Political Project

NIRMA UNIVERSITY
Institute of Law
3nd Semester B.A. L.L.B.(Hons.)Course
A brief legal research in the subject of
Political Science as Project Work for the
academic year 2011-12
On the topic of TITLE: United Nation Reforms : An International Perspectives
Submitted by: Himani Bhargava
Submitted to: Ass. Prof. Ravi Saxena
Declaration
I hereby declare that this project report entitled TITLE: United Nation Reforms : An International Perspectives is a bona fide record work done by me during the course of III sem BALLB (Hons) in the subject of Political Science and it has not previously formed the basis of award to me for any degree/diploma ,associate ship ,fellowship or other similar title of any other institute /society.
Preface
This project is an outcome of the term assignment of Institute of law, Nirma University for the students of third semester. The main constituents of the project are the report on legal research on related issues. I have tried my best to do justice with my activities and put it in black and white with the same effort as I did it during the research.
Institute of Law Nirma University

Ahmedabad
Certificate
This is to certify that Ms. Himani Bhargava Roll no. 10BAL71 has done project on the topic TITLE: United Nation Reforms: International Perspectives for the subject Sociology as a part of their Course. This is her original work.
Supervisor Signature
Acknowledgement
I have taken efforts in this project. However, it would not have been possible without the kind support and help of many individuals and organizations. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.
I am highly indebted to Course Coordinator Asst. Professor Ravi Saxena. , ILNU for their guidance and constant supervision as well as for providing necessary information regarding the project & also for their support in completing the project. I would like to express my gratitude towards my parents & member of Institute of law Nirma University for their kind co-operation and encouragement which help me in completion of this project. I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to industry persons for giving me such attention and time.
My thanks and appreciations also go to my colleague in developing the project and people who have willingly helped me out with their abilities.
Table Of Content
Chapter : 108 Introduction y Review Of Literature.10 y Objective, Hypothesis, Research Methodology12
Chapter : 2...13 Born in Controversy y y y y Background Trends.14 Immaculate Conception..15 Reforms Efforts...16 2005 UN World Summit.17
Chapter : 3................18 Selected Reforms y y y y y The believering as one initiate...19 Establishment of the U.N. Women20 Overhaul of the Internal Justice.21 The Biggest Missconception..22 The Central Role of Power Politics26
Chapter : 4.27 Reforms related to UN y Reforms dependent on the Security Council..28

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y Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and U.N. Reform30 Chapter : 532 Other Reform Initiatives y Congress and U.N. Reform.33 y Arguments For and Against Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform..34 Chapter : 634 Administration Policies y Obama administrations..34 y Bush administration...36 Chapter : 7....37 Reform Perspectives and Priorities y y y y y y Selected International Perspectives European union G77 Developed Countries Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups The Volcker Commissio
Chapter : 8.41 U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force. Conclusion.48 Bibliography..49
Chapter :1 INTRODUCTION Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations (U.N.) has been in a constant state of transition as various international stakeholders seek ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N. system. Controversies such as corruption of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program; allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers; and instances of waste, fraud, and abuse by U.N. staff have focused renewed attention on the need for change and improvement of the United Nations. Many in the international community, including the United States, have increased pressure on U.N. member states to implement substantive reforms. The 112th Congress will most likely continue to focus on U.N. reform as it considers appropriate levels of U.S. funding to the United Nations and monitors the progress and implementation of ongoing and previously approved reform measures. In September 2005, heads of U.N. member states met for the World Summit at U.N. Headquarters in New York to discuss strengthening the United Nations through institutional reform. The resulting Summit Outcome Document laid the groundwork for a series of reforms that included establishing a Peace building Commission, creating a new Human Rights Council, and enlarging the U.N. Security Council. Member states also agreed to Secretariat and management reforms including improving internal U.N. oversight capacity, establishing a U.N. ethics office, enhancing U.N. whistle-blower protection, and reviewing all U.N. mandates five years or older. Since the World Summit, U.N. member states have worked toward implementing these reforms with varied degrees of success. Some reforms, such as the creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peace building Commission, have already occurred or are ongoing. Other reforms, such as mandate review and U.N. Security Council enlargement, have stalled or not been addressed. U.N. member states disagree as to whether some proposed reforms are necessary, as well as how to most effectively implement previously agreed-to reforms. Developed countries, for example, support delegating more power to the U.N. Secretary-General to implement management reforms, whereas developing countries fear that giving the Secretary-General more authority may undermine the power of the U.N. General Assembly and therefore the influence of individual countries. Congress has maintained a significant interest in the overall effectiveness of the United Nations. Some Members are particularly interested in U.N. Secretariat and management reform, with a focus on enhanced accountability and internal oversight. In the past, Congress has enacted legislation that links U.S.
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funding of the United Nations to specific U.N. reform benchmarks. Opponents of this strategy argue that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may negatively impact diplomatic relations and could hinder the United States ability to conduct foreign policy. Supporters contend that the United Nations has been slow to implement reforms and that linking payment of U.S. assessments to progress on U.N. reform is the most effective way to motivate member states to efficiently pursue comprehensive reform.
The United Nations faces serious problems: it has a hide-bound organizational edifice in which, for example, there are overlapping agencies for development and humanitarian assistance; a patronage system that allows member states to appoint supporters and hence encourages incompetence and waste; inadequate financial discipline; and an often indistinct vision. Its record of past successes, such as ending apartheid in South Africa, moderating the nuclear arms race, instituting democracy in El Salvador and Haiti, and bringing peace to Guatemala and Angola, has been tarnished by such persistent bureaucratic and political defects. Indeed, the organization's vexing and long-running fiscal and political crises have for the first time raised questions about its ability to survive into the next millennium. Recent efforts to assess and fix its flaws have come up against serious impediments, not least of which is bureaucratic inertia. But a good many of the United Nations' shortcomings are rooted in its beginnings, at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. That remarkable event shadows and marks the United Nations, for good or ill, over a half-century later. Most Americans, much less most foreigners, and even many U.N. delegates, have little knowledge, or at best a distorted sense, of the basic elements that went into shaping the U.N.'s basic architecture at San Francisco. Such ignorance complicates any realistic attempt to make significant reforms in the organization today. It is also why the most recent U.S. proposal for the payment of America's past dues (over $1 billion), one that comes with many conditions, has raised hackles inside the United Nations. In order to better understand why the United Nations is in such bad shape today and how it must eventually be reformed, it is first necessary to identify some of the most prevalent current myths surrounding the U.N.'s creation. I count ten major misconceptions that tend to blur the vision of even the most intelligent and sophisticated observers of the organization.
Review Of Literature
Proposals for the reform of the United Nations cannot be made in general terms, or without reference to specific historical and political circumstances. They must be based on an evaluation of the Organizations strengths and weaknesses, and of its actual performance record. The conceptualization of reform must begin with an examination of the historical background, involve an understanding of UN mechanisms and an assessment of the Organization's performance. None of this features in the official UN effort at reform. For nearly 15 years the discussion of reform has gone round and round a diplomatic maypole of national ambitions and animosities. A number of pages on this site deal with aspects of reform that governments have ignored. The following articles are being reviewed for the deep understanding of the topic.
In the U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented, including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. In this document the various functioning of the United Nation has been briefly explained .The reform initiate in the 1980s and 1990s as well as of 1997 to 2005 are given in the document. The Outcome Document negotiated by member states at the 2005 U.N. World Summit called for a systematic review of all U.N. mandates five years or older, a process that has never before been undertaken. Member states are currently reviewing mandates, but progress is slow due to resistance from some countries that fear that mandates important to them will be discarded. If the working group recommends a mandate for removal, the General Assembly would need to amend the resolution that established the mandate. The reforms that are explained in this document are essentially of two types of reforms. Ones that require the consent of the Permanent Members, and the ones that depend on the General Assembly or on the civil societies in each of the member states. Admittedly, all, except perhaps three of the reforms mentioned below, does need a degree of cooperation from the Permanent Members. This document focused on the various role of the UN.
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In the book title: United Nations Peacekeeping operations : Principles and guidelines the author stated the role of un in maintaining the peace around the globe .United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools used by the international community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the number of military, police and civilian personnel deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world has reached unprecedented levels. Not only has United Nation peacekeeping grown in size but it has become increasingly complex . Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, todays multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law.
In the panels report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility was released on December 2, 2004 in which the different role of the UN are explained. The objective of reform must be to equip it to deal effectively with all of them. It must be able to guide the world towards a pattern of economic globalization that will eradicate poverty, sustain individual freedom and liberties, and maintain intact the critically important balances of Nature. Obviously, this cannot be achieved with piecemeal reform. The Organization must be fundamentally reconceptualized. The overall functioning of world order must be critically assessed and changed where necessary. The reforms now under way do not have these objectives in view and are thus entirely inadequate.
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Objective y The objective behind this research is to understand the various functioning of the United Nation in order to maintain the peace as their object. y To analyze the reforms that could be possible in the UN.
Hypothesis
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y Whether the UN which was formed keeping the democratic principle has been guided by the powerful nation. y Whether the reforms needed in the functioning of the UN to keep it more strong . y Whether the UN functioning be dependent and driven by its five super nation. Research Methodology y The research is based on the secondary data. In this data the books and the internet research has been done. Various other reports have been used in the following research. y The books and the online resources have been used in the research y Its a doctrinal based research project.
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Chapter: 2 Born in Controversy The first misconception is - to the extent that people remember San Francisco at all - the belief that it was a conference unencumbered by controversy. Actually, quite the opposite was the case. The conference opened in heated argument - the Soviets opposing an American as chairman - and ended as the Cold War was beginning to heat up. The U.N.'s birth was, in fact, a very difficult one, and the baby was nearly stillborn. Throughout the two-month affair (April-June 1945), there were significant conflicts over matters that today may seem surprising in their intensity but which at the time galvanized the participants: such issues as the admission to the United Nations of the pro-Nazi Argentina or the Soviet-controlled nations of Poland, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine (which would have given Stalin extra votes); how much authority the United Nations was to have over the process of decolonization; whether regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) could play a role in handling local crises before they went to the United Nations; whether the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council would extend not only to action but to the discussion of issues; and the more fundamental question of whether the veto should exist at all. At times, these squabbles nearly crippled the conference. A second misconception about San Francisco holds that this was a conclave of collegial friends, bound together by common democratic ideals and a burning idealism, intent on setting up a world body to promote collective security. Certainly this was among the motivating factors that brought 46 nations together in San Francisco. But in fact there was also a desire to settle long-festering grievances about border demarcations and colonial possessions and to gain further political power at the expense of ancient adversaries. Every national delegation carried with it its own historic baggage: age-old enmities, preoccupations over national honor, and seething ethnic and religious tensions. Washington, for its part, feared that the traditional obsessions and domestic passions of the participants might interfere with its ample vision for the United Nations. However , the American government had an edge. In the months leading up to the conference, it had intercepted diplomatic cables from almost all the countries coming to San Francisco. It knew in advance the negotiating positions of practically every delegation except for those of Britain and the Soviet Union. In addition, during the assembly itself, American FBI agents saturated San Francisco, and FBI wiretaps picked up the
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conversations of delegates. This is not to say that Soviet intelligence agents and spies from other powers were not also active, just less ubiquitous1.
Background and Trends

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, U.N. member states and past secretaries general have repeatedly attempted to reform the organization. These reform efforts tend to be cyclical, with member states considering waves of new reform proposals every 5 to 10 years. The reform attempts can be initiated by a member state, groups of member states, and/or the current secretary-general. They generally focus on three areas of concern: (1) perceived inefficiencies and lack of accountability in the U.N. Secretariat; (2) duplication and redundancy of U.N. mandates, missions, and/or programs; and (3) evidence of fraud, waste, abuse and/or mismanagement of U.N. resources. Proposed reforms often reflect the political, economic, and cultural climate of the time. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, member states focused on increasing membership on the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to account for growing U.N. membership. In the 1970s, as the economic and political gap between developed and developing countries grew more pronounced, the General Assembly requested the Secretary- General to appoint a group of experts to recommend structural changes that would help the United Nations address problems of international economic co-operation. The most recent wave of U.N. reform is likely driven by a combination of U.N. budgetary and financial issues, controversy over mismanagement of the Iraq OilFor-Food Program, perceived ineffectiveness of U.N. human rights mechanisms, and recent allegations of sexual abuse committed by U.N. staff and peacekeepers, among other things.
U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented, including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs
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Immaculate Conception We come next to one of the more persistent myths among the general public - that the United Nations was born out of a dreamy, gentle, idealistic vision of a global body a sort of Immaculate Conception. In fact, the U.N. Charter was a meticulously crafted, power-oriented document carefully molded by hard-nosed drafters to conform to the global realities of 1945. Engineered primarily by the four major victorious wartime allies - the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China - it started with the premise that the organization had to be welded tightly to security issues and, only secondarily, to economic and social issues. It was configured so that this quartet of strong nations - the so-called Big Four, which when later joined by France became the "Big Five" - were given the tools, including the veto, to prevent future wars, especially another global conflict. The most destructive war in the history of mankind was just winding down - only 30 years after the world had endured an almost equally horrendous ordeal - and the exhausted nations that were represented in San Francisco were determined to deter another such conflict. Hence, the blueprint for the United Nations was the product neither of naivet nor credulousness2. Another illusion on the part of many people is that the United Nations was organized on the basis of democratic principles. In truth, the United Nations was never intended to be representative of peoples but of sovereign states. The governments of these states may or may not be the products of free elections3. This does not mean the United Nations is antidemocratic, only that its non-binding resolutions represent the opinion of peoples as expressed through their governments. Through debate in the Security Council and votes in the General Assembly, member states can express the moral outrage of their citizens over all sorts of earthly misbehavior. But, in the end, it is the five permanent members that
Annan appointed a special panel on U.N. Peace Operations in March 2000 to make recommendations for improving the peacekeeping system. The panels recommendations were consolidated into what is known as the Brahimi Report. A number of the reports recommendations, such as increasing the number of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, were implemented. Other recommendations, particularly those involving U.N. member state personnel commitments for deployment, have yet to be achieved. U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented, including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
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decide issues of peace and war - and, I might add, determine who is secretary general and what amendments are made to the U.N. Charter. None of the other 180 member nations - either individually or as members of the General Assembly possess those prerogatives. Reform Efforts (1980s and early 1990s) U.N. reform initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s focused primarily on financial and structural issues. In 1986, under pressure from the United States and other industrialized countries, the General Assembly established a high-level group of 18 intergovernmental experts to review the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning, of the United Nations. The group made 71recommendations to the General Assembly, including a revised budgetary process that introduced the use of consensus-based budgeting. In the early 1990s, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced broad reform proposals in reports, An Agenda for Peace (1992) and An Agenda for Development (1994). Some of these reform initiatives proposed led to substantive changes to the U.N. structure 4.
Reform Efforts (1997 to 2005) Kofi Annan ran for Secretary-General on a Platform of reform and introduced many reform proposals during his tenure, most notably in 1997, 2002, and 2005. Annan also appointed several independent panels and commissions to propose reforms on specific issues, such as the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Annan first proposed a two track reform program that recommended cutting Secretariat administrative costs, combining three smaller departments into one large Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), and creating the post of Deputy Secretary-General5. Over time, some of these early reform initiatives were achieved. In September 2002, Annan proposed additional reforms, including a reorganization of the budget and planning system to make it less complex; a thorough review of the U.N. work program; establishing a highlevel panel to examine the relationship between the United Nations and civil society; improving U.N. human rights protection; and enhancing U.N. information
U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented, including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
5 4
The 2000 Millennium Summit was held from September 6-8, 2000, in New York. Its theme was the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.
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services. In September 2003, Annan appointed a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to evaluate how the United Nations addressed present-day threats to international peace and security. The panel recommended enlarging the U.N. Security Council, establishing a Peace building Commission, and enhancing the role of the Secretary-General. Annan drew from many of the panels recommendations in his 2005 report, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security, and Human Rights for All6 .
The 2005 U.N. World Summit In September 2005, U.N. reform efforts seemed to gain momentum as heads of state and government met for the 2005 World Summit at U.N. Headquarters in New York. The Summit convened to review the progress made in the fulfillment of the 2000 Millennium Summit goals and commitments made in other earlier U.N. conferences. It provided the groundwork for potentially significant changes to the U.N. system, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations through various reforms. The Summit Outcome Document was negotiated by 191 member states and adopted by consensus on September 16, 20057. The document laid the foundation for reforms such as establishing a Peace building Commission; strengthening the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF); establishing a Democracy Fund; strengthening the Security Council; improving U.N. system coordination; and creating a new Human Rights Council. Member states also agreed to Secretariat and management reforms, including: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Establishment of an ethics office; Greater whistle-blower protection; Strengthening oversight capacity; Review of all General Assembly mandates over five years old; and Full financial disclosure by U.N. staff
U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented, including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
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Report. A number of the reports recommendations, such as increasing the number of staff in the Department ,Peacekeeping Operations, were implemented. Other recommendations, particularly those involving U.N. member state personnel commitments for deployment, have yet to be achieved
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Chapter : 3 Selected Reform Efforts
This section describes examples of ongoing or completed U.N. reform efforts by U.N. member states and/or the Secretary-General. It does not aim to measure or assess the effectiveness of these efforts. Recent Reform Efforts U.N. member states have worked toward implementing reform with varied results since the 2005 World Summit. Some reforms, particularly initiatives such as internal oversight, mandate review, and Security Council enhancement, are stalled or have not been addressed. Other reforms, such as enhancing U.S. system-wide coherence, establishing the Human Rights Council, and creating a Peace building Commission, are completed or are underway. Some management and budget reforms endorsed by heads of state and government at the World Summit were also implemented, including the establishment of a U.N. Ethics Office, enhanced whistle-blower protection policies, the adoption of international public sector accounting standards, and improved financial disclosure policies for U.N. staff. The following sections address some of these reform efforts in further detail8. U.N. System-wide Coherence The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document called on the Secretary-General to improve U.N. system-wide coherence and coordination by strengthening linkages between the normative work of the United Nations system and its operational
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activities.9 Accordingly, in February 2006, the Secretary-General announced the creation of a High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence (the panel) to examine how the U.N. system can work more effectively, especially in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. The panels final report emphasized the overall value and progress of the United Nations, but also noted that without substantial reforms the United Nations will be unable to deliver on its promises and maintain its legitimate position at the heart of the multilateral system. In its report, the panel made several recommendations to improve systemwide coherence. Two of these proposalsthe creation of the Delivering as One initiative and the establishment of a new U.N. entity for womenare discussed below. The Delivering as One Initiative The panel recommended the concept of Delivering as One (DAO) to promote greater coherence and consolidation of U.N. departments and agencies at the country, regional, and headquarters level, and also recommended an overhaul of U.N. business practices to bring greater focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In December 2006, the United Nations announced that it would test a voluntary DAO pilot program in Vietnam with an aim of promoting faster and more effective development. It subsequently announced the establishment of voluntary DAO initiatives in seven additional countries: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uruguay. Under DAO, U.N. agencies operating in-country share one budget, one leader, one office, and one program with harmonized business practices. Participants hope that such changes create greater country ownership, reduce transaction costs for governments, and increase the impact and effectiveness of the U.N. system through more coherent and coordinated programs10. Since the DAO initiative was established, participating countries and U.N. entities have sought to evaluate the initiatives progress and challenges through various stock-taking reports, meetings, and working groups. Overall, DAO participants have found that the implementation in the pilot countries has: (1) given renewed government leadership to U.N. programs;
The panels report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, was released on December 2, 2004.
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The 2000 Millennium Summit was held from September 6-8, 2000, in New York. Its theme was the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century
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(2) led to better alignment of national priorities and U.N. efforts; and (3) enhanced the coherence and effectiveness of U.N. support. At the same time, many agree that much more can be done to improve DAO. Several pilot evaluations, for example, found that the U.N. Resident Coordinators (who lead U.N. development activities in their countries) do not have full authority over all U.N. entities operating in-country, leading to a lack of coordination and coherence. Moreover, U.N. headquarters, which include not only agency headquarters but also governing bodies, are viewed by many as being behind the curve on DAO, particularly because the pace of reform at the headquarters levels appears to lag behind reform and innovation at the country level. Finally, the evaluations found that a lack of multi-year and predictable core funding has reduced the United Nations capacity to improve long-term planning and limits its ability to provide accurate and timely inputs in national plan. Establishment of UN Women The Panel on System-wide Coherence also recommended that the United Nations establish one entity focused on womens equality and empowerment. It found that there is a strong sense that the United Nations systems contribution [to achieving gender equality and womens empowerment] has been incoherent, under-resourced and fragmented. Since the panel made its recommendation, U.N. member states and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have taken steps to establish a new U.N. entity for women. On July 2, 2010, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 64/289 that transferred the mandates and functions of the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) into a newly established United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, known as UN Women11. In the resolution, member states also decided to establish an Executive Board as the governing body of the entity to provide intergovernmental support and supervision of its operational activities. On September 14, 2010, Secretary-General Ban appointed Michelle Bachelet, former president of Chile, as the Executive Director and Under Secretary-General for UN Women. Bachelet is a member of all senior U.N. decision-making bodies and reports directly to the Secretary-General. Her appointment was met with general
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approval by many policymakers, including some Members of Congress. UN Women is headquartered in New York and became operational on January 1, 2011 Overhaul of Internal Justice System On April 4, 2007, the General Assembly adopted a framework resolution to create a new system of internal justice administration for the U.N. Secretariat and separately administered U.N. funds and programs. The system is part of the U.N. Secretariat and coordinated through a new Office of the Administration of Justice that operates in two tiersthe U.N. Dispute Tribunal and the U.N. Appeals Tribunal. The resolution establishes formal and informal channels to protect U.N. staff facing disciplinary action, and provides additional accountability among staff, especially managers. The previous internal justice system was criticized by member states for being slow cumbersome, ineffective, and lacking in professionalism. The system was backlogged with cases and many of its employees lacked formal legal training or qualifications. The Office of Administration of Justice and its Tribunals became operational on July 1, 2009. Since then, the Tribunal judges have worked their way through a backlog of cases from the previous system of internal justice. In early 2010, controversy emerged over Secretary-General Bans decision not to comply with orders from the Dispute Tribunal to provide confidential documents and other information related to legal claims by U.N. staff of unfair treatment. Ban has declined to respond to the Dispute Tribunal orders with which he disagrees, reportedly hoping the Appeals Tribunal will rule in his favor. Many contend that Bans refusal to comply with the orders stem from his concern that the Tribunals12 decisions infringe on decisions made in the context of U.N. human resources, an area typically under the authority of the Secretary-General The Vital Veto We come to the next misconception - namely, that the veto power held by the Big Five, which gives five capitals the ability to decide on U.N. intervention, determine who leads the organization, block U.N. Charter amendments, and so forth, is simply too potent a weapon to be wielded by so few and should be abolished. The truth is that the veto is as vital to the operation of the United Nations today as it
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was to the founding of the organization in 1945. Fifty years ago, the United States and its four allies made it clear that they would not participate in such a global
organization unless they possessed that power. In Washington's thinking the demise of the earlier League of Nations was attributable to the failure of its organizers to restrict the veto to the leading powers of the day. And, realistically speaking, if efforts to maintain world peace are to be effective, the leading powers must cooperate, or at least refrain from opposition. There is no doubt that in situations where even one leading power is party to a conflict the United Nations is in no position to act. On the contrary, a show of authority in such circumstances would only lead to a breakup of the organization. Hence, as Yale scholar Jean Krasno has observed, while the veto is surely not democratic, it keeps the big players in the game, and there is no game without them. The reluctant acquiescence by the lesser powers to the veto at San Francisco was an acknowledgment of this reality. The Chief Patron Another myth - that America was simply one among several major players in San Francisco - also complicates thinking about U.N. reform. The United States was in truth the chief patron of the United Nations. Franklin Roosevelt had begun thinking seriously about the need for such a world organization early in the war. The U.S. State Department drafted the original U.N. Charter. Washington had to pressure Churchill and Stalin, neither of whom was terribly enthusiastic about the idea of a world organization, into supporting it, and it made certain that the 1945 conference was held on American soil. The United States airlifted many delegations from wardevastated countries abroad to San Francisco in its own military planes; it paid the flail cost of the two-month meeting; and, as the most powerful country on earth in 1945, possessing the most potent military force in history, it freely exercised economic and military muscle to get its way on most issues13. Conservative Republicans today charge that the United Nations was primarily the outgrowth of the obsessive internationalism of the American Democratic Party.
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This is another misconception about the U.N.'s founding, which, from the American perspective, was a bipartisan enterprise. President Roosevelt,
remembering how Republican isolationists had led the successful fight against the League of Nations in the U.S. Senate in 192014, insisted that Republicans be part of the planning process from the beginning, starting with the State Department's charter deliberations in 1942 and extending to full participation by the opposition party in the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Among these delegates were such Republican stalwarts as Sen. Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, Gov. Harold Stassen of Minnesota, and John Foster Dulles, later to become secretary of state under Dwight Eisenhower. All strongly embraced the concept of the United Nations. Such deep Republican involvement guaranteed that the United Nations would escape the fate of the League of Nations, and in 1945 the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly ratified the U.N. Charter. Once the United Nations was established, there arose the question of how it was to enforce its authority. Another popular myth was that the decisions of the General Assembly were to be binding on member states, especially when the permanent members of the Security Council were in agreement on a particular issue. But the decisions of the General Assembly were not - and are not - binding on members as a matter of international law. Moreover, while decisions of the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the U.N.'s activities with respect to maintaining peace and security, were intended to be binding on all member states, they are not so in fact. The U.N. Charter makes clear that the General Assembly can only offer "recommendations" to the world community. Majority rule, it was recognized from the outset, could never work in the General Assembly as it might work in a national parliament or legislature. The obligatory acceptance by all nations of U.N. decisions would have run up against the concept of national sovereignty. National governments could not tolerate major assaults on their interests and, if pushed, would likely refuse to play by the rules. Thus the General Assembly's decisions had to rest on the will of its members to carry them out. However, under the U.N. Charter, the decisions of the 15-member Security Council require compliance by all member nations. But the Security Council has
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no independent means to enforce its will. No nation, for example, ever signed the "Article 43" agreements that were intended to provide the United Nations with a military capacity to execute Security Council decisions15. The Security Council can apply pressure on dissenting nations through its edicts, but they are not always enforceable - except through moral suasion. Moral pressure can often be brought to bear effectively - but not always. In any event, it is quite clear that the United Nations cannot act like a world government. What has sometimes given the United Nations more leverage is its relationship with regional security organizations. Regional groups are supposed to act in crises before the United Nations becomes involved, according to the U.N. Charter. But it is a misconception to think that the United Nations originally acknowledged regional bodies as partners. Washington at first resisted sanctioning these groupings, believing that regional entities would dilute the U.N.'s authority. However, the Latin American delegates at San Francisco, seeking recognition for their own inter-American regional security pact, threatened a revolt unless they got legal acceptance for their body, later known as the OAS. Eventually, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it was agreed that "nothing...shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." This provision cleared the way for such regional security organizations as NATO, SE^TO, and the Warsaw Pact. While the growth of regional organizations did take away some of the U.N.'s authority, it also spared an overburdened United Nations from having to commit resources to local crises. The Biggest Misconception The final myth worth exploding is that the United Nations has never taken happily to internal reform, that it is an inflexible institution set in its ways and unwilling to change. This critique is particularly wide of the mark. The U.N. Charter itself provided for a second constitutional convention after ten years, the founding fathers being well aware that an institution conceived on the ruins of war might require alteration a decade later. Although another convention was never held, the United Nations did change in many ways. For example, when
U.N. document, A/RES/41/213, December 19, 1986. The group of experts was convened, in part, because of U.S. legislation popularly known as the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment, which directed that U.S. contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced if larger U.N. financial contributors did not have a more substantial influence in the U.N. budget process. See Previous Reform Legislation section of this report
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the Cold War stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union developed in the Security Council, the organization found inventive paths around the deadlock to achieve its broader goals: the secretary general took over the role as international mediator; the Trusteeship Council oversaw decolonization; the notion of peacekeeping, a concept never mentioned in the U.N. Charter, was authorized; and the General Assembly, despite its often heated rhetoric, became a genuine deliberative body and acquired increased moral authority. The application of this moral authority could be seen, for example, in the imposition of U.N. sanctions against South Africa, which contributed to the collapse of apartheid. And it has been applied generally to advance the cause of human rights around the world. Moreover, during the most dangerous years of the Cold War, the United Nations, by providing a place for the major powers to debate their differences, to negotiate deals, even to scapegoat the organization, helped prevent the outbreak of catastrophic nuclear war. The General Assembly also employed imaginative and resourceful methods to get around its inherent inability to legislate the behavior of its members. It did so, for example, by codifying international standards, most recently with respect to nuclear arms testing guidelines, and then seeking ratification of the covering agreements by individual member states. This process often took an enormous amount of time, and compliance was not always assured. But members that may have not participated in such agreements at the outset often joined later on as global pressure to do so built and the desire to be involved set in. This complicated process worked better than expected. The United Nations has issued dozens of declarations, resolutions, and conventions on the enforcement of human rights and press freedoms that have been ratified around the world. It has negotiated over 300 international treaties on such more mundane matters as airline routes, nuclear energy inspections, and pollution controls, and in dozens of other areas that are critical to the functioning of a well-balanced international system. The United Nations has also acted in ways unanticipated in its charter - most recently by convening international conferences on women's rights, human rights, the protection of children, environmental degradation, and poverty, all of which have broadened the international consensus on civilized norms. By coordinating its activities with those of nongovernmental organizations, as it did, for example, in June 1996 when it invited nongovernmental organizations to participate in the Habitat II Conference on Cities in Istanbul, it has strengthened its constituent base. It has achieved notable successes through innovative responses to human suffering. The vaccines distributed through UNICEF have saved the lives of millions of
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children16. The World Health Organization has eliminated smallpox and today is seeking to wipe out polio by the year 2000. The World Food Program feeds millions of hungry people annually (in 1994, for example, it fed some 57 million) and continually enlarges its workload.
The Central Role of Power Politics By dispelling the persistent myths about the founding and history of the United Nations, we should gain a clearer vision of the world organization around which the demands for reform (particularly from Washington) have arisen. What we can see is an organization that was born of and remains subject to politics. It is, moreover, an organization chronically torn by divisions between North and South as well as between dictatorships and democracies, in which the United States and, by extension, its two preeminent political parties, remains the major player. As a body its authority is moral, political, and economic rather than coercive. But it is a body that adjusts well to changing conditions and is capable of acting swiftly and decisively on occasion - albeit sometimes indirectly - and one that shows surprising durability. Many Americans today are hoping that the new U.N. secretary general, Kofi Annan, will implement the latest U.S. demands for change as called for in the congressional legislation put forward in June in the promised overhaul of the U.N. bureaucracy. He will have some task. Due to the influence of Republican conservatives, Congress approved payment of only $819 million of the over $1 billion the United States owes the organization in unpaid dues. Moreover, the legislation set forth some 38 conditions to be met before the United States will pay its arrears. These range from the cosmic (the United Nations shall not violate the U.S. Constitution or impose taxes) to the nuts and bolts (the U.S. share of dues for the general operating budget is to be cut in the future from 25 percent to 20 percent) to the mundane (the United States will cut aid to nations whose U.N.
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U.N. document, A/RES/41/213, December 19, 1986. The group of experts was convened, in part, because of U.S. legislation popularly known as the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment, which directed that U.S. contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced if larger U.N. financial contributors did not have a more substantial influence in the U.N. budget process. See Previous Reform Legislation section of this report
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diplomats do not pay New York City parking tickets) to the entirely gratuitous (the United States will no longer help fund U.N. global conferences)17. This overall approach to instructing the United Nations on its operations, while certainly ham-fisted, is entirely consistent with how the United States has viewed its role in running the organization ever since it took the lead in creating the body 52 years ago. In terms of the United Nations, at least, it still sees itself as the "indispensable nation." With the end of the Cold War, as more and more nations turn toward democratic systems of governance and as the number of prosperous states increases the United States should ostensibly have less control over the United Nations. In fact, the United States has begun to recognize some of these new realities by recommending the appointment of five new permanent members to the Security Council (Germany, Japan, and three developing nations to be chosen by rotation) - though without indicating whether these countries should have the veto - as well as an increase in the number of nonpermanent members18. But as the Gulf War and Bosnia proved, successful U.N. operations still require America's backing19. Hence, while there may be considerable grumbling over Washington's high-handed dictates in this latest bill, there is likely to be an attempt to satisfy its demands. Indeed, that is the nub of the problem: the practice of power politics still overwhelms the United Nations - to the detriment of a more rational mode of operation. Changing the United Nations may be necessary, but it is likely to be a good deal more difficult than one might suspect.
17
Annan appointed a special panel on U.N. Peace Operations in March 2000 to make recommendations for improving the peacekeeping system. The panels recommendations were consolidated into what is known as the Brahimi Report. A number of the reports recommendations, such as increasing the number of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, were implemented. Other recommendations, particularly those involving U.N. member state personnel commitments for deployment, have yet to be achieved. 18 U.N. document, A/RES/41/213, December 19, 1986. The group of experts was convened, in part, because of U.S. legislation popularly known as the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment, which directed that U.S. contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced if larger U.N. financial contributors did not have a more substantial influence in the U.N. budget process. See Previous Reform Legislation section of this report
19
See Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups section for more information on the report, which was released onMarch 21, 2005
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Chapter : 4 Reforms related to the United Nations Essentially, there are two types of reforms. Ones that require the consent of the Permanent Members, and the ones that depend on the General Assembly or on the civil societies in each of the member states. Admittedly, all, except perhaps three of the reforms mentioned below, does need a degree of cooperation from the Permanent Members. Reforms dependent on civil society 1. One of the most immediate, and fairly rapidly achievable, reform concerns the accountability of our UN representative to members of Parliament. The appointment of our Ambassador to the UN should be scrutinized by a select committee, and he/she should report to that committee on a regular basis. The effect of this reform should not be underestimated. It would raise the level of awareness among our MPs of how the UN functions. It would make them aware of its potential and of the reasons for its present limitations. In turn, it would demand more accurate reporting from the media. Hopefully, these two factors would lead to a radical rethinking among the policy makers of how the UN should function. Very much related to this reform is the need for openness in Security Council deliberations. Linda Melvern has extensive and detailed facts relating to this issue. 2. UN Second Assembly. Although there is already a special Millenium Forum (scheduled for July 2002), a Peoples Assembly should be a regular feature of the UN. It is fair to say that NGOs (on the Millenium Forum or on the Peoples Assembly) are more representative of the people of the UN than government appointees20.. 3. Need to implement the neglected or ignored aspects of the Charter. These should be spelt out in detail. - e.g. Article 26 which is consistently being sidelined; Article 43, and especially Article 47. Also, less emphasis should be placed on Article 51 and, perhaps, the ICJ should be asked to clarify the amount of armaments needed
See Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups section for more information on the report, which was released on March 21, 2005
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for self defence, and also ask the Security Council to co-ordinate the supply of any such armaments. 4. Need for International Law regarding the dissemination of hatred and the call to violence. Although in the UK we do have such a law, there is no equivalent of it internationally. If such law existed at the time of the Rwandan crisis, the various media involved in the build up to that violence could have been silenced long before the trouble got out of control. This law would, naturally, need to be backed up with quick and effective means to enforce it. All the violent conflicts involve the misuse of the media one way or the other. We have to put a stop to this on the international level. 5. Need for the UN to have its own Ambassadors. Currently, (almost unbelievably) the UN relies on NGOs or on a collection of second-hand reporting when trying to deal with a humanitarian disaster or trying to ameliorate a military conflict that has gone wrong. These Ambassadors, just like any other ambassadors, would be the eyes the ears and the mouth of the UN. It would not be a ceremonial role, but very much a simple, business-like arrangement, - along the Dutch system. The UN should not have to rely on second-hand information. In many cases, the role of the present directors of UN Information Centers could be simply upgraded. (Incidentally, there need not be an Ambassador in each country.) 6. Need to have selection by merit rather than by quota. At present, many of the important posts within the UN are made on the quota system. This means that many of the appointees are unsuitable, and are in effect doing a disservice to the UN. (The so called scandals of mismanagements and corruption in the UN system can be attributed to these individuals.) There should be a strict selection by merit. There could be an international equivalent of a civil service exam, and anyone appointed should have an unequivocal allegiance to the UN. (In order to prevent this "UN Civil Service" to be staffed mainly from the Permanent Members countries, there could be a proportionate number of people invited from developing countries to take this exam.) There is a detailed exposition of this in Renewing the United Nations System, A World in Need of Leadership, Towards a more effective United Nations. - (All by Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart.) 7. UN Peace Corp There is natural opposition to the UN having a standing army. This is understandable, and there is really no need for such a force. However, there is no reason why there could not be volunteers, in several countries, trained along
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the principles of the territorial army, ready to serve the UN if and when required. (At very short notice.) These volunteers would, naturally, be well motivated, well equipped, highly trained and qualified. Each unit would be equipped to do a specific task such as securing the communication system in a given area. A country such as Britain, could also pledge some of its regular armed forces to this UN Peace Corp. (And, incidentally, a UN commander would be in charge, answerable to the Military Staff Committee, and to no one else.) Also, there should be more emphasis on policing for the UN rather than on military intervention. Reforms dependent on the Security Council. 1. Financing the UN - If the UN is to function effectively, it will need to be financed in a way that is not dependent on the vagaries of the current national or international political systems. Whatever method is chosen, whether a tax on international money transactions, or a tax on aviation, or any other system, it does not matter. What matters is the need for a different system to the current one. 2. The Veto. - The veto has been a contentious issue well before the Charter was even signed. At the time, the Member States reluctantly agreed that, given the circumstances just after the war, the Permanent Members were the only ones capable of ensuring international peace. As it turned out, the Veto has been one of the main reasons for the build up of the arms industries, simply because, instead of supposedly cooperating, the Permanent Members have continually mistrusted each other. And they still do today. A prime example is what happened in Bosnia. There, the UN mandated forces had such restricted rules of engagement, (because of the Russians insistence!), that they were unable to provide even a safe haven for the refugees in Sebrenizca. Hence, NATO supplanting the UN. (One Permanent Member side-stepping the other.) We should not get ourselves tied up in the minutia of what should be in place of the veto, or how many Permanent Members should be on the Security Council. This has already been debated at length by several learned bodies, including the General Assembly. What is important to bear in mind, - the Veto is not helping to secure international peace. What is more, it is proving extremely costly to shore up international law by the only method currently available, - overbearing military force. 3. Need to re-examine sanctions. The current reasoning behind sanctions is that, if a targeted regimes economy is severely curtailed, it will eventually comply with 30
the wishes of the international community. This is a very blunt instrument. The collateral damage on the innocent citizens of that country is enormous. Further, as a rule, they have absolutely no chance of influencing the policies of that regime. Sanctions, if there is a need for it, should be targeted at the key personnel of that regime, - at the military, business, administrative and academic leaders. These are the people who may have an influence on that regime. Their accounts abroad should be frozen, their travel and any form of international contact should be denied. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and U.N. Reform On December 14, 2006, Ban Ki-moon of South Korea took the oath of office to succeed outgoing U.N. Secretary-General Annan. He was appointed to a second five-year term on June 21, 2011. Ban has stated that U.N. reform is the most pressing and principled issue of today, and that it is a top priority during his tenure. Selected examples of Bans reform efforts are highlighted below. Disarmament and Peacekeeping Restructuring In February 2007, Ban introduced his first set of reform initiatives. He proposed the establishment of a new Department of Field Support to improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.N. field activities. He also called for the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) to become an office under the Secretary-General instead of a stand-alone department. He noted that the U.N. disarmament and non-proliferation agenda needs revitalization, and will require a greater role and personal involvement of the Secretary-General. Bans proposals were met with skepticism by many developing countries, which were concerned with the possible downgrading of DDA and the impact of a new Department of Field Support on current peacekeeping operations On March 15, 2007, after extensive consultations among the Secretary-General and member states, the General Assembly approved two framework resolutions offering preliminary support for Bans proposals. The first resolution supported establishment of an Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). It stated that DDA will retain its budgetary autonomy and the integrity of the existing structures and functions. It also stated that the High-Representative for ODA should be appointed at the rank of UnderSecretary-General and report directly to the Secretary-General. The resolution requested that after appointing the High-Representative, the Secretary-General report to the General Assembly on the financial, administrative, and budgetary implications of the reorganization, as well as report on the ODAs activities at the
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62nd session of the General Assembly. On July 2, 2007, the Secretary-General appointed Sergio Duarte, a career diplomat from Brazil, as High Representative. The second General Assembly resolution addressed peacekeeping restructuring and supported establishing a Department of Field Support to be headed by an Under-Secretary General. It requested that the Secretary-General submit a comprehensive report ... elaborating on the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the establishment of the Department of Field Support, including functions, budgetary discipline and full financial implications. The General Assembly supported Bans proposal in principle. In late June 2007, the Assembly approved the restructuring, establishing the Department of Field Support with a new Under-Secretary-General to head the Department. A significant point of contention among some member states during negotiations was the level of autonomy the Secretary-General would have to organize the Secretariat vis--vis the Assemblys authority to determine the budget and how it should be spent. Thus, in its initial framework resolution the General Assembly required the Secretary-General to provide comprehensive information on the functions, budgets, and other financial implications of the reorganization21.
Annan appointed a special panel on U.N. Peace Operations in March 2000 to make recommendations for improving the peacekeeping system. The panels recommendations were consolidated into what is known as the Brahimi Report. A number of the reports recommendations, such as increasing the number of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, were implemented. Other recommendations, particularly those involving U.N. member state personnel commitments for deployment, have yet to be achieved.
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Chapter : 5 Other Reform Initiatives
Secretary-General Ban has raised other aspects of U.N. reform, including: y Financial Disclosure Ban submitted his mandatory personal financial disclosure form and released it to the public. He encouraged other U.N. staff to follow his example of public financial disclosure, but will not make it a requirement.46 (U.N. staff members are required to complete and submit confidential financial disclosure statements on an annual basis as part of the U.N. financial disclosure program; however, public disclosure is not a requirement and is done on a voluntary basis.) y Staff MobilityBan announced the availability of several Secretariat positions to be filled by internal U.N. staff. He encouraged other managers to do the same, noting the importance of staff mobility among U.N. agencies and departments. During the last few years, the United Nations has launched initiatives to support staff mobility, including the Voluntary Initiative for Network Exchange (VINE) and the Managed Reassignment Program for junior professionals y Security Council ReformBan calls Security Council reform an important and sensitive issue. He supports enlarging the Council, and has stated he will use his position as Secretary-General to facilitate cooperation among member states in order to build a broad consensus for Security Council enhancement. On January 14, 2011, Secretary-General Ban identified strengthening the United Nations from within, as one of his priorities for 2011. He stated that progress needs to be made in three areas: (1) improving what and how the United Nations delivers on the ground; (2) doing more with what he United Nations has; and (3) increasing accountability. Ban also emphasized the United Nations need to improve its budget process and embrace innovations that will save money and increase impact. He did not offer specific information on how these proposals and recommendations would be achieved.
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Congress and U.N. Reform Generally, Congress supports the United Nations and its mission. It authorizes and appropriates U.S. funds to the organization each year and often utilizes U.N. mechanisms to further U.S. foreign policy objectives. Congress can also be critical of the United Nations, however, especially when some Members believe that the organization may not be running as effectively as it could be. When this happens, Congress may use a wide range of legislative tools to influence and direct U.S. policy at the United Nations. Such efforts may include considering sense of the Congress resolutions; holding hearings to investigate U.N. programs or oversee Administration policies; and determining U.S. nominees for U.N. posts. Placing financial conditions or limits on U.S. funding to the United Nations is another common congressional policy approach to U.N. reform.
Arguments For and Against Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform Opponents of linking U.S. funding to progress on U.N. reform are concerned that doing so may weaken U.S. influence at the United Nations, thereby undercutting its ability to conduct Collaborating with U.N. Member StatesThe United States may wish to Continue to reach out to other U.N. member states to build consensus and form Partnerships on reform policies, either within the framework of the United Nations or bilaterally. Some observers have noted that U.S. support for certain U.N. reform initiatives can be a liability because some member states may view U.S. support as self-serving. In these cases, the United States may consider Allowing like-minded countries advocate its reform agenda. Identifying Key PrioritiesThe United States may wish to focus on a small Number of reform priorities and pursue them vigorously in both multilateral and bilateral fora. It may also consider compromising with other member states on U.N. reform issues that it has identified as lesser priorities. Former SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan often stated that U.N. reform is a process and not an event. With this in mind, the 112th Congress may wish to continue monitoring the Implementation and overall progress of recently-approved reform initiatives moon.
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Chapter : 6 Administration Policies The United States generally supports the mission and mandate of the United Nations. It played a key role in establishing the United Nations in 1945, and serves as one of five permanent members of the Security Council. Some Administrations have been critical of the United Nations, however, and have advocated sweeping reform of the organization. Obama Administration Since his inauguration, President Barack Obama has stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation, particularly with the United Nations, in U.S. foreign and national security policy. In the State Departments 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, for example, the Administration highlighted the significance of the United Nations, stating that it is unique among multilateral institutions given its legitimate issues. In February 2011, Esther Brimmer, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, emphasized that robust engagement across the U.N. system is essential to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. Overview of Reform Priorities While the Obama Administration supports U.S. engagement in the United Nations, it recognizes the need for improving the organization through reform. Examples of the Administrations reform priorities include: enforcing budget discipline by taking cost-saving measures such as eliminating vacant U.N. posts and exploring alternate budget practices; improving transparency and accountability by strengthening the effectiveness of U.N. bodies charged with evaluating performance and investigating abuses, including the Ethics Office, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, the Board of Auditors, and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). reforming human resources practices to create a more mobile and merit-based workforce by further streamlining U.N. staff contracting and conditions of service across the U.N. system; and
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overhauling day-to-day business practices such as upgrading information Technology, and improving procurement procedures, accounting procedures, and budgeting processes. Administration officials have also generally supported U.N. system-wide coherence efforts, including the Delivering as One initiative and the establishment of UN Women. The Administration has implemented initiatives within the State Department aimed at evaluating and improving U.N. system transparency and effectiveness. It has continued to support the U.N. Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI), a Bush Administration program implemented by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations that tracks the adoption of management reforms by U.N. funds and programs. (The Administration is currently reviewing UNTAI structure and may make modifications to the initiative in the near future.) Additionally, in September 2010, Assistant Secretary Brimmer announced that the Bureau of International Organization Affairs hired an advisor on effectiveness, whose role is to systematically review the effectiveness of international organizations, including U.N. entities. The Administration has generally resisted proposed legislation tying U.S. contributions to specific U.N. reforms.67 In an April 2011 statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice remarked that failing to pay U.N. dues undermines our [U.S.] credibility and influence [in the United Nations]not just on reform, but on a range of U.S. national security policies22 Statements on Security Council Reform The Administration has made a number of statements regarding Security Council reform. At her confirmation hearing in January 2009, Ambassador Rice emphasized that while the Administration has not taken a position on the issue, the President recognizes that the Council of today quite logically ought to be something ... that looks a little bit different from the Council as it was created 60plus years ago. Rice also maintained that it is critically important to ensure that any Security Council reforms do not undermine the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. More recently, on November 8, 2010, President Barack Obama expressed support for Indias inclusion as a permanent Security Council member during a speech to a Joint Session of the Indian Parliament:
22
See Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups section for more information on the report, which was released on March 21, 2005
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As two global leaders, the United States and India can partner for global security especially as India serves on the Security Council over the next two years. Indeed, the just and sustainable international order that America seeks includes a United Nations that is efficient, effective, credible and legitimate. That is why I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member In a November 11, 2010, statement to the General Assembly, Deputy Permanent Representative Rosemary DiCarlo repeated U.S. support for Council expansion within a framework of not impeding effectiveness and efficiency, stating: The United States is open in principle to a modest expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent members. The United States strongly believes that any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific in nature. In assessing which countries merit permanent membership, the United States will take into account the ability of countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the United Nations. DiCarlo also emphasized that the United States is not open to an enlargement of the Security Council that changes the current veto structure. Bush Administration The George W. Bush Administration was an active participant in U.N. reform efforts. It identified several key priorities that it believed would help the United Nations improve its effectiveness, including (1) management, budget, and secretariat reform; (2) increased oversight and accountability; (3) review of all U.N. mandates and missions; and (4) fiscal discipline. Prior to and after the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the Bush Administration attempted to work with like-minded countries and the U.N. Secretary-General to move a reform agenda forward. Some reform initiatives supported by the President, particularly management and oversight reforms, were not approved or considered by the General Assembly. The Administration was displeased with the overall effectiveness of some previously implemented reforms, and was not satisfied with the pace of reform efforts. Nevertheless, it did not support mandatory withholding of U.S. payments to the United Nations23.
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The panels report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, was released on December 2, 2004
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Chapter : 7 Reform Perspectives and Priorities A significant challenge for advocates of U.N. reform is finding common ground among the disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. The global community has no common definition of U.N. reform and, as a result, there is often debate among some over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness of past and current reform initiatives. One method for determining how a stakeholder defines U.N. reform may be to identify policy priorities in the U.N. reform debate. In some cases, common objectives among stakeholders have translated into substantive reform policy, though shared goals do not always guarantee successful outcomes. Recent reform debates in the U.N. General Assembly and its committees drew attention to fundamental differences that exist among some member states, particularly developing countries (represented primarily by the Group of 77 and China), and developed countries (including the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom). Developed countries, which account for the majority of assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget, would like the Secretary-General to have greater flexibility and authority to implement reforms, specifically those related to oversight and human resources. Developing countries, however, generally object to policies that may enhance the power of the SecretaryGeneral and decrease the power of the General Assembly and its budget and administrative committees. Observers are concerned that this difference in reform philosophy will create a deadlock in the General Assembly and significantly delay the implementation of some key management and budget reforms. Selected International Perspectives Stakeholders engaged in the U.N. reform debate have different perspectives on how U.N. reform should be implemented and how to prioritize specific U.N. reform issues. Several key factors, including the European Union, the Group of 77 and China, developed countries, and nongovernmental organizations, have weighed in on several reform issues, most notably management and budget reform and development.
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European Union (EU) The EU is composed of 27 countries, accounting for about 13% of the vote share in the U.N. General Assembly and approximately 38% of the U.N. regular budget.75 The EUs reform initiatives often focus on management reform and increasing the U.N. capacity for development. The EU attaches great importance to keeping U.N. management reform on track, and supports management reforms such as mandate review. It also views the work of the Secretary-General appointed Panel on System-wide Coherence as a high priority, and supports the panels efforts to explore how the U.N. system may improve system coordination in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. The EU actively supports the reform of core U.N. organs, including the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC, and it also attaches particular importance to the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. The Group of 77 and China (G-77) The G-77 is a loosely affiliated group of 131 U.N. member states representing the interests of developing countries. It has played a significant role in recent reform debates due in part to its large membership, which can be a significant voting bloc in the General Assembly. The G-77 generally supports U.N. reform and has long viewed development as a key U.N. reform issue, emphasizing that it should be given the utmost priority by the United Nations. The G-77 views reform as a process to examine how the mandates of the United Nations can work through Well-coordinated synergies to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It believes that U.N. reform should not alter the intergovernmental nature of our [the United Nations] decision making, oversight, and monitoring process. Additionally, it does not view reform as a mechanism to reduce budget levels ... to fund more activities from within the existing pool of resources, nor to redefine the roles and responsibilities assigned to the various organs. The G-77 supported some management reforms adopted by the U.N. General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit, including the establishment of an ethics office and whistle-blower protection policy. It has, however, actively opposed other initiatives proposed by the Secretary- General, particularly those proposals that it feels may weaken the authority of the General Assembly in the areas of management, budget, and oversight. The G-77 also maintains that the positions of all member countries should be taken into consideration during the reform process. It has also expressed concern that reform initiatives proposed by the Secretary39
General may be influenced by the larger U.N. financial contributors, such as the United States, Japan, and some members of the European Union.
Developed Countries In some cases, the reform priorities of developed countries may not always align with the reform priorities of the G-77 and other developing countries. While the Gviews development as a top U.N. reform priority, many developed countries tend to focus on management, budget, and structural reform. Generally, developed countries make significantly larger financial contributions to the U.N. system than developing country member states and therefore may want to ensure that their funds are used in what they perceive as the most effective way. For example, the United States and the EU, which together account for a significant portion of the regular budget, view management and budget reform as a top priority. Japan, which contributed approximately 12.5% of the U.N. regular budget in 2010, also views management reform as a priority, particularly Secretariat reform, Security Council reform, and system-wide coherence The differing perspectives on U.N. reform among developing and developed nations were highlighted in December 2005 when a group of U.N. member states, led primarily by developed countries such as the United States and Japan, sought to link progress on management reforms to the U.N. budget. The countries placed a spending cap of $950 million (about six months of U.N. spending) on the two-year, $3.6 billion budget in hopes that the General Assembly would adopt a series of management and budget reform measures proposed by Secretary-General Annan.85 On May 8, 2006, the General Assemblys Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) by passed the traditional practice of budget-by-consensus and voted on a resolution, supported by the G-77, that approved some reforms but delayed the consideration of several others. The developed nations that imposed the budget cap were disappointed with the outcome, and eventually lifted the budget cap in June 2006 because they were unwilling to cause a shutdown of the United Nations.
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Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups Since the United Nations was established in 1945, many commissions, panels, committees, and task forces (hereafter referred to collectively as groups) have been created to examine ways to improve the United Nations. These groups are established by a variety of stakeholders, including past secretaries-general, individual member states, groups of member states, NGOs, academic institutions, and others. The following paragraphs will address the findings of a cross section of these groupsthe Volcker Commission, the U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force, and Secretary-General Kofi Annans report, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security, and Human Rights for All. Though the circumstances and mandates for each group are different, they made similar recommendations for improving the United Nations. Notably, each group highlighted the need for enhanced internal oversight and Secretariat reform, including staff buyouts and enhanced financial disclosure requirements. The groups also emphasized the need for overall streamlining and consolidation of the U.N. system The Volcker Commission In April 2004, Secretary-General Annan, with the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, appointed an independent high-level commission to inquire into corruption in the U.N.-led Iraq Oil-for-Food Program. The commission, led by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, concluded that the failures of the Oil-For-Food Program were evidence of a greater need for fundamental and wideranging administrative reform in the United Nations. The commission recommended establishing an Independent Oversight Board to review U.N. auditing, accounting, and budgeting activities; creating the position of Chief Operating Officer to oversee administrative matters such as personnel and planning practices; providing fair compensation to third parties involved in U.N. programs (while ensuring that the compensation does not lead to inappropriate profit); and expanding financial disclosure requirements to cover a variety of U.N. staff, including those working on procurement24.
24
www.google.com
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Chapter : 8 U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force In December 2004, Congress directed the U.S. Institute of Peace to create a bipartisan task force to examine ways to improve the United Nations so that it is better-equipped to meet modern-day security and human rights challenges. Congress appropriated $1.5 million to the task force and required that it submit a report on its findings to the House Committee on Appropriations. The task force identified improving internal oversight as its single most important reform recommendation. It supported the creation of an independent oversight board to direct the budget and activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). It also recommended several management reforms, including establishing the position of Chief Operating Officer, creating a U.N. Ethics Office, and enhancing whistle-blower protection. It supported broadening the U.N. staff financial disclosure policy, and recommended the review of all U.N. mandates five years or older, as well as the incorporation of sunset clauses into all new mandates. The task force supported incorporating results-based budgeting into the U.N. system, and a one-time buyout for all unwanted or unneeded staff. It recommended the creation of a new U.N. Human Rights Council to replace the discredited Commission on Human Rights, but was unable to come to consensus on Security Council reform. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All On March 21, 2005, Secretary-General Annan released his report, In Larger Freedom, in response to the findings of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The report was presented to member states as a starting point for discussion at the 2005 U.N. World Summit25, and included the following management reform recommendations: the review of all U.N. mandates over five years old; a one-time staff-buyout to ensure U.N. Secretariat staff meets current needs; the establishment of a cabinet-style decision-making body in the Secretariat to
25
The panels report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, was released on December 2, 2004
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improve management and policy activities; the review of all budget and human resource operations; and a comprehensive review of Office of Internal Oversight Services to examine ways to enhance its authority and effectiveness. In addition, Secretary-General Annan proposed a broad range of institutional and programmatic reforms, including modifying the composition of the U.N. Security Council so that it more adequately reflects current political realities, and replacing the Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council. Annan also recommended streamlining the General Assembly agenda and committee structure so that the Assembly can increase the speed of its decision making and react more swiftly and efficiently to events as they occur. Implementing Reform: Mechanics and Possible Challenges Mechanics of Implementing Reform Previous and current U.N. reform initiatives encompass an array of organizational issues that may require different processes for implementation. These reforms might be achieved by amending the U.N. Charter or through various non-Charter reforms. Charter amendment is a rarely used practice and has only occurred on three occasions. Non-Charter reforms are more common and comparatively easier to achieve. Amending the U.N. Charter Articles 108 and 109 provide for potential changes to the U.N. Charter. Article 108 of the Charter states that a proposed Charter amendment must be approved by twothirds of the full General Assembly, and be ratified according to the constitutional processes of two-thirds of U.N. member states, including the all permanent members of the Security Council. The Charter was first amended in 1963 to increase U.N. Security Council membership from 11 to 15 members, and to increase ECOSOC membership from 18 to 27. It was last amended in 1973, when ECOSOC membership increased from 27 to 54. Examples of possible reform initiatives that might involve amending the U.N. Charter include, but are not limited to: increasing Security Council membershipeither permanent and/or nonpermanent members; increasing membership on ECOSOC; and adding or removing a principal organ. Article 109 of the Charter allows for a convening of a General Conference of U.N. members with the purpose of reviewing the present Charter. The date and place of the Conference would be determined by a twothirds vote in the General Assembly, and an affirmative vote from any nine
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Security Council members. Potential revisions to the Charter would be adopted at the conference by a two-thirds vote (with each country having one vote), and take effect when ratified by the governments of two-thirds of U.N. member states. A Charter review conference has never been held.
Non-Charter Reform Process Since 1945, the General Assembly has authorized reforms of its own processes and procedures as well as those of the Secretariatwithout Charter amendment. The General Assembly has established various flora for discussing reform issues, including a Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and a Working Group on the Security Council. The General Assembly has also implemented reforms on its own by adopting proposals introduced by member states or the SecretaryGeneral. The Secretary-General can also implement reform in his capacity as chief administrative officer. For example, as part of his reform proposal in 1997, Annan established a Senior Management Group to ensure more integrated and cohesive management of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General can also make administrative decisions regarding the organization of some U.N. departments. Other non-Charter reforms have included the establishment of consensus-based budgeting in 1986; the creation of an Office of Strategic Planning in the Secretariat, authorized by Kofi Annan in 1997; and the establishment of a Peace building Commission by the Security Council and General Assembly in 2006. Possible Challenges to Reform Achieving meaningful and comprehensive U.N. reform is a significant and ongoing challenge for U.N. member states. Congress may wish to take possible reform obstacles into account when considering legislation that exercises oversight or supports a reform agenda. National Self-Interest and Differing Reform Perspectives Each U.N. member state has its own political agenda and foreign policy goals, and may also have its own definition of U.N. reform. As a result, member states often hold differing views on how best to implement reform and how to measure the success or failure of a given reform initiative. In some cases, failure to reach consensus can lead to significant delay, or failure, of certain reform initiatives. Some member states package their policy priorities as U.N. reform to further
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their own policy goals. This can cause distrust among member states as countries question whether reform proposals by other member states are based on selfinterest or a genuine desire to improve the U.N. system. Competing Priorities Some observers cite the inability of U.N. member states or secretaries-general to effectively prioritize reform initiatives as an obstacle to U.N. reform. When Secretary-General Annan presented his 2005 reform proposals, for example, he requested that they be adopted by the General Assembly not in increments, but as a package of reforms. Instead of considering a large series of reform proposals, some observers argue that member states should select only a few reform priorities and work toward their adoption and implementation. Others contend that the most efficient way to achieve reform may be for member states first to adopt reform initiatives they can agree to and then gradually work toward tackling the more divisive and complicate reform issues. Organizational Structure and Bureaucracy The United Nations is a highly complex and decentralized organization, and therefore may be slow to consider or implement potential reforms. Some argue that there is a culture of inaction in the United Nations, and that U.N. managers and staff are resistant to the implementation of new programs or changes to existing programs. Many contend that prospective and agreed-to reforms lack clear plans for implementation, including deadlines and cost estimates. They stress that this overall lack of planning may affect the progress and ultimate success of reforms already implemented, as well as those reforms currently being considered by the General Assembly.105 Some also emphasize that without proper implementation plans and follow-up, U.N. member states will be unable to adequately gauge the overall effectiveness of reforms. Limited Resources Many observers note that a significant challenge for U.N. reform efforts may be the effective implementation of reforms within the current U.N. budget. Some reform initiatives, such as the Peace building Commission, were established by member states to operate within existing resources. Many argue that the existing U.N. budget limits may not be able to support all of the reform initiatives currently
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being considered. Some member states, including the United States, however, contend that money saved from other reforms, such as mandate review, could create a funding source for further reforms and/or the creation of new U.N. programs or bodies.
External Influences The complex relationships that exist among member states outside of the U.N. system may be another challenge affecting U.N. reform efforts. These relationships are entirely independent of the United Nations but can affect how countries work together within the U.N. framework to achieve reform objectives. Military conflict, religious and ethnic differences, political conflict, trade and economic issues, and geography can all potentially impact reform cooperation among U.N. member states.
Previous Reform Legislation When considering U.N. reform issues, the 112th Congress may wish to explore the nature and effectiveness of past legislative approaches and how or if they may have influenced the adoption of reform measures at the United Nations. There is evidence that legislation such as the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment and the Helms-Biden Agreement may have led, either directly or indirectly, to substantive changes in U.N. policies. The following sections highlight selected reform legislation from 1986 to the present and note any subsequent changes to internal U.N. policy26. Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment (1986-1987)107 In the mid-1980s, some Members of Congress expressed concern that U.S. influence over the U.N. budget was not proportionate to its rate of assessment. In 1986 Congress passed legislation, popularly known as the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment, which required that the U.S. assessed contribution to the U.N.
26
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regular budget be reduced to 20% unless the United Nations gave major U.N. financial contributors a greater say in the budget process. Subsequently, in 1986 the General Assembly adopted a new budget and planning process that incorporated consensus-based budgeting as a decision-making mechanism, thus giving member states with higher assessment levels a potentially greater voice in the budget process. U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (1993) In the early 1990s, some Members of Congress and the Administration were concerned with the apparent lack of oversight and accountability within the U.N. system. In 1993, as part of the FY1994 State Department Appropriations Act, Congress directed that 10% of U.S. assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget be withheld until the Secretary of State certified to Congress that the United Nations has established an independent office with responsibilities and powers substantially similar to offices of Inspectors General Act of 1978.109 On July 29, 1994, the U.N. General Assembly established the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) which reports directly to the Secretary-General and provides internal auditing, investigation, inspection, programme monitoring, evaluation and consulting services to all U.N. activities under the SecretaryGenerals authority. Helms-Biden Agreement (1999) In the late 1990s, Congress and the Administration negotiated and agreed to legislation that would further U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. The HelmsBiden bill authorized payment of some U.S. arrears if specific reform benchmarks were met and certified to Congress by the Secretary of State. Under the terms of Helms-Biden, the United States agreed to (1) pay $819 million in arrearages over fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000; and (2) forgive $107 million owed to the United States by the United Nations in peacekeeping costs if the United Nations applied the $107 million to U.S. peacekeeping arrears. For arrearage payments to occur, Congress required that the U.S. assessment for contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced from 25% to 22% and that the peacekeeping contribution be reduced from 30% to 25%.112 In December 2000 the U.N. General Assembly reduced the regular budget assessment level to from 25% to 22%, and the Peacekeeping share from approximately 30.4% to 28%. In subsequent years, the U.S. peacekeeping assessment continued to fall and is now close to 26.5%.
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Conclusion The United Nations as it now functions is minimally effective in dealing with most of the problems noted above. The objective of reform must be to equip it to deal effectively with all of them. It must be able to guide the world towards a pattern of economic globalization that will eradicate poverty, sustain individual freedom and liberties, and maintain intact the critically important balances of Nature. Obviously, this cannot be achieved with piecemeal reform. The Organization must be fundamentally reconceptualized. The overall functioning of world order must be critically assessed and changed where necessary. The reforms now under way do not have these objectives in view and are thus entirely inadequate. Can any set of reforms equip the United Nations for the very large tasks outlined above? Will governments have the vision and the capacity to make the necessary changes? The answer has to be yes. The human species has made many behavioral adaptations in its evolutionary march; this just happens to be the first one that must be globally coordinated and implemented. The hypothesis which has been taken lies in critical however there is a ray of hope This research raised many mind boggling question regarding the UN reform the hypothesis hence proved partly right the UN is driven by the powerful hand.
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Bibliography
See Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups section for more information on the report, which was released on
y U.N. document, A/57/387, September 9, 2002, Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change. Some of the 2002 reform proposals were implemented, including centralization of U.N. information around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe; strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the establishment of a policy planning unit in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. y The panels report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, was released on December 2, 2004. y Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups section for more information on the report, which was released on March 21, 2005. y United Nations: A Programme for Reform, (A/51/950, July 14, 1997) which was endorsed by the General Assembly on December 19, 1997. y United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and guidelines Book. y www.google.com y United Nations Wikipedia information.
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NIRMA UNIVERSITY

3nd Semester B.A. L.L.B.(Hons.)Course

A brief legal research in the subject of

Political Science as Project Work for the

academic year 2011-12

On the topic of TITLE: United Nation Reforms : An International Perspectives

Submitted by: Himani Bhargava

Submitted to: Ass. Prof. Ravi Saxena

Institute of Law Nirma University

Chapter : 108 Introduction y Review Of Literature.10 y Objective, Hypothesis, Research Methodology12

Chapter : 4.27 Reforms related to UN y Reforms dependent on the Security Council..28

Background and Trends

Chapter : 3 Selected Reform Efforts

Chapter : 5 Other Reform Initiatives

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