this month sees the 350th I anniversary of the death of Gas- ar de Guzman, Count-Duke of Olivares, Philip IV of Spain’s first min- ister from 1622 to 1643. Olivares is, considered by many to be Spain's most important minister in the seven: teenth century. He has been the sub- ject of a magisterial biography by J.H. Elliott and is a surefire bet for an ‘A level question most summers. How- 30 LERMA BEFORE In the saddle? Rubens’ portrait of the Duke of Lerma shows him in majestic mode, Was he as lazy and venal as some of Olivares’ apologists have arguwed? ever, the attention that has been focused on Olivares is surprising since he was a failure, and he failed on a monumental scale. The very thing he set out to prevent, th decline of Spain, he actually accele ated. What is also surprising is that he has completely overshadowed. his predecessor, the Duke of Lerma, Philip II's first minister from 1598 to 1618, who was a success; he adopted a realistic peace policy which better reflected Spain’s interests, while at the same time maintaining Spanish prestige at a high level. Why then has Olivares attracted so much attention? The Count-Duke, as he was known, was not a very attrac- tive figure ~ in both senses of the phrase: he was corpulent, moody, fre- quently rude and not a very clear thinker. However, he had an incredi- ble capacity for hard work and is reputed to have driven several secre ries to an early grave. He had a grandiose concept of his country’s greatness and embraced both domes- tic reform and a forward foreign poli- cy in order to shore up Spain's posi tion which he, along with other contemporaries, felt was slipping, For his efforts he has been described (by Braudel) as ‘very nearly a great man’ who only failed by a “hair's breadth" (Elliott). But his belligerent foreign policy and his attempts to spread the financial burden throughout Spain's territories were based on fundamen- tal_misunderstandings of Spain's position, At the beginnin of the seventeenth century the Spanish monarchy (the title ‘empire’ should strictly be reserved for the Holy Roman Empire only) was the foremost power in Europe, if not the world, with territo- ry all round the globe from the Philip- pines to Peru, In Europe, Spain con- trolled the Iberian peninsula in its entirety, dominated the western Mediterranean and ltaly (ruling directly in Milan, Naples and Sicily) and held on to a substantial portion of its Burguadian inheritance in the north, the Netherlands (roughly mod- ern-day Belgium, Luxemburg and Burgundy). But ail this had accrued to the Spanish Habsburgs quite fortu- itously, by marriage, by dynastic inheritance. The monarchy had thus come about by accident. Because it was a patchwork of different jurisclic- tions, it was difficult to govern, and because it was geographically dis- persed, it was difficult to defe vast territory brou; wealth and population, and in the sixteenth century Spain had enjoyedOLIVARES a period of artificial predominance while France had sunk into religious civil war The Spanish position, then, was extremely tenuous and Philip Il (1556-98) had already put an enor- ‘mous strain on the monarchy by pro voking former subjects, the Dutch, into rebellion and by fighting wars with both France and. England. Castile, which bore the principal bur- den of this forward foreign policy, could ill afford it and much of the monarchy's costs were met by bor- rowing, By 1598 the cumulative debt was 85 million ducats; by the time Olivares came to power it was up to 120 million. This debt principally took the form of juros, government bonds, which required a pay-out of about 4 per cent per annum (thus ¢.4 million in 1598, 514 million in the 1620s), Clearly the Spanish monarchy could not afford a forward foreign policy and yet this is what Olivares pursued. Admittedly he inherited par- ipation in the Thirty Years’ War and the renewal of warfare with the Dutch from his uncle ZiiAiga, but he showed little inclination to make peace and even extended the warfare by getting, involved in an Italian dispute (the Mantuan War, 1628-31) and by pro- voking war with France (1635). The latter was a disaster and opened up new fronts in Flanders, Franche Comté, Italy and the Pyrences, Olivares had begun his: ministry with high hopes of reform but most of the schemes = a uniform tax, a national bank, etc. came to nought. Reform offended too many vested interests. However, one reforming theme he remained true to, unity. He was determined to spread the burden of defence across all the monarchy since Castile with approx mately one third of the monarchy 15 million population provided about 75 per cent of the revenue, The Count-Duke’s plans took concrete form in the Union of Arms launched in 1625. The idea was that all the components of the monarchy would provide soldiers on a pro rata basis. However, this in practice became a money payment. Olivares had some Graham Darby argues the case for rehabilitating the reputation of one of 17th-century Spain’s chief ministers. success with this, particularly in the New World and in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, but ultimately it had disastrous consequences for it led to the revolt of both Catalonia and Portugal in 1640 (and Naples and Sicily in 1647) and the near disint gration of the monarchy. As disaster followed upon disaster Olivares was forced to resign (in 1643) and he died two years later, a broken man, By the 1640s Spain had lost its leading position in Europe and although the issue of primacy of place remained in the balance for several more decades, Olivares must shoul- der much of the blame for this los: His inability to make peace and his grandiose schemes showed little appreciation of the vulnerable nature of both the monarchy’s finances and its territories. These charges could not be levelled at the Duke of Lerm: Indeed it was perhaps Olivares’ fear ‘of comparison with Lerma, who had been accused of selling Spain short, that prevented him from making a compromise peace with cither the Dutch or the French. Francisco Gomez de Sandoval y Rojas, Sth Marquis of Denia and Ist Duke of Lerma, came from an illustri ‘ous but impoverished Castilian fam ly. He was born in 1553 in Tordesillas and in his early life had shown a Strong. inclination to. enter the church, a theme he constantly returned to throughout his long min: isterial career. Lerma is a difficult sub- ject to study because he was not much in the habit of putting pen to paper and in any event what papers there were, were confiscated in the reign of Philip IV when a prosecution was mounted. He has been accused of laziness, but this is to misunder- stand the way he worked, He mainly operated by word of mouth, behind the scenes. Contemporaries passed. ‘comment on his great charm and tact and foreign diplomats were struck by his lack of arrogance However, Lerma remains a shad. owy figure whose reputation has been largely moulded by the subse- quent distortions of the Olivares fac tion which sought to discredit him Accordingly, historians have concen- trated on his greed (he amassed a for- tune of many millions of ducats) and his nepotism whereby he placed fami: ly (and friends) in high places regard- less of their suitability for the job. However, his wish to build up the fortunes of an impoverished family are understandable and the establish ment of a clientage system could just as easily be described as the adept application of political patronage. Where patronage ended and corrup- tion began in the seventeenth century is not altogether clear. Moreover, some family members, as in any fami- ly, were not close allies; for instance, erma’s uncle, whom he made Arch- bishop of Toledo, was a constant crit- ic. And indeed subsequent ministers Little man? A 1605 portrait of Philip I, to whom Lerma was arguably the father he never had, 31who adopted Lerma’s methods, such as the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin in France and of course (though he would have us believe otherwise) Olivares, do not seem to have attracted the same sort of criti- cism, Lerma was at least a kindly man who treated those he removed with some generosity; this cannot be said of Olivares, who was quite vindictive. In 1612 Philip Ul stated: Since I have known the Duke of Lerma, Thave seen him serve the king my father and lord, who is in heaven, and myself with such satisfaction on the part of both of us that I have found myself to be daily more satisfied with the good account that he gives of ever thing that | entrust 10 him. Because of this, and because of the help that he gives me with the weight of affairs, | ‘order you to fulfil all that the duke tells and orders you to do... and although it has been understood thus since 1 succeeded to these kingdoms, I have ordered and encharge it now erma owed his position, as did Olivares, entirely to his close tionship with the king. He was the valido or royal favourite. Philip IIL had not had a close relationship with his father ~ indeed the aloof Philip Il had remarked: “God, who has given me so many kingdoms, has denied me a son capable of ruling them’. It is, not difficult to imagine the psycho- logical damage such remarks would have on his son. Indeed, in many ways Lerma, who was twenty-five cars older, was the father that Philip never really had, a factor borne out by the intimacy of their correspon dence. Initially though, the duke did not have complete control over gov- ernment policy. It took time to build up his influence, Ar the beginning of his reign Philip revived conciliar gov- ‘ernment (the councils were dominat- ed by Philip II's experienced advisers) and wished (0 be the master of policy himselE, Philip was determined to cut a fig- ure on the European stage by some great victory but his initial steps were stymied by the catastrophic plague that literally decimated the Castilian population (600,000 died), by ten- sion with France and by the complie: tions engendered by the sovereignty of the Netherlands which his father ad transferred to Archduke Albert id Archduchess Isabela (Philip HIT half-sister), Although their sovereign. ty never amounted to a great deal, it did at the outset serve to complicate the ongoing wars with the Dutch and England. Their influence had to be overcome and Philip had to establish Folie de grandeur: Velasquez’ portrait of Gaspar de Gurman, Count-Duke of Olivares, Lerma’s successor as chief ‘minister to the Spanish the decline of Spain hhad possibly che ‘opposite effect and ‘compared ‘unfavourably with the zmore modest jeavours of Lerma. his authority, prior to the conduct of a coherent policy In 1601 Philip decided upon wo grand strategies; a despatched to crush the pirates of Algiers and another was despatched to Ireland in support of the Irish rebels and his half-sister Isabela’s claim to the English throne. However, both ended in disaster, Th armada to Algiers was turned back by the weather and the one to Ireland ended in defeat. The Irish rebels were all but beaten prior to arrival and the Spanish had to surrender at Kinsale in 1602. A projected invasion of Eng- land in that year was also thwarted and two further attempts on Algiers did not even leave port. The failure of these enterprises. is important because there is no doubt the demor- alisation they brought on Philip IIL was Lerma’s opportunity to take over and mould foreign policy completely. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 and there was a smooth tran: tion from Tudor to Stuart, the whole raison d’étre for the war with Eng- land disappeared and Lerma was able to prevail upon the king to make peace. The Treaty of London was signed in 1604 despite opposition. Lerma now turned his attention to making peace with the Dutch rebels and the success of General Spinola in capturing Ostend in 1604 ultimately persuaded the Dutch that a cessation of hostilities. made sense. From Spain’s point of view the dire finan- ial situation made peace almost the only option. The continuation of a forward foreign policy in the carly years of Philip I's reiga led to a bankruptcy (in effect the conversion of short-term loans into long-term in 1607 just eleven years after the previous one (despite massive debasement of the coinage by Lerma) Negotiations with the Dutch really made headway in 1606; a ceasefire was arranged in 1607 and a Twelve Year Truce was signed in 1609. The terms of the truce which seemed to concede everything to the Dutch and nothing to Spain were considered humiliation even by the king and caused an outcry in Spain. Lerma had to work very hard to get the agree ment accepted. In truth the poor terms were not his fault since Arch- duke Albert botched the negotiations by conceding liberty to the Dutch without receiving anything in return. Itwas to become an obsession of Oli vares when in office that he had to improve upon these truce terms to point up the contrast between the two regimes. However, this proved