AYLLON VS.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA FACTS: The defendant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, is the owner of a large tract of land located in the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga and known as the Buenadicha Estate. On October 1, 1913, a contract was executed by which the plaintiff, Conrado Ayllon, was placed in charge of this property in the character of agent or administrator. The period of the contract was fixed at one year, expiring September 30, 1914. It was stipulated among other things that, in view of the unproductive and undeveloped condition of the property, the plaintiff should be entitled to retain ninety per centum of the net profits of the estate, any losses incurred in the management of the property being borne exclusively by him. Upon the expiration of the period of the contract above mentioned the plaintiff remained in possession and continued, with the consent of the defendant, to manage the property about as he had done before. At the end of the year 1916, the defendant resumed possession; and the plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum of P11,000, composed of two items to-wit (a) P3,000, alleged to have been expended by the plaintiff in the case and improvement of the estate; and (b) P8,000, representing the supposed reasonable value of the plaintiffs services as administrator of the estate from September 30, 1914, to December 31, 1916 Decision: Trial court- dismissed the action SC: concur with the trial court. Judgment affirmed! ISSUE: WON the plaintiff should be entitled to reimbursement of his expenditures and to compensation for services rendered upon the basis of a reasonable allowance. HELD: One of the fundamental conditions essential to the creation of such implied obligation is that the expenditures or services for which compensation is sought should be incurred, or rendered in response to a request, expressed or implied, on the part of the person benefitted. The obligation cannot arise where services are rendered or expenditures paid out voluntarily, that is, without request made and without expectation of a reward. Furthermore, it is elementary that the law will not create an obligation to compensate or reimburse where there is a special contract to which the services or expenditures in question may be referred. In such case the measure of compensation must be sought in the contract itself. In the case before us the relation existing between the parties to this action and its origin in a special contract, which defied the duties of the plaintiff and the obligations of the defendant; and when both parties by tacit consent, after the expiration of the period fixed in the contract, continued the relation substantially as it had existed under the contract, the only reasonable assumption is that they intended for their respective obligations to be measured by that contract. The law in such a situation will not imposed an obligation on the part of the defendant to compensate or reimburse on a basis different from that specially fixed in the contract by which their relation was originally created. The situation here contemplated is exactly analogous to that created by tacit reconduction, expressly recognized in the Civil Code (art. 1566); and the rule which in such case fixes the rights of the parties according to the obligations created by the original contract is equally applicable in relations of agency and service

CUISON VS. CA FACTS: Petitioner Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap, with places of business at Baesa, Quezon City, and Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. Private respondent Valiant Investment Associates, on the other hand, is a partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with business address at Kalookan City. From December 4, 1979 to February 15, 1980, private respondent delivered various kinds of paper products amounting to P297,487.30 to a certain Lilian Tan of LT Trading. The deliveries were made by respondent pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu Huy Tiac who was then employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. It was likewise pursuant to Tiac's instructions that the merchandise was delivered to Lilian Tan. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan paid for the merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiu Huy Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to private respondent as payment for the paper products. Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank. Thereafter, private respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the merchandise in question, claiming that Tiu Huy Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the questioned transactions with private respondent and Lilian Tan. Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac and refused to pay private respondent the amount corresponding to the selling price of the subject merchandise. Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection of P297,487.30 representing the price of the merchandise. DECISION: TRIAL COURT: dismissed the complaint against the petitioner for lack of merit. CA: reversed! ISSUE: Whether or not Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction. HELD: Petitioner is liable for the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers (Article 1911 Civil Code). It is a well-established rule that one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be (Macke, et al, v. Camps, 7 Phil. 553 (1907]; Philippine National Bank. v Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357 [1979]). From the facts and the evidence on record, there is no doubt that this rule obtains. The petition must therefore fail. FIRST, It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiu Huy Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. More particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced Tiu Huy Tiac to Bernardino Villanueva, respondent's manager, as his (petitioner's) branch manager as testified to by Bernardino Villanueva. SECONDLY, Lilian Tan, who has been doing business with petitioner for quite a while, also testified that she knew Tiu Huy Tiac to be the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo, Binondo branch. This general perception of Tiu Huy Tiac as the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo store is even made manifest by the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac is known in the community to be the "kinakapatid" (godbrother) of petitioner. In fact, even petitioner admitted his close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that they are "like brothers" (Rollo, p. 54). There was thus no reason for anybody especially those transacting business with petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiu Huy Tiac as his manager in the Sto. Cristo Binondo branch. All of these point to the fact that at the time of the transaction Tiu Huy Tiac was admittedly the manager of petitioner's store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo. Consequently, the transaction in question as well as the concomitant obligation is valid and binding upon petitioner. By his representations, petitioner is now estopped from disclaiming liability for the transaction entered by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf. It matters not whether the representations are intentional or merely negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such representations in good faith and for value As

held in the case of Manila Remnant Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (191 SCRA 622 [1990]): More in point, we find that by the principle of estoppel, Manila Remnant is deemed to have allowed its agent to act as though it had plenary powers. Article 1911 of the Civil Code provides: "Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal issolidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers." (Emphasis supplied).

Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI) v. Pedro Linsangan G.R. No. 151319 November 22, 2004 Tinga, J. FACTS: Florencia Baluyot offered Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan a lot called Garden State at the Holy Cross Memorial Park owned by MMPCI. A former owner of a memorial lot under Contract No. 25012 was no longer interested in acquiring the lot and had opted to sell his rights subject to reimbursement of the amounts he already paid. The contract was for P95,000.00. Baluyot reassured Atty. Linsangan that once reimbursement is made to the former buyer, the contract would be transferred to him. Atty.Linsangan agreed and gave Baluyot P35,295.00 representing the amount to be reimbursed to the original buyer and to complete the down payment to MMPCI.

Subsequently, Baluyot brought an Offer to Purchase a different memorial lot denominated as Contract No. 28660 with a listed price of P132,250.00. Atty. Linsangan objected to the new contract price, as the same was not the amount previously agreed upon. To convince Atty. Linsangan, Baluyot executed a document confirming that while the contract price is P132,250.00, Atty. Linsangan would pay only the original price of P95,000.00. On 25 May 1987, Baluyot verbally advised Atty. Linsangan that Contract No. 28660 was cancelled for reasons the latter could not explain, and presented to him another proposal for the purchase of an equivalent property. He refused the new proposal and insisted that Baluyot and MMPCI honor their undertaking. MMPCI alleged that Contract No. 28660 was cancelled conformably with the terms of the contractb e c a u s e o f n o n - p a y m e n t o f a r r e a r a g e s . M M P C I s t a t e d t h a t B a l u y o t w a s n o t a n a g e n t b u t a n independent contractor, and as such was not authorized to represent MMPCI or to use its name except as to the extent expressly stated in the Agency Manager Agreement. Moreover, MMPCI wasnot aware of the arrangements entered into by Atty. Linsangan and Baluyot, as it in fact received a down payment and monthly installments as indicated in the contract. Official receipts showing the application of payment were turned over to Baluyot whom Atty. Linsangan had from the beginning allowed to receive the same in his behalf. ISSUE: WON MMPCI allowed Baluyot to act as though she had full powers to be held solidarily liable with the latter HELD: No. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The elements of agency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (ii) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (iii) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. MMPCI cannot be bound by the contract procured by Atty. Linsangan and solicited by Baluyot. Baluyot was authorized to solicit and remit to MMPCI offers to purchase interment spaces obtained on forms provided by MMPCI. The terms of the offer to purchase, therefore, are contained in such forms and, when signed by the buyer and an authorized officer of MMPCI, becomes binding on both parties. The Offer to Purchase duly signed by Atty. Linsangan, and accepted and validated by MMPCI showed a total list price of P132,250.00. Likewise, it was clearly stated therein that Purchaser agrees thathe has read or has had read to him this agreement, that he understands its terms and conditions,a n d t h a t t h e r e a r e n o c o v e n a n t s , c o n d i t i o n s , w a r r a n t i e s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e contained herein. By signing the Offer to Purchase, Atty. Linsangan signified that he understood its contents. That he and Baluyot had an agreement different from that contained in the Offer to Purchase is of no moment, and should not affect MMPCI, as it was obviously made outside Baluyots authority. To repeat, Baluyots authority was

limited only to soliciting purchasers. She had noa u t h o r i t y t o a l t e r t h e t e r m s o f t h e w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e d b y M M P C I . T h e d o c u m e n t / l e t t e r confirming the agreement that Atty. Linsangan would have to pay the old price was executed byBaluyot alone. Nowhere is there any indication that the same came from MMPCI or any of its officers. It has not been established that Atty. Linsangan even bothered to inquire whether Baluyot was authorized to agree to terms contrary to those indicated in the written contract, much less bind MMPCI by her commitment with respect to such agreements. Even if Baluyot was Atty. Linsangans friend and known to be an agent of MMPCI, her declarations and actions alone are not sufficient to establish the fact or extent of her authority. Atty. Linsangan as a practicing lawyer for relatively l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e w h e n h e s i g n e d t h e c o n t r a c t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p u t o n g u a r d w h e n t h e i r agreement was not reflected in the contract. More importantly, Atty. Linsangan should have been alerted by the fact that Baluyot failed to effect the transfer of rights earlier promised, and was unable to make good her written commitment, nor convince MMPCI to assent thereto, as evidenced by several attempts to induce him to enter into other contracts for a higher consideration. He did not even bother to ask for official receipts of his payments, nor inquire from MMPCI directly to ascertain the real status of the contract, blindly relying on the representations of Baluyot. A lawyer by profession, he knew what he was doing when he signed the written contract, knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase used in the contract, and more importantly, knew the legal effects which said document produced. He is bound to accept responsibility for his negligence. MMPCI cannot be held liable based on ratification and estoppels. (See Arts. 1898, 1910 and 1911.) Ratification adoption or confirmation by one person of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority. Ordinarily, the principal must have full knowledge at the time of ratification of all the material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act of the person who assumed to act as agent. Thus, if material facts were suppressed or unknown, there can be no valid ratification and this regardless of the purpose or lack thereof in concealing such facts and regardless of the parties between whom the question of ratification may arise. Nevertheless, this principle does not apply if the principals ignorance of the material facts and circumstances was willful, or that the principal chooses to act in ignorance of the facts. However, in the absence of circumstances putting a reasonably prudent man on inquiry, ratification cannot be implied as against the principal who is ignorant of the facts. No ratification can be implied in this case. The real arrangement between Baluyot and Atty. Linsangan was for the latter to pay a monthly installment of P1,800.00 whereas Baluyot was to shoulder the counterpart amount of P1,455.00 tom e e t t h e P 3 , 2 5 5 . 0 0 m o n t h l y i n s t a l l m e n t s a s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t . T h u s , e v e r y t i m e a n installment falls due, payment was to be made through a check from Atty. Linsangan for P1,800.00 and a cash component of P1,455.00 from Baluyot. However, it appears that while Atty. Linsangan issued the post-dated checks, Baluyot failed to come up with her part of the bargain. If MMPCI was aware of the arrangement, it would have refused the latters check payments for being insufficient. It would not have applied to his account the P1,800.00 checks. Moreover, the fact that Baluyot had to practically explain to MMPCIs Sales Manager the details of her arrangement with Atty. Linsangan and admit to having made an error in entering such arrangement confirm that MMCPI had no knowledge of the said agreement. There is also no agency by estoppel in this case. (See elements of agency by estoppels, infra.) There is no indication that MMPCI let the public, or specifically, Atty. Linsangan to believe that Baluyot had the authority to alter the standard contracts of the company. One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection. The agreement, insofar as the P95,000.00 contract price is concerned, is void and cannot be enforced as against MMPCI. Neither can he hold Baluyot liable for damages under the same contract, since there is no evidence showing that Baluyot undertook to secure MMPCIs ratification. At best, the agreement between Baluyot and Atty. Linsangan bound only the two of them. As far as MMPC is concerned, it bound itself to sell its interment space to Atty. Linsangan for P132,250.00 underContract No. 28660,

and had in fact received several payments in accordance with the same contract. If the contract was cancelled due to arrearages, Atty. Linsangans recourse should only be against Baluyot who personally undertook to pay the difference between the true contract price of P132,250.00 and the original proposed price of P95,000.00

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC. V. LINSANGAN G.R. No. 94050 TINGA, November 21. 1991 NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC FACTS -Florencia Baluyot, an Agency Manager of MMPCI, offered to Atty. Pedro Linsangan a lot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park owned byMMPCI for P95,000. The lots former owner was not interested on the lot anymore and so agreed to sell the lot after he has beenreimbursed. Atty. Linsangan agreed to the offer, gave Baluyot the reimbursement that would be given to the former owner and downpayment that would be paid to MMPCI, with Baluyot only handing him handwritten and typewritten receipts (not O.R.).-However, instead of the old contract with the old owner reformed so that Atty. Linsangan would become the new owner of the lot,Baluyot offered a new contract covering the same lot. Atty. Linsangan protested, but Baluyot assured him that that Atty. Linsanganwould still be paying P95,000 instead of the P132,250 price under the new contract. Baluyot even executed a document confirmingthe previous arrangement between her and Atty. Linsangan so that even if the purchase price under the new contract has increased,Atty. Linsangan would still be paying the old purchase price. Atty. Linsangan signed the new contract with MMPCI and tenderedpayment in checks in accordance with the old agreement between him and Baluyot.-It turns out that MMPCI was not aware of the arrangement between Baluyot and Atty. Linsangan, and that Baluyot was onlyauthorized under her Agency Management contract to Solicit and remit to MMPCI offers to purchase interment spaces belongingto and sold by MMPCI. So, even if Atty. Linsangan had complied with the agreed payment, MMPCI cancelled the new contract for non-payment of arrearages. -Atty. Linsangan filed complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Baluyot and MMPCI. DECISION: LC: Baluyot was an agent of MMPCI; MMPCI was estopped from denying the agency after having received and encashed the checksissued by Atty. Linsangan and given it by Baluyot. CA: affirmed LC + Baluyots authority was conferred upon her by habit and custom ISSUES 1. WON the SC could review the findings of fact of CA 2. WON Baluyot was an agent of MMPCI 3. WON MMPCI was bound by the contract procured by Atty. Linsangan and solicited by Baluyot 4. WON MMPCI was estopped from denying liability to Atty. LinsanganHELD1. YES HELD: 1. YES Ratio.

There are instances when the findings of fact of the trial court and/or Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee ; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.2. YES 2. YES Ratio. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. Thus, the elements of agency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (ii) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (iii) the agent acts as are presentative and not for himself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. Reasoning. Baluyot was an agent of MMPCI, having represented the interest of the latter, and having been allowed by MMPCI to represent it in her dealings with its clients/prospective buyers.3. NO

3. NO Ratio. The acts of the agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal unless the latter ratifies the same. It also bears emphasis that when the third person knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person was aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principals ratification.-on RATIFICATION: Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority. The substance of the doctrine is confirmation after conduct, amounting to a substitute for a prior authority. Ordinarily, the principal must have full knowledge at the time of ratification of all the material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act of the person who assumed to act as agent. Thus, if material facts were suppressed or unknown, there can be no valid ratification and this regardless of the purpose or lack thereof in concealing such facts and regardless of the parties between whom the question of ratification may arise. Nevertheless, this principle does not apply if the principals ignorance of the material facts and circumstances was willful, or that the principal chooses to act in ignorance of the facts. However, in the absence of circumstances putting a reasonably prudent man on inquiry, ratification cannot be implied as against the principal who is ignorant of the facts. Reasoning. Baluyot acted in excess of the authority granted to her by MMPCI. The original agreement between her and Atty.Linsangan was unknown to MMPCI and thus, MMPCI was not bound by their agreement. As far as they were concerned, the contract price was P132,250 and not P95, 000. As for the ratification, see estoppel.4. NO. 4. NO Ratio. The essential elements of estoppels are (i) conduct of a party amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (ii) intent, or at least expectation, that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, theo ther party; and (iii) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. -One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection. -Estoppel must be intentional and unequivocal, for when misapplied, it can easily become a most convenient and effective means of injustice. Reasoning. There is no indication that MMPCI let the public nor Atty. Linsangan to believe that Baluyot had the authority to alter the standard contracts of the company. Neither is there any showing that prior to signing of the new contract, MMPCI had any knowledge of Baluyots commitment to Atty. Linsangan.-Even assuming that Atty. Linsangan was misled by MMPCIs actuations, he still cannot invoke the principle of estoppel, as he was clearly negligent in his dealings with Baluyot, and could

have easily determined, had he only been cautious and prudent, whether said agent was clothed with the authority to change the terms of the principals written contract. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 June 2001 and its Resolution dated 12 December 2001 in CA- G.R. CV No. 49802, as well as the Decision in Civil Case No. 88-1253 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City Branch 57, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-1253 is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO v. CA (GR 115838, July 8 2002) FACTS: Appellants5 were co-owners of four (4) lots located at EDSA corner New York and Denver Streets in Cubao, Quezon City. In a letter dated January 24, 1984, appellee6 was authorized by appellants to act as real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00, five percent (5%) of which will be given to the agent as commission. It was appellee who first found Times Transit Corporation, represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as prospective buyer which desired to buy two (2) lots only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually, sometime in May of 1985, the sale of lots 14 and 15 was consummated. Appellee received from appellants P48,893.76 as commission. It was then that the rift between the contending parties soon emerged. Appellee apparently felt short changed because according to him, his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of the agreed price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to appellants for the two (2) lots, and that it was he who introduced the buyer to appellants and unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which ultimately led to the consummation of the sale. Hence, he sued below to collect the balance of P303,606.24 after having received P48,893.76 in advance. On the other hand, appellants completely traverse appellee's claims and essentially argue that appellee is selfishly asking for more than what he truly deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more instrumental in the consummation of the sale. Although appellants readily concede that it was appellee who first introduced Times Transit Corp. to them, appellee was not designated by them as their exclusive real estate agent but that in fact there were more or less eighteen (18) others whose collective efforts in the long run dwarfed those of appellee's, considering that the first negotiation for the sale where appellee took active participation failed and it was these other agents who successfully brokered in the second negotiation. But despite this and out of appellants' "pure liberality, beneficence and magnanimity", appellee nevertheless was given the largest cut in the commission (P48,893.76), although on the principle of quantum meruit he would have certainly been entitled to less. So appellee should not have been heard to complain of getting only a pittance when he actually got the lion's share of the commission and worse, he should not have been allowed to get the entire commission. Furthermore, the purchase price for the two lots was only P3.6 million as appearing in the deed of sale and not P7.05 million as alleged by appellee. Thus, even assuming that appellee is entitled to the entire commission, he

would only be getting 5% of the P3.6 million, or P180,000.00." Private respondent Francisco Artigo ("Artigo" for brevity) sued petitioners Constante A. De Castro ("Constante" for brevity) and Corazon A. De Castro ("Corazon" for brevity) to collect the unpaid balance of his broker's commission from the De Castros. The Trial Court finds defendants Constante and Corazon Amor de Castro jointly and solidarily liable to plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners as indispensable parties HELD: The De Castros argue that Artigo's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead all the co-owners of the two lots. The De Castros claim that Artigo always knew that the two lots were coowned by Constante and Corazon with their other siblings Jose and Carmela whom Constante merely represented. The De Castros contend that failure to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the four co-owners, would be paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners. The De Castros' contentions are devoid of legal basis. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. 7 The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence.8 Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.9 However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case. There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note dated January 24, 1984 to sell the properties of the De Castros for P23 million at a 5 percent commission. The authority was on a first come, first serve basis. Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners. Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's individual or representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency,10 citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the agency. The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros' theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. 12 The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case. Indeed, Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may sue any of the solidary debtors. This article reads: Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected. Thus, the Court has ruled in Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc. that "x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.