Labor II Reviewer MT

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I. INTRODUCTION A. Constitution
Art III Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Art XIII Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth. B. Labor Code ARTICLE 211. Declaration of Policy. - A. It is the policy of the State: (a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes; (b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social justice and development; (c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement; (d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union members and as employees; (e) To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes; (f) To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and (g) To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare. B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code. (As amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 275. Tripartism and tripartite conferences.
(a) Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a State policy. Towards this end, workers and employers shall, as far as practicable, be represented in decision and policy-making bodies of the government. (b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives may, from time to time, call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of representatives of government, workers and employers for the consideration and adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed to promote industrial peace based on social justice or to align labor movement relations with established priorities in economic and social development. In calling such conference, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult with accredited representatives of workers and employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 212. Definitions. (a) Commission means the National Labor Relations Commission or any of its divisions, as the case may be, as provided under this Code. (b) Bureau means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices established under Presidential Decree No. 1, in the Department of Labor. (c) Board means the National Conciliation and Mediation Board established under Executive Order No. 126. (d) Council means the Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council established under Executive Order No. 126, as amended. (e) Employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer. (f) Employee includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. (g) Labor organization means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. (h) Legitimate labor organization means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof. (i) Company union means any labor organization whose formation, function or administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this Code. (j) Bargaining representative means a legitimate labor organization whether or not employed by the employer. (k) Unfair labor practice means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the Code. (l) Labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. (m) Managerial employee is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not
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merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book. ARTICLE 213. National Labor Relations Commission. There shall be a National Labor Relations Commission which shall be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only, composed of a Chairman and fourteen (14) Members. Five (5) members each shall be chosen from among the nominees of the workers and employers organizations, respectively. The Chairman and the four (4) remaining members shall come from the public sector, with the latter to be chosen from among the recommendees of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Upon assumption into office, the members nominated by the workers and employers organizations shall divest themselves of any affiliation with or interest in the federation or association to which they belong. The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. Subject to the penultimate sentence of this paragraph, the Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches, and formulating policies affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions, and duties through its divisions. Of the five (5) divisions, the first, second and third divisions shall handle cases coming from the National Capital Region and the parts of Luzon; and the fourth and fifth divisions, cases from the Visayas and Mindanao, respectively; Provided that the Commission sitting en banc may, on temporary or emergency basis, allow cases within the jurisdiction of any division to be heard and decided by any other division whose docket allows the additional workload and such transfer will not expose litigants to unnecessary additional expense. The divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial jurisdictions. [As amended by Republic Act No. 7700]. The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of judgment or resolution. Whenever the required membership in a division is not complete and the concurrence of two (2) commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the Chairman shall designate such number of additional Commissioners from the other divisions as may be necessary. The conclusions of a division on any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion. It shall be mandatory for the division to meet for purposes of the consultation ordained herein. A certification to this effect signed by the Presiding Commissioner of the division shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. The Chairman shall be the Presiding Commissioner of the first division and the four (4) other members from the public sector shall be the Presiding Commissioners of the second, third, fourth and fifth divisions, respectively. In case of the effective absence or incapacity of the Chairman, the Presiding Commissioner of the second division shall be the Acting Chairman. The Chairman, aided by the Executive Clerk of the Commission, shall have administrative supervision over the Commission and its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. The Commission, when sitting en banc shall be assisted by the same Executive Clerk and, when acting thru its Divisions, by said Executive Clerks for the second, third, fourth and fifth Divisions, respectively, in the performance of such similar or equivalent functions and duties as are discharged by the Clerk of Court and Deputy
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Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals. (As amended by Section 5, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 214. Headquarters, Branches and Provincial Extension Units. The Commission and its First, Second and Third divisions shall have their main offices in Metropolitan Manila, and the Fourth and Fifth divisions in the Cities of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, respectively. The Commission shall establish as many regional branches as there are regional offices of the Department of Labor and Employment, sub-regional branches or provincial extension units. There shall be as many Labor Arbiters as may be necessary for the effective and efficient operation of the Commission. Each regional branch shall be headed by an Executive Labor Arbiter. (As amended by Section 6, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 215. Appointment and Qualifications. The Chairman and other Commissioners shall be members of the Philippine Bar and must have engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines for at least fifteen (15) years, with at least five (5) years experience or exposure in the field of labor-management relations, and shall preferably be residents of the region where they are to hold office. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall likewise be members of the Philippine Bar and must have been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines for at least seven (7) years, with at least three (3) years experience or exposure in the field of labor-management relations: Provided, However, that incumbent Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least five (5) years may be considered as already qualified for purposes of reappointment as such under this Act. The Chairman and the other Commissioners, the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of sixty-five years, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Chairman, the division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointment to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Commission, appoint the staff and employees of the Commission and its regional branches as the needs of the service may require, subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and upgrade their current salaries, benefits and other emoluments in accordance with law. (As amended by Section 7, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. The Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of a Regional Director of said Department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to,
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and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials. (As amended by Section 8, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor, shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (As amended by Section 14, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court, shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion. ARTICLE. 228. Indorsement of cases to Labor Arbiters. (a) Except as provided in paragraph(b) of this Article, the Labor Arbiter shall entertain only cases endorsed to him for compulsory arbitration by the Bureau or by the Regional Director with a written notice of such indorsement or non-indorsement. The indorsement or non-indorsement of the Regional Director may be appealed to the Bureau within ten (10) working days from receipt of the notice. (b) The parties may, at any time, by mutual agreement, withdraw a case from the Conciliation Section and jointly submit it to a Labor Arbiter, except deadlocks in collective bargaining.] (Repealed by Section 16, Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981). ARTICLE 229. Issuance of subpoenas. - The Bureau shall have the power to require the appearance of any person or the production of any paper, document or matter relevant to a labor dispute under its jurisdiction, either at the request of any interested party or at its own initiative. ARTICLE 230. Appointment of bureau personnel. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may appoint, in addition to the present personnel of the Bureau and the Industrial Relations Divisions, such number of examiners and other assistants as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of the Code. [As amended by Section 15, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989]. ARTICLE 231. Registry of unions and file of collective bargaining agreements. The Bureau shall keep a registry of legitimate labor organizations.
The Bureau shall also maintain a file of all collective bargaining agreements and other related agreements and records of settlement of labor disputes and copies of orders and decisions of voluntary arbitrators. The file shall be open and accessible to interested parties under conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, provided that no specific information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed unless authorized by the Secretary, or when it is at issue in any judicial litigation, or when public interest or national security so requires. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment for registration, accompanied with verified proofs of its posting in two conspicuous places in the place of work and ratification by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or Regional Offices shall act upon the application for registration of such Collective Bargaining Agreement within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. The Regional Offices shall furnish the Bureau with a copy of the Collective Bargaining Agreement within five (5) days from its submission. The Bureau or Regional Office shall assess the employer for every Collective Bargaining Agreement a registration fee of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or in any other amount as may be deemed appropriate and necessary by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the effective and efficient administration of the Voluntary Arbitration Program. Any amount collected under this provision shall accrue to the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund. The Bureau shall also maintain a file and shall undertake or assist in the publication of all final decisions, orders and awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, Regional Directors and the Commission. (As amended by Section 15, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 232. Prohibition on certification election. The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code. (As amended by Section 15, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ARTICLE 233. Privileged communication. Information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them. ARTICLE 267. Assistance by the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor, at the initiative of the Secretary of Labor, shall extend special assistance to the organization, for purposes of collective bargaining, of the most underprivileged workers who, for reasons of occupation, organizational structure or insufficient incomes, are not normally covered by major labor organizations or federations. ARTICLE 268. Assistance by the Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies. The Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies shall render technical and other forms of assistance to labor organizations and employer organizations in the field of labor education, especially pertaining to collective bargaining, arbitration, labor standards and the Labor Code of the Philippines in general.
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 126 as Amended by E.O. 251 REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (Pertinent Provisions only) The Executive Order is also known as the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is the declared policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of the workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and human conditions of work. Sec. 4. Mandate and Objectives. The Ministry shall be the primary policy, programming, coordinating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the field of labor and employment. It shall assume primary responsibility for: (a) The promotion of gainful employment opportunities and the optimization of the development and utilization of the country's manpower resources; (b) The advancement of workers' welfare by providing for just and humane working conditions and terms of employment; (c) The maintenance of industrial peace by promoting harmonious, equitable, and stable employment relations that assure equal protection for the rights of all concerned parties. Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. In pursuit of its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers and functions: (a) Formulate and recommend policies, plans and programs for manpower development, training, allocation, and utilization; (b) Protect and promote the interest of every citizen desiring to work locally or overseas by securing for him the most equitable terms and conditions of employment, and by providing social and welfare services; (c) Regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or work permit system for such aliens; (d) Formulate general guidelines concerning wage and income policy; (e) Recommend necessary adjustments in wage structures with a view to developing a wage system that is consistent with national economic and social development plans; (f) Provide for safe, decent, humane and improved working conditions and environment for all workers, particularly women and young workers; (g) Maintain harmonious, equitable and stable labor relations system that is supportive of the national economic policies and programs; (h) Uphold the right of workers and employers to organize and to promote free collective bargaining as the foundation of the labor relations system; (i) Provide and ensure the fair and expeditious settlement and disposition of labor and industrial disputes through collective bargaining, grievance machinery, conciliation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, compulsory arbitration as may be provided by law, and other modes that may be voluntarily agreed upon by the parties concerned. Sec. 6. Minister of Labor and Employment. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Labor and Employment, hereinafter referred by the President, and who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry. For such purposes, the Minister shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Advise the President on the promulgation of executive/administrative orders, other regulative issuances and legislative proposals on matters pertaining to labor and employment; (b) Formulate policies, guidelines, rules and regulations and other issuances necessary to carry out Ministry policies, plans, programs and projects; (c) Issue orders, directives, rules and regulations and other issuances to carry out labor and employment policies, plans, programs and projects; (d) Provide overall direction, supervision, and control over all offices under the Ministry to ensure effective and efficient implementation of its policies, plans, programs and projects; (e) Coordinate with other government offices, labor, organizations, employers associations, and any other group to carry out the mandate of the Ministry; (f) Evaluate the policy, plans, programs and project accomplishment of the Ministry; (g) Prepare reports for the President and for the public; (h) Delegate authority for the performance of any function to officers and employees of the Ministry; (i) Exercise such other powers and functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the President. Sec. 10. Structural Organization. The Ministry shall consist of the Ministry proper comprising the Office of the Minister, the Office of the Deputy and Assistant Ministers, the Services and the Staff Bureaus, and its Regional Offices. Sec. 22. National Conciliation and Mediation Board. A National Conciliation and Mediation Board, herein referred to as the "Board", is hereby created and which shall absorb the conciliation mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the Bureau of Labor of Relations in accordance with Section 29 (c) hereof. The Board shall be composed of an Administrator and two (2) Deputy Administrators. It shall be an attached agency under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Administrators and the Deputy Administrators shall be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. There shall be as many Conciliators-Mediators as the needs of the public service require, who shall have at least three (3) years of experience in handling labor relations and who shall be appointed by the Secretary. The Board shall have its main office in Metropolitan Manila and its Administrators shall exercise supervision over Conciliators-Mediators and all its personnel. It shall establish as many branches as there are administrative regions in the country, with a many Conciliator-mediators as shall be necessary for its effective operation. Each branch of the Board shall be headed by an Executive Conciliator-Mediator. The Board shall have the following functions: (a) Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and conciliation of labor disputes; (b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions; (c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors of institutions, and other government authorities concerned with matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes; (d) formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to the promotion of cooperative and nonadversarial schemes, grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlements; (e) Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain/update a list of voluntary arbitrations; compile arbitration awards and decisions; (f) Provide counselling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration of collective agreement; awards and decisions;
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(g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented in the regional offices; and (h) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary. A Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council is hereby created and attached to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. The Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council shall advise the National Conciliation Board on matters pertaining to the promotion of voluntary arbitration as the preferred mode of dispute settlement. The Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council shall consist of the Administrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board as Chairman, one other member from the government, two members representing labor, and two other members representing management. The members shall be appointed by the President to serve for a term of three (3) years. The Chairman and Members thereof shall serve without compensation. Sec. 24. Regional Offices, District Offices and Provincial Extention Units. The Department is hereby authorized to establish, operate and maintain such Department-wide Regional Offices, District Offices and Provincial Extension Units in each of the administrative regions of the country, insofar as necessary to promote economy and efficiency in the delivery of its services. Each Regional Office shall be headed by a Regional Director who shall have supervision and control thereof. The Regional Director, whenever necessary, shall be assisted by an Assistant Regional Director. A Regional Office shall have, within its regional areas, the following functions: a) Implement laws, policies, plans, programs, projects, rules and regulations of the Department; b) Provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people; c) Coordinate with regional offices of other departments and agencies; d) Coordinate with local government units; e) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary. PAL v NLRC (1993) Management prerogative not boundless PAL asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1985, there was no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility therefor between employer and employee. Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly considered it a State policy (t)o ensure the participation of workers in decision and policymaking processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare. However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina, it was held that managements prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion. Line drawn between policies which are purely business-oriented and those which affect rights of employees. A close scrutiny of the objectionable provisions of the Code reveals that they are not purely business-oriented nor do they concern the management aspect of the business of the company as in the San Miguel case. The provisions of the Code clearly have repercussions on the employees right to security of tenure. The implementation of the provisions may result in the deprivation of an employees means of livelihood which is a property right.
In view of these aspects of the case which border on infringement of constitutional rights, we must uphold the constitutional requirements for the protection of labor and the promotion of social justice, for these factors tilt the scales of justice when there is doubt, in favor of the worker Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes of action. Employees right to participate in policymaking upheld Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their rights. PALs position that it cannot be saddled with the obligation of sharing management prerogatives as during the formulation of the Code, Republic Act No. 6715 had not yet been enacted cannot thus be sustained. While such obligation was not yet founded in law when the Code was formulated, the attainment of a harmonious labor-management relationship and the then already existing state policy of enlightening workers concerning their rights as employees demand no less than the observance of transparency in managerial moves affecting employees rights. Meralco v Quisumbing Wage increases for Public Utilities and its effect on consumers Meralco warns that if the wage increase of P2,200 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioners employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase. Retroactive effect of Arbitral Awards Collective Bargaining Agreement arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last Collective Bargaining Agreement shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or their union, and in the absence of such an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the Collective Bargaining Agreement should there be one, or, in the absence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Secretarys determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control. An arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties Cooperatives; The award of loans for housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of life, but providing seed money for the establishment of an employees cooperative is a matter in which the employer has no business interest or legal obligation. Management Prerogatives; Contracting Out of Services; The employer is allowed to contract out services for six months or more. The added requirement of consultation imposed by the Secretary in cases of contracting out for six (6) months or more has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say that the employer is allowed to contract out services for six months or more. However, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of
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employees, and in treating the latter, the employer should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order to attain a harmonious labor-management relationship and enlighten the workers concerning their rights. The management cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operationit has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies; Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative The management cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already sufficiently regulates this matter. Jurisprudence also provides adequate limitations, such that the employer must be motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of malicious or arbitrary actions. ARTICLE 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters; II. RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION A. Concept & Scope
xxx (c) Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of service, be considered as an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715). Article. 212. Definitions. (e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer. (f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.
Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I-Rule II, as amended by D.O. 40, series of 2003 RULE II - COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION Section 1. Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the free and responsible exercise of the right to self-organization through the establishment of a simplified mechanism for the speedy registration of labor unions and workers associations, determination of representation status and resolution of inter/intra-union and other related labor relations disputes. Only legitimate or registered labor unions shall have the right to represent their members for collective bargaining and other purposes. Workers' associations shall have the right to represent their members for purposes other than collective bargaining. Section 2. Who may join labor unions and worker's associations. - All persons employed in commercial, industrial an agricultural enterprises, including employees of government owned or controlled corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well as employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs, or which has ratified either ILO Convention No. 87 and ILO Convention No. 93.
Article 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980). Article 246. Non-abridgment of right to self-organization. It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-organization. Such right shall include the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose or for their mutual aid and protection, subject to the provisions of Article 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980). Article. 277. Miscellaneous provisions.
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For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization. All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the selfemployed, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining. (As amended by DO 40-C-05.) S.S. Ventures International v. S.S Ventures Labor Union To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents. It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition of a labor union, after it has submitted the corresponding papers, is not ministerial on the part of the BLR. Far from it. After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously complied with. If the union's application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especial those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these considerations, the issuance to the Union of a Certificate of Registration necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities. B. Special Groups of Employees 1. Managerial & Supervisory Employees Article 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; Right of Supervisory Employees. - Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in the collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate collective bargaining units and/or legitimate labor organizations of their own. The rank-and-file union and the supervisors union operating within the same establishment may join the same federation or national union. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989 and Section 8, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article. 212. Definitions. (m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any
of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book. Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 as amended by D.O. 40-03 (hh) "Managerial Employee" refers to an employee who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. (nn) "Rank-and-File Employee" refers to an employee whose functions are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature. (xx) "Supervisory Employee" refers to an employee who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends managerial actions and the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical but requires the use of independent judgment. Franklin Baker v. Trajano, A managerial employee is defined as one "who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions." The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. Thus, where such recommendatory powers as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law. Subject employees are not managerial employees because as borne by the records, they do not participate in policy making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe, thus having little freedom of action. Even if we regard the employees concerned as "managerial employees," they can still join the union of the rank and file employees. They cannot however form their own exclusive union as "managerial employees". Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa Triumph International v. Ferrer Calleja, In ruling that the members of respondent union are rank and file and not managerial employees, the public respondent made the following findings: (1) they do not have the power to lay down and execute management policies as they are given ready policies merely to execute and standard practices to observe; (2) they do not have the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees but only to recommend for such actions as the power rests upon the personnel manager; and (3) they do not have the power to effectively recommend any managerial actions as their recommendations have to pass through the department manager for review, the personnel manager for attestation and general manager/president for final actions.
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The public respondent, in its factual findings, found that the supervisory employees sought to be represented by the respondent union are not involved in policy-making and their recommendatory powers are not even instantly effective since the same are still subject to review by at least three managerial heads (department manager, personnel manager and general manager) before final action can be taken. Hence, it is evidently settled that the said employees do not possess a managerial status. The fact that their work designations are either managers or supervisors is of no moment considering that it is the nature of their functions and not the said nomenclatures or titles of their jobs which determines their statuses. Instead of forming another bargaining unit, the law requires them to be members of the existing one. If a collective bargaining agreement validly exists, a petition for certification election can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of said agreement. United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesina Art. 245 of Labor Code is valid, right to organize is not absolute. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC: In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them. In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus: ". . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership." To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of confidential employees to organize. But the same reason for denying them the right to organize justifies even more the ban on managerial employees from forming unions. After all, those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers information that not only is confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to other employees. It is hardly necessary to point out that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is unconstitutional would be to contradict the decision in that case.
3 types of Managers: FIRST-LINE MANAGERS: The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. Firstline managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers. Example of first-line managers are the foreman or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level managers are often called supervisors. MIDDLE MANAGERS: The term middle management can refer to more than one level in an organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle manager. TOP MANAGERS: Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organizations interactions with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are chief executive officer, president, and senior vice-president. Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest management classification. Distinction between Managers; Managers still employees A distinction exist between those who have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such polices are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees. Managerial employees may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the managers per se, who compose the former group described above, and the supervisors who form the latter group. Whether they belong to the first or second category, managers, vis--vis employers, are, likewise, employees. University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja The power to recommend, in order to qualify an employee as a supervisor or managerial employee "must not only be effective but the exercise of such authority should not be merely of a routinary or clerical nature but should require the use of independent judgment." Where such recommendatory powers, as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law. There are various factors which must be satisfied and considered in determining the proper constituency of a bargaining unit. No one particular factor is itself decisive of the determination. The weight accorded to any particular factor varies in accordance with the particular question or questions that may arise in a given case. What are these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number, but the most pertinent to our case are: (1) will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
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compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal probationary employees. . . . Also these factors may also be considered: the history, extent and type of organization of employees; the history of their collective bargaining; the history, extent and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same industry; the skill, wages, work, and working conditions of the employees; the desires of the employees; the eligibility of the employees for membership in the union or unions involved; and the relationship between the unit or units proposed and the employer's organization, management, and operation. . . . The basic test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining (citing Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco, Labor Laws, 162). . . . The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping is community or mutuality of interests. And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 490)." Since then, the "community or mutuality of interests" test has provided the standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor Union Supervisory employees, as defined above, are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but require the use of independent judgment. Under the job description for level five employees, such personnel all engineers having a number of personnel under them, not only oversee production of new models but also determine manpower requirements, thereby influencing important hiring decisions at the highest levels. This determination is neither routine nor clerical but involves the independent assessment of factors affecting production, which in turn affect decisions to hire or transfer workers. The use of independent judgment in making the decision to hire, fire or transfer in the identification of manpower requirements would be greatly impaired if the employee's loyalties are torn between the interests of the union and the interests of management. A supervisory employee occupying a level five position would therefore find it difficult to objectively identify the exact manpower requirements dictated by production demands. The rationale behind the Code's exclusion of supervisors from unions of rank-andfile employees is that such employees, while in the performance of supervisory functions, become the alter ego of management in the making and the implementing of key decisions at the sub-managerial level. Certainly, it would be difficult to find unity or mutuality of interests in a bargaining unit consisting of a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees.
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list contains the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election. The purpose of every certification election is to determine the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. A certification election for the collective bargaining process is one of the fairest and most effective ways of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. In determining the labor organization which represents the interests of the workforce, those interests must be, as far as reasonably possible, homogeneous, so as to genuinely reach the concerns of the individual members of a labor organization. A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rankand-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code. Toyota Motor Phils. Labor Union v. Toyota Motor Phils. The Med-Arbiter also found that TMPCLU had not acquired legal personality for the reason that its composition, being a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, was in direct violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code. The union's composition being in violation of the Labor Code's prohibition of unions composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it could not possess the requisite personality to file for recognition as a legitimate labor organization. In any case, the factual issue, albeit ignored by the public respondents assailed Resolution, was adequately threshed out in the Med-Arbiters September 28, 1994 Order. In effect therefore, we already impressed our stamp of approval on the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter in his 28 September 1994 decision, i.e., that petitioner had no valid certificate of registration and therefore no legal personality to file the Petition for Certification Election and in the absence of any attempt on its part to rectify the legal infirmity, likewise the disputed Petition-in-Intervention. We cannot also accede to petitioner's submission that the issuance of a certificate of registration in its favor is an adequate and unassailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file a Petition for Certification Election. As we emphasized in Progressive Development Corp. - Pizza Hut v. Laguesma, if a labor organizations application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of registration has been issued, the propriety of its registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election. SPI Technologies v. DOLE (minute resolution), 8 March 1999
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Under prevailing rules, once a union acquires legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation. It is worth noting too that Article 245 of the Labor Code relied upon by petitioner merely prescribes the requirements for eligibility in joining a union and does not prescribe the grounds for the cancellation of union registration In the absence of any independent petition for cancellation of registration filed against private respondent labor union, it continues to be possessed with legal personality of a legitimate labor organization. Tagaytay Highlands v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees UnionPTGWO January 22, 2003 While Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rankand-file union, it does not provide what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees among its members, or vice-versa. After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code. THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered to have already acquired juridical personality which may not be assailed collaterally. The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor Code. Atlas Litographic Services v. Laguesma The intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor organization would represent conflicting interests. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they are not managers, when they recommend action implementing management policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of subordinates, they identify with the interests of the employer and may act contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file. The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file local union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit. De La Salle University Medical Center v. Laguesma Supervisory employees have the right to self-organization as do other classes of employees save only managerial ones. The reason for the segregation of supervisory and rank-and-file employees of a company with respect to the exercise of the right to self-organization is the difference in their interests. Supervisory employees are more closely identified with the employer than with the rank-and-file employees.
If supervisory and rank-and-file employees in a company are allowed to form a single union, the conflicting interests of these groups impair their relationship and adversely affect discipline, collective bargaining, and strikes. These consequences can obtain not only in cases where supervisory and rank-and-file employees in the same company belong to a single union but also where unions formed independently by supervisory and rank-andfile employees of a company are allowed to affiliate with the same national federation. To avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union activities in the company. The affiliation of two local unions in a company with the same national federation is not by itself a negation of their independence since in relation to the employer, the local unions are considered as the principals, while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent. Although private respondent FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC and another union composed of rank-and-file employees of petitioner DLSUMCCM are indeed affiliated with the same national federation, the FFW, petitioner DLSUMCCM has not presented any evidence showing that the rank-and-file employees composing the other union are directly under the authority of the supervisory employees. As held in Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR, the fact that the two groups of workers are employed by the same company and the fact that they are affiliated with a common national federation are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that their organizations are actually just one. Their immediate professional relationship must be established. The locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of locals into the national unionwas in furtherance of the same end. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it to existence. 2. Confidential Employees Standard Charter, etc. v. Standard Chartered Bank While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Bank cashiers, according to jurisprudence, are confidential employees having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters. Confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to
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confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as spy or spies of either party to a CBA. Finally, human resources staff may be qualified as confidential employees because by the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. Pepsi Cola Products v. Secretary of Labor Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by Ra No. 6715 provides: Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union activity in the company. The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit. It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a nonadversarial and fact finding character." Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in the position papers and other documents. At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. The rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees is that if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company dominated with the presence of managerial
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employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interest is well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers. "Confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union. What is essential is the nature of the employee's function and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has rank and file or managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory employee. National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) v. NLRC A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the Court considered the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus: ". . . if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become companydominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245. If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the
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purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers. Metrolab Industries v. Confesor, Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. The rationale behind the exclusion of confidential employees from the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees and their disqualification from the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees and their disqualification to join any labor organization is that: By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them. The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee the confidential relationship must exist between the employees and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations (important element). The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential employee rule. The rationale is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. In determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information. Granting that an employee has access to confidential labor relations information but such is merely incidental to his duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties, said access does not render the employee a confidential employee. If access to confidential labor relations information is to be a factor in the determination of an employees confidential status, such information must relate to the employers labor relations policies. Thus, knowledge of labor relations information pertaining to the companies with which the union deals, or which the association represents, will not clause an employee to be excluded from the bargaining unit representing employees of the union or association. Access to
information which is regarded by the employer to be confidential from the business standpoint, such as financial information or technical trade secrets, will not render an employee a confidential employee. Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to all workers the right to self-organization. Hence, confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to needlessly deprive many employees of their right bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing. The employees in this case may appropriately form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining since the confidential information they have access to are not related to labor relations policies. Furthermore, even assuming that they are confidential employees, jurisprudence has established that there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union. Sugbuanon Rural Bank v. Laguesma Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations.It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the union's registration. On this score, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed. The law frowns on a union where the membership is composed of both supervisors and rank-and-file employees, for fear that conflicts of interest may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining, and strikes. However, in the present case, none of the members of the respondent union came from the rank-and-file employees of the bank. 3. Security Guards Manila Electric Co. v. Secretary of Labor & Employment Pursuant to the Department of Labor's goal of strengthening the constitutional right of workers to self-organization, RA 6715 was subsequently passed which reorganized the employee-ranks by including a third group, or the supervisory employees, and laying down the distinction between supervisory employees and those of managerial ranks in Art. 212, depending on whether the employee concerned has the power to lay down and execute management policies, in the case of managerial employees, or merely to recommend them, in case of supervisory employees.
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The determinative factor in classifying an employee as managerial, supervisory or rank-and-file is the nature of the work of the employee concerned. The nature of the work of a managerial employees is. . . that the employee's primary duty consists of the management of the establishment or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, that he customarily and regularly directs the work of other employees therein, that he has the authority to hire or discharge other employees or that his suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and discharging and or to the advancement and promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight, that he customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers. While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization. Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own. 4. Members of Cooperatives Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Ferrer-Calleja The Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining. 5. Members of the Iglesia ni Cristo Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a right, it can be safely said that a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: (1) liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and (2) power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he makes up his
mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawal by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization the employer is, however, not precluded from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified, it prohibits unreasonable impairment only; the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? To insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates from which the individual needs protection. The employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces a third aggregate of group strengththe collective bargaining relationship. It cannot be denied, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve the purpose exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreementsis reasonable.
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The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. The benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The establishment clause (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. Religious Test - The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Under Republic Act No. 3350, a religious objector is not required to do a positive actto exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. Republic Act 3350 does not violate the equal protection of the law clause of the constitution. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinction. The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements. Republic Act 3350 does not violate the concept of social justice contained in the Constitution. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefitedit is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby. Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v. Ferrer-Calleja
The right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of selforganization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation." The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987. As pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot." 6. Government Employees: Article 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986). Article. 276. Government employees. - The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be no reduction of existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of this Code. Executive Order No. 180 - PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES I. Coverage Sec. 1. This applies to all employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Sec. 2. All government employees can form, join or assist employees' organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in conjunction with appropriate government authorities, labormanagement committees, works councils and other forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives. Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policymaking or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and-file government employees.
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Sec. 4. Shall not apply to the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards. II. Protection of the Right to Organize Sec. 5. Government employees shall not be discriminated against in respect of their employment by reason of their membership in employees' organizations or participation in the normal activities of their organization. Their employment shall not be subject to the condition that they shall not join or shall relinquish their membership in the employees' organizations. Sec. 6. Government authorities shall not interfere in the establishment, functioning or administration of government employees' organizations through acts designed to place such organizations under the control of government authority. III. Registration of Employees' Organization Sec. 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, which shall immediately transmit the applications to the BLR within three (3) days from receipt thereof. Sec. 8. Upon approval, a registration certificate be issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment. IV. Sole and Exclusive Employees' Representatives xxx Sec. 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees. Sec. 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that the said organizations has the majority support of the rank-and-file employees in the organizational unit. Sec. 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization unit. D. Terms and Conditions of Employment in Government Services Sec. 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities. VI. Peaceful Concerted Activities and Strikes
Sec. 14. The Civil Service laws and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. xxx VIII. Settlement of Disputes Sec. 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the Council, for appropriate action. Acosta v. CA June 28, 2000 The character and legality of the mass actions which they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr. wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we added that: it is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances." It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the "mass actions," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. 7. Employees of International Organizations International Catholic Migration Commission v. Ferrer-Calleja The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
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ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan. ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better managementemployee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an international organization, deprives its employees of the right to self-organization. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem." 8. Non-employees Article 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. xxx Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980). Republic Planters Bank v Laguesma The Court ruled that if the union members are not employees, they have no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as bargaining agents. The Court held that since the persons involved are not employees of the company, they
are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. The question of EER is the primary question that must be asked before extending labor benefits. The EER is a condition sine qua non for the recognition of the employees as a bargaining unit. Failure to establish this juridical relationship between the union members and the employers affects the legality of the union itself. C. Acquisition and Retention of Membership: Union Security Agreements:
Article. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. xxx (c) Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of service, be considered as an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715). Article 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: xxx (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent; Liberty Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc. It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to enable the workers to negotiate with management on the same level and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and independently bargain for the improvement of their respective conditions. To this end, the Constitution guarantees to them the rights "to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted actions including the right to strike in accordance with law." There is no question that these purposes could be thwarted if every worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of joining his co-employees in planning collective action and presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with their employers. It is for this reason that the law has sanctioned stipulations for the union shop and the closed shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join and support the labor union of their own choice as their representative in the negotiation of their demands and the protection of their interest vis-a-vis the employer. The certification of the collective bargaining agreement by the Bureau of Labor Relations is not required to put a stamp of validity to such contract. Once it is duly entered into and signed by the parties, a collective bargaining agreement becomes
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effective as between the parties regardless of whether or not the same has been certified by the BLR. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.
organize freely. Such interpretation would be inconsistent with the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford protection to labor. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations correctly found that the disputed "maintenance-of-membership" clause in question did not give the Manila Cordage Company the right to dismiss just because they resigned as members of the Manco Labor Union. A maintenance-of-membership provision is one which requires all employees who are already members of the union at the time the provision takes effect to remain such members during the life thereof -is a condition of continued employment.
III. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS A. Definition & Types: Rule I, Sec (h-p)
Santos-Juat v. CIR The closed shop proviso in a collective bargaining agreement between employer and employee is sanctioned by law. A closed-shop agreement has been considered as one form of union security whereby only union members can be hired and workers must remain union members as a condition of continued employment. The requirement for employees or workers to become members of a union as a condition for employment redounds to the benefit and advantage of said employees because by holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed-shop the union wields group solidarity. In fact, it is said that "the closed-shop contract is the most prized achievement of unionism". The closed-shop proviso of a collective bargaining agreement entered into between an employer and a duly authorized labor union applies, and should be applied, to old employees or workers who are non-members of any labor union at the time the collective bargaining agreement was entered into. In other words, the old employees or workers can be obliged by his employer to join the labor union which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement that provides for a closed-shop as a condition for his continuance in his employment, otherwise his refusal to join the contracting labor union would constitute a justifiable basis for his dismissal. Manila Cordage Co. v. CIR. The stipulation in the CBA does not clearly state that maintenance of membership in the Manco Labor Union is a condition of continuous employment in the Manila Labor Cordage Company. In order that the Manila Cordage Company may be deemed bound to dismiss employees who do not maintain their membership in the Manco Labor Union, the stipulation to this effect must be so clear as to leave no room for doubt thereon. An undertaking of this nature is so harsh that it must be strictly construed and doubts must be resolved against the existence of the right to dismiss. To construe the stipulations above-quoted as imposing as a condition to continued employment in the Manila Cordage Company the maintenance of membership in the Manco Labor Union is to violate the natural and constitutional right of the laborer to
Article. 212. Definitions. (g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. (h) "Legitimate labor organization" means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof. Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 as amended by D.O. 40-03 (a) "Affiliate" refers to an independent union affiliated with a federation, national union or a chartered local which was subsequently granted independent registration but did not disaffiliate from its federation, reported to the Regional Office and the Bureau in accordance with Rule III, Sections 6 and 7 of these Rules. (i) "Chartered Local" refers to a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through registration with the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these Rules. (As amended by DO 40-B-03.) (l) "Consolidation" refers to the creation or formation of a new union arising from the unification of two or more unions. (w) "Independent Union" refers to a labor organization operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through independent registration under Article 234 of the Labor Code and Rule III, Section 2-A of these Rules. (cc) "Labor Organization" refers to any union or association of employees in the private sector which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining, mutual aid, interest, cooperation, protection, or other lawful purposes. (ee) "Legitimate Labor Organization" refers to any labor organization in the private sector registered or reported with the Department in accordance with Rules III and IV of these Rules.
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(ff) "Legitimate Workers' Association" refers to an association of workers organized for mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining registered with the Department in accordance with Rule III, Sections 2-C and 2-D of these Rules. (jj) "Merger" refers to a process where a labor organization absorbs another resulting in the cessation of the absorbed labor organization's existence, and the continued existence of the absorbing labor organization. (kk) "National Union" or "Federation" refers to a group of legitimate labor unions in a private establishment organized for collective bargaining or for dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment for their member unions or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards and programs, registered with the Bureau in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-B of these Rules. (zz) "Union" refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective bargaining and for other legitimate purposes. (ccc) "Workers' Association" refers to an association of workers organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining. B. Registration of Unions:
Regional Directors and the Commission. (As amended by Section 15, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). Article 234. Requirements of registration. - A federation, national union or industry or trade union center or an independent union shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: (a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee; (b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings; (c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate; (d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and (e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981 and Section 1, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article 234-A. Chartering and creation of a local chapter. - A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local chapter by issuing a charter certificate indicating the establishment of the local chapter. The chapter shall acquire legal personality only for purposes of filing a petition for certification election from the date it was issued a charter certificate. The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization only upon the submission of the following documents in addition to its charter certificate: (a) The names of the chapters officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the chapter; and (b) The chapters constitution and by-laws: Provided, That where the chapters constitution and by-laws are the same as that of the federation or the national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly. The additional supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer of the chapter and attested by its president. (As inserted by Section 2, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article 235. Action on application. - The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing. All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president. Article 236. Denial of registration; appeal. - The decision of the Labor Relations Division in the regional office denying registration may be appealed by the applicant union to the Bureau within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof. Article 237. Additional requirements for federations or national unions. Subject to Article 238, if the applicant for registration is a federation or a national
Article. 231. Registry of unions and file of collective bargaining agreements. - The Bureau shall keep a registry of legitimate labor organizations. The Bureau shall also maintain a file of all collective bargaining agreements and other related agreements and records of settlement of labor disputes and copies of orders and decisions of voluntary arbitrators. The file shall be open and accessible to interested parties under conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, provided that no specific information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed unless authorized by the Secretary, or when it is at issue in any judicial litigation, or when public interest or national security so requires. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment for registration, accompanied with verified proofs of its posting in two conspicuous places in the place of work and ratification by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or Regional Offices shall act upon the application for registration of such Collective Bargaining Agreement within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. The Regional Offices shall furnish the Bureau with a copy of the Collective Bargaining Agreement within five (5) days from its submission. The Bureau or Regional Office shall assess the employer for every Collective Bargaining Agreement a registration fee of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or in any other amount as may be deemed appropriate and necessary by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the effective and efficient administration of the Voluntary Arbitration Program. Any amount collected under this provision shall accrue to the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund. The Bureau shall also maintain a file and shall undertake or assist in the publication of all final decisions, orders and awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
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union, it shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding Articles, submit the following: (a) Proof of the affiliation of at least ten (10) locals or chapters, each of which must be a duly recognized collective bargaining agent in the establishment or industry in which it operates, supporting the registration of such applicant federation or national union; and (b) The names and addresses of the companies where the locals or chapters operate and the list of all the members in each company involved. Article 238. Cancellation of registration. - The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, may be cancelled by the Bureau, after due hearing, only on the grounds specified in Article 239 hereof. (As amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article 238-A. Effect of a petition for cancellation of registration. - A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election. In case of cancellation, nothing herein shall restrict the right of the union to seek just and equitable remedies in the appropriate courts. (As inserted by Section 4, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article 239. Grounds for cancellation of union registration.- The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification; (b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters; (c) Voluntary dissolution by the members. (As amended by Section 5, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article 239-A. Voluntary cancellation of registration. - The registration of a legitimate labor organization may be cancelled by the organization itself: Provided, That at least two-thirds of its general membership votes, in a meeting duly called for that purpose to dissolve the organization: Provided, further, That an application to cancel registration is thereafter submitted by the board of the organization, attested to by the president thereof. (Inserted as a new provision by Section 6, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007). Article 240. Equity of the incumbent. All existing federations and national unions which meet the qualifications of a legitimate labor organization and none of the grounds for cancellation shall continue to maintain their existing affiliates regardless of the nature of the industry and the location of the affiliates.
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Requirements of Registration: Changes BEFORE AMENDMENT R.A. 9481 ART.234 Labor organization, association, group of FEDERATION, NATIONAL UNION, unions or workers. D.O. No. 40-03 INDUSTRY OR TRADE UNION CENTER, already provides for the registration of INDEPENDENT UNION independent unions, federations, national unions as well as locals or chapter Names of all members comprising at Applies only to INDEPENDENT UNION least 20% of all employees in collective bargaining unit No Provision ART.234-A (new) CHARTERING AND CREATION OF A LOCAL CHAPTER But D.O. No. 3-B-04 provides that a Adopted provisions of D.O. 3-B-04 with registered federation or national union the additional provision: The chapter may directly create a chartered local shall acquire legal personality only for union by submitting under oath the ff. the purpose of filing a petition for documents certified by the locals certification election from the date it was Secretary or Treasurer and attested by issued a charter certificate. its President: 1. Charter certificate 2. Names & addresses of chapters officers 3. Constitution and by-laws ART. 239 1. Misrepresentation, false 1. Same statement or fraud related to adoption/ratification of Constitution, By-Laws, amendments, minutes of ratification, list of members who took part in ratification 2. Failure to submit above 2. Deleted documents within 30 days from adoption or ratification of constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto 3. Misrepresentation/false 3. Misrepresentation/false statements/fraud related to statements/fraud related to election of election of officers, minutes of officers, minutes of election of officers election of officers/list of AND list of voters. [or failure to submit voters, failure to submit these these documents together with list of documents together with list of newly elected/appointed officers, their newly elected/appointed postal addresses within 30 days from officers, their postal addresses election]; within 30 days from election 4. Failure to submit the annual Grounds 4. 10. Have been DELETED. financial report to the Bureau within 30 days after closing of every fiscal year and
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9481 - AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE WORKERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION, AMENDING FOR THE
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misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in preparation of financial report Acting as labor contractor or engaging in cabo system or in any activity prohibited by law Entering into CBAs which provide terms and conditions of employment below minimum standards established by law Asking for/accepting attorneys fees/negotiation fees from employers (constitutes ULP under Art.
membership) Any violation of rights and conditions shall be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officer from office whichever is appropriate ART. 238-A (new) Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. - A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election. In case of cancellation, nothing herein shall restrict the right of the union to seek just and equitable remedies in the appropriate courts. Reportorial Requirements: ART. 232-A (new) Documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by a legitimate labor organization: 1. Constitution and by--laws, amendments thereto, minutes of ratification and list of members who took part within 30 days from adoption or ratification 2. List officers, minutes of election and list of voters within 30 days from election 3. Annual financial report within 30 days after close of every fiscal year 4. List off members at least once a year or as required by the Bureau Failure to comply not a ground for cancellation but subjects the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate penalty. Commingling: Supervisors and Rank-and-file unions: ART. 245. Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to Join Any Labor Organization; Right of Supervisory Employees Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form separate COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNITS AND/OR legitimate labor organizations of their own. THE RANK AND FILE UNION AND THE SUPERVISORS UNION OPERATING WITHIN THE SAME Establishment MAY JOIN THE SAME FEDERATION OR NATIONAL UNION. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they are not managers, when they recommend action implementing policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of subordinates, they identify with the interests of the employer and may act contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file (Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. vs. Laguesma) Conflict of interest may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strike: a) Members of the supervisors union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures against their co-affiliate rank-and-file employees b) In the area of bargaining, their interest can not be considered identical. The needs of one are different from those of the other c) In the event of a strike, the federation might influence the supervisors union to conduct a sympathy strike on the sole basis of affiliation Mixture in Union Membership NO LONGER ENFORCEABLE
249) 8. Checking off special assessments or any other fees without duly signed individual written authorization of the members 9. Failure to submit list of individual members to Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau 10. Failure to comply with the requirements under Article 237 (maintenance of not less 10 affiliates by federation/national union) VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION BY THE MEMBERS (new) ART. 239-A (new) VOLUNTARY CANCELLATION BY 2/3 VOTES OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP OF LABOR ORGANIZATION PROVIDED THAT APPLICATION TO CANCEL REGISTRATION IS SUBMITTED BY ITS BOARD ATTESTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
Outside the power of Bureau to act which is expressly limited to 3 grounds under amended Art. 239
OTHER GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION ART. 238 Bureau shall cancel Bureau can cancel only on 3 grounds registration after due hearing if labor specified in ART. 239 organization no longer meets one or more of prescribed requirements ART. 237 Registration of federation/national union valid only if it has affiliation of at least 10 locals or chapter duly recognized as collective bargaining agents in respective establishments Art. 241 (rights & conditions of
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ART. 245-A. (new): provides that inclusion as members of employees outside the bargaining unit not a ground for cancellation. This new provision reiterates what is already provided by case law. In cases of mixture in union membership, the procedure provided in purging the ranks of a rank-and-file union with ineligible members may be through the following: 1) Mechanisms under the union constitution and by-laws; 2) Inclusion-exclusion proceedings during the pre-election conference pursuant to Section 2, Rule XII. - The inclusion-exclusion proceedings are primarily conducted to determine the eligibility of voters during certification elections NOTE: But this process is vitiated in the case of federations with chartered local unions participating in certification elections inasmuch as they are not required to disclose their membership and officers Majority Representation, How Acquired 1. Voluntary recognition (Sec. 1[bbb], Rule I; Rule VII, D.O. No. 40-03 In unorganized establishments with only one legitimate labor organization, employer may voluntarily recognize representation status. 2. Certification election (Sec. 1[h], Rule 1; Rule VIII, D.O. No. 40-03) 3. Run-off election When an election for 3 or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, run-off election is conducted between the 2 labor unions receiving the highest number of votes 4. Consent election (Sec. 1[h], Rule 1; Sec. 10, Rule VIII, D.O. No. 40-03) An election voluntarily agreed upon by 2 or more contending unions with or without the intervention of DOLE to determine majority representation of the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit (ART. 256) Representation Issue in Organized Establishments 1. A verified petition questioning majority status of incumbent bargaining agent is filed before DOLE by a legitimate labor organization including national union/federation which has issued charter certificate to its local chapter participating in the certification election or local chapter which has been issued a charter certificate by the national union or federation 2. Petition filed within the last 60 days of the 5th year of the CBA (contractbar rule) 3. Med-Arbiter shall automatically order election when petition is supported by written consent of at least 25% off all employees in the collective bargaining unit 4. If petition is filed by a national union or federation, it shall not be required to disclose the names of the local chapters members and officers. Implications: 1. The Federation is exempt from submitting the 25% written consent of all employees. 2. An employer would have NO way of knowing WON the chartered local union members include non-eligible employees (ART. 257) Petitions in UNORGANIZED establishments 1. Establishment has no certified collective bargaining agent. 2. The Med-arbiter shall automatically conduct a certification election upon the filing of a petition 3. By la legitimate labor organization (including a national union/federation which has issued a charter certificate to its local chapter participating in
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the certification election or local chapter which has been issued a charter certificate by the national union or federation) If petition is filed by a national union or federation, it shall not be required to disclose the names of the local chapters members and officers.
ART. 258-A. (new) EMPLOYER AS BYSTANDER Provides that in a petition for certification election, the employer is considered not a party thereto with concomitant right to oppose. Its participation is limited to: 1. Being notified of the petition and 2. Submitting the list of employees during the pre-election conference This provision is a reiteration of case law: Upon filing of the petition for certification election, the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. It becomes merely a bystander (Furusawa Rubber Philippines vs. Secretary of Labor) Progressive Development Corp. v. Secretary Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof." (Italics supplied) Rule I, Section 1(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof." Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer required. a local or chapter need not be independently registered. Such local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization upon compliance with the aforementioned provisions Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules. The local union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise the right to be certified as the employees bargaining agent. The intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of the branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor. The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends. A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975]), the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of
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its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother union. Protection Technology, Inc. v. Secretary Non-submission of such books of account certified by and attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground, which the employer can invoke legitimately to oppose a petition for certification election filed by the local or chapter concerned. Although the federation with which the Union is affiliated submitted documents purporting to show that the latter had offered books of account to support its (the Union's) application for registration as a legitimate labor organization, what had been actually submitted to the BLR by the Union was a mere "financial statement," a generous description considering the sheet of paper submitted by the Union. It is immaterial that the Union, having been organized for less than a year before its application for registration with the BLR, would have had no real opportunity to levy and collect dues and fees from its members, which need to be recorded in the books of account. Such accounting books can and must be submitted to the BLR, even if they contain no detailed or extensive entries as yet. The point to be stressed is that the applicant local or chapter must demonstrate to the BLR that it is entitled to registered status because it has in place a system for accounting for members' contributions to its fund even before it actually receives dues or fees from its members. The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of fraud and diversion in the course of the subsequent formation and growth of the Union fund. The statutory and regulatory provisions defining the requirements of registration of legitimate labor organizations are an exercise of the overriding police power of the State, designed for the protection of workers against potential abuse by unions and federations of unions that recruit them. This purpose is obviously defeated if the registration requirements are relaxed arbitrarily by the very officials supposed to administer such requirements and registered status extended to an organization not entitled to such status, as in the case at bar. The Union must comply with all the requirements of registration as a legitimate labor organization before it may enjoy the fruits of its certification election victory and before it may exercise the rights of a legitimate labor organization. Registration is a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by a labor organization and the exercise of the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations. The Union must submit its books of account certified under oath by its treasurer and attested to by its president before such Union may demand recognition by the Company as exclusive bargaining agent of the members of the bargaining unit and before the Union may exercise any of the rights pertaining to such an agent. Pagpalain Haulers v. Trajano The Labor Code does not require the submission of books of account in order for a labor organization to be registered as a legitimate labor organization. The requirement that books of account be submitted as a requisite for registration can
be found only in Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, prior to its amendment by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997. Specifically, the old Section 3(e), Rule II, of Book V provided that [t]he local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed. Neither can Petitioner contend that Department Order No. 9 is an invalid exercise of rule-making power by the Secretary of Labor. For an administrative order to be valid, it must: (i) be issued on the authority of law and (ii) it must not be contrary to the law and the Constitution. Department Order No. 9 has been issued on authority of law. Under the law, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the Labor Code. Furthermore, the controlling intention in requiring the submission of books of account is the protection of labor through the minimization of the risk of fraud and diversion in the handling of union funds. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, this intention can still be realized through other provisions of the Labor Code. Article 274 of the Labor Code empowers the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative to inquire into the financial activities of legitimate labor organizations upon the filing of a complaint under oath duly supported by the written consent of 20% of the total membership of the labor organization concerned, as well as to examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance or non-compliance with the law. All of these provisions are designed to safeguard the funds of a labor organization that they may not be squandered or frittered away by its officers or by third persons to the detriment of its members. Eagle Ridge Golf vs. CA When the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been admitted as union members, it is enough to establish the fact of admission of the four that they had duly signified such desire by accomplishing the membership form. The fact that the Union, owing to its scant membership, had not yet fully organized its different committees shows the direct and valid acceptance of the four employee applicants rather than deter their admission. The Court has emphasized, and reiterated in its earlier rulings, that even if there were less than 30% [the required percentage of minimum membership then] of the employees asking for a certification election, that of itself would not be a bar to respondent Director ordering such an election provided, there is no grave abuse of discretion. The Court has held that a certification election is the most appropriate procedure for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the competing organizations should represent the employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. Where the company seeks the cancellation of a unions registration during the pendency of a petition for certification election, the same grounds invoked to cancel should not be used to bar the certification election. A certification election is the most expeditious and fairest mode of ascertaining the will of a collective bargaining unit as to its choice of its exclusive representative. It is the fairest and most
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effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. As held in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union (SSVLU), the employees withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the union? C. Local Unions and Federations
the interests and affairs of SAMANA BAY, including the ouster of herein individual private respondents, is rendered without force and effect. MSMG-UWP v. Ramos, GR 113907 Petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. Respondent company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds. Relying merely upon the federations allegations, the company terminated petitioners from employment when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the union officers. The right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and dismissal from his job. Dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily, eroding the employees right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation to which it belongs when circumstances warrant, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. The purpose of affiliation by a local union with a mother union or a federation: "xxx is to increase by collective action the bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence." Thus, a local union which has affiliated itself with a federation is free to sever such affiliation anytime and such disaffiliation cannot be considered disloyalty. In the absence of specific provisions in the federations constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the declaration of autonomy of a local union, a local may dissociate with its parent union. Phil. Skylanders v. NLRC 31 January 2002 Jurisdiction over inter-union conflict is with the BLR, not Labor Arbiter At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-union conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter.
ANGLO-KMU v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining. This is a fundamental right of labor and derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we have always adopted the liberal approach, which favors the exercise of labor rights. This Court is not ready to bend this principle to yield to a mere procedural defect, to wit: failure to observe certain procedural requirements for a valid disaffiliation. Noncompliance with the procedure on disaffiliation, being premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise above the fundamental right of self-organization. Although statute provides that: No petition for certification election, for intervention and disaffiliation shall be entertained or given due course except within the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, said law is definitely not without exceptions. Settled is the rule that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union when circumstances warrant. Generally, a labor union may disaffiliate from the mother union to form a local or independent union only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. However, even before the onset of the freedom period, disaffiliation may be carried out when there is a shift of allegiance on the part of the majority of the members of the union. A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employeemembers. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliation [with a Federation] does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. By SAMANA BAYs disaffiliation from ANGLO, the vinculum that previously bound the two entities was completely severed. ANGLO was divested of any and all power to act in representation of SAMANA BAY. Thus, any act performed by ANGLO affecting
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Local unions do not owe their creation to the national federation; they are free to disassociate/disaffiliate The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is not a novel thesis unillumined by case law. In the landmark case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. we upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. The sole essence of affiliation is to increase, by collective action, the common bargaining power of local unions for the effective enhancement and protection of their interests. Admittedly, there are times when without succor and support local unions may find it hard, unaided by other support groups, to secure justice for themselves. Local Unions are free to serve their own interests Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence. No conditions were imposed on PSEA by PAFLU for a valid breakaway Upon an application of the aforecited principle to the issue at hand, the impropriety of the questioned Decisions becomes clearly apparent. There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation If the national federation acts as the agent of the local Union; it cannot act against the wishes of the Union No legal personality to sue the employer on its own There is a further consideration that likewise argues for the granting of the petitions. It stands unchallenged that PAFLU instituted the complaint for unfair labor practice against the wishes of workers whose interests it was supposedly protecting. The mere act of disaffiliation did not divest PSEA of its own personality; neither did it give PAFLU the license to act independently of the local union. Recreant to its mission, PAFLU cannot simply ignore the demands of the local chapter and decide for its welfare. PAFLU might have forgotten that as an agent it could only act in representation of and in accordance with the interests of the local union. The complaint then for unfair labor practice lodged by PAFLU against PSI, PSEA and their respective officers, having been filed by a party which has no legal personality to institute the complaint, should have been dismissed at the first instance for failure to state a cause of action. SMEU PTGWO vs. SMPPEU-PDMP A legitimate labor organization is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof." The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict compliance with the requirements on registration because a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. Legitimate labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions,
one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization. The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the affiliation of an independent union with a federation or national union or industry union. The second, finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct creation of a local or a chapter through the process of chartering. The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly created by a federation or national union. A duly constituted local or chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the BLR. The issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI. when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registration of an independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. D. Cancellation of Registration; See: Omnibus Rules, Book V, Rule XIV-XV, as amended by D.O. 40-03 Mariwasa etc. v. Sec. of DOLE 608 SCRA 706 The affidavits of recantation were executed after the identities of the union members became public, i.e., after the union filed a petition for certification election, since the names of the members were attached to the petition. The purported withdrawal of support for the registration of the union was made after the documents were submitted to the DOLE, Region IV-A. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the employees were not totally free from the employers pressure, and so the voluntariness of the employees execution of the affidavits becomes suspect. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, retractions are looked upon with disfavor and do not automatically exclude the original statement or declaration based solely on the recantation. It is imperative that a determination be made as to which between the original and the new statements should be given weight or accorded belief. While it is true that withdrawal of support may be considered resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the unions application for registration, the affiants were members, and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union
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registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence. For the purpose of de-certifying a union, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR. The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not provide a valid reason to cancel respondents certificate of registration. The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration, the nature must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. SMMSC did not commit misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements. The alleged failure of SMMSC to indicate with mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is immaterial as long as the 20% requirement is complied with. Sta. Lucia etc v Sec of DOLE 596 SCRA 92 The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings with SMSLEC. The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining representative. CLUPSLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification election earlier than the date of recognition, and this petition remained pending as of the date of SMSLECs voluntary recognition by the company. Thus, SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWAs present petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us. E. Rights of Labor Organization
Article 242. Rights of legitimate labor organizations. A legitimate labor organization shall have the right: (a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining; (b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining; (c) To be furnished by the employer, upon written request, with its annual audited financial statements, including the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of the request, after the union has been duly recognized by the employer or certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit, or within sixty (60) calendar days before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement, or during the collective bargaining negotiation; (d) To own property, real or personal, for the use and benefit of the labor organization and its members; (e) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and (f) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit the organization and its members, including cooperative, housing, welfare and other projects not contrary to law. Notwithstanding any provision of a general or special law to the contrary, the income and the properties of legitimate labor organizations, including grants, endowments, gifts, donations and contributions they may receive from fraternal and similar organizations, local or foreign, which are actually, directly and exclusively used for their lawful purposes, shall be free from taxes, duties and other assessments. The exemptions provided herein may be withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing this provision. (As amended by Section 17, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). Article. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. - (a) All unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees, union dues, assessments and fines and other contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization benefits, welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative undertakings. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
IV. MEMBERSHIP, RIGHTS OF MEMBERS Art. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization: a. No arbitrary or excessive initiation fees shall be required of the members of a legitimate labor organization nor shall arbitrary, excessive or oppressive fine and forfeiture be imposed; The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial transactions as provided for in the constitution and by-laws of the organization; The members shall directly elect their officers, including those of the national union or federation, to which they or their union is affiliated, by secret ballot at intervals of five (5) years. No qualification requirements for candidacy to any position shall be imposed other than membership in good standing in subject labor organization. The secretary or any other responsible union officer shall
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furnish the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a list of the newly-elected officers, together with the appointive officers or agents who are entrusted with the handling of funds, within thirty (30) calendar days after the election of officers or from the occurrence of any change in the list of officers of the labor organization; (As amended by Section 16, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) d. The members shall determine by secret ballot, after due deliberation, any question of major policy affecting the entire membership of the organization, unless the nature of the organization or force majeure renders such secret ballot impractical, in which case, the board of directors of the organization may make the decision in behalf of the general membership; No labor organization shall knowingly admit as members or continue in membership any individual who belongs to a subversive organization or who is engaged directly or indirectly in any subversive activity; No person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall be eligible for election as a union officer or for appointment to any position in the union; No officer, agent or member of a labor organization shall collect any fees, dues, or other contributions in its behalf or make any disbursement of its money or funds unless he is duly authorized pursuant to its constitution and by-laws; Every payment of fees, dues or other contributions by a member shall be evidenced by a receipt signed by the officer or agent making the collection and entered into the record of the organization to be kept and maintained for the purpose; The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than those expressly provided by its constitution and by-laws or those expressly authorized by written resolution adopted by the majority of the members at a general meeting duly called for the purpose; Every income or revenue of the organization shall be evidenced by a record showing its source, and every expenditure of its funds shall be evidenced by a receipt from the person to whom the payment is made, which shall state the date, place and purpose of such payment. Such record or receipt shall form part of the financial records of the organization. Any action involving the funds of the organization shall prescribe after three (3) years from the date of submission of the annual financial report to the Department of Labor and Employment or from the date the same should have been submitted as required by law, whichever comes earlier: Provided, That this provision shall apply only to a legitimate labor organization which has submitted the financial report requirements under this Code: Provided, further, that failure of any labor organization to comply with the periodic financial reports required by law and such rules and regulations promulgated thereunder six (6) months after the effectivity of this Act shall automatically result in the cancellation of union registration of such labor organization; (As amended by Section 16, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) k. The officers of any labor organization shall not be paid any compensation other than the salaries and expenses due to their positions as specifically provided for
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in its constitution and by-laws, or in a written resolution duly authorized by a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. The minutes of the meeting and the list of participants and ballots cast shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives. Any irregularities in the approval of the resolutions shall be a ground for impeachment or expulsion from the organization; l. The treasurer of any labor organization and every officer thereof who is responsible for the account of such organization or for the collection, management, disbursement, custody or control of the funds, moneys and other properties of the organization, shall render to the organization and to its members a true and correct account of all moneys received and paid by him since he assumed office or since the last day on which he rendered such account, and of all bonds, securities and other properties of the organization entrusted to his custody or under his control. The rendering of such account shall be made: 1. At least once a year within thirty (30) days after the close of its fiscal year; 2. At such other times as may be required by a resolution of the majority of the members of the organization; and 3. Upon vacating his office. The account shall be duly audited and verified by affidavit and a copy thereof shall be furnished the Secretary of Labor. m. The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of any labor organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof during office hours; No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the members in a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees. The record shall be attested to by the president. Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessments, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction; and It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officers to inform its members on the provisions of its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and obligations under existing labor laws.
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For this purpose, registered labor organizations may assess reasonable dues to finance labor relations seminars and other labor education activities. Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officers from office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau.
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The Bureau shall have the power to hear and decide any reported violation to mete the appropriate penalty. Criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of above rights and conditions of membership shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. Art. 274. Visitorial power. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative is hereby empowered to inquire into the financial activities of legitimate labor organizations upon the filing of a complaint under oath and duly supported by the written consent of at least twenty percent (20%) of the total membership of the labor organization concerned and to examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance or non-compliance with the law and to prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitution and by-laws: Provided, That such inquiry or examination shall not be conducted during the sixty (60)-day freedom period nor within the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date of election of union officials. (As amended by Section 31, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) Art. 222. Appearances and Fees. a. Non-lawyers may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only: 1. If they represent themselves; or 2. If they represent their organization or members thereof. b. No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, However, that attorneys fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1691, May 1, 1980)
(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining agreements; (n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization, union membership and collective bargaining 1. between and among legitimate labor organizations; 2. between and among members of a union or workers' association. Section 2. Coverage. - Other related labor relations disputes shall include any conflict between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or group that is not a labor organization or workers' association. This includes: (1) cancellation of registration of unions and workers associations; and (2) a petition for interpleader. Section 3. Effects of the filing/pendency of inter/intra-union and other related labor relations disputes. - The rights, relationships and obligations of the parties litigants against each other and other parties-in-interest prior to the institution of the petition shall continue to remain during the pendency of the petition and until the date of finality of the decision rendered therein. Thereafter, the rights, relationships and obligations of the parties litigants against each other and other parties-in-interest shall be governed by the decision so ordered. The filing or pendency of any inter/intra-union dispute and other related labor relations dispute is not a prejudicial question to any petition for certification election and shall not be a ground for the dismissal of a petition for certification election or suspension of proceedings for certification election. Section 4. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization or member(s) thereof specially concerned may file a complaint or petition involving disputes or issues enumerated in Section 1 hereof. Any party- in-interest may file a complaint or petition involving disputes or issues enumerated in Section 2 hereof. Where the issue involves the entire membership of the labor organization, the complaint or petition shall be supported by at least thirty percent (30%) of its members. Section 5. Where to file. - Complaints or petitions involving labor unions with independent registrations, chartered locals, workers' associations, its officers or members shall be filed with the Regional Office that issued its certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered local. Complaints involving federations, national unions, industry unions, its officers or member organizations shall be filed with the Bureau. Petitions for cancellation of registration of labor unions with independent registration, chartered locals and workers association and petitions for deregistration of collective bargaining agreements shall be resolved by the Regional Director. He/She may appoint a Hearing Officer from the Labor Relations Division. Other inter/intra-union disputes and related labor relations disputes shall be heard and resolved by the Med-Arbiter in the Regional Office. Complaints or petitions involving federations, national or industry unions, trade union centers and their chartered locals, affiliates or member organizations shall be filed either with the Regional Office or the Bureau. The complaint or petition shall be heard and resolved by the Bureau.
OMNIBUS RULES
RULE XI INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES
Section 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall include: (a) cancellation of registration of a labor organization filed by its members or by another labor organization; (b) conduct of election of union and workers' association officers/nullification of election of union and workers' association officers; (c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers' association funds; (d) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements; (e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation; (f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership; (g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and workers association officers and members; (h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition; (i) opposition to application for union and CBA registration; (j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers' association constitution and by-laws; (k) disagreements over chartering or registration of labor organizations and collective bargaining agreements; (l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers' association membership;
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When two or more petitions involving the same parties and the same causes of action are filed, the same shall be automatically consolidated. Section 6. Formal requirements of the complaint or petition. - The complaint or petition shall be in writing, verified under oath and shall, among others, contain the following: (a) name, address and other personal circumstances of the complainant(s) or petitioner(s); (b) name, address and other personal circumstances of the respondent(s) or person(s) charged; (c) nature of the complaint or petition; (d) facts and circumstances surrounding the complaint or petition; (e) cause(s) of action or specific violation(s) committed; (f) a statement that the administrative remedies provided for in the constitution and by-laws have been exhausted or such remedies are not readily available to the complainant(s) or petitioner(s) through no fault of his/her/their own, or compliance with such administrative remedies does not apply to complainant(s) or petitioner(s); (g) relief(s) prayed for; (h) certificate of non-forum shopping; and (i) other relevant matters. Section 7. Raffle of the case. -Upon the filing of the complaint or petition, the Regional Director or any of his/her authorized representative in the Regional Office and the Docket Section of the Bureau shall allow the party filing the complaint or petition to determine the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer assigned to the case by means of a raffle. Where there is only one Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer in the region, the raffle shall be dispensed with and the complaint or petition shall be assigned to him/her. Section 8. Notice of preliminary conference. - Immediately after the raffle of the case or receipt of the complaint or petition, the same shall be transmitted to the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be, who shall in the same instance prepare the notice for preliminary conference and cause the service thereof upon the party filing the petition. The preliminary conference shall be scheduled within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint or petition. Within three (3) days from receipt of the complaint or petition, the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall cause the service of summons upon the respondent(s) named therein, directing him/her to file his/her answer/comment on the complaint or petition on or before the scheduled preliminary conference and to appear before the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer on the scheduled preliminary conference. Section 9. Conduct of preliminary conference. - The Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall conduct a preliminary conference and hearing within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint or petition. He/She shall exert every effort to effect an amicable settlement of the dispute. Where the parties agree to settle amicably, their agreements shall be specified in the minutes of the conference and a decision based on compromise shall be issued by the Med-Arbiter or the Regional Director, as the case may be, within five (5) days from the date of the mandatory conference. Where no amicable settlement is reached, the MedArbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall proceed with the stipulation of facts, limitation or definition of the issues, clarificatory questioning and submission
of laws and jurisprudence relied upon in support of each other's claims and defenses. Section 10. Conduct of Hearing(s). - The Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall determine whether to call further hearing(s) on the complaint or petition. Where the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be, decides to conduct further hearing(s), he/she shall require the parties to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and such documentary evidence material to prove each other's claims and defenses. The hearing(s) shall be limited to clarificatory questions by the MedArbiter or Hearing Officer and must be completed within twenty-five (25) days from the date of preliminary conference. The complaint or petition shall be considered submitted for decision after the date of the last hearing or upon expiration of twenty-five (25) days from date of preliminary conference, whichever comes first. Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial evidence. - Any affidavit submitted by a party to prove his/her claims or defenses shall be re-affirmed by the presentation of the affiant before the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be. Any affidavit submitted without the re-affirmation of the affiant during a scheduled hearing shall not be admitted in evidence, except when the party against whom the affidavit is being offered admits all allegations therein and waives the examination of the affiant. Section 12. Filing of pleadings. - The parties may file his/her pleadings, including their respective position papers, within the twenty-five (25) day period prescribed for the conduct of hearing(s). No other pleading shall be considered or entertained after the case is considered submitted for decision. Section 13. Hearing and resolution of the complaint or petition in the Bureau. - The Bureau shall observe the same process and have the same period within which to hear and resolve the complaints or petitions filed before it. Section 14. Decision. - The Bureau and the Med-Arbiter or Regional Director, as the case may be, shall have twenty (20) days from the date of the last hearing within which to decide the complaint or petition. The decision shall state the facts, findings, conclusion, and reliefs granted. Section 15. Release of Decision. - The notice of decision shall be signed by the Records Officer in the Bureau and by the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer in the Regional Office. Within twenty (20) days from date of last hearing, the decision shall be released to the parties personally on a date and time agreed upon during the last hearing. Section 16. Appeal. - The decision of the Med-Arbiter and Regional Director may be appealed to the Bureau by any of the parties within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, copy furnished the opposing party. The decision of the Bureau Director in the exercise of his/her original jurisdiction may be appealed to the Office of the Secretary by any party within the same period, copy furnished the opposing party. The appeal shall be verified under oath and shall consist of a memorandum of appeal specifically stating the grounds relied upon by the appellant, with supporting arguments and evidence.
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Section 17. Where to file appeal. - The memorandum of appeal shall be filed in the Regional Office or Bureau where the complaint or petition originated. Within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum of appeal, the Bureau or Regional Director shall cause the transmittal thereof together with the entire records of the case to the Office of the Secretary or the Bureau, as the case may be. Section 18. Finality of Decision. - Where no appeal is filed within the ten-day period, the Bureau and Regional Director or Med-Arbiter, as the case may be, shall enter the finality of the decision in the records of the case and cause the immediate implementation thereof. Section 19. Period to reply. - A reply to the appeal may be filed by any party to the complaint or petition within ten (10) days from receipt of the memorandum of appeal. The reply shall be filed directly with the Bureau or the Office of the Secretary, as the case may be. Section 20. Decision of the Bureau/Office of the Secretary. - The Bureau Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall have twenty (20) days from receipt of the entire records of the case within which to decide the appeal. The filing of the memorandum of appeal from the decision of the Med- Arbiter or Regional Director and Bureau Director stays the implementation of the assailed decision. The Bureau or Office of the Secretary may call the parties to a clarificatory hearing in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Section 21. Finality of Decision of Bureau/Office of the Secretary. - The decision of the Bureau or the Office of the Secretary shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the parties, unless a motion for its reconsideration is filed by any party therein within the same period. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Bureau or the Office of the Secretary in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be allowed. Section 22. Execution of decision. - The decision of the Med-Arbiter and Regional Director shall automatically be stayed pending appeal with the Bureau. The decision of the Bureau in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be immediately executory upon issuance of entry of final judgment. The decision of the Bureau in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall automatically be stayed pending appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Office of the Secretary shall be immediately executory upon issuance of entry of final judgment. Section 23. Transmittal of records to the Regional Office/Bureau. - Within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of receipt of decision by the parties and finality of the decision, the entire records of the case shall be remanded to the Bureau or Regional Office of origin for implementation. The implementation of the decision shall not be stayed unless restrained by the appropriate court. RULE XII ELECTION OF OFFICERS OF LABOR UNIONS AND WORKERS ASSOCIATIONS Section 1. Conduct of election of union officers; procedure in the absence of provisions in the constitution and by-laws. - In the absence of any agreement among the members or any provision in the constitution and by-laws of a labor
union or workers' association, the following guidelines may be adopted in the election of officers. (a) within sixty (60) days before the expiration of the term of the incumbent officers, the president of the labor organization shall constitute a committee on election to be composed of at least three (3) members who are not running for any position in the election, provided that if there are identifiable parties within the labor organization, each party shall have equal representation in the committee; (b) upon constitution, the members shall elect the chairman of the committee from among themselves, and case of disagreement, the president shall designate the chairman; (c) within ten (10) days from its constitution, the committee shall, among others, exercise the following powers and duties: 1) set the date, time and venue of the election; 2) prescribe the rules on the qualification and eligibility of candidates and voters; 3) prepare and post the voters' list and the list of qualified candidates; 4) accredit the authorized representatives of the contending parties; 5) supervise the actual conduct of the election and canvass the votes to ensure the sanctity of the ballot; 6) keep minutes of the proceedings; 7) be the final arbiter of all election protests; 8) proclaim the winners; and 9) prescribe such other rules as may facilitate the orderly conduct of election. Section 2. Dispute over conduct of election of officers. - Where the terms of the officers of a labor organization have expired and its officers failed or neglected to do so call for an election of new officers, or where the labor organization's constitution and by-laws do not provide for the manner by which the said election can be called or conducted and the intervention of the Department is necessary, at least thirty percent (30%) of the members of the labor organization may file a petition for the conduct of election of their officers with the Regional Office that issued its certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered local. In the case of federations, national or industry unions and trade union centers, the petition shall be filed with the Bureau or the Regional Office but shall be heard and resolved by the Bureau. This rule shall also apply where a conduct of election of officers is an alternative relief or necessary consequence of a petition for nullification of election of officers, impeachment/expulsion of officers, or such other petitions. Section 3. Formal requirements and proceedings. - The formal requirements, processes and periods of disposition of this petition stated in Rule XI shall be followed in the determination of the merits of the petition and appeal. Section 4. Pre-election conference and conduct of election. - The appointment of an election officer and the procedures and periods in the conduct of the preelection conference and election proceedings prescribed in Rule IX shall also apply in the conduct of a pre-election conference and election of officers in any labor organization. Section 5. Applicability of the provisions of the labor organization's constitution and by-laws. - Where the conduct of election of officers is ordered by the Med-Arbiter, the Bureau or Office of the Secretary, the rules and regulations governing the filing of candidacies and conduct of election under the constitution
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and by-laws of the labor organization may be applied in the implementation of the decision, or new and additional rules may be adopted as agreed upon by the parties. The entire proceedings shall be presided by the Election Officer from the Labor Relations Division of the Regional Office or the Bureau. He/She shall act as the COMELEC referred to in the labor organization's constitution and by-laws and obligate himself/herself to comply with his/her mandate under the decision to be implemented and the constitution and by-laws. RULE XIII ADMINISTRATION OF TRADE UNION FUNDS AND ACTIONS ARISING THEREFROM Section 1. Right of union to collect dues and agency fees. - The incumbent bargaining agent shall continue to be entitled to check-off and collect dues and agency fees despite the pendency of a representation case, other inter/intra-union disputes or related labor relations disputes. Section 2. Visitorial power under Article 274. - The Regional or Bureau Director may inquire into the financial activities of any legitimate labor organization and examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance with the law and the organization's constitution and by-laws. Such examination shall be made upon the filing of a request or complaint for the conduct of an accounts examination by any member of the labor organization, supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of its total membership. Section 3. Where to file. - A request for examination of books of accounts of independent labor unions, chartered locals and workers associations pursuant to Article 274 shall be filed with the Regional Office that issued its certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered local. A request for examination of books of accounts of federations or national unions and trade union centers pursuant to Article 274 shall be filed with the Bureau. Such request or complaint, in the absence of allegations pertaining to a violation of Article 241, shall not be treated as an intra-union dispute and the appointment of an Audit Examiner by the Regional or Bureau Director shall not be appealable. Section 4. Actions arising from Article 241. - Any complaint or petition with allegations of mishandling, misappropriation or non-accounting of funds in violation of Article 241 shall be treated as an intra-union dispute. It shall be heard and resolved by the Med-Arbiter pursuant to the provisions of Rule XI. Section 5. Prescription. - The complaint or petition for audit or examination of funds and book of accounts shall prescribe within three (3) years from the date of submission of the annual financial report to the Department or from the date the same should have been submitted as required by law, whichever comes earlier. Section 6. Decision. - A decision granting the conduct of audit shall include the appointment of the Audit Examiner and a directive upon him/her to submit his/her report and recommendations within ten (10) days from termination of audit. The decision granting the conduct of audit is interlocutory and shall not be appealable. The decision denying or dismissing the complaint or petition for audit may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt thereof pursuant to the provisions prescribed in Rule XI.
Section 7. Pre-audit conference. - Within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the decision granting the conduct of audit, the Regional Director shall summon the parties to a pre-audit conference conducted by the Audit Examiner to determine and obtain the following: (a) sources of funds covered by the audit; (b) the banks and financial institutions where the labor organization maintains its account; (c) union books of accounts and financial statements; (d) disbursement vouchers with supporting receipts, invoices and other documents; (e) income and revenue receipts; (f) cash books; (g) minutes of general membership meeting and board meetings; (h) other relevant matters and documents. The first pre-audit conference shall be scheduled within ten (10) days from receipt by the Audit Examiner of the decision granting the conduct of an audit. Section 8. Issuance of subpoena. - The Regional Director may compel any party to appear or bring the required financial documents in a conference or hearing through the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or subpoena duces tecum. He/She may also require the employer concerned to issue certifications of union dues and other assessments remitted to the union during the period of audit. Section 9. Conduct of audit examination. - Where book of accounts are submitted by the parties, the Audit Examiner shall: (a) examine the transactions reflected in the disbursement vouchers; (b) determine the validity of the supporting documents attached to the vouchers consistent with the union's constitution and by-laws, relevant resolutions of the union and the Labor Code; (c) trace recording and posting in the disbursement book; (d) record observations or findings of all financial transactions. Where no book of accounts are maintained by the officers of the labor organization, the Audit Examiner shall: (a) examine the transactions reflected in the disbursement vouchers; (b) determine the validity of the supporting documents attached to the vouchers consistent with the labor organization's constitution and by-laws, relevant board resolutions, and the Labor Code; (c) prepare working papers or worksheet/s; (d) record and post all financial transactions reflected in the cash vouchers in the working papers or worksheet/s; and (e) record observations or findings of all financial transactions. The Audit Examiner shall conduct an inventory of all physical assets acquired by the labor organization, if any, and on the basis of his/her findings prepare his/her audited financial report or statement reflecting the true and correct financial accounts and balances of the labor organization with relevant annexes attached. Section 10. Period of audit. - The Audit Examiner shall have sixty (60) days from the date of first pre- audit conference within which to complete the conduct of audit, unless the volume of financial records, the period covered by the audit and other circumstances warrant the extension thereof. In such a case, the Audit Examiner
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shall notify the Med-Arbiter or the Bureau Director, as the case may be, of such fact at least ten (10) days before the expiration of the sixty (60) day period. Section 11. Audit Report. - The Audit Examiner shall make a report of his/her findings to the parties involved and the same shall include the following: (a) name of the labor organization; (b) name of complainant(s) or petitioner(s) and respondent(s); (c) name of officers of the labor organization during the period covered by the audit report; (d) scope of the audit; (e) list of documents examined; (f) audit methods and procedures adopted; and (g) findings and recommendations. Section 12. Completion of audit. - A copy of the audit report shall be forwarded by the Audit Examiner to the Med-Arbiter or the Bureau Director, as the case may be, within ten (10) days from termination of the audit, together with the entire records of the case and all documents relative to the conduct of the audit. Section 13. Decision after audit. - The Med-Arbiter or the Bureau Director shall render a decision within twenty (20) days from receipt of the audit report. All issues raised by the parties during the conduct of the audit shall be resolved by the MedArbiter. The decision shall be released in the same manner prescribed in Section 15, Rule XI. When warranted, the Med-Arbiter or Bureau Director shall order the restitution of union funds by the responsible officer(s) in the same decision. Section 14. Appeal. - Appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter denying the conduct of audit and from the results of the audit may be filed by any of the parties with the Bureau. Decisions rendered by the Bureau after the conduct of audit in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may be appealed to the Office of the Secretary. Both shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Section 16, Rule XI. Section 15. Period of inquiry or examination. - No complaint for inquiry or examination of the financial and book of accounts as well as other records of any legitimate labor organization shall be entertained during the sixty (60) day freedom period or within thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date of election of union officers. Any complaint or petition so filed shall be dismissed. RULE XVIII CENTRAL REGISTRY OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS Section 1. Forms for registration. - Consistent with the policy of the State to promote unionism, the Bureau shall devise or prescribe such forms as are necessary to facilitate the process of registration of labor organizations and collective bargaining agreements or of compliance with all documentary or reporting requirements prescribed in these Rules. Section 2. Transmittal of records; central registry. - The Labor Relations Division of the Regional Offices shall, within forty-eight (48) hours from issuance of a certificate of creation of chartered locals or certificate of registration of labor organizations and collective bargaining, transmit to the Bureau a copy of such certificates accompanied by a copy of the documents supporting registration.
The Labor Relations Division of the Regional Office shall also transmit to the Bureau a copy of every final decision canceling or revoking the legitimate status of a labor organization or collective bargaining agreement, indicating therein the date when the decision became final. In cases of chartering and affiliation or compliance with the reporting requirements under Rule V, the Regional Office shall transmit within two (2) days from receipt thereof the original set of documents to the Bureau, retaining one set of documents for its file. RULE XX LABOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH Section 1. Labor education of workers and employees. - The Department shall develop, promote and implement appropriate labor education and research programs on the rights and responsibilities of workers and employers. It shall be the duty of every legitimate labor organization to implement a labor education program for its members on their rights and obligations as unionists and as employees. Section 2. Mandatory conduct of seminars. - Subject to the provisions of Article 241, it shall be mandatory for every legitimate labor organization to conduct seminars and similar activities on existing labor laws, collective agreements, company rules and regulations and other relevant matters. The union seminars and similar activities may be conducted independently of or in cooperation with the Department and other labor education institutions. Section 3. Special fund for labor education and research. - Every legitimate labor organization shall, for the above purpose, maintain a special fund for labor education and research. Existing strike funds may, in whole or in part, be transformed into labor education and research funds. The labor organization may also periodically assess and collect reasonable amounts from its members for such funds. A. Governing Law Oca v. Trajano [1991] 2 splintered factions of the same Labor Organization attempted to elect officers of the Organization in 2 different meetings, both in violation of the By-Laws of the organization. The Director of the BLR refused to acknowledge either set of officers and ordered both factions to secure certificates of registration after declaring that the original Labor Organization had already ceased to exist. The Court held: For the cancellation of a labor unions certificate of authority under Art. 239 of the Labor Code, the causes provided therein must be substantially proved, with the requisite notices given and hearings held. From the foregoing, it is apparent that respondent Labor Directors refusal to declare the validity of the election of officers of either parties is not tainted with abuse of discretion. However, that part of the decision which ordered the parties to secure new registration certificates as PTGWO-Oca and PTGWO-Dinglasan, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision is without basis. No provision in the Labor Code sanctions such an act. For the cancellation of a labor unions certificate of authority under Article 239 of the Labor Code, the causes provided therein must be substantially proved, with the requisite notices given and hearings held. In this case, such elementary elements of due process were not observed. B. Rights and Obligations of Members
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Right to withdraw from the Unions Legal Action Will a judgment against the union bar a subsequent action by its individual members based on the principle of res judicata? Aldovino v NLRC, 1998 YES, unless the member signified his intention to withdraw from the case before trial and judgment on the merits. Only members of the petitioning union who did not signify their intention to withdraw from the case before its trial and judgment on the merits are bound by the outcome of the case or of the arbitration. The right of a legitimate labor union to represent its members is expressly guaranteed under Art. 242 of the Labor Code. This right, however, does not deprive its individual members of their concomitant right to file a case in their own names, nor of their right to withdraw from any case filed by the union in their behalf. More importantly, the individual member may seasonably exercise his option to withdraw from a case filed by his union if he does not want to be bound thereby. In Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR, the Court ruled that only those members of the petitioning union who did not signify their intention to withdraw from the case before its trial and judgment on the merits are bound by the outcome of the case. Right Against Impositions or Forced Contributions to the Organization Gabriel v. Secretary, 2000 Nature of a Check-Off In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latters wages and remits them directly to the union. It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. The system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees. Requisites for a Valid Check-off Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) 2) 3) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; secretarys record of the minutes of the meeting; and individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned.
have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (As amended by Section 14, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). See also the last Paragraph of Art. 241. For a complaint for the violation of the rights of a member to prosper, is it necessary that the complaint be filed by at least 30% of the members as provided in Art 241? Rodriguez v. Director of BLR The Directors ruling that the assent of 30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 1 of the Labor Code, was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization cannot be affirmed and will be reversed. The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization may be made by at least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned. The use of the permissive may in the provision at once negates the notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report may be made, alternatively by any member or members specially concerned. And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, over all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management relations, making no reference whatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the power to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) upon request of either or both parties as well as (2) at their own initiative. (Rodriguez v. Director of BLR, 1988) Same Rule applies to controversies involving Union elections These considerations apply equally well to controversies over elections. In the cases at bar, the petition to nullify the 1986 union elections could not be deemed defective because it did not have the assent of 30% of the union membership. The petition clearly involved an intra-union conflictone directly affecting the right of suffrage of more than 800 union members and the integrity of the union electionsover which, as the law explicitly provides, jurisdiction could be assumed by the Labor Relations Director or the Med-Arbiters at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties.
Clearly, attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent. The Consent of Both the employees as a collective and the individual employee is a condition sine qua non for the deduction. What happens if there is no proper check-off? Then the payment for attorneys fees would come from the General Funds of the Union. C. Remedies for Violation of Rights Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor, shall
Take note, this refers to Art. 241 in our Code
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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies before filing with the BLR Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V IRR of Labor Code: Sec. 2. Who may file. If the issue involves the entire membership of the union, the complaint shall be signed by at least 30% of the membership of the union. In addition to the above requirement, the petition on its face must show that the administrative remedies provided for in the constitution and by-laws have been exhausted or such remedies are not readily available to the complaining members through no fault of their own. x x x (italics supplied) Diamonon v. DOLE, 2000 When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intraunion dispute, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance machinery or appeals body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. Petitioners premature invocation of public respondents intervention is fatal to his cause of action. No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted without a final judgment finding that an unfair labor practice was committed, having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. During the pendency of such administrative proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized shall be considered interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in the administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the criminal case nor be considered as evidence of guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the requirements therein set forth. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980 and later further amended by Section 19, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) B. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: a. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; b. c. To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs; To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization; To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters; To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent; To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code; To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
d. V. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Concept of Unfair Labor Practices Art. 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also criminal offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein provided. Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorneys fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases involving unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are submitted for decision. Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.
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The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981) Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Insular Life Employees NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co. (1971) The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. By-passing the Union to speak directly to its members is unfair labor practice The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. When employees are on strike, Employer cannot bargain with individuals Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as
the employees bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332) Acts Considered as interference Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining. It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation Letters constituting interference are not protected by Free Speech clause Since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution. The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal Bribing striking employees amounts to strike-breaking When the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strikebreaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be. Unduly favoring loyal employees is also ULP the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in. Acts of employers, in determining if there was ULP, should viewed in light of the Totality of Conduct Doctrine Whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under
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which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. Favoring non-strikers over strikers in the rehiring process; clearly discriminatory It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring Discrimination in dismissal of employees amounts to a waiver of the right to dismiss So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them. Delayed reinstatement of employees constitutes discrimination Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized. Heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged in the picket lines do not affect or diminish the right to strike We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. Necessary incidents of strikes should not be considered a bar to reinstatement Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement. In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement.
Espionage in union activities is interference and considered ULP It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice. ... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an exemployee..." Strikers are entitled for back pay when strikes arise from unfair labor practice The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for workupon the invitation of the respondentsthey were discriminatory dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. The fact that positions of union members were already filled by replacements is not a defense to reinstatement [W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; Availability of backpay to unionists It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer. We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge. Discriminated employees who were refused reinstatement, entitled to backpay A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although nonstrikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These
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strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement, especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another Steam and Navigation v. Philippine Marine Officers Guild (1965) Acts found by respondent court constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice (1) the interrogation and investigation by PHILSTEAM's supervisory officials of its captains, deck officers and engineers, to determine whether they had authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent; (2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the participation of PHILSTEAM's pier superintendent in soliciting membership for a competing union. When Investigating union membership constitutes ULP PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an investigation of its officers as to their membership in PMOG and whether they had given PMOG authority to represent them in collective bargaining. The reason for this, PHILSTEAM would, however, aver, was merely to ascertain for itself the existence of a duty to bargain collectively with PMOG, a step allegedly justified by PMOG's refusal to furnish proof of majority representation. The asserted reason for the investigation cannot be sustained. The record discloses that such investigation was started by PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG's reply stating a refusal to submit proof of majority representation. The respondent court, therefore, aptly concluded that PMOG's refusal to submit evidence showing it represented a majority had nothing to do with PHILSTEAM's decision to carry out the investigation. An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation, provided the same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the employer that no reprisals would be taken against unionists. Nonetheless, any employer who engages in interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor practice if the circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. Rule in this Jurisdiction The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series of questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice Rule on reinstatement As to the question of reinstatement, we have already ruled, in Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUG) vs, C.I.R that striking employees are entitled
to reinstatement, whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employer's unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not the consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers and has promised them continued employment. The present strike was the consequence of PHILSTEAM's unfair labor practice, Reinstatement of the strikers, who have not found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, therefore follows as a matter of right, notwithstanding that the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers for the purpose of continuing the operation of the plant or the business of the industry Relevance of offer to return to work Even if the employer hires others to replace the strikers, thereby avoiding paralysis of his business, if the strike is against an unfair labor practice on its part, the employer is bound to reinstate the strikers. As to the matter of a voluntary offer to return to work without any condition the same is relevant only to the question of payment of back wages in addition to reinstatement. Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Corp v. NLRC (1965) Dismissal due to union activities Facts: Two employees were dismissed for violation of a company rule against fights in the premises or during working hours. It appears, however, that said employees, who were union officers, were provoked into a prearranged fight by two recently hired employees pursuant to a strategy of the company designed to provide an apparently lawful cause for their dismissal, and said dismissed employees had not figured in similar incidents before or violated company rules in their many years with the company. Held: That this is unfair labor practice. Rothenberg on Labor Relations x x x it can be established that the true and basic inspiration for the employers act is derived from the employees union affiliations or activities, the assignment by the employer or another reason, whatever its semblance of validity, is unavailing. Thus, it has been held that the facts disclosed that the employers acts in discharging employees were actually prompted by the employers improper interest in the affected employees union affiliations and activities, even though the employer urged that his acts were predicated on economic necessity, desire to give employment to more needy persons, lack of work, cessation of operations, refusal to work overtime, refusal of non-union employees to work with union employees, seasonal lay-off, libelous remarks against management, violation of company rules. Management pre-arranged the incident to have an excuse to dismiss the union leaders The record shows that Besana and Rodiel were provoked by Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia into a pre-arranged fight pursuant to a strategy of the company designed to provide an apparently lawful cause for their dismissal. Reyes and Pacia were hired only within that week. Besana and Rodiel were not shown to have previously figured in similar incidents before or to have violated company rules and regulations in their many years with the company. The company did not investigate the incident, and its manager admitted that Besana was dismissed because he was a hard-headed leader of the union. It was this manager who had warned VIBEMWUs officers responsible for the affiliation that if they will not withdraw VIBEMWU from the NLU, he would take steps in order to dismiss them from work.
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The findings of the CIR to the foregoing effect are supported by substantial evidence. No reason obtains to alter the conclusion that Besana and Rodiel were in reality dismissed because of their union activities and not because of their violation of a company rule against fights in the premises or during working hours. Furthermore, the so-called violation of company rules having been brought about by the company itself, thru the recent employment of Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia who provoked the fight as above indicated, the same cannot be regarded as a ground to punish the aforementioned employees. Judric Canning Corp. v. Inciong (1982) Unfair Labor Practice via interference can be committed even a year before the Labor Union actually comes into existence Under Article 248(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in their exercise of the right to self-organization is an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it an unfair labor practice for an employer to initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it. In this particular case, the private respondents were dismissed, or their services were terminated, because they were soliciting signatures in order to form a union within the plant. For sure, the petitioner corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice in interfering with the formation of a labor union and retaliating against the employees exercise of their right to self-organization. Manila Hotel Co. v. Pines Hotel Employees Association (1972) Circumstances showing unfair discrimination of union members Where a company contrary to previous practice of dividing equally to all employees a certain percentage of its net profits as Christmas bonus allocated 50% thereof only to its Manila Hotel employees, some of whom were granted yearend bonus, while its Pines Hotel employees where there exists a labor union did not receive any year-end bonus; where only 25% of said percentage of net profits was distributed to its Pines Hotel employees and 25% to its Taal Vista Lodge employees, these circumstances constitute a clear case of discrimination, it appearing that there is no union at the Manila Hotel or the Taal Vista Lodge and considering further that the company had been besieged with demands for better living conditions from the union as well as strikes of said union. Court may grant affirmative relief There being unfair discrimination found in the distribution of bonuses to its employees, the industrial court's order that the company distribute said bonus pro rata among all its employees regardless of their place of work, as was consistently done in previous years, does not constitute reversible error. It is- a proper exercise of its power under section 5 of R.A. 875 to grant affirmative relief whenever it has adjudged the existence of an unfair labor practice. Unfair and unjust discrimination There is unfair and unjust discrimination in the granting of salary adjustments where the evidence shows that(a) the management of a hotel company paid the employees of one of its branch hotels where there is a union the minimum monthly salary for daily workers when said employees are paid on a monthly basis; (b) where salary adjustments were granted to employees of one of its branch hotels which was always losing in its operations and where there is no labor organization in a manner not in accordance with the Interpretative Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Standards of the Department of Labor; and (c) the total salary adjustments given
every ten of its Pines Hotel employees where there is a labor union would not even equal the salary adjustments given one single Manila office employee. Wise and Co. Inc, v. Wise and Co., Inc Employees Union NATU (1989) In this case, the Employer granted profit sharing benefits to employees who were not members of the Labor Union: Unfair Labor Practice; There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of the union employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. Indeed, discrimination per se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. Rule that labor law does not authorize the substitution of judgment of the employer in the conduct of its business, established The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate, according to its discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. This flows from the established rule that labor law does not authorize the substitution of the judgment of the employer in the conduct of its business. Such management prerogative may be availed of without fear of any liability so long as it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or valid agreement and are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite. Grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the bargaining unit falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the bargaining unit falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in the CBA where the employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those who are not. In the case of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which constitute the law between the contracting parties. Both the employer and the union members are bound by such agreement. Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. NLRC (1998) Management prerogative to remove paid lunch break by increasing break period The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production. It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs during that period as they were on call. Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could very well be considered as working time because the factory employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use this hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their work. Since the employees are no longer required to work
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during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period. Right to self-organization Where the change effected by management with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work whether or not they are members of the union, it cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of the union to self-organization. Alhambra Industries v. NLRC (1970) Employers refusal to bargain collectively constitutes an unfair labor practice. Failure on petitioners part to live up in good faith to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement by denying the privileges and benefits thereof to the fifteen drivers and helpers through its device of trying to pass them off as employees of its salesmen and propagandists was a serious violation of petitioners duty to bargain collectively and constituted unfair labor practice in any language. In this case, the employer refused to treat the drivers and helpers as its employees and considered them employed by the salesmen. The salesmen were given allowances to pay for the salaries of the drivers/helpers. The corporation was found, in truth and in fact, to be the employer of the driver or helper and not the salesman or propagandist who is merely expressly authorized by the former to engage such services. Balmar v. NLRC (1991) In the bargaining process, the workers and employer shall be represented by their exclusive bargaining representatives. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit, shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The refusal of the Employer to bargain with the certified representative of the employees is an act of unfair Labor practice. Employees have a constitutional right to choose their own bargaining representative and it is only through certification election that they can obtain this purpose. Mabeza v. NLRC (1997) Loss of Confidence as cause for dismissal Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for terminating their employeesloss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers money or property Coercion to sign false affidavits at the threat of dismissal is ULP The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employee's right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek better terms and conditions of employment through concerted action.
De Leon v. NLRC, 2001 [In a case Where the contracting company terminates the services of its security agency, but the agency was wholly and entirely owned by the same entity, in order to terminate or put on a permanent floating status the security guards, there is Unfair Labor Practice. The corporate veil is pierced and the contracting company is considered the employer of the security guards.] Piercing of the corporate veil as applied in ULP cases ...when the concept of separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in case of two corporations, merge them into one. The separate juridical personality of a corporation may also be disregarded when such corporation is a mere alter ego or business conduit of another person. In the case at bar, it was shown that FISI was a mere adjunct of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for security services, provided FTC with security guards to safeguard its premises. However, records show that FISI and FTC have the same owners and business address, and FISI provided security services only to FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies. The purported sale of the shares of the former stockholders to a new set of stockholders who changed the name of the corporation to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. appears to be part of a scheme to terminate the services of FISI's security guards posted at the premises of FTC and bust their newly-organized union which was then beginning to become active in demanding the company's compliance with Labor Standards laws. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot allow FTC to use its separate corporate personality to shield itself from liability for illegal acts committed against its employees. C. Unfair Labor Practices of Labor Organizations Art. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives: a. To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership; To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members; To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the representative of the employees; To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations; To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
b.
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To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981) Salunga v CIR (1967) Unfair labor practice by the union in arbitrarily refusing readmission although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, the former had, soon laterupon learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision above referred torevoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. The Union had not only acted arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to continue his membership. The trial Judge found said refusal of the Union officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them. What is more, the officers of the Union have, in effect, confirmed the fact that their refusal to allow the withdrawal of petitioners resignation had been due to his aforementioned criticisms. Indeed said officers tried to justify themselves by characterizing said criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true, not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of its officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but also because the constitution and by-laws of the Union explicitly recognize the right of its members to give their views on all transactions made by the Union. As a consequence, the resolution appealed from cannot be affirmed without, in effect, nullifying said right which, independently of the constitution and by-laws of the Union, is part and parcel of the freedom of speech guaranteed in the Constitution of our Republic, as a condition sine qua non to the sound growth and development of labor organizations and democratic institutions. Voluntary associations; State may not compel them to admit any individual as member; Exception Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality or as regards a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement. Union membership is affected by public interest The reason is that the closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements of trade unions to become affected with public interest. Likewise, closed-shop, union shop, or maintenance-of-membership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with public interest. Union may not arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership It is well settled that labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor. Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new
members who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may at least invoke the right of those who seek admission for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily be denied readmission. When company was not guilty of unfair labor practice In the case at bar, the company was reluctantif not unwillingto discharge petitioner. When the union first informed it of petitioners resignation and urged implementation of Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the company advised petitioner of its provisions, thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the company notified the union that it would not take any action on the case and would consider petitioner still a member of the union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioners discharge, the company still demurred and explained that it was not taking sides and that its stand was prompted merely by humane considerations, springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the union without realizing its effect upon his employment. And, as the union reiterated its demand, the company notified petitioner that it had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with regret. Under the circumstances, the company was not unfair to petitioner. Right of employee dismissed from service due to unfair labor practice Having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the union. In the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, the lower court may, however, take such measures as it may deem best, including the power to authorize the company to make deductions for petitioners benefit, from the sums due to the union by way of check off or otherwise. United Restaurors Employees and Labor Union v. Torres (1968) Petitioners strike is unlawful A minority union cannot demand collective bargaining. Said right belongs to the union which commands the majority. By law, the right to be the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union "designated or selected" for such purpose "by the majority of the employees" in the unit concerned. In the case at bar, SELU and not petitioner union has the right as well as the obligation to hear, voice out and seek remedies for the grievances of all Sul employees, including employees who are members of petitioner Union, regarding the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who had themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute. Those who voted in the consent election against the labor union that was eventually certified are hidebound to the results thereof. Adherence to the methods laid down by statute f or the settlement of industrial strife is one way of achieving industrial peace; one such method is certification election.
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After the proper bargaining representative is certified, a strike by a minority union to compel an employer to bargain with it is unlawful. No labor dispute can exist between a minority union and an -employer in such case The strike is for an illegal purpose Petitioner Union's concerted activities designed to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of Sul employees must come to a halt. Collective bargaining cannot be the appropriate objective of petitioning Union's continuation of their concerted activities. The record before us does not reveal any other legitimate purpose. To allow said Union to continue picketing for the purpose of drawing the employer to the collective bargaining table would obviously be to disregard the results of the consent election. To further permit the Union's picketing activities would be to flaunt at the will of the majority. Minority unions right to strike ceases upon its defeat during the consent election Before an election is held by the Board to determine which of two rival unions represents a majority of the employees, one of the unions may call a strike and demand that the employer bargain with it. A labor dispute will then exist. Nothing in the statute makes it illegal for a minority to strike and thereby seek to obtain sufficient strength so as to become the sole bargaining agent. But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority union to compel an employer to bargain with it is unlawful. No labor dispute can exist between a minority union and an employer in such a case.
What bank should have done What the bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor practice under Section 4(a)(6) of the Industrial Peace Act. Instead of stifling criticism, the bank should have allowed respondents to air their grievance. Good faith bargaining required of the bank an open mind and a sincere desire to negotiate over grievances. Nature of collective bargaining Collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the term of their agreement the mutual obligation to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith x x x for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement (Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 875) and a violation of this obligation is, by Section 4(a)(6) and (b)(3), an unfair labor practice. Nature of grievance procedure The grievance procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective bargaining. It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly dialogue between labor and management as a means of maintaining industrial peace. Duty of Court of Industrial Relations to weigh employer's motive It is for the Court of Industrial Relations, in the first instance, to make the determination, to weigh the employer's expressed motive in determining the effect on the employees of management's otherwise equivocal act. Act does not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which constitutes an unfair labor practice. Rather, it leaves to the court the work of applying its general prohibitory language in the light of infinite combinations of events which may be charged as violative of its terms. Dismissal of an employee on account of his participation in a concerted activity is interference with right to self-organization What we have just essayed underscores at once the difference between Royal Interocean and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa on the one hand and this case on the other. In Royal Interocean, the employee's letter to the home office, for writing which she was dismissed, complained of the local manager's "inconsiderate and untactful attitude" a grievance which, the court found, "had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities." Nor did the court find evidence of discriminatory discharge in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa as the letter, which the employee wrote to the mother company in violation of the local company's rule, denounced "wastage of company funds." In contrast, the express finding of the court in this case was that the dismissal of the respondents was made on account of the letter they had written, in which they demanded the resignation of the bank president for a number of reasons touching labor-management relations reasons which not even the Bank's judgment that the respondents had committed libel could excuse it for making summary discharges in disregard of its duty to bargain collectively. In final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
VII. STRIKES, LOCKOUTS AND CONCERTED ACTIONS A. Concerted Actions Republic Savings Bank v. CIR (1967) Where employees were dismissed for uniting a letter urging the bank president to resign In the case at bar, respondents wrote and published a letter to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank employees. Held: Assuming that they acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter, they were nonetheless protected, for they were engaged in a concerted activity, in their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes unfair labor practice under Section 4(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 875. The joining in protests or demands by even a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. Complaint against nepotism, favoritism, and other management practices is within area of collective bargaining When respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism, and other management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Industrial Peace Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Even the reference to immorality was not irrelevant, as it was made to support the respondents' other charge that the bank president had failed to provide wholesome working conditions, let alone a good moral example for the employees, by practicing discrimination and favoritism in the appointment and promotion of certain employees on the basis of illicit relations or blood relationship with them.
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Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC, San Miguel Corp (1991) The right of workers to peaceful concerted activities Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, . . (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers. Examples of concerted activities The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor. Wage distortion law prohibits concerted activities on issues involving distortion It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. What is a slowdown? A slowdown is an inherently illegal activity, essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract, or statute or rule. The Court is in substantial agreement with the petitioner's concept of a slowdown as a "strike on the installment plan;" as a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their demands. The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees "continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them," they at the same time "select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do other work;" in other words, they "work on their own terms. B. Strikes Art. 212. Definitions. X x x
o. p. q.
"Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. "Lockout" means any temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. "Internal union dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in this Code. "Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing affecting wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of self-organization or collective bargaining. "Strike area" means the establishment, warehouses, depots, plants or offices, including the sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the employer struck against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in moving to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit from said establishment. (As amended by Section 4, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
r.
s.
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. a. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining. b. Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes. In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the Minister of Labor and Employment may promulgate. During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.
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A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981 and further amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-towork and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same. h. i. Before or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. (As amended by Section 27, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
g.
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. b. No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or collective bargaining, or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference. No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker, nor shall any person be employed as a strike-breaker. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and legal order. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)
In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted to substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health, through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by management to lockout. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.
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No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982)
Art. 265. Improved offer balloting. In an effort to settle a strike, the Department of Labor and Employment shall conduct a referendum by secret ballot on the improved offer of the employer on or before the 30th day of the strike. When at least a majority of the union members vote to accept the improved offer the striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement. In case of a lockout, the Department of Labor and Employment shall also conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the board of directors or trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case of a partnership vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.(Incorporated by Section 28, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) Art. 266. Requirement for arrest and detention. Except on grounds of national security and public peace or in case of commission of a crime, no union members or union organizers may be arrested or detained for union activities without previous consultations with the Secretary of Labor. RULE XXII CONCILIATION, STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS Section 1. Conciliation of labor-management disputes. - The board may, upon request of either of both parties or upon its own initiative, provide conciliation-mediation services to labor disputes other than notices of strikes or lockouts. Conciliation cases which are not subjects of notices of strike or lockout shall be docketed as preventive mediation cases. Section 2. Privileged communication. - Information and statements given in confidence at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communications. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matter taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them. Section 3. Issuance of subpoena. - The Board shall have the power to require the appearance of any parties at conciliation meetings. Section 4. Compromise Agreements. - Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Board and its regional branches shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion. Upon motion of any interested party, the Labor Arbiter in the region where the agreement was reached may issue a writ of execution requiring a sheriff of the Commission or the courts to enforce the terms of the agreement.
Section 5. Grounds for strike or lockout. - A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter- union and intra-union disputes without first having filed a notice of strike or lockout or without the necessary strike or lockout vote having been obtained and reported to the Board. Neither will a strike be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Section 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout. - Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on grounds of unfair labor practices. Section 7. Notice of strike or lockout. - In bargaining deadlocks, a notice of strike or lockout shall be filed with the regional branch of the Board at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof, a copy of said notice having been served on the other party concerned. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be fifteen (15) days. However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of any union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board. Section 8. Contents of notice. - The notice shall state, among others, the names and addresses of the employer and the union involved, the nature of the industry to which the employer belongs, the number of union members and of the workers in the bargaining unit, and such other relevant data as may facilitate the settlement of the dispute, such as a brief statement or enumeration of all pending labor disputes involving the same parties. In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle the differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of and the efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably. In case a notice does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section/s, the regional branch of the Board shall inform the concerned party of such fact.
Section 9. Action on Notice. - Upon receipt of the notice, the regional branch of the Board shall exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to
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settle the dispute amicably. The regional branch of the Board may, upon agreement of the parties, treat a notice as a preventive mediation case. It shall also encourage the parties to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty to bargain collectively in good faith and to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. A notice, upon agreement of the parties, may be referred to alternative modes of dispute resolution, including voluntary arbitration. Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. - A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners in a partnership obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and the notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule. Section 11. Declaration of strike or lockout. - Should the dispute remain unsettled after the lapse of the requisite number of days from the filing of the notice of strike or lockout and of the results of the election required in the preceding section, the labor union may strike or the employer may lock out its workers. The regional branch of the Board shall continue mediating and conciliating. Section 12. Improved offer balloting. - In case of a strike, the regional branch of the Board shall, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the improved offer of the employer on or before the 30th day of strike. When at least a majority of the union members vote to accept the improved offer, the striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon re-admit them upon the signing of the agreement. In case of a lockout, the regional branch of the Board shall also conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the board of directors or trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case of partnership vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement. Section 13. Peaceful picketing. - Workers shall have the right to peaceful picketing. No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. No person shall obstruct, impede or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by workers during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to self- organization or collective bargaining or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference. No employer shall use or employ any person to commit such acts nor shall any person be employed for such purpose. Section 14. Injunctions. - No court or entity shall enjoin any picketing, strike or lockout, except as provided in Articles 218 and 263 of the Labor Code. The Commission shall have the power to issue temporary restraining orders in such cases but only after due notice and hearing and in accordance with its rules. The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any Labor Arbiter who shall submit his recommendations to the Commission for its consideration and resolution. Any ex parte restraining order issued by the Commission, or its chairman or ViceChairman where the Commission is not in session and as prescribed by its rules, shall be valid for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days. Section 15. Criminal prosecution. - The regular courts shall have jurisdiction over any criminal action under Article 272 of the Labor Code.
NCMB PRIMER ON STRIKES What is a strike, picketing, and lockout? Strike - means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of the employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. (Art. 212 (o), Labor Code, as amended by Sec. 4, R. A. 6715) Peaceful Picketing -the right of workers during strikes consisting of the marching to and fro before the premises of an establishment involved in a labor dispute, generally accompanied by the carrying and display of signs, placards or banners with statements relating to the dispute. (Guidelines Governing Labor Relations, October 19, 1987) Lockout means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. (Article 212 (p) Labor Code, as amended by Section 4, R.A. 6715). What are the different forms of strikes? (a) Legal Strike one called for a valid purpose and conducted through means allowed by law. (b) Illegal Strike one staged for a purpose not recognized by law, or if for a valid purpose, conducted through means not sanctioned by law. (c) Economic Strike one staged by workers to force wage or other economic concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant (d) ULP Strike one called to protest against the employers acts of unfair labor practice enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, as amended, including gross violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and union busting. (e) Slowdown Strike one staged without the workers quitting their work but merely slackening or by reducing their normal work output.
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(f)
Wildcat Strike one declared and staged without filing the required notice of strike and without the majority approval of the recognized bargaining agent. (g) Sit Down Strike one where the workers stop working but do not leave their place of work. What is an Industrial Dispute? An industrial or labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. (Article 212 (1) Labor Code, as amended by Section 4, R.A. 6715) What is the nature of the right to strike and lockout? The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of the workers as the employers have the inherent and statutory right to lockout, all within the context of labor relations and collective bargaining. It is a means of last resort and presupposes that the duty to bargain in good faith has been fulfilled and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement have been tried and exhausted. (Guidelines Governing Labor Relations). Who May Declare a Strike or lockout? Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. Likewise, the employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on the ground of unfair labor practice. (Section 2, Rule XIII, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing The Labor Code, as amended). What are the requisites of a lawful strike or lockout? The requirements for a valid strike or lockout are as follows: It must be based on a valid and factual ground; A strike or lockout NOTICE shall be filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) at least 15 days before the intended date of the strike or lockout if the issues raised are unfair labor practices, or at least 30 days before the intended date thereof if the issue involves bargaining deadlock. In cases of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute UNION BUSTING where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the result thereof submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. 1. A strike must be approved by a majority vote of the members of the Union and a lockout must be approved by a majority vote of the members of the Board of Directors of the Corporation or Association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose.
2. A strike or lockout VOTE shall be reported to the NCMB-DOLE Regional Branch at least 7 days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period. In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed within the cooling-off period, the 7-day requirement shall be counted from the day following the expiration of the cooling-off period. (NSFW vs. Ovejera, G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982) In case of dismissal from employment of union officers which may constitute union busting, the time requirement for the filing of the Notice of Strike shall be dispensed with but the strike vote requirement being mandatory in character, shall in every case be complied with. The dispute must not be the subject of an assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary of Labor and Employment, a certification for compulsory or voluntary arbitration nor a subject of a pending case involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. What are the valid grounds for declaring a strike or lockout? The law recognizes two grounds for the valid exercise of the right to strike or lockout, namely: 1. Collective Bargaining Deadlock (CBD) and/or 2. Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) May a Union file a notice of strike or the employer file a notice of lockout if the labor dispute is based on a ground other than ULP or CBD? No. The union/employer may not file a notice based on grounds other than ULP and CBD. Violations of Collective Bargaining Agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable and no strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter-union and internal union disputes or on issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration including legislated wage orders and labor standard cases. However, if improvidently filed and it appears on the face of the notice that the issues raised are non-strikeable or the real issues discovered during conciliation proceedings are not proper subjects of a Notice of Strike or Lockout, The NCMB Regional Branch shall dismiss motu propio the notice without prejudice to further conciliation, or upon request of either or both parties in which case, the Notice of Strike or Lockout is treated as a Preventive Mediation Case. (See Definition of Preventive Mediation Case under Appendix 3, Definition of Terms). What are the contents of a notice of strike or lockout? The notice shall state, among others, the names and addresses of the employer and the union involved, the nature of the industry to which the employer belongs, the number of union members and of the workers in the bargaining unit, and such other relevant data as may facilitate the settlement of the dispute, such as a brief statement or enumeration of all pending labor disputes involving the same parties. In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle the differences.
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In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of and the efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably. What is the role of the NCMB in case a notice of strike or lockout is filed? Upon receipt of a valid notice of strike or lockout, the NCMB, through its ConciliatorMediators, shall call the parties to a conference the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them to explore all possibilities for amicable settlement. To this end, the Conciliator-Mediator may suggest/offer proposals as an alternative avenue for the resolution of their disagreement/conflict which may not necessarily bind the parties. In the event of failure in conciliation/mediation the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. What is the legal implication if the content-requirement of the notice of strike or lockout has not been complied with? Any notice which does not conform with the foregoing requirements shall be deemed not having been filed. What is the Purpose of the Strike vote? To ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the Union members in general and not with a mere minority, at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. What is the Purpose of the Strike Vote report? To ensure that a strike vote was indeed taken and in the event that the report is false, to afford the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late. What is the purpose of the time requirement (Cooling Off Period) in the notice of strike/lockout? The 15 and 30 days requirement is known as the Cooling-Off Period designed to afford parties the opportunity to amicable resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB Conciliator/Mediator. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the required number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may commence a lockout after having complied with the 7-day requirement for the filing of the strike or lockout vote, as the case may be. What is the correct interpretation of the requirement to observe the cooling-off periods and the strike ban? They are mandatory. See the Doctrines in NFSW v. Ovejera and in Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC. What are the prohibited acts and practices? 1. Declaring a strike or lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes or on issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration. 2. Declaring a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively or without first having filed the required notice or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Regional Branch of the NCMB. 3. Declaring a strike or lockout in defiance of a cease-and-desist order, or an order for the striking employees to return to work and for the employer to accept the workers after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or Secretary of Labor and Employment, or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration, or during the pendency of a case involving the authorized grounds for the strike or lockout. 4. Obstructing, impending or interfering with by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy or in the exercise of their right to self-organization or collective bargaining, or aiding or abetting such obstruction or interference. 5. Employing any strike breaker or being employed as a strike-breaker. 6. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, of the Philippine National Police, or any armed person shall bring in, introduce or escort, in any manner, any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of strikers. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent the aforementioned officials, employees or peace officers from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order and/or to protect life and property. 7. Stationary picket and the use of means like placing of objects to constitute permanent blockade or to effectively close points of entry or exit in company premises. 8. Any act of violence, coercion or intimidation by any picketer. 9. The obstruction of the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes. 10. Obstruction of public thoroughfares while engaged in picketing. What are the legal implications for non-compliance with the requirements for a valid strike/lockout? The requirements for a valid strike or lockout are mandatory in character and noncompliance therewith is sufficient ground to declare the strike or lockout illegal. If a strike is declared illegal, the employer may be authorized to terminate the employment of union officials who knowingly participated in the illegal strike and/or any worker or union officer who knowingly participated in the commission of other illegal acts during the strike. In case the lockout is declared illegal, any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence thereof may be entitled to re-instatement including payment of full backwages and other benefits. When a dispute, which is the subject of a Notice of strike, is forthwith treated as a Preventive Mediation Case, may the Union later on stage a strike on account of the same dispute? No. Once the dispute has been converted into a preventive mediation case, the notice of strike is deemed dropped from the dockets as if no notice of strike has been filed. Since there is no more notice of strike to speak about, any strike subsequently staged by the Union is deemed not to have complied with the requirements of a valid strike. The same rule applies in the case of lockout by an employer, (PAL vs. Sec. of Labor) Who has the duty to declare that the notice of strike/lockout has been converted into preventive mediation case? Upon the recommendation of the Conciliator/Mediator handling the labor dispute, the Director of the Regional Branch of the NCMB which has jurisdiction over the labor dispute has the duty to declare and inform the parties that the issues raised or the actual issues involved are not proper subjects of a Notice of Strike or Lockout and that the Notice of Strike or Lockout has been converted into a Preventive
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Mediation Case without prejudice to further conciliation or upon the request of either or both parties. May a labor dispute subject of a notice of strike/lockout, mature into a voluntary arbitration case? Yes. By mutual agreement, the parties may decide to bring the matter for resolution before an accredited voluntary arbitrator of their choice, in which case the Notice is deemed automatically withdrawn and dropped from the dockets. May a strike/lockout be declared illegal? A strike or lockout may be declared illegal if any of the requirements for a valid strike or lockout is not complied with. It may also be declared illegal if it is based on non-strikeable issues or if the issues involved are already the subject of arbitration. During a strike or lockout, when either of the parties commits prohibited acts or practices, the strike or lockout may be declared illegal. Who has the jurisdiction to determine the legality of strike/lockout? In general, the Labor Arbiter in the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission has the power to determine questions involving the legality or the illegality of a strike or lockout upon the filing of a proper complaint and after due hearing. Where the matter of legality or illegality of strike is raised in the dispute over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction or in disputes certified by the Secretary to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, the same may be resolved by the Secretary or the Commission, respectively. (International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union, G.R. No. 92981-83, January 9, 1992.) May a voluntary arbitrator determine the legality of a strike? If the issue is voluntary and jointly submitted by the parties to voluntary arbitration, the question may be resolved by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Can a person performing prohibited acts be charged before the court? Yes. They may be charged before the appropriate civil and criminal courts. What penalties are imposable? Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 265 of the Labor Code (performing any of the above prohibited activities) shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding P500.00 and/or imprisonment for not less than one (1) day nor more than six (6) months. If the person so convicted is a foreigner, he shall be subjected to immediate and summary deportation and will be permanently barred from re-entering the country without the special permission of the President. If the act is at the same time a violation of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), a prosecution under the Labor Code will preclude prosecution for the same act under the RPC or vice-versa.
Is an employee who participates in a lawful strike deemed to have abandoned his employment? No. An employee who goes on strike is not deemed to have abandoned his employment but is merely exercising his right to self-organization precisely to protect his rights as an employee and/or to obtain better working conditions. Is participation by an employee in a strike sufficient ground for an employer to terminate his employment? No. The mere participation of a worker in lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for the termination of his employment even if a replacement has been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. However, any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Are the strikers entitled to payment of wages during the period of a lawful strike? As a general rule, striking employees are not entitled to the payment of wages for unworked days during the period of the strike pursuant to the principle of No workNo pay. However, this does not preclude the parties from entering into an agreement to the contrary. On the other hand, when strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the existence of valid grounds but the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practices, the strikers, who refuse to accept the new conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement, are entitled to the losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the employers discriminatory acts from the time they were refused reinstatement. May a strike/lockout be enjoined/prevented by legal process? General Rule: strikes and lockouts validly declared enjoy the protection of law and cannot be enjoined unless illegal acts are committed in the course of such strikes or lockouts. Ordinarily, the law vests in the NLRC the authority to issue injunctions to restrain the commission of illegal acts during strikes and pickets. However, in the national interest cases, the certification or assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over the dispute under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as a amended, has the effect of automatically enjoining the intended strike or lockout whether or not a corresponding return to work order has been issued. The workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing before the strike. What is the extent of the power of the Presidernt/Secretary of Labor to issue Assumption and Certification orders? The power to issue assumption and certification orders is an extraordinary authority strictly limited to national interest cases and granted to the President or to the Secretary of Labor, which can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interest. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, the Secretary of Labor is vested with the discretionary power to decide not only the question of whether to assume jurisdiction over a given labor dispute or certify the
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same to the NLRC, but also the determination of the industry indispensable to national interest. The President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving industries indispensable to national interest in order to settle or terminate the same. Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in the implementation of a mass lay-off. When the President or Secretary of labor, or Certified to the NLRC assumes a dispute for Compulsory Arbitration, may a strike/lockout be validly declared on account of the same dispute? No. The assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. What is the nature of a Return-to-work Order? The return-to-work order is a valid statutory part and parcel of the assumption and certification orders given the predictable prejudice the strike could cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest. Stated otherwise, the assumption of jurisdiction and the certification to the NLRC has the effect of automatically enjoining the strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, even if the same has not been categorically stated or does not appear in the assumption or certification order. It is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. It must be discharged as a duty even against the workers will. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operation of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. x x x. It is executory in character and shall be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity x x x precisely to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. (Union of Filipro Employees vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc., GR No. 88710-13, December 19, 1990). What are the legal consequences of defiance of the return-to-work order by either the employer or the employees? In case of non-compliance with the return-to-work order in connection with the certification or assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor, the employees concerned may be subjected to immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief even criminal prosecution against either or both of them. The Secretary of Labor may cite the defiant party in contempt pursuant to the power vested in him under the provisions of the Labor Code. Can the PNP be deputized to enforce orders from the DOLE? Yes. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) or any Labor Arbiter may deputize the PNP to enforce any of its order, award or decision.
In such a case, what will be PNPs role? In such a case, the role of the PNP is merely to assist the sheriff or the appropriate DOLE Officers in enforcing the decision, award or order. It shall maintain peace and order and public safety in the area where the decision, award or order is to be enforced. It shall also give security to the officers enforcing the decision, award or order. (Please see also Article 264 (d), Article 266 of the Labor Code, as amended, and Guidelines for the Conduct of PNP During Strikes, Lockouts and Labor Disputes in General, Oct. 22, 1987). What is a strike area? A strike area includes: (a) The establishment of the employer struck against including run-away shops, factories or warehouses and other premises where members of the bargaining unit carry out the operations and business of the employer, and (b) The area immediately before points of entrance and exit of establishment struck against. Is the ingress and egress of the establishment part of the strike area? No. Since it is not part of the strike area, the same could not be blocked or picketed. Who is a strike-breaker? A strike-breaker means any person who obstructs, impedes or interferes with by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation any peaceful picket by employees during any labor controversy. 1. Concept and Scope Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil (2001) Labor Secretarys authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and Employments jurisdiction over labor and labor-related disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union (ALU) where the Court declared: In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Where the employees assented by practice to an arrangement of a continuous 24hour, two-shift work daily schedule in spite of the eight-hour schedule provided for in their CBA, they cannot now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because they were not obliged to work beyond eight hours It is evident from the foregoing provision that the working hours may be changed, at the discretion of the company, should such change be necessary for its operations, and that the employees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company. In the case before us, Labor Arbiter Caday found that respondent company had to adopt a continuous 24-hour work daily schedule by reason of the nature of its business and the demands of its clients. It was established that the employees adhered to the said work schedule since 1988. The employees are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule since they followed, without any
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question or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto. The two-shift schedule effectively changed the working hours stipulated in the CBA. As the employees assented by practice to this arrangement, they cannot now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because they were not obliged to work beyond eight hours No-Strike Clause; An overtime boycott or work slowdown by the employees constitutes a violation of the CBA which prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work More importantly, the overtime boycott or work slowdown by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work.
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Strike vote report must be submitted to the NCMB-DOLE Regional Branch 5.1. Upon the filing of the Strike Vote Report, the 7-Day strike Ban Must be observed Observance of the Cooling Off Period and the Strike-Ban Period 6.1. As mentioned, the 30/15 day cooling off period must be observed 6.2. The 7-day strike ban must also lapse 6.3. Exception: In case of dismissal from employment of union officers which may constitute union busting, the time requirement for the filing of the Notice of Strike shall be dispensed with but the strike vote requirement being mandatory in character, shall in every case be complied with There must be a legitimate labor union before a strike may be held In all cases, the Union must comply with the procedural requirements The Union cannot validly conduct/declare an Economic Strike when the CBA contains a No-Strike Clause General Rule: No injunctions can be issued for labor disputes o Except if there are illegal acts or acts of violence
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7. In extending substantial separation package to some officers of the union during the pendency of the case employer did not condone the illegal acts they committedthe Court views the gesture of the company as an act of generosity for which it should not be punished Finally, the Court cannot agree with the proposition that respondent company, in extending substantial separation package to some officers of petitioner union during the pendency of this case, in effect, condoned the illegal acts they committed. Respondent company correctly postured that at the time these union officers obtained their separation benefits, they were still considered employees of the company. Hence, the company was merely complying with its legal obligations. Respondent company could have withheld these benefits pending the final resolution of this case. Yet, considering perhaps the financial hardships experienced by its employees and the economic situation prevailing, respondent company chose to let its employees avail of their separation benefits. The Court views the gesture of respondent company as an act of generosity for which it should not be punished. 2. Requisites for a valid strike From Lecture of Atty. E.M. Zuiga 1. There Must be Valid Grounds 1.1. Unfair Labor Practice 1.2. Collective Bargaining Deadlock o Grounds are exclusive. Wage Distortion is not valid 2. A Notice of Strike Must be submitted to the NCMB 2.1. This gives rise to the 30/15 Day Cooling off period 2.2. For Deadlocks, the Notice must be submitted 30 days before the intended strike 2.3. For ULP, Notice must be submitted 15 days before the intended Strike 2.4. Notice may be dispensed with in cases of Union Busting A Notice of Strike Vote Must Be Submitted to DOLE 3.1. Notice must be given 24 Hours prior to the strike vote 3.2. Failure to give Notice of Strike Vote to the DOLE makes the strike illegal 3.3. Strike Vote Cannot be dispensed with, it is mandatory in every case A Strike Vote Must Be conducted 4.1. The Strike must receive assent from the majority of the Total Membership of the Union
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CASES: National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) v. Ovejera (1982) The prescribed cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after submission of report of strike vote are mandatory. When the law says the labor union may strike should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice, the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that in every case, the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period. It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory coolingoff period. Correct interpretation of the requirement to observe the cooling off periods and the strike ban The prescribed cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after submission of report of strike vote are mandatory. The observance of both periods must be complied with, although a labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. The avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The waiting period, on the other hand, is intended to provide opportunity for the members of the union or the management to take the appropriate remedy in case the strike or lockout vote report is false or inaccurate. Moreover, the cooling-off and 7-day strike ban provisions of law are reasonable and valid restrictions on the right to strike and these restrictions constitute a valid exercise of police power of the State. If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes for
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which the filing of the strike notice and strike vote report is required cannot be achieved. The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. Purpose of 7-day strike vote report Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of minority groups within the union. The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period. Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC Nature of Strikes A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute." It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest. Strikes require 7-day waiting period and the decision of the majority The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. Strike conducted within the waiting period, illegal The strike conducted by the union is plainly illegal as it was held within the 7 day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike.
Penalty of dismissal on leaders of an illegal strike We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike, especially the officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to promote their interest. Effect of participating in an illegal strike union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike. First City Interlink Transportation Co. v. Roldan-Confesor (1997) Requisites for a valid strike Pursuant to Art. 263(c)(f) of the Labor Code, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (1) a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (3) notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike. Even if a strike vote had been taken, failure to report the same to the DOLE and non-observance of the 7-day strike ban renders the strike illegal Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, we agree with petitioner that the Union nevertheless failed to observe the required seven-day strike ban from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the DOLE up to the time the Union staged the strike. As petitioner contends: It must be noted in this regard that as shown in the minutes of conciliation conferences, the parties met in a conciliation conference on June 13, 4 days before the June 17 strike. So even if it is conceded that a strike vote was taken, there would have been non-compliance with the requisite cooling off period and the 7-day strike ban for the simple reason that between the day the parties met for conciliation conference and the day of the strike, there were only 4 days. Instance when good faith could cure illegality of the strike It is nonetheless contended by the Solicitor General that [a] strike inspired by good faith is not illegal simply because certain requirements were not followed, citing the case of Ferrer v. CIR. The contention has no merit. In Ferrer, the strikers failed to observe the 30-day cooling off period, but this Court found the strike legal because of the strikers belief in good faith that the employer committed unfair labor practice. But, in the case at bar, what is lacking is the strike vote which should have been reported to the DOLE seven days before staging the strike. The importance of the strike vote and reporting of the results to the DOLE cannot be gainsaid as it is the Union itself that the law seeks to protect by ensuring that the majority of its members voted in favor of the strike. Union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike would be treated differently
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Responsibility for these illegal acts must be on an individual and not collective basis. Therefore, although the strike was illegal because of the commission of illegal acts, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status. Union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently. When conditions required for reinstatement deemed valid The requirement to submit NBI, Police and Barangay clearances is reasonable to enable management to determine whether the returning employees have pending charges of illegal acts especially those committed during the strike. So also is the requirement to have drivers and conductors/conductress license, to enable them to perform their tasks. The pictures required are necessary for the employers personnel records and so can validly be required. With respect to the required medical examination, the same can be justified as management prerogative since it is the employers right to ensure that the employees are physically fit to resume the performance of their duties. This is especially true in this case, because two years had elapsed since the time of dismissal of the employees. As held in Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co., an employer should not be compelled to reinstate an employee who is no longer physically fit for the job from which he was ousted. Medical examination could not be required as a condition for reinstatement, in cases where the employer is guilty of unfair labor practice To require [employees] to undergo a physical or medical examination as a precondition of reinstatement or return to work simply because of the long pendency of their case which is due to no fault of theirs would not only defeat the purpose of the law and the constitutional and statutory mandates to protect labor but would work to their unfair prejudice as aggrieved parties and give an undue advantage to employers as the offenders who have the means and resources to wage attrition and withstand the bane of protracted litigation. Hence, the aggrieved workers may be subject to periodic physical or medical examination as old reinstated workers, but not as a precondition to their reinstatement or return to work with the important consequence that if they are found to be ill or suffering from some disability, they would be entitled to all the benefits that the laws and company practices provide by way of compensation, medical care, disability benefits and gratuities, etc. to employees and workers Tiu v. NLRC (1997) The union has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support its allegations that management committed unfair labor practices The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB contained general allegations that RBS management committed unfair labor practices by its gross violation of the economic provisions in their collective bargaining agreement and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference and discrimination which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support these allegations. It is not enough that the union believes that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief
Petitioners plead that their contemporaneous acts, reckoned from their 26 June letter to RBS up to the actual strike held on 2 August, were justified based on its honest belief that RBS was committing unfair labor practices. Stated otherwise, the presumption of legality (of the strike) prevails even if the allegations of unfair labor practices are subsequently found out to be untrue. The Court is not unmindful of this rule, but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even at least a rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. Court affirms the factual finding of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that there was no strikeable issue to support the Unions subject strike. The evidence show that the union anchored its position on alleged unfair labor practices in order to evade not only the grievance machinery but also the no strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement with RBS. Union leaders who, in disregard of the grievance machinery established in the collective bargaining agreement, knowingly participate in an illegal strike act unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their behavior Even assuming arguendo that in the issuance of said guidelines RBS may have violated some provisions in the collective bargaining agreement, there was no palpable showing that the same was a flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. Hence, the law mandates that said violation shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. The bottom line is that the union should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery established in their agreement with RBS. In disregarding said procedure the union leaders who knowingly participated in the illegal strike have acted unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their behavior. NUWHRAIN (Interim Junta) v. NLRC (1998) Effect of Good Faith on illegal strikes Generally, a strike based on a non-strikeable ground is an illegal strike; corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such acts actually exist. As an exception, even if no ULP acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP acts exist so as to constitute a valid ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where the union believed that the employer committed ULP and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless. Mere claim of good faith, insufficient An established caveat, however, is that a mere claim of good faith would not justify the holding of a strike under the aforesaid exception as, in addition thereto, the circumstances must have warranted such belief. It is therefore, not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to sustain such belief. Dismissal of an employee, when legal and not ULP, is not a proper cause for a strike
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The dismissal of Coronel which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike was not a sufficient ground to justify that radical recourse on the part of the Junta members. As the NLRC later found, the dismissal was legal and was not a case of ULP but a mere exercise of management prerogative on discipline, the validity of which could have been questioned through the filing of an appropriate complaint and not through the filing of a notice of strike or the holding of a strike. Evidently, to repeat, appropriate remedies under the Labor Code were available to the striking employees and they had the option to either directly file a case for illegal dismissal in the office of the labor arbiter or, by agreement of the parties, to submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that it may be subjected to voluntary arbitration proceedings. Petitioners should have availed themselves of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, holding a wildcat strike at the expense of the Hotel whose operations were consequently disrupted for two days. Unwarranted strikes cannot be justified by a claim of good faith Not every claim of good faith is justifiable, and herein petitioners claim of good faith shall not be counternanced by this Court since their decision to go on strike was clearly unwarranted. Non-compliance with a prohibition to strike, badge of bad faith Besides, petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of discrimination of the Hotel were not ULP, hence not strikeable. The refusal of petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith. In light of the foregoing circumstances, their claim of good faith must fall and we agree with the NLRC that there was no justification for the illegal strike. An employer may lawfully discharge employees for participating in an unjustifiable wildcat strike We accordingly uphold the dismissal from employment of the 15 officers of the Junta who knowingly participated in the strike. An employer may lawfully discharge employees for participating in an unjustifiable wildcat strike and especially so in this case, because said wildcat strike was an attempt to undermine the Unions position as the exclusive bargaining representative and was, therefore, an unprotected activity. The cessation from employment of the 15 Junta officers as a result of their participation in the illegal strike is a consequence of their defiant and capricious decision to participate therein. Philippine Inter-fashion, Inc. v. NLRC (1982) Where parties are in pari delicto, restoration of the status quo ante is warranted; Reinstatement of dismissed employees, proper The Court approves the stand taken by the Solicitor General that there was no clear and unequivocal waiver on the part of petitioner and on the contrary the record shows that it tenaciously pursued its application for their dismissal, but nevertheless in view of the undisputed findings of illegal strike on the part of the 114 employees and illegal lockout on petitioner's part, both parties are in pari delicto and such situation warrants the restoration of the status quo ante and bringing the parties back to the respective positions before the illegal strike and illegal lockout through the reinstatement of the said 114 employees.
General rule that strikers are not entitled to backwages; Principle of "no work, no pay" applicable With such restoration of the status quo ante it necessarily follows, as likewise submitted by the Solicitor General, that the petition must be granted insofar as it seeks the setting aside of the award of three months' backwages to the 114 employees ordered reinstated on the basis of the general rule that strikers are not entitled to backwages (with some exceptions not herein applicable, such as where the employer is guilty of oppression and union-busting activities and strikers ordered reinstated are denied such reinstatement and therefore are declared entitled to backwages from the date of such denial). More so, is the principle of "no work, no pay" applicable to the case at bar, in view of the undisputed finding of illegality of the strike. A strike based on grievances not submitted to the grievance committee per agreement of the parties sanctioned by the Court of Industrial Relations is premature and illegal. 3. Injunction Art. 254. Injunction prohibited. No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982) Samahang Manggagawa ng Liberty Commercial v. Pimentel (1987) Even illegal concerted actions must be considered acts arising from labor dispute The concerted action taken by petitioners in picketing the premises of the department store of private respondent, no matter how illegal, cannot be regarded as acts not arising from a labor dispute over which the Regional Trial Courts may exercise jurisdiction. View that until allegations of unfair labor practice are proven before the proper forum no labor dispute to speak of and therefore regular courts may assume jurisdiction and once assumed they cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction cannot be sustained We cannot agree with the view of respondent court that until allegations of unfair labor practice are proven before the proper forum, there exists no labor dispute to speak of and therefore the regular courts may assume jurisdiction over the case, and that once jurisdiction is assumed by the courts, they cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. To sustain such a view will be to promote conflict of jurisdiction and would render meaningless the provision of the Labor Code conferring upon the administrative agency the "original and exclusive jurisdiction" to hear Illegal strikes and illegal picketing condemned by the Court In holding the respondent court to be without jurisdiction to hear the instant case (Civil Case No. T-1287) and to issue the writ of preliminary injunction, we do not thereby condone illegal strikes or illegal picketing by workers or picketing which seek to block free ingress or egress to and from business establishments. We have time and again condemned such practices, but we have done so in cases properly ventilated before the right forum. Original and exclusive jurisdiction over labor dispute is with Labor Arbiter.
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MSF Tire & Rubber v. CA (1999) The Innocent Bystander Rule (PAFLU v. Cloribel) The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we upheld a trial courts injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection was found between the two mills owned by two different corporations other than their being situated in the same premises. It is to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were located. An Innocent bystander is entitled to a writ of injunction from civil courts against picketing workers. An innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from and without any connection whatever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof An innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof. For instance, in PAFLU v. Cloribel, this Court held that Wellington and Galang were entirely separate entities, different from, and without any connection whatsoever to, the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, against whom the strike was directed, other than the incidental fact that they are the banks landlord and co-lessee housed in the same building, respectively. Similarly, in Liwayway Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, this Court ruled thatLiwayway was an innocent bystander and thus entitled to enjoin the unions strike because Liwayways only connection with the employer company was the fact that both were situated in the same premises. Injunctive write is not issued on the basis of separate corporate personality Petitioner contends, the corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation is used as a mere alter-ego or business conduit, it is not these standards but those of the innocent bystander rule which govern whether or not petitioner is entitled to an injunctive writ.
Deltaventures, Inc. v. Cabato (2000) Certain property was awarded to some workers in an Unfair Labor Practice, Deltaventures was not a party. Petitioner filed before the Commission a third-party claim asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the Sheriffs notice of sale. It then filed a petition for injunction against the sheriff with the RTC. Where the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, it is a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courtssuch courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis--vis the alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the writ. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit: Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice. Considering the factual setting, it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courts. Precedent abound confirming the rule that said courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. A party, by filing its third-party claim with a deputy sheriff executing a writ of execution in a labor case, submits to the jurisdiction of the NLRC acting through the Labor Arbiter Petitioner failed to realize that by filing its third-party claim with the deputy sheriff, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission acting through the Labor Arbiter. It failed to perceive the fact that what it is really controverting is the decision of the Labor Arbiter and not the act of the deputy sheriff in executing said order issued as a consequence of said decision rendered. The Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264) It must be noted that the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly observed by court a quo, the main issue and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven with the execution of the Commissions decision. No doubt the aforecited prohibition in Article 254 is applicable. The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution Petitioner should have filed its third-party claim before the Labor Arbiter, from whom the writ of execution originated, before instituting said civil case. The NLRCs
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Manual on Execution of Judgment, issued pursuant to Article 218 of the Labor Code, provides the mechanism for a third-party claimant to assert his claim over a property levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to an order or decision of the Commission or of the Labor Arbiter. The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution. A Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter 4. Assumption of Jurisdiction; Return-to-work Order Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor (1997) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers constitutional right to strike The section provides in part, viz.: When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . . The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. Art. 263(g) gives DOLE Secretary discretion in determining industries indispensable to national interest The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. Article 263 (g) meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, (i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. PSBA v. Noriel (1988) The premise of petitioners argument that Secretary Drilon have acted on the request of Congressman Ramon J. Jabar is flawed The premise of petitioners argument, however, is flawed. Its conclusion that the Acting Secretarys order was vitiated by a jurisdictional defect is anchored on the
premise that the only basis for, and what impelled him to issue, the order was Congressman Jabars letter to Secretary Drilon. But this is not so. Respondent union petitioned for its direct certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative of petitioners non-academic personnel. A notice of strike was filed by respondent union after petitioner allegedly engaged in union busting, coercion and harassment. Conciliation conferences were held, but to no avail. A strike took place, thereby causing the disruption of the operations of the school. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and declaration of illegality of the strike with the National Labor Relations Commission while some of its students filed a civil case and obtained a temporary restraining order from the Regional Trial Court. In the subsequent conciliation conferences petitioners representatives failed to attend, leading to an impasse. Given these circumstances, the existence of an unresolved labor dispute in petitioners Manila campus which needed the immediate attention of the labor authorities certainly cannot be denied. Duty of Secretary under Art 263(g) In the opinion of Acting Secretary Noriel, the labor dispute adversely affected the national interest, affecting as it did some 9,000 students. He was authorized by law to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute, after finding that it adversely affected the national interest. Under the circumstances the Acting Secretary had the power and the duty to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute Hence, even if the writing of the letter to Secretary Drilon constituted an appearance as counsel by Congressman Jabar before a quasi-judicial body (although the Court is not disposed to agree to such contention), still the fact remains that under the circumstances the Acting Secretary had the power and the duty to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and, corollary to the assumption of jurisdiction, issue a return-to-work order. Given this factual and legal backdrop, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Acting Secretary. That the regular courts have no jurisdiction over labor disputes and to issue injunctions against strikes is well-settled The Regional Trial Court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed by some PSBA students, involving as it does a labor dispute over which the labor agencies had exclusive jurisdiction. That the regular courts have no jurisdiction over labor disputes and to issue injunctions against strikes is well-settled. This the Regional Trial Court recognized when it subsequently corrected its error and dismissed the complaint for damages and injunction upon respondent unions motion. Contention that the Acting Secretary favored respondent union when he issued the assailed order cannot be seriously considered The facts and the law fully support the Acting Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the issuance of a return-to-work order. It may also be added that due to petitioners intransigent refusal to attend the conciliation conferences called after the union struck, assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and the issuance of a return-to-work order had become the only way of breaking the deadlock and maintaining the status quo ante pending resolution of the dispute. The Solicitor General was correct when he stated that by assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute, the Acting Secretary of Labor merely provided for a formal forum for the parties to ventilate their positions with the end in view of settling the dispute. Thus, the contention that the Acting Secretary
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favored respondent union when he issued the assailed order cannot be seriously considered. Issuance of the return-to-work order clear mandated by the law [Art 263(g)] Once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over, or certifies for compulsory arbitration, a labor dispute adversely affecting the national interest, the law mandates that if a strike or lockout has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Far from erring, the Acting Secretary, in issuing the return-to-work order, merely implemented the clear mandate of the law. St. Scholasticas College v. Torres (1992) Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, the same must be involved in the labor dispute itself or otherwise submitted to him for resolution Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor dispute itself, or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all striking employees shall immediately return to work. This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARYs compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over labor disputes involving academic institutions upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration vs. Noriel. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a returnto-work order may consequently be declared to have lost his employment status The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, be declared to have lost his employment status. By insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions and so could be validly replaced
Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced. Length of time employees defied Return to work order is immaterial From the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Suffice it to say, in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, the workers were terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for only 9 days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to stand akimbo and wait until 5 orders shall have been issued for their return before they report back to work. This is absurd. Here, the workers defied 2 return to work orders for a period of 1 month. Thus, the Secretary gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reinstatement of striking union members who refused to report back to work after he issued two 2 return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in an illegal act. Sarmiento v. Tuico (1988) Issuance of RTW order upon Certification of dispute to the NLRC is embodied in the law There can be no question that the MOLE acted correctly in certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest. Affirming this fact, we conclude that the return-to-work order was equally valid as a statutory part and parcel of the certification order issued by the MOLE on November 24, 1986. The law itself provides that such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The challenged order of the NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued by the MOLE in its own assumption order of September 9, 1986. Return-to-work order is to prevent impairment of the national interest It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return-to-work order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. In the instant case, stoppage of work in the firm will be hurtful not only to both the employer and the employees. More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of the contracts of the company with foreign importers. It was particularly for the purpose of avoiding such a development that the labor dispute was certified to the NLRC, with the return-to-work order following as a matter of course under the law.
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Return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the workers will It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the workers will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills. The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike. By their own acts, petitioners are deemed to have abandoned their employment and cannot now demand the right to return thereto by virtue of the very order they have defied The records show that the return-to-work order was first issued on June 3, 1986, and was reiterated on June 13, 1986. The strike was declared thereafter, if we go by the criminal complaints in G.R. Nos. 75271-73, where the alleged acts are claimed to have been done on June 9, 1986, and July 15, 1986. These dates are not denied. In fact, the petitioners argue in their pleadings that they were engaged only in peaceful picketing, which would signify that they had not on those dates returned to work as required and had decided instead to ignore the said order. By their own acts, they are deemed to have abandoned their employment and cannot now demand the right to return thereto by virtue of the very order they have defied. It is not correct to say that the return-to-work order may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in activities inimical to their employers interest. This is like eating ones cake and having it too, and at the expense of the management. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary. Only those workers who complied with the order should benefit Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or
to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered. Reformist Union of R.B. Liner v. NLRC (1997) When an employer accedes to the peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC, agreeing to accept all employees who had not yet returned to work, it waives the issue of the illegality of the strike The private respondents can no longer contest the legality of the strike held by the petitioners, as the private respondents themselves sought compulsory arbitration in order to resolve that very issue, hence their letter to the Labor Secretary read, in part: This is to request your good office to certify for compulsory arbitration or to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute (strike continuing) between R.B. Liner, Inc. . . . and the Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas . . . The current strike by Lakas which started on December 13, 1989 even before Certification Election could be held could not be resolved by the NCR Conciliation-Mediation Division after six meetings/conferences between the parties. The dispute or strike was settled when the company and the union entered into an agreement on 19 January 1990 where the private respondents agreed to accept all employees who, by then, had not yet returned to work. By acceding to the peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC, the private respondents waived the issue of the illegality of the strike. Compulsory Arbitration, Defined The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined both as the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. Clearly then, the legality of the strike could no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by the NLRC, as this had already been resolved. It was the sole issue submitted for compulsory arbitration by the private respondents, as is obvious from the portion of their letter quoted above. The case certified by the Labor Secretary to the NLRC was dismissed after the union and the company drew up the agreement mentioned earlier. This conclusively disposed of the strike issue. Neither the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC could review the same issue passed upon in a certified case, and their decisions to the contrary are rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction The Labor Code provides that the decision in compulsory arbitration proceedings shall be final and executory 10 calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. The parties were informed of the dismissal of the case in a letter dated 14 February 1990, and while nothing in the record indicates when the said letter was received by the parties, it is reasonable to infer that more than 10 days elapsedhence, the NLRC decision had already become final and executorybefore the private respondents filed their complaint with the Labor Arbiter on 13 July 1990. A final judgment is no longer susceptible to change, revision, amendment, or reversal. Neither the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC, therefore, could review the same issue passed upon in NLRC Certified Case No. 0542, and their decisions to the contrary have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
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While the Supreme Court is not abandoning the rule that unfair labor practice acts are beyond and outside the sphere of compromises, the agreement in the instant case was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, thus binding upon the parties The agreement entered into by the company and the union, moreover, was in the nature of a compromise agreement, i.e., an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. Thus, in the agreement, each party made concessions in favor of the other to avoid a protracted litigation. While we do not abandon the rule that unfair labor practice acts are beyond and outside the sphere of compromises, the agreement herein was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, thus it binds the parties. The burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing employees from employment rests on the employer, and the latters failure to do so results in a finding that the dismissal was unfounded The only barrier then to the employees reinstatement is their defiance of the Labor Secretarys return-to-work order, which the employers claim as one reason to validly dismiss the employees. We disagree, however, with the finding that Lakas/Reformist violated the said order. It is upon the respondents to substantiate the aforesaid defiance, as the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing employees from employment rests on the employer, and the latters failure to do so results in a finding that the dismissal was unfounded. The private respondents fell short of discharging this burden. Where the employer fails to satisfactorily establish any violation of the Labor Secretarys return-to-work order, any contrary finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is committed with grave abuse of discretion The private respondents thus failed to satisfactorily establish any violation of the Labor Secretarys return-to-work order, and consequently, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRCs contrary finding is not anchored on substantial evidence. Grave abuse of discretion was thus committed once more. Where there was, in fact, no defiance of the Labor Secretarys return-to-work order, and no cause to decree the employees dismissal in the first instance, employees must be reinstated As regards the illegal lockout alleged by the petitioners, we agree with the NLRCs finding that the petitioners had sufficient basis to believe in good faith that the private respondents were culpable. The NLRC found this circumstance to justify the petitioners-employees reinstatement; we add that since there was, in fact, no defiance of the Labor Secretarys return-to-work order, and no cause to decree the petitioners-employees dismissal in the first instance, reinstatement of the dismissed employees can be the only outcome in this case. Separation pay, equivalent to one months salary for every year of service, is awarded as an alternative to reinstatement when the latter is no longer an option, and is computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of termination, including the imputed service for which the employee is entitled to back wages, with the salary rate prevailing at the end of the period of putative service being the basis for computation. Consolidated Labor Association v. Marsman & Co. (1964)
Refusal to readmit strikers because of union activities The denial of readmittance to striking employees not because of business exigency but due ,to a desire to discourage union activities is unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. Right of reinstatement should not be denied to employees innocent of illegal acts against company Where it appears that illegal acts committed by individual strikers against the company were neither authorized nor impliedly sanctioned by the union, the other strikers who were innocent of and did not participate in said acts should not be punished by being deprived of their right of reinstatement. No right to backpay in during the period the strike was still an economic strike In an economic strike, the strikers are not entitled to backpay, since the employer should get the equivalent day's work for what he pays his employees. During the time that the strike was an economic one, complainants had no right to back pay. The Industrial Court could not have made a finding of unfair labor practice with respect to such time, as none had so far been committed. This being an unfair labor practice case, it cannot, therefore, order reinstatement much less back pay for that period. Definition of economic strike An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. When economic strike changed to unfair labor practice strike An economic strike changes in character to one for unfair labor practice from the time a company refuses to reinstate some of its striking employees because of their union activities after it had offered to readmit all the strikers and in fact did readmit the others. Court has discretion to grant backpay in ULP strikes On the other hand, even after the court has made a finding of unfair labor practice, it still has the discretion to determine whether or not to grant back pay. Such discretion was not abused when it denied back wages to complainants, considering the climate of violence which attended the strike and picket that the complainants conducted. While the complainants ordered reinstated did not actively take part in the acts of violence, their minatory attitude towards the Company may be gathered from the fact that from the very first day of the strike policemen had to patrol the strike zone in order to preserve peace. Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union-PTUC v. CIR (1964) Two types of employees involved Two types of employees involved in unfair labor practice cases should be distinguished, namely, those who were discriminatorily dismissed for union activities and those who voluntarily went on strike even if it is in protest of an unfair labor practice. Both types of employees are entitled to reinstatement. Exception of rule; Employees guilty of unlawful conduct or violence From the rule that employees who strike because of unfair labor practice are entitled to reinstatement, however, must be excepted those who, although discriminatorily discharged, must nevertheless be denied reinstatement because of (1) unlawful conduct or (2) because of violence.
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Court of Industrial Relations to determine effect of misconduct of strikers It is not for the Supreme Court to judge the effect of misconduct by the striking employees. That is primarily for the Court of Industrial Relations to determine. Court of Industrial Relations to determine whether strikers who found other employment should be reinstated It is for the Court of Industrial Relations to determine primarily whether to deny reinstatement to those of the strikers who might have found substantial employment elsewhere. Discriminatorily dismissed employees to receive backpay Discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay f rom the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the day of their discharge. Voluntary strikers not entitled to backpay Those employees who voluntarily went on strike even if in protest against what they considered unfair labor practices of the company are not entitled to backpay. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the companys unfair labor practice. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. (See Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, L-14183, Nov. 28, 1959). Offer to return to work must be unconditional to entitle strikers to backpay upon refusal of employer to readmit them To be effective so as to entitle the strikers to backpay, the offer must have been unconditional. The strikers must have offered to return to work under the same conditions under which they work just before their strike so that the companys refusal would have placed on the latter the blame for their economic loss. 5. Consequences of Strike Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. CA (2000) Upon Labor Sec.s assumption of jurisdiction, strikes are enjoined automatically It is clear from the [Art. 263(g)] that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-towork order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore. Rationale of 264(a) once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. We have held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or member.
We cannot allow the Union to thwart the efficacy of the assumption and return to work orders, issued in the national interest, through the simple expediency of refusing to acknowledge receipt thereof. Strikes conducted in defiance of RTW order, illegal The strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for having been staged in open and knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work orders. The necessary consequence thereof is that by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be validly replaced. Writs of Execution; The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor are not the kind of orders contemplated in Sections 1 and 4, Rule III of the NLRC Manual because such Orders do not yet finally dispose of labor disputes To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section 1, Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment which provides that: Section 1. Hours and Days When Writ Shall Be Served.Writ of Execution shall be served at any day, except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, between the hours of eight in the morning and five in the afternoon, x x x However, the above-cited rule is not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as Sections 1 and 4, Rule III of the same NLRC Manual provide that such Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding. The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor in the case at bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the immediately cited rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did not yet finally dispose of the labor dispute. No right to backpay Since the strikers were not illegally dismissed, the COMPANY is under no obligation to pay backwages to them. It is simply inconsistent, nay, absurd, to award backwages when there is no finding of illegal dismissal, when the record shows that the striking workers did not comply with lawful orders for them to return to work during said periods of time. In fact, the Secretary of Labor observed that while it was obligatory on the part of both parties to restore, in the meantime, the status quo obtaining in the workplace, the same was not possible considering the strikers had defied the return-to-work Order of this Office. With such blatant disregard by the strikers of official edicts ordering their temporary reinstatement, there is no basis to award them backwages corresponding to said time frames. Otherwise, they will recover something they have not or could not have earned by their willful defiance of the return-to-work order, a patently incongruous and unjust situation. The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or separation pay Purpose of grant of plenary powers to Secretary of labor The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it incumbent for him to bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees so that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work
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or any lagging of the activities of the industry or the possibility of these contingencies which might cause detriment to national interest. Association of Independent Unions of the Phil (AIUP) v. NLRC (1999) When a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the said agreement The court is not persuaded by petitioners allegation of union busting. The NLRC correctly ruled that the strike staged by petitioners was in the nature of a unionrecognition-strike. A union-recognition-strike, as its legal designation implies, is calculated to compel the employer to recognize ones union, and not the other contending group, as the employees bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking unions doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit. It is undisputed that at the time the petition for certification election was filed by AIUP, the petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the respondent company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining representative of all rank and file employees. The petition should have not been entertained because of the contract bar rule. When a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the said agreement. Outside the said period, as in the present case, the petition for certification election or motion for intervention cannot be allowed. Hence, the conclusion that the respondent company did not commit the alleged union busting. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. It is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes or c) obstruct public thoroughfares. A strike though valid may be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered illegal as the strikers formed a human cordon along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of Petitioners. ficers of the union may be dismissed as a consequence of an illegal strike It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: " . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any . . union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. . ." Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is greater than that of the members. An ordinary striking employee can not be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified The next aspect of the case to consider is the fact of the four petitioners herein. Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: x x any worker x x who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. x x It can be gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can not be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Note: 4 petitioners were ordered reinstated for failure of the company to substantiate allegations that they performed criminal/violent acts during the strike. They were awarded backwages
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III. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS A. Definition & Types: Rule I, Sec (h-p)

RULE XI INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES

Take note, this refers to Art. 241 in our Code

To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

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