. , . , . , . .

,
..., GR-54006,
E-mail: georgago@civil.auth.gr , iklad@civil.auth.gr , kostasecp@civil.auth.gr,
azorba@civil.auth.gr

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SUMMARY
During the past recent years, the scientific interest on communities that based on their own
institutions have developed natural resource management systems, which diversify from the
state and the market, with substantial success and for long periods of time. In order to study
the interaction between users of an underground aquifer, an economics experiment took
place, which aimed at simulating the exploitation of underground water by farmers. The
results (which are explained through the game theory) showed that in normal conditions the
players pumping fluctuates near the Nash balance. Furthermore, punishing those who
contribute to over-pumping from the aquifer looks like a factor tool used by the players,
which eventually leads to a decrease in the overall pumping.

1.
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(Bullock and Baden, 1977).

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Taylor (1987) (free-rider
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(Heilbroner, 1974)
(Coase, 1960).

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1)
(Ostrom, 1990), (Wade 1987),.
2) (Casari,
2004), (Eraso, Montserrat, 2001),(Georgakopoulos, Zorba, Tolikas, Sidiropoulos, 2006)
,
(Ostrom,
2002), (Ostrom, Walker, Gardner 1992), (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000), (Casari, 2005).

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To z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007)
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(2.1)
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N i =1
: fi : i ()
qi : i () 0< qi <0,5.
N : ()
:

1.

(Clark, 1990). H
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, qi=0.5
fi max=0.25.
i ( )

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fi = qi(A qi


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0.125.



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(Axelord, 1984).
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: qi = 0.33. Nash fi = 0.1089
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Axelrod, R., 1984. H . ,

Bullock, K., and Baden, J.,1977. Communes and the Logic of the Commons. In: Hardin G.
and Baden J.(Editor), Managing the Commons, Freeman, San Francisco pp. 182-199
Casari, M., 2004. Can Genetic Algorithms Explain Experimental Anomalies?,
Computational Economics, 24 (3): 257-275.
Casari, M., 2005. On the design of peer punishment experiments, Exp Econ 8(2): 107115.
Coase, R., 1960.The problem of social cost. Journal of Law Economics, 3: 1-44.
Colin, C., 1990 Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable
Resources (2nd edition), Wiley
Eraso, O.N. and Montserrat V.G., 2001, Co-operation, altruism and common property. IV
Congreso de la Asociacin Espaola de Economa Agraria.
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experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4): 98094.
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Experimental Economics 10(2): 171-178.
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and Punishment in Simulated Aquifer Exploitation, WSEAS Transactions on Environment
and Development, 2(1), pp.1-8.
Heilbroner, R., 1974. An inquiry into the human prospect. Basic Books, New York
Ostrom, E., 1990. . , .
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., and Gardner, R., 1992,. Covenants With and Without a Sword: SelfGovernance is Possible. American Political Science Review. 86: 404417
Taylor, M.,1987, The Possibility of Cooperation, University Press, Cambridge
Tolikas, P.K, Zorba, A.S, Tolikas, D.K., 2002, Quest for state policy in an aquifer with
pumping wells under variable hydrological conditions, In: Kungolos, A.G et al. (Editors)
Wade, R., 1987. The management of common property resources: finding a cooperative
solution, Research Observer 2(2): 219-234.