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On the verge of data revolution. We believe that in the current decade, data will transform the Indian telecom industry the way voice did in the previous decade. Over the next three years, data could more than double in size to a US$14 bn industry, contributing over half the incremental industry revenue and add 500 bp CAGR to an otherwise slowing voice industry. Recent experience from China and datapoints from India, which we analyse in this report, indicate to us that the data story is set to become a reality sooner than current investor expectations. Supply chain problems falling in place. We analyse the entire data access supply chain to identify critical areas of shortage that have so far prevented India from experiencing the Internet/data uptake seen in other parts of the world. Encouragingly, we see signs of easing in almost all these bottlenecks. As the 3G ecosystem develops, we expect all the missing parts to fall into place and trigger data uptake in India. Looking at the China experience and recent datapoints from India, we increase our near-term 3G estimates, leading to a 05% increase to the EPS of Bharti and Idea. Bharti/ Idea could benefit most. We see Bharti and Idea with their higher quality subscriber bases benefiting the most from the impending data revolution. Further, Bharti, with its integrated business model, can benefit from being present in all parts of the data access supply chain. While the companies have gained in recent months from the benign competitive environment in India, the coming quarters could see greater excitement in these stocks as data revenues start contributing materially to the overall business. Our new target prices imply 20% (Rs450) and 40% (Rs95) potential upside, respectively, for Bharti and Idea. We reiterate our OUTPERFORM rating on these stocks. We also look at a blue-sky valuation scenario for Bharti of Rs500 (implying 35% potential upside).
DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND THE STATUS OF NON-US ANALYSTS. U.S. Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
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Figure 5: We see a number of bottlenecks in data supply chain easing (like terrestrial optic fibre bandwidth)
Tot al national bandwidth(GB)
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Figure 6: China has shown the impact of data 84% of incremental revenues in past three years came from data
1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 2 006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014 E 201 5E 3G la unch Dat a acco unted for 84 % of in cremental revenues last 3 yrs RMB bn And expected to contribute 74% to next three yrs incr. 2007-2010 revenue CAGR: With Dat a: 6.4% Without Data: 1.4% 2010-2013 revenue CAGR: With Dat a: 7.3% Without Data: 2.9%
Figure 7: We expect India to follow suit. Data could add 500 bp to the industry revenue CAGR over three years
2,500,00 0 Rs mn ind ustry revenu es And e xpected t o co ntribu te 51% to next 3 yrs incr. reven ues Retail da ta D ata accou nted for 3 3% o f increme ntal re venu es last 3 yrs FY0 8-FY11 C AGR: With Da ta: 12 .4% Withou t Data: 10.1% FY1 1-FY14 C AGR: With Da ta: 13 .2% Withou t Data: 8.5% E nterprise data F ixed line d ata 3G launch Mobile da ta - dongle Mobile da ta - handse t F ixed line voice Mobile vo ice FY3 /08 FY3/0 9 FY3 /10 FY3/11 FY3/1 2 FY3/13 FY3/ 14
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Globally, the telecom industry obtains 35-50% of its revenue from non-voice services. For India this is less than 18%
18%
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Note: The non-voice revenues above includes enterprise/corporate data services Source: Company data, country telecom regulators, Credit Suisse estimates
Going deeper, across various indicators of data penetration, India lags the emerging world. Revenue contribution to both mobile and integrated telcos lower than world average Low data contribution to mobile revenues is well known before the launch of 3G services there was no real mechanism to offer a reasonable data experience to mobile subscribers.
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Figure 11: Indian telcos are yet to enjoy the data revolution of other emerging markets
Non-voice revenue s as % of sales for mobile operato rs 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
54% 42% 39% 34% 34%
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However, what is often missed is the low contribution of data to even integrated telcos. This implies low data penetration even into the enterprise/ corporate segments.
Figure 12: Traditional integrated telcos have 30-50% data revenues, but not in India
Non-voice revenues as % of sales for integrated telecom operators 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% SingTel Optus Singapore Australia AT&T US Maxis PT Telkom China * Malaysia America Movil Bharti Airtel (exAfrica) BSNL
* The China data above is the cumulative of three operators China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom to obtain an overall integrated industry view. Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Low Internet/ broadband penetration Unlike the rapid uptake in mobile voice telephony by India in recent years (penetration 68%), the broadband industry remains a poor cousin of its mobile voice counterpart. Internet penetration is struggling to even reach 10% a third of the world average of 29%. In fact given its size India is actually helping pull down the world average by around 400 bps. Internet penetration in India is struggling to reach even 10%
So ftb an k( J M ax apa n is Ma ) la Vo y da sia fon eU Ve r iz K o Te lko n U ms S e C h l In d Vo ina o da Mo fon e G b ile er m an SK y Te Vo Am le co da fon e ric m a e EM M o (e vil M x-O ne In di a MT S in g ) ap Nor So e ut hA fric AI S Th a ail Bh and ar ti A ir t el
52 % 51% 47% 43% 33%
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Figure 13: Internet penetration in India is far behind the world average
33%
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Note: Based on ITUs definition of Internet user those having used Internet at least once Source: ITU, Internet Worldstats, TRAI, Credit Suisse estimates.
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Figure 15: Data accounted for 84% incremental revenues over past three years for the China telecom industry
1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 3G launch 400 200 2006 2007 2008 2 009 2010 2011E 2012E 201 3E 2014E 2015 E Wireless Da ta - large screen Wireless Da ta - small scree n Wireless Voice Wireline Data Wireline Voice Data accounted for 84% of incremental reve nues la st 3 yrs RMB bn And expected to contribute 74% to next three yrs incr. revenues 2007-2010 revenue CAGR: With Dat a: 6.4% Without Data: 1. 4% 2010-2013 revenue CAGR: With Dat a: 7.3% Without Data: 2. 9%
Figure 16: A chart similar to the above, focusing on the mobile industry alone
1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 2 006 2007 2008 20 09 2010 2011 E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 3G launch Wireless Dat a - large screen Wireless Dat a - small screen Wireless Voice Data accounted for 50% of incremental re venues last 3 yrs RM B bn And expected to contribut e 64% to next three yrs incr. re venues 2007-2 010 revenue CAGR: W it h Data: 11. 2% W it hou t Data: 7.7 % 2010-2 013 revenue CAGR: W it h Data: 10. 0% W it hou t Data: 5.6 %
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Figure 17: India is six years behind China on Internet penetration levels
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However, experience from the mobile penetration trend indicates India is capable of catching up quickly. The gap behind China in terms of mobile penetration shrunk from five years to one year between 2005 and 2009.
Figure 18: Despite late start, India caught up quickly with China on mobile penetration
Mobile uptake showed that India can catch up quickly on new technology adoption
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Note: The chart stops at 2009, as the penetration in India beyond this point is coloured by a surge in duplicate SIMs. Source: Company data, TRAI, Credit Suisse estimates
Importantly, we note that India is only two years behind China in the launch of 3G services. Further, a younger population in India (versus China) lends itself to a better adoption of new technologies.
Expect data to add 500 bp to the industrys CAGR over next three years
One could argue that the data revolution has already started in India in some way, with revenues from non-voice services contributing 33% to the industrys incremental revenues over the last three years (CS estimates). However, this is largely on the back of 2G nonvoice revenue streams like SMS and VAS. With the launch of 3G services, we expect true data services to contribute meaningfully to growth. We expect data to account for 51% of incremental revenues for the industry over the next three years. While data added 230 bp to the industry CAGR over the last three We expect data to account for 51% of incremental revenues for the industry over the next three years.
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years (over and above voice CAGR of 10%), the coming years could likely see data add nearly 470 bp to industry CAGR offsetting a slowdown in voice growth.
Figure 19: Data to contribute to more than half of incremental revenues for the industry
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Rs mn in dustry revenues And expe ct ed to con tribu te 51% to next 3 yrs incr. reven ues Ret ail d ata Data accoun ted for 33 % of incremental re ve nue s last 3 yrs
FY08-FY 11 CAGR: W it h Data: 12.4% W it hout Data: 10. 1% FY11-FY 14 CAGR: W it h Data: 13.2% W it hout Data: 8.5 % En terprise da ta
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PC penetration
Wireline penetration
3G encouraging signals from China Numbers from China show that despite a slow start in the initial months of 3G launch, the uptake is picking up rapidly. While the overall industrys 3G penetration at 7% total subs two years after launch is discouraging, this number is dragged down by China Mobiles constraints of technology TD-SCDMA is patronised by no other operator in the world thus impacting the overall ecosystem (for further details, please read Colin McCallums Chinese Telecoms Sector: Tipping point published on 15 April 2011). The other two operators (which use commercially stronger WCDMA/ EVDO) have achieved 11-16% 3G conversion within 18-23 months. In fact, China Unicom has guided to ~37 mn 3G China Unicom and China Telecom have 11-16% of subscribers on 3G within 1823 months
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subscribers by December 2011 (i.e., 26 months from launch), which would work out to ~19% of total subscribers as per CS analyst Colin McCallums estimates. We note that China Unicom reduced the minimum monthly commitment on its 3G packages from the initial Rmb66 to Rmb46 in December 2010.
Figure 21: China Unicom and China Telecom have seen good 3G conversion rates among subscribers
China Mobile
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Additional details on 3G ARPU (provided only by Unicom as of now) indicate a reasonably high level of ARPU from the initial subscribers. The 3G ARPU is 2x regular 2G ARPU even after crossing the 10% 3G conversion.
Figure 22: China Unicom 3G operating metrics
(Rmb) China Unicom 3G subs as % of total China Unicom 3G ARPU China Unicom 2G ARPU China Mobile Blended ARPU Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Mar-10 3.2 140 59 69 Jun-10 4.8 128 57 74 Sep-10 6.5 124 57 73 Dec-10 8.4 115 55 77 Mar-11 10.6 116 58 66
Positive datapoints on India 3G uptake While it is still early days of 3G in India, initial datapoints and comments by managements indicate good uptake among subscribers. Recent media reports (Business Line) indicate over 9 mn 3G subscriptions countrywide in four months of launch. Bharti management indicated incremental 3G ARPUs of $3-4 at the CS AIC (refer to our note Bharti Airtel: Notes from AIC - pricing power to return soon published on 28 March 2011).
Figure 23: Recent datapoints on 3G uptake in India
Operator Tata Bharti Idea Aircel No. of 3G subs 1.5 mn as of Mar-11 2 mn within 45 days of launch 1 mn within one month of launch % of subs base 1.7 1.2 1.1 Other comments by management Incremental ARPU of US$3-4 Expect 30% conversion in 3-4 years
3G will drive growth through both small screen and large screen access So far we have been quite conservative in our 3G estimates for Indian telcos, building:
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only 15% subscriber conversion three years after launch in 3G spectrum circles; no inter-operator roaming arrangements in circles where there is no spectrum hence no 3G services in these circles; and Rs80 incremental data ARPU (less than US$2).
FY3/11 0 0 FY3/12 6 5 3 80 40 FY3/13 12 10 6 79 40 FY3/14 20 15 9 78 40
Considering the China experience and early indications/comments from India, these assumptions are clearly conservative. We revise our estimates and now expect ~18% of industry subscribers to start subscribing to 3G services by March 2014 (i.e., three years from launch), including an assumption of inter-operator roaming arrangements starting FY13. We also increase near-term 3G ARPU estimates, starting at Rs110 (US$2.4) for the early high-end customers who would convert (and falling off sharply as more customers convert we build 40% ARPU erosion in two years versus 5% earlier). While the mass market data/Internet uptake is expected to be through handset-based access, the PC-based large screen market could also continue to grow, owing to its inherent advantages over the small screen devices. Even here, we expect 3G-based dongles to grow in market share, gaining over the wireline and CDMA 1x options available.
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Figure 25: Retail data revenue breakdown for India telecom industry (by access technology)
FY3/09 Small-screen access SMS+VAS ARPU (Rs) % YoY Revenues (Rs mn) % of mobile revenues % YoY 3G handset based Subs (mn) As % of total mobile subs Incremental data ARPU as % of blended mobile ARPU Revenues (Rs mn) % YoY Large-screen access PC penetration households (%) 3G dongle based Subs (mn) As % of PCs in India ARPU (Rs) % YoY Revenue (Rs mn) % YoY Fixedline DSL Subs (mn) As % of PCs in India ARPU (Rs) % YoY Revenue (Rs mn) % YoY Others (Cable modem, Dial-up) Subs (mn) As % of PCs in India Revenue (Rs mn) % YoY Total retail data market Rs mn Of which 3G % Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 8 18.1 21,577 0.3 133,849 0 8 16.2 21,333 -1.1 159,793 0 8 13.3 21,083 -1.2 206,919 0 9 11.6 21,073 0.0 272,008 14 9 10.3 21,469 1.9 369,560 32 10 9.5 21,882 1.9 450,758 42 5 12.5 488 25,302 8 15.4 463 -5.0 36,035 42.4 10 16.6 440 -5.0 47,330 31.3 14 18.3 352 -20.0 50,813 7.4 18 20.3 282 -20.0 53,499 5.3 22 22.1 225 -20.0 54,567 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5 6.7 317 9,510 15 17.0 254 -20.0 30,432 220.0 30 29.5 203 -20.0 54,778 80.0 3.7 4.2 5.2 6.2 7.2 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44 4.9 110 80.0 29,916 116 12.0 87 64.0 88,269 195.1 186 18.2 69 51.2 134,534 52.4 22 86,970 8.5 0.0 18 -21.2 102,425 9.6 17.8 17 -3.7 138,506 11.6 35.2 16 -6.0 160,696 11.4 16.0 16 -1.3 175,889 11.0 9.5 16 -1.3 184,997 10.7 5.2 FY3/10 FY3/11 FY3/12E FY3/13E FY3/14E FY08-11 CAGR (%) FY11-14 CAGR (%)
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Potential winners We believe that two factors could determine which operators take the lead in 3G conversions: Higher paying subscribers: operators with higher paying subscribers would see quicker 3G conversions in their subscriber bases. In the table below, we see that Bharti, Loop, Vodafone and Idea have ARPUs significantly ahead of the industrys average level, indicating a more lucrative subscriber base. Scale of operations: At the same time, operators with scale can leverage this to provide better services (ex. better negotiation with content providers etc.). On this metric, Bharti, Vodafone, Idea and RCOM score high in terms of revenue market share. Operators with scale and higher paying subs should benefit
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Looking at the above results, we believe that Bharti, Vodafone and Idea (in that order) could be best positioned on the 3G opportunity.
Figure 26: Potential winners in the 3G race
CY2010 ARPU (Rs) 226 198 190 180 147 120 114 110 100 97 76 45 44 23 151 Rank on ARPU 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Revenue market share (%) 31.7 0.6 21.2 13.0 0.0 0.1 8.4 4.6 8.3 11.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 100.0 Rank on RMS 1 8 2 3 14 11 5 7 6 4 10 9 13 12 Subscriber market share (%) 20.0 0.4 16.6 11.0 0.1 0.0 11.0 6.8 12.0 16.8 1.2 2.8 0.3 0.9 100.0 Rank by subscriber mkt share 1 11 3 5 13 14 6 7 4 2 9 8 12 10
Operator Bharti Loop Vodafone Idea Etisalat HFCL TTSL Aircel BSNL/MTNL RCOM Sistema Shyam Uninor S Tel Videocon Industry
Note to maintain uniformity across operators, the ARPU here is derived from the revenue and subscriber figures that operators report to TRAI on a quarterly basis. This could be different from numbers reported to shareholders in some cases. Source: TRAI, Credit Suisse estimates
Where would RIL fit in? We continue to retain our view (please refer to our 8 July 2010 note, Indian Telecom Sector: the night is darkest before dawn) that RILs impact could be limited given it is a late entrant and does not have a 2G business as of now. Further, while an entry by RIL would definitely be large scale, we see little possibility of the launch happening within two years time. In the meantime, with our improved 3G expectations in this note, we are reminded of China Mobiles handicap of having weak 3G technology while competitors with commercially strong 3G technologies are enjoying a significant headstart in the data market RIL has no 3G operations (for further details, please see Colin McCallums Chinese Telecoms Sector: Tipping point, published on 15 April 2011) Further, in our models (which we describe later) we exclude any upside for the companies from the dongle market an area we believe will be the primary area of operation for RIL in the initial years of its launch.
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registered with the Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs would have taken a 100Mbps line at current BSNL rates.
Figure 27: Enterprise data spend in India is below global levels
Ent erprise data spen d a s % o f no n-agricultural GDP 0 .5% 0 .4% 0 .3% 0 .2% 0 .1% 0 .0% Ma la ysia UK Ja pan USA In dia FY3 /14 (CS) India FY3/1 0 0 .39% 0.3 8% 0.33% 0.27 % 0. 20% 0.13 %
Source: Company data, US FCC, Ofcom, Tulip Telecom, CIA World Factbook, Credit Suisse estimates
Potential winners The enterprise data services market is quite concentrated, with the top-three players accounting for a 50% plus market share, and the top-five players having a 75% plus share. The key success factors, in our view, are access to international and national fibre connectivity, good last-mile presence, and (increasingly) managed services capabilities. We believe Bharti Airtel, RCOM and Tulip Telecom have the right strengths as seen in the table below.
Figure 29: Key players in the enterprise data services market
Operator Tata Comm. Bharti Airtel Reliance Comm. BSNL Tulip Telecom Others FY3/10 enterprise data market share (%) Strengths 21 Leading market share in international connectivity 17 Strong presence in international connectivity (access to seven submarine cable systems worldwide), third largest NLD fibre network (~126,000km) and last-mile presence in ~90 cities 14 International connectivity (FLAG), second-largest NLD fibre network (190,000km), fibre connectivity to over 1 mn buildings across 44 cities in India 14 Largest NLD fibre network of ~615,000km, legacy infrastructure being the incumbent fixed-line operator 11 Wide presence across ~2,000 cities through a mix of both fibre and wireless last mile, leader in managed services and MPLS/VPN 23
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expect the mobile voice industry to deliver a 10% CAGR over the next three years, as shown below.
Figure 30: Voice business growth rates to slow down further
Mobile voice Subscribers (mn) Net adds / month (mn) Penetration (%) ARPU (Rs) % YoY Revenues (Rs mn) % YoY Fixed-line voice estimates Subscribers (mn) Revenues (Rs mn) % YoY Total industry voice Revenues (Rs mn) % YoY 1,049,501 21.2 1,077,036 2.6 1,155,157 7.3 1,311,340 13.5 1,416,226 8.0 1,476,046 4.2 10.1 8.5 38 117,794 -8.3 37 108,346 -8.0 36 99,646 -8.0 35 86,726 -13.0 34 75,828 -12.6 33 66,242 -12.6 -8.1 -12.7 FY3/09 390 11 33.6 239 931,707 26.4 FY3/10 581 16 49.4 166 -30.5 968,690 4.0 FY3/11 782 17 65.6 129 -22.4 1,055,511 9.0 FY3/12 902 10 74.6 121 -6.0 1,224,614 16.0 FY3/13 964 5 78.8 120 -1.3 1,340,399 9.5 FY3/14 1,024 5 82.7 118 -1.3 1,409,804 5.2 FY08-FY11 CAGR (%) FY11-FY14 CAGR (%)
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Note: This calculation represents a decision made at the point of adding an incremental carrier of 8 channels to an existing cell site. Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
However, even beyond the revenue-level trade-off shown above, data can add to profitability in many ways: Segmentation: Unlike with a plain voice service where it is difficult to provide different gradations of service and packages data renders itself very well to segmentation to target-specific customer groups. The segmentation could be in the form of size of packages, download speeds etc. Below, is a summary of data tariffs offered by Bharti to its 3G customers. Note that the smaller sized packages which could become the most popular are also the most profitable.
Download limit (MB) 10 65 100 250 600 2,048 At 30p per 20 KB Validity (days) Revenue per MB (Rs/MB) 1 3 30 30 30 30 0.80 0.94 1.01 0.80 0.75 0.37 15.36
Figure 32: 3G data tariffs of Bharti highlights the ability to segment offerings
Pack amount (Rs) 8 61 101 201 450 750 Beyond download limit
Growth sustainability: There is a limit for voice volumes (i.e., the amount of time people talk on their phones). Once the country reaches mature penetration levels, voice revenues may not grow by much. However, the amount of data downloaded by a user could continuously rise as bandwidth requirements of applications increase (the user may still be spending the same time on his phone/laptop). As long as Indian telcos do not offer unlimited download plans (and they have shown this discipline so far on 3G), data services could help sustain growth rates for operators.
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China Mobile data revenues as % of total 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E Data surge t ook off in 2006 it self 3G launched only in 2009 3G conversion less than 5% even aft er two years
The key takeaway from this illustration is that 3G is not synonymous with data growth. 3G happens to be only a part of the data access supply chain. The entire supply chain needs to develop in order for data growth to take place. We extend this thought further in the following chapter.
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Supply constraints exist across the data supply chain but these are easing
Popular perception is that the lack of last-mile access was the key hurdle that telcos were unable to cross in order to drive data/broadband penetration. Hence, the release of 3G spectrum and the subsequent launch of services are considered a panacea for all ills plaguing data uptake in India. However, this is a very narrow view of the industry, in our opinion. Our analysis below shows that supply constraints are glaringly evident across the data services supply chain. We identify the five key parts of the data access supply chain in the chart below, and explore Indias current standing on these parts versus global levels. Encouragingly, we note that the supply bottlenecks seem to be easing in recent years.
Figure 34: The data access supply chain
Supply constraints are glaringly evident across the data services supply chain
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A person accessing the Internet in China has more than 3x the international bandwidth at his disposal compared to a person in India
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While Chinas bandwidth capacity is 3x, as seen above, we note that this is a recent surge in capacity. Bandwidth capacity in China was similar to current Indian levels just three years ago.
Figure 36: Chinas international connectivity has grown hand-in-hand with Internet penetration
1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 b and width mbps Int ern ation al bandwidth up 3 x in the last three years penetra tion %
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What is changing? Data from TRAI shows a surge in new submarine capacity investments out of India with bandwidth going up more 2x in the past 12 months. This is reminiscent of the surge in international bandwidth in China in the run-up to the rise in Internet penetration. An updated bar in Figure 35 would show a value of 5.4 Mbps/10,000 population for India.
Figure 37: Recent surge in international bandwidth as per TRAI data
Total International bandwidth (GB) 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 Mar-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Dec-09 Mar-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 2.2x increase in bandwidth over the last 12M
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The limitation of this metric is that all terrestrial optic fibre cables may not be of the same bandwidth they could range from a single pair of fibres to a cable of 96 pairs. However, our discussion within the telecom industry indicates that for large countries the average bandwidth in the cable works out to 48 pairs of fibre (true even in the case of India). What is changing? Similar to the surge in international fibre, TRAI data shows that the national bandwidth has been rising sharply recently up 2.3x in the past 12 months as seen below.
Figure 39: National terrestrial bandwidth has gone up 2.3x in the past 12 months
Total national bandwidth (GB) 600 500 400 300 200 100 Mar-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Dec-09 Mar-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 2.3x increase in bandwidth over the last 12M
TRAI data shows that the national bandwidth has been rising sharply recently up 2.3x in the past 12 months.
In addition, the government. is drafting the national broadband plan with the intention to roll out optic fibres to all habitation centres with a population of 500 plus over the next three years, at a cost of US$13-14 bn (largely funded from the Universal Service Obligation Fund). While these targets seem aggressive, even a partial achievement on these targets could help improve the terrestrial fibre infrastructure in the country, in our view.
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Based on our analysis, given the lower income levels in India, an entry-level 3G handset for an Indian consumer is 5x more expensive than for his Chinese counterpart.
Figure 40: India does not enjoy cheap device ecosystems like other emerging economies
Ent ry level 3 G ha ndset ASP/GDP per capita 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 8. 8%
An entry-level 3G handset for an Indian consumer is 5x more expensive than for his Chinese counterpart
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Note: We have taken the retail, full value (i.e non-contract) price of the cheapest 3G handset available in a country to prepare the chart below. Wherever data is hard to obtain, we have relied on the inputs from CS analysts in these countries. Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
We believe that a comparison of retail prices for entry-level PCs/notebooks would also have a similar pattern as above since the manufacturing ecosystem for both the categories of devices is weak in India. Case study: Mexico in 2000 Private telcos have addressed the problem of affordable devices by offering easy credit facilities to customers. The features included instantaneous credit approval and low finance costs. Almost 100% of PC sales also generated Internet subscriptions
Figure 41: Mexico: Private sector financing is helping PC sales
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20.0% Telmex launched PC financing scheme with t wo year PC financing. Optional int ernet connection at 25% discount
Service positioning: Instant credit approval, no credit card is required, reasonably priced PCs with low-cost financing; subscription to broadband optional Nearly 100% of PC sales also generated internet subscriptions
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What is changing? Our industry meetings indicate that 35% plus of handsets sold today are 3G enabled. While 3G handsets start at Rs4,500 (US$100) and Smartphones start at Rs9,000 (US$200), these prices are falling and Smartphones at US$100 are expected in about 1218 months. In addition, recent media articles (Business Standard) talk of Indian handset vendors (like Spice Mobiles, Bharti Teletech, Karbonn, Lava) working on low-priced tablet PCs (priced Rs10,000-20,000) to be launched by September 2011. This could stimulate the dongle market, in our view. An important point to note is that India has enjoyed low prices in the GSM handset ecosystem because the GSM market in China had grown to scale already (GSM was the technology followed by China Mobile, the dominant market leader) helping reduce prices of GSM handsets globally. However, there is no common 3G technology in China and globally accepted standards like WCDMA are not used by the dominant leader. It is likely that with India adopting a common WCDMA platform, the related handset industry could benefit from scale too. Our estimate of 44 mn WCDMA subscribers in India within a year of launch is higher than the 37 mn guidance of China Unicom (the only operator using WCDMA in China) two years after launch. The WCDMA handset ecosystem could benefit from the scale that India is expected to offer
An Indian consumers data download costs twice as much as his Chinese counterparts
2% 2%
1.0%
Singap ore
We note that Indian mobile operators who launched 3G services have largely matched the pricing of the prevalent wireline DSL and wireless CDMA dongle tariffs. What we expect to change We believe that the introductory 3G offers where operators have matched existing fixed line/CDMA tariffs are testing grounds for operators. With usage surprising on the upside,
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we would not be surprised to see operators lowering tariffs. In our 3G models, we build 3G ARPUs to fall by 40% plus over the next two years.
However, a similar look at the top websites in India shows a completely different picture. All the top-ten websites accessed by Indians are in English. Of these, only two (#9 and #10 in the table below) are homegrown (also in English). On the other hand, eight out of the top-ten popular websites accessed by Chinese Internet users are homegrown Chinese websites.
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In fact, India seems to be only large economy where Internet users have almost zero local language content.
Figure 45: Distribution of web pages viewed by language
China saw an explosion in local language Internet content accompanying its Internet penetration surge. We believe that a similar content explosion is required for India, to encourage voice subscribers to try accessing the Internet on their phones.
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Figure 46: Chinas Internet usage surge was accompanied by a local content explosion
3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 200 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 20 07 200 8 2009 A n explo sion of Chinese websites attracted new internet use rs No. Chinese websites ('00 0s) penetration % 35 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5% 0%
Case study: Brazil In Brazil, the government gave a massive push to e-governance making this an anchor content for Internet penetration. By 2002, over 70% of government services and 93% of all tax filings were conducted on-line. In 2005-06, the government also offered easy PC financing schemes to retailers, causing an increase in PC penetration.
Figure 47: Brazil: the government provided anchor content for Internet access
350 Individual credit (BRL bn) penetration % 40. 0% 35. 0% 300 2005-06: Govt.'s easy PC financing program to retailers - By 2002, 70% of government services to population provided online - 93% of federal tax filings done online in 2002 30. 0% 25. 0% 20. 0% 15. 0% Some stores saw 400% increase in PC sales 10. 0% within 2 weeks of launch of t he program 5.0% 0.0% 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
250
200
150
100
Internet penetration
What we expect to change This is probably the weakest link in the entire data supply chain for India and suffers from the classic chicken-and-egg problem (content versus Internet penetration). We note here that the telecom operators have tried to stimulate demand through various mobile applications we sample below some of the ~100,000 apps found on Bhartis Airtel App Central. We believe that with the growing Internet ecosystem around 3G services, more content developers would be attracted to develop locally relevant native language content.
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Further, some of the handset vendors intending to bring out low-priced tablets (which we discussed in an earlier section) plan to have localised applications on these tablets to suit Indian needs.
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Topic of interest #3: Will VoIP spell doom for traditional telcos?
Over the long term, data-based communication technologies can threaten the regular voice revenues of traditional telcos. This impact is already being felt by some of the western telecom operators. In a recent survey, our European telecoms team (Justin Funnel, Paul Sidney in their 31 March 2011 note Mobile survey: More evidence of voice cannibalisation) found that 40% of European telcos were seeing cannibalisation of voice revenues by data-based smartphone communication technologies. Thus, voice revenue cannibalisation from new communication streams like VoIP, messaging etc. is a real threat that Indian telcos should be aware of over the longer term. However, we believe that this is not an immediate concern in India, due to the following reasons: Regulations do not allow VoIP calls originating in India to terminate on another phone in India (PC-to-PC calls are fine). In future, the restriction may be relaxed but the government will always be wary of security issues with respect to tracking of calls. Further, while VoIP-VoIP calls are seemingly free, they do consume bandwidth which is paid for. As we show below, the voice calls in mature markets are relatively more expensive, leading to a favourable trade-off towards data communication.
All the above issues could change over the long term it is reasonable to expect: 1) data tariffs to fall (faster than voice tariffs) and 2) smartphones to become cheaper. But that gives telcos enough time to cultivate the data habits of their subscribers so that any loss in voice revenues is overcome by data revenue growth.
2 1 1 0
0 .11 0 .62 0.62
0.10
0.08
0 .04
0.01
India
Malaysia
China
US
UK
Indonesia
Japan
Singapore
Based on entry level monthly 3G data packs offered by leading mobile operators in these countries Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
In addition to low data tariffs, we also need to see the availability of affordable VoIP capable smartphones
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Idea has most exposure to mobile business and hence could have highest upside
Note: 1) The long-distance segment revenues have been included in Others for Bharti (3% of sales) and RCOM (6%),. The split between data and voice revenues in this segment are not available. 2) ILD bandwidth market shares are as per TRAI 2007 data Source: Company data,TRAI, Credit Suisse estimates
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Bharti guidance of $1.9bn for FY12 already builds in a fairly aggressive rollout
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data growth in the market. We raise our target price for Bharti to Rs450 (20% potential upside) and Idea to Rs95 (40% potential upside). We retain our OUTPERFORM ratings on these stocks.
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1M -1.8 4.4
3M 12.9 12.2
Financial and valuation metrics Year Revenue (Rs mn) EBITDA (Rs mn) EBIT (Rs mn) Net income (Rs mn) EPS (CS adj.) (Rs) Change from previous EPS (%) Consensus EPS (Rs) EPS growth (%) P/E (x) Dividend yield (%) EV/EBITDA (x) P/B (x) ROE (%) Net debt/equity (%)
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GPRS uptake
We have earlier discussed that GPRS has been dormant due to a weak data supply chain / ecosystem in the country. Conversely, if the data supply chain improves in a 3G environment, GPRS usage could also take place. This could happen without necessarily cannibalising our 3G data assumption these would be from non-3G customers who are still over 80% of subscriber base even by FY14. In our blue-sky scenario, we build 2G data revenue contributions from 13.3% currently to 17.5% over three years (the contribution to incremental revenues going up from 13.3% to 25%) and steady thereafter. For this we model an additional US$500 mn capex over the next three years (to accommodate an additional 9% 2G network capacity to carry the extra data traffic). With these assumptions, the fair value for the mobile segment (ex. 3G) goes up by Rs26 per share, as shown below If the dormant GPRS usage picks in a improving data ecosystem, we see an additional Rs26 per share addition to fair value
Our current Africa capex estimates are significantly above management guidance
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The price relative chart measures performance against the BOMBAY SE 30 SHARE SENSITIVE index which closed at 18326.09 on 20/05/11 On 20/05/11 the spot exchange rate was Rs44.53/US$1
1M -1.6 4.5
3M 6.1 5.4
Financial and valuation metrics Year Revenue (Rs mn) EBITDA (Rs mn) EBIT (Rs mn) Net income (Rs mn) EPS (CS adj.) (Rs) Change from previous EPS (%) Consensus EPS (Rs) EPS growth (%) P/E (x) Dividend yield (%) EV/EBITDA (x) P/B (x) ROE (%) Net debt/equity (%)
3/10A 124,470.8 34,071.5 13,922.4 9,539.3 3.03 n.a. n.a. -14.5 22.2 0 8.7 1.9 7.7 67.0
3/11E 156,895.4 38,142.0 14,254.6 8,938.1 2.71 -0.1 2.46 -10.6 24.8 0 9.1 1.8 7.6 103.2
3/12E 189,945.0 53,745.9 24,223.9 14,433.3 4.37 1.7 2.37 61.5 15.4 0.4 6.4 1.6 11.1 91.5
3/13E 211,140.9 65,280.0 33,641.5 22,076.2 6.69 4.2 3.95 53.0 10.0 1.2 5.1 1.4 15.1 69.6
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Companies Mentioned (Price as of 20 May 11) Advanced Info Service PCL (ADVA.BK, Bt94.00, NEUTRAL, TP Bt100.00) Axiata Group Berhad (AXIA.KL, RM4.95, OUTPERFORM, TP RM6.25) Bakrie Telecom PT (BTEL.JK, Rp375.00, RESTRICTED [V]) Bharti Airtel Ltd (BRTI.BO, Rs373.70, OUTPERFORM, TP Rs450.00) China Mobile Limited (0941.HK, HK$69.25, NEUTRAL, TP HK$86.00) Excelcomindo Pratama PT (EXCL.JK, Rp6500.00, OUTPERFORM [V], TP Rp7200.00) Far EasTone Telecom (4904.TW, NT$44.00) Globe Telecom Inc (GLO.PS, P853.00, OUTPERFORM, TP P930.00) Hutchison Telecommunications HK Holdings Ltd (0215.HK, HK$2.20, OUTPERFORM, TP HK$2.90) Idea Cellular Ltd (IDEA.BO, Rs67.15, OUTPERFORM [V], TP Rs95.00) LG Uplus (032640.KS, W5,740, NEUTRAL, TP W6,600) M1 Limited (MONE.SI, S$2.44, NEUTRAL, TP S$2.66) Maxis Berhad (MXSC.KL, RM5.40, OUTPERFORM, TP RM6.10) NTT DoCoMo (9437, 146,000, NEUTRAL, TP 150,000, OVERWEIGHT) PT Indosat Tbk (ISAT.JK, Rp5350.00, OUTPERFORM, TP Rp7900.00) PT Telkom (Telekomunikasi Indo.) (TLKM.JK, Rp7650.00, OUTPERFORM, TP Rp9750.00) Reliance Communication Ltd (RLCM.BO, Rs83.85, NEUTRAL [V], TP Rs120.00) Singapore Telecom (STEL.SI, S$3.22, NEUTRAL, TP S$3.62) Sistema (SSAq.L, $26.14, OUTPERFORM [V], TP $36.00) SmarTone Telecom (0315.HK, HK$12.92, UNDERPERFORM, TP HK$12.00) StarHub Ltd (STAR.SI, S$2.75, UNDERPERFORM, TP S$2.31) Taiwan Mobile (3045.TW, NT$75.00) Tata Communications Ltd (TATA.BO, Rs214.45, OUTPERFORM, TP Rs375.00) Total Access Communication PCL (DTAC.BK, Bt55.75, NEUTRAL, TP Bt50.00) True Corp PCL (TRUE.BK, Bt5.05, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP Bt3.30) Vodafone Group (VOD.L, 173.90 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 185.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
Disclosure Appendix
Important Global Disclosures I, Sunil Tirumalai, certify that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names.
3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for BRTI.BO
BRTI.BO Date 8-Jul-08 25-Jul-08 13-Mar-09 24-Jul-09 2-Oct-09 22-Oct-09 25-Jan-10 9-Jul-10 17-Sep-10 6-May-11 Closing Price (Rs) 355.95 398.225 279.35 416.95 435 337.5 331 307.5 359.5 Target Price Initiation/ (Rs) Rating Assumption 462.5 475 425 N 375 U 290 320 N 360 O 415 X
475 463 425 405 U N 375 355 320 305 290 Rs 6-May-11 255 N O 360 415
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3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for IDEA.BO
IDEA.BO Date 8-Jul-08 29-Oct-08 3-Jun-09 27-Jul-09 22-Oct-09 25-Jan-10 9-Jul-10 26-Jan-11 Closing Price (Rs) 85.7 38.75 80.9 79.6 59.75 61.9 66.9 71.6 Target Price Initiation/ (Rs) Rating Assumption 95 60 O 70 N 72.5 45 U 50 75 O 85
106 96 86 N 76 66 56 46 Rs 36 O 60 45 70 73 U 50 75 O 95 85
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23 -M ay -0 23 8 -Ju l-0 8 23 -S ep -0 8 23 -N ov -0 8 23 -Ja n09 23 -M ar2 3 09 -M ay -0 9 23 -Ju l- 0 9 23 -S ep -0 9 23 -N ov -0 9 23 -Ja n-1 0 23 -M ar -10 23 -M ay -1 0 23 -Ju l-1 0 23 -S ep -1 0 23 -N ov -1 0 23 - Ja n23 11 -M ar -1 1
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Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties. See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names. Price Target: (12 months) for (BRTI.BO) Method: We arrive at our TP of Rs450 for Bharti by Discounted cash flow (DCF). We assume a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 12. Our DCF model builds in strong cashflow growth till FY3/15, a 8% medium term growth (FY3/15 - FY3/30) and 3% terminal growth. This includes a Rs24/share value destruction from Zain Africa acquisition Risks: Risks to our 12-month target price of Rs450 for Bharti include 1) TRAI recommendations get implemented 2) increased capex/slower improvement in EBITDA for African operations and 3) increased competitive intensity in the Indian market 4) Slower than expected 3G ramp Price Target: (12 months) for (IDEA.BO) Method: Our 12-month target price of Rs95 for Idea Cellular Limited is based on discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. We assume a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 12. Our DCF model builds a period of strong cashflow growth till FY3/16, and a 3% terminal growth rate and terminal ROIC of 27%. Risks: Risks to our 12-month target price of Rs95 for Idea are: 1) If TRAI's recommendations get implemented, it could negatively impact our fair value estimate by 70% 2) execution risk - Idea is entering new circles, where it is the sixth or seventh operator. If marketshare or margins are below our estimates or capex higher than our numbers, it could lead to a downside risk to our target price, 3) Intensification of competition in the Indian telecom market. Please refer to the firm's disclosure website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures for the definitions of abbreviations typically used in the target price method and risk sections. See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names. The subject company (BRTI.BO, IDEA.BO) currently is, or was during the 12-month period preceding the date of distribution of this report, a client of Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse provided investment banking services to the subject company (BRTI.BO, IDEA.BO) within the past 12 months. Credit Suisse expects to receive or intends to seek investment banking related compensation from the subject company (BRTI.BO, IDEA.BO) within the next 3 months. Important Regional Disclosures Singapore recipients should contact a Singapore financial adviser for any matters arising from this research report. The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this report have not visited the material operations of the subject company (BRTI.BO, IDEA.BO) within the past 12 months. Restrictions on certain Canadian securities are indicated by the following abbreviations: NVS--Non-Voting shares; RVS--Restricted Voting Shares; SVS--Subordinate Voting Shares. Individuals receiving this report from a Canadian investment dealer that is not affiliated with Credit Suisse should be advised that this report may not contain regulatory disclosures the non-affiliated Canadian investment dealer would be required to make if this were its own report. For Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc.'s policies and procedures regarding the dissemination of equity research, please visit http://www.csfb.com/legal_terms/canada_research_policy.shtml. The following disclosed European company/ies have estimates that comply with IFRS: SSAq.L, VOD.L. As of the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the equities securities that are the subject of this report.
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