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner Shauf. While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateos services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations. The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi & Detwiler violated Shaufs constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She never acquired rights over that amount because she was never appointed. Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants discriminatory acts. The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.

Republic vs. Sandoval [March 19, 1993] Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9 Facts: This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and the heirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (Girls d ko naisasama ang details ng massacre the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting and no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.) Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages. President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizens Mendiola Commission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for damages by the petitioners. February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit Held: No Ratio Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal

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right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reason of public policy that public policy would be hindered and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government. Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself. The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are o When the Republic is sued by name o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company). Thus, the doctrine of non-suability cannot bar or impede a notice of garnishment. 2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge. Several cases have ruled that funds of government-owned entities are not exempt from garnishment (PNB vs. CIR, National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR). Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals [October 1, 1990] Petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals Facts Off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by the petitioner Municipal of Makati against Admiral Finance Creditor Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and Arceli P. Jo. June 4, 1987 The RTC judge fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666 and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160 which was earlier received. The decision became final and executory. A notice of garnishment was served upon the PNB Buendia branch but the sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed on the account of the petitioner The City of Makati filed a motion to lift the garnishment on the ground that the manner of payment should be done in instalment. Also the City of Makati filed a Manifestation that the private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. PSB and the private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings. Trial judge issued an order approving the compromise agreement, ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 and ordered PSB and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property in favour of the petitioner PNB Buendia branch failed to comply with the order of the court because according to the branch manager he was still waiting for proper authorization from PNB Head Office. Issue: WON the account of the City of Makati with PNB can be levied for a money judgement against the City. Held: No Ratio: The petitioner alleges for the first time that they have 2 accounts with PNB. Account no. 265-537154-3 for expropriation of the property with a balance of P99,743.94 and Account no. 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and other purposes with a balance of P170,098,421.72 Petitioner contends that amount involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the fund garnished by the sheriff over P99,743.94 are public funds earmarked for the municipal governments other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required by law. Account no. 263-530850-7 are public funds and are not subject to levy and execution unless otherwise provided for by the statute. The properties of a municipality whether real or personal cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgement against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fee, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. There was no Municipal Ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision. No levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account no. 263-530850-7. The remedy for the respondents is a petition for mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds.

PNB vs. PABALAN Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Mandamus w/ Preliminary Injunction FACTS: Dec. 17, 1970 writ of execution was issued w/ a notice of garnishment for the sum of P12,724.66. Said amount belongs to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration & deposited with PNBs La Union branch. Execution of writ & garnishment was delayed since PNB objected to the garnishment & questioned WON Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration really had funds deposited w/ PNB La Union. Jan. 25, 1971 execution of writs & garnishment. It ordered that Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Funds deposited w/ PNB shall be garnished & delivered to plaintiff immediately to satisfy Writ of Execution for of the amount awarded in the decision of Nov. 16, 1970. PNB claims that since funds are public in character, a prohibition must be issued against Pabalans orders based on the doctrine of the non-suability of the state. ISSUE: WON funds of public corporations w/c can sue & be sued are exempt from garnishment. HELD: No. Petition dismissed. RATIO: 1. When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity & is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States vs. Planters Bank) By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character so as to render the corporation subject to the rules governing private corporations (Manila Hotel

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salaries and other emoluments. The City government appealed the decision but it was also dismissed. During 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages. Remaining balance = P530,761.91 The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan were arguing that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at a public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for 100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle maintaining that the properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed ordinance no. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer cant release it because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. May 7, 1993 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB decided to follow the order of Judge Allarde. Issues and Ratio 1. WON the garnishment of the funds of the City if Caloocan still needed authority of the Mayor to be released NO

Jose Nessia v. Jesus Fermin Petition for review of the decision of CA, 1993 FACTS: 1993: Respondent Mayor Fermin of Victorias, Negros Occidental, ignored deliberately and refused incessantly to reimburse travel expenses incurred by petitioner Nessia, then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias. Hence, the latter filed this complaint to recover damages and reimbursement of expenses. Petitioner further asserts that vouchers were ignored because he defied the Mayors request to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections. Respondent claims that he never received any vouchers indicating expenses. And even if he did, they wouldnt be approved for payment because they were submitted late and was in excess of the budgetary appropriations. Municipality of Victorias sided with Fermin. Nessia filed a complaint against Fermin & Municipality of Victorias. Trial court ruled in favor of Nessia. According to the RTC, Fermins secretary received the vouchers & even if he did not actually receive them, he would still be liable because he should have made inquiries upon receipt of Nessias follow-up letters. Municipality of Victorias did not appeal while Fermin & Nessia appealed to the CA. Nessia prayed for an increase in the award of moral & exemplary damages while Fermin sought to be absolved from liability. CA dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. According to the CA, Fermin acted on the vouchers as proven by his denial/refusal of Nessias claims. No proof that he actually received the vouchers and even if he did, he could have not acted on them because they were submitted late & not supported by an appropriation. ISSUE: WON respondents inaction on Nessias claim is punishable HELD: Petition granted. Trial courts decision granted and reaffirmed. RATIO: Yes, respondent Mayor may be held liable for damages under Art.27 for malicious and unjust inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. This is in lieu of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which penalizes neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, w/ o sufficient justification, to act w/in a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of discriminating against any interested party. Public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. Even if he could have not possibly paid for the claims due to lack of appropriation, he should have done something about it. CA did not exactly absolve the Municipality of Victorias. It should be noted that a non-appellant cannot, on appeal, seek an affirmative relief. Its exoneration was a mere consequence of the dismissal of the case. Besides, this is immaterial at this point due to the SCs decision.

Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a 3rd person., or money owed by such 3rd person or garnishee to the defendant. RULE: All government funds deposited in PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government remains government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Based on consideration of Public Policy. State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. EXCEPTION: When there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a case monetary judgement may be legally enforced by judicial process. Pasay City Government vs. CFI of Manila government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from execution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for the payment of the Citys obligation. Ordinance no. 0143 was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The sum that was indicated in the ordinance was deemed automatically segregated from other budgetary allocation of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys monetary obligation to her. A valid appropriation lifts its exemption from execution. The appropriation was duly signed and approved by the council and the mayor. 2. WON the levy and sale at public auction of 3 motor vehicles owned by the City cannot be attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a money judgement against the City of Caloocan. MOOT CASE Judge Allarde already the levy on the three vehicles thereby formally discharging them from the jurisdiction of this court. 3. WON the auction of the vehicle was valid. YES Sheriff complied with the rules on public auction and the administrative complaint acknowledges that fact. Petitioner cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction sale.

City of Caloocan vs. Allarde [September 10, 2003] Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: In 1972 Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via the ordinace no. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition and in 1973 the CFI declared that it was illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back

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1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.

13 Republic v. Feliciano FACTS: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. ISSUE: WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land RULING: NO RATIONALE: A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Addtl: Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23,

14 Phil Agila Satellite v. Lichauco FACTS: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding1 (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28, 1996. When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial payment. When they requested the Land banks confirmation of its participation in a club loan for the governments assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco sent a letter to the bank controverting the said assignment, clearly stating that orbital slot 153E can no longer be assigned to PASI. She subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including 153E in December 1997. PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn that another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153E, filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint7 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages. PASI filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Because a prejudicial question was found by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was dismissed and reconsideration was denied by Order dated

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July 17, 1998. Hence, PASI is in petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint. ISSUE: WON there exists a prejudicial question, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the dismissal of the complaint on that account is in order RULING: Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder of the orbital lot 153E is, in the civil case declared valid for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer. It would sanction the extiguishment of the criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a vis Article 90 and 91 of the RPC. The Order dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 dated July 17, 1998 against Lichauco was set aside. The Ombudsman was Ordered to reinstate the case for further proceedings. RATIONALE: When a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury caused by him is his own personal liability and cannot be imputed to the State. (p.34, Political Law, Isagani Cruz) Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari. ISSUE: WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) involving a money claim against the government, predicated on a contract is valid RULING: No. RATIONALE: the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State ... . In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity." Once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.

15 SAYSON v. SINGSON FACTS: "In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro a representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the

16 Republic v. Purisima Facts: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: WON the respondents decision is valid

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Ruling: No. Rationale: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building. The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. Nothing was found in the record which would justify increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this the Court thinks there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. The Court, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075. The petitioner vis--vis Act No. 2457 effective February 3, 1915 was authorized to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General to appear in said suit. Issue: WON the scope of the Act authorizes the Court to hold that the Government is legally liable for the said amount Ruling: No Rationale: Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.) Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and

17 E. Meritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands Facts: This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause. The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. The plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent

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that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.) According to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.) 18 PNB v. CIR Facts: Petitioners motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character." The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970." 5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition. Issue: WON the funds mentioned may be garnished Ruling: No Rationale: National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations 6 is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended." In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 8 this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. 19 SSS v. CA Facts: Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Rizal covered by TCT No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as collateral. Pursuant to this real estate ban said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to P48,000.00 covering the aforementioned property as shown in their mortgage contract. The plaintiffs complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first five (5) days of the month. On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date. Pursuant to this application for foreclosure, the notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property. After this first publication of the notice, and before the second publication of the notice, plaintiff herein thru counsel formally wrote defendant SSS, a letter dated July 19, 1968 and received on the same date by said entity demanding, among others, for SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations. Nothing came out of the telegraphic communications between the parties and the second and third publications of the notice of foreclosure were published successively in the Sunday Chronicle in its issues of July 21 and 28, 1968. On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the

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Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs[(a) P2,500.00 as actual damage;(b) P35,000.00 as moral damage;(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages; and(d) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees]. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Courts judgment but modified it by deducting P5000 to total damages. SSS then filed a petition for review on certiorari alleging: I. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that under Condition No. 10 of the Mortgage contract, which is a self-executing, automatic acceleration clause, all amortizations and obligations of the mortgagors become ipso jure due and demandable if they at any time fail to pay any of the amortizations or interest when due; II. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that a previous notice to the mortgagor was necessary before the mortgage could be foreclosed; III. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, assuming that there was negligence committed by subordinate employees of the SSS in staking 'Socorro C. Cruz' for 'Socorro J. Cruz' as the defaulting borrower, the fault cannot be attributed to the SSS, much less should the SSS be made liable for their acts done without its knowledge and authority; IV. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no extenuating circumstance to mitigate the liability of petitioner; V. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner is not liable for damages not being a profit-oriented governmental institution but one performing governmental functions petitions. Issue: WON SSS can be held liable for damages Ruling: Yes Rationale: The amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts have come to the courts, there should be no question considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L17874, August 31, 1963). Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can 'sue and be sued in any court' is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners. 20. BENITO E. LIM, as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Arsenia Enriquez, plaintiffappellant, vs. HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., Attorney General of the United States, and ASAICHI KAGAWA, defendants-appellee, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee. FACTS: The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila. The lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. Alien Property Custodian, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2. On July, 6, 1948 The Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien Property Custodian) under the authority of the same statute, issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4. The Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the United States) and the President of the Philippines, executed two formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines .The transfer agreements were executed. On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. The notice was subsequently amended to permit Lim to prosecute the claim as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Arsenia Enriquez, thus, in effect, substituting the intestate estate as the claimant, it being alleged that the lots were once the property of Arsenia Enriquez. The claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. The claimant Benito E. Lim filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant. As amended, it alleged that the lands in What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between said individual and the System. Under the circumstances of the case, the SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as awarded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Tribunal nor can the SSS be held liable for moral and temperate damages. The filing alone of the foreclosure application should not be a ground for an award of moral damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded civil action is not among the grounds for moral damages. With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside. However, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts, there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS.

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question formerly belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. He stated some reasons in his allegations to prove that Arsenia is the owner of the property. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that the sheriff's sale to Kagawa and the vesting of the properties in the Philippine Alien Property Administrator and the transfer thereof by the United States to the Republic of the Philippines be declared null and void; that Arsenia Enriquez be adjudged owner of the said properties and the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to her. The court ordered the complaint dismissed on the ground as stated in the dispositive part of the order that the "court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, ISSUE: Whether or not Lim has the right to sue or claim for damages against the Republic and Attorney General of the United States. RULING: The immunity of the state from suit, however, cannot be invoked where the action, as in the present case, is instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and of recovering his ownership and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has expressly been given by the United States. (Sec. 3, Philippine Property Act of 1946; Philippine Alien Property Administration vs. Castelo, et al., 89 Phil., 568.) The order of dismissal, however, with respect to plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant Attorney General of the United States must be upheld. The relief available to a person claiming enemy property which has been vested by the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is limited to those expressly provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which does not include a suit for damages for the use of such vested property. That action, as held by this Court in the Castelo case just cited, is not one of those authorized under the Act which may be instituted in the appropriate courts of the Philippines under the provisions of section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Congressional consent to such suit has not been granted. The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise, cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government. Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed. On the other hand, plaintiff in his original complaint made no claim against the Republic and only asked for damages against it for the use of the property when the complaint was amended. In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from insofar as it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damages against the Attorney General of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, is affirmed, 21. FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINOMALONG petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, Lingayen Branch 11, respondents FACTS: The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages. Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. The Malong spouses appealed to the Court . ISSUE: Whether or not the PNR is cannot be sue or sued because its a governmental instrument? RULING: The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune from suit.The PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50year term. The Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. The Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court. We hold that in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. But the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the State. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National Railways. 22. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents FACTS:

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It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities. The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus: . . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132) Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position. Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees? RULING: The liability of the State has two aspects. Namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the 15ortuous acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ). In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the 15ortuous acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the aforequoted 15ortuous15 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The States agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said officials usual governmental functions. If the States agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agents tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be governmental in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a proprietary one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the 15ortuous act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees of 20% of the total award. 23. Santiago vs Republic Facts: January 1971 plaintiff Ildefonso Santiago executed a deed of donation to the Bureau of Plant Industry with terms of the donation, to install lighting facilities and water system on the property

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donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974. August 9, 1976 Plaintiff Santiago filed a petition with the Court of first instance of Zamboanga for revocation of the property donated because the 16one failed to comply with the terms and conditions aforementioned. Respondents asked for the dismissal of the case in lieu with the principle that the state may not be sued without its consent. The court decided in favor of the accused and dismissed the case. Issue: Whether or not state can claim immunity if it violated the conditions of a donation. Ruling: No, the state cannot claim immunity if it violated the conditions of a donation. Rationale: The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Here, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being presumed. Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the 16one, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power. Decision of lower court is reversed and set aside. 24. Amigable vs Cuenca Facts: Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925." March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959. Petitioner filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways. The lower court decided in favor of the Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. Judgement is set reversed and set aside. 25. Torio vs Fontanilla Facts: Municipality of Malasiqui passed resolution number 159 to manage the 1959 town fiesta. Jose macaraeg was appointed as chairman of the committee concerning the entertainment and construction of stage for the said event. The committee constructed two stages for the event, one for the sarzuela and the other for cancionan, bamboo were used for the construction of both. defendant and further stated that It did not have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Issue: Whether or not the state is immune from the suit charged. Ruling: No, the state is not immune with regards to the suit charged. Rationale: Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. Heirs of the deceased filed a complaint against the municipality of malasiqui, municipal council and all the members thereof. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. Trial court ruled that the defendants exercised diligence of a good father of a family and therefore they are not liable for damages as the undertaking was not for profit. Appellate court

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reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanill. Issue: Whether or not the municipality and its councilors are liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Ruling: The municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla, however the councilors acted as mere agents of the municipality thus are not liable. Rationale: We hold that of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . . Issue: When it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior applies." 26. The Holy See vs Hon. Rosario Jr. Facts: Parcel of Land was donated by the archdiocese of Manila to the Holy See for the Construction of a residence of the Pope located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. The said parcel of land was adjacent to the parcel of lands registered to the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). Whether or not petitioner is correct in claiming sovereign immunity being a foreign state and on behalf of the Papal Nuncio. Ruling: Yes, petitioner has sovereign immunity from suit. Rationale: As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilo and assigned his rights over the property to Star Bright Sales Enterprises, inc and informed the sellers of the said assignment. Thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Private respondent counter proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash. Private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana. Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. Private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and asserts its sovereign immunity from suit but the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question"

April 17, 1988 - Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters with the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same.

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii:

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(1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949] (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]) (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects 1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines. 2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners stating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties The said company filed a suit against United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy to order the latter to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. Herein petitioner raised the question of jurisdiction for the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint. They also filed a motion to dismiss the case. The lower court denied the motion and issued the writ prayed by edigio de Guzman & Co., inc. Issue: Whether or not the defendant-appellant U.S.A has immunity from suit. Ruling: The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the land for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint Petition is granted and decision of the lower court is set aside. The Petitioner has sovereign immunity. Yes, the U.S.A has immunity from suit in the said case. Rationale: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. The land in question was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

27. U.S.A vs Ruiz Facts:

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contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act Judgment of lower court is reversed and set aside. Ruling: The answer depends on each and every case involved. Rationale: 28. U.S.A vs Guinto Facts: Several cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges. In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file Ms complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual petitioners. In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13 While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. 16 Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of their wounds. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity is applicable on the said cases.

In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs

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The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED. 2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED. 3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent. 4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED. 29. Minucher Vs C.A Facts: Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines. May 13, 1986 Minucher came to know Arthur Scalzo private defendant which expressed his interest in buying caviar. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was the business of Minucher after Khoemeni government cut his pensions. Upon knowing that defendant was working in the US embassy in the Philippines as special agent of Drug Enforcement Administration expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. May 26, 1986 - defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. May 27, 1986 defendant visited petitioner for the payment for the visa. A while later the defendant was with a few Americans and arrested petitioner for drug trafficking. The petitioners arrest as heroin trafficker was well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. The arrest of defendant was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news. Minucher filed a case in the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. RTC denied the motion. Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction in this court(SC) but was referred to the C.A. asking that the complaint by minucher be dismissed. C.A. sustained diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. S.C reversed the decision of C.A. and ordered the continuance of the trial and ordered the trial court to decide on the case. RTC ruled he should still be liable for the damages although he is an agent entitled to immunity for it is committed outside his official duties. C.A. reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Issue: Whether or not whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. Ruling: Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. Rationale: Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal

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capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. Decision of C.A. is affirmed. Defendant has immunity. 30. Republic of Indonesia vs Vinson Facts: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. Petitioners informed respondents that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Respondents claim that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence respondent filed a complaint. Petitoner being the accused at that time filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement: Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines. Respondents opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. C.A. affirmed the trial courts decision. Issue: Whether or a stipulation in a Maintenance Agreement can waive the states immunity from suit. Ruling: No, the stipulation in an agreement cannot be a waiver of immunity from suit. Rationale: Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii. Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides: xxx 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

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The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein. Petition is granted. Decision of lower court is reversed and set aside. any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed. Summary: Altajeros vs. Commission on Elections (GR 163256, 10 November 2004) Altajeros vs. Commission on Elections [GR 163256, 10 November 2004] En Banc, Azcuna (J): 10 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2 on official leave, 1 on leave Facts: Ciceron P. Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections. On 15 January 2004, Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Altajeros on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country. Almie, et. al. alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of Immigration dated 25 June 2001, Altajeros was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration E139507 issued on 3 November 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. On 26 January 2004, Altajeros filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as 17 December 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act 8171. Thus, Altajeros claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Altajeros sought the dismissal of the petition. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of the case, recommended that Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections; on the ground that Altajeros failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship inasmuch as he has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the

Summary: Tecson vs. Commission on Elections (GR 151434, 3 March 2004) Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]; also Velez vs. Poe [GR 161823] and Fornier vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151824] En Banc, 1 concurs, 5 concur in separate opinions, 1 on leave but allowed to vote, 1 on official leave, 3 dissent in separate opinions to which 2 joined Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform

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Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In its Resolution promulgated on 22 March 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. On 25 March 2004, Altajeros filed a motion for reconsideration. On 7 May 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit. On 10 May 2004, the election day itself, Altajeros filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Altajeros is eligible to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in light of his repatriation under RA 8171. Held: Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 provides that "Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. Herein, Altajeros took his Oath of Allegiance on 17 December 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6 years or on 18 February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on 1 March 2004. Altajeros, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. Republic Act 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of naturalborn Filipinos. The Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists. Accordingly, Altajeross repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. He was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the 10 May 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying Altajeros to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. However, considering that Altajeros failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation,as he submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of the present case. elections, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May 1992." Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 5 (not 7) of Article XVIII of the Transitory Provision of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to. Issue: Whether Aquino and Laurel are the legitimate President and Vice President of the Philippines. Held: The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of 30 June 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government." 3. Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda [GR L-13250, 29 October 1971] En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2 took no part Facts: Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira died in Tangier (North Africa), on 2 January 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. The real estate situated in the Philippines had a market value of P1,109,483.50 and her personal properties also in the Philippines had a value of P396,308.90. On the real estate, Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to Section 122 of the Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira. On appeal the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Collector, without costs. Campos Rueda elevated the case to the Supreme for review. On 30 May 1962, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the reception of evidence or proofs on whether or not the words "bienes muebles", "movables" and "movable property" as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace "intangible personal property", as used in the Tax Code.

Summary: In RE Bermudez (GR 76180, 24 October 1986) In RE Bermudez [GR 76180, 24 October 1986] Resolution En banc, Per curiam: 7 concur Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, Saturnino V. Bermudez, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the 7 February 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of

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On 30 October 1957, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the action taken by the Collector of the Internal Revenue, holding that the element of reciprocity was not lacking based on copies of Tangier legislation. The CTA held that "the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code." The Collector appealed. Issue: Whether Tangier qualifies as a foreign country to which Section 122 of the Tax Code would apply. Held: If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. EHerein, even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the Collector of Internal Revenue has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that 4 days after the filing of the present petition on 6 January 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, that Section 122 of the Tax Code does not require that the "foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its terms. Thus, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.