fl*"i/ r"-^-ii, lhit_.4,-_&+*-gt [or"J, .,.

-,1
[/*ir.n,{7 lrcsr, f1$? ).

Counterfactal Dependence and Time's

Ano,

33

on the future, and in general whether the way things are earlier
depends on the way things will be later. Often, indeed, ne seem to reason in a way that takes it for granted that the past is counterfactually independent of the present: that is, that even if the present were different, the past would be just as it actually

SEVENTEEN
Ptilr- o

Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow

is. In reasoning from a counterfacmal supposition, we use auxiliary premises drawn from (what we take to be) our factual knowledge. But not iust anything we know may be used, since some truths would not be true under the given supposition. If the supposition concerns the present, we do not feel free to use all ve know about the future. If the supposirion v/ere true, the future vould be different and some thngs q/e know about the actual future might not hold in this different counterfactual future. But we do feel free, ordinarily, to use whatever q'e know about the past. We evidently assume that even if our supposition about the present were true, the past would be no different. If I were acting otherwise just now, I would revenge a wrong done me last year-it is absurd even to raise the question whether that past wrong would have taken place if I were acting otherwise now! More generally, in reasoning from a counterfactual supposition about any time, we ordinarily assume that facts about earlier times are counterfactually independent of the supposition and so may freely be used as auxiliary
premlses.

THE ASYMMETRY OF COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCE

I am ryping words on e page. Suppose today were different. Suppose I were typing different words. Then plainly tomorrow would be differenr also; for instance, different words would appear on rhe page. Nlonl*Testerday also be different? If so, how? Invited to answer, you will perhaps come up with something. But I do not think there is
Today anything you can say about how yesterday would be thet will seem
clearly and uncontroversially true. The way the future is depends countelactually on the way the present is. If the present were different, the future q/ould be different; and there are counterfactual conditionals, many of them as unquestionably true as counterfactuals ever get, that tell us a good deal about how the future would be different if the present were different in various ways. Likewise the present depends counterfactually on the past, and in general the way things are later depends on the way things were
earlier.

would like to present neat contrast between counterfactual

Not so in reverse. Seldom, if ever, can we find a clearly rrue counterfactual about hoq/ the past would be different if the present were somehow different. Such a counterfacrual, unless clearly false, normally is not clear one way or the other. It is at best doubtful whether the past depends counterfactually on the present, whether the present depends
32

dependence in one direction of dme and counterfactual independence in the other direction. But until a distinction is made, the situation is nor as neat as that, There are some special contexts that complicate mattes, \e know that present conditions have their past causes. e can persuade ourselves, and sometimes do, that if the present were different then these past causes would have to be different, else they would have caused the present to be as it acmally is. Given such an argument----{all it a bach-tracing argument-we willingly grant that if the present were different, the past would be different too. I borroq/ an example from Downing (tS]). Jim and Jack quarreled yesterday, and Jack is still hopping mad. \fle conclude that if Jim asked Jack for help today, Jack would not help him. But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He never would ask for help after such a quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack for help today, there would have to have been no quarrel yesterday. In that case Jack would be his usual geneous self. So ifJim asked Jack for help today, Jack would help him after all. At this stage we may be persuaded (and rightly so, I think) that if asked Jack for help today, there s'ould have been no quarrel yes-

Jim

34

Conrfaaals and Time

Contert'actul Dependence and Time's

Anozp

35

terday. But the persuasion does not last, \e very easily slip back into our usual sort of counterfactual reasoning, and implicitly assume once again that facts about earlier times are counterfactually independent of facts about later times. Consider v/hethcr pride is cosdy. In this case, at
least, it costs Jim nothing, It would be useless for Jim to ask Jack for help, sinceJack would not help him. lle rely once more on the premise we recently doubted: if Jim asked Jack for help today, the quarrel would nevertheless have taken place yesterday. ](/hat is going on, suggest, can best be explained as follos's.

"If it q/ere that . . . then it would have to be that. . . " or the like. A suitable context may make it acceptable to say "If Jim asked Jack for help today, there
replaced by more complicated constructions:

would have been no quarrel yesterday", but it would be more natural

Counterfactuals are infected with vagueness, as everyone agrees. Different ways of (panly) resolving the vagueness are appropriate in different contexts. Remember the case of Cacsar in Korea: had he been in command, would he have used the atom bomb? Or would he have used catapults? It is right to say either, though not to say both together. Each is true under a resolution of vagueness appropriate to some contex. (2) !/e ordinarily resolve the vagueness of counterfactuals in such a way that counterfactual dependence is asymmetric (except perhaps in cases of time travel or the like). Under this standard resolution, back-tracking arguments are mistaken: if the present were different the past would be the same, but the same past causes would fail somehoq ro cause the same present effects. If Jim asked Jack for help today, somehow Jim s'ould have overcome his pride and asked despite yesterday's quarrel. (3) Some special contexts favor a different resolution of vagueness, one under which the past depends counterfactually on the present and some back-tracking arguments are correct. If someone propounds a back-tracking argument, for instance, his cooperative partners in conversation will switch to a resolution that gives him a chance to be right. (This son of accommodating shift in abstract features of context is common; see Lewis ([14]).) But when the need for a special resolution of vagueness comes to an end, the standard resolution returns. (4) A counterfactud saying that the past would be different if the present were somehow different may come out true under the special resolution of its vagueness, but false under the standard resolution. l so, cell ir e bdc-tracking counterfaaual.Taken out of context, it s,ill not be clearly true or clearly false. Although we tend to favor the standard resoludon, we also charitably tend to favor a resolution which gives the sentence under consideration a chance of

(l)

to say " . . . there would have to have been no quarrel yesterday." Three paragraphs ago, I used such constuctions to lure you into a context thet favors back-tracking.) I have distinguished the standard resolution of vagueness from the sort that permiti back-tracking only so that I can ask you to ignore the latter. Only under the standard resolution do we have the clear-cut asymmetry of counterfactual dependence that interests me. I do not claim that the asymmetry holds in all possible, or even all actual, cases. It holds for the sorts of familiar cases that arise in everyday life. But it well might break down in the different conditions that might obtain in a time machine, or at the edge of a black hole, or bcfore the Big Bang, or after the Heat Death, or at a Possible world consisting of one solitiry atom in the void. It may also break down with respect to the immediate past. \X/e shall return to these matters later. Subject to these needed qualifications, what I claim is as follows. Consider those counterfactuals of the form "If it were that,4, then it would be that C" in which the supposition ,4 is indeed false, and in shich,4 and C are entirely about the states of affairs at tro dmes t4 and t6 respectively. Many such counterfachals ere true in which C also is falsi, and in which t6 is later than l. These are counterfactuals that say how the way things are later depends on the way thinBs were earlier. But if 16 is earlier than t, then such counterfactuals are true if and only if C is true. These are the counterfactuals that tell us how the way things are earlier does not depend on the way things q/ill be later.

ASYMMETRIES OF CAUSATION AND OPENNESS

The asymmetry of counterfactual dependence has been little discussed' (Howver, see Downing [5], Bennett [2], and Slote [19] ) Some of its are better known. It is instructive to see how the "onr"or,"r,a"a counterfctual dependence serves to explain these of

trurh. (Back-tracking counterfactuals, used in a context that favors their tn'th, are marked by a syntactic peculiarity. They are the ones in vhich the usual subjunctive conditional constmctions are readily

"rya-",ry asymmetries. more familiar

Consider the temporal asymmetry of causation. Effects do not pre* at least not ordinarily. Elsewhere ([12]) I have cede their ""ur"r, a counterfectual analysis of causation: (1) the relation of advocated

36

CounterfactaaLs andTime

CounterfactaL Dependence andTime's

Arrou

37

cause to effect consists in their being linked by a causal chain; (2) a causal chain is a certain kind of chain of counterfactual dependences; and (3) the counterfactuals involved are to be taken under the srandard resolution of vagueness. If anything of the sort is right, there can be no backward causation s/ithout counterfactual dependence of past on future. Only where the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence

breaks down can there possibly be exceptions futuevard direction of causation.

to the predominnr

Consider also what

shall call che asymmetry of openness: the

obscure concrast we drav betveen the "open future" and the "fixed past". We tend to regard the future as a multitude of alternative possibilities, a "garden of forking paths" in Borges'phrase, whereas we regard the past as a unique, settled, immutable actuality. These descriptions scarcely wear their meaning on their sleeves, yet do seem to capture some genuine and important difference between past and future, Vhat can it be? Several hypotheses do not seem quite satisfactory. Hypothesis 1: Asymmetry of Epistemic Possibility. Is it just that we know more bout the past than about the future, so that the future is richer in epistemic possibilities? I think that's not it. The epistemic contrst is a matter of degree, not a difference in kind, and sometimes is not very pronounced. There is a great deal we know bout the future, and a great deel we don't know about the past. Ignorance of history has not the least tendency to make (most of) us think of the past as somewhat future-like, multiple, open, or unfixed. Hypotbesis 2: Aslmmetry of Muhrple

Hypotbesis 3:Asymmetry of Indeterminism. Is it that we think of our world as governed by indeterministic laws of nature, so that the actual pst and present are nomically compossible with various alternative future continuations? I think this hypothesis also fails. For one thing, it is less certain that our wold is indeterministic than that there is an asymmetry betveen open future and fixed Past-whatever that may turn out to be, Our best reason to believe in indeterminism is the success of quantum mechanics, but that reason is none too good until quntum mechanics succeeds ih giving a satisfactory account of processes of measurement. For another thing, such reson as we have to believe in indeterminism is reson to believe that the laqs of nature are indeterministic in both directions, so that the actual future and present are nomically compossible with various alternative pasts. If there is a process of reduction of the wave packec in which a given suPerPosition may be followed by any of many eigenstates, equally this is a process in which a given eigenstate may have been preceded by any of mny suPerPositions. Again we have no asymmetry. I believe that indeterminism is neither necessary nor sufficient for the asymmetries I am discussing. Therefore I shall ignore the possibility of indeterminism in the rest of this paper, and see how the asymmetries might arise even under strict determinism. A' deterministic system of lws is one such that, whenever two possible worlds both obey the laws pernecy, then either they are exactly alike throughout all of time, or else they are not exactly alike through any stretch of time. They are alike always or never. They do not diverge, matching perfectly in their initial segments but not thereafter; neither do they ion,retge. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of nature of our actual world are in this sense deterministic. (My definition of determinism derives from Montague ([15]), but with modifications. (1) I prefer to avoid his use of mathematical constructions as ersatz possi5le worlds. But should you prefer ersatz worlds to the real thing, that will not matter for the purposes of this paper. (2) I take exact likeness of s,orlds at dmes as a primitive relaiion; Montague instead uses the relation of having the same complete description in a certain language, which he leaves unspecified. My definition presupposes that ve can identify stretches of time from one world to another. That presupposition is questionable, but it could be avoided at the cost of some complication). Hypotbesis 4: Asymmetry of M utability. Is it that we can change the future, but not the past? Not so, if "change" has its literal meaning'

Aaulity.

Is

it that all our

possible futures are equally actual? It is possible, I think, to make sense of multiple actuality. Eisewhere I have argued for two theses (in [9] and [8]): (1) any inhabitant of any possible world may truly call his own world actual; (2) we ourselves inhabit this one world only, and are not identical with our other-worldly counterpats. Both theses are controversial, so perhaps I am right about one and wrong about the other. If (1) is true and (2) is false, here we are inhabiting several vorlds at once and truly calling all of them actual. (Adams argues contrapositively in [1], arguing from the denial of multiple actualiry and the denial of (2) to the denial of (1).) That makes sense, I think, but it gives us no asymmetry. For in some sufficiently broad sense of possiblity, we have alternative possible pasts as well as alternative possible futures. But if (l ) is true and (2) is false, tht mens tht ll our possibilities are equally actual, past as well as furure.

38
ft
is true enough that

Counterfaauals andTime
a is any Past time' then we cannot bring about t at time tl and the (supposedlv .,"," oi "tt"itt "t t is affairs at f at a later time t2' But the pastness of

CounterfaaaL Dependence and Time's

Arrow

39

if,

f.;;,;;,.
"i".rn"d) #;i;i;t;h;

is an easy matter to build the asymmetry into an analysis of counterfactuals, for instance as follows

It might work by fiat. It

be true if t were Present or future' Pest' mpossibil;;;;;;;:';;Ji",".e are alike immutable' \fhatixplains the"the state of ",rt. state of affairs at t at 4" or i* .ilJ;*t.t ,n."n iust mean: the state of affairs at t,h.v ",

r,"," of

ti-. -o"t :;;

ANALYSIS 1. Consider a cot4nterf*ctunl "If it uete that A, tben it woald be that C" ubere A is entire abot affirs in a stretcb of time t. Consider aII those possible worlds vt such tbdt:
(1) A
is trae at 7r);

;i;;;;;;,;i ;. i .;;;.

"bo"t " Dependence' Our Final H'vothesis: Asymmetry of Colnterfadual the truth than the others' wn we can fo,rrrh hvthesis was closer to about il;;;:;;i;;;;"nsine th. future" (so to speak) is to bring it of the will bi'-rather than anv ir'", r. ,** ;;';hi;'"v it actuallv in the Present' other ways it would have been if se acted differently Ve make a di{ference' But it is not literi'r,"i rt rirn.ir,gik. "hrng.. and ;;-;;;;., ;t" the diffrence we make is between actualitvtruth successive actualities' The literal Iti*" "!t;rj,t* ,,i u.,o,."n fu,u." d.p"nd' counterfactually on the present' It il'i;t,';;;;
deends. oanlv, on what we do noq' -"ili..*1i., cdnnot do by way of "changing that the past s the-wy rt actually was' the oast" is to bring it about wav it *ould have been if we acted differendv ;;;;t;;;t'her acted now' ;..... ;;;;; The past wo"ld be the same' however we on what we do now' It is counterfacdepend 'il;":;;;.i

b.i.tg

"nv'hing, d-ifference between that and itself'

(2) to is exaa lie or ctul zaorld at ll times before trnsition peiod beginning shortly before t; (3) tu conforms to the awal huts of ntre t all times aftet t7,;
and

(4) daring ta and tbe preceding transition period, w differs no more from or ct&al u,orld thn it mst to Permit A to hold. Tbe counterfaaual is true if and on if C bolds at eaery such utorld u'.
In short, take the counterfactual present (if r is now), avoiding gratuitous difference from the actual present; graft it smoothly onto the
actual past; let the situation evolve according to the actual laqts; and see what happens. An analysis close to Analysis t has been put forward by Jackson ([7]). Bennett ([2]), Bowie ([3]), and\feiner ([21]) have considered, but not endorsed, similar treatments. Analysis 1 guarantees the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence,

t.ili.g *e o'din"rily

";; "Jall t,.,"llv independent of the present' ''."'i.ti

tteest tha the mysterious asymmetry between open is nothing else than the-asymmetry of counterfacfr;;;Jh;Jtt .""i.""ti.*.lrhe forking faths into the furure-the actual one and come. abour ;il;i;;;;;,1* -"nv "t"n"tiue {utures that would Tre one abou the Present' ;i;;;;;;t;;""nte.f"ctu"l suppositions ;tJ, 6;J past is the o,t" p"'ih"t would remain actual under this same range of suPPositions' TWO ANALYSES OF COUNTERFACTUALS
of counterfactual I hooe I have now convinced you that an asymmetry therefore "';;;;;;;';-,t ", i n"J i'npottnt consequences; anda'alysis of semantic .-pr"itt by'anv satisfactory i il;;il. condicinah. I.' ih" i"st of this paper' I shall consider ."""t".f**

with an exception for the immediate Past' Let C be entirely about a stretch of timi 16. If t6.is later than r,a, then C may very vell be false at our world, yet ffue at the worlds that meet the conditions listed in Analysis 1. \e have the countefactuals whereby the affairs of later times depend on those of earlier times. But if 16 is before ,{' and also before the transition period, then C holds at worlds that meet condition (2) if and only if C is true at our actual world' Since C is entirely

about something that does not differ at all from one of these qorlds to another, its truth vlue cannot vary. Therefore, excePt for cses in which c falls in the transition period, we have the counterfactuals whereby the affairs of earlier times are independent of those of later times, any temPtation to 'le need the transition period, and should resist replace (2) by the simpler and stronger

(2'r)

za is

exactly like our actual world at all times before

r.

how that explanation ought to work'

(2*) makes for abrupt discontinuities. Right up to t, the match_ was stationary and a foot away from the striking surface. If it had been

40
struck at t, would

Contfaauals and Time

Counterfactaal Dependence adTime's

Arrow

41

it

ri"ri r""irn* ;;;it";;;;;;- "e

"",u"1 dePends on future, That is not to say, however, that the immedite Past There may be a vanety ot ways the present in any very definite way' *ier',-, henc' th'ie mav be no true co.unterfactuals ;il; it the Present ih", r"" in anv de-tail how the immediate past would be were a definite and detailed if there i*"1ri"."ti'

we have travelled a foot in no time at all? Noi the immediate past- to provide an independence of past to counterfactual present and iro,

of counterfactual dependence. It will not do to declare them impossible

priori. The asymmetry-by-fiat strategy of Analysis 1 is an instructive error, not a dead loss. Often we do have the right sort of supposition, the

i;;;il

i"p" "",, ti"* 'coors'-as ;"d.;.;:l; ;.uli b. h"'d for me to sav whv some of this depen-C" backward i'i.'p*"-*'onglv' of :ii'";; that are not at ll exttain cases
causation over shot intervals of time

ordinarv.

"'i"it 1 seems to fit a wide range of counterfactuals;.and it ;"iii "'";;;".rv of tot'nt"tf"ttial dependence'I though with fear not' for "blu; ;;"ht ,.*"ra'..rottrn
such
as

standard resolution of vagueness, and no extraordinary circumstances. Then Analysis 1 works as vell as we could ask. The right analysis of counterfactuals needs to be both more general and more flexible. But also it needs to agree with Analysis 1 over the q/ide range of cases for which Analysis 1 succeeds. The right general analysis of counterfactuals, in my opinion, is one based on comparative similarity of possible worlds. Roughly, a counterfactual is true if every world that makes the antecedent tue vithout gratuitous departure from actuality is a v.,orld that also makes the consequent rrue. Such an analysis is given in my [10] and [11];here is one

.*Lp,i"t' Should we be iontent? "i","lt*^tu"1iti" two resons. "'iitti. i"r".it I is built for a special case' we necd a suppositron the

formulation.

t" nttd ' countefactual taken under ii,n", "" of vagueness' rJhat shall we do with suppositions

ANALYSIS 2. A counterfactual "lf it utere tht A, then it u.,old be tltdt C" is (non-aacuouslT) tre if and only if some (dccesible) orld robere both A nd. C are tre is tnore similar to or actal zaorld, otterll, tban is any uorld ubere A is true but C is fake.
This analysis is fully general:. can be a supposition of any sort. It is also extremely vague. Overall similarity among worlds is some sot of resultant of similarities and dif{erences of many different kinds, and I have not said what system of weights or priorities should be used to squeeze these down into a single relation of overall similarity. I count that a virtue. Countefactuals are both vague and various. Different resolutions of the vagueness of overall similarity are appropriate in different contexts,

If kangaroos had no tails ' ' ' If graviry went by the inverse cube of distance ' ' '
1 cannot cope as it ,hich are not about particular timesl Analysis it' At most we could *""r."tl tr,*. any obvious way to generlize on the cases.handled f ott'"' :i:";il;;";;t, ""s"id'"-ing is tl;;r.'i Cfzll does this to some extent') Analvsis t in of counterfactuals uniform treatment lr',ni.' ;;i;;';

If Collett had

ever designed a Pacific

''

'

EiIi*"

general. Second' Analysis

"

may be' no *ant. No matter how special the circumstances ol the case exceptions-to the is m"de for actual or possible ;;i"i;;;i;;;";' period)' rhat is-too.inflexible' in ln. :;;;';;;i o

to gtves us more of an asymmetry than we ought

""n'i'i"n stones lr"ful t""dt. hve thought they could make sens.ol t.avel (see my [1]l for further discussion); hard-headed. Psycnrcat have

t'.:

in precognition; speculativc phvsicists and consideration to tihyont, "dutnttd potentials' """" or all of these timlik' cu*e'' Most :;;"b;i;.-;i;"'iih

;.r.;;.'rti.'.ir"* -""ritt,
pt"*".-*;U

(plus some simple observations about the formal character of comparative similarity) is about all that can be said in full generality about counterfactuals. \hile not devoid of testable conrent-it settles some questions of logic-it does little to predict the tuth values of particular counterfactuals in particular contexts, The rest of the study of counterfactuals is not fully general. Analysis 2 is only a skeleton. It must be fleshed out gith an account of the appropriate similarity relation, and this will differ from context to context. Our present task is to see what sort of similarity relation can be combined with Analysis 2 to yield what I have called the standard
Analysis
resolution of vagueness: one that invalidates back-tracking arguments, one that yields an symme[ry of counterfactual dependence except

involve special excePtions to the normal asymmetry

'1""'d

42

Counterfaaals andTime

Conterfactual Dependence and Tine's

Ano

43

perhaps under special circumstances' one that agrees with Analysis 1, ur arymmetry-by-fiat analysis, whenever it ought to. But-first, a word of warning! Do not assume that iust any respect of similarity you can think of must enter into the balance of overall similarity with positive weight. The point is obvious for some respects of

simiiarity, i such they be. It contributes nothing to the similarity of two gemstones that both are grue. (To be gre is to be green-and first .*"--ined before 2000 A.D. or blue and not 6rst examined before 2000 A.D.) But even some similarities in less gruesome resPects may count for nothing. They may have zero weight, at least under some reasonable resolutions of vagueness' To what extent are the philosophical writings of llittgenstein similar, overall, to those of Heidegger? I don't know. But here is one respect of comparison that does not enter into it at all, not even with negligible weight: the ratio of vowels to consonants.

comparative similarity relations should enter into the interPretation of a single sentence. The thing to do is not to start by deciding, once and for all, what we think about similarity of worlds, so tht $'e can afterwards use these decisions to test Analysis 2. V/hat that would test would be the combination of Analysis 2 s'ith a foolish denial of the shiftiness of similarity.

Rather, we must use what we knov about the truth and falsity of counterfactuals to see if we can find some sort of similarity relationnot necessarily the first one that springs to mind-that combines s/ith Analysis 2 to yield the proper truth conditions. It is this combination that can be tested against our knowledge of counterfactuals, not Analysis 2 by itself. In looking for a combination that s'iil stand up to the test, we must use what ve know about counterfactuals to find out about the appropriate similarity relation-not the other way around.

(Bowie ([3]) has argued that if some respects of comprison counted foi nothing, my assumption of "centering" in [10] and [11] would be

violated: worlds differing from ours only in the respects that don't count would be as similar to our world as our world is to itself. I reply that there may not be any worlds that differ from ours only in the respects tht on't count, even if there are some resPects that d-ont Respect, of comparison may not be entirely separable. If the "orr.rt. of-two philosophers were alike in every respect that mattered, writings they would be word-fr-word the same; then they would have the same ratio of vosels to consonants,) And next, another word of warning! It is all too easy to make offhand similarity judgments and then assume that they will do for all purposes.

THE FUTURE SIMILARITY OBJECTION

Several people have raised what they take to be a serious objection against nalysis 2. (It was first brought to my attention by Michael Slote; it occurs, in various forms, in [2], t3l, t4l, t6l' [7]' [17]' [18]' and [19]. Kit Fine ([6]: 452) shtes it as follows. The counterfactual "If Nixon had pressed the button there vould have been nuclea holocaust" is rue or can be imagined to be so. Now suppose that there never will be a nuclea holocaust. Then that counterfactual ls, on Lewis's analysis, very likely false For given any wold in which antecedent and consequent are both true it will be easy to imagine a closer s'orld in vhich the antecedent is true and the consequent false. For ve need only imagine a change that prevents the holocaust but that does not require such a great divergence from rcality.

But if we respect the extreme shiftiness and context-dependence of \e will similarity, 'e^will not set much store by offhand judgmentssimilariry relations that guide be prepared to distinguish between the oui ofih"nd explicit iudgments and those that govern our counterfactuals in various contexts. Indeed, unless we are prepared so to distinguish, Analysis 2 faces immediate refutation. Sometimes a pair of countelactuals of the following form seem true: "If,4, the world would be very different; but if .4 and B, the world would not be very different"' Only if the similarity relation governing counterfactuals disagrees with that governing explicit judgrients of what is "very different" can such a Pir be true-under AnalyJis 2. (I owe this argument to Pavel Tichf and, in a slightly di f"."r,i forrn, ro Richard J. Hall.) It seems to me no surprise, given the instability even of explicit judgments of similarity, that ts'o different

The presence or absence of a nuclear holocaust surely does contribute with- overwhelming weight to some Prominent similarity relations. (For instance, to one that governs the explicit judgment of similarity in the consequent of "If Nixon had pressed the button, the vorld would be very different.") But the relation that governs the counterfactual may not be one of these. It may nevertheless be a relation of overall similarity-not because it is likely to guide our explicit judgments of similarity, but rather because it is a resultant, under some system of weights or priorities, of a multitude of relations of similarity in par-

ticular respects,

44

Coanterfactals

atdTime

Couterfactdl DePendece and Time's

Aout

45

Let us take the supposition that Nixon pressed the button as implicitly referring to a particular time t-let it be the darkesr moment of the tnal days. Consider e, a world that may or may not be ours. At e, Nixon does not press the button at , and no nucler holocaust ever occurs. Let zrs also be a world with deterministic laws, since we have confined our attention here to counterfactual
dependence under determinism. Let u.re also be a world that 6ts our worst fantasies about the bufton: there is such a button, it is connected to a fully automatic command and control system, the wired-in sar plan consists of one big salvo, everything is in fauldess working order, there is no way for anyone to stop the attack, and so on. Then I agree that Fine's counterfactual is true at e: if Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holooaust.

whatever else a law may be, it is at least an exceptionless regularity. I am using "miracle" to express a relation between different s/orlds. A miracle at ub relzrtive to tos, is a violation at t1 of the laws of e, which are t best the almost-laws of uThe laws of 1 itself, if such
there be, do not enter into it.) A second class of candidates is typified by u2. This is a vorld completely free of miracles: the deterministic laws of lq are obeyed perfectly. However, r2 differs from ze in that Nixon Pressed the button. @o are alike always or alike By definition of determinism, 'Io2 ^i never, and they are not alike always,Therefore, they are not exactly alike through any stretch of time. They differ even in the remote Past. lhat is worse, there is no guarantee whatever lhat v2 can be chosen so that the differences diminish and eventually become negligible in the

There ee all sorts of s/orlds where Nixon (or rather, a counterpart of Nixon) presses the button ar . \(/e must consider which of these differ leasr, under the appropriate similarity relation, from rro. Some are non-starrers. Those where the payload of the rockets consists entirely of confeni depart gratuitously from we by any reasonable standards. The more serious candidates fall into several classes. One class is typified by the world t1. Until shortly before r, u.r1 is exactly like zae. The two match perfectly in every detail of particular facc, however minute. Shortly before , however, the spatio-temporal region of perfect match comes to an end as ar1 and @q begin to diverge. The deterministic laws of zls are violated at '1 in some simple,localized, inconspicuous way. A dny miracle takes place. Perhaps a few extra neurons fire in some corner of Nixon's brain. As a result of this, Nixon presses the button. rlith no further miracles events take their lawful course and the two qorlds w1 an, ws go their separate ways. The holocaust takes place. From that point on, at least so far as the surface of this planet is concerned, the two worlds ae not even approximately similar in matters of panicular fact. In short, the worlds typified by 1

are the worlds that meet the conditions listed in Analysis 1, our asymmetry-by-fiat analysis. lVhat is the case throughout these worlds is just what we think uould have been the case if Nixon had pressed the button (assuming that we are at,rgs ar\d operating under the standard resolution of vagueness). Therefore, the worlds typified by r should turn out to be more similar to zre, under the similarity relation we seek, than any of the other worlds where Nixon pressed the button. (ufhen I say that a miracle takes place ar 1, I n.ean that there is a violation of the laws of nature. But note that the violated laws are nor las's of the same world where they are violated. That is impossible;

is hard to imagine hos two deterministic worlds anything like ous could possibly remain just a little bit different for very long. There are altogether too many oPPortunities for little differences to give rise to bigger differences. Certainly such worlds as z2 should not turn out to be the most similar worlds to ule where Nixon pressed the button. Thac vould lead to back-tracking unlimited. (And as Bennett observes in [2], it would make counterfactuals useless; we know far too little to figure out which of them are true under a resolution of vagueness chat validates very much back-tracking.) The lesson we learn by comparing '1 and ro2 is that under the similarity relation s,e seek, a lot of perfect match of particular fact is worth a little miracle. third class of candidates is typified by 3. This world begins like ,r. Undl shortly before t, w3 is exactly like zre. Then a tiny miracle takes place, permitting divergence. Nixon presses the buron at . But there is no holocaust, because soon after a second dny miracle takes place, just as simple and localized and inconspicuous as the first' The atal signal vanishes on its way from the button to the rockets. Thereut take their lawful course. At least for a while, worlds after events ^t zas ad u3 remain very closely similar in matters of particular fact But they are no longer exactly alike. The holocaust has been prevented, but Nixon's deed has left its mark on the world 3' There are his 6ngerprints on che button. Nixon is still trembling, wondering what went wrong-or right. His gin bottle is depleted. The click of the button has been preserved on tape. Light waves that flew out the s'indow, bearing the image of Nixon's finger on the button, are still on their way into outer space. The wire is ever so slightly warmed q/hee the signal current passed through it. And so on, and on, and on. The differences
more and more remote past. Indeed,

it

46

Counterfaaaals and Time

Counterfactual Dependence dnd Time's

Anop

47

between tu3 and zo are many and varied, although no one of them amounts to much. i rl.rf think that the close similarity between u''3 end trlo could not

last. Some of the little differences would give rise to bigger diflerences at fl sooner or leter. Maybe Nixon's memoirs are more sanctrmonrous character Conseqlently they have a different impact on the hu.rdred rrt of the millions s'ho read them' A tew ot these of a feo. -hrt.

;il;;;".

i.ii*r-*

make different decisions at crucial moments of their we're off ! But if you are not convinced that the differences need increase, no matter. My case will not depend on that' ^'-iit"l"t'z it ,o succeed, such worlds as r3 must not turn out to be worlds to ze where Nixon pressed the button' The ,t "--ori"irnit"t by comparin g zo1 and zl is that.und-er the similariry i;r"; -" leam relation q/e seek, close but approximate match ot Partrcular -tect i"rr..i"fb if it is iemporary) is nt *otth even a little miracle' Taking rr"i

zue reconverge. They are exacdy alike again soon ater t, e exactly alike forevermoe. All it takes is enough of a reconvergence miracle: one involving enough different sorts of violations of the laws of uo, in enough different places. Because there are many different sorts of traces to be removed, and because the taces spread out rapidly, the cover-upjob divides into very many parts. Each part requires a miracle at least on a par with the small miracle required to prevent the holocaust, or the one required to get the button pressed in the first place. Differenc sorts of unlawful processes are needed to remove different sots of traces: the miraculous vanishing of a pulse of current in a wire is not like the miaculous rearrangement of magnedzed grains on a recording tape. The big miracle required for perfect

wa and

i"rro of -, ,ogether' we learn that pcrfect match "rJ-t. "*ti",r, counts for -u ttiott than imperfect match' even if "i"r,i""1**, th"'imoerfect match is good enough to give us similariry in respects ;;;, ;:.*t very much t us. I do iot "1"- that this pre-eminence o{ ii i"tuitivelv obvious. I do not claim that it is a feature of "".i.* i"*ft ..t",ions mst likely to guide our explicit judgments k is ii,. ,i*;t".ity put ,rot; .lt. ,h objection we are considering never would have been

io"rd. (S." also the opinion survey reported by Bennett in [2]') But ,tr" pr"-.rrin."." of p..fect match-is a feature of some relations of

reconvergence consists of a multitude of little miracles, spread out and diverse. Such worlds as zaa had better not turn out to be the most similar worlds to @q where Nixon pressed the button. The lesson we learn by comparing ul and ta is that under the similarity relation we seek, perfect match of particular fact even through the entire future is not woth a big, widespread, diverse miracle. Taking that and the lesson of z2 together, we learn that avoidance of big miracles counts for much more than avoidance of little miracles. Miracles are not all equal. The all-ornothiDg distincrion between worlds that do and thai do not ever violate the laws of te is not sensitive enough to meet our needs. This completes our survey of the leading candidates. There are other

"""iit;-il".it", "nd needs. *ill meet our piesent '

it must be a feature of any similarity relation that

i.iii "fitt .f candidates is typified by za' This world begins-like before t' there 12' and zr3. There is perfect match with z'e until shortly the button is pressed' But there is a widei " r- ait"t*"n". mi."cl.,
.".."J'". cplicated

"'."".., ir.rtit*. fn"."".r-up

,f,. hoio"rurt

and diverse second miracle after It not only '' but also removes all traces of Nixon's buttonjob is miraculously perfect' Of course the fatal

itgn"i nith.t, iurt , -r, but there is much more' The fingerprint "i ',rirh.r, t. s*""t returns to Nixon's fingertip' Nixon's. nerves "ndhis memories are falsified, and so he feels no need of the t.i.d, "* -"nini. Th" click on the tape is replaced by innocent noses' The "*i." ."i.aing tigttt *""es cease ro beai their incriminating images' The wire .ool, d*i, and not by heating its surroundings in the ordinary way' And so on, and on, and on. Not only are there no traces that ny

candidates, but they teach us nothing new. There are some worlds where approximate reconvergence to ,e is secured by a second small miracle before t, rather than afterq/ard as at ur3i Haig has seen fit to disconnect the button, Likewise there are worlds where a diverse and widespread miracle to permit perfect reconvergence takes place mostly before and during r: Nixon's fingers leave no prints, the tape recorder malfunctions, and so on. Under the similariry relation we seek, t1 must count as closer to taq than any o1 u.'2, 14, and wa. That means that a similarity relation that combines with Analysis 2 to give the corect truth conditions for counterfactuals such as the one we have considered, taken under the standard resolution of vagueness, must be governed by the following system of weights or priorities.

(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse

violations of law. (2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal

human detective could read; in every detail of particular fact' however ;i;u,l, is just as if the button-prssing had never been' The worlds

48

Conterfaauals and Time

Conterfaaul Dependence andTime's

Arrota

49

match o{ Particular fact region throughout which perfect

ol Tjir,r'"

orevails.

localized' third importance rc avoid even small' similar-

i-po""n"t to tecure approximate t'' :'iti i;nor"o' "" i" *""ers that incern us greatlv' ") il:;;;;"l;'

simPle violations o{ lav'

(rt is a good question whether r"t ,hoild h"ue little weight or Ii:il:i:'i',?J::'.#mt"ll: ri't'i 1zo and Jackson ([7]) i;;"H'jirc ' z- o-nly if sive cases which appear 'o "o-"'oi''ijttt'uei'en"lytis but Morgenbesser has i.ro.o"i-"t. similaities toun' io'oif,ing; aPPears to to,'-l"Tt" n sl'* tiiill' *r'i't' '.pi,.Jwas first b'ought to my attention by brnest il;. Th*;t'i.

how could one small, localized, simple miracle possibly do all that needs doing? How could it deal with the fatal signal, the fingerprints, the memoriis, the tape, the light waves, and all the rest? I put it to you that it can't be doneiDivergence from a world such as z''e is easier than perfect convergence to it. Either takes a miracle, since te is determinisic, brrt conu"igence takes very much more of a miracle. The asymmetry of counierfactual dependence arises because the appropriate stand".d, of similarity, themselves symmetric, respond to this asymmetry o{ miracles. It might be otherwise if e were a different sort of q/orld' I do not men t; suggest that the asymmetry of divergence and convergence miracles holds necessary or universally. For instance, consider a simple word inhabited by just one atom. Consider the worlds that differ from it in a certain way at a certain time. You will doubtless conclude that convergence to this world takes no more of a varied and widespread miraclJ than divergence from it. That means, if I am right, that no asymmetry of countefactual dependence prevails at this- -q/old' Aiymmetry-by-fiat analyses go wrong for such simple worlds. The asymmetry of miracles, and hence of counterfactual dependence, rests on a feature of vorlds like urq which very simple worlds cannot share.

:d

t'"*liu'

i#J',

Loevinsohn.)

of course' even Plenry of unresolved vagueness -remains' comparison' and ranked of of respect have distinguished the foursorts been said to ota"' ot '-po-i"n"i' n""nougit has them in decreasing oher versions of the future simtLt**'rtitii"ti'on; "nd I ihinkthe same way' be answered in i".ity u;""tn -ay

efte we

THE ASYMMETRY OF MIRACLES

Enough-has been said' counterfactual dePendence tn st have been oJ the sort the button-' the future sould ffiffi;;;; of particular fact, {rom {ound at tu r: a future very drtter"n,lln -"".tr at t: a *ould have been of the sort tound il;";;.'i;;"it \lhence came this "l'o before ' oast exactlv like that of to unlit'tto'ity the staninto Analvsis 2' It is not built into TlJit.,"i, 1, not built Analvsis 2' uith iliilliJr;:,i"t -t t'"u' t"n nt to combine of.candidates. \tr'e in the range

ASYMMETRY OF OVERDETERMINATION

"*:l':.;1":HlJ-'5::'1, :';;'UX. :l

Any panicular fact about a deterministic world is predetermined

throughout the past and postdetermined throughout the future. 't any -past or future, it hs at least one determinant: a minimal set of time, conditons jointly sufficient, given the laws of nature, for the fact in question. (Members of such a set may be causes of the fact, or traces o{ ii, or neither,) The fact may have only one determinant at a given time, disregarding inessential differences in a way I shall not try to make precise. Or it may have tqo or more essentially different determinants at a given time, each sufficient by itself. If so, it is oaerdeteflnined at thet iime. Orrerdetermination is a matter of degree; there might be two determinants, or there might be very many more than tYo. I suggest that whac makes convergence take so much more of a miracle than divergence, in the case of a world such as e, is an symmetry

i,o* "n ",y.,n.i| divergence from worlds s/here ,*"ii'-ilt""t" permit--ted considered " where a small miracle. permitted worlds 'approxti,il'.;.;td;; permitted pert" * *o'i' *here a bis miracle worlds where a ;:;.:;.*;;;io *-" Ji no' consiet any fect convergence to r''o' But to ri'o' If we had' our svm.;;;;;; o**itte p"rfect conutrgencer"uot" such sorlds no less of itil"ity JuJ-ttiu"
It
came instead

metric standards

th"fr.ffi.

an.r.,ny

could they be likc: such worlds to consider?'vhat

of overdetermination at such a wold. How much overdetermination of later affairs by earlier ones is there at our world, or at a deterministic world which might be ours for all we know? Ve have our stock examples-the victim ''fi/hose heart is simultaneously pierced by rwo

to

Counterfaauls and Time

Cot4ntefdcttl DePendence andTime's

Anou

51

bullets, and the. like' But those-:::"#""XHi:,#:::::,': extreme' *t "o"' ':::.*r:.;t".t' overdetermination is not very

of earlier affairs by later ones' on

t-"*,il.''ot

very

matter, holding near here but not in remote parts of time and space' If th"irests on it-the asymmetries of miracles, of counterfacso, then "ll ,u"l d"p"rrd.n"", of causation and openness-may likewise be local
and subject to exceptions.

qorld like outs'Vh-at-*"' less universal at a

;;;i;;;"t

i;:;;;;;;*g'iili'ili:::',',f"iml:"i them: but no mattr' so long

a

are so mrnute or future times-' Most of these traces

""" lilI"o,:,r#:ifiil:iT got' o" it"tts widesPread

I regret that I do not know how to connect the several asymmetries I herre d"iscussed and the famous asymmetry of entropy'r

present fact of t'"""t-of "ny manv simultaneou, di';oint "ornlin"ton' for the combinaton to wav ; there is no lawful

REFERENCES f1l Robert M. Adams, "Theorics of Actualiry," Nods 8(1974):2Il-31' of izi o.r"th"n Bennett, re"ie* of Lewis ([to]), Tbe Cnadizn Journal
P bilo

:T:;;ffin,hereof

il;;;;

trace could somet" the alsence of the fact' (Even if a tf the requisite of T:::t hos, have been faked, t'"""' "t itt"'"tit form a set jointly sufi"trr to i"Lr"r i'n"l;" -i'tt 'r'"'tt""t the abundan-ce of future traces in quesuon ) If so' ficient for the fact tutu'" ettr-ina"t'' Ve mry reasonably makes for a like abund-"t ot the past on an altogether ditterent exoect overdetermination tos'ard i'ii'o'"'""'mination to*ard the

[f]

G. Lee Bowie, "The Similarity Approach to Counterfactuals:

soPhy 4(197 4):

381402

Some

Problems," Nois 13(1979): 477-98. ([10]), Philosopby of [4] Lewis Creary and Christopher Hill, review of Lewis
Scic nce 42(197 5) : 34

::;,o';;;"'ion"l "" t"l:; It takes a miracle to *ot,o explain the asymmetry o{ miracles' which it determines' and that br."k ;h.it.k ;;;" "ny ttt'*i'i"nt where Nixon from iiil; .."-prt' rt itttg"the linkszao' a u/orld wherebv certain past con;;;..;'h.'t;;n.d onlv brea p'ess it' To converge' to'us' a world
itions determine that h" do"s "ot
where Nixon

14'

Order, and Causa[5] P. B. Downing, "subjunctive Conditionals, Time of the Atistotelian Societf 59(1959)t 12540 rion," Prcceedings
16l Kit Fine, review o Lewis (l1o))' Mind 84(1975):451-8' izj frank ackson, "A Causal ih"ory of Counerfactuals," Atttrahtian Joamal of Pbilosophy 55(1977)t 3-21.

varied utt*on"ttt tttt 'tt" tinttt -hereby a not that he does 'ht iluj;;i filte conditions vastly overdetermine' necd breaking overdetermin"n' tttt more links oress it. The more be i{ it is to break

and Quaotificd ModalLogic," Jor[8] bavid Lewis, "Counterpart Theory nal of Pbilosopby 65(1968): 113-26'
91

pres"'

"Anselm and Actuality," Noris 4(1970): 175-88.

liol
i11j
........--.."._,

ounrrrfaauak (ox[or& Rlackwell, 1973)'

'and

iiitttt'tti" -itacle them all. "',r-.o.vnotedbvt"-P#:gi:rl,'::l;""iffi

the more widespread and

-, osoPbical -,
in

'co""terfactuali

'I o overdetermination' oppostte from point sou'c' to infiniry' The ;J;;J;;;ard " inward from infiniry contrects #.":tt.:,'i;;ht"h " 'pt";"t*"i" of nature equallv well' But ther u-' b'v ffi;:J"i;-;;utd ;;;t;"" of '- sort exhibits t*sms 6vgdgtermtna-

-.trv

;ti5:l

U2l -=-.._, ' '

Ernest Sosa (ed.), Csation and Conditionals (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). "1" paadoxes of Time Tr ate\," Aerican Philosopbicl Quar[13] ter 13(1976)t 145-52'

and comparative Possibility," Jomal of Pbil' Logic 2(1973): 41846. "C;sation," Joumal of Philosophy 7.0(1973)t 556-67; rePrinted

-,
I

:J;;;;. "itht' wave each- deterd ";;;i;.:;ion' cou*ltt' iinv '"tpl"t.of the wave is emitted *tt"t" the ptltit mine what happen' "t'tt" tp'"T-ii'ot ;h"; ;;Jtt are the ones in which this or absorbed' The processes it got;-to*t' th" p"tt' not those in which extreme overdeter-in"tion t9tt gtl"li[' tl'i th" '"r,.t i"ru" goes toward the futu'"' r "'gg; that the- asymmetry of o-verdetermtmore' Let me emphasize, once a local #'i ;';'ffi si^'i a' f ii ^ tt'r' Moieov'r' it mav be

m erateful to manv friends for discussion of these matters, and especially to Tonathin Bennett, RoLerr Goble, Philip Kitcher, Ernest Loevinsohn' John Perry' ifi"hael Slote, and Robert Stalnaker. I am grateful o seminar eudiences t sevel 'nithe versities in New Zealand for comments on an early version of this paper, rnd to Founderion for making those seminars posNew Zealnd-United Sttes Educarional sible.I also thank Princeton Univershy and the American Council ofLerned Societies foi r.r."r.h .uppor, "t earlier stages. An eerlier version of this papcr was presented et the 1976 AnnuaiConference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy'

Countedactual Depetdence andTime's

Anow

tJ

52
f

Counerfaauals and Time

of Philosophical "scorekeeping in a Lenguage Gtme"' Jotmal Lo1ic, I (1979): 3!9-59 ' i Decisions' Vahtes dnd tl51 Richad Montague, "I)etermmrstic Theories"' t'"' -, p.r*"rnon pr"rr,lie2); reprinted in Mongue' Formal l"".,iri".i

t4t

Then I focus attention on some contexts in particular, and on the range of similarity relations that apply in such contexts' Thereby I add to my .irti.r irJutri"n, bt t do ni at all subtract from ir' Yet not a few
readers

i"i)iy

Press' 197-4)' 1N..* naien: Yale Universiry

--^

tft+imi:t,;rffi ijxffi ;#'i!!t'])!)-!)!;"'.-a"r ' l0r-118

Pbilosoohv 5J(1975):
38(1978)1

tttr

;i'#i::u"g"i-';dl'il"'t'v
80-2'

. t ,..-t and countcrfactuts"' Anasis

.' ,t-:--t
D--.'

think I have taken something back. Vhy? The trouble seems to be that a comparative elation of the sort thar I now put forward----one that turns to some extent on the size of regions of o.'.f"", match, and to some extent on the scarcity in one vorld of ,trr, violaie the laws of another-is not at all what my earlier "ue'n,. led these readers to exPect. But why not? I think the trouble writings
has three sources.

Pbilosophkal Retnew tlrf iliri;',i. 1o,", "Tltt in Counterfactuels"' 87(1978): !-27 ' Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of t20l Pavel Tichi, "A Counterexample to the t'"' l-7 "t,"*""11,4 r," ilo'oph;,.ot'st"tlie s 29(1976\ 27 conundrum"' Noris 13(r e7e)z 4ee-5os' rtf iJ;;;;;.u""Jitu"t
f

PostsctiPts to

"' Counterfactual DePendence and Time's Arrow"

A. NE\THEORY AND OLD?

One source, I think, is entrenched doubt about the very idea of similaritv. It is widelv thought that eaery shared property, in the most inclisive possible sense ol that "rord, is prin fcie a respect of similarbe similar in respect of satisfying the same miscellairr,, ,h", ,i,in*, ""n formula, or in respecr of belonging to the same .,ouslv disirinctive ,,tt"rlr/ misellaneous class. If so, then there's little to be said about similarity. Any two things, be they two peas in a pod or "o-ot",iu. and a writing-desk, are alike in infinitely many resPec$ be thev a raven arrd u[ke in equ"lly many. ^scepticism, I observed that we undeniably do make g"int, this i,rdpents of comparatiue overall similarity. And readers took the

'""i,-U", in far ioo limited a way. "Yes," I think they thought'

i'there is indeed
a

.in, ou, "tpli.it r. op.*,io"A t"rt'

Fromtimetotimelhavebeentold'muchtomysurprise'thatthis bppoied to the "old oaoer Dresents a "n"* ,h.oty" oitlterfactuals' ir,r*l; i"J"anced in erlier writings'r "'""tld';l;"'etn, t"tt*,itt'i'he"truth of the matter was as folthtt counterfctuals r'-e*-"-l*d loqs. ln the earlier writings t "lJ of

lIii.i.'h ;iiio"'
irJ
i".i*-

overall similaritv 'worlds' relation of simil"ttty Ct1that there was no on" pt"t"tly.fi*ed but :lit srmralw"ys' To the contrary' the governtng
s"v

toto*"tive

ground, and. 'e're as much at Apart from that one special case, we- do no.t understand .." i, "u".. io* on" rhrrd prop".ty can be more or less of a similarity-maker be that some orderings are comparisons of tto* i, ,-tr* -o,t ""n And so I speak of similarity, and these "t; ". oth".s aren't." "i-il".i,t, ".r the one scepti"s nderstand me in the only wy they can: they seize on since they can underJisrirnin"tion they regard as unproblematic, .t"n noo',o pi.t ut ne similarity relation operationally i: IiTt tf rnro i"ern.nit. Then they observe, quite rightly, that the- "similarity r-.litin'ir now put for*ard as governing counterfactuals isn' that

comPerative relation that is special in the way it govtr,ap judgments. Ve can scarcely doubt that-q/e have
^But

i."u. that firm

one.

ia",a" :iJ;oiil

riL

l""."t""tuals

*"ii *..-t"Jing

Djlferent was both vagut "nd cotext-dePendent' probablv r"i.., it'"nit^nges of similariry relations' allthat' fuu d"t";in""tv' In this paier I reiterate

Th. right lesson would have been more far-reaching Our ability to .rk" *rJ snap judgment is one reason, among others, to reject the ."epti"tl, egaliariai otthodoxy. It iust isnt so that a'll propenies (in th"'-oriinlusiue ,ense) are equally respects of similarity' Then it is by

IPrinciollv Countel4ctxdlt (Oxford: Blackwell'

:Jffi;';,ritv'

l"ip"tiitr't i"

1973); lso "Countcrfctuls nd le73 rnd rcprintcd in this volume'

*"i!n"a."*i,"n, of respects of similarity

no means empty to say as I dohat a relation of overall similarity is any

and dissimilarity' (To

Conterfactual Depcndence and Time's

Arrow

5t

54

Couterfactuals dnd Time

nonarchimedean; that is' s'e which I add that the weighting might be we have ;ih"* ";;. of po'iti" r"ih"r th"" trade-offs') Here one that go far bevond the that can l':i;;;p;;;;". class qoverns the snap iudgments; and that yei falls far shon.of.the ""l"tion' slmllarlty' "Iin.",.d iust by the iormal character of comparatrve An what shall we put in its 'place? propertis that are t'.it" int"ntt uetween those distinction? A llJ,illiJi'''i;;r "n 'no'" 't'"' aren't? A primiiive of.the very a denial in the for of

"'i"""ii.."i,'.*i"ti",,itt,

,.il::r,;;;;,

i::ilJo; t;;;;;;"*'logv'ir'at aren't respects of similaritv? A :,;;;i;;;ii.iJp,op'"iJJ t"ke up' lest we put the.onus on the #:,,".;;;ilo,i" i,, 'lt'v t"on thisiubject' Ihink' is that.egali::'^:;".'\ -" lno* bst reiect it without :tH; iir;t';""..aiu.,' we are entitled to d"u"loP"d altemative'2 o*iig " "ny is that some readers :',;;J;."t; of trouble' I suspect'match' and neslect thethinh of case of itot'i"ct h;;;;;ilt; "'*sin' ro illustrate' consider three locoiimtea ;:i:;;;a "l*'"v' 4018 are alike in this wav: i, ;,-"nJ eolsl zars and and reboxes (to the extent ,'i"" r''"" ""ii""te Loilers, smokeboxes, production line-eve are ;il*;;i;i;firo- "n t"tlv zoth century uplicated' But 2818 is a ffiiJ,;;J;rioot t"tt"t *ings also are coar haurer-prentv or 2-&4 :i':"Ji'i*rJ, ;;;:;v;;d opposite' a {astJargc-wheeled' is the to..a-*","", 4t8 is 6018; but "i,i,,i" .,',r-.vlindered ,H express p"""ng"i io"ototive.' So

sticking in down the lavs of the first world, then to mutilate them by ;il"r-;" fe.mit 'rarious exceptions in an unprincipled fashion' Yet almost evervthing that ever happens in the second world conloms li.f; ;ih. i"is of the 6rst."ihe third world does have a nice' elethe st l-, if*t" system; its laws resemble those ofsquare to world except inverse cube here, a switch from inverse i.r I "fiisn "ft".g. ;;;,;;d"; f"o'ith.. ich mino' changes' consequentlv' the third *o.l .on.t"ntly uiolates the laws of the first; any little thing that goes on .i i. ,tt" third ould be prohibited by the laws of the.first' Focus the o[ the laws, and it may well seem that tn"'ii.*itii. "ti6cation ;illJ;;;iJ;"t"-bles the 6rst with respect to laws far more than the r.".. ""t. But I s'ould insist that theie is anoiher way of comparing .i-ii"riru s/ith respect to laws, equally deserving of that name' on ;;h;. i."ond otld resembles the first very well' and the third linguistic t.ri",ii.t ,ft. first very badly. That is the way that neglects outlawed inrt"d th" classes of lawful and of Ioo

"rl'i"","t, "tJ events,

B, BIG

"t

AND LITTLE MIRACLES

It

:i.idlkT;; t' rt". r.*'ir ""v p""s ihat duplicate.the correspondins of 4018') i;i;. (ili' " "'r'i-"p and modrnized version4018 than *"v in whici eols is more similar to i;;";;J;h. I'iJi. sTi"" in.i,,,,i"'tht" i' tnother wav of comparing simiffi;:;""lt;;;;ru'i.g of .h"t n"*t, on which the duplicate standard
.rrnrrntk"

I should has often been suggested, not often by well-wishers, that big miracles are other-worldly i"i""ritft Si* "nd litil. mir""les thus: urZtt ,n"ny of the laq/s that actually obtain, whereas linle this proposal is thoroughly mis-it""", Ut""t onty a few la*s. I thinkendorsed it, and a bad thing that I thing that I never

;;;il;

r"iJ".i it " s..

m sometimes said to have endorsed

-';r;id;t two cases' (1) By "laws" we might mean t'undamental t*,,i"t. t.gttrtiti.s t"t *ould "ome out as axioms in a system that and
qras
if

it'

ootimal

"";;;"i,t.tu'lt ,.ro..i ao l"-. of nature to similarity :i"'i;; ;;','h"- lineuitti" todfi"ttio"t of laws' consider three hws' The J"iii n,'r'"t't.iti-""t, "t'sant svstem.of uniformbe to wrrte laws would dov'n its
..In'do.,
,ro,, ,he best way to write InthistclnindcbtcdtoMichaelSlotc;llongegodefcndcdthccgditarilnortho. io -v oirisnisfrction Morc rccendv'I havc ::::"fi ;;o..n", not
mc

2-8t8 the stronger candidate' may be a hasty step from similarity with of the laws-or' I mrght even say'

;;;;.;i;.
.

true systems in its combination of simplicity "Lonq of pvri", .ote true, there mav be onlv a few of ii,i"p".,

"-"",rili*tt -r
sltttoaing"t

t".."ft"J"..",.1'la*s

"iuation, ing fundamental laws.

aitogethet' Then zo miracle violates many fun-uiolatt' the Grand Unified Field equation' miracle or another one of the very few' very sweep-

-;'itt bt iil"*r" *.
"eJ; ones. --Jt

'nti']iv ii.ln,l;... .i.*vc discussions *i'th D. M. Armstrong, which havchclpcd of rditionl problcm ir,i-ii' - t.r.. the qucstion oi-t"ttit"ti"nt,n nd ihc Thcorv of Univrsels"' ru^r'* ,li."us'ion' "cf -"v "rtcw llork For a "".1.i.
Arrlt,a/lriun loumal ol
Pbilosophy

to

might rather mean fundamental or deried h*., t"'t"gultrities that iould come out as axioms or theorems in oo,irn"Lt"ti"-. Then any miracle violates infinitely many laws; and " i; J.."t'. seem that iig miracles violate moe laws than little

6l (1i83\t 14177 '

"

blind alley to count the "iolated laws''fhat to do instead?

t6

Counterfaauals and Time

Conterfactual Dependencc and'l ime's

Atow

tl

Take the laws collectively; distinguish lawful events from.unlac'ful ones. (For example, lawiul pair-annihilations with radiation from unlawfl quiet diiappearings of single particles. without a -trce') In whatever -"y .r,"n-""n b spread out or localized, unlawful events b. aor." out or localized. In whatever way several events can be ""r, or varied, several unlac'ful events can be alike or veried' In whetalike we can distinguish one simple vent from many simple ."..

"o-p-ia* "uarrt "r.n,r, oanicular distinguish one simple unlawful event from meny' or can in fro- on. co-ple* "uent consisting of many simple unlawful.parts' A ;n *it".l" .ontit,s of manv little miracles together, preferably not all iliie. 'Vh"t m"kes the big miracle more of a miracle is not that it breaks more laws; but that it is divisible into many and varied parts, any one
of which is on a par with the little miracle '

","y froo,

ona

aonsisting of many simple pans, we

"diversence from such a world as tze is easier than perfect converBence ,o it. Eth"r r"k", miracle . ' . but convergence takes very much more be fo " sure, I said that it might be otherwise for a differf ".it""1"." .it ,on of *otld. But the Bennett o'orld seems to be a wold of the seme sort as t o. After all, it has the very same laws' No. Same laws are not enough. If there ate de facto asymmetries of time, not written into the laq/s,hcy could be just what it takc-s to make ,h" iff.r"n"" between a world to which the asymmetry of miracles a world to which it does not; that is, between a world like "nd "oolies out.) to which convergence is dif6cul and a Bennett world to .rlJ("r is easy. Consider, for instance, Poppet's asym*i"h "onu.rg.n"e *"*", of law, so it could obtain in one and not -"rrr.o Th"t ii no, " the ther of two worlds with exactly the same las's' Likewise in general for the asymmetry of overdetermination'

C.

\ORLDSTO VHICH COIWERGENCE

IS EASY

oui o",n. Proceed to zr, the world which stans out just like ?'0, Ji".rg", frorn it by a small miracle, and thereefter evolves in accord-

Beein with our base world e, the deterministic world something like

ii.h the lawi of zro. Now extrapolate the later pan of z, back"n"" in accordance uith the laws of e to obtain what I shall call a q,ard Bennett uorld.3 This Bennett world is free of miracles, relative to z'6' That is, it conforms perfectly to the laws of zre; and t seems safe to suppose that these ar the laws of the Bennett 'orld also' From a cer,"in'ti-. onward, the Bennett wold and world z'' match perfectly, c/hich is to sey tht u'r converges to the Bennett world' Further, this converpence i; accomplished bi.a small miracle: namely' the very same ii"Lirt.l. t'h.teby zr diveiges from zre' For we had already settled ih"t thi, ,-"ll diuergenci mirac-le was the only violation by u1 of the l"*, of r0, and thoie re the same es the laws of the Bennett world' T'hus the Bennett -orld is world to which convergence is easy, since ur converges to it by only a small miracle' \flhat tten becomes of my asymmetry of miracles? I said that
t So-clled to ckowlcdgc my indebtcdncss toJonethrn Bcnncn, who 6rst brought the oossibiliw of such *oild, iorny ttention. Sec his "Countcfcruds rnd Tcmporal 'Dir.rtioi," et itosoptirot R.!ir@ gf $984)t 57-91, cspccirlly pp' 6144' I m indebtcd
lo to Dvid Snford for hclpful corraspondcncc on thc subicct'

A B"nn.,, *or-ld is deceptive' After the time of its convergence with tht rtr.does; ?rrr, it contains exctly the same apparent traces of its. past be found in u, are such as to record a past exactly like th" tr"""r,o "n of the base world re,6. So the Bennett q/orld is full of taces that that ,""* * ,."o.d " past likehat of tl,e. But the past of the Bennett world ir rlti .. the pst of o: under the laws tLat are common to both that Nixon -orlds. the oait of the Bennett world predetermines the past of 6 predetermines that he does presses'the button, whereas not. Further, we cennot suPPose that the two Pasts ere eve close' As I noted in discussing world 2, there is no reason to think that t'o laq'-

"

truthful record of its past; because the Bennen s'old " laq's are ex hypotbesi deterministic (in both.-direcis lawful, and its any complete cross sittion of such a world is lawfully sufiion$, "nd fi"i.i fot "ny oth.i' But in a wold like r0, one that manifests the .ordinary de fLao asymmetries, we also have plenty of very incomPlete arorr r.rio. that postdetermine incomplete cross sections at erlier times. It is these inomplete Postdeterminents that are missing from
in

ful histories can, b-efore diverging, remain very clos throughout a long initial segment of time. To cnstrain a history to be lawful.in its,own rieht, an to constrain it also to stay very close to a given lawful histo-* fo, a lone time and then swerve off, is to impose two very strong Tiere is not the slightest reson to think the two con"ortr"int..compatible. straints are To be sure, any co-pl"t" cross section of the Bennett world, taken

rll d.t"il,

;t

'

Karl Popper, "The A :r.ow oTime," Narure

177 (1956')t 538

58

Co*nrfaatals nd Time

Cotaterfactdll)ependencetd|'ime'sAnota

t9

its history;.butthe postdeterminathe Bennett world. Not throughout ,tt.,i-e of conterfen"e *ith zr is deficicnt' ,i"" "*"tt same wav' Ripple: 1'-" the get rnwaro and'r'e higher;-when they reach the edge; they contract pond is perfecdy q'aieand"then the cenrer a stone flies out ol ttre it tr" time-reversed mirrr imase of what It is no less lawful; .r"rrilr"pp...'-h"n ' "ont il' into " pond' Theres'ould be no ,h. violeted asvmmetries are not matter of law' thcre would be no trace ;;td;; ;;; -i"i t' t"""ened' For rock q'ould the on the water of its previous "gn'i'iJ"t and * {o'-tt' no a splash' the nearby light would eer no iound of

"op;i;i.i""i" i"'
::il:'d;".ii;pp""J

1:*d

process takes place when a person idea that a unique microphysical se"m''about' credible as the idea that a unrque 'ffii;f";;;ionr"k", t-o people fall trulv in love' Instru-

;;il;;;*."r,t
\--'.).i')" ,^
1"

Ti:Hffiit;;
;;;,f;;'iu,,
irli'lri",
I

*t"ii; ;;'i"";"i';i;; "' follo*' h' treoretical foundation ;,il;;"h;;i., il p'ob"blv *'ong to sav that reduction is brought
::":i:*';;;;;'

of present dismissed es a mere instrument' Vhich parts .rlt'" *ill remain when the dust settles? i;ili. n.ii'"r but for guess; my guess rs not especially well informed; can only of

fl""t "h"n phvtiti'tt doesn't help matters' though "'ong r measurement is such a disaster that it tt'"o'f

r *"fJ bear lil-J.."*.,.

J;;.

. . . In shon,

'."J"''"i',

;i;h.-il;;" :H;i';,iii"'*""s't
lesser postdeterminants.

perfcct covet-up iob-and wrthoutny be n'" *'ra ur*Jt"' *d not in a s'orld like ours' Ioanv d.t..*ini'tit, the event is postdetermined bv
a

we lackihe usurl abundance of

the working quantum mechantcs of and the like can radioactive decay, coherent sotrcs, chemical-bonding' it, o*n' It does not need this unfortunate anthroIi;;.""d;; that govern our w-orld :;;; "i"ii rrt." th" lao's of naturtof thJreduction of the vh"tt"tt we make ;;;; fr;",i"" supposedly brought on by measurement' at any.rete

ili,l;il;;";;;tri..

D. THE INDETERMINISTIC CASE

:;:l.i it,;;;;Ji'"'r" in radoactiue decav'-in tbe making ;".i""1 uona', in ionization' in the radiation of light "jffi;f so that not il h;;;:;; ;. ".. These processes are pervasive' so.much contain fev it can *-tt" intt*tiniitic' but also "1" tJ.;d;, "
if

Iassumeddeterminismforthesakeoftheargument'Iconsidered.the odt' to oppose the view that the,aslmmetrtes ",,.il;';;ii brencnmg' arise out of one-way indetermimstrc ,ri", determinism "onridat"tion oi I :!!li^:-*'r' hard to ""u"', 't'"' "'ime Jn not- Acceoted phvsics, atter all' is not deterministic'.It is in present-day quantum 1".- -f,* to -"k" of the indeterminism se ii credible enough' But ..J"t: P;; ilnr,.in, ind"ttttinism perprocess in nature-reduclilliiu.'lt i". ,t. il-v i""tttinisiic Schrdinger wolfon-is ';;h. o'aue function, as opposed to of measurement'5 And the :;:.';.;;;0""i",'i'r'" pr'!'menon

"

"H;;;:;;'

one wv' the |j-.l;; ;i;;i."o*"' of 'v "'vmmetries? In miracle' not rtP-robthere m "ri"t. O;t"rgence no long"r reouires a small outcomes of chance ;;;;;, op|;iunitit' fo''diu"tience in the

"n.,

deterministic enclaves.

;;:,i.:]"iJq""T;ll': X:'.'",**";',.'f,r'11: still be reouired somettme

-i'ht

:::i.ii.ffi li;i'.-i"li.,ii"u"

tJJ".r;; ilf
Even

mi'a"le'

* diverfences come cheaPer still' approximate convergence Th: ,ht;g o s"y "but
if "*ii*"i, b;itJ*iir'i"t

"s

"T:',"."r':: it des not matter q/hether I tel"tiuelv cheap dissimilarities' our

case

remains'the same'

'Forrfonhrightlccountofthcprcdicrrncnt'sccEugcncP.Vign,lx's!,imetficsand \i;gn" 1il"o^ington: Indiene lJ:rivcnigr Rcflcction: Scientfc Essays of Etg'n" i thc wlvc ti-lu'' r' h"othcsis that mcasuiqnent rcduccsMathemai,.'. ;;:;.:;t by John von Ncumatn' function comcs from r,a"*tnt" o' t"l*totcnt ,lchonihlBTlin:sringcr'.1er2);andbvFritzLon-

;il1;;iJ.
i,i-

even if .it is cheaper aproximate convergence is cheaP-and miracle-still w-e cn sev even a litle so it is not so that if Nixon had

o' nott'ing'

i;:";",:;;t:;;;;{i,t,o .i t.J s* e, u

6HerelfollowtheleadofNrncyCartwright'HtbeLauso|P,rr.Lie,insuggcst. this case' thc "proiechon Pos' *",.p,1.i.rn ;u.* alleged fundo-entrl laws-in
tuite." which svs ha,

;"#;''i:.,;-"t :"il;'uf ;;*"' tittti .ti; -.t i:'"#;i;; il ;;'H";

1983).

(Paris: tho'i' ic I'ib'cruation cimtniquc quantuc in Abntr shimonv' n'o'pt"t' to' wv ou! 'rG survcvcd Pri"s 3l (1963): n qu""tu Th'ory"; Amecan Joumal of "n'"*-it Mcsuremlnt Poblcmjs n Ancfct of ct'gr", iott's of Psa Lie (orford: clcndon Press' ':h"

*"""""-"ntl"iuitt
to

btti.;t,';;""*h ;l'.i;;;J;" i';' *pp*'

"

with acieptance ofless fundmcntal "pprv' "nd I do noi follow Canwright in her 'fi*'ever' p'ot""tt laws rbout these objeco postulate iuna'"t""oil"*t or phvsics l take,th'e proiection ; "na ;;:*";* hertn' of generl tooo io be . sp.ii"l c"te, sick spot in the midst

the ve function-may pcrfectly well to rclism about the rnobsewble obiects.and Proccsscs

60

Co

unterfact

ua ls an

d Time

Cornte{actudl l)ependencc

an 1

Tme's Anow

pressed the button there 'ould have been aPProximete convergence to

couldn't ihey accomplish the cover-up? \(ihy couldn convergence happen *ithut any miracles at all, simply by the right pattern of lawfuutco-es of many different chance processes? Call such a pattern a qusi-miracle.lt is extraordinarily improbable, no doubt, but it does the laq's of nature that prevail at our world. not "iolate \lhat must be said, I think, is that a guasi-miracle to accomplish perfect convergence, though it is entirely lawful, nevertheless detracts from similarity in muchhe sa-. *"y that a convergence miracle does' That seems plausible enough' (Though the test of the hypothesis is not in its offhan plausibility, but its success in yielding the right counter-quasi-miracle would be such a remarkable coincidence factuals.) The it would b quite unlike the goings-on we take to be typical-of our that n'orld. Like a big genuine miracle, it makes a tremendous difference from our world. Therefore it is not something that hePPens in the closest worlds to ours where Nixon presses the button. These worlds
have no convergence miracles, and also no convergence quasi-miracles'

our world, and no holocaust. But s'hat about perfect convergence? Here, indeterminism makes my problem harder. It is not to be said that the similaity achieved by counts for little or nothing. For it is just like the o"rl"., "on".rg.ncehas decisive weight in the deterministic case-,-tilting past similarity ihat ih" brl"n"" n fa'or of last-minute divergence instead of difference throughout the past. I said that perfect convergenc would take. a big, *idesread, uari.d mit"cle-" miraculously perfect cover-up job' But if chance processes are abundant, as I have guessed that they are, why

So the case turns out as it should: the closest worlds s'here Nixon presses the button are s,orlds where a holocaust ensues' My point is not that quasi-miracles detract from similarity because theyire so t'ery imptobable. They ar.; but ever so many unremarkable thigs that actually happen, and ever so many other thin-gs that might hapfen under various counterfactual suppositions, are likewise very improbable. rlhat makes a quasi-miracle is not improbability Per se' bui ather the remarkable way in which the chance outcomes seem to conspire to produce a pattern. lf the monkey at the ty-pewriter produces a 950-age dissertation on the Yarieties of anti-realism, that is at least somewhat quasi-miraculous; the chance keystrokes happen to simulate the tracei that would have been left by quite a different process. If the monkey instead types 950 pages of jumbled letters, that is not at all quasi-miraculous. But, given suitable assumptions about q,hat sorr of chance device the monkey is, the one text is exactly as

improbable as the other. (It is irrelevant to comPare the probability tha there will be soze disserttion with the ptobabilicy that there will be sorze jumble-the monkey does not iust select one or the other kind of te*t, 6ut also produces particular text of the selected kind.) The pattern of systematic falsification of traces required for perfect convergence is quasi-miraculous in the same way. ('hat if, contary to what we believe, our oqn world is full of quasi-miracles? Then other-worldly quasi-miracles would not make ther *orlds dissimilar to ours. But if so, we would be very badly wrong about our world, so why should q/e not turn out to be wrong also a-bout which counterfactuals it makes tru? I say that the case needn't worry us. Let it fall where it may') In the deterministic case, the asymmetry of counterfactuals derives from an asymmecry of miracles: divergence takes less of a miracle than (perfect) convergence. Likewise in the indeterministic case se have an of quasi-miracles. Convergence to an indetcrministic "iy--etty q,orld of tbe sort that ours might be takes a quasi-miracle; divergence from such a q/orld does not. (l do not speak of small quasi-miracles; what corresponds to a small miracle in the deterministic case is a perfectly commonplace chance occurrence.) The asymmetry is made plausible by the same thought-experiment as efore: think, in some etail and without neglecting imperceptible differences, of what would be needed for a perfect cover-up. The trouble with using quasi-miracles as a weighty respect of dissimilarity is that it seems to prove too much, more than is true. For if quasi-miracles make enough of a dissimilarity to outweigh perfect atch throughout the future, and if I am right that counterfactuals work by similarity, then we can flatly say that if Nixon had pressed the button there would have been no quasi-miracle. But if chance processes are abundant' and would have been likewise abundant if Nixon had pressed the button, then in that case there would have been sone chance of a quasi-miracle. To be sure, the probability would have been very low indeed. But it would not haYe been zero' ut if there would have been some minute probability of a quasimiracle, does it not follow that there might have been one? And if there might have been one, then is it not false to say that there would not have been one? True, it would have been overwhelmingly probable that there not be one. But may we say flady that this improbable thing would not have happened? (Note that I am not talking about probabilities that certain counterfactuals are true, Rather, the consequents of the counterfactuals have to

i
i ,l

:
iH

ffi

l
iH

tfi

ili
rEl

r
ij
!.1
rr

ii
,l 'i

i
t

62
do

Cotnterfactuals and Time

ConterfactuLl)epcndenceandTimc'sArroe

6J

probabilities' In particular,. the-y have.to do with, objective sinsle-case chances, as of tlie time right after the hypotheticel Prcsstn-g'

*ith

ih", -ould 'prise a suita6le quasi-miracle'7) exact blancei Suppose that perfect match o"r"ot, "n ,#";;;; Ih; i;i";. contributes to similaiiiv excdv- as much.as the quasi-iracle needed to achieve that match detracts trom srmrlrlty' i.I -"tt *ir, a quasi-miraculous convergence have no net ad,vanb" tott' but not all' of Then thev ;;';;;; ""n ".;di.u"n,"g.. pressed ihe button' That seems to give irtif"l*i *.rfr where Ni"xon the button i tiei1"t.,"*actuals: it is nt so that if he had pressed ,iti" t'.t" toould have been quasi-miraculous convergence' and.such .I"*".t.. *itlJ not h"*'" teen at all probable; but it is so that if Nixoniad oressed the button then there migbt have been- quastiir"tt Jonu.tg"n"". So far, so good' But- his-solution (besides r."-.g "iirul fiil, to ,olu. the *iole-problem' \)hat about other o,rasi-riiracles: atterns of outcomes of chance Processcs that ar 'ust l--"i'f,'t.-"tlUle coincidences, just as improbable, iust as,dissimilar typically goes on et our world-but do not yield converfiom -h"t O"','tt" Ut""" hypothesis, these non-conoergence quasi' ""r". "^;*rr-dr;rt^r, greatly ftom similarity and bring.no compensating io,tt.t, u'lik. ih. convrgence qusi-miracles, are not to be ""1n. tt of the closest worlds where Nixon had Pressed the butound "nf ."..s wrong. It seems that we shouldsay the same thing in. ra *t, ;;;;';;t-q,r"tt-miracle,"whether or not it yields convergence: if 1""" n pessed the button, it would have had some minute probh'appening, hence if so it might have happened' hence we "Uif* "i t"Tn*ly"that it *ould not have happened.' So the hypother"ri.", in trouble' sis of e*""t b"lan.e does not sat'e the day and I am still is asy-mmetry by.fi.at' Analysis 1' The line of retreat, of course, ls 'hich drops the whole idea that counterlactuals work by slmtlarlty' determinism' or we could complicate r,iiili.t". r, has no need of the past ii. *.igh,ing .f tespects of similarity so that Perfect match in nothrnS' -heavilv future counts tor but perfect match in the *'eishs

;i.il ;;;;i;;;. -'ilif,;t;,

in oart of temporal order. I still say that won't do' lt imposes a priori ,nr..r, on questions that ought to be empirical No; the asymmetry of counterfaitual dependence should come from a symmetrical analysis and an asymmetrical q/orld.
is t be done? Our trouble v'as caused by an apparent logical connection between counterfactuals about what would happen' coun*rf""ru"l, about qhat might happen, and counterfactuals -about what the chances would be. One et"ap" route is to reconsider that connecbe ,ion, lnd."d, the connection seemed intuitively right, and I. s'ould just as a cure for my Present trouble' But it reluctant to challenge it

vhat

needs challenging also for other reasons'

Recall the ptoLl"rn. By trcating quasi-miracles as a weighty respect of of Jirri-il".iiy, I make i turn out ih", there are no quasi-miracles at any anv kind, and hence there is no quasi-miraculous convergence' oi',h. tno.t similar worlds where Nixon pressed the button That
means that:

(l)

If Nixon had pressed thebutton, there sould not have been a

quasi-miracle.

But cuasi-miracles are iust certain special patterns of outcomes of pro""rr"., and the chances -ould h"ut been much the same if "h"n"'. had pressed the button. That means that: Nixon (2) If Nixon had Pressed the button, there s'ould
minute chance of a quasi-miracle'
have been some

\le

had better accept both (1) and (2)' But they seem to conflict Or do thev? Considered Lv themselues, there is no very clear impression of coflict. Above, to reate a sembl"nce of conflict, I went in two steps' by way of:

(3) If Nixon had pressed the button, there might have been
quasi-miracle.
'$(,fhether

ii"rr"

the.time of :;;;;;f;;".,jpposition in question-as it might be, 'e build an ^pressing of ihe but-ton' Either way' i-"r{ ttpp.t" very analysrs:
symmtry bets'een the directions of time into our

pt".i*'

perfect match before and after the time relevant to the

or not (1) and (2) conflict, it certainly seems that (1) and (3) confict, and it alo seemi that (2) implies (3)' But perhaps we are being
fooled by an ambiguitY in (3). -advocated a "not-gould-not" reading I hav hitherto on which (3) comes out as: counterfactuals,

of "might"

."ri"tfr,u"t,
'
Sce

and hence on my view causal, dependence just

con sists

Theory"' and Subjcctivisfs Guide to Oblective Chance," "Crusal Decision Postcript B to "Crusation," ll in this volumc'

"

l3-nwn) It is not the

case that; if Nixon had pressed the button' there would not have been a quasi-miracle'

64
comes out as:

Connterfactuals and Time

Counterfactudl Dependence andTime's

Atow

6t

But perhaps there is also a "would-be-possible" reading, on which (3)

In fact, our problem is more far-reaching still' If we want any kind sould of t.l"tit ,n'."ty of counterfactuals, -e "'e not tre^t "there
b" ron"

(3-wbp) If

Nixon had pressed the button,

it would

be that:

quasi-miracle is Possible'

The readings differ as follo's. (3-nwn) means that some of the most q/here a similar *oilds where Nixon pressed tbe button are s'orlds ouasi-miracle haopens; whe.eas (3-wbp) means that all of them are *orlds *here it ii ossible for a quasi-miracle to happen' If all of them are solds -her. ihe.. is an unfulfilled possibility of a quasi-miracle, that makes (3-nwn) false and (3-wbp) true. And if we take possibility ,o .."r, non-""ro chance (as of the time of the pressing), then that is exectly the situation that makes (l) and (2) both true together' Indeed, (l) conflicts with (3-nwn); indeed, (2) implies (3-wbp);but (1) and (2)
same problem arises in consequence of my treatment of counterfacuals $'ith true antecedents. Suppose that our world is an ,4-world s'ith an unfu16lled non-zero chance of B. Then, since a counterfactual with a true antecedent is true iff its consequent is,e we hve a pair of true counterfactuals that parallel (t) and (2)' are compatible.E

"h"n"" two kinds or,iUi", Stppot. lor reductio tht counterfactuls of these Let C be any proposition that might incompatible. i." i" "*1,l of chance; let andubeaC-worldandanotol,^in J. no, "t ".atrbut let them both be worlds that have a chance -*"rta, t"rp"o;tely,

oit"

and

"it s'ould

not haPPen" in general as incom-

I note that the

be the proposition that holds at these two and let u, be any third world lt is true at tr, that *o?ldrind no oth"rs; if 14, tere would be some chance that C; so by the supposed incom;r,ttilt*. it is false at t, that if ,4, it would be that not-C; so must be , i."r, i close to 2l as z is. Likewise, PuttinB not-C in place of C' to z., as is. Tht is, worlds and z are tied in must be at lest as close to eny third world. But u and ' were az7 two worlds.that "tor"n"ttr.tp""i of the outcome of a matter of chance-no matter how i* in .r"tr ,tt"y iray differ in other ways as well! This compleres rhe reduc-

noi.rn'either

-av; let,{

o.1o

(4) If it were that

/,

then it vould be that not 8.

be some chance that B'

(5) If it were that,4, then there would

Thus (4) and (5), on my account, are comPtible' Yet they may appear to conflict if we consider:

(6) If it were that A, then it might

be that B.

can have a simpler reductio if we suppose that it is legtimate to mendon chances in tire antecedent of a counterfactual-and hoq/ can i-i", ftii be legitimate' if chances are indeed an objectiv-e.feature of iit" *otld 'tfhawould be the case if there were an unful6lled chance oi C to, then there would be some chance that C' But if so, then i, *." not be that C. So here q'e have a counterexample to the "fr. r"ooor" incompatibility, just on the principle that a counterfactual holt *h.tt the antecedent implies the consequent' reconSo the supposed incompatibility had better.be. rejected ' The no means iust a ciliation of (t) with (2), (ai with (5), and the like is by dodee to deiend my controversial vie's about time's arrow and about
'r(,e

This counterfactual seems to confict with (+) and to be implied by (5)' I reply that on the "not-would-not" reading (6) conflicts- with (4) end is filse, *here"s on the "would-be-possible" reading it is implied by (5) and is true.
r Comore Roben Stalnaker's discussion of "might" countcrfectuels in his "A Dcfcnse oi cndnionl Excluded Middle" in /r, ed. by villirm Harper, Robet Stalnaker and Glenn Pcarce (Dordrecht: Reidcl, l98o). He tecognizes rangc of diffcrent senser for "mighf' counter{rctuels. Some of these are epistemic stnscs irrelcvrnt !o our.P'esent conms. But he does dmh my "not-would-not" reading, though as quasi-epistemic; nd it seems that he s'ould ao edmit my "would-be-possible" rceding, though as doubly abnormal beclrse the "might" neither is epistcmic nor has wide scope . sec Scction I of "Corncrfctrals " ttis fllo*s from my assumptioi of "centering"i nd Comparrive Possibility," in this volume.

louri

".f""tu"lt defend them. \fe

*iih

iro-

p"rrurd. ouselves by examples that pcrfect ""n fike ours would require, if not a.big miracle' ""turli,y; ,."onu.tg.n"! io e worli

*.

true antecedents But it does sewe, inter alia' to can count quasi-miracles as weighty dissimilarities

we can conclude that if Nixon had pressed the and still ve can souid have been some minute chance of should, that there r"y, perfect convergence.

"il""r, "!u".i--iracle; been no perfect convergence; borton, th.r. *ould have

"t"

ro Pavel

of chance and future similarity in "A Counterexamplc Theory of Counterfactuals," Philosophkal Studiet 29 (1976): ro th. St"li"ke.-l-c-i. it. rr. "-".prc is ineffective, however. It can be met simply by denying thrt toward similarity, and thus it serves to support that denial' i-pJ.., .",.h "un,"

Tichf

raises the problem

66

Counterlaauals and Time

E. UBTQUTTOUSTR,CES

AND COMMON KNOITLEDGE

miracles

My argument for an asymmetry of

(or of qui-miracles)

relied on an empiricd premise: at a world like ours, everything rhat happens leaves many and varied traces, so that it would take a big miracle----equivalently, many and varied small miracles working rogerherto eradicate those traces and achieve reconvergnce. Bur I need more than merely the truth of that premise. I need common knowledge of it. For if the premise were tnre but generally disbelieved, and if our countefactuals work as I say they do, then we ought to nd people often ccepting the counterfactuls that would be true on my ccount if that premise were false, Ve ought to find them saying that if Nixon had pressed the button, the future c,ould have been no different, there would have been convergence and no holocaust. In illustrating the multitude of traces that the pressing would have left, and the difficulty of a perfect cover-up, I relied on certain amount of scientific knon ledge that many people do not shae. I may have explained why the right counterfactuals come out true according to my bcliefs. But I have done nothing to explain why ignorant folk accept thosc sarne counter-

EI GHTEEN

The Paradoxes of Time Travel

I reply that veryon believes in ubiquity of traces. Maybc not everyone cn illustrate the point in the way I did (though I must say that I did not use anything very esoteric) but they can still think that somehow everything leaves many and varied traces, Consider detective stories. Seldom are they written by, or for, expert scientists. The background against which they are to be read is common knowledge, not expert knowledge. And part o{ that background is the assumption tht events leave many and varied traces. Else the plots would not make sense. !e are supposed to marvel at the skill of the detective in spotting and reading the traces. Ife are not supposed to
marvel that the fieces are there at all. Ignorant or expert, anyone knows better than to read the tale as a hardJuck story: how rhe criminal was caught because he was especially unfonunate in leaving traces. And anyone knows bener then to read the tale s science fiction: how
things would be in a bizarre world where rhings leave far more traces than they do in ours, No; it is supposed to be a tale of a world like ours, and the ubiquity of traces is part of the likeness.

factuals.

Time travcl,

I maintain, is possible. The paradoxes of time travel are not impossibilities. They prove only this much, which few oddities, would have doubted: that a possible world where time travel took place would be e most strange world, different in fundamental ways

from the vvorld we think is ours. I shall be concerned here sith the sort of time travel that is recounted in science fiction. Not all science ficdon s'iters are clearheaded, to be sure, and inconsistent time travel stories have often been written. But some writers have thought the problems through with
great care, and their stories are perfectly consistent.l If I can defend the consistency of some science ction stories of time travel, then I suppose parallel defenses might be given of some contoversial physical hypotheses, such as the hypothesis that time is circular or the hypothesis that there ere particles that trevel faster than light. But I shall not explore these parallels here. 'What is time travel? Inevitably, it involves a discrepancy between time and time. Any traveler dePrts and then arrives at his destination; II
of Rob.r, Hcinlcin: "By have particularly in mind two of the time tr"".l ",ori.. His Boatrrps," in R. A.Heinlein,The Menace from Eanb (Hicksvillc' N.Y.' 1959)'

d "-A,ll You Zombies-," in R. A'

Heinlein, The lJnpleasant Profession of

Jonathan Hoag (Hicksville, N.Y., 1959).

67