Mimesis and Truth Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe Diacritics, Vol. 8, No. 1, Special Issue on the Work of Rene 10-23, rard (Spring, 1978), Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sie?sici=0300-7162% 28197821%298%3A 1% 3C10%3AMAT% 3E2.0.CO%3B2-5 Diacritcs is currently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup//uk,jstor.org/abouvterms.himl, JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you ‘may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hhup://uk,jstor.org/jourmals/jhup.himl Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hups//uk.jstororg! Sun Feb 5 19:51:59 200610 MIMESIS AND TRUTH PHILIPPE LACQUE-LABARTHE Rene Girard, "SYSTEME DU DELIRE.” Critique, No. 306 (November 1972], pp. 960-80. Rene Girard, LA VIOLENCE ET LE SACRE. Paris: Grasset, 1972. The pages that follow are extracted from a much longer essay pub- lished in 1975 in a collective work devoted to the question of mimesis. More than a discussion of Girard, they sought primarily to initiate a discussion with Girard—a “dialogue,” as it were. And itis still in that light that they are translated here, since there is every reason to believe, at least as far as | am concemed, that this dialogue is far from finished: we are still along way from the point when anyone will have measured the scope of the question Girard has raised. And yet, thus removed from their context, set apart, these pages could take on a false appearance for the American reader, that of representing nothing more, precisely, than a simple “critique.” It therefore seems necessary to me, at the outset, to offer a few preliminary remarks. In the first place, let us note that the analysis of Girard’s theses followed, as a detour in a relatively complex strategic process, an at- tempt at “deconstructing” Heidegger's version of the relation between Nietzsche and Plato or Platonism (cf. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche [Piullingen: Neske, 1961}, J, 1, “Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst"). The analysis implied then, in the same breath, a deconstruction—or attempt at deconstruction—of the Heideggerian interpretation of the Platonic theory of art, and quite specifically of the Platonic “mimetology.” Now the principal thesis underlying this whole enterprise was itself of a Girardian inspiration. To give a summary idea of it, we can say that it was a matter of underscoring, in Heidegger, a deliberate inattention to “mimeticism,” considered not as a “Nietzschean theme” (even if, start- ing with the first intuition of the agonistic nature of Greek culture, it is indeed just that, a theme that dominates all of his thought), but as that which structures, more or less subconsciously, the very bio-graphy of Nietzsche, in his “affair” with Wagner as well as subsequently in his increasingly “delirious” relation with the exemplary figures of philos- phy (Socrates, Plato) or religion (Dionysius, Christ). Girard thus made it possible, ina first stage, to cast suspicion onto Heidegger, that isto say, ‘above all, to notice how, on the question of mimesis, Heidegger resur- tects the Platonic misunderstanding, or more precisely, refuses to see just how strange is that operation whereby Plato wards off (or imagines that he can ward off) the danger he senses at the heart of mimesis. But this first indication—obviously devoid of nuances—immediately calls for a second one: proceeding out of Girard, such an analysis never- theless amounted to raising, in the closest proximity to Heidegger (and assuredly not “against” him) the question of the subject of philosophy (in the sense, to put it simply, of the subject that makes the philosophic statement) and thereby, through the problematics—always subjacent,in Heidegger, but kept at a distance and under suspicion—of the philosophic Darstellung ("presentation"), to reopening the question of truth—as (unveiling or as in-stallation (Gestell, Hence this questioning could not fail, through a kind of rebound effect, to dent Girard’s thesis, and his reading of Plato, in some of its fundamental presuppositions (for example, the idea of a possible revelation of mimesis.) Shortly after the section devoted to Girard, two pages of this study proceeded to restate the overall argument and review its development. | have decided to repro: duce those two pages here, thus inverting the positions first held by the analysis and the resumé: in the case of Heidegger (where then itis linked to afethea (to the “stele”, ‘mimesis thought, in accord with Pato (but through a movement that aries him on {o the limit, if 'does not simply cary him on beyond himsel) as clsnstalation, that is simultaneously, as fall decline, diminution, obuseation, ete—whereby we can Understand, moreover, hy mimesis could then also be interpreted tater the ft, borin Pato himself, s the “same” time, as incongruency Unadequation, (dss miltude, that, fase congruency, false similtude, degraded copy, ete. Now Its {quite evidently understood, tobe Sut, that this divergence in relation to truth does fot provide 2 serious correction of the traditional postion of mimes (mess, ‘decidedly is weecuperabe), nd especially tate not commensurale with this sort Of fundamental and absolute “incongruency" of the aletheie withdrawal from any opposition of the congruent [adequat] and the incongruent, of presence and Shsence, etc.—in other words, this divergence [écar] is not commensurable with this removal (ntfemung] of truth which isthe inexhaustible and unfathomable abyss ofits “very” proximity, in the case of Girard, by contrast (where it s linked in an apparently intra philosophic manner to desie—to the subject of desire), mimesis s rather thought as Sn assimilation primitive doubling, general reciprocity, undiflerenation, ete) but in’ manner sueh that all the values sssocated vith the opposition congruent! incongruent are perverted (and with no possibilty for correction), and such that the Propet [le propre is swallowed up in the assimilation without there being, ultimately, Sny\chance for any sort of reappropristion: again we have disnsalation, but ths time ts rather in the form ofa generalized istabity, which is actually mich more redoutable as result of being ireducible tos simple decine, tothe fall remains recessary to recognize that this can hardly be argued unless Grard Is extended 0 the limit, Unless the adhetences of his interpretation to the philosophic register {even it this scircumstantally disguised 363 religious” one) and, im sum, unless the moorings of his system tfor it sa system) are unfastened. And again it must be ‘eeognized, then, that this cannot occur unless we play of against Girard, against his treatment of Platonism and his hope fora revelation of mimesis.» Heidegger. But not the Heideggeran interpretation of Pato. Something else in Heidegger, and let Us say rather as to llustratea bit what tis all about-—a Heidegger who himselt ‘would alteady be affected by 3 suspicion emanating from -- Girard Such a stategy--such an operation is sophisti only in appearance. At stake is an enormous question truth, of cours), and arising from i we know how 12 Perform deduction, isastil quite simple result. Surprising, certain diicult—today-— {o contront head on, but simple: namely, that mimesis, a8 itis put to the test by Plato (but not necessary thought, even when Plato “theorizes” it) requires the Suppostion that something governs or precedes setheia sel, of, more precise), desstabilizesaletheia: something that nol unrelated, however strange lay Seem, to this definition [determination of ruth that Heidegger wil aways have Sought 10 Consider as secondary and derived (he definition of truth as homordsis, a8 conge tency, simile oF resemblance), but set in turn displaced. at any ate discon nected from the horizon of accuracy and of exactitude (of evidence), never being Figorously there inthe place where one would expect to see st nor that which one ‘would want to know. An unstable homoidn, in other words, ceaselessly circulating ‘rom inadequate resemblance to resembling inadequation, confusing memory 38 Well as sight upseting the play of sethela and indeed carrying the breakdown night up to the very means of signifying difference, s0 inapprenensibe imperceptible Is the agitation that this unstable homoisis imprints on the same, Now the reason for such results again very simple: it i thatthe “question of rmimesi'™which comes from. swoon, an uneasiness, amalsse rom whatever You tke n the face ofthis wonder [haul known as mimesis, but certainly no, inital, {rom what is, “properly speaking, philosophical wonder" (shaumazetn} actual forces usto reintroduce the question of aledheia within that of language of envnei tion, Aussage, insofar a8 what fs at ply there iin effect. nothing other than the ‘question ofthe "subject" Or rather the obsession with the "subject" diacritics/March 1978 n