PLDT vs CA G.R. No.

L-57079 September 29, 1989 Facts: A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation was due to the installation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and any warning signs. As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also damaged. PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges that L.R. Barte and company acting as an independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavation was performed by them. As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performing their work, and that it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans. Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages. Upon respondents second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following he decision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages. Issue: Whether or not PLDT is liable Held: NO We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of

Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987 FACTS: Respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving on his way home from a cocktail-and-dinner party, from which he had a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati when allegedly his car headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic. It also did not have any lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. Due to the event therefore the herein private respondent filed an action for Damages on the grounds that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Phoenix had allowed its truck to be parked. Petitioners defense: that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel. Intermediate Appellate Court confirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Phoenixs negligence is the proximate cause? HELD: YES. We agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987 VICENTE VERGARA, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON Facts: An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22. In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private respondent) and that the said accident was an act of God for which he cannot be held liable. Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third party defendant insurance company. Petitioner

asked that the latter be ordered to pay him whatever amount he may be ordered by the court to pay to the private respondent. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, to the private, respondent. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Held: Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or negligence is not tenable. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner. The issue of whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed upon by the trial court. The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver. Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence on the part of the petitioner, the petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is untenable. RCPI VS. CA G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991 Facts: Spouses Timan through RCPI sent a telegram, in order to express their condolences for the death of the mother-in-law of their cousins Mr. and Mrs. Midoranda. The telegram, however, was written in a Happy Birthday card and inserted in a Christmasgram envelope.

The spouses Timan, filed an action against RCPI in order to claim damages for the ridicule, contempt and humiliation that the latter caused to the private respondents. RCPI in its defense alleges that the "error" in the social form used does not come within the ambit of fraud, malice or bad faith as understood/defined under the law. Court rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Timan. Issue: Whether or not RCPI should be held liable HELD: YES We fully agree with the appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's conclusion that RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is engaged in a business affected with public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of diligence expected of it in the performance of its obligation. In the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. Precisely, it is denominated "telegram of condolence" because it tenders sympathy and offers to share another's grief. It seems out of this world, therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not only render violence to good taste and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings. They ridicule the deceased's loved ones and destroy the atmosphere of grief and respect for the departed.

Pantranco North Express, Inc vs Baesa G.R. 7905051| November 14, 1989 FACTS The spouses Baesa, their four children, the Ico spouses, the latters son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses. The jeep was driven by David Ico. Upon reaching the highway, the jeep turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for one daughter, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, the surviving daughter, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Icos (the driver)alleged negligence as a proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC ruled in favor of Baesa, which was upheld by the CA The petitioner now contends that the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of the last clear chance against the jeepney driver. Petitioner contends that under the circumstances,

it was the driver of the jeep who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Does the last clear chance doctrine apply? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of a prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages. It is the petitioners position that even assuming arguendo, that the bus encroached into the lane of the jeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the jeepney towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his right without danger to himself or his passengers. This is untenable For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction. Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. The Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

CHINA AIR LINES, LTD., petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PAGSIBIGAN, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO ESPIRITU, respondents. G.R. No. 45985 May 18, 1990 FACTS: Jose Pagsibagan, General Manager of Rentokil (Phil.) Inc. purchased an airline ticket for Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila with Philippine Airlines which at that time was a sales and ticketing agent of China Air Lines.

His plane ticket indicated that he is booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart from Manila for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 17:20 hours (5:20 p.m.) as issued by PAL, through its ticketing clerk defendant Roberto Espiritu. One hour before his flight, Pagsibagan was informed that Flight No. 812 bound to Taipei had already left at 10:20. PAL employees made appropriate arrangements for the former to take the next flight to Taipei the following day, to which he arrived around noontime. Jose Pagsibagan filed a complaint for damages, alleging further the negligence of Roberto Espiritu. PAL on its defense alleges that its ticketing office through Roberto Espiritu asked for confirmation from CAL before issuing the ticket to Mr. Pagsibagan, which CAL confirmed. Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims liability for the negligence and incompetence of the employees of PAL. Moreover, CAL avers that it had properly notified PAL of the flight schedule. Trial Court ruled that PAL and its employee shall indemnify Pagsibagan. However, the complaint is dismissed with respect to CAL. ISSUE: Whether or not CAL shall be rendered liable. HELD: NO. There is indeed no basis whatsoever to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. As hereinbefore stated, the court a quo absolved CAL of any liability for fault or negligence. This finding was shared by respondent court when it concluded that defendant CAL did not contribute to the negligence committed by therein defendants-appellants PAL and Roberto Espiritu. Respondent Pagsibigan insists that CAL was barred from proving that it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. This argument is obviously misplaced. CAL is not the employer of PAL or Espiritu. In Duavit vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 11 we have stressed the need of first establishing the existence of an employer-employee relationship before an employer may be vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.