Paper on Europe in the 20th Century: From division to reunification Prof. Joao C.

Espada - 2011-2012

Marine BINET

The Cold War (Chapter IV) Tony Judt asserts that: with an alacrity that would perplex future generations, the struggle in Europe between Fascism and Democracy was hardly over before it was displaced by a new breach: that separating Communists from anti-Communists (Tony Judt, Postwar : A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, New York, 2005, p. 197.) Essay Question: What, in your opinion, were the main conflicting views at stake between the Soviet system and European democracies during the Cold War? Word count (including footnotes): 2493

Introduction One must choose between URSS and the Anglo-Saxon bloc1 (J.-P. Sartre) Analysing the influence of ideas during the Cold War has some implication for the field of history: How can intellectual views become the basis for radical societal change in the Western and the Eastern blocs, and influence the relations between them? The period of the Cold War which lasts from the end of the World War II (1947) to the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) is not a homogeneous one. Yet it is featured by the constant state of political and military tension between two poles. As the World War II was barely ended, the Yalta order (1945) was created on the ashes of Nazism by the allied United States and URSS. This nevertheless anon led to the partition of the world in two spheres of influence, opposing European democracies under the leadership of the USA and sovietised Eastern regimes. Yet according to Hobsbawm, there was no real ideological crusade embarked upon from the outset of the Cold War until the 1970s.2

Jean-Paul Sartre quoted in: Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, New York: Penguin Press, 2006, p. 214. 2 Eric Hobsbawm, the Age of Extreme: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Abacus, New Edition, 12 oct. 1995, p. 317.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

The role of ideas has usually been neglected in the study of the Cold War.3 It is often merely portrayed as a peculiar conflict, characterized by apocalyptic discourses on the imminence of a Third World War, but also the acceptance of a balance of power. The Realist theory of international relations discounts the role of ideas in historical process, and assumes that the Cold War was a mathematical security dilemma.4 Considering the forces set and actors nuclear deterrence strategies, one may suppose like Hobsbawm that confrontation would probably have developed without ideology.5 On the opposite side of the analysis, American post-revisionist historians consider that the causes of the Cold War are much more rooted in a profound misunderstanding of each others motives. Nevertheless even when ideas are taken into account, the Cold War is often oversimplified down to a Manichean ideological bipolarization. Therefore, is Sartre right in depicting the intellectual choice as an ultimatum without any other alternative? The Cold War was, indeed, a clash of ideological preferences for ordering politics and society (1.). However the deconstruction of ideologies that might have influenced the sequence of events, proves that the ideas constellation didnt fit the conventional battle lines drawn by the Iron Curtain (2.). Some scholars even proclaimed the end of ideology within the Western bloc ; with a similar ideological cracking in the Eastern bloc (3.). This essay attempts to offer some insight into the main views at stake between the Soviet Union and European democracies during this period.

Nigel Gould-Davies, Rethinking the role of ideology in International Politics during the Cold War, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No.1, Winter 1999, p. 90. 4 Robert Jevis, Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? Journal of the Cold War Studies, Volume 3, Number 1, Winter 2011, pp. 36-60. 5 Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 233.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

1. Two conflicting beliefs systems The clash of the Cold War between the URSS and the Western democracies was not a collision between two models, as communism was never achieved, since it is the ideal final stage of the Marxist-Leninist historical materialism.6 It was more a conflict between two beliefs systems. This Manichean opposition centred upon two core ideas: the conception of politics and society, and of liberty. 1.1. Divergent visions of Politics and Society The opposition between the Soviet system and the European one can be sketched as antagonist preferences for ordering politics and society. To do so, it seems fitting to revisit the philosophical approaches of Popper, Hayek and Oakeshott. Adopting an analogical reasoning regarding Poppers theory, one can observe that the Soviet system embraces a dogmatic rationalism, as opposed to the Western critical rationalism. Popper opposes the circular mind of totalitarian discourses promoting the almighty of the historical materialisms science in enclosed Soviet societies, to the democratic disputatio in open Western societies.7 In a similar approach, Oakeshott distinguishes between politics of faith8 and politics of scepticism.9 The Soviet Union designed a gargantuan societal construct based on a rationalist administration, reducing politics to problem-solving activity. In contrast, Western societies are more malleable and leave more space for self-expression. These divergent visions of politics lead to radical differing conceptions of social ordering. In the Soviet system, the State-Party embodies a holistic vision of society, opposed to the Western individualism supported by A. Smiths concept of invisible hand.10 The Soviet System creates felt needs11, annihilating desire and creating a spiritual vacuum fulfilled with the communist New faith12, whereas Europe adopts the American consumerist way of life.

Karl Marx & Friedriech Engels, The Communist Manifesto: a modern edition, London ; New-York: verso, 1998, 87 p. 7 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge, 2011, 755 p. 8 Michael, Oakeshott, Rationalism in politics and other essays ; foreward by Timothy Fuller, Liberty Fund, New and expanded ed., c1991, 556 p. 9 Ibid. 10 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Prometheus Books, 2000, 546 p. 11 Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 9. 12 Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind, Vintage, August 1990, 272 p.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

The Soviet Society is a uniform unit, which discards variety or disorder. It has thus shifted from a decentralized grown order to a centralized totalitarian organization, as Hayek calls it13, or Hobbes the Leviathan.14 Oakeshott likewise opposes civil and enterprise association.15 The Soviet political system is a sterile enterprise association, based of the satisfaction of collective wants and instrumental management. As for the Western democracies, they have emancipated by civil association, a framework composed by common recognized rules, in which politics is a form of dialogue. The condition of such a dialogue is the openness to criticism emphasized by Popper, meaning a certain degree of liberty of mind. However, under the Soviet Big Brothers16 scrutiny, a critical thought is only possible at the fringes of the system or outside its cognitive frame. This results from a profound East-West discrepancy about the conception of liberty. 1.2. Totalitarian vs. liberal democracy: Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin opposes negative and positive liberty. The liberal negative liberty can be resumed in a simple question: What is the area within a person [] is or should be left to do or be, without any interference of other persons?17 The Truman doctrine epitomizes this vision, defending free people against external domination.18 Berlin distinguishes two variants of romantic positive liberty. The first understands liberty as the capability to be ones own master: the individual is submitted to his superego or a common higher entity. Berlin credits Rousseau and Marx with this vision. In the second variant individuals can be coerced by a superior authority in the name of their own sake or some higher collective goal, what perfectly fits the Soviet System. Aron merges Berlins concepts of negative and positive liberty in the concept of liberts formelles, meaning liberty from and liberty to. By liberts relles, Aron means the utopian realization of total liberty. He attributes this vision to Marx, who considered that total democracy should ensure total liberty from exploitation.19

Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, London ; New York ; Routledge, 2004, 256 p. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Oxford University Press, USA; Reissue edition, 2009, 576 p. 15 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, 329 p. 16 George Orwell, 1984, Gallimard French, 1972, 407 p. 17 Isaiah Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: their Rise and Influence on Modern Thought, Random House, 2006, p. 155. 18 Truman Library. Available at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm (consulted 16.10.11) 19 Raymond Aron, Essai sur les Liberts, Paris, Calman-Lvy, 1965, 235 p.
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Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

As we saw it in the first part, the intellectuals Kulturkampf was sharp during the Cold War. Though, as Professor Geremek stated, the European dream has nourished the hopes of Eastern intellectuals20, while some Western scholars answered the Moscow calling. These domestic crossed-divisions anon led to ideological cracking in the two blocs. 2. Ideological cracking As Judt argues: [] the Cold War fault-line fell not so much between East and West, as within Eastern and Western Europe alike.21 Relying on Judts interpretation, this section describes the ideological divides within the two blocs, proving the plasticity of each ideology. While European intellectuals debated in the public sphere, Eastern actors were compelled to act at the margin of the system, taking advantage of windows of opportunity22 after Stalins death in 1953. 2.1. The European cultural divides The divisions of the Parisian intellectual community for or against Communism epitomized the moral rift of a whole continent. The French left intellectual russophilia can be explained by three main factors. Firstly by the familiarization of the French revolutionary intellectual tradition with the Communist rhetoric of violence. Secondly, by the post-World War II anti-fascism and anti-americanism rhetorics. But more important, by the fascination exercised by the Soviet Union. This new opium of the intellectuals23 as Aron calls it, fulfilled the spiritual vacuum left by the Holocaust. Aron sharply criticizes French left thinkers like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, champions of neutralism or supporters of the Soviet doctrine. He condemns their thirst for teleological absoluteness and their Manichean dogmatism, which excused in their eyes the worst Stalins cruelties following the maxim the end justifies the means. This ignorance of Western intellectuals about the Eastern reality coupled with the Western indifference provoked bafflement among Eastern intellectuals, who became staunch defenders of a desovietization24 process.

Bronislaw Geremek, The Transformation of Central Europe, in: Marc F. Plattner and Joao C. Espada (Eds), The democratic invention, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 70. 21 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, New York: Penguin Press, 2006, p. 202. 22 John Kingdon, Agendas and Public Policies, Pearson Education, 2nd edition, 1997, chap. 8. 23 Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, 1955, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2001, 358 p. 24 Georges Mink, Vie et Mort du Bloc sovitique, Paris-Florence: Casterman-Guinti, coll. Histoire du XXe sicle, 1997, p. 89.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

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2.2. The desovietization process From 1953 the democratic claims of the Eastern populations appealed by Western values were soon to be heard. Thus a fault-line appeared between privileged communists and those who suffered disillusion and repression. This process corresponds to an adaptation of the System to national realities and also to the spontaneous adjustment at the margin of Eastern European countries to its dysfunctions. The desovietization was the result of two concomitant mechanisms: on the one hand, an elite movement of Party members and of revisionist intellectuals echoing the disenchantment with Communist Faith; on the other hand a Communists relegitimation strategy trough relaxing policy in order to secure their power. Therefore, variety and disordered were reintroduced in the rationalized Soviet structure. Civil society started to organize against the holistic State. As Judt so accurately describes it: The division within Communist states was no longer between Communists and its opponents. The important distinction was once again between those in authority [] and everyone else.25 Nevertheless, the Soviet system soon evacuated these irrational elements. As Professor Geremek stated: Central European societies paid the price of their struggle for freedom on the streets of Budapest in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1956, 1968, 1970 and in 1981.26 Finally, the desovietization processes produces unexpected and perverse effects27 as Bondon calls it, namely the collapse of the URSS and the renewing of communist elite in the political apparatus.

25 26

Judt, op. cit., p. 202. Geremek, op. cit., p. 70. 27 Raymond Bondon, Effets pervers et Ordre social, PUF, 3rd edition, 2009, 296 p.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

3. The European Third Way As the European neutralist position of some intellectuals argued, Europe should broaden the realms of possibility by overpassing the communists / anticommunists enmity. Actually, European intellectuals were not just followers of one or the other bloc.28 They exercised sometimes a decisive influence in the shaping of the conflict by taking a European Third Way. 3.1. The End of Ideology Horrified by the Stalinist crimes and disgusted by the Uncle Sams propaganda, some European intellectuals felt uncomfortable with the alignment with America or the Soviet Union.29 European intellectuals often pursued a less of two evil strategy, like their comrades in the East, who found themselves in a schizophrenic situation. Faced up with an ideological deadlock, European democracies had no choice but to find their own path between the two giants. In the early 1960s Bell provocatively declared: In Western World, therefore, there is rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: The acceptance of Welfare State, the desirability of decentralized power, a system of mix economy and of political pluralism. In that sense, the ideological age has ended.30 As consequence of the erosion of class cleavage and traditional ideological divisions in Western societies, the black/white dichotomy might have transformed into shades of grey simultaneously with the growing differentiation of (post-)industrialised societies. However, by the end of the Cold War, one wonders if this phenomenon marks the real end of an ideology, or if it merely represents a shift of the ideological struggle. 3.2. Postmaterialism Ingleharts postmaterial hypothesis challenges Bells theory. While Inglehart supports Bells argument on the ideological decline in European and American democracies, he also stresses the fact that news postmaterial issues have emerged in post-industrialized Society. Thus, controversies over lifestyle, environmental issues and self-expression have appeared

Wilfried Loth, Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965, London, Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2004, p. 1. 29 Judt, op. cit, p. 218. 30 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1960, p. 373.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

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in Marxist doctrine place.31 The Marxist-Leninist class struggle theory experienced thus a deep erosion among European communists and Eastern populations, what the collapse of the Soviet System in 1991 later confirmed. To resume, Postmaterialism assumes that ideology did not end, but its content transformed with modernisation process. Conclusion As the ongoing academic debates exemplify, the study about the ideological gap during the Cold War seems to have reached a deadlock. As I acknowledged in the first and second parts, some analysts conclude to a simple Manichean opposition, while others highlight the complex cross-cutting interests constellation on both sides. Others like Brown argue that the Cold War was a continual dialogue between two beliefs systems, which in the end contributed to the survival of Communism, rather than its downfall.32 Finally, as described in the third part, some intellectuals even claim the end of ideology in both blocs. More than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one may wonder which ideologies now impel the contemporary sequence of events. According to Poppers historical indeterminism33, we cannot foresee tomorrows ideological clashes.

31 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 484 p. 32 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009, 720 p. 33 Rene Bouveresse, Karl Popper ou le Rationalisme Critique, Vrin, 1998, p. 124.

Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books OAKESHOTT, Michael, On Human Conduct, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, 329 p. OAKESHOTT, Michael, Rationalism in politics and other essays ; foreward by Timothy Fuller, Liberty Fund, New and expanded ed., c1991, 556 p. ARON, Raymond, The Opium of the Intellectuals, 1955, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2001, 358 p. ARON, Raymond, Essai sur les Liberts, Paris, Calman-Lvy, 1965, 235 p. BELL, Daniel, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960, p. 373. BERLIN, Isaiah, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: their Rise and Influence on Modern Thought, Random House, 2006, p. 166-217. BONDON, Raymond, Effets pervers et Ordre social, PUF, 3rd edition, 2009, 296 p. BOUVERESSE, Rene, Karl Popper ou le Rationalisme Critique, Vrin, 1998, p. 124. BROWN, Archie, The Rise and Fall of Communism, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009, 720 p. GEREMEK, Bronislaw, The Transformation of Central Europe, in: Marc F. Plattner and Joao C. Espada (Eds), The Democratic Invention. Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 70. GOULD-DAVIES, Nigel, Rethinking the role of ideology in International Politics during the Cold War, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No.1, Winter 1999, pp. 90109. HAYEK, Friedrich, The Road to Serfdom, London ; New York ; Routledge, 2004, 256 p. HOBBES, Thomas, Leviathan, Oxford University Press, USA; Reissue edition, 2009, 576 p. HOBSBAWN, Eric, The Age of Extreme: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Abacus, New Edition, 12 oct. 1995, Chapters 8 and 9. INGLEHART, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 484 p. JEVIS, Robert, Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? Journal of the Cold War Studies, Volume 3, Number 1, Winter 2011, pp. 36-60. JUDT, Tony, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, New York: Penguin Press, 2006, pp. 119-225. KINGDON, John, Agendas and Public Policies, Pearson Education, 1997, chap. 8.
Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

2nd Edition,

LOTH, Wilfried, Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965, London, Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2004, p. 1. MARX, Karl & ENGELS, Friedriech, The Communist Manifesto: a modern edition, London; New-York: verso, 1998, 87 p. MILOSZ, Czeslaw, The Captive Mind, Vintage, August 1990, 272 p. MINK, Georges, Vie et Mort du Bloc sovitique, Paris-Florence: Casterman-Guinti, coll. Histoire du XXe sicle, 1997, p. 89. ORWELL, George, 1984, Gallimard French, 1972, 407 p. POPPER, Karl, The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge, 2011, 755 p. SMITH, Adam, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Prometheus Books, 2000, 546 p. Internet Truman Library. Available (consulted 16.10.11) at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm

Marine Binet - Europe in the 20th Century - Prof. Joao C. Espada - Collge dEurope, Natolin, 2011-2012

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