Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

Jonathan Abdalla

Even a casual reader of Saul Kripkes monograph on the later Wittgenstein will recognize immediately the vast amount of sustained engagement with Wittgensteins texts on the part of Kripke. In addition to forceful analysis of Wittgensteins principal theses, Kripke gives the reader a synopsis of the structure of the Philosophical Investigations and an explicit reconstruction of the so-called private language argument. For those more historically minded, Kripke addresses at least somewhat the relations between Wittgensteins work and the work of Quine and Goodman among others. Quite admirably, Kripke stays true to his title and concentrates on those portions of the Philosophical Investigations that are relevant to his thesis; he also covers certain parts of the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. The central thesis of Kripkes monograph is that Wittgenstein in his later philosophy of language recognizes a powerful skeptical argument against the coherence of the notion of meaning and consequently offers a solution to it consonant with his dictum that meaning is use. The two areas in which such a skeptical thesis seems most damaging are mathematics and inner experience. Kripke sees the formative statement of the paradox in 201 of the Philosophical Investigations: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. To make the claim as clear as possible, he begins with a mathematical example; the case of inner experience would proceed analogously.

It seems quite commonsensical that in grasping the rule of addition one has determined ones answer for any novel future sum. The skeptic, as all good skeptics do, questions the certainty implicit in the claim of a rule being grasped. Let us say that Bertrand has grasped the rule of addition. When pressed by the skeptic as to his certainty in saying that the sum of 68 and 57 is 125, Bertrand replies that he is following the rule for addition that he has previously grasped. The skeptic responds by defining the function quus as follows: x y = x + y, if x, y < 57; = 5, otherwise. He then asks how it is that Bertrand knows that in the past he has not always meant quus by plus and consequently should answer 5 instead of 125. This point is crucial. The skeptic is not asking how Bertrand knows that 68 + 57 is 125, but rather how Bertrand knows that 68 +57 should denote 125 as a consequence of Bertrands meaning plus in the past. If Bertrands past usage of plus denoted quus, then Bertrands past intention was such that he ought to compute the sum as 5 rather than as 125. Now, if Bertrand attempts to give an account of the facts about his mental states that constitute his meaning plus, not quus, he seems to find himself in a dilemma. The skeptic claims that there exist no facts about Bertrands past mental history, even Bertrands past observable behavior, that establish Bertrand meant plus rather than quus.1 Thus, the skeptical paradox is not epistemological; even an omniscient observer would not know which of the two Bertrand meant. Furthermore, argues the skeptic, if there exist no facts about which function Bertrand meant then, then there existed no

1 Kripke acknowledges the close similarities between this skeptical argument and Quines thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. He points out though that Wittgensteins allowance of introspective evidence distinguishes him from Quine and his behavioristic limitations.

facts then about which function Bertrand presently meant. If there exist no facts about which function Bertrand presently meant in the past, then there exist no facts about which function Bertrand means in the present. Hence, there exist no facts about what one means by any word at any time. For Kripke, this is Wittgensteins skeptical paradox.2 More systematically, the paradox rejects the notion of meaning as truth conditions. The skeptic concludes that there exist no facts corresponding to sentences such as Bertrand meant addition by plus. Consequently, any assertion involving a meaning claim is meaningless. Having dismissed a number of objections on behalf of Wittgenstein or on behalf of himself, Kripke turns to the solution that Wittgenstein offers. Wittgenstein accepts the skeptics rejection of meaning as truth conditions; this amounts to rejecting the views of both Frege and the Tractatus. In its place, he offers a two-faceted theory of language. In a move reminiscent of the positivists emphasis on provability conditions in their verificationist theory of meaning, Wittgenstein partially characterizes meaning in terms of assertability conditions. He completes this characterization by incorporating the notion of the practical utility of such assertions. In application to the mathematics example above, Kripke explains it this way: Do not look for entities and facts corresponding to numerical assertions, but look at the circumstances under which utterances involving numerals are made, and the utility of making them under these circumstances (77). This postulation of a new conception of meaning allows

2 Footnote 43 on page 58 is fascinating. Kripke intimates that his idea of quus quite possibly might have arisen from reading Goodman on grue. In fact, if one considers not a mathematics problem but the language of color impressions, it seems that grue would play the role that quus now plays. Of course, the problem would not be Goodmans new riddle of induction, but rather if one knows whether one ought to call the sky green given that in the past one might have meant grue by green.

Wittgenstein to accept the skeptical premise without being forced to accept that all meaning assertions are therefore meaningless. Kripke roughly characterizes the assertion conditions for a sentence such as Bertrand means addition by plus as follows: [Bertrand] is entitled, subject to correction by others, provisionally to say, I mean addition by plus, whenever he has the feeling of confidence now I can go on! that he can give correct responses in new cases; and he is entitled, again provisionally and subject to correction by others, to judge a new response to be correct simply because it is the response he is inclined to give.3 If Bertrand claims to be following a rule, then the community can check his claim. Others in the community can see whether Bertrand as a putative rule follower is or is not giving responses that agree with the ones that they themselves endorse. If they perceive such agreement, then they judge that Bertrand has grasped the rule. Now, if Bertrand were ever to begin to deviate substantially from how the community behaved, then the community would conclude that Bertrand no longer grasped the rule. Kripke is thus claiming that Wittgenstein offers a social theory of meaning. That theory claims that there does exist a useful role in the life of the community for a language game that allows people to assert meaning claims. Furthermore, within that language game, one is allowed to assert that ones present usage of a given word does agree with how one used it in the past. It is here that the so-called private language argument becomes relevant. Many think incorrectly that a private language is a language that is impossible for anyone else besides its bearer to understand. Kripke claims instead that by it Wittgenstein means that there can be no private way in which to follow a rule. If one were to follow a rule privately, then one would be proceeding

Kripke, 90.

randomly or blindly, since there is no fact of the matter as to whether one rule or another applies. Ones authority would be unconditional, and no one could say that any behavior was correct or incorrect. However, when one steps up to the level of the community, others then have the authority to assess that behavior as correct or incorrect. As such, a private language is incoherent, properly understood. Now, even given a social theory of meaning, it seems that membership in a community is irrelevant to ones characterization of ones inner experience. As noted before, Kripke sees Wittgensteins approach here as analogous to the mathematics case. Here, instead of grasping a rule for addition, one would grasp a name for a sensation. But, that naming is clearly conventional. Any normative force regarding the conceptualization of a particular sensation and its continued usage arises from the community. The community observes the behavior of a putative member together with attendant circumstances and judges whether that person is using the word pertaining to that sensation and state of affairs properly. For the record, Kripke also takes Wittgenstein to have viewed the philosophical problem of the existence of other minds as a narrow case quite close to the issues already addressed and to have constructed an analogous skeptical problem and an analogous solution. Interestingly, the centrality of the notion of community in Wittgensteins social theory of meaning bears a striking resemblance to the work of Goodman and of Putnam. Specifically, it seems that Wittgenstein would agree with Putnam that meanings are not in the head. Where Putnam differs is in the complexity of the causal-historical theory of reference that he gives to characterize meaning. Of course, both of these are positive improvements over Quines rejection of meaning.

In summary, let me say that Kripkes monograph is an impressive model of careful philosophical argumentation. Though he declaims it at times, it is clear that Kripke is both offering an interpretation of Wittgenstein and asserting that Wittgenstein does hold certain claims as true. Thus, it is legitimate to ask whether Kripkes interpretation is a plausible one. My suspicion from the portions of the Philosophical Investigations that I have read is that Kripkes reconstruction is just that. More specifically, it is a reconstruction of what might be an argument in Wittgenstein and a recasting of it in strict analytic terms. In other words, it seems to me that Kripke has successfully rehabilitated the later Wittgenstein into the ranks of analytic philosophers. But, that seems to be in great tension with the persona and attitude that Wittgenstein portrays in the Philosophical Investigations. To say it another way, if Kripkes reading of Wittgenstein is correct, then I now understand what Wittgenstein was attempting to accomplish in the Philosophical Investigations. My reading of Wittgensteins text does not convince me in the least that I understand all of Wittgensteins thought. As such, it seems the Kripkes Wittgenstein is not the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Nevertheless, I must say again that Kripkes accomplishment is very commendable. He has fashioned from a difficult text a quite plausible theory and argued vigorously for it. I would that all interpretive work in philosophy met that same standard.