a> RTTUZYUW RUHHABAOGE7 3322356-UUUU-=RUEONBA. \ 4 ang uuu ae] & 8 2623352 NOV 67 b Fw CINCPACAF > She7, OT 88 70 _RUWJGMA/USAFTFWC NELLIS AFB NEV —INEO_RUEONBA/T. ae UNCLaS OiPE SUBJ; DECLASSIFICATION OF PACAF E&R REPORT NO 63. de REFERENCE TAC (O10T) 2619532 NOV 67+ SAME SUBJECT. 2. PACAF EaR REPORT NO 63 IS DOWNGRADED TO. UNCLASSIFIED WHEN INFORMATION CITED BELOW IS DELTED. As PAGE 1. PARA BEGINNING "ON 20. AUG 66°ee0" IN ENTIRETY. 5+ PASE 5 SECOND PARA IN ENTIRETY. Ce PAGE 5S» FOURTH PARAr FOURTH SENTENCE, ALL AFTER "I ALMOST PANICKED BECAUSE I COULDN'T RECALL ITt. Os PAGE Sy FIFTH PARAr LINES 4 AND Sr "FROM THE CARRIER ORISKANY'. PAGE 6 THIRD PARA? LINES 1 AND 2+ 110 MINUTES* AND "FROM THE CARRIER KEARSARGEs ar Fs PAGE 8. ITEMS 9B AND 10. NNN J—a1er9 ~}ae : ON CRA SEI IE Ss c 3 (a = PACAF EVASION AND RECOVERY REPORT < Name: HAWKS, Edwin T. Jr. Grade: Captain, USAF Woe Position: Aircraft Commander Type A AbmRE-AC Ea Previous Sorvia/EuE Baperience: USAF Eurvival Echool, Ftead AFB; as ’ r i ‘an fon Nhut AB, RVN. 4 AEA BEE BIS 2 MeV Cs 76 LS THE Meas GBM “Aftor ejection of our Tth or 8th cartridge it appeared that we were hit in the lower aft right center of the fuselage with a dull hollow piercing sound. Immediately upon hearing this sound the aircraft lurched forward, down, out of control and the entire aircraft burst into flames, Communications were impossible between the acft cmdr and the pilot, and nothing could be seen but fire, The actt was out of control, seemed to be going straight down or ina epin, .I was pulling both negative and positive G's and I was bouncing around inside the cockpit. All this happened very quickly, probably within three seconds. f “T reached for the face curtain handle and immediately realized I couldn't reach {t, my left hand grasped the alternate handle and I pulled it upward. Before I left the acft, it seemed like I was falling straight down in @ big bucket of flames: I never thought I could get.out. Behind me the fire 7 pe PED cx . CLE <<»was very intense. I don't see how the rear seat pilot could have gotten out; of course, this is pure speculation. My reaction waa quick and I just barely made it out in time. PART It ‘The ejection was good, and apparently normal, When T'was conscious that I was out of the cockpit, descending in the chute I couldn't really believe that I got out of the cockpit. I had no vision for the first half of the dascent, ... probably for § to 7 seconds, and then began to return but was blurred. A few seconds later my vision was almost normal. Loss of my vision was apparently: from the G's and wind blast during the ejection. When my vision cleared I was facing, I think, Eouth, and:could see what may have been the fire from the cragh, however, there were some napalm strikes in this area. It seemed to encompass an area a half mile wide by a half to two miles long, all over the ground. My helmet was crooked on my head, the oxygen mask was choking me and the chinstrap was unfastened. I righted my helmet, adjusted the oxygen mask and fastened the chin strap. I began to try to focus on the horizon to see what; little. [could pee. .I never thought to deploy the seat kit because my first thought. was: that I'd be hitting the ground almost immediately. theta chan Dy : ii , 8a dar. had been conscious about 12 to 15.seconds... I reached for the.risers, put.my feet together, buckled my knees and.at.that time I hit ina thicket. I. « could not see the ground as I went down. I did deploy LPU just before hitting the ground. I Janded in a thicket approximately 5 ft high; it was forest undergrowth which cushioned my impact with the ground. I landed on my back . and was not-really.hurt at all. My right shoulder was sore and badly bruised, possibly from. hitting the canopy rail during ejection, and my right instep was badly bruised, I had picked up some burns on my left wrist and the. back of my. ; neck andieare where the helmet had not covered, before ejection. $ ‘ ‘ ; PART Iv- "[ had apparently landed 2-400 ft up from a valley and could see downwards. T could hear Vietnamese down in the valley. The voices seemed to be about one mile away; the crash site was approximately two miles away and I could see the flames, at times reflecting on the haze layer, I stayed on my back, tried to determine if I was injured, and started to pull the parachute down below the , thicket. I had difficulty getting out of the harness because my shoulder was badly bruised, I disconnected the oxygen mask from the lead on the harne This is very important: the oxygen supply from the bailout bottle was very nolsyy"The sound could be heard some distance away because the forest was very dark and quiet. ,.I tried to cover it up, stuffed it with leaves and tried to