De Anima (On the soul) Aristotle (ca.

350 BC)

Classics in the History of Psychology An internet resource developed by Christopher D. Green York University, oronto, !ntario De Ani"a #!n the soul$ Aristotle #ca. %&' (C$ ranslated by ). A. *"ith (ekker page nu"bers are given in s+uare brackets Chapter , Holding as -e do that, -hile kno-ledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and pri.ed, one kind of it "ay, /0'1a2 either by reason of its greater e3actness or of a higher dignity and greater -onderfulness in its ob4ects, be "ore honourable and precious than another, on both accounts -e should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. he kno-ledge of the soul ad"ittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of 5ature, for the soul is in so"e sense the principle of ani"al life. !ur ai" is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties6 of these so"e are taught to be affections proper to the soul itself, -hile others are considered to attach to the ani"al o-ing to the presence -ithin it of soul. o attain any assured kno-ledge about the soul is one of the "ost difficult things in the -orld. As the for" of +uestion -hich here presents itself, vi.. the +uestion 78hat is it97, recurs in other fields, it "ight be supposed that there -as so"e single "ethod of in+uiry applicable to all ob4ects -hose essential nature #as -e are endeavouring to ascertain there is for derived properties the single "ethod of de"onstration$6 in that case -hat -e should have to seek for -ould be this uni+ue "ethod. (ut if there is no such single and general "ethod for solving the +uestion of essence, our task beco"es still "ore difficult6 in the case of each different sub4ect -e shall have to deter"ine the appropriate process of investigation. :f to this there be a clear ans-er, e.g. that the process is de"onstration or division, or so"e kno-n "ethod, difficulties and hesitations still beset us ;; -ith -hat facts shall -e begin the in+uiry9 <or the facts -hich for" the starting;points in different sub4ects "ust be different, as e.g. in the case of nu"bers and surfaces. <irst, no doubt, it is necessary to deter"ine in -hich of the su""a genera soul lies, -hat it is6 is it 7a this;so"e-hat,7 a substance, or is it a +uale or a +uantu", or so"e other of the re"aining kinds of predicates -hich -e have distinguished9 <urther, does soul belong to the class of potential e3istents, or is it not rather an actuality9 !ur ans-er to this +uestion is of the greatest i"portance. /0'1b2 8e "ust consider also -hether soul is divisible or is -ithout parts, and -hether it is every-here ho"ogeneous or not6 and if not ho"ogeneous, -hether its various for"s are different specifically or generically= up to the present ti"e those -ho have discussed and investigated soul see" to have confined the"selves to the hu"an soul. 8e "ust be careful not to ignore the +uestion -hether soul can be defined in a single una"biguous for"ula, as is the case -ith ani"al, or -hether -e "ust not give a separate for"ula for each of it, as -e do for horse, dog, "an, god #in the latter case the 7universal7 ani"al ;; and so too every other 7co""on predicate7 ;; being treated either as nothing at all or as a later product$. <urther, if -hat e3ists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, -hich ought -e to investigate first, the -hole soul or its parts9 #:t is also a difficult proble" to decide -hich of these parts are in nature distinct fro" one another.$ Again, -hich ought -e to investigate first, these parts or their functions, "ind or thinking, the faculty

or the act of sensation, and so on9 :f the investigation of the functions precedes that of the parts, the further +uestion suggests itself= ought -e not before either to consider the correlative ob4ects, e.g. of sense or thought9 :t see"s not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the derived properties of substances to be ac+uainted -ith the essential nature of those substances #as in "athe"atics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the e+uality of the interior angles of a triangle to t-o right angles to kno- the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane$ but also conversely, for the kno-ledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely pro"oted by an ac+uaintance -ith its properties= for, -hen -e are able to give an account confor"able to e3perience of all or "ost of the properties of a substance, -e shall be in the "ost favourable position to say so"ething -orth saying about the essential nature of that sub4ect6 in all de"onstration a definition of the essence is re+uired as a starting;point, so that definitions -hich do not enable us to /0'%a2 discover the derived properties, or -hich fail to facilitate even a con4ecture about the", "ust obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile. A further proble" presented by the affections of soul is this= are they all affections of the co"ple3 of body and soul, or is there any one a"ong the" peculiar to the soul by itself9 o deter"ine this is indispensable but difficult. :f -e consider the "a4ority of the", there see"s to be no case in -hich the soul can act or be acted upon -ithout involving the body6 e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. hinking see"s the "ost probable e3ception6 but if this too proves to be a for" of i"agination or to be i"possible -ithout i"agination, it too re+uires a body as a condition of its e3istence. :f there is any -ay of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul -ill be capable of separate e3istence6 if there is none, its separate e3istence is i"possible. :n the latter case, it -ill be like -hat is straight, -hich has "any properties arising fro" the straightness in it, e.g. that of touching a bron.e sphere at a point, though straightness divorced fro" the other constituents of the straight thing cannot touch it in this -ay6 it cannot be so divorced at all, since it is al-ays found in a body. :t therefore see"s that all the affections of soul involve a body;passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, 4oy, loving, and hating6 in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. :n support of this -e "ay point to the fact that, -hile so"eti"es on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no e3cite"ent or fear felt, on others faint and feeble sti"ulations produce these e"otions, vi.. -hen the body is already in a state of tension rese"bling its condition -hen -e are angry. Here is a still clearer case= in the absence of any e3ternal cause of terror -e find ourselves e3periencing the feelings of a "an in terror. <ro" all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are en"attered for"ulable essences. Conse+uently their definitions ought to correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain "ode of "ove"ent of such and such a body #or part or faculty of a body$ by this or that cause and for this or that end. hat is precisely -hy the study of the soul "ust fall -ithin the science of 5ature, at least so far as in its affections it "anifests this double character. Hence a physicist -ould define an affection of soul differently fro" a dialectician6 the latter -ould define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or so"ething like that, -hile the for"er -ould define it as a boiling of the blood or -ar" substance /0'%b2 surrounding the heart. he latter assigns the "aterial conditions, the for"er the for" or for"ulable essence6 for -hat he states is the for"ulable essence of the fact, though for its actual e3istence there "ust be e"bodi"ent of it in a "aterial such as is described by the other. hus the essence of a house is assigned in such a for"ula as 7a shelter against destruction by -ind, rain, and heat76 the physicist -ould describe it as 7stones, bricks, and ti"bers76 but there is a third possible description -hich -ould say that it -as that for" in that "aterial -ith that purpose or end. 8hich, then, a"ong these is entitled to be regarded as the genuine physicist9 he one -ho confines hi"self to the "aterial, or the one -ho restricts hi"self to the for"ulable essence alone9 :s it not rather the one -ho co"bines both in a single for"ula9 :f this is so, ho- are -e to characteri.e the other t-o9 >ust -e not say that there is no type of thinker -ho concerns hi"self -ith those +ualities or attributes of the "aterial -hich are in fact inseparable fro" the "aterial, and -ithout atte"pting even in thought to separate the"9 he physicist is he -ho concerns hi"self -ith all the properties active and passive of bodies or "aterials thus or thus defined6 attributes not considered as being of this character he leaves to others, in certain cases it "ay be to a specialist, e.g. a carpenter or a physician, in others #a$ -here they are inseparable in fact, but are separable fro" any particular kind of body by an effort of abstraction, to the "athe"atician, #b$ -here they are separate both in fact and in thought fro" body altogether, to the <irst Philosopher or "etaphysician. (ut -e "ust return fro" this digression, and repeat that the affections of soul are inseparable fro" the "aterial substratu" of ani"al life, to -hich -e have seen that such affections, e.g. passion and fear, attach, and have not the sa"e "ode of being as a line or a plane.

Chapter 1 <or our study of soul it is necessary, -hile for"ulating the proble"s of -hich in our further advance -e are to find the solutions, to call into council the vie-s of those of our predecessors -ho have declared any opinion on this sub4ect, in order that -e "ay profit by -hatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors. he starting;point of our in+uiry is an e3position of those characteristics -hich have chiefly been held to belong to soul in its very nature. -o characteristic "arks have above all others been recogni.ed as distinguishing that -hich has soul in it fro" that -hich has not "ove"ent and sensation. :t "ay be said that these t-o are -hat our predecessors have fi3ed upon as characteristic of soul. *o"e say that -hat originates "ove"ent is both pre;e"inently and pri"arily soul6 believing that -hat is not itself "oved cannot originate "ove"ent in another, they arrived at the vie- that soul belongs to the class of things in /0'0a2 "ove"ent. his is -hat led De"ocritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance6 his 7for"s7 or ato"s are infinite in nu"ber6 those -hich are spherical he calls fire and soul, and co"pares the" to the "otes in the air -hich -e see in shafts of light co"ing through -indo-s6 the "i3ture of seeds of all sorts he calls the ele"ents of the -hole of 5ature #?eucippus gives a si"ilar account$6 the spherical ato"s are identified -ith soul because ato"s of that shape are "ost adapted to per"eate every-here, and to set all the others "oving by being the"selves in "ove"ent. his i"plies the vie- that soul is identical -ith -hat produces "ove"ent in ani"als. hat is -hy, further, they regard respiration as the characteristic "ark of life6 as the environ"ent co"presses the bodies of ani"als, and tends to e3trude those ato"s -hich i"part "ove"ent to the", because they the"selves are never at rest, there "ust be a reinforce"ent of these by si"ilar ato"s co"ing in fro" -ithout in the act of respiration6 for they prevent the e3trusion of those -hich are already -ithin by counteracting the co"pressing and consolidating force of the environ"ent6 and ani"als continue to live only so long as they are able to "aintain this resistance. he doctrine of the Pythagoreans see"s to rest upon the sa"e ideas6 so"e of the" declared the "otes in air, others -hat "oved the", to be soul. hese "otes -ere referred to because they are seen al-ays in "ove"ent, even in a co"plete cal". he sa"e tendency is sho-n by those -ho define soul as that -hich "oves itself6 all see" to hold the vie- that "ove"ent is -hat is closest to the nature of soul, and that -hile all else is "oved by soul, it alone "oves itself. his belief arises fro" their never seeing anything originating "ove"ent -hich is not first itself "oved. *i"ilarly also Ana3agoras #and -hoever agrees -ith hi" in saying that "ind set the -hole in "ove"ent$ declares the "oving cause of things to be soul. His position "ust, ho-ever, be distinguished fro" that of De"ocritus. De"ocritus roundly identifies soul and "ind, for he identifies -hat appears -ith -hat is true ;; that is -hy he co""ends Ho"er for the phrase 7Hector lay -ith thought distraught76 he does not e"ploy "ind as a special faculty dealing -ith truth, but identifies soul and "ind. 8hat Ana3agoras says about the" is "ore obscure6 in "any /0'0b2 places he tells us that the cause of beauty and order is "ind, else-here that it is soul6 it is found, he says, in all ani"als, great and s"all, high and lo-, but "ind #in the sense of intelligence$ appears not to belong alike to all ani"als, and indeed not even to all hu"an beings. All those, then, -ho had special regard to the fact that -hat has soul in it is "oved, adopted the vie- that soul is to be identified -ith -hat is e"inently originative of "ove"ent. All, on the other hand, -ho looked to the fact that -hat has soul in it kno-s or perceives -hat is, identify soul -ith the principle or principles of 5ature, according as they ad"it several such principles or one only. hus @"pedocles declares that it is for"ed out of all his ele"ents, each of the" also being soul6 his -ords are= <or 7tis by @arth -e see @arth, by 8ater 8ater, (y @ther @ther divine, by <ire destructive <ire, (y ?ove ?ove, and Hate by cruel Hate. :n the sa"e -ay Plato in the i"aeus fashions soul out of his ele"ents6 for like, he holds, is kno-n by like, and things are for"ed out of the principles or ele"ents, so that soul "ust be so too. *i"ilarly also in his lectures 7!n Philosophy7 it -as set forth that the Ani"al itself is co"pounded of the :dea itself of the !ne together -ith the pri"ary length, breadth, and depth, everything else, the

ob4ects of its perception, being si"ilarly constituted. Again he puts his vie- in yet other ter"s= >ind is the "onad, science or kno-ledge the dyad #because it goes undeviatingly fro" one point to another$, opinion the nu"ber of the plane, sensation the nu"ber of the solid6 the nu"bers are by hi" e3pressly identified -ith the <or"s the"selves or principles, and are for"ed out of the ele"ents6 no- things are apprehended either by "ind or science or opinion or sensation, and these sa"e nu"bers are the <or"s of things. *o"e thinkers, accepting both pre"isses, vi.. that the soul is both originative of "ove"ent and cognitive, have co"pounded it of both and declared the soul to be a self;"oving nu"ber. As to the nature and nu"ber of the first principles opinions differ. he difference is greatest bet-een those -ho regard the" /0'&a2 as corporeal and those -ho regard the" as incorporeal, and fro" both dissent those -ho "ake a blend and dra- their principles fro" both sources. he nu"ber of principles is also in dispute6 so"e ad"it one only, others assert several. here is a conse+uent diversity in their several accounts of soul6 they assu"e, naturally enough, that -hat is in its o-n nature originative of "ove"ent "ust be a"ong -hat is pri"ordial. hat has led so"e to regard it as fire, for fire is the subtlest of the ele"ents and nearest to incorporeality6 further, in the "ost pri"ary sense, fire both is "oved and originates "ove"ent in all the others. De"ocritus has e3pressed hi"self "ore ingeniously than the rest on the grounds for ascribing each of these t-o characters to soul6 soul and "ind are, he says, one and the sa"e thing, and this thing "ust be one of the pri"ary and indivisible bodies, and its po-er of originating "ove"ent "ust be due to its fineness of grain and the shape of its ato"s6 he says that of all the shapes the spherical is the "ost "obile, and that this is the shape of the particles of fire and "ind. Ana3agoras, as -e said above, see"s to distinguish bet-een soul and "ind, but in practice he treats the" as a single substance, e3cept that it is "ind that he specially posits as the principle of all things6 at any rate -hat he says is that "ind alone of all that is si"ple, un"i3ed, and pure. He assigns both characteristics, kno-ing and origination of "ove"ent, to the sa"e principle, -hen he says that it -as "ind that set the -hole in "ove"ent. hales, too, to 4udge fro" -hat is recorded about hi", see"s to have held soul to be a "otive force, since he said that the "agnet has a soul in it because it "oves the iron. Diogenes #and others$ held the soul to be air because he believed air to be finest in grain and a first principle6 therein lay the grounds of the soul7s po-ers of kno-ing and originating "ove"ent. As the pri"ordial principle fro" -hich all other things are derived, it is cognitive6 as finest in grain, it has the po-er to originate "ove"ent. Heraclitus too says that the first principle ;; the 7-ar" e3halation7 of -hich, according to hi", everything else is co"posed ;; is soul6 further, that this e3halation is "ost incorporeal and in ceaseless flu36 that -hat is in "ove"ent re+uires that -hat kno-s it should be in "ove"ent6 and that all that is has its being essentially in "ove"ent #herein agreeing -ith the "a4ority$. Alc"aeon also see"s to have held a si"ilar vie- about soul6 he says that it is i""ortal because it rese"bles 7the i""ortals,7 and that this i""ortality belongs to it in virtue of its ceaseless "ove"ent6 for all the 7things divine,7 "oon, sun, the planets, and the -hole heavens, are in perpetual "ove"ent. !f "ore superficial -riters, so"e, e.g. Hippo, have pronounced it to be -ater6 they see" to have /0'&b2 argued fro" the fact that the seed of all ani"als is fluid, for Hippo tries to refute those -ho say that the soul is blood, on the ground that the seed, -hich is the pri"ordial soul, is not blood. Another group #Critias, for e3a"ple$ did hold it to be blood6 they take perception to be the "ost characteristic attribute of soul, and hold that perceptiveness is due to the nature of blood. @ach of the ele"ents has thus found its partisan, e3cept earth ;; earth has found no supporter unless -e count as such those -ho have declared soul to be, or to be co"pounded of, all the ele"ents. All, then, it "ay be said, characteri.e the soul by three "arks, >ove"ent, *ensation, :ncorporeality, and each of these is traced back to the first principles. hat is -hy #-ith one e3ception$ all those -ho define the soul by its po-er of kno-ing "ake it either an ele"ent or

constructed out of the ele"ents. he language they all use is si"ilar6 like, they say, is kno-n by like6 as the soul kno-s everything, they construct it out of all the principles. Hence all those -ho ad"it but one cause or ele"ent, "ake the soul also one #e.g. fire or air$, -hile those -ho ad"it a "ultiplicity of principles "ake the soul also "ultiple. he e3ception is Ana3agoras6 he alone says that "ind is i"passible and has nothing in co""on -ith anything else. (ut, if this is so, ho- or in virtue of -hat cause can it kno-9 hat Ana3agoras has not e3plained, nor can any ans-er be inferred fro" his -ords. All -ho ackno-ledge pairs of opposites a"ong their principles, construct the soul also out of these contraries, -hile those -ho ad"it as principles only one contrary of each pair, e.g. either hot or cold, like-ise "ake the soul so"e one of these. hat is -hy, also, they allothe"selves to be guided by the na"es6 those -ho identify soul -ith the hot argue that sen #to live$ is derived fro" sein #to boil$, -hile those -ho identify it -ith the cold say that soul #psuche$ is so called fro" the process of respiration and #katapsu3is$. *uch are the traditional opinions concerning soul, together -ith the grounds on -hich they are "aintained. Chapter % 8e "ust begin our e3a"ination -ith "ove"ent6 for doubtless, not only is it false that the essence of soul is correctly described by those -ho say that it is -hat "oves /0'Aa2 #or is capable of "oving$ itself, but it is an i"possibility that "ove"ent should be even an attribute of it. 8e have already pointed out that there is no necessity that -hat originates "ove"ent should itself be "oved. here are t-o senses in -hich anything "ay be "oved ;; either #a$ indirectly, o-ing to so"ething other than itself, or #b$ directly, o-ing to itself. hings are 7indirectly "oved7 -hich are "oved as being contained in so"ething -hich is "oved, e.g. sailors in a ship, for they are "oved in a different sense fro" that in -hich the ship is "oved6 the ship is 7directly "oved7, they are 7indirectly "oved7, because they are in a "oving vessel. his is clear if -e consider their li"bs6 the "ove"ent proper to the legs #and so to "an$ is -alking, and in this case the sailors tare not -alking. Becogni.ing the double sense of 7being "oved7, -hat -e have to consider no- is -hether the soul is 7directly "oved7 and participates in such direct "ove"ent. here are four species of "ove"ent;loco"otion, alteration, di"inution, gro-th6 conse+uently if the soul is "oved, it "ust be "oved -ith one or several or all of these species of "ove"ent. 5o- if its "ove"ent is not incidental, there "ust be a "ove"ent natural to it, and, if so, as all the species enu"erated involve place, place "ust be natural to it. (ut if the essence of soul be to "ove itself, its being "oved cannot be incidental to ;; as it is to -hat is -hite or three cubits long6 they too can be "oved, but only incidentally ;; -hat is "oved is that of -hich 7-hite7 and 7three cubits long7 are the attributes, the body in -hich they inhere6 hence they have no place= but if the soul naturally partakes in "ove"ent, it follo-s that it "ust have a place. <urther, if there be a "ove"ent natural to the soul, there "ust be a counter;"ove"ent unnatural to it, and conversely. he sa"e applies to rest as -ell as to "ove"ent6 for the ter"inus ad +ue" of a thing7s natural "ove"ent is the place of its natural rest, and si"ilarly the ter"inus ad +ue" of its enforced "ove"ent is the place of its enforced rest. (ut -hat "eaning can be attached to enforced "ove"ents or rests of the soul, it is difficult even to i"agine. <urther, if the natural "ove"ent of the soul be up-ard, the soul "ust be fire6 if do-n-ard, it "ust be earth6 for up-ard and do-n-ard "ove"ents are the definitory characteristics of these bodies. he sa"e reasoning applies to the inter"ediate "ove"ents, ter"ini, and bodies. <urther, since the soul is observed to originate "ove"ent in the body, it is reasonable to suppose that it trans"its to the body the "ove"ents by -hich it itself is "oved, and so, reversing the order, -e "ay infer fro" the "ove"ents of the body back to si"ilar "ove"ents of the soul. 5o- the /0'Ab2 body is "oved fro" place to place -ith "ove"ents of loco"otion. Hence it -ould follo- that the soul too "ust in accordance -ith the body change either its place as a -hole or the relative places of its parts. his carries -ith it the possibility that the soul "ight even +uit its body and re;enter it, and -ith this -ould be involved the possibility of a resurrection of ani"als fro" the dead. (ut, it "ay be contended, the soul can be "oved indirectly by so"ething else6 for an ani"al can be pushed out of its course. Yes, but that to -hose essence belongs the po-er of being "oved by itself, cannot be "oved by so"ething else e3cept incidentally, 4ust as -hat is good by or in itself cannot o-e its goodness to so"ething e3ternal to it or to so"e end to -hich it is a "eans. :f the soul is "oved, the "ost probable vie- is that -hat "oves it is sensible things.

8e "ust note also that, if the soul "oves itself, it "ust be the "over itself that is "oved, so that it follo-s that if "ove"ent is in every case a displace"ent of that -hich is in "ove"ent, in that respect in -hich it is said to be "oved, the "ove"ent of the soul "ust be a departure fro" its essential nature, at least if its self;"ove"ent is essential to it, not incidental. *o"e go so far as to hold that the "ove"ents -hich the soul i"parts to the body in -hich it is are the sa"e in kind as those -ith -hich it itself is "oved. An e3a"ple of this is De"ocritus, -ho uses language like that of the co"ic dra"atist Philippus, -ho accounts for the "ove"ents that Daedalus i"parted to his -ooden Aphrodite by saying that he poured +uicksilver into it6 si"ilarly De"ocritus says that the spherical ato"s -hich according to hi" constitute soul, o-ing to their o-n ceaseless "ove"ents dra- the -hole body after the" and so produce its "ove"ents. 8e "ust urge the +uestion -hether it is these very sa"e ato"s -hich produce rest also ;; ho- they could do so, it is difficult and even i"possible to say. And, in general, -e "ay ob4ect that it is not in this -ay that the soul appears to originate "ove"ent in ani"als ;; it is through intention or process of thinking. :t is in the sa"e fashion that the i"aeus also tries to give a physical account of ho- the soul "oves its body6 the soul, it is there said, is in "ove"ent, and so o-ing to their "utual i"plication "oves the body also. After co"pounding the soul;substance out of the ele"ents and dividing it in accordance -ith the har"onic nu"bers, in order that it "ay possess a connate sensibility for 7har"ony7 and that the -hole "ay "ove in "ove"ents -ell attuned, the De"iurge bent the straight line into a /0'Ca2 circle6 this single circle he divided into t-o circles united at t-o co""on points6 one of these he subdivided into seven circles. All this i"plies that the "ove"ents of the soul are identified -ith the local "ove"ents of the heavens. 5o-, in the first place, it is a "istake to say that the soul is a spatial "agnitude. :t is evident that Plato "eans the soul of the -hole to be like the sort of soul -hich is called "ind not like the sensitive or the desiderative soul, for the "ove"ents of neither of these are circular. 5o- "ind is one and continuous in the sense in -hich the process of thinking is so, and thinking is identical -ith the thoughts -hich are its parts6 these have a serial unity like that of nu"ber, not a unity like that of a spatial "agnitude. Hence "ind cannot have that kind of unity either6 "ind is either -ithout parts or is continuous in so"e other -ay than that -hich characteri.es a spatial "agnitude. Ho-, indeed, if it -ere a spatial "agnitude, could "ind possibly think9 8ill it think -ith any one indifferently of its parts9 :n this case, the 7part7 "ust be understood either in the sense of a spatial "agnitude or in the sense of a point #if a point can be called a part of a spatial "agnitude$. :f -e accept the latter alternative, the points being infinite in nu"ber, obviously the "ind can never e3haustively traverse the"6 if the for"er, the "ind "ust think the sa"e thing over and over again, indeed an infinite nu"ber of ti"es #-hereas it is "anifestly possible to think a thing once only$. :f contact of any part -hatsoever of itself -ith the ob4ect is all that is re+uired, -hy need "ind "ove in a circle, or indeed possess "agnitude at all9 !n the other hand, if contact -ith the -hole circle is necessary, -hat "eaning can be given to the contact of the parts9 <urther, ho- could -hat has no parts think -hat has parts, or -hat has parts think -hat has none9 8e "ust identify the circle referred to -ith "ind6 for it is "ind -hose "ove"ent is thinking, and it is the circle -hose "ove"ent is revolution, so that if thinking is a "ove"ent of revolution, the circle -hich has this characteristic "ove"ent "ust be "ind. :f the circular "ove"ent is eternal, there "ust be so"ething -hich "ind is al-ays thinking ;; -hat can this be9 <or all practical processes of thinking have li"its ;; they all go on for the sake of so"ething outside the process, and all theoretical processes co"e to a close in the sa"e -ay as the phrases in speech -hich e3press processes and results of thinking. @very such linguistic phrase is either definitory or de"onstrative. De"onstration has both a starting;point and "ay be said to end in a conclusion or inferred result6 even if the process never reaches final co"pletion, at any rate it never returns upon itself again to its starting;point, it goes on assu"ing a fresh "iddle ter" or a fresh e3tre"e, and "oves straight for-ard, but circular "ove"ent returns to its starting;point. Definitions, too, are closed groups of ter"s. <urther, if the sa"e revolution is repeated, "ind "ust repeatedly think the sa"e ob4ect. <urther, thinking has "ore rese"blance to a co"ing to rest or arrest than to a "ove"ent6 the sa"e "ay be said of inferring. :t "ight also be urged that -hat is difficult and enforced is inco"patible -ith blessedness6 if the

"ove"ent of the soul is not of its essence, "ove"ent of the soul "ust be /0'Cb2 contrary to its nature. :t "ust also be painful for the soul to be ine3tricably bound up -ith the body6 nay "ore, if, as is fre+uently said and -idely accepted, it is better for "ind not to be e"bodied, the union "ust be for it undesirable. <urther, the cause of the revolution of the heavens is left obscure. :t is not the essence of soul -hich is the cause of this circular "ove"ent ;; that "ove"ent is only incidental to soul ;; nor is, a fortiori, the body its cause. Again, it is not even asserted that it is better that soul should be so "oved6 and yet the reason for -hich God caused the soul to "ove in a circle can only have been that "ove"ent -as better for it than rest, and "ove"ent of this kind better than any other. (ut since this sort of consideration is "ore appropriate to another field of speculation, let us dis"iss it for the present. he vie- -e have 4ust been e3a"ining, in co"pany -ith "ost theories about the soul, involves the follo-ing absurdity= they all 4oin the soul to a body, or place it in a body, -ithout adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions re+uired for it. Yet such e3planation can scarcely be o"itted6 for so"e co""unity of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one "oves and the other is "oved6 interaction al-ays i"plies a special nature in the t-o interagents. All, ho-ever, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul6 they do not try to deter"ine anything about the body -hich is to contain it, as if it -ere possible, as in the Pythagorean "yths, that any soul could be clothed upon -ith any body ;; an absurd vie-, for each body see"s to have a for" and shape of its o-n. :t is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could e"body itself in flutes6 each art "ust use its tools, each soul its body. Chapter 0 here is yet another theory about soul, -hich has co""ended itself to "any as no less probable than any of those -e have hitherto "entioned, and has rendered public account of itself in the court of popular discussion. :ts supporters say that the soul is a kind of har"ony, for #a$ har"ony is a blend or co"position of contraries, and #b$ the body is co"pounded out of contraries. Har"ony, ho-ever, is a certain proportion or co"position of the constituents blended, and soul can be neither the one nor the other of these. <urther, the po-er of originating "ove"ent cannot belong to a har"ony, -hile al"ost all concur in regarding this as a principal attribute of soul. :t is "ore appropriate to call health #or /0'Da2 generally one of the good states of the body$ a har"ony than to predicate it of the soul. he absurdity beco"es "ost apparent -hen -e try to attribute the active and passive affections of the soul to a har"ony6 the necessary read4ust"ent of their conceptions is difficult. <urther, in using the -ord 7har"ony7 -e have one or other of t-o cases in our "ind6 the "ost proper sense is in relation to spatial "agnitudes -hich have "otion and position, -here har"ony "eans the disposition and cohesion of their parts in such a "anner as to prevent the introduction into the -hole of anything ho"ogeneous -ith it, and the secondary sense, derived fro" the for"er, is that in -hich it "eans the ratio bet-een the constituents so blended6 in neither of these senses is it plausible to predicate it of soul. hat soul is a har"ony in the sense of the "ode of co"position of the parts of the body is a vie- easily refutable6 for there are "any co"posite parts and those variously co"pounded6 of -hat bodily part is "ind or the sensitive or the appetitive faculty the "ode of co"position9 And -hat is the "ode of co"position -hich constitutes each of the"9 :t is e+ually absurd to identify the soul -ith the ratio of the "i3ture6 for the "i3ture -hich "akes flesh has a different ratio bet-een the ele"ents fro" that -hich "akes bone. he conse+uence of this vie- -ill therefore be that distributed throughout the -hole body there -ill be "any souls, since every one of the bodily parts is a different "i3ture of the ele"ents, and the ratio of "i3ture is in each case a har"ony, i.e. a soul. <ro" @"pedocles at any rate -e "ight de"and an ans-er to the follo-ing +uestion for he says that each of the parts of the body is -hat it is in virtue of a ratio bet-een the ele"ents= is the soul identical -ith this ratio, or is it not rather so"ething over and above this -hich is for"ed in the parts9 :s love the cause of any and every "i3ture, or only of those that are in the right ratio9 :s love this ratio itself, or is love so"ething over and above this9 *uch are the proble"s raised by this account. (ut, on the other hand, if the soul is different fro" the "i3ture, -hy does it disappear at one and the sa"e "o"ent -ith that relation bet-een the ele"ents -hich constitutes flesh or the other parts of the ani"al body9 <urther, if the soul is not identical -ith the ratio of "i3ture, and it is conse+uently not the case that each of the parts has a soul, -hat is that -hich perishes -hen the soul +uits the body9 hat the soul cannot either be a har"ony, or be "oved in a circle, is clear fro" -hat -e have said.

Yet that it can be "oved incidentally is, as -e said above, possible, and even that in a sense it can "ove itself, i.e. in the sense that the vehicle in -hich it is can be "oved, and "oved by it6 in no other sense can the soul be "oved in space. >ore legiti"ate doubts "ight re"ain as to its "ove"ent in vie- /0'Db2 of the follo-ing facts. 8e speak of the soul as being pained or pleased, being bold or fearful, being angry, perceiving, thinking. All these are regarded as "odes of "ove"ent, and hence it "ight be inferred that the soul is "oved. his, ho-ever, does not necessarily follo-. 8e "ay ad"it to the full that being pained or pleased, or thinking, are "ove"ents #each of the" a 7being "oved7$, and that the "ove"ent is originated by the soul. <or e3a"ple -e "ay regard anger or fear as such and such "ove"ents of the heart, and thinking as such and such another "ove"ent of that organ, or of so"e other6 these "odifications "ay arise either fro" changes of place in certain parts or fro" +ualitative alterations #the special nature of the parts and the special "odes of their changes being for our present purpose irrelevant$. Yet to say that it is the soul -hich is angry is as ine3act as it -ould be to say that it is the soul that -eaves -ebs or builds houses. :t is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the "an -ho does this -ith his soul. 8hat -e "ean is not that the "ove"ent is in the soul, but that so"eti"es it ter"inates in the soul and so"eti"es starts fro" it, sensation e.g. co"ing fro" -ithout in-ards, and re"iniscence starting fro" the soul and ter"inating -ith the "ove"ents, actual or residual, in the sense organs. he case of "ind is different6 it see"s to be an independent substance i"planted -ithin the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. :f it could be destroyed at all, it -ould be under the blunting influence of old age. 8hat really happens in respect of "ind in old age is, ho-ever, e3actly parallel to -hat happens in the case of the sense organs6 if the old "an could recover the proper kind of eye, he -ould see 4ust as -ell as the young "an. he incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle, as occurs in drunkenness or disease. hus it is that in old age the activity of "ind or intellectual apprehension declines only through the decay of so"e other in-ard part6 "ind itself is i"passible. hinking, loving, and hating are affections not of "ind, but of that -hich has "ind, so far as it has it. hat is -hy, -hen this vehicle decays, "e"ory and love cease6 they -ere activities not of "ind, but of the co"posite -hich has perished6 "ind is, no doubt, so"ething "ore divine and i"passible. hat the soul cannot be "oved is therefore clear fro" -hat -e have said, and if it cannot be "oved at all, "anifestly it cannot be "oved by itself. !f all the opinions -e have enu"erated, by far the "ost unreasonable is that -hich declares the soul to be a self;"oving nu"ber6 it involves in the first place all the i"possibilities -hich follo- fro" regarding the soul as "oved, and in the second special absurdities -hich follo- fro" /0'Ea2 calling it a nu"ber. Ho- -e to i"agine a unit being "oved9 (y -hat agency9 8hat sort of "ove"ent can be attributed to -hat is -ithout parts or internal differences9 :f the unit is both originative of "ove"ent and itself capable of being "oved, it "ust contain difference. <urther, since they say a "oving line generates a surface and a "oving point a line, the "ove"ents of the psychic units "ust be lines #for a point is a unit having position, and the nu"ber of the soul is, of course, so"e-here and has position$. Again, if fro" a nu"ber a nu"ber or a unit is subtracted, the re"ainder is another nu"ber6 but plants and "any ani"als -hen divided continue to live, and each seg"ent is thought to retain the sa"e kind of soul. :t "ust be all the sa"e -hether -e speak of units or corpuscles6 for if the spherical ato"s of De"ocritus beca"e points, nothing being retained but their being a +uantu", there "ust re"ain in each a "oving and a "oved part, 4ust as there is in -hat is continuous6 -hat happens has nothing to do -ith the si.e of the ato"s, it depends solely upon their being a +uantu". hat is -hy there "ust be so"ething to originate "ove"ent in the units. :f in the ani"al -hat originates "ove"ent is the soul, so also "ust it be in the case of the nu"ber, so that not the "over and the "oved together, but the "over only, -ill be the soul. (ut ho- is it possible for one of the units to fulfil this function of originating "ove"ent9 here "ust be so"e difference bet-een such a unit and all the other units, and -hat difference can there be bet-een one placed unit and another e3cept a difference of position9 :f then, on the other hand, these psychic units -ithin the body are different fro" the points of the body, there -ill be t-o sets of units both occupying the sa"e place6 for each unit -ill occupy a point. And yet, if there can be t-o, -hy cannot there be an infinite nu"ber9 <or if things can occupy an indivisible lace, they "ust the"selves be indivisible. :f, on the other hand, the points of the body are identical -ith the units -hose nu"ber is the soul, or if the nu"ber of the

points in the body is the soul, -hy have not all bodies souls9 <or all bodies contain points or an infinity of points. <urther, ho- is it possible for these points to be isolated or separated fro" their bodies, seeing that lines cannot be resolved into points9 Chapter & he result is, as -e have said, that this vie-, -hile on the one side identical -ith that of those -ho "aintain that soul is a subtle kind of body, is on the other entangled in the absurdity peculiar to De"ocritus7 -ay of describing /0'Eb2 the "anner in -hich "ove"ent is originated by soul. <or if the soul is present throughout the -hole percipient body, there "ust, if the soul be a kind of body, be t-o bodies in the sa"e place6 and for those -ho call it a nu"ber, there "ust be "any points at one point, or every body "ust have a soul, unless the soul be a different sort of nu"ber ;; other, that is, than the su" of the points e3isting in a body. Another conse+uence that follo-s is that the ani"al "ust be "oved by its nu"ber precisely in the -ay that De"ocritus e3plained its being "oved by his spherical psychic ato"s. 8hat difference does it "ake -hether -e speak of s"all spheres or of large units, or, +uite si"ply, of units in "ove"ent9 !ne -ay or another, the "ove"ents of the ani"al "ust be due to their "ove"ents. Hence those -ho co"bine "ove"ent and nu"ber in the sa"e sub4ect lay the"selves open to these and "any other si"ilar absurdities. :t is i"possible not only that these characters should give the definition of soul ;; it is i"possible that they should even be attributes of it. he point is clear if the atte"pt be "ade to start fro" this as the account of soul and e3plain fro" it the affections and actions of the soul, e.g. reasoning, sensation, pleasure, pain, Fc. <or, to repeat -hat -e have said earlier, "ove"ent and nu"ber do not facilitate even con4ecture about the derivative properties of soul. *uch are the three -ays in -hich soul has traditionally been defined6 one group of thinkers declared it to be that -hich is "ost originative of "ove"ent because it "oves itself, another group to be the subtlest and "ost nearly incorporeal of all kinds of body. 8e have no- sufficiently set forth the difficulties and inconsistencies to -hich these theories are e3posed. :t re"ains no- to e3a"ine the doctrine that soul is co"posed of the ele"ents. he reason assigned for this doctrine is that thus the soul "ay perceive or co"e to kno- everything that is, but the theory necessarily involves itself in "any i"possibilities. :ts upholders assu"e that like is kno-n only by like, and i"agine that by declaring the soul to be co"posed of the ele"ents they succeed in identifying the soul -ith all the things it is capable of apprehending. (ut the ele"ents are not the only things it kno-s6 there are "any others, or, "ore e3actly, an infinite nu"ber of others, for"ed out of the ele"ents. ?et us ad"it that the soul kno-s or perceives the ele"ents out of -hich each of these co"posites is "ade up6 but by -hat "eans -ill it kno- or perceive the co"posite -hole, e.g. -hat God, "an, flesh, bone #or any other co"pound$ is9 <or each is, not /0,'a2 "erely the ele"ents of -hich it is co"posed, but those ele"ents co"bined in a deter"inate "ode or ratio, as @"pedocles hi"self says of bone, he kindly @arth in its broad;boso"ed "oulds 8on of clear 8ater t-o parts out of eight, And four of <ire6 and so -hite bones -ere for"ed. 5othing, therefore, -ill be gained by the presence of the ele"ents in the soul, unless there be also present there the various for"ulae of proportion and the various co"positions in accordance -ith the". @ach ele"ent -ill indeed kno- its fello- outside, but there -ill be no kno-ledge of bone or "an, unless they too are present in the constitution of the soul. he i"possibility of this needs no pointing out6 for -ho -ould suggest that stone or "an could enter into the constitution of the soul9 he sa"e applies to 7the good7 and 7the not;good7, and so on. <urther, the -ord 7is7 has "any "eanings= it "ay be used of a 7this7 or substance, or of a +uantu", or of a +uale, or of any other of the kinds of predicates -e have distinguished. Does the soul consist of all of these or not9 :t does not appear that all have co""on ele"ents. :s the soul for"ed out of those ele"ents alone -hich enter into substances9 so ho- -ill it be able to kno- each of the other kinds of thing9 8ill it be said that each kind of thing has ele"ents or principles of its o-n, and that the soul is for"ed out of the -hole of these9 :n that case, the soul "ust be a +uantu" and a +uale and a substance. (ut all that can be "ade out of the ele"ents of a +uantu" is a +uantu", not a substance. hese #and others like the"$ are the conse+uences of the vie- that the soul is

co"posed of all the ele"ents. :t is absurd, also, to say both #a$ that like is not capable of being affected by like, and #b$ that like is perceived or kno-n by like, for perceiving, and also both thinking and kno-ing, are, on their o-n assu"ption, -ays of being affected or "oved. here are "any pu..les and difficulties raised by saying, as @"pedocles does, that each set of things is kno-n by "eans of its corporeal ele"ents and by reference to so"ething in soul -hich is like the", and additional testi"ony is furnished by this ne- consideration6 for all the parts of the ani"al body -hich consist -holly of earth such as bones, sine-s, and hair see" to be -holly insensitive and conse+uently not perceptive even of ob4ects earthy like /0,'b2 the"selves, as they ought to have been. <urther, each of the principles -ill have far "ore ignorance than kno-ledge, for though each of the" -ill kno- one thing, there -ill be "any of -hich it -ill be ignorant. @"pedocles at any rate "ust conclude that his God is the least intelligent of all beings, for of hi" alone is it true that there is one thing, *trife, -hich he does not kno-, -hile there is nothing -hich "ortal beings do not kno-, for ere is nothing -hich does not enter into their co"position. :n general, -e "ay ask, 8hy has not everything a soul, since everything either is an ele"ent, or is for"ed out of one or several or all of the ele"ents9 @ach "ust certainly kno- one or several or all. he proble" "ight also be raised, 8hat is that -hich unifies the ele"ents into a soul9 he ele"ents correspond, it -ould appear, to the "atter6 -hat unites the", -hatever it is, is the supre"ely i"portant factor. (ut it is i"possible that there should be so"ething superior to, and do"inant over, the soul #and a fortiori over the "ind$6 it is reasonable to hold that "ind is by nature "ost pri"ordial and do"inant, -hile their state"ent that it is the ele"ents -hich are first of all that is. All, both those -ho assert that the soul, because of its kno-ledge or perception of -hat is co"pounded out of the ele"ents, and is those -ho assert that it is of all things the "ost originative of "ove"ent, fail to take into consideration all kinds of soul. :n fact #,$ not all beings that perceive can originate "ove"ent6 there appear to be certain ani"als -hich stationary, and yet local "ove"ent is the only one, so it see"s, -hich the soul originates in ani"als. And #1$ the sa"e ob4ection holds against all those -ho construct "ind and the perceptive faculty out of the ele"ents6 for it appears that plants live, and yet are not endo-ed -ith loco"otion or perception, -hile a large nu"ber of ani"als are -ithout discourse of reason. @ven if these points -ere -aived and "ind ad"itted to be a part of the soul #and so too the perceptive faculty$, still, even so, there -ould be kinds and parts of soul of -hich they had failed to give any account. he sa"e ob4ection lies against the vie- e3pressed in the 7!rphic7 poe"s= there it is said that the soul co"es in fro" the -hole -hen breathing takes place, being borne in upon the -inds. 5o- this cannot take place in the case of plants, /0,,a2 nor indeed in the case of certain classes of ani"al, for not all classes of ani"al breathe. his fact has escaped the notice of the holders of this vie-. :f -e "ust construct the soul out of the ele"ents, there is no necessity to suppose that all the ele"ents enter into its construction6 one ele"ent in each pair of contraries -ill suffice to enable it to kno- both that ele"ent itself and its contrary. (y "eans of the straight line -e kno- both itself and the curved ;; the carpenter7s rule enables us to test both ;; but -hat is curved does not enable us to distinguish either itself or the straight. Certain thinkers say that soul is inter"ingled in the -hole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that hales ca"e to the opinion that all things are full of gods. his presents so"e difficulties= 8hy does the soul -hen it resides in air or fire not for" an ani"al, -hile it does so -hen it resides in "i3tures of the ele"ents, and that although it is held to be of higher +uality -hen contained in the for"er9 #!ne "ight add the +uestion, -hy the soul in air is "aintained to be higher and "ore i""ortal than that in ani"als.$ (oth possible -ays of replying to the for"er +uestion lead to absurdity or parado36 for it is beyond parado3 to say that fire or air is an ani"al, and it is absurd to refuse the na"e of ani"al to -hat has soul in it. he opinion that the ele"ents have soul in the" see"s to have arisen fro" the doctrine that a -hole "ust be ho"ogeneous -ith its parts. :f it is true that ani"als beco"e ani"ate by dra-ing into the"selves a portion of -hat surrounds the", the

partisans of this vie- are bound to say that the soul of the 8hole too is ho"ogeneous -ith all its parts. :f the air sucked in is ho"ogeneous, but soul heterogeneous, clearly -hile so"e part of soul -ill e3ist in the inbreathed air, so"e other part -ill not. he soul "ust either be ho"ogeneous, or such that there are so"e parts of the 8hole in -hich it is not to be found. <ro" -hat has been said it is no- clear that kno-ing as an attribute of soul cannot be e3plained by soul7s being co"posed of the ele"ents, and that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as "oved. (ut since #a$ kno-ing, perceiving, opining, and further #b$ desiring, -ishing, and generally all other "odes of appetition, belong to soul, and #c$ the local "ove"ents of ani"als, and #d$ gro-th, "aturity, and decay are produced by the soul, -e "ust ask -hether each of these is an attribute of the soul as a -hole, /0,,b2 i.e. -hether it is -ith the -hole soul -e think, perceive, "ove ourselves, act or are acted upon, or -hether each of the" re+uires a different part of the soul9 *o too -ith regard to life. Does it depend on one of the parts of soul9 !r is it dependent on "ore than one9 !r on all9 !r has it so"e +uite other cause9 *o"e hold that the soul is divisible, and that one part thinks, another desires. :f, then, its nature ad"its of its being divided, -hat can it be that holds the parts together9 *urely not the body6 on the contrary it see"s rather to be the soul that holds the body together6 at any rate -hen the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays. :f, then, there is so"ething else -hich "akes the soul one, this unifying agency -ould have the best right to the na"e of soul, and -e shall have to repeat for it the +uestion= :s it one or "ultipartite9 :f it is one, -hy not at once ad"it that 7the soul7 is one9 :f it has parts, once "ore the +uestion "ust be put= 8hat holds its parts together, and so ad infinitu"9 he +uestion "ight also be raised about the parts of the soul= 8hat is the separate role of each in relation to the body9 <or, if the -hole soul holds together the -hole body, -e should e3pect each part of the soul to hold together a part of the body. (ut this see"s an i"possibility6 it is difficult even to i"agine -hat sort of bodily part "ind -ill hold together, or ho- it -ill do this. :t is a fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living -hen divided into seg"ents6 this "eans that each of the seg"ents has a soul in it identical in species, though not nu"erically identical in the different seg"ents, for both of the seg"ents for a ti"e possess the po-er of sensation and local "ove"ent. hat this does not last is not surprising, for they no longer possess the organs necessary for self;"aintenance. (ut, all the sa"e, in each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of soul, and the souls so present are ho"ogeneous -ith one another and -ith the -hole6 this "eans that the several parts of the soul are indisseverable fro" one another, although the -hole soul is divisible. :t see"s also that the principle found in plants is also a kind of soul6 for this is the only principle -hich is co""on to both ani"als and plants6 and this e3ists in isolation fro" the principle of sensation, though there nothing -hich has the latter -ithout the for"er.

(ook :: Chapter , ?et the foregoing suffice as our account of the vie-s /0,1a2 concerning the soul -hich have been handed on by our predecessors6 let us no- dis"iss the" and "ake as it -ere a co"pletely fresh start, endeavouring to give a precise ans-er to the +uestion, 8hat is soul9 i.e. to for"ulate the "ost general possible definition of it. 8e are in the habit of recogni.ing, as one deter"inate kind of -hat is, substance, and that in several senses, #a$ in the sense of "atter or that -hich in itself is not 7a this7, and #b$ in the sense of for" or essence, -hich is that precisely in virtue of -hich a thing is called 7a this7, and thirdly #c$ in the sense of that -hich is co"pounded of both #a$ and #b$. 5o- "atter is potentiality, for" actuality6 of the latter there are t-o grades related to one another as e.g. kno-ledge to the e3ercise of kno-ledge. A"ong substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies6 for they are the principles of all other bodies. !f natural bodies so"e have life in the", others not6 by life -e "ean self;nutrition and gro-th #-ith its correlative decay$. :t follo-s that every natural body -hich has life in it is a substance in the sense of a co"posite.

(ut since it is also a body of such and such a kind, vi.. having life, the body cannot be soul6 the body is the sub4ect or "atter, not -hat is attributed to it. Hence the soul "ust be a substance in the sense of the for" of a natural body having life potentially -ithin it. (ut substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characteri.ed. 5o- the -ord actuality has t-o senses corresponding respectively to the possession of kno-ledge and the actual e3ercise of kno-ledge. :t is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, vi.. that of kno-ledge as possessed, for both sleeping and -aking presuppose the e3istence of soul, and of these -aking corresponds to actual kno-ing, sleeping to kno-ledge possessed but not e"ployed, and, in the history of the individual, kno-ledge co"es before its e"ploy"ent or e3ercise. hat is -hy the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. he body so described is a body -hich is organi.ed. he parts of plants in /0,1b2 spite of their e3tre"e si"plicity are 7organs76 e.g. the leaf serves to shelter the pericarp, the pericarp to shelter the fruit, -hile the roots of plants are analogous to the "outh of ani"als, both serving for the absorption of food. :f, then, -e have to give a general for"ula applicable to all kinds of soul, -e "ust describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural organi.ed body. hat is -hy -e can -holly dis"iss as unnecessary the +uestion -hether the soul and the body are one= it is as "eaningless as to ask -hether the -a3 and the shape given to it by the sta"p are one, or generally the "atter of a thing and that of -hich it is the "atter. Unity has "any senses #as "any as 7is7 has$, but the "ost proper and funda"ental sense of both is the relation of an actuality to that of -hich it is the actuality. 8e have no- given an ans-er to the +uestion, 8hat is soul9 ;; an ans-er -hich applies to it in its full e3tent. :t is substance in the sense -hich corresponds to the definitive for"ula of a thing7s essence. hat "eans that it is 7the essential -hatness7 of a body of the character 4ust assigned. *uppose that -hat is literally an 7organ7, like an a3e, -ere a natural body, its 7essential -hatness7, -ould have been its essence, and so its soul6 if this disappeared fro" it, it -ould have ceased to be an a3e, e3cept in na"e. As it is, it is 4ust an a3e6 it -ants the character -hich is re+uired to "ake its -hatness or for"ulable essence a soul6 for that, it -ould have had to be a natural body of a particular kind, vi.. one having in itself the po-er of setting itself in "ove"ent and arresting itself. 5e3t, apply this doctrine in the case of the 7parts7 of the living body. *uppose that the eye -ere an ani"al;sight -ould have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye -hich corresponds to the for"ula, the eye being "erely the "atter of seeing6 -hen seeing is re"oved the eye is no longer an eye, e3cept in na"e ;; it is no "ore a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure. 8e "ust no- e3tend our consideration fro" the 7parts7 to the -hole living body6 for -hat the depart"ental sense is to the bodily part -hich is its organ, that the -hole faculty of sense is to the -hole sensitive body as such. 8e "ust not understand by that -hich is 7potentially capable of living7 -hat has lost the soul it had, but only -hat still retains it6 but seeds and fruits are bodies -hich possess the +ualification. Conse+uently, -hile -aking is actuality in a sense corresponding to the cutting and the /0,%a2 seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the po-er of sight and the po-er in the tool6 the body corresponds to -hat e3ists in potentiality6 as the pupil plus the po-er of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the ani"al. <ro" this it indubitably follo-s that the soul is inseparable fro" its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are #if it has parts$ for the actuality of so"e of the" is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet so"e "ay be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. <urther, -e have no light on the proble" -hether the soul "ay not be the actuality of its body in the sense in -hich the sailor is the actuality of the ship. his "ust suffice as our sketch or outline deter"ination of the nature of soul. Chapter 1 *ince -hat is clear or logically "ore evident e"erges fro" -hat in itself is confused but "ore observable by us, -e "ust reconsider our results fro" this point of vie-. <or it is not enough for a definitive for"ula to e3press as "ost no- do the "ere fact6 it "ust include and e3hibit the ground also. At present definitions are given in a for" analogous to the conclusion of a syllogis"6 e.g. 8hat is s+uaring9 he construction of an e+uilateral rectangle e+ual to a given oblong rectangle. *uch a definition is in for" e+uivalent to a conclusion. !ne that tells us that s+uaring is the discovery of a line -hich is a "ean proportional bet-een the t-o une+ual sides of the given rectangle discloses

the ground of -hat is defined. 8e resu"e our in+uiry fro" a fresh starting;point by calling attention to the fact that -hat has soul in it differs fro" -hat has not, in that the for"er displays life. 5o- this -ord has "ore than one sense, and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing -e say that thing is living. ?iving, that is, "ay "ean thinking or perception or local "ove"ent and rest, or "ove"ent in the sense of nutrition, decay and gro-th. Hence -e think of plants also as living, for they are observed to possess in the"selves an originative po-er through -hich they increase or decrease in all spatial directions6 they gro- up and do-n, and everything that gro-s increases its bulk alike in both directions or indeed in all, and continues to live so long as it can absorb nutri"ent. his po-er of self;nutrition can be isolated fro" the other po-ers "entioned, but not they fro" it ;; in "ortal beings at least. he fact is obvious in plants6 for it is the only psychic po-er they possess. his is the originative po-er the possession of -hich leads us to speak of things as living at all, but it is the /0,%b2 possession of sensation that leads us for the first ti"e to speak of living things as ani"als6 for even those beings -hich possess no po-er of local "ove"ent but do possess the po-er of sensation -e call ani"als and not "erely living things. he pri"ary for" of sense is touch, -hich belongs to all ani"als. 4ust as the po-er of self;nutrition can be isolated fro" touch and sensation generally, so touch can be isolated fro" all other for"s of sense. #(y the po-er of self;nutrition -e "ean that depart"ental po-er of the soul -hich is co""on to plants and ani"als= all ani"als -hatsoever are observed to have the sense of touch.$ 8hat the e3planation of these t-o facts is, -e "ust discuss later. At present -e "ust confine ourselves to saying that soul is the source of these pheno"ena and is characteri.ed by the", vi.. by the po-ers of self;nutrition, sensation, thinking, and "otivity. :s each of these a soul or a part of a soul9 And if a part, a part in -hat sense9 A part "erely distinguishable by definition or a part distinct in local situation as -ell9 :n the case of certain of these po-ers, the ans-ers to these +uestions are easy, in the case of others -e are pu..led -hat to say. 4ust as in the case of plants -hich -hen divided are observed to continue to live though re"oved to a distance fro" one another #thus sho-ing that in their case the soul of each individual plant before division -as actually one, potentially "any$, so -e notice a si"ilar result in other varieties of soul, i.e. in insects -hich have been cut in t-o6 each of the seg"ents possesses both sensation and local "ove"ent6 and if sensation, necessarily also i"agination and appetition6 for, -here there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and, -here these, necessarily also desire. 8e have no evidence as yet about "ind or the po-er to think6 it see"s to be a -idely different kind of soul, differing as -hat is eternal fro" -hat is perishable6 it alone is capable of e3istence in isolation fro" all other psychic po-ers. All the other parts of soul, it is evident fro" -hat -e have said, are, in spite of certain state"ents to the contrary, incapable of separate e3istence though, of course, distinguishable by definition. :f opining is distinct fro" perceiving, to be capable of opining and to be capable of perceiving "ust be distinct, and so -ith all the other for"s of living above enu"erated. <urther, so"e ani"als possess all these parts of soul, so"e certain of the" only, others one /0,0a2 only #this is -hat enables us to classify ani"als$6 the cause "ust be considered later.7 A si"ilar arrange"ent is found also -ithin the field of the senses6 so"e classes of ani"als have all the senses, so"e only certain of the", others only one, the "ost indispensable, touch. *ince the e3pression 7that -hereby -e live and perceive7 has t-o "eanings, 4ust like the e3pression 7that -hereby -e kno-7 ;; that "ay "ean either #a$ kno-ledge or #b$ the soul, for -e can speak of kno-ing by or -ith either, and si"ilarly that -hereby -e are in health "ay be either #a$ health or #b$ the body or so"e part of the body6 and since of the t-o ter"s thus contrasted kno-ledge or health is the na"e of a for", essence, or ratio, or if -e so e3press it an actuality of a recipient "atter ;; kno-ledge of -hat is capable of kno-ing, health of -hat is capable of being "ade healthy #for the operation of that -hich is capable of originating change ter"inates and has its seat in -hat is changed or altered$6 further, since it is the soul by or -ith -hich pri"arily -e live, perceive, and think= ;; it follo-s that the soul "ust be a ratio or for"ulable essence, not a "atter or sub4ect. <or, as -e said, -ord substance has three "eanings for", "atter, and the co"ple3 of both and of these three -hat is called "atter is potentiality, -hat is called for" actuality. *ince then the co"ple3 here is the living thing, the body cannot be the actuality of the soul6 it is the soul -hich is the actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the rightness of the vie- that the soul cannot be -ithout a body, -hile it

cannot be a body6 it is not a body but so"ething relative to a body. hat is -hy it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. :t -as a "istake, therefore, to do as for"er thinkers did, "erely to fit it into a body -ithout adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body. Beflection confir"s the observed fact6 the actuality of any given thing can only be reali.ed in -hat is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a "atter of its o-n appropriate to it. <ro" all this it follo-s that soul is an actuality or for"ulable essence of so"ething that possesses a potentiality of being besouled. Chapter % !f the psychic po-ers above enu"erated so"e kinds of living things, as -e have said, possess all, so"e less than all, others one only. hose -e have "entioned are the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the loco"otive, and the po-er of thinking. Plants have none but the first, the nutritive, -hile another order of living things has this plus the sensory. :f any order of living things has the sensory, it /0,0b2 "ust also have the appetitive6 for appetite is the genus of -hich desire, passion, and -ish are the species6 no- all ani"als have one sense at least, vi.. touch, and -hatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful ob4ects present to it, and -herever these are present, there is desire, for desire is 4ust appetition of -hat is pleasant. <urther, all ani"als have the sense for food #for touch is the sense for food$6 the food of all living things consists of -hat is dry, "oist, hot, cold, and these are the +ualities apprehended by touch6 all other sensible +ualities are apprehended by touch only indirectly. *ounds, colours, and odours contribute nothing to nutri"ent6 flavours fall -ithin the field of tangible +ualities. Hunger and thirst are for"s of desire, hunger a desire for -hat is dry and hot, thirst a desire for -hat is cold and "oist6 flavour is a sort of seasoning added to both. 8e "ust later clear up these points, but at present it "ay be enough to say that all ani"als that possess the sense of touch have also appetition. he case of i"agination is obscure6 -e "ust e3a"ine it later. Certain kinds of ani"als possess in addition the po-er of loco"otion, and still another order of ani"ate beings, i.e. "an and possibly another order like "an or superior to hi", the po-er of thinking, i.e. "ind. :t is no- evident that a single definition can be given of soul only in the sa"e sense as one can be given of figure. <or, as in that case there is no figure distinguishable and apart fro" triangle, Fc., so here there is no soul apart fro" the for"s of soul 4ust enu"erated. :t is true that a highly general definition can be given for figure -hich -ill fit all figures -ithout e3pressing the peculiar nature of any figure. *o here in the case of soul and its specific for"s. Hence it is absurd in this and si"ilar cases to de"and an absolutely general definition -hich -ill fail to e3press the peculiar nature of anything that is, or again, o"itting this, to look for separate definitions corresponding to each infi"a species. he cases of figure and soul are e3actly parallel6 for the particulars subsu"ed under the co""on na"e in both cases ;; figures and living beings ;; constitute a series, each successive ter" of -hich potentially contains its predecessor, e.g. the s+uare the triangle, the sensory po-er the self;nutritive. Hence -e "ust ask in the case of each order of living things, 8hat is its soul, i.e. 8hat is the soul of plant, ani"al, "an9 8hy the ter"s are related in this serial -ay "ust for" the /0,&a2 sub4ect of later e3a"ination. (ut the facts are that the po-er of perception is never found apart fro" the po-er of self;nutrition, -hile in plants the latter is found isolated fro" the for"er. Again, no sense is found apart fro" that of touch, -hile touch is found by itself6 "any ani"als have neither sight, hearing, nor s"ell. Again, a"ong living things that possess sense so"e have the po-er of loco"otion, so"e not. ?astly, certain living beings ;; a s"all "inority ;; possess calculation and thought, for #a"ong "ortal beings$ those -hich possess calculation have all the other po-ers above "entioned, -hile the converse does not hold ;; indeed so"e live by i"agination alone, -hile others have not even i"agination. he "ind that kno-s -ith i""ediate intuition presents a different proble". :t is evident that the -ay to give the "ost ade+uate definition of soul is to seek in the case of each of its for"s for the "ost appropriate definition. Chapter 0 :t is necessary for the student of these for"s of soul first to find a definition of each, e3pressive of -hat it is, and then to investigate its derivative properties, Fc. (ut if -e are to e3press -hat each is, vi.. -hat the thinking po-er is, or the perceptive, or the nutritive, -e "ust go farther back and first give an account of thinking or perceiving, for in the order of investigation the +uestion of -hat an agent does precedes the +uestion, -hat enables it to do -hat it does. :f this is correct, -e "ust on the sa"e ground go yet another step farther back and have so"e clear vie- of the ob4ects of each6 thus -e "ust start -ith these ob4ects, e.g. -ith food, -ith -hat is perceptible, or -ith -hat is intelligible. :t follo-s that first of all -e "ust treat of nutrition and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is found

along -ith all the others and is the "ost pri"itive and -idely distributed po-er of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of -hich all are said to have life. he acts in -hich it "anifests itself are reproduction and the use of food;reproduction, : say, because for any living thing that has reached its nor"al develop"ent and -hich is un"utilated, and -hose "ode of generation is not spontaneous, the "ost natural act is the production of another like itself, an ani"al producing an ani"al, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature /0,&b2 allo-s, it "ay partake in the eternal and divine. hat is the goal to-ards -hich all things strive, that for the sake of -hich they do -hatsoever their nature renders possible. he phrase 7for the sake of -hich7 is a"biguous6 it "ay "ean either #a$ the end to achieve -hich, or #b$ the being in -hose interest, the act is done. *ince then no living thing is able to partake in -hat is eternal and divine by uninterrupted continuance #for nothing perishable can for ever re"ain one and the sa"e$, it tries to achieve that end in the only -ay possible to it, and success is possible in varying degrees6 so it re"ains not indeed as the self; sa"e individual but continues its e3istence in so"ething like itself ;; not nu"erically but specifically one. he soul is the cause or source of the living body. he ter"s cause and source have "any senses. (ut the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses -hich -e e3plicitly recogni.e. :t is #a$ the source or origin of "ove"ent, it is #b$ the end, it is #c$ the essence of the -hole living body. hat it is the last, is clear6 for in everything the essence is identical -ith the ground of its being, and here, in the case of living things, their being is to live, and of their being and their living the soul in the" is the cause or source. <urther, the actuality of -hatever is potential is identical -ith its for"ulable essence. :t is "anifest that the soul is also the final cause of its body. <or 5ature, like "ind, al-ays does -hatever it does for the sake of so"ething, -hich so"ething is its end. o that so"ething corresponds in the case of ani"als the soul and in this it follo-s the order of nature6 all natural bodies are organs of the soul. his is true of those that enter into the constitution of plants as -ell as of those -hich enter into that of ani"als. his sho-s that that the sake of -hich they are is soul. 8e "ust here recall the t-o senses of 7that for the sake of -hich7, vi.. #a$ the end to achieve -hich, and #b$ the being in -hose interest, anything is or is done. 8e "ust "aintain, further, that the soul is also the cause of the living body as the original source of local "ove"ent. he po-er of loco"otion is not found, ho-ever, in all living things. (ut change of +uality and change of +uantity are also due to the soul. *ensation is held to be a +ualitative alteration, and nothing e3cept -hat has soul in it is capable of sensation. he sa"e holds of the +uantitative changes -hich constitute gro-th and decay6 nothing gro-s or decays naturally e3cept -hat feeds itself, and nothing feeds itself e3cept -hat has a share of soul in it. @"pedocles is -rong in adding that gro-th in plants is to be e3plained, the do-n-ard rooting by the natural tendency of earth to travel do-n-ards, and the up-ard /0,Aa2 branching by the si"ilar natural tendency of fire to travel up-ards. <or he "isinterprets up and do-n6 up and do-n are not for all things -hat they are for the -hole Cos"os= if -e are to distinguish and identify organs according to their functions, the roots of plants are analogous to the head in ani"als. <urther, -e "ust ask -hat is the force that holds together the earth and the fire -hich tend to travel in contrary directions6 if there is no counteracting force, they -ill be torn asunder6 if there is, this "ust be the soul and the cause of nutrition and gro-th. (y so"e the ele"ent of fire is held to be the cause of nutrition and gro-th, for it alone of the pri"ary bodies or ele"ents is observed to feed and increase itself. Hence the suggestion that in both plants and ani"als it is it -hich is the operative force. A concurrent cause in a sense it certainly is, but not the principal cause, that is rather the soul6 for -hile the gro-th of fire goes on -ithout li"it so long as there is a supply of fuel, in the case of all co"ple3 -holes for"ed in the course of nature there is a li"it or ratio -hich deter"ines their si.e and increase, and li"it and ratio are "arks of soul but not of fire, and belong to the side of for"ulable essence rather than that of "atter. 5utrition and reproduction are due to one and the sa"e psychic po-er. :t is necessary first to give precision to our account of food, for it is by this function of absorbing food that this psychic po-er is distinguished fro" all the others. he current vie- is that -hat serves as food to a living thing is -hat is contrary to it ;; not that in every pair of contraries each is food to the other= to be food a contrary "ust not only be transfor"able into the other and vice versa, it "ust also in so doing increase the bulk of the other. >any a contrary is transfor"ed into its other and vice versa, -here

neither is even a +uantu" and so cannot increase in bulk, e.g. an invalid into a healthy sub4ect. :t is clear that not even those contraries -hich satisfy both the conditions "entioned above are food to one another in precisely the sa"e sense6 -ater "ay be said to feed fire, but not fire -ater. 8here the "e"bers of the pair are ele"entary bodies only one of the contraries, it -ould appear, can be said to feed the other. (ut there is a difficulty here. !ne set of thinkers assert that like fed, as -ell as increased in a"ount, by like. Another set, as -e have said, "aintain the very reverse, vi.. that -hat feeds and -hat is fed are contrary to one another6 like, they argue, is incapable of being affected by like6 but food is changed in the process of digestion, and change is al-ays to -hat is opposite or to -hat is inter"ediate. <urther, food is acted upon by -hat is nourished by it, not the other -ay round, as ti"ber is -orked by a carpenter and not conversely6 /0,Ab2 there is a change in the carpenter but it is "erely a change fro" not;-orking to -orking. :n ans-ering this proble" it "akes all the difference -hether -e "ean by 7the food7 the 7finished7 or the 7ra-7 product. :f -e use the -ord food of both, vi.. of the co"pletely undigested and the co"pletely digested "atter, -e can 4ustify both the rival accounts of it6 taking food in the sense of undigested "atter, it is the contrary of -hat is fed by it, taking it as digested it is like -hat is fed by it. Conse+uently it is clear that in a certain sense -e "ay say that both parties are right, both -rong. *ince nothing e3cept -hat is alive can be fed, -hat is fed is the besouled body and 4ust because it has soul in it. Hence food is essentially related to -hat has soul in it. <ood has a po-er -hich is other than the po-er to increase the bulk of -hat is fed by it6 so far forth as -hat has soul in it is a +uantu", food "ay increase its +uantity, but it is only so far as -hat has soul in it is a 7this; so"e-hat7 or substance that food acts as food6 in that case it "aintains the being of -hat is fed, and that continues to be -hat it is so long as the process of nutrition continues. <urther, it is the agent in generation, i.e. not the generation of the individual fed but the reproduction of another like it6 the substance of the individual fed is already in e3istence6 the e3istence of no substance is a self; generation but only a self;"aintenance. Hence the psychic po-er -hich -e are no- studying "ay be described as that -hich tends to "aintain -hatever has this po-er in it of continuing such as it -as, and food helps it to do its -ork. hat is -hy, if deprived of food, it "ust cease to be. he process of nutrition involves three factors, #a$ -hat is fed, #b$ that -here-ith it is fed, #c$ -hat does the feeding6 of these #c$ is the first soul, #a$ the body -hich has that soul in it, #b$ the food. (ut since it is right to call things after the ends they reali.e, and the end of this soul is to generate another being like that in -hich it is, the first soul ought to be na"ed the reproductive soul. he e3pression #b$ 7-here-ith it is fed7 is a"biguous 4ust as is the e3pression 7-here-ith the ship is steered76 that "ay "ean either #i$ the hand or #ii$ the rudder, i.e. either #i$ -hat is "oved and sets in "ove"ent, or #ii$ -hat is "erely "oved. 8e can apply this analogy here if -e recall that all food "ust be capable of being digested, and that -hat produces digestion is -ar"th6 that is -hy everything that has soul in it possesses -ar"th. 8e have no- given an outline account of the nature of food6 further details "ust be given in the appropriate place. Chapter & Having "ade these distinctions let us no- speak of sensation in the -idest sense. *ensation depends, as -e have said, on a process of "ove"ent or affection fro" -ithout, for it is held to be so"e sort of change of +uality. /0,Ca2 5o- so"e thinkers assert that like is affected only by like6 in -hat sense this is possible and in -hat sense i"possible, -e have e3plained in our general discussion of acting and being acted upon. Here arises a proble"= -hy do -e not perceive the senses the"selves as -ell as the e3ternal ob4ects of sense, or -hy -ithout the sti"ulation of e3ternal ob4ects do they not produce sensation, seeing that they contain in the"selves fire, earth, and all the other ele"ents, -hich are the direct or indirect ob4ects is so of sense9 :t is clear that -hat is sensitive is only potentially, not actually. he po-er of sense is parallel to -hat is co"bustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but re+uires an agent -hich has the po-er of starting ignition6 other-ise it could have set itself on fire, and -ould not have needed actual fire to set it abla.e. :n reply -e "ust recall that -e use the -ord 7perceive7 in t-o -ays, for -e say #a$ that -hat has the po-er to hear or see, 7sees7 or 7hears7, even though it is at the "o"ent asleep, and also #b$ that -hat is actually seeing or hearing, 7sees7 or 7hears7. Hence 7sense7 too "ust have t-o "eanings, sense potential, and sense actual. *i"ilarly 7to be a sentient7 "eans either #a$ to have a certain po-er or #b$ to "anifest a certain activity. o begin -ith, for a ti"e, let us speak as if there -ere no difference bet-een #i$ being "oved or affected, and #ii$ being active, for "ove"ent is a kind of

activity ;; an i"perfect kind, as has else-here been e3plained. @verything that is acted upon or "oved is acted upon by an agent -hich is actually at -ork. Hence it is that in one sense, as has already been stated, -hat acts and -hat is acted upon are like, in another unlike, i.e. prior to and during the change the t-o factors are unlike, after it like. (ut -e "ust no- distinguish not only bet-een -hat is potential and -hat is actual but also different senses in -hich things can be said to be potential or actual6 up to no- -e have been speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. 8e can speak of so"ething as 7a kno-er7 either #a$ as -hen -e say that "an is a kno-er, "eaning that "an falls -ithin the class of beings that kno- or have kno-ledge, or #b$ as -hen -e are speaking of a "an -ho possesses a kno-ledge of gra""ar6 each of these is so called as having in hi" a certain potentiality, but there is a difference bet-een their respective potentialities, the one #a$ being a potential kno-er, because his kind or "atter is such and such, the other #b$, because he can in the absence of any e3ternal counteracting cause reali.e his kno-ledge in actual kno-ing at -ill. his i"plies a third "eaning of 7a kno-er7 #c$, one -ho is already reali.ing his kno-ledge ;; he is a kno-er in actuality and in the "ost proper sense is kno-ing, e.g. this A. (oth the for"er are potential kno-ers, -ho reali.e their respective potentialities, the one #a$ by change of +uality, i.e. repeated transitions fro" one state to its opposite under instruction, the other #b$ by the transition fro" the inactive possession of /0,Cb2 sense or gra""ar to their active e3ercise. he t-o kinds of transition are distinct. Also the e3pression 7to be acted upon7 has "ore than one "eaning6 it "ay "ean either #a$ the e3tinction of one of t-o contraries by the other, or #b$ the "aintenance of -hat is potential by the agency of -hat is actual and already like -hat is acted upon, -ith such likeness as is co"patible -ith one7s being actual and the other potential. <or -hat possesses kno-ledge beco"es an actual kno-er by a transition -hich is either not an alteration of it at all #being in reality a develop"ent into its true self or actuality$ or at least an alteration in a +uite different sense fro" the usual "eaning. Hence it is -rong to speak of a -ise "an as being 7altered7 -hen he uses his -isdo", 4ust as it -ould be absurd to speak of a builder as being altered -hen he is using his skill in building a house. 8hat in the case of kno-ing or understanding leads fro" potentiality to actuality ought not to be called teaching but so"ething else. hat -hich starting -ith the po-er to kno- learns or ac+uires kno-ledge through the agency of one -ho actually kno-s and has the po-er of teaching either #a$ ought not to be said 7to be acted upon7 at all or #b$ -e "ust recogni.e t-o senses of alteration, vi.. #i$ the substitution of one +uality for another, the first being the contrary of the second, or #ii$ the develop"ent of an e3istent +uality fro" potentiality in the direction of fi3ity or nature. :n the case of -hat is to possess sense, the first transition is due to the action of the "ale parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage -hich corresponds to the possession of kno-ledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the e3ercise of kno-ledge. (ut bet-een the t-o cases co"pared there is a difference6 the ob4ects that e3cite the sensory po-ers to activity, the seen, the heard, Fc., are outside. he ground of this difference is that -hat actual sensation apprehends is individuals, -hile -hat kno-ledge apprehends is universals, and these are in a sense -ithin the soul. hat is -hy a "an can e3ercise his kno-ledge -hen he -ishes, but his sensation does not depend upon hi"self a sensible ob4ect "ust be there. A si"ilar state"ent "ust be "ade about our kno-ledge of -hat is sensible on the sa"e ground, vi.. that the sensible ob4ects are individual and e3ternal. A later "ore appropriate occasion "ay be found thoroughly to clear up all this. At present it "ust be enough to recogni.e the distinctions already dra-n6 a thing "ay be said to be potential in either of t-o senses, #a$ in the sense in -hich -e "ight say of a boy that he "ay beco"e a general or #b$ in the sense in -hich -e "ight say the sa"e of an adult, and there are t-o corresponding senses of the /0,Da2 ter" 7a potential sentient7. here are no separate na"es for the t-o stages of potentiality6 -e have pointed out that they are different and ho- they are different. 8e cannot help using the incorrect ter"s 7being acted upon or altered7 of the t-o transitions involved. As -e have said, has the po-er of sensation is potentially like -hat the perceived ob4ect is actually6 that is, -hile at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the t-o interacting factors are dissi"ilar, at the end the one acted upon is assi"ilated to the other and is identical in +uality -ith it. Chapter A :n dealing -ith each of the senses -e shall have first to speak of the ob4ects -hich are perceptible

by each. he ter" 7ob4ect of sense7 covers three kinds of ob4ects, t-o kinds of -hich are, in our language, directly perceptible, -hile the re"aining one is only incidentally perceptible. !f the first t-o kinds one #a$ consists of -hat is perceptible by a single sense, the other #b$ of -hat is perceptible by any and all of the senses. : call by the na"e of special ob4ect of this or that sense that -hich cannot be perceived by any other sense than that one and in respect of -hich no error is possible6 in this sense colour is the special ob4ect of sight, sound of hearing, flavour of taste. ouch, indeed, discri"inates "ore than one set of different +ualities. @ach sense has one kind of ob4ect -hich it discerns, and never errs in reporting that -hat is before it is colour or sound #though it "ay err as to -hat it is that is coloured or -here that is, or -hat it is that is sounding or -here that is.$ *uch ob4ects are -hat -e propose to call the special ob4ects of this or that sense. 7Co""on sensibles7 are "ove"ent, rest, nu"ber, figure, "agnitude6 these are not peculiar to any one sense, but are co""on to all. here are at any rate certain kinds of "ove"ent -hich are perceptible both by touch and by sight. 8e speak of an incidental ob4ect of sense -here e.g. the -hite ob4ect -hich -e see is the son of Diares6 here because 7being the son of Diares7 is incidental to the directly visible -hite patch -e speak of the son of Diares as being #incidentally$ perceived or seen by us. (ecause this is only incidentally an ob4ect of sense, it in no -ay as such affects the senses. !f the t-o for"er kinds, both of -hich are in their o-n nature perceptible by sense, the first kind ;; that of special ob4ects of the several senses ;; constitute the ob4ects of sense in the strictest sense of the ter" and it is to the" that in the nature of things the structure of each several sense is adapted. Chapter C he ob4ect of sight is the visible, and -hat is visible is #a$ colour and #b$ a certain kind of ob4ect -hich can be described in -ords but -hich has no single na"e6 -hat -e "ean by #b$ -ill be abundantly clear as -e proceed. 8hatever is visible is colour and colour is -hat lies upon -hat is in its o-n nature visible6 7in its o-n nature7 here "eans not that visibility is involved in the definition of -hat thus underlies colour, but that that substratu" contains in itself the cause of visibility. @very colour has in it the po-er to set in "ove"ent -hat is actually transparent6 /0,Db2 that po-er constitutes its very nature. hat is -hy it is not visible e3cept -ith the help of light6 it is only in light that the colour of a thing is seen. Hence our first task is to e3plain -hat light is. 5o- there clearly is so"ething -hich is transparent, and by 7transparent7 : "ean -hat is visible, and yet not visible in itself, but rather o-ing its visibility to the colour of so"ething else6 of this character are air, -ater, and "any solid bodies. 5either air nor -ater is transparent because it is air or -ater6 they are transparent because each of the" has contained in it a certain substance -hich is the sa"e in both and is also found in the eternal body -hich constitutes the upper"ost shell of the physical Cos"os. !f this substance light is the activity ;; the activity of -hat is transparent so far forth as it has in it the deter"inate po-er of beco"ing transparent6 -here this po-er is present, there is also the potentiality of the contrary, vi.. darkness. ?ight is as it -ere the proper colour of -hat is transparent, and e3ists -henever the potentially transparent is e3cited to actuality by the influence of fire or so"ething rese"bling 7the upper"ost body76 for fire too contains so"ething -hich is one and the sa"e -ith the substance in +uestion. 8e have no- e3plained -hat the transparent is and -hat light is6 light is neither fire nor any kind -hatsoever of body nor an efflu3 fro" any kind of body #if it -ere, it -ould again itself be a kind of body$ ;; it is the presence of fire or so"ething rese"bling fire in -hat is transparent. :t is certainly not a body, for t-o bodies cannot be present in the sa"e place. he opposite of light is darkness6 darkness is the absence fro" -hat is transparent of the corresponding positive state above characteri.ed6 clearly therefore, light is 4ust the presence of that. @"pedocles #and -ith hi" all others -ho used the sa"e for"s of e3pression$ -as -rong in speaking of light as 7travelling7 or being at a given "o"ent bet-een the earth and its envelope, its "ove"ent being unobservable by us6 that vie- is contrary both to the clear evidence of argu"ent and to the observed facts6 if the distance traversed -ere short, the "ove"ent "ight have been unobservable, but -here the distance is fro" e3tre"e @ast to e3tre"e 8est, the draught upon our po-ers of belief is too great. 8hat is capable of taking on colour is -hat in itself is colourless, as -hat can take on sound is -hat is soundless6 -hat is colourless includes #a$ -hat is transparent and #b$ -hat is invisible or scarcely

visible, i.e. -hat is 7dark7. he latter #b$ is the sa"e as -hat is transparent, -hen it is potentially, not of course -hen it is actually transparent6 it is the sa"e substance -hich is no- darkness, no- light. 5ot everything that is visible depends upon light for its /0,Ea2 visibility. his is only true of the 7proper7 colour of things. *o"e ob4ects of sight -hich in light are invisible, in darkness sti"ulate the sense6 that is, things that appear fiery or shining. his class of ob4ects has no si"ple co""on na"e, but instances of it are fungi, flesh, heads, scales, and eyes of fish. :n none of these is -hat is seen their o-n proper7 colour. 8hy -e see these at all is another +uestion. At present -hat is obvious is that -hat is seen in light is al-ays colour. hat is -hy -ithout the help of light colour re"ains invisible. :ts being colour at all "eans precisely its having in it the po-er to set in "ove"ent -hat is already actually transparent, and, as -e have seen, the actuality of -hat is transparent is 4ust light. he follo-ing e3peri"ent "akes the necessity of a "ediu" clear. :f -hat has colour is placed in i""ediate contact -ith the eye, it cannot be seen. Colour sets in "ove"ent not the sense organ but -hat is transparent, e.g. the air, and that, e3tending continuously fro" the ob4ect to the organ, sets the latter in "ove"ent. De"ocritus "isrepresents the facts -hen he e3presses the opinion that if the interspace -ere e"pty one could distinctly see an ant on the vault of the sky6 that is an i"possibility. *eeing is due to an affection or change of -hat has the perceptive faculty, and it cannot be affected by the seen colour itself6 it re"ains that it "ust be affected by -hat co"es bet-een. Hence it is indispensable that there be so"ething in bet-een ;; if there -ere nothing, so far fro" seeing -ith greater distinctness, -e should see nothing at all. 8e have no- e3plained the cause -hy colour cannot be seen other-ise than in light. <ire on the other hand is seen both in darkness and in light6 this double possibility follo-s necessarily fro" our theory, for it is 4ust fire that "akes -hat is potentially transparent actually transparent. he sa"e account holds also of sound and s"ell6 if the ob4ect of either of these senses is in i""ediate contact -ith the organ no sensation is produced. :n both cases the ob4ect sets in "ove"ent only -hat lies bet-een, and this in turn sets the organ in "ove"ent= if -hat sounds or s"ells is brought into i""ediate contact -ith the organ, no sensation -ill be produced. he sa"e, in spite of all appearances, applies also to touch and taste6 -hy there is this apparent difference -ill be clear later. 8hat co"es bet-een in the case of sounds is air6 the corresponding "ediu" in the case of s"ell has no na"e. (ut, corresponding to -hat is transparent in the case of colour, there is a +uality found both in air and -ater, -hich serves as a "ediu" for -hat has s"ell ;; : say 7in -ater7 because ani"als that live in -ater as -ell as those that live on land see" to possess the sense of s"ell, and 7in air7 because "an and all other land ani"als /0,Ea2 that breathe, perceive s"ells only -hen they breathe air in. he e3planation of this too -ill be given later. Chapter D 5o- let us, to begin -ith, "ake certain distinctions about sound and hearing. *ound "ay "ean either of t-o things #a$ actual, and #b$ potential, sound. here are certain things -hich, as -e say, 7have no sound7, e.g. sponges or -ool, others -hich have, e.g. bron.e and in general all things -hich are s"ooth and solid ;; the latter are said to have a sound because they can "ake a sound, i.e. can generate actual sound bet-een the"selves and the organ of hearing. Actual sound re+uires for its occurrence #i, ii$ t-o such bodies and #iii$ a space bet-een the"6 for it is generated by an i"pact. Hence it is i"possible for one body only to generate a sound ;; there "ust be a body i"pinging and a body i"pinged upon6 -hat sounds does so by striking against so"ething else, and this is i"possible -ithout a "ove"ent fro" place to place. As -e have said, not all bodies can by i"pact on one another produce sound6 i"pact on -ool "akes no sound, -hile the i"pact on bron.e or any body -hich is s"ooth and hollo- does. (ron.e gives out a sound -hen struck because it is s"ooth6 bodies -hich are hollo- o-ing to reflection repeat the original i"pact over and over again, the body originally set in "ove"ent being unable to escape fro" the concavity. <urther, -e "ust re"ark that sound is heard both in air and in -ater, though less distinctly in the latter. Yet neither air nor -ater is the principal cause of sound. 8hat is re+uired for the production of sound is an i"pact of t-o solids against one another and against the air. he latter condition is

satisfied -hen the air i"pinged upon does not retreat before the blo-, i.e. is not dissipated by it. hat is -hy it "ust be struck -ith a sudden sharp blo-, if it is to sound ;; the "ove"ent of the -hip "ust outrun the dispersion of the air, 4ust as one "ight get in a stroke at a heap or -hirl of sand as it -as traveling rapidly past. An echo occurs, -hen, a "ass of air having been unified, bounded, and prevented fro" dissipation by the containing -alls of a vessel, the air originally struck by the i"pinging body and set in "ove"ent by it rebounds fro" this "ass of air like a ball fro" a -all. :t is probable that in all generation of sound echo takes place, though it is fre+uently only indistinctly heard. 8hat happens here "ust be analogous to -hat happens in the case of light6 light is al-ays reflected ;; other-ise it -ould not be diffused and outside -hat -as directly illu"inated by the sun there -ould be blank darkness6 but this reflected light is not al-ays strong enough, as it is -hen it is reflected fro" -ater, bron.e, and other s"ooth bodies, to cast a shado-, -hich is the distinguishing "ark by -hich -e recogni.e light. :t is rightly said that an e"pty space plays the chief part in the production of hearing, for -hat people "ean by 7the vacuu"7 is the air, -hich is -hat causes hearing, -hen that air is set in "ove"ent as one continuous "ass6 but o-ing to its friability it e"its no sound, being dissipated by i"pinging upon any surface -hich is not s"ooth. 8hen the /01'a2 surface on -hich it i"pinges is +uite s"ooth, -hat is produced by the original i"pact is a united "ass, a result due to the s"oothness of the surface -ith -hich the air is in contact at the other end. 8hat has the po-er of producing sound is -hat has the po-er of setting in "ove"ent a single "ass of air -hich is continuous fro" the i"pinging body up to the organ of hearing. he organ of hearing is physically united -ith air, and because it is in air, the air inside is "oved concurrently -ith the air outside. Hence ani"als do not hear -ith all parts of their bodies, nor do all parts ad"it of the entrance of air6 for even the part -hich can be "oved and can sound has not air every-here in it. Air in itself is, o-ing to its friability, +uite soundless6 only -hen its dissipation is prevented is its "ove"ent sound. he air in the ear is built into a cha"ber 4ust to prevent this dissipating "ove"ent, in order that the ani"al "ay accurately apprehend all varieties of the "ove"ents of the air outside. hat is -hy -e hear also in -ater, vi.. because the -ater cannot get into the air cha"ber or even, o-ing to the spirals, into the outer ear. :f this does happen, hearing ceases, as it also does if the ty"panic "e"brane is da"aged, 4ust as sight ceases if the "e"brane covering the pupil is da"aged. :t is also a test of deafness -hether the ear does or does not reverberate like a horn6 the air inside the ear has al-ays a "ove"ent of its o-n, but the sound -e hear is al-ays the sounding of so"ething else, not of the organ itself. hat is -hy -e say that -e hear -ith -hat is e"pty and echoes, vi.. because -hat -e hear -ith is a cha"ber -hich contains a bounded "ass of air. 8hich is it that 7sounds7, the striking body or the struck9 :s not the ans-er 7it is both, but each in a different -ay79 *ound is a "ove"ent of -hat can rebound fro" a s"ooth surface -hen struck against it. As -e have e3plained7 not everything sounds -hen it strikes or is struck, e.g. if one needle is struck against another, neither e"its any sound. :n order, therefore, that sound "ay be generated, -hat is struck "ust be s"ooth, to enable the air to rebound and be shaken off fro" it in one piece. he distinctions bet-een different sounding bodies sho- the"selves only in actual sound6 as -ithout the help of light colours re"ain invisible, so -ithout the help of actual sound the distinctions bet-een acute and grave sounds re"ain inaudible. Acute and grave are here "etaphors, transferred fro" their proper sphere, vi.. that of touch, -here they "ean respectively #a$ -hat "oves the sense "uch in a short ti"e, #b$ -hat "oves the sense little in a long ti"e. 5ot that -hat is sharp really "oves fast, and -hat is grave, slo-ly, but that the difference in the +ualities of the one /01'b2 and the other "ove"ent is due to their respective speeds. here see"s to be a sort of parallelis" bet-een -hat is acute or grave to hearing and -hat is sharp or blunt to touch6 -hat is sharp as it -ere stabs, -hile -hat is blunt pushes, the one producing its effect in a short, the other in a long ti"e, so that the one is +uick, the other slo-. ?et the foregoing suffice as an analysis of sound. Goice is a kind of sound characteristic of -hat has soul in it6 nothing that is -ithout soul utters voice, it being only by a "etaphor that -e speak of the voice of the flute or the lyre or generally of -hat #being -ithout soul$ possesses the po-er of

producing a succession of notes -hich differ in length and pitch and ti"bre. he "etaphor is based on the fact that all these differences are found also in voice. >any ani"als are voiceless, e.g. all non;sanuineous ani"als and a"ong sanguineous ani"als fish. his is 4ust -hat -e should e3pect, since voice is a certain "ove"ent of air. he fish, like those in the Achelous, -hich are said to have voice, really "ake the sounds -ith their gills or so"e si"ilar organ. Goice is the sound "ade by an ani"al, and that -ith a special organ. As -e sa-, everything that "akes a sound does so by the i"pact of so"ething #a$ against so"ething else, #b$ across a space, #c$ filled -ith air6 hence it is only to be e3pected that no ani"als utter voice e3cept those -hich take in air. !nce air is inbreathed, 5ature uses it for t-o different purposes, as the tongue is used both for tasting and for articulating6 in that case of the t-o functions tasting is necessary for the ani"al7s e3istence #hence it is found "ore -idely distributed$, -hile articulate speech is a lu3ury subserving its possessor7s -ell; being6 si"ilarly in the for"er case 5ature e"ploys the breath both as an indispensable "eans to the regulation of the inner te"perature of the living body and also as the "atter of articulate voice, in the interests of its possessor7s -ell;being. 8hy its for"er use is indispensable "ust be discussed else-here. he organ of respiration is the -indpipe, and the organ to -hich this is related as "eans to end is the lungs. he latter is the part of the body by -hich the te"perature of land ani"als is raised above that of all others. (ut -hat pri"arily re+uires the air dra-n in by respiration is not only this but the region surrounding the heart. hat is -hy -hen ani"als breathe the air "ust penetrate in-ards. Goice then is the i"pact of the inbreathed air against the 7-indpipe7, and the agent that produces the i"pact is the soul resident in these parts of the body. 5ot every sound, as -e said, "ade by an ani"al is voice #even -ith the tongue -e "ay "erely "ake a sound -hich is not voice, or -ithout the tongue as in coughing$6 -hat produces the i"pact "ust have soul in it and "ust be acco"panied by an act of i"agination, for voice is a sound -ith a "eaning, and is not "erely the result of any i"pact of the breath as in coughing6 in voice the breath in the -indpipe is used as an instru"ent to knock -ith against /01,a2 the -alls of the -indpipe. his is confir"ed by our inability to speak -hen -e are breathing either out or in ;; -e can only do so by holding our breath6 -e "ake the "ove"ents -ith the breath so checked. :t is clear also -hy fish are voiceless6 they have no -indpipe. And they have no -indpipe because they do not breathe or take in air. 8hy they do not is a +uestion belonging to another in+uiry. Chapter E *"ell and its ob4ect are "uch less easy to deter"ine than -hat -e have hitherto discussed6 the distinguishing characteristic of the ob4ect of s"ell is less obvious than those of sound or colour. he ground of this is that our po-er of s"ell is less discri"inating and in general inferior to that of "any species of ani"als6 "en have a poor sense of s"ell and our apprehension of its proper ob4ects is inseparably bound up -ith and so confused by pleasure and pain, -hich sho-s that in us the organ is inaccurate. :t is probable that there is a parallel failure in the perception of colour by ani"als that have hard eyes= probably they discri"inate differences of colour only by the presence or absence of -hat e3cites fear, and that it is thus that hu"an beings distinguish s"ells. :t see"s that there is an analogy bet-een s"ell and taste, and that the species of tastes run parallel to those of s"ells ;; the only difference being that our sense of taste is "ore discri"inating than our sense of s"ell, because the for"er is a "odification of touch, -hich reaches in "an the "a3i"u" of discri"inative accuracy. 8hile in respect of all the other senses -e fall belo- "any species of ani"als, in respect of touch -e far e3cel all other species in e3actness of discri"ination. hat is -hy "an is the "ost intelligent of all ani"als. his is confir"ed by the fact that it is to differences in the organ of touch and to nothing else that the differences bet-een "an and "an in respect of natural endo-"ent are due6 "en -hose flesh is hard are ill;endo-ed by nature, "en -hose flesh is soft, -ell;endo-ed. As flavours "ay be divided into #a$ s-eet, #b$ bitter, so -ith s"ells. :n so"e things the flavour and the s"ell have the sa"e +uality, i.e. both are s-eet or both bitter, in others they diverge. *i"ilarly a s"ell, like a flavour, "ay be pungent, astringent, acid, or succulent. (ut, as -e said, because s"ells are "uch less easy to discri"inate than flavours, the na"es of these varieties are applied to s"ells only "etaphorically6 for e3a"ple 7s-eet7 is e3tended fro" /01,b2 the taste to the s"ell of saffron or honey, 7pungent7 to that of thy"e, and so on. :n the sa"e sense in -hich hearing has for its ob4ect both the audible and the inaudible, sight both the visible and the invisible, s"ell has for its ob4ect both the odorous and the inodorous. 7:nodorous7 "ay be either #a$ -hat has no s"ell at all, or #b$ -hat has a s"all or feeble s"ell. he sa"e

a"biguity lurks in the -ord 7tasteless7. *"elling, like the operation of the senses previously e3a"ined, takes place through a "ediu", i.e. through air or -ater ;; : add -ater, because -ater ;; ani"als too #both sanguineous and non; sanguineous$ see" to s"ell 4ust as "uch as land;ani"als6 at any rate so"e of the" "ake directly for their food fro" a distance if it has any scent. hat is -hy the follo-ing facts constitute a proble" for us. All ani"als s"ell in the sa"e -ay, but "an s"ells only -hen he inhales6 if he e3hales or holds his breath, he ceases to s"ell, no difference being "ade -hether the odorous ob4ect is distant or near, or even placed inside the nose and actually on the -all of the nostril6 it is a disability co""on to all the senses not to perceive -hat is in i""ediate contact -ith the organ of sense, but our failure to apprehend -hat is odorous -ithout the help of inhalation is peculiar #the fact is obvious on "aking the e3peri"ent$. 5o- since bloodless ani"als do not breathe, they "ust, it "ight be argued, have so"e novel sense not reckoned a"ong the usual five. !ur reply "ust be that this is i"possible, since it is scent that is perceived6 a sense that apprehends -hat is odorous and -hat has a good or bad odour cannot be anything but s"ell. <urther, they are observed to be deleteriously effected by the sa"e strong odours as "an is, e.g. bitu"en, sulphur, and the like. hese ani"als "ust be able to s"ell -ithout being able to breathe. he probable e3planation is that in "an the organ of s"ell has a certain superiority over that in all other ani"als 4ust as his eyes have over those of hard;eyed ani"als. >an7s eyes have in the eyelids a kind of shelter or envelope, -hich "ust be shifted or dra-n back in order that -e "ay see, -hile hard;eyed ani"als have nothing of the kind, but at once see -hatever presents itself in the transparent "ediu". *i"ilarly in certain species of ani"als the organ of s"ell is like the eye of hard;eyed ani"als, uncurtained, -hile in others /011a2 -hich take in air it probably has a curtain over it, -hich is dra-n back in inhalation, o-ing to the dilating of the veins or pores. hat e3plains also -hy such ani"als cannot s"ell under -ater6 to s"ell they "ust first inhale, and that they cannot do under -ater. *"ells co"e fro" -hat is dry as flavours fro" -hat is "oist. Conse+uently the organ of s"ell is potentially dry. Chapter ,' 8hat can be tasted is al-ays so"ething that can be touched, and 4ust for that reason it cannot be perceived through an interposed foreign body, for touch "eans the absence of any intervening body. <urther, the flavoured and tasteable body is suspended in a li+uid "atter, and this is tangible. Hence, if -e lived in -ater, -e should perceive a s-eet ob4ect introduced into the -ater, but the -ater -ould not be the "ediu" through -hich -e perceived6 our perception -ould be due to the solution of the s-eet substance in -hat -e i"bibed, 4ust as if it -ere "i3ed -ith so"e drink. here is no parallel here to the perception of colour, -hich is due neither to any blending of anything -ith anything, nor to any efflu3 of anything fro" anything. :n the case of taste, there is nothing corresponding to the "ediu" in the case of the senses previously discussed6 but as the ob4ect of sight is colour, so the ob4ect of taste is flavour. (ut nothing e3cites a perception of flavour -ithout the help of li+uid6 -hat acts upon the sense of taste "ust be either actually or potentially li+uid like -hat is saline6 it "ust be both #a$ itself easily dissolved, and #b$ capable of dissolving along -ith itself the tongue. aste apprehends both #a$ -hat has taste and #b$ -hat has no taste, if -e "ean by #b$ -hat has only a slight or feeble flavour or -hat tends to destroy the sense of taste. :n this it is e3actly parallel to sight, -hich apprehends both -hat is visible and -hat is invisible #for darkness is invisible and yet is discri"inated by sight6 so is, in a different -ay, -hat is over brilliant$, and to hearing, -hich apprehends both sound and silence, of -hich the one is audible and the other inaudible, and also over;loud sound. his corresponds in the case of hearing to over;bright light in the case of sight. As a faint sound is 7inaudible7, so in a sense is a loud or violent sound. he -ord 7invisible7 and si"ilar privative ter"s cover not only #a$ -hat is si"ply -ithout so"e po-er, but also #b$ -hat is adapted by nature to have it but has not it or has it only in a very lo- degree, as -hen -e say that a species of s-allo- is 7footless7 or that a variety of fruit is 7stoneless7. *o too taste has as its ob4ect both -hat can be tasted and the tasteless ;; the latter in the sense of -hat has little flavour or a bad flavour or one destructive of taste. he difference bet-een -hat is tasteless and -hat is not see"s to rest ulti"ately on that bet-een -hat is drinkable and -hat is undrinkable both are tasteable, but the latter is bad and tends to destroy taste, -hile the for"er is the nor"al sti"ulus of taste. 8hat is drinkable is the co""on ob4ect of both touch and taste. /011b2 *ince -hat can be tasted is li+uid, the organ for its perception cannot be either #a$ actually li+uid or #b$ incapable of beco"ing li+uid. asting "eans a being affected by -hat can be tasted as such6 hence the organ of taste "ust be li+uefied, and so to start -ith "ust be non;li+uid but capable

of li+uefaction -ithout loss of its distinctive nature. his is confir"ed by the fact that the tongue cannot taste either -hen it is too dry or -hen it is too "oist6 in the latter case -hat occurs is due to a contact -ith the pre;e3istent "oisture in the tongue itself, -hen after a foretaste of so"e strong flavour -e try to taste another flavour6 it is in this -ay that sick persons find everything they taste bitter, vi.. because, -hen they taste, their tongues are overflo-ing -ith bitter "oisture. he species of flavour are, as in the case of colour, #a$ si"ple, i.e. the t-o contraries, the s-eet and the bitter, #b$ secondary, vi.. #i$ on the side of the s-eet, the succulent, #ii$ on the side of the bitter, the saline, #iii$ bet-een these co"e the pungent, the harsh, the astringent, and the acid6 these pretty -ell e3haust the varieties of flavour. :t follo-s that -hat has the po-er of tasting is -hat is potentially of that kind, and that -hat is tasteable is -hat has the po-er of "aking it actually -hat it itself already is. Chapter ,, 8hatever can be said of -hat is tangible, can be said of touch, and vice versa6 if touch is not a single sense but a group of senses, there "ust be several kinds of -hat is tangible. :t is a proble" -hether touch is a single sense or a group of senses. :t is also a proble", -hat is the organ of touch6 is it or is it not the flesh #including -hat in certain ani"als is ho"ologous -ith flesh$9 !n the second vie-, flesh is 7the "ediu"7 of touch, the real organ being situated farther in-ard. he proble" arises because the field of each sense is according to the accepted vie- deter"ined as the range bet-een a single pair of contraries, -hite and black for sight, acute and grave for hearing, bitter and s-eet for taste6 but in the field of -hat is tangible -e find several such pairs, hot cold, dry "oist, hard soft, Fc. his proble" finds a partial solution, -hen it is recalled that in the case of the other senses "ore than one pair of contraries are to be "et -ith, e.g. in sound not only acute and grave but loud and soft, s"ooth and rough, Fc.6 there are si"ilar contrasts in the field of colour. 5evertheless -e are unable clearly to detect in the case of touch -hat the single sub4ect is -hich underlies the contrasted +ualities and corresponds to sound in the case of hearing. o the +uestion -hether the organ of touch lies in-ard or not #i.e. -hether -e need look any farther than the flesh$, no indication in favour of the second ans-er can be dra-n fro" the fact that if the ob4ect co"es into contact /01%a2 -ith the flesh it is at once perceived. <or even under present conditions if the e3peri"ent is "ade of "aking a -eb and stretching it tight over the flesh, as soon as this -eb is touched the sensation is reported in the sa"e "anner as before, yet it is clear that the or is gan is not in this "e"brane. :f the "e"brane could be gro-n on to the flesh, the report -ould travel still +uicker. he flesh plays in touch very "uch the sa"e part as -ould be played in the other senses by an air;envelope gro-ing round our body6 had -e such an envelope attached to us -e should have supposed that it -as by a single organ that -e perceived sounds, colours, and s"ells, and -e should have taken sight, hearing, and s"ell to be a single sense. (ut as it is, because that through -hich the different "ove"ents are trans"itted is not naturally attached to our bodies, the difference of the various sense;organs is too plain to "iss. (ut in the case of touch the obscurity re"ains. here "ust be such a naturally attached 7"ediu"7 as flesh, for no living body could be constructed of air or -ater6 it "ust be so"ething solid. Conse+uently it "ust be co"posed of earth along -ith these, -hich is 4ust -hat flesh and its analogue in ani"als -hich have no true flesh tend to be. Hence of necessity the "ediu" through -hich are trans"itted the "anifoldly contrasted tactual +ualities "ust be a body naturally attached to the organis". hat they are "anifold is clear -hen -e consider touching -ith the tongue6 -e apprehend at the tongue all tangible +ualities as -ell as flavour. *uppose all the rest of our flesh -as, like the tongue, sensitive to flavour, -e should have identified the sense of taste and the sense of touch6 -hat saves us fro" this identification is the fact that touch and taste are not al-ays found together in the sa"e part of the body. he follo-ing proble" "ight be raised. ?et us assu"e that every body has depth, i.e. has three di"ensions, and that if t-o bodies have a third body bet-een the" they cannot be in contact -ith one another6 let us re"e"ber that -hat is li+uid is a body and "ust be or contain -ater, and that if t-o bodies touch one another under -ater, their touching surfaces cannot be dry, but "ust have -ater bet-een, vi.. the -ater -hich -ets their bounding surfaces6 fro" all this it follo-s that in -ater t-o bodies cannot be in contact -ith one another. he sa"e holds of t-o bodies in air ;; air being to bodies in air precisely -hat -ater is to bodies in -ater ;; but the facts are not so evident to our observation, because -e live in air, 4ust as ani"als /01%b2 that live in -ater -ould not notice that the things -hich touch one another in -ater have -et surfaces. he proble", then, is= does the perception of all ob4ects of sense take place in the sa"e -ay, or does it not, e.g. taste and touch re+uiring contact

#as they are co""only thought to do$, -hile all other senses perceive over a distance9 he distinction is unsound6 -e perceive -hat is hard or soft, as -ell as the ob4ects of hearing, sight, and s"ell, through a 7"ediu"7, only that the latter are perceived over a greater distance than the for"er6 that is -hy the facts escape our notice. <or -e do perceive everything through a "ediu"6 but in these cases the fact escapes us. Yet, to repeat -hat -e said before, if the "ediu" for touch -ere a "e"brane separating us fro" the ob4ect -ithout our observing its e3istence, -e should be relatively to it in the sa"e condition as -e are no- to air or -ater in -hich -e are i""ersed6 in their case -e fancy -e can touch ob4ects, nothing co"ing in bet-een us and the". (ut there re"ains this difference bet-een -hat can be touched and -hat can be seen or can sound6 in the latter t-o cases -e perceive because the "ediu" produces a certain effect upon us, -hereas in the perception of ob4ects of touch -e are affected not by but along -ith the "ediu"6 it is as if a "an -ere struck through his shield, -here the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the "an, but the concussion of both is si"ultaneous. :n general, flesh and the tongue are related to the real organs of touch and taste, as air and -ater are to those of sight, hearing, and s"ell. Hence in neither the one case nor the other can there be any perception of an ob4ect if it is placed i""ediately upon the organ, e.g. if a -hite ob4ect is placed on the surface of the eye. his again sho-s that -hat has the po-er of perceiving the tangible is seated inside. !nly so -ould there be a co"plete analogy -ith all the other senses. :n their case if you place the ob4ect on the organ it is not perceived, here if you place it on the flesh it is perceived6 therefore flesh is not the organ but the "ediu" of touch. 8hat can be touched are distinctive +ualities of body as body6 by such differences : "ean those -hich characteri.e the ele"ents, vi., hot cold, dry "oist, of -hich -e have spoken earlier in our treatise on the ele"ents. he organ for the perception of these is that of touch ;; that part of the body in -hich pri"arily the sense of touch resides. his is that part -hich is potentially such as its ob4ect is actually= for all sense;perception is a process of being so affected6 so that that -hich "akes so"ething such as it itself actually is /010a2 "akes the other such because the other is already potentially such. hat is -hy -hen an ob4ect of touch is e+ually hot and cold or hard and soft -e cannot perceive6 -hat -e perceive "ust have a degree of the sensible +uality lying beyond the neutral point. his i"plies that the sense itself is a 7"ean7 bet-een any t-o opposite +ualities -hich deter"ine the field of that sense. :t is to this that it o-es its po-er of discerning the ob4ects in that field. 8hat is 7in the "iddle7 is fitted to discern6 relatively to either e3tre"e it can put itself in the place of the other. As -hat is to perceive both -hite and black "ust, to begin -ith, be actually neither but potentially either #and so -ith all the other sense;organs$, so the organ of touch "ust be neither hot nor cold. <urther, as in a sense sight had for its ob4ect both -hat -as visible and -hat -as invisible #and there -as a parallel truth about all the other senses discussed$, so touch has for its ob4ect both -hat is tangible and -hat is intangible. Here by 7intangible7 is "eant #a$ -hat like air possesses so"e +uality of tangible things in a very slight degree and #b$ -hat possesses it in an e3cessive degree, as destructive things do. 8e have no- given an outline account of each of the several senses. Chapter ,1 he follo-ing results applying to any and every sense "ay no- be for"ulated. #A$ (y a 7sense7 is "eant -hat has the po-er of receiving into itself the sensible for"s of things -ithout the "atter. his "ust be conceived of as taking place in the -ay in -hich a piece of -a3 takes on the i"press of a signet;ring -ithout the iron or gold6 -e say that -hat produces the i"pression is a signet of bron.e or gold, but its particular "etallic constitution "akes no difference= in a si"ilar -ay the sense is affected by -hat is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indifferent -hat in each case the substance is6 -hat alone "atters is -hat +uality it has, i.e. in -hat ratio its constituents are co"bined. #($ (y 7an organ of sense7 is "eant that in -hich ulti"ately such a po-er is seated. he sense and its organ are the sa"e in fact, but their essence is not the sa"e. 8hat perceives is, of course, a spatial "agnitude, but -e "ust not ad"it that either the having the po-er to perceive or the sense itself is a "agnitude6 -hat they are is a certain ratio or po-er in a "agnitude. his

enables us to e3plain -hy ob4ects of sense -hich possess one of t-o opposite sensible +ualities in a degree largely in e3cess of the other opposite destroy the organs of sense6 if the "ove"ent set up by an ob4ect is too strong for the organ, the e+uipoise of contrary +ualities in the organ, -hich 4ust is its sensory po-er, is disturbed6 it is precisely as concord and tone are destroyed by too violently t-anging the strings of a lyre. his e3plains also -hy plants cannot perceive. in spite of their having a portion of soul in the" and obviously being affected by tangible ob4ects the"selves6 for undoubtedly their te"perature can be lo-ered or raised. he e3planation is that they have no "ean /010b2 of contrary +ualities, and so no principle in the" capable of taking on the for"s of sensible ob4ects -ithout their "atter6 in the case of plants the affection is an affection by for";and;"atter together. he proble" "ight be raised= Can -hat cannot s"ell be said to be affected by s"ells or -hat cannot see by colours, and so on9 :t "ight be said that a s"ell is 4ust -hat can be s"elt, and if it produces any effect it can only be so as to "ake so"ething s"ell it, and it "ight be argued that -hat cannot s"ell cannot be affected by s"ells and further that -hat can s"ell can be affected by it only in so far as it has in it the po-er to s"ell #si"ilarly -ith the proper ob4ects of all the other senses$. :ndeed that this is so is "ade +uite evident as follo-s. ?ight or darkness, sounds and s"ells leave bodies +uite unaffected6 -hat does affect bodies is not these but the bodies -hich are their vehicles, e.g. -hat splits the trunk of a tree is not the sound of the thunder but the air -hich acco"panies thunder. Yes, but, it "ay be ob4ected, bodies are affected by -hat is tangible and by flavours. :f not, by -hat are things that are -ithout soul affected, i.e. altered in +uality9 >ust -e not, then, ad"it that the ob4ects of the other senses also "ay affect the"9 :s not the true account this, that all bodies are capable of being affected by s"ells and sounds, but that so"e on being acted upon, having no boundaries of their o-n, disintegrate, as in the instance of air, -hich does beco"e odorous, sho-ing that so"e effect is produced on it by -hat is odorous9 (ut s"elling is "ore than such an affection by -hat is odorous ;; -hat "ore9 :s not the ans-er that, -hile the air o-ing to the "o"entary duration of the action upon it of -hat is odorous does itself beco"e perceptible to the sense of s"ell, s"elling is an observing of the result produced9

(ook ::: Chapter , hat there is no si3th sense in addition to the five enu"erated ;; sight, hearing, s"ell, taste, touch ;; "ay be established by the follo-ing considerations= :f -e have actually sensation of everything of -hich touch can give us sensation #for all the +ualities of the tangible +ua tangible are perceived by us through touch$6 and if absence of a sense necessarily involves absence of a sense;organ6 and if #,$ all ob4ects that -e perceive by i""ediate contact -ith the" are perceptible by touch, -hich sense -e actually possess, and #1$ all ob4ects that -e perceive through "edia, i.e. -ithout i""ediate contact, are perceptible by or through the si"ple ele"ents, e.g. air and -ater #and this is so arranged that #a$ if "ore than one kind of sensible ob4ect is perceivable through a single "ediu", the possessor of a sense;organ ho"ogeneous -ith that "ediu" has the po-er of perceiving both kinds of ob4ects6 for e3a"ple, if the sense;organ is "ade of air, and air is a "ediu" both for sound and for colour6 and that #b$ if "ore than one "ediu" can trans"it the sa"e kind of sensible ob4ects, as e.g. -ater as -ell as air can trans"it colour, both /01&a2 being transparent, then the possessor of either alone -ill be able to perceive the kind of ob4ects trans"issible through both$6 and if of the si"ple ele"ents t-o only, air and -ater, go to for" sense;organs #for the pupil is "ade of -ater, the organ of hearing is "ade of air, and the organ of s"ell of one or other of these t-o, -hile fire is found either in none or in all ;; -ar"th being an essential condition of all sensibility ;; and earth either in none or, if any-here, specially "ingled -ith the co"ponents of the organ of touch6 -herefore it -ould re"ain that there can be no sense;organ for"ed of anything e3cept -ater and air$6 and if these sense;organs are actually found in certain ani"als6 ;; then all the possible senses are possessed by those ani"als that are not i"perfect or "utilated #for even the "ole is observed to have eyes beneath its skin$6 so that, if there is no fifth ele"ent and no property other than those -hich belong to the four ele"ents of our -orld, no sense can be -anting to such ani"als. <urther, there cannot be a special sense;organ for the co""on sensibles either, i.e. the ob4ects -hich -e perceive incidentally through this or that special sense, e.g. "ove"ent, rest, figure, "agnitude, nu"ber, unity6 for all these -e perceive by "ove"ent, e.g. "agnitude by "ove"ent, and therefore also figure #for figure is a species of "agnitude$, -hat is at rest by the absence of "ove"ent= nu"ber is perceived by the negation of continuity, and by the special sensibles6 for each sense perceives one class of sensible ob4ects. *o that it is clearly i"possible that there should be a

special sense for any one of the co""on sensibles, e.g. "ove"ent6 for, if that -ere so, our perception of it -ould be e3actly parallel to our present perception of -hat is s-eet by vision. hat is so because -e have a sense for each of the t-o +ualities, in virtue of -hich -hen they happen to "eet in one sensible ob4ect -e are a-are of both conte"poraneously. :f it -ere not like this our perception of the co""on +ualities -ould al-ays be incidental, i.e. as is the perception of Cleon7s son, -here -e perceive hi" not as Cleon7s son but as -hite, and the -hite thing -hich -e really perceive happens to be Cleon7s son. (ut in the case of the co""on sensibles there is already in us a general sensibility -hich enables us to perceive the" directly6 there is therefore no special sense re+uired for their perception= if there -ere, our perception of the" -ould have been e3actly like -hat has been above described. he senses perceive each other7s special ob4ects incidentally6 not because the percipient sense is this or that special sense, but because all for" a unity= this incidental perception takes place -henever sense is directed at one /01&b2 and the sa"e "o"ent to t-o disparate +ualities in one and the sa"e ob4ect, e.g. to the bitterness and the yello-ness of bile, the assertion of the identity of both cannot be the act of either of the senses6 hence the illusion of sense, e.g. the belief that if a thing is yello- it is bile. :t "ight be asked -hy -e have "ore senses than one. :s it to prevent a failure to apprehend the co""on sensibles, e.g. "ove"ent, "agnitude, and nu"ber, -hich go along -ith the special sensibles9 Had -e no sense but sight, and that sense no ob4ect but -hite, they -ould have tended to escape our notice and everything -ould have "erged for us into an indistinguishable identity because of the conco"itance of colour and "agnitude. As it is, the fact that the co""on sensibles are given in the ob4ects of "ore than one sense reveals their distinction fro" each and all of the special sensibles. Chapter 1 *ince it is through sense that -e are a-are that -e are seeing or hearing, it "ust be either by sight that -e are a-are of seeing, or by so"e sense other than sight. (ut the sense that gives us this nesensation "ust perceive both sight and its ob4ect, vi.. colour= so that either #,$ there -ill be t-o senses both percipient of the sa"e sensible ob4ect, or #1$ the sense "ust be percipient of itself. <urther, even if the sense -hich perceives sight -ere different fro" sight, -e "ust either fall into an infinite regress, or -e "ust so"e-here assu"e a sense -hich is a-are of itself. :f so, -e ought to do this in the first case. his presents a difficulty= if to perceive by sight is 4ust to see, and -hat is seen is colour #or the coloured$, then if -e are to see that -hich sees, that -hich sees originally "ust be coloured. :t is clear therefore that 7to perceive by sight7 has "ore than one "eaning6 for even -hen -e are not seeing, it is by sight that -e discri"inate darkness fro" light, though not in the sa"e -ay as -e distinguish one colour fro" another. <urther, in a sense even that -hich sees is coloured6 for in each case the sense;organ is capable of receiving the sensible ob4ect -ithout its "atter. hat is -hy even -hen the sensible ob4ects are gone the sensings and i"aginings continue to e3ist in the sense;organs. he activity of the sensible ob4ect and that of the percipient sense is one and the sa"e activity, and yet the distinction bet-een their being re"ains. ake as illustration actual sound and actual hearing= a "an "ay have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that -hich has a sound is not al-ays sounding. (ut -hen that -hich can hear is actively hearing and -hich can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound are "erged in one #these one "ight call respectively hearkening and /01Aa2 sounding$. :f it is true that the "ove"ent, both the acting and the being acted upon, is to be found in that -hich is acted upon, both the sound and the hearing so far as it is actual "ust be found in that -hich has the faculty of hearing6 for it is in the passive factor that the actuality of the active or "otive factor is reali.ed6 that is -hy that -hich causes "ove"ent "ay be at rest. 5o- the actuality of that -hich can sound is 4ust sound or sounding, and the actuality of that -hich can hear is hearing or hearkening6 7sound7 and 7hearing7 are both a"biguous. he sa"e account applies to the other senses and their ob4ects. <or as the;acting;and;being;acted;upon is to be found in the passive, not in the active factor, so also the actuality of the sensible ob4ect and that of the sensitive sub4ect are both reali.ed in the latter. (ut -hile in so"e cases each aspect of the total actuality has a distinct

na"e, e.g. sounding and hearkening, in so"e one or other is na"eless, e.g. the actuality of sight is called seeing, but the actuality of colour has no na"e= the actuality of the faculty of taste is called tasting, but the actuality of flavour has no na"e. *ince the actualities of the sensible ob4ect and of the sensitive faculty are one actuality in spite of the difference bet-een their "odes of being, actual hearing and actual sounding appear and disappear fro" e3istence at one and the sa"e "o"ent, and so actual savour and actual tasting, Fc., -hile as potentialities one of the" "ay e3ist -ithout the other. he earlier students of nature -ere "istaken in their vie- that -ithout sight there -as no -hite or black, -ithout taste no savour. his state"ent of theirs is partly true, partly false= 7sense7 and 7the sensible ob4ect7 are a"biguous ter"s, i.e. "ay denote either potentialities or actualities= the state"ent is true of the latter, false of the for"er. his a"biguity they -holly failed to notice. :f voice al-ays i"plies a concord, and if the voice and the hearing of it are in one sense one and the sa"e, and if concord al-ays i"plies a ratio, hearing as -ell as -hat is heard "ust be a ratio. hat is -hy the e3cess of either the sharp or the flat destroys the hearing. #*o also in the case of /01Ab2 savours e3cess destroys the sense of taste, and in the case of colours e3cessive brightness or darkness destroys the sight, and in the case of s"ell e3cess of strength -hether in the direction of s-eetness or bitterness is destructive.$ his sho-s that the sense is a ratio. hat is also -hy the ob4ects of sense are #,$ pleasant -hen the sensible e3tre"es such as acid or s-eet or salt being pure and un"i3ed are brought into the proper ratio6 then they are pleasant= and in general -hat is blended is "ore pleasant than the sharp or the flat alone6 or, to touch, that -hich is capable of being either -ar"ed or chilled= the sense and the ratio are identical= -hile #1$ in e3cess the sensible e3tre"es are painful or destructive. @ach sense then is relative to its particular group of sensible +ualities= it is found in a sense;organ as such and discri"inates the differences -hich e3ist -ithin that group6 e.g. sight discri"inates -hite and black, taste s-eet and bitter, and so in all cases. *ince -e also discri"inate -hite fro" s-eet, and indeed each sensible +uality fro" every other, -ith -hat do -e perceive that they are different9 :t "ust be by sense6 for -hat is before us is sensible ob4ects. #Hence it is also obvious that the flesh cannot be the ulti"ate sense;organ= if it -ere, the discri"inating po-er could not do its -ork -ithout i""ediate contact -ith the ob4ect.$ herefore #,$ discri"ination bet-een -hite and s-eet cannot be effected by t-o agencies -hich re"ain separate6 both the +ualities discri"inated "ust be present to so"ething that is one and single. !n any other supposition even if : perceived s-eet and you perceived -hite, the difference bet-een the" -ould be apparent. 8hat says that t-o things are different "ust be one6 for s-eet is different fro" -hite. herefore -hat asserts this difference "ust be self;identical, and as -hat asserts, so also -hat thinks or perceives. hat it is not possible by "eans of t-o agencies -hich re"ain separate to discri"inate t-o ob4ects -hich are separate, is therefore obvious6 and that #it is not possible to do this in separate "ove"ents of ti"e "ay be seen7 if -e look at it as follo-s. <or as -hat asserts the difference bet-een the good and the bad is one and the sa"e, so also the ti"e at -hich it asserts the one to be different and the other to be different is not accidental to the assertion #as it is for instance -hen : no- assert a difference but do not assert that there is no- a difference$6 it asserts thus ;; both no- and that the ob4ects are different no-6 the ob4ects therefore "ust be present at one and the sa"e "o"ent. (oth the discri"inating po-er and the ti"e of its e3ercise "ust be one and undivided. (ut, it "ay be ob4ected, it is i"possible that -hat is self;identical should be "oved at "e and the sa"e ti"e -ith contrary "ove"ents in so far as it is undivided, and in an undivided "o"ent of ti"e. <or if -hat is s-eet be the +uality perceived, it "oves the sense or thought in this /01Ca2 deter"inate -ay, -hile -hat is bitter "oves it in a contrary -ay, and -hat is -hite in a different -ay. :s it the case then that -hat discri"inates, though both nu"erically one and indivisible, is at the sa"e ti"e divided in its being9 :n one sense, it is -hat is divided that perceives t-o separate ob4ects at once, but in another sense it does so +ua undivided6 for it is divisible in its being but spatially and nu"erically undivided. (ut is not this i"possible9 <or -hile it is true that -hat is self;identical and undivided "ay be both contraries at once potentially, it cannot be self;identical in its being ;; it "ust lose its unity by being put into activity. :t is not possible to be at once -hite and black, and therefore it "ust also be i"possible for a thing to be affected at one and the sa"e "o"ent by the for"s of both, assu"ing it to be the case that sensation and thinking are properly so described.

he ans-er is that 4ust as -hat is called a 7point7 is, as being at once one and t-o, properly said to be divisible, so here, that -hich discri"inates is +ua undivided one, and active in a single "o"ent of ti"e, -hile so far forth as it is divisible it t-ice over uses the sa"e dot at one and the sa"e ti"e. *o far forth then as it takes the li"it as t-o7 it discri"inates t-o separate ob4ects -ith -hat in a sense is divided= -hile so far as it takes it as one, it does so -ith -hat is one and occupies in its activity a single "o"ent of ti"e. About the principle in virtue of -hich -e say that ani"als are percipient, let this discussion suffice. Chapter % here are t-o distinctive peculiarities by reference to -hich -e characteri.e the soul #,$ local "ove"ent and #1$ thinking, discri"inating, and perceiving. hinking both speculative and practical is regarded as akin to a for" of perceiving6 for in the one as -ell as the other the soul discri"inates and is cogni.ant of so"ething -hich is. :ndeed the ancients go so far as to identify thinking and perceiving6 e.g. @"pedocles says 7<or 7tis in respect of -hat is present that "an7s -it is increased7, and again 78hence it befalls the" fro" ti"e to ti"e to think diverse thoughts7, and Ho"er7s phrase 7<or suchlike is "an7s "ind7 "eans the sa"e. hey all look upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving, and hold that like is kno-n as -ell as perceived by like, as : e3plained at the beginning of our discussion. Yet they ought at the sa"e ti"e to have accounted for error also6 for it is "ore inti"ately /01Cb2 connected -ith ani"al e3istence and the soul continues longer in the state of error than in that of truth. hey cannot escape the dile""a= either #,$ -hatever see"s is true #and there are so"e -ho accept this$ or #1$ error is contact -ith the unlike6 for that is the opposite of the kno-ing of like by like. (ut it is a received principle that error as -ell as kno-ledge in respect to contraries is one and the sa"e. hat perceiving and practical thinking are not identical is therefore obvious6 for the for"er is universal in the ani"al -orld, the latter is found in only a s"all division of it. <urther, speculative thinking is also distinct fro" perceiving ;; : "ean that in -hich -e find rightness and -rongness ;; rightness in prudence, kno-ledge, true opinion, -rongness in their opposites6 for perception of the special ob4ects of sense is al-ays free fro" error, and is found in all ani"als, -hile it is possible to think falsely as -ell as truly, and thought is found only -here there is discourse of reason as -ell as sensibility. <or i"agination is different fro" either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found -ithout sensation, or 4udge"ent -ithout it. hat this activity is not the sa"e kind of thinking as 4udge"ent is obvious. <or i"agining lies -ithin our o-n po-er -henever -e -ish #e.g. -e can call up a picture, as in the practice of "ne"onics by the use of "ental i"ages$, but in for"ing opinions -e are not free= -e cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth. <urther, -hen -e think so"ething to be fearful or threatening, e"otion is i""ediately produced, and so too -ith -hat is encouraging6 but -hen -e "erely i"agine -e re"ain as unaffected as persons -ho are looking at a painting of so"e dreadful or encouraging scene. Again -ithin the field of 4udge"ent itself -e find varieties, kno-ledge, opinion, prudence, and their opposites6 of the differences bet-een these : "ust speak else-here. hinking is different fro" perceiving and is held to be in part i"agination, in part 4udge"ent= -e "ust therefore first "ark off the sphere of i"agination and then speak of /01Da2 4udge"ent. :f then i"agination is that in virtue of -hich an i"age arises for us, e3cluding "etaphorical uses of the ter", is it a single faculty or disposition relative to i"ages, in virtue of -hich -e discri"inate and are either in error or not9 he faculties in virtue of -hich -e do this are sense, opinion, science, intelligence. hat i"agination is not sense is clear fro" the follo-ing considerations= *ense is either a faculty or an activity, e.g. sight or seeing= i"agination takes place in the absence of both, as e.g. in drea"s. #Again, sense is al-ays present, i"agination not. :f actual i"agination and actual sensation -ere the sa"e, i"agination -ould be found in all the brutes= this is held not to be the case6 e.g. it is not found in ants or bees or grubs. #Again, sensations are al-ays true, i"aginations are for the "ost part false. #!nce "ore, even in ordinary speech, -e do not, -hen sense functions precisely -ith regard to its ob4ect, say that -e i"agine it to be a "an, but rather -hen there is so"e failure of accuracy in its e3ercise. And as -e -ere saying before, visions appear to us even -hen our eyes are shut. 5either is i"agination any of the things that are never in error= e.g. kno-ledge or

intelligence6 for i"agination "ay be false. :t re"ains therefore to see if it is opinion, for opinion "ay be either true or false. (ut opinion involves belief #for -ithout belief in -hat -e opine -e cannot have an opinion$, and in the brutes though -e often find i"agination -e never find belief. <urther, every opinion is acco"panied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by discourse of reason= -hile there are so"e of the brutes in -hich -e find i"agination, -ithout discourse of reason. :t is clear then that i"agination cannot, again, be #,$ opinion plus sensation, or #1$ opinion "ediated by sensation, or #%$ a blend of opinion and sensation6 this is i"possible both for these reasons and because the content of the supposed opinion cannot be different fro" that of the sensation #: "ean that i"agination "ust be the blending of the perception of -hite -ith the opinion that it is -hite= it could scarcely be a blend of the opinion that it is good -ith the perception that it is -hite$= to i"agine is therefore #on this vie-$ identical /01Db2 -ith the thinking of e3actly the sa"e as -hat one in the strictest sense perceives. (ut -hat -e i"agine is so"eti"es false though our conte"poraneous 4udge"ent about it is true6 e.g. -e i"agine the sun to be a foot in dia"eter though -e are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited part of the earth, and the follo-ing dile""a presents itself. @ither #a -hile the fact has not changed and the #observer has neither forgotten nor lost belief in the true opinion -hich he had, that opinion has disappeared, or #b$ if he retains it then his opinion is at once true and false. A true opinion, ho-ever, beco"es false only -hen the fact alters -ithout being noticed. :"agination is therefore neither any one of the states enu"erated, nor co"pounded out of the". (ut since -hen one thing has been set in "otion another thing "ay be "oved by it, and i"agination is held to be a "ove"ent and to be i"possible -ithout sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content -hat can be perceived, and since "ove"ent "ay be produced by actual sensation and that "ove"ent is necessarily si"ilar in character to the sensation itself, this "ove"ent "ust be #,$ necessarily #a$ incapable of e3isting apart fro" sensation, #b$ incapable of e3isting e3cept -hen -e perceive, #such that in virtue of its possession that in -hich it is found "ay present various pheno"ena both active and passive, and #such that it "ay be either true or false. he reason of the last characteristic is as follo-s. Perception #,$ of the special ob4ects of sense is never in error or ad"its the least possible a"ount of falsehood. #1$ hat of the conco"itance of the ob4ects conco"itant -ith the sensible +ualities co"es ne3t= in this case certainly -e "ay be deceived6 for -hile the perception that there is -hite before us cannot be false, the perception that -hat is -hite is this or that "ay be false. #%$ hird co"es the perception of the universal attributes -hich acco"pany the conco"itant ob4ects to -hich the special sensibles attach #: "ean e.g. of "ove"ent and "agnitude$6 it is in respect of these that the greatest a"ount of sense;illusion is possible. he "otion -hich is due to the activity of sense in these three "odes of its e3ercise -ill differ fro" the activity of sense6 #,$ the first kind of derived "otion is free fro" error -hile the sensation is present6 #1$ and #%$ the others "ay be erroneous -hether it is present or absent, especially -hen the ob4ect of perception is far off. :f then i"agination presents no other features than those enu"erated and is -hat -e have described, then i"agination "ust be a "ove"ent resulting fro" an actual e3ercise of a po-er of /01Ea2 sense. As sight is the "ost highly developed sense, the na"e Phantasia #i"agination$ has been for"ed fro" Phaos #light$ because it is not possible to see -ithout light. And because i"aginations re"ain in the organs of sense and rese"ble sensations, ani"als in their actions are largely guided by the", so"e #i.e. the brutes$ because of the non;e3istence in the" of "ind, others #i.e. "en$ because of the te"porary eclipse in the" of "ind by feeling or disease or sleep. About i"agination, -hat it is and -hy it e3ists, let so "uch suffice. Chapter 0 urning no- to the part of the soul -ith -hich the soul kno-s and thinks #-hether this is separable fro" the others in definition only, or spatially as -ell$ -e have to in+uire #,$ -hat differentiates this part, and #1$ ho- thinking can take place.

:f thinking is like perceiving, it "ust be either a process in -hich the soul is acted upon by -hat is capable of being thought, or a process different fro" but analogous to that. he thinking part of the soul "ust therefore be, -hile i"passible, capable of receiving the for" of an ob4ect6 that is, "ust be potentially identical in character -ith its ob4ect -ithout being the ob4ect. >ind "ust be related to -hat is thinkable, as sense is to -hat is sensible. herefore, since everything is a possible ob4ect of thought, "ind in order, as Ana3agoras says, to do"inate, that is, to kno-, "ust be pure fro" all ad"i3ture6 for the co;presence of -hat is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block= it follo-s that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its o-n, other than that of having a certain capacity. hus that in the soul -hich is called "ind #by "ind : "ean that -hereby the soul thinks and 4udges$ is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. <or this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended -ith the body= if so, it -ould ac+uire so"e +uality, e.g. -ar"th or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty= as it is, it has none. :t -as a good idea to call the soul 7the place of for"s7, though #,$ this description holds only of the intellective soul, and #1$ even this is the for"s only potentially, not actually. !bservation of the sense;organs and their e"ploy"ent reveals a distinction bet-een the i"passibility of the sensitive and that of the intellective faculty. After strong /01Eb2 sti"ulation of a sense -e are less able to e3ercise it than before, as e.g. in the case of a loud sound -e cannot hear easily i""ediately after, or in the case of a bright colour or a po-erful odour -e cannot see or s"ell, but in the case of "ind thought about an ob4ect that is highly intelligible renders it "ore and not less able after-ards to think ob4ects that are less intelligible= the reason is that -hile the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, "ind is separable fro" it. !nce the "ind has beco"e each set of its possible ob4ects, as a "an of science has, -hen this phrase is used of one -ho is actually a "an of science #this happens -hen he is no- able to e3ercise the po-er on his o-n initiative$, its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense fro" the potentiality -hich preceded the ac+uisition of kno-ledge by learning or discovery= the "ind too is then able to think itself. *ince -e can distinguish bet-een a spatial "agnitude and -hat it is to be such, and bet-een -ater and -hat it is to be -ater, and so in "any other cases #though not in all6 for in certain cases the thing and its for" are identical$, flesh and -hat it is to be flesh are discri"inated either by different faculties, or by the sa"e faculty in t-o different states= for flesh necessarily involves "atter and is like -hat is snub;nosed, a this in a this. 5o- it is by "eans of the sensitive faculty that -e discri"inate the hot and the cold, i.e. the factors -hich co"bined in a certain ratio constitute flesh= the essential character of flesh is apprehended by so"ething different either -holly separate fro" the sensitive faculty or related to it as a bent line to the sa"e line -hen it has been straightened out. Again in the case of abstract ob4ects -hat is straight is analogous to -hat is snub;nosed6 for it necessarily i"plies a continuu" as its "atter= its constitutive essence is different, if -e "ay distinguish bet-een straightness and -hat is straight= let us take it to be t-o;ness. :t "ust be apprehended, therefore, by a different po-er or by the sa"e po-er in a different state. o su" up, in so far as the realities it kno-s are capable of being separated fro" their "atter, so it is also -ith the po-ers of "ind. he proble" "ight be suggested= if thinking is a passive affection, then if "ind is si"ple and i"passible and has nothing in co""on -ith anything else, as Ana3agoras says, ho- can it co"e to think at all9 <or interaction bet-een t-o factors is held to re+uire a precedent co""unity of nature bet-een the factors. Again it "ight be asked, is "ind a possible ob4ect of thought to itself9 <or if "ind is thinkable per se and -hat is thinkable is in kind one and the sa"e, then either #a$ "ind -ill belong to everything, or #b$ "ind -ill contain so"e ele"ent co""on to it -ith all other realities -hich "akes the" all thinkable. #,$ Have not -e already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a co""on ele"ent, -hen -e said that "ind is in a sense potentially -hatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought9 8hat it thinks "ust be in it 4ust as characters "ay be said to be on a /0%'a2 -riting tablet on -hich as yet nothing actually stands -ritten= this is e3actly -hat happens -ith "ind. #1$ >ind is itself thinkable in e3actly the sa"e -ay as its ob4ects are. <or #a$ in the case of ob4ects -hich involve no "atter, -hat thinks and -hat is thought are identical6 for speculative kno-ledge

and its ob4ect are identical. #8hy "ind is not al-ays thinking -e "ust consider later.$ #b$ :n the case of those -hich contain "atter each of the ob4ects of thought is only potentially present. :t follo-s that -hile they -ill not have "ind in the" #for "ind is a potentiality of the" only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged fro" "atter$ "ind "ay yet be thinkable. Chapter & *ince in every class of things, as in nature as a -hole, -e find t-o factors involved, #,$ a "atter -hich is potentially all the particulars included in the class, #1$ a cause -hich is productive in the sense that it "akes the" all #the latter standing to the for"er, as e.g. an art to its "aterial$, these distinct ele"ents "ust like-ise be found -ithin the soul. And in fact "ind as -e have described it is -hat it is -hat it is by virtue of beco"ing all things, -hile there is another -hich is -hat it is by virtue of "aking all things= this is a sort of positive state like light6 for in a sense light "akes potential colours into actual colours. >ind in this sense of it is separable, i"passible, un"i3ed, since it is in its essential nature activity #for al-ays the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the "atter -hich it for"s$. Actual kno-ledge is identical -ith its ob4ect= in the individual, potential kno-ledge is in ti"e prior to actual kno-ledge, but in the universe as a -hole it is not prior even in ti"e. >ind is not at one ti"e kno-ing and at another not. 8hen "ind is set free fro" its present conditions it appears as 4ust -hat it is and nothing "ore= this alone is i""ortal and eternal #-e do not, ho-ever, re"e"ber its for"er activity because, -hile "ind in this sense is i"passible, "ind as passive is destructible$, and -ithout it nothing thinks. Chapter A he thinking then of the si"ple ob4ects of thought is found in those cases -here falsehood is i"possible= -here the alternative of true or false applies, there -e al-ays find a putting together of ob4ects of thought in a +uasi;unity. As @"pedocles said that 7-here heads of "any a creature sprouted -ithout necks7 they after-ards by ?ove7s po-er -ere co"bined, so here too ob4ects of thought -hich -ere given separate are co"bined, e.g. 7inco""ensurate7 and 7diagonal7= if the co"bination be of ob4ects past or future the co"bination of thought includes in its content the date. <or falsehood al-ays involves a synthesis6 /0%'b2 for even if you assert that -hat is -hite is not -hite you have included not -hite in a synthesis. :t is possible also to call all these cases division as -ell as co"bination. Ho-ever that "ay be, there is not only the true or false assertion that Cleon is -hite but also the true or false assertion that he -as or -ill he -hite. :n each and every case that -hich unifies is "ind. *ince the -ord 7si"ple7 has t-o senses, i.e. "ay "ean either #a$ 7not capable of being divided7 or #b$ 7not actually divided7, there is nothing to prevent "ind fro" kno-ing -hat is undivided, e.g. -hen it apprehends a length #-hich is actually undivided$ and that in an undivided ti"e6 for the ti"e is divided or undivided in the sa"e "anner as the line. :t is not possible, then, to tell -hat part of the line it -as apprehending in each half of the ti"e= the ob4ect has no actual parts until it has been divided= if in thought you think each half separately, then by the sa"e act you divide the ti"e also, the half;lines beco"ing as it -ere ne- -holes of length. (ut if you think it as a -hole consisting of these t-o possible parts, then also you think it in a ti"e -hich corresponds to both parts together. #(ut -hat is not +uantitatively but +ualitatively si"ple is thought in a si"ple ti"e and by a si"ple act of the soul.$ (ut that -hich "ind thinks and the ti"e in -hich it thinks are in this case divisible only incidentally and not as such. <or in the" too there is so"ething indivisible #though, it "ay be, not isolable$ -hich gives unity to the ti"e and the -hole of length6 and this is found e+ually in every continuu" -hether te"poral or spatial. Points and si"ilar instances of things that divide, the"selves being indivisible, are reali.ed in consciousness in the sa"e "anner as privations. A si"ilar account "ay be given of all other cases, e.g. ho- evil or black is cogni.ed6 they are cogni.ed, in a sense, by "eans of their contraries. hat -hich cogni.es "ust have an ele"ent of potentiality in its being, and one of the contraries "ust be in it. (ut if there is anything that has no contrary, then it kno-s itself and is actually and possesses independent e3istence.

Assertion is the saying of so"ething concerning so"ething, e.g. affir"ation, and is in every case either true or false= this is not al-ays the case -ith "ind= the thinking of the definition in the sense of the constitutive essence is never in error nor is it the assertion of so"ething concerning so"ething, but, 4ust as -hile the seeing of the special ob4ect of sight can never be in error, the belief that the -hite ob4ect seen is a "an "ay be "istaken, so too in the case of ob4ects -hich are -ithout "atter. Chapter C Actual kno-ledge is identical -ith its ob4ect= potential /0%,a2 kno-ledge in the individual is in ti"e prior to actual kno-ledge but in the universe it has no priority even in ti"e6 for all things that co"e into being arise fro" -hat actually is. :n the case of sense clearly the sensitive faculty already -as potentially -hat the ob4ect "akes it to be actually6 the faculty is not affected or altered. his "ust therefore be a different kind fro" "ove"ent6 for "ove"ent is, as -e sa-, an activity of -hat is i"perfect, activity in the un+ualified sense, i.e. that of -hat has been perfected, is different fro" "ove"ent. o perceive then is like bare asserting or kno-ing6 but -hen the ob4ect is pleasant or painful, the soul "akes a +uasi;affir"ation or negation, and pursues or avoids the ob4ect. o feel pleasure or pain is to act -ith the sensitive "ean to-ards -hat is good or bad as such. (oth avoidance and appetite -hen actual are identical -ith this= the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either fro" one another or fro" the faculty of sense;perception6 but their being is different. o the thinking soul i"ages serve as if they -ere contents of perception #and -hen it asserts or denies the" to be good or bad it avoids or pursues the"$. hat is -hy the soul never thinks -ithout an i"age. he process is like that in -hich the air "odifies the pupil in this or that -ay and the pupil trans"its the "odification to so"e third thing #and si"ilarly in hearing$, -hile the ulti"ate point of arrival is one, a single "ean, -ith different "anners of being. 8ith -hat part of itself the soul discri"inates s-eet fro" hot : have e3plained before and "ust nodescribe again as follo-s= hat -ith -hich it does so is a sort of unity, but in the -ay 4ust "entioned, i.e. as a connecting ter". And the t-o faculties it connects, being one by analogy and nu"erically, are each to each as the +ualities discerned are to one another #for -hat difference does it "ake -hether -e raise the proble" of discri"ination bet-een disparates or bet-een contraries, e.g. -hite and black9$. ?et then C be to D as A is to (= it follo-s alternando that C=A==D=(. :f then C and D belong to one sub4ect, the case -ill be the sa"e -ith the" as -ith and /0%,b2 A and ( for" a single identity -ith different "odes of being6 so too -ill the for"er pair. he sa"e reasoning holds if be s-eet and ( -hite. he faculty of thinking then thinks the for"s in the i"ages, and as in the for"er case -hat is to be pursued or avoided is "arked out for it, so -here there is no sensation and it is engaged upon the i"ages it is "oved to pursuit or avoidance. @.g.. perceiving by sense that the beacon is fire, it recogni.es in virtue of the general faculty of sense that it signifies an ene"y, because it sees it "oving6 but so"eti"es by "eans of the i"ages or thoughts -hich are -ithin the soul, 4ust as if it -ere seeing, it calculates and deliberates -hat is to co"e by reference to -hat is present6 and -hen it "akes a pronounce"ent, as in the case of sensation it pronounces the ob4ect to be pleasant or painful, in this case it avoids or persues and so generally in cases of action. hat too -hich involves no action, i.e. that -hich is true or false, is in the sa"e province -ith -hat is good or bad= yet they differ in this, that the one set i"ply and the other do not a reference to a particular person. he so;called abstract ob4ects the "ind thinks 4ust as, if one had thought of the snubnosed not as snub;nosed but as hollo-, one -ould have thought of an actuality -ithout the flesh in -hich it is e"bodied= it is thus that the "ind -hen it is thinking the ob4ects of >athe"atics thinks as separate ele"ents -hich do not e3ist separate. :n every case the "ind -hich is actively thinking is the ob4ects -hich it thinks. 8hether it is possible for it -hile not e3isting separate fro" spatial conditions to think anything that is separate, or not, -e "ust consider later. Chapter D ?et us no- su""ari.e our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a -ay all e3isting things6 for e3isting things are either sensible or thinkable, and kno-ledge is in a -ay -hat is kno-able, and sensation is in a -ay -hat is sensible= in -hat -ay -e "ust in+uire. Hno-ledge and sensation are

divided to correspond -ith the realities, potential kno-ledge and sensation ans-ering to potentialities, actual kno-ledge and sensation to actualities. 8ithin the soul the faculties of kno-ledge and sensation are potentially these ob4ects, the one -hat is kno-able, the other -hat is sensible. hey "ust be either the things the"selves or their for"s. he for"er alternative is of course i"possible= it is not the stone -hich is present in the soul but its for". :t follo-s that the soul is analogous to the hand6 for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the "ind is the for" of /0%1a2 for"s and sense the for" of sensible things. *ince according to co""on agree"ent there is nothing outside and separate in e3istence fro" sensible spatial "agnitudes, the ob4ects of thought are in the sensible for"s, vi.. both the abstract ob4ects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence #,$ no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and #-hen the "ind is actively a-are of anything it is necessarily a-are of it along -ith an i"age6 for i"ages are like sensuous contents e3cept in that they contain no "atter. :"agination is different fro" assertion and denial6 for -hat is true or false involves a synthesis of concepts. :n -hat -ill the pri"ary concepts differ fro" i"ages9 >ust -e not say that neither these nor even our other concepts are i"ages, though they necessarily involve the"9 Chapter E he soul of ani"als is characteri.ed by t-o faculties, #a$ the faculty of discri"ination -hich is the -ork of thought and sense, and #b$ the faculty of originating local "ove"ent. *ense and "ind -e have no- sufficiently e3a"ined. ?et us ne3t consider -hat it is in the soul -hich originates "ove"ent. :s it a single part of the soul separate either spatially or in definition9 !r is it the soul as a -hole9 :f it is a part, is that part different fro" those usually distinguished or already "entioned by us, or is it one of the"9 he proble" at once presents itself, in -hat sense -e are to speak of parts of the soul, or ho- "any -e should distinguish. <or in a sense there is an infinity of parts= it is not enough to distinguish, -ith so"e thinkers, the calculative, the passionate, and the desiderative, or -ith others the rational and the irrational6 for if -e take the dividing lines follo-ed by these thinkers -e shall find parts far "ore distinctly separated fro" one another than these, na"ely those -e have 4ust "entioned= #,$ the nutritive, -hich belongs both to plants and to all ani"als, and #1$ the sensitive, -hich cannot easily be classed as either irrational or rational6 further #%$ the i"aginative, -hich is, /0%1b2 in its being, different fro" all, -hile it is very hard to say -ith -hich of the others it is the sa"e or not the sa"e, supposing -e deter"ine to posit separate parts in the soul6 and lastly #0$ the appetitive, -hich -ould see" to be distinct both in definition and in po-er fro" all hitherto enu"erated. :t is absurd to break up the last;"entioned faculty= as these thinkers do, for -ish is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational6 and if the soul is tripartite appetite -ill be found in all three parts. urning our attention to the present ob4ect of discussion, let us ask -hat that is -hich originates local "ove"ent of the ani"al. he "ove"ent of gro-th and decay, being found in all living things, "ust be attributed to the faculty of reproduction and nutrition, -hich is co""on to all= inspiration and e3piration, sleep and -aking, -e "ust consider later= these too present "uch difficulty= at present -e "ust consider local "ove"ent, asking -hat it is that originates for-ard "ove"ent in the ani"al. hat it is not the nutritive faculty is obvious6 for this kind of "ove"ent is al-ays for an end and is acco"panied either by i"agination or by appetite6 for no ani"al "oves e3cept by co"pulsion unless it has an i"pulse to-ards or a-ay fro" an ob4ect. <urther, if it -ere the nutritive faculty, even plants -ould have been capable of originating such "ove"ent and -ould have possessed the organs necessary to carry it out. *i"ilarly it cannot be the sensitive faculty either6 for there are "any ani"als -hich have sensibility but re"ain fast and i""ovable throughout their lives. :f then 5ature never "akes anything -ithout a purpose and never leaves out -hat is necessary #e3cept in the case of "utilated or i"perfect gro-ths6 and that here -e have neither "utilation nor i"perfection "ay be argued fro" the facts that such ani"als #a$ can reproduce their species and #b$ rise to co"pleteness of nature and decay to an end$, it follo-s that, had they been capable of originating for-ard "ove"ent, they -ould have possessed the organs necessary for that purpose. <urther, neither can the calculative faculty or -hat is called 7"ind7 be the cause of such "ove"ent6

for "ind as speculative never thinks -hat is practicable, it never says anything about an ob4ect to be avoided or pursued, -hile this "ove"ent is al-ays in so"ething -hich is avoiding or pursuing an ob4ect. 5o, not even -hen it is a-are of such an ob4ect does it at once en4oin pursuit or avoidance of it6 e.g. the "ind often thinks of so"ething terrifying or pleasant -ithout en4oining the e"otion of fear. :t is the heart that is "oved #or in the case of a pleasant ob4ect so"e other part$. <urther, even -hen /0%%a2 the "ind does co""and and thought bids us pursue or avoid so"ething, so"eti"es no "ove"ent is produced6 -e act in accordance -ith desire, as in the case of "oral -eakness. And, generally, -e observe that the possessor of "edical kno-ledge is not necessarily healing, -hich sho-s that so"ething else is re+uired to produce action in accordance -ith kno-ledge6 the kno-ledge alone is not the cause. ?astly, appetite too is inco"petent to account fully for "ove"ent6 for those -ho successfully resist te"ptation have appetite and desire and yet follo- "ind and refuse to enact that for -hich they have appetite. Chapter ,' hese t-o at all events appear to be sources of "ove"ent= appetite and "ind #if one "ay venture to regard i"agination as a kind of thinking6 for "any "en follo- their i"aginations contrary to kno-ledge, and in all ani"als other than "an there is no thinking or calculation but only i"agination$. (oth of these then are capable of originating local "ove"ent, "ind and appetite= #,$ "ind, that is, -hich calculates "eans to an end, i.e. "ind practical #it differs fro" "ind speculative in the character of its end$6 -hile #1$ appetite is in every for" of it relative to an end= for that -hich is the ob4ect of appetite is the sti"ulant of "ind practical6 and that -hich is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action. :t follo-s that there is a 4ustification for regarding these t-o as the sources of "ove"ent, i.e. appetite and practical thought6 for the ob4ect of appetite starts a "ove"ent and as a result of that thought gives rise to "ove"ent, the ob4ect of appetite being it a source of sti"ulation. *o too -hen i"agination originates "ove"ent, it necessarily involves appetite. hat -hich "oves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite6 for if there had been t-o sources of "ove"ent ;; "ind and appetite ;; they -ould have produced "ove"ent in virtue of so"e co""on character. As it is, "ind is never found producing "ove"ent -ithout appetite #for -ish is a for" of appetite6 and -hen "ove"ent is produced according to calculation it is also according to -ish$, but appetite can originate "ove"ent contrary to calculation, for desire is a for" of appetite. 5o- "ind is al-ays right, but appetite and i"agination "ay be either right or -rong. hat is -hy, though in any case it is the ob4ect of appetite -hich originates "ove"ent, this ob4ect "ay be either the real or the apparent good. o produce "ove"ent the ob4ect "ust be "ore than this= it "ust be good that can be brought into being by action6 and only -hat can be other-ise than as it is can thus be brought into being. hat then such a po-er in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates "ove"ent /0%%b2 is clear. hose -ho distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance -ith differences of po-er, find the"selves -ith a very large nu"ber of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and no- an appetitive part6 for these are "ore different fro" one another than the faculties of desire and passion. *ince appetites run counter to one another, -hich happens -hen a principle of reason and a desire are contrary and is possible only in beings -ith a sense of ti"e #for -hile "ind bids us hold back because of -hat is future, desire is influenced by -hat is 4ust at hand= a pleasant ob4ect -hich is 4ust at hand presents itself as both pleasant and good, -ithout condition in either case, because of -ant of foresight into -hat is farther a-ay in ti"e$, it follo-s that -hile that -hich originates "ove"ent "ust be specifically one, vi.. the faculty of appetite as such #or rather farthest back of all the ob4ect of that faculty6 for it is it that itself re"aining un"oved originates the "ove"ent by being apprehended in thought or i"agination$, the things that originate "ove"ent are nu"erically "any. All "ove"ent involves three factors, #,$ that -hich originates the "ove"ent, #1$ that by "eans of -hich it originates it, and #%$ that -hich is "oved. he e3pression 7that -hich originates the "ove"ent7 is a"biguous= it "ay "ean either #a$ so"ething -hich itself is un"oved or #b$ that -hich at once "oves and is "oved. Here that -hich "oves -ithout itself being "oved is the reali.able good, that -hich at once "oves and is "oved is the faculty of appetite #for that -hich is influenced by appetite so far as it is actually so influenced is set in "ove"ent, and appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a kind of "ove"ent$, -hile that -hich is in "otion is the ani"al. he instru"ent -hich appetite e"ploys to produce "ove"ent is no longer psychical but bodily= hence the

e3a"ination of it falls -ithin the province of the functions co""on to body and soul. o state the "atter su""arily at present, that -hich is the instru"ent in the production of "ove"ent is to be found -here a beginning and an end coincide as e.g. in a ball and socket 4oint6 for there the conve3 and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning #that is -hy -hile the one re"ains at rest, the other is "oved$= they are separate in definition but not separable spatially. <or everything is "oved by pushing and pulling. Hence 4ust as in the case of a -heel, so here there "ust be a point -hich re"ains at rest, and fro" that point the "ove"ent "ust originate. o su" up, then, and repeat -hat : have said, inas"uch as an ani"al is capable of appetite it is capable of self;"ove"ent6 it is not capable of appetite -ithout possessing i"agination6 and all i"agination is either #,$ calculative or #1$ sensitive. :n the latter all ani"als, and not only "an, partake. Chapter ,, 8e "ust consider also in the case of i"perfect ani"als, sc. those -hich have no sense but touch, -hat it is that in the" originates "ove"ent. Can they have /0%0a2 i"agination or not9 or desire9 Clearly they have feelings of pleasure and pain, and if they have these they "ust have desire. (ut ho- can they have i"agination9 >ust not -e say that, as their "ove"ents are indefinite, they have i"agination and desire, but indefinitely9 *ensitive i"agination, as -e have said, is found in all ani"als, deliberative i"agination only in those that are calculative= for -hether this or that shall be enacted is already a task re+uiring calculation6 and there "ust be a single standard to "easure by, for that is pursued -hich is greater. :t follo-s that -hat acts in this -ay "ust be able to "ake a unity out of several i"ages. his is the reason -hy i"agination is held not to involve opinion, in that it does not involve opinion based on inference, though opinion involves i"agination. Hence appetite contains no deliberative ele"ent. *o"eti"es it overpo-ers -ish and sets it in "ove"ent= at ti"es -ish acts thus upon appetite, like one sphere i"parting its "ove"ent to another, or appetite acts thus upon appetite, i.e. in the condition of "oral -eakness #though by nature the higher faculty is al-ays "ore authoritative and gives rise to "ove"ent$. hus three "odes of "ove"ent are possible. he faculty of kno-ing is never "oved but re"ains at rest. *ince the one pre"iss or 4udge"ent is universal and the other deals -ith the particular #for the first tells us that such and such a kind of "an should do such and such a kind of act, and the second that this is an act of the kind "eant, and : a person of the type intended$, it is the latter opinion that really originates "ove"ent, not the universal6 or rather it is both, but the one does so -hile it re"ains in a state "ore like rest, -hile the other partakes in "ove"ent. Chapter ,1 he nutritive soul then "ust be possessed by everything that is alive, and every such thing is endo-ed -ith soul fro" its birth to its death. <or -hat has been born "ust gro-, reach "aturity, and decay ;; all of -hich are i"possible -ithout nutrition. herefore the nutritive faculty "ust be found in everything that gro-s and decays. (ut sensation need not be found in all things that live. <or it is i"possible for touch to belong either #,$ to those -hose body is unco"pounded or #1$ to those -hich are incapable of taking in the for"s -ithout their "atter. (ut ani"als "ust be endo-ed -ith sensation, since 5ature does nothing in vain. <or all things that e3ist by 5ature are "eans to an end, or -ill be conco"itants of "eans to an end. @very body capable of for-ard "ove"ent /0%0b2 -ould, if unendo-ed -ith sensation, perish and fail to reach its end, -hich is the ai" of 5ature6 for ho- could it obtain nutri"ent9 *tationary living things, it is true, have as their nutri"ent that fro" -hich they have arisen6 but it is not possible that a body -hich is not stationary but produced by generation should have a soul and a discerning "ind -ithout also having sensation. #5or yet even if it -ere not produced by generation. 8hy should it not have sensation9 (ecause it -ere better so either for the body or for the soul9 (ut clearly it -ould not be better for either= the absence of sensation -ill not enable the one to think better or the other to e3ist better.$ herefore no body -hich is not stationary has soul -ithout sensation. (ut if a body has sensation, it "ust be either si"ple or co"pound. And si"ple it cannot be6 for then

it could not have touch, -hich is indispensable. his is clear fro" -hat follo-s. An ani"al is a body -ith soul in it= every body is tangible, i.e. perceptible by touch6 hence necessarily, if an ani"al is to survive, its body "ust have tactual sensation. All the other senses, e.g. s"ell, sight, hearing, apprehend through "edia6 but -here there is i""ediate contact the ani"al, if it has no sensation, -ill be unable to avoid so"e things and take others, and so -ill find it i"possible to survive. hat is -hy taste also is a sort of touch6 it is relative to nutri"ent, -hich is 4ust tangible body6 -hereas sound, colour, and odour are innutritious, and further neither gro- nor decay. Hence it is that taste also "ust be a sort of touch, because it is the sense for -hat is tangible and nutritious. (oth these senses, then, are indispensable to the ani"al, and it is clear that -ithout touch it is i"possible for an ani"al to be. All the other senses subserve -ell;being and for that very reason belong not to any and every kind of ani"al, but only to so"e, e.g. those capable of for-ard "ove"ent "ust have the"6 for, if they are to survive, they "ust perceive not only by i""ediate contact but also at a distance fro" the ob4ect. his -ill be possible if they can perceive through a "ediu", the "ediu" being affected and "oved by the perceptible ob4ect, and the ani"al by the "ediu". 4ust as that -hich produces local "ove"ent causes a change e3tending to a certain point, and that -hich gave an i"pulse causes another to produce a ne- i"pulse so that the "ove"ent traverses a "ediu" the first "over i"pelling -ithout being i"pelled, the last "oved being i"pelled -ithout i"pelling, -hile the "ediu" #or "edia, for there are "any$ is both ;; so is it also in the case of alteration, e3cept that the agent produces it /0%&a2 -ithout the patient7s changing its place. hus if an ob4ect is dipped into -a3, the "ove"ent goes on until sub"ersion has taken place, and in stone it goes no distance at all, -hile in -ater the disturbance goes far beyond the ob4ect dipped= in air the disturbance is propagated farthest of all, the air acting and being acted upon, so long as it "aintains an unbroken unity. hat is -hy in the case of reflection it is better, instead of saying that the sight issues fro" the eye and is reflected, to say that the air, so long as it re"ains one, is affected by the shape and colour. !n a s"ooth surface the air possesses unity6 hence it is that it in turn sets the sight in "otion, 4ust as if the i"pression on the -a3 -ere trans"itted as far as the -a3 e3tends. Chapter ,% :t is clear that the body of an ani"al cannot be si"ple, i.e. consist of one ele"ent such as fire or air. <or -ithout touch it is i"possible to have any other sense6 for every body that has soul in it "ust, as -e have said, be capable of touch. All the other ele"ents -ith the e3ception of earth can constitute organs of sense, but all of the" bring about perception only through so"ething else, vi.. through the "edia. ouch takes place by direct contact -ith its ob4ects, -hence also its na"e. All the other organs of sense, no doubt, perceive by contact, only the contact is "ediate= touch alone perceives by i""ediate contact. Conse+uently no ani"al body can consist of these other ele"ents. 5or can it consist solely of earth. <or touch is as it -ere a "ean bet-een all tangible +ualities, and its organ is capable of receiving not only all the specific +ualities -hich characteri.e earth, but also the hot and the cold and all other tangible +ualities -hatsoever. hat is -hy -e have no /0%&b2 sensation by "eans of bones, hair, Fc., because they consist of earth. *o too plants, because they consist of earth, have no sensation. 8ithout touch there can be no other sense, and the organ of touch cannot consist of earth or of any other single ele"ent. :t is evident, therefore, that the loss of this one sense alone "ust bring about the death of an ani"al. <or as on the one hand nothing -hich is not an ani"al can have this sense, so on the other it is the only one -hich is indispensably necessary to -hat is an ani"al. his e3plains, further, the follo-ing difference bet-een the other senses and touch. :n the case of all the others e3cess of intensity in the +ualities -hich they apprehend, i.e. e3cess of intensity in colour, sound, and s"ell, destroys not the but only the organs of the sense #e3cept incidentally, as -hen the sound is acco"panied by an i"pact or shock, or -here through the ob4ects of sight or of s"ell certain other things are set in "otion, -hich destroy by contact$6 flavour also destroys only in so far as it is at the sa"e ti"e tangible. (ut e3cess of intensity in tangible +ualities, e.g. heat, cold, or hardness, destroys the ani"al itself. As in the case of every sensible +uality e3cess destroys the organ, so here -hat is tangible destroys touch, -hich is the essential "ark of life6 for it has been sho-n that -ithout touch it is i"possible for an ani"al to be. hat is -hy e3cess in intensity of tangible +ualities destroys not "erely the organ, but the ani"al itself, because this is the only sense -hich it "ust have. All the other senses are necessary to ani"als, as -e have said, not for their being, but for their -ell; being. *uch, e.g. is sight, -hich, since it lives in air or -ater, or generally in -hat is pellucid, it "ust have in order to see, and taste because of -hat is pleasant or painful to it, in order that it "ay

perceive these +ualities in its nutri"ent and so "ay desire to be set in "otion, and hearing that it "ay have co""unication "ade to it, and a tongue that it "ay co""unicate -ith its fello-s.