Lecture 6

Cognitive Semantics: From Prototype Theory to Frames and Idealized Cognitive Models

1. Introducing Prototype Semantics Prototype semantics suggests answers to some of the tantalizing dissatisfactions inherent in the necessary and sufficient conditions model. It is fair to say that many researchers use the term prototype for both the psychological concept (best example of, or typical member of, a category) and for the lexical concept (bundle of features) describing it.
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Wittgensteins games and family resemblance Games are like families. There is no simple collection of properties that all games share, the category is united by family resemblance. Chess and go both involve competition, skill and the use long-term strategies. Chess and poker both involve competition. Poker and old maid are both card games. In short, games, like family members are similar to one another in a variety of ways
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Austins The meaning of a word (1940/1961)

Problem: Why do we call different kinds of thinks by the same name? The senses of a word represent a category with a prototypical zone, i.e., a prototypical sense. The adjective healthy: when I talk of a healthy body, and again of a healthy complexion, of healthy exercise: the word is not just used equivocally there is a primary nuclear sense of healthy, the sense in which healthy is used of a healthy body. I call this nuclear because it is contained as a part in the other two senses which may be set out as productive of healthy bodies and resulting from a healthy body Now are we content to say that the exercise, the complexion and the body are called healthy because they are similar? Such a remark cannot fail to be misleading. The three meanings form a category with healthy bodies as central meaning and the other two meaning derived on the basis of metonymic extension.
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1.1 The standard version of prototype semantics corresponds to the statements first proposed by Elanor Rosch in the early seventies. These statements put forth a conception of the category and of categorization which concerns the internal structure of a category, as well as its place in the hyponymic vertical hierarchies. a) Rosch speaks of the internal structure of the category. On the horizontal dimension, a category is structured into a center and a periphery, having central and less central members. b) the theory also puts forth a hierarchical view of the system of categories categories are structured on the vertical dimension. Not all the levels of a hyponymic hierarchy have the same cognitive relevance. We will examine the internal (horizontal) structure of the category first.
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What is a prototype? In the seventies Rosch conducted a series of celebrated experiments that challenged the classical view of categories and categorization, producing the Roschean revolution. The central idea is that categories are structured around prototypes. A prototype is usually defined as the best example of a category. The centrality of the prototype was first apparent in naming tasks. Thus, the subjects were asked to name, say birds, according to their degree of birdiness, i.e., the degree to which they matched the ideal of a bird. Rosch soon established hierarchies of birdiness, vegetableness, etc., which indicated that categories like bird, vegetable are internally structured: (1) Birdiness hierarchy Vegetableness hierarchy robins carrots, asparagus eagles celery chickens, ducks, geese onion penguins, pelicans parsley bats pickles 1.2
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The prototype is not any particular example of a bird, but rather it is a welldefined subcategory; moreover, it is the most typical subcategory commonly accepted as such by the community of speakers. The prototype is the most representive subcategory. Membership in a category is determined by matching the categorized object with the prototype. The prototype acts as a cognitve reference point. The judgment of similarity is global. One does not go by checking the features in a list. The experimental verification of the existence of prototypes has included three domains: natural categories having a physiological basis, natural kinds having a perceptual basis and artifacts (artificial categories). In all of them, there is a structuring of the category into central/peripheral members. (2) Category Central members Peripheral members
bird fruit metal sickness crime vehicle body part furniture robin, sparrow pear, apple, banana copper, aluminium iron cancer, measles rape, robbery car, bus arm, leg chair, bed chicken, duck strawberry, prune magnesium, platinum, rheumatism, rickets treason, fraud tank, carriage lips, skin TV set
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1.3 Category and Categorization The new conception of categories and categorization is founded on the following theses: 1) The category has an internal prototypical structure. 2) The degree of representativity of an individual corresponds to its degree of membership in a category. 3) Membership in a category results from a global judgment of similarity with the prototype, rather than from a feature by feature confrontation with a definition. 4) Members in a category may, but need not, share all, or even most of their properties. They are grouped together on the basis of a family resemblance judgment, These have been established on an experimental basis. Here are some of the best types of experimental evidence collected by Rosch, together with the results that they lead to. a) Prototypical instances are categorized faster than less typical members. Thus, reaction time increases to decide on the truth values of the following sentences: (4) A robin is a bird. A chicken is a bird. A penguin is a bird. A bat is a bird, b) Prototypical members are the first to be learned by children. c) Time and again prototypical members are mentioned in the first place when speakers are asked to enumerate the members of a category d) Prototypes serve as cognitive reference points in categorization and recognition 8 tasks.

1.4 The (mental) representation of a prototype The (mental) representation of a prototype typically consists of (one of) the following: a) a list of typical features (bird, lie) b) features plus an image schema (often a shape: BIRD is prototypically described as below: 1. It can fly. 5. Not domestic 2. It has feathers. 6. It lays eggs 3. It is typically shaped like 7. It has a bill. 4. It has wings The schema below shows which features are shared by the kinds of birds illustrated below. It appears that there no 9 NSC for membership in the category bird.

6, 7 4

kiwi

sparrow
1

ostrich
1

chicken

penguin

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CUP the prototypes also includes a shape of a cup and saucer. Notice the presence of functional features in artifacts.

1. It is a recipient for drinking 2. It is as tall as it is wide. 3. It has a handle. 4. It has a saucer.

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LIE
We will consider this as an example of how to deal with an abstract term. As shown so far, a semantic prototype associates a word or phrase with a (prelinguistic) image or a verbal schema. Speakers are equipped with an ability to judge the degree to which an object matches this prototype schema or image. The particular prototype schema that Coleman and Kay propose for LIE has the following semi-formal characteristics. (a) (b) it contains a finite list of properties the individual properties in the list are each treated as dichotomous, i.e., as either satisfied or not. We envisage that prototype schemata may in general contain gradient properties. membership in the category LIE is a gradient phenomenon. satisfaction of each property on the list does not necessarily contribute equally to the degree of membership of an individual in the category. Properties may be of differential importance in constituting the prototype.
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(c) (d)

Defining LIES (5) a. P is false. (falsehood) b. S believes P to be false. (deliberate falsehood) c. In uttering P, S intends to deceive A (intended deceit) Utterances which have all the three Ps are full-fledged lies. Utterances which lack one or more of the elements in the definition might still be classified as lies, though less clearly so. The experiment A questionnaire was constructed with eight stories, each of which had a different configuration of the three elements. Each story contained a question, rating the story as an instance of lie, as indicated in (6) (6) It was a lie./ It was not a lie./ I cant say.
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Here are five of the stories part of the experiment. stories, (7) i. Moe has eaten the cake Juliet meant to serve to company. Juliet asks Moe: Did you eat the cake? Moe says, No, I didnt. Did Moe lie? iv. One morning Katerina has an arithmetic test she hasnt studied for. She says to her mother: Im sick. Her mother takes her temperature and it turns out to Katerinas surprise that she really is sick; later that day she develops the measles. Did Katerina lie? v. Schmallowitz is invited to dinner at his bosss house. After a dismal evening enjoyed by no one, Schmallowitz say to his hostess: Thank you, it was a terrific party. Schmallowitz doesnt believe that it was a terrific party, and he really isnt trying to convince anyone he had a good time, but he is just concerned to say something nice to his bosss wife, even if he doesnt expect her to believe it. Did Schmallowitz lie? vi. John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino is Marys ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary: Have you seen Valentino this week? Mary answers: Valentinos been sick with mononucleosis for the past week. Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the part two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had a date with Valentino the night before. Did Mary lie? viii. Superfan has got tickets for the championship game and is very proud of them. He shows them to his boss, who says, Listen, Superfan, any day you dont come to work, youd better have a better excuse than that. Superfan says, I will. Superfan call in on the day of the game and says; I cant come to work, Im sick. Ironically, when he goes home the slight stomach ache he felt arising turns out to be ptomaine poisoning, So Superfan was really sick when he said he was. Did he lie?

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(8) Features in the definition of lie Story (i) (iv) (v) (vi) (viii) P is false + + S believes P is false + + + + S intends to deceive + + + Total

Moe Katerina Schmallowitz Mary Superfan

466 346 315 233 309

Results of the experiment 1. The general rule is that the more prototypical elements a story contains, the higher it scores on the LIE scale.(Compare stories (iv)/ (v) to stories vi/viii) where only one feature is satified) 2. The data indicate some ranking of the three elements in terms of their importance in determining whether or not an utterance was a lie. (Compare stories viii and vi). Falsity of belief is the most important element, intended deception is the next most important element and factual falsity is the least important.
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1.5 What kind of properties make up the prototype.? The study of the prototype is a matter of linguistic and psycholinguistic investigation. The basic idea that meaning is decomposable and structured continues to be valid. But now conceptual analysis is undertaken with: a) linguistic methods (syntagmatic, paradigmatic (setting oppositions, lexical decomposition, etc); b) experimental methods, which test, refine linguistic methods. The study of the prototypes (stereotype) with PL means has brought to light a number of interesting aspects regarding the relation extension/ intension. a) It is the actual nature of the objects in the extension of the concrete terms which is fundamental in explaining their semantics. The extension will determine the nature of the feature in the stereotype, as well as the richness of the stereotype/prototype. Thus, expectedly, the stereotype for dog is richer than for plaice. This idea is illustrated in chart II (from Dahlgreen () b) The attributes P1, P2.Pn do not occur independently. There is a perceived correlational structure of real world objects, such that some combinations are more expected than others, some are rare and some are logically impossible. For example, a creature that has feathers is more likely to have wings than a creature that is endowed with fur. c) The prototype includes those features that have a high cue validity. Cue validity is the conditional probability that some object is in a particular category, given the possession of a particular feature (the cue). The best cues are those that work all of the time for categories at given level. For example, if you see a living thing with gills, you may be certain that it is a fish. Thus gills will represent a cue validity of 10 (the highest on a scale from 0 to 10) for the category fish and a cue validity of 0 16 for other categories.

(9)

Type of features
Type of term Color in the stereotype perceptual Example red Stereotypical features physiologically based properties (heat, emotion, anger) seat, legs you sit on it with bended knees educates middle class, erudite, well-paid color, shape, flavor

artifact

perceptual, functional motor, movement social function, relative rank, typical trait of behavior, income perceptual

chair

social rank

professor

fruit

orange

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Hedges Languages possess resources for expressing degree of category membership, linguistic devices commonly called category hedges. Hedges represent a semantic, not a syntactic class, that is why they formally belong in various grammatical categories: adverbial phrases (including participial constructions) loosely speaking, technically speaking, technically, par excellence, etc modifiers (of different kind of predicates) so-called, sort of, kind of conjunctions in that Semantically, hedges are (metalinguistic) devices for speakers employ for commenting on the language they are using. When they are employed in categorization, they focus on an area in the internal structure of the category, pushing the referent to that area. Par excellence- is a category hedge whose function is to pick out only the central members of a category. (10) A robin is bird par excellence. ??A turkey is a bird par excellence/ Other hedges restructure the category by excluding the central members: loosely speaking, in a way, etc. (11) a. ??Loosely speaking, a chair is piece of furniture. b. Loosely speaking a telephone is a piece of furniture. c. *Loosely speaking, a six-sided figure is hexagonal d. Loosely speaking, France is hexagonal.

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Strictly speaking is similar in that this hedge also excludes the central members. (12) a. ?Strictly speaking beans are vegetables. b. Strictly speaking, rhubarb is a vegetable. Yet, strictly speaking restructures the category in a different manner from loosely speaking, introducing expert criteria. It removes the fuzziness from the category boundary, by picking out non-central members and giving full status. In contrast, loosely speaking extends the category by picking out things that would not ordinarily be considered members, but which might be associated with the category on the basis of one or two non-essential attributes. (13) a. ?A bat is a bird (false) b. *Strictly speaking a bat is a bird.(false) c. Loosely speaking, a bat is a bird.
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In that restructures the category picking out peripheral members that satisfy a particular criterion. Thus it spells out reasons for assigning an entity to a particular category. (14) Loosely speaking, a bat is a bird in that it has got wings and it can fly. (15) a. *He killed Alice in that he murdered her. b. He killed Alice in that he did nothing to keep her alive/ c. Shes a friend of mine in that Ive known her for years, but we are really not that close. Sentence (15a) sounds odd since it is not usually necessary to state the reasons for categorizing murder as killing. Kill prototypically denotes an action that causes loss of life, and murder is a central instance of killing. Sentence (15b) in contrast denotes a non-prototypical instance of killing, with the consequence that in that is felicitous. Sentence (15c) focuses on a single attribute which is frequently associated with friendship (long acquaintance), but which does not guarantee friendship. In that is again called-for. Hedges also differentiate between various non-members of a category, in that a category cannot be extended too much. Consider strictly speaking and as such: (16) a. Strictly speaking, a bat is not a bird. b. *Strictly speaking, a TV set is not a bird (17) a. An octopus is not a fish as such. b. *A bicycle is not a fish as such. Consider finally the hedge technically speaking. Technically speaking, like strictly speaking, removes the fuzziness from a category, and in many contexts, the two hedges are interchangeable. But technically invokes a technical or expert definition of a category setting it off against the folk dimension. Consider (18), which is issued from a taxpayment expert point of vies (18) Reagan is technically speaking a cattle rancher.
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3. Basic Level Terms 3.1. The concept of basic level term has to do with the hyponymic structure of the vocabulary, i.e. with the vertical hierarchies.

(19) tool table hot chair

artifact furniture chair dining chair bed kitchen chair dentists chair dwelling place

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Given such a hierarchy, the same entity, this particular chair may be labeled in many different ways: kitchen chair, chair, piece of furniture, artifact, entity. Taken in itself, this hierarchy does not grant any privileged position to any level of categorization in the hierarchy. Experimental psychology has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the facts of cognition and language show the existence of a level of categorization which is cognitively more salient. This is the so-called basic-level of categorization. The basic level should be opposed to the super-ordinate level and to the sub-ordinate level, in triplets like (20): (20) superordinate basic level subordinate furniture chair dining chair animal cat manx animal dog boxer plant tree oak
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Basic-level categories are basic in at least four respects: 1. It is this level at which members have similarly perceived overall shapes; it is the level of perceptual templates (Gestalts). All chairs look alike, but all pieces of furniture do not; hence the difficulty of drawing a piece of furniture, as opposed to trying draw a chair/ bed, etc. 2. It is the highest level at single mental image can reflect the entire category. (compare kitchen char/chair vs. furniture item/chair; fruit/apple, etc. 3. It is the highest level at which a person uses similar motor programs for interacting with category members. We interact in a particular ways with beds, chairs, desks, buses, dogs, but we have no particular motor programs for furniture, animal, kitchen chair 4. Regarding language structure, it is the level with the most commonly used labels for category members. Basic level terms are used in natural contexts, since they are stylistically neutral. Basic level terms are frequently short, root forms, while terms below the basic level are frequently compounds: table/ kitchen table/ whist table/dining table, etc. Terms above the basic level are sometimes grammatically marked: thus furniture is uncountable, similarly pairs like: footwear//shoe, boot, headgear// hat,cap, etc.; often the super-category term is missing; ??colored// red, blue, technically created; spouse// husband, wife; sibling// berother/ sister, etc. 5. The basic level terms are extremely useful in the organization of our knowledge of the world. The basic level is the level at which most of our knowledge is organized. Basic categories most fully exploit the correlations of attributes in the real world: wings/feathers/*fur; animal/move/*dwelling places, etc. Such clusters of concepts characterizing categories are called frames.
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Basic level terms: a) maximize the number of attributes shared by members, b) Minimize the number of attributes shared with members of other categories. Objects in the extension of basic level categories are maximally distinct, and therefore salient. Superordinate terms have a systematizing function, often they possess few defining attributes: furniture, fruit (you eat it). For instance, for some categories like furniture the best you can do is to list members and hope that some generalizing attributes will be deducible. Chairs in contrast have quite a few defining attributes, not shared by beds and tables. Members in the category on the next, lower, level (sub-ordinate terms, like kitchen chair, dining chair, armchair maximize the attributes shared by members of the category; the sub-ordinate category is not maximally distinct (perceptually, functionally) from the other categories on the same level, hence items are interchangeable: for many purposes any old chair will do.
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Lecture 6-7

The second Stage of Prototype Theory. The extended Theory. Cognitive Semantics: Prototype effects of Idealized Cognitive models (frames)

The empirical facts that prompted this theoretical reorientation are the following: a. Not all categories have prototypical structure. A case in point is that of linguistic categories: the various meanings of a lexeme may be related among themselves, even though they need not all be related to a central prototypical sense. Many categories exhibit a polycentric rather than a central prototypical sense. An example is the verb climb: (21) a. The plane climbed to 30 000 feet. b. The locomotive climbed to the mountain side. c. Prices are climbing day bay day. d. The boy climbed the tree. e. The boy climbed down the tree and over the wall. f. The boy climbed into car/ under a table / out of his sleeping bag. While a-c are related, meaning ascend, and d-e are also related meaning, clamber, using limbs), a and e are not necessarily related. The different discrete meanings are related through meaning chains, according to the family resemblance model. While any two adjacent meanings are related (one meaning can be inferred from the other), resemblance is not transitive. (22) A B C D b. A second empirical problem: since not all categories have prototypical structure, perhaps prototype are not psychological real entities; perhaps one can explain the prototypical effects in other terms. Basically, the proposal is that prototypical effects are derived from the organization of knowledge into conceptual frames, also called idealized cognitive models.
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4.1

The most interesting and well spelled-out proposal is Lakoffs experiential internal realism.

a. This position implies a commitment to the existence of the real world, both external to human beings and including the reality of human experience; It also presupposes an acceptance of truth as reflecting a certain correspondence between what we say, that is, between our knowledge, and the world. b. The position of internal realism (a variety of which is experiential realism) grants an active part to the epistemic subject in the constitution and functioning of conceptual systems. The idea is that different languages cut the world out into objects in different ways. Putnam (1982) adopts the position of internal realism. According to him, the characteristic of this view is to hold that what objects the world consists of is question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or description ( a science, a language, etc.) Many internalist philosophers further claim than there is more than one true description of the world. In an internalist view, also, signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects, independently of how these signs are employed and by whom. But a sign that is actually employed in a particular way by a community of users will correspond to a particular object within the conceptual schemes of these users. What objects are acknowledged in a way depends on these conceptual schemes c. The specific position of experiential realism is to characterize meanings, concepts, in terms of the nature and experience of the human organism doing the thinking. This will be obvious in the hypothesis of how a conceptual system is constituted.
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4.2. Idealized Cognitive Models as Means of Storing Knowledge The central hypothesis of cognitive semantics is that knowledge is organized in idealized cognitive models (= ICMs) or frames. Each ICM is a complex structured whole, a gestalt. We have seen the various types of lexical sets available in the lexicon; they reflect such cognitive models. Concepts are understood function of the models they are part of. Several kinds of structuring principles for ICM have been described: a) propositional structures (so called because the concepts of the ICM generate propositions) All the lexical systems described so far can be subsumed under propositional models. b) image schematic models these are schematic images, nonverbal elements, such as trajectories, containers, orientational images ( up, down, top, botto) which may structure concepts and hold them together; c) metaphoric mappings d) metonymic mappings
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4.2.1 Propositional models specify a class of elements with the properties and relations holding among them (taxonomies, partonomies, scripts, scenarios, etc.). Here are a few examples: (23) Tuesday can be understood only with respect to an ICM that includes the natural cycle defined by the rotation of the Earth around the sun, with the four seasons, etc. waiter can only be understood w rt the restaurant script buyer - seller presuppose the knowledge of the commercial event. 4.2.2 Image schematic model these are schematic images, non-verbal elements, such as trajectories, containers, orientational images ( up, down, top, bottom) which may structure concepts and hold them together
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4.2.3 Metaphoric models are mappings from one propositional or image schematic model in one domain [ the base domain] to corresponding structure in another domain [ the target domain]. Metaphoric transfers represent a basic ingredient in the conceptualizing ability of humans. Metaphors are basic inferential strategies in the construction of abstract concepts ( feelings, ideas, sciences; etc. Recall : barriers, locality conditions etc.) A favorite examples is the analysis of feelings (abstract concepts), a metaphorical ICM which has physiological source domain The folk theory of physiological effects, especially that part that emphasizes heat, forms the basis of the most general structural metaphor for anger. Anger is heat. There are two versions of this metaphor, one where the heat is applied to a fluid, the other when the heat is applied to a solid: (24) Anger is the heat of a fluid in a container This is a very elaborate metaphors. It combines with the structural metaphors bodies are containers and yields the central metaphors of the domains (25) Bodies are containers He was filled with anger She couldnt contain her joy. She was brimming with rage.
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(26) Anger is the heat of a fluid in a container You make my blood boil. I had reached the boiling point. Let him stew. The source domain has cognitive priority because it is more accessible. Speakers have detailed knowledge of the source domain. By metaphorical entailment this knowledge is transferred to the target domain, that of emotions. Thus, it is known about fluids that that when they start to boil, the fluid goes upward. Likewise, when the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises: (27) His pent up energies welled up in him. I was in a towering rage. My anger kept boiling inside me. We also know that intense heat produces steam and creates pressure on the container. This yields other metaphorical entailments. (28) intense anger produces steam I was fuming/ Billy is just blowing off steam She got all stewed up.
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(29) intense anger produces pressure on the container He was bursting with anger. I could barely contain my rage. I could barely keep it in any more. A variant of this involves refers to keeping the pressure down (30) I suppressed my anger. He turned his anger inward. He was blue in the face. When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes: (31) When I told him the truth, he just exploded. She blew up at me. I blew my top / hit the roof / the ceiling. Notice the very interesting fact that an abstract, potentially unstructured domain acquires a detailed (familiar) structure through metaphorical entailment.
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4.2.4 Metonymic models A metonymic model has the following characteristics: There is a target concept/ domain A to be understood for some purpose in some context. There is some conceptual structure containing the target concept A as well as another concept B. B is either a part of A or closely associated with it in that structure. Compared to the target A, the source B is either easier to understand, or easier to remember or to recognize. A metonymic model is a model of how A and B are related in a conceptual structure; the relation between them is specified by means of some function from B to A. It has been noticed that many metonymic models actually involve individuals that stand for the whole category. Several such situations have been described: a) social stereotypes these can be used to understand the category as a whole. (32) the stereotypical politician: conniving, egotistical, dishonest the stereotypical bachelor :is macho, dates a lot of different women, is interested in sexual conquest, hangs out in single bars, etc. b) ideals many categories are understood in terms of ideals: abstract perfect cases (33) the ideal husband: a good provider, faithful, strong, attractive, etc. the stereotypical husband dull, pot-bellied,

Apparently, in American culture, there are many kinds of ideal models for marriges: (34) successful marriages good marriages strong marriages those where the goals of both partners are fulfilled those where both partners find the marriage beneficial those which are likely to last

A lot of cultural knowledge is organized in terms of ideals: ideal families, ideal mates, ideal jobs, ideal bosses, ideal worker, etc.
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Cultural knowledge about ideals leads to prototypical effects. There is an asymmetry between ideal and non-ideal cases. One generally makes judgments of quality and sets goals for the furutre in terms of ideal cases. c) Paragons We also comprehend categories in terms of concrete individuals members who represent either an ideal or its opposite. Thus, there are institutions like the ten-best and ten worst lists, Academy Awards, The Guiness Book of World Records, etc. We have dicator paragons: Hitler, Stalin, Ceausescu We have paragon makes of cars,as testified by adds like This is the Cadillac of vacuum cleaners d) Generators The natural numbers are the best known examples: 0-9. The category as a whole is defined metonymically. We start from the single digit numbers and the simple rules of arithmetic and advances to more difficult higher numbers. e) Submodels For natural numbers the most common submodel is the subcategory of the powers of tesn: 10, 100, 1000, etc. We use this sub-model to comprehend the relative size of numbers. They function as cognitive reference points, which have a special place in reasoning, particularly in making approximations and estimating size. Thus we say 98 is approximately 100, rather than 100 is approximately 98. Some submodels have a biological basis: the primary colors, the basic emotions, others are culturally stipulated: e.g.: the seven deadly sins (Pride, Gluttony, Sloth, Lust, Avarice, Wrath, Envy) f) Typical examples these are what is usually meant by a prototype (35) Apples and pears are typical fruit. Saws and hammers are typical tools.

g) Salient examples It is common for speakers to use familiar memorable or otherwise salient examples to comprehend a category. For instance, California earthquakes, the 1977 Bucharest earthquake are salient examples of natural disasters. Conclusion We have reviewed the following kinds of metonymic models: spscila stereotypes, ideals, paragons, generators, subomodels, typical examples, salient examples, all of which give rise to prototypical effects.

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4.4 The acquisition of concepts. The formation of conceptual systems. The experientialist approach attempts to characterize meaning in terms of the nature and experience of the epistemic subject. The fresh insight of this approach is to characterize meaning in terms of embodiment, i.e., in terms of our collective biological capacities and our physical and social experiences as beings functioning in our environment. There are two problems here: a) one that we have already discussed, that of the structure of the conceptual system; specifically, knowledge is organized in ICMs and certain cognitive subsystems have priority over others. b) the second problem is that of the embodiment of this structure.
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1. Pre-conceptual experience. There are at least two kinds of structure in our pre-conceptual experiences: A) Basic level structure As already seen in the study of the prototype, experience is structured in terms of the way we are handling basic level objects. We interact in specific ways with certain classes of objects in our environment. As discussed above, basic level categories are precisely defined by specific gestalt patterns, by specific motor programs and functional patterns in our interaction with them. We thus form rich mental images of these categories. The level of basic terms is the level where we perceive the sharpest discontinuities. It is the level of: (36) a) the level of natural kinds; b) the level of basic actions: sit, drink, run, etc. c) the level of basic properties: soft, hard, hot, cold, etc. Pre-conceptually, experience is structured at this level. b) Kinesthetic image schematic structure The second kind of pre-conceptual structure is the level of kinesthetic image-schematic structure. The child possesses certain image schemas which structure his experience. Image schemas are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience: containers, paths, links, balance, and in the various orientations and relations of daily life: up/down, front/back, part/whole, center/periphery, etc.

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2. Abstract concepts As to the abstract concepts, the claim is that they arise from basic-level and image-schematic structure, basically in two ways: a. by metaphorical projection from the domain of the physical to abstract domains; b. by projecting from the basic level to super-ordinate and subordinate categories. Abstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they are understood because of their systematic relationship to directly meaningful categories. The study of taxonomies and partonimies has already shown how basic level terms project super-ordinate and subordinate categories Let us now turn to imahe schematic models and the role they play in concept formation. The central hypothesis is once more that certain conceptual cognitive models derive their fundamental meaningfulness directly from their ability to match up with preconceptual structure. In domain where there is clearly discernible pre-conceptual structure to our experience, we import such structure via metaphor
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4.5.1 The Container Schema Bodily experience As Mark Johnson points out (The Body in the Mind), we experience our bodies both as containers and as things (objects) within containers (things contained). Structural elements: Interior, Boundary, Exterior Basic logic: Like most image schemas, its internal structure is arranged so as to yield a basic logic. Everything is either inside a container or out of it, i.e. either P or bP. If container A is in container B and X is in a, then X is also in B, which is the basis for a modus ponens inference. If all As are Bs, and X is A, then X is B. (the metonymic logic of classes is founded on this schema). Sample metaphor: The visual field is understood as a container. Things come into sight, go out of sight. Approximately 600 verbs are constructed with in and out in English (walk, look, run etc). Personal relationships are also understood in terms of containers: to be trapped in a marriage and get out of it. The basic logic of image schemas is due to their configurations as gestalts, i.e. as structured wholes which more than mere collections of parts. Their basic logic derives from their configuration.

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The container schema is inherently meaningful to people by virtue of their bodily experience. The container schema has a meaningful configuration from which the basic logic follows, given certain vasic cognitive operations such as superimposition and focusing: a. X b. A B B is a container schema with contents A A A is a container with content X

c.

X A B

Superimposition of A and B

d. X B

B is a container schema with contents X

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4.5.2 The Part-Whole schema Bodily experience We are whole beings with parts that we can manipulate. Our entire lives are spent with an awareness of both our wholeness and our parts. We experience our bodies as wholes with parts. We become aware of the part-whole structure of the objects. Structural elements: a whole, parts and a configuration. Basic logic If A is part of B, the B is not a part of A.(asymmetry) A is not a part of A (irreflexive) If the parts exist in the given configurations, then and only then does the whole exist. If the whole is located at a place P, then the parts too are located at P. This is a typical, but not necessary property. The parts are contiguous to one another. Sample metaphors: Families and other social organizations are understood as wholes with parts. For example, marriage is understood as the creation of a family whole, with the spouses opiii, Divorce is thus viewed as splitting up, In India the caste society is viewed as a body (the whole) with castes as parts, the highest caste (the priests) being the head and the lowest case being the feet. The caste system is understood as being structured metaphorically according to the configuration of the body ; hence the belief that the maintainance of the caste structure (the configuration) is necessary to the preservation of society (the whole).
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4.5.3 The link schema Bodily experience Our first link is the umbilical cord. Throughout infancy and early childhood, we hold onto our parents and other things either to secure our location or theirs. To secure the location of two things relative to one another, one uses such things as strings, ropes or other means of connection. Structural elements: Two entities, A and B and a Link connecting them. Basic Logic: If A is linked to B, then A is constrained by, and dependent upon, B. Symmetry: If A is linked to B, then b is also linked to A Metaphors: One makes connections, breaks social ties, breaks promises, engagements, we sstay in touch, connected, etc.
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4.5.4 The Source/Path/Goal Schema (cf. Fillmores Case for Case, theta theory), there is relation between movement in space, transfer of possession, and change of state. (37) He walked to the Post Office. He lost his heart to her. The pumpkin turned into a coach. Other image schemas include an up-down schema, a frontback schema, a linear order schema, etc. At present the range of existing schemata and of their properties is still being studied. Image scgematas provide particularly important evidence for the claim that abstract reasoning is a matter of two things: (a) reason based on bodily experience, and b) metaphorical projections from concrete to abstract domains.
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4.6 People possess a conceptualizing capacity. This can be noticed in the following: a) Given basic level concepts and image schemta concepts, people build up complex cognitive models/ structured clusters of concepts. b) Image schemas plus metaphorical projections provide the structures used in the more abstract conceptual models. The presentation of the container schema, of the part-whole schema, of the center-periphery schema has already shown the relation between conceptual structure and the pre-conceptual image schema. Categories are understood as containers (class membership), Hierarchical structure is based on the part-whole schema. Relations between concepts are links etc. On this basis Lakoff (1987) proposes a Spacialization of Form Hypothesis.
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4.7. Concepts and Categories Concepts are elements of cognitive models. The internal structure of concepts is different. Some differences relate to the part of speech feature ( such as the difference between Ns and Vs). But cocncepts are also different function of the type of frame they presuppose. Consequently, there several types of conceptual structure: 1) There are concepts which are understood in terms of scenario (script). The concept waiter is understood in terms of the restaurant scenario. The term constable is understood function of the role it plays in the scenario provided by the police institution. The term second baseman is characterized relative to a baseball game scenario. 2) There are radial concepts, those which involve the superposition of several models the concept itself is felt as basic and simpler despite its richness. Radial concepts have a center-periphery structure. Elements that fit the central description are what we have called the prototypes. For instance mother involves the superposition of four ICMs. a) the genetic and birth domains she contributes genetic material to the child and gives birth to the child as stressing in the definition proposed by Wierzbicka. b) the nurturance domain- A mother is a female adult who nurtures and raises the child, providing for his social integration (Mufwene); c) the genealogical domain she is supposed to be the closest female relative; d) the marital domain the mother is the wife of the father. Compounds like the following describe deviations from the prototype: foster mother, step mother
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3) generator concepts- these are based on prototypical subgroup plus a rule which generates other concepts from the basic ones (38) odd number even number 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,.. 2, 4, 6, 8,..

4) classical categories bundle of features which are NSC for membership in the category: bachelor, vixen, occulist, circle, square, etc. 5) metonymic categories these are the categories which are understood in terms of subset which represent stereotypes (e.g. the stereotype of the housewife mother), paragons, ideals, etc. 6) gradiant categories categories that form implicational hierarchies, such as grammatical squishes; (Recall that squishes running from the participle to verbal noun in the grammar of ing-complements in English ).
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4.7 Prototypical effects of ICMs Given the different possible categorial structures sketched above, prototypical effects may arise of number of ways: a) metonymic categories given category B, when A is either a member or a subcategory of B. suppose that A metonymically stands for B, i.e. it is a social stereotype, typical vase, best example of B, b) radial categories: given category B with a radial structure and A at its center, A is the best example of B. c) generator categories Suppose B is a category generated by rules from a subcategory member A. Then, A is the best example of B. d) classical categories consider a cognitive model containing a feature bundle that characterizes a classical category B. If A has all the properties in the feature bundle, it is a best example of B. Conclusion: Prototypical effects accompany the formation of a large number of concepts, though not all of them.

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4.8 Characterization by schema and by prototype. The fact that a concept may simultaneously be analyzed with respct to several ICMs lends plausibility to a suggestion put forth by Langacker (1987) and taken over by Taylor (1989), that prototypes and conceptual schemas are both present in our dealings with the world. For Langacker extension from a prototype coexists with a second structuring principle, the elaboration of a schema. Schemas may be organized within category in conjunction with extensions from prototypes. Here is Langackers account of how TREE may be learned. Initially the learner associates TREE with instances of large deciduous leafed plant: e.g., oaks, elms, maples. He then extracts what is a common in a representation say TREE1; this functions as a prototype. Pine trees get associated with the category, but they dont have leaves. Now the learner may elaborate a further schema TREE2 (TREE1 + pines, firs) = a tall central trunk, with branches. TREE2 now functions as a prototype for extension; palms, which can now be added will not have branches either = TREE3 . FRUIT-TREE may emerge as a sub-schema for TREE1, while TREE2 may function as a prototype for a number of metaphorical extensions: genealogical tree, phrase marker, branching structure, etc. As the example suggests, characterization by prototype is developmentally prior. The existence of both prototype and schema explains the existence of prototypical effects even for classical categories like odd number/ even number; another form of multiple concept formation is the dichotomy folk category/ expert category ( Bats are birds/mammals, etc.)
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