Topic 4: Perception / Primary and Secondary Qualities Reading List Locke, Essay, Book II, Chs.

Book II, Chs. 8&9 Lowe 1995, Ch. 3 Mackie 1976, Chs. 1&2 Bennett 1971, Ch. 4 Bennett 2001, Ch. 25 Ayers 1993, vol. I, Part 3 Lowe 2005, Ch. 2 Newman 2007, Ch. 4 (also available via Moodle) Michael Ayers 1998, Locke, John. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DA054SECT4 Michael Martin 1998, Perception. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V023 A.D. Smith 1998, Primarysecondary distinction. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N077 Michael Martin, Stanford entry on the Problem of Perception http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/perception-problem/ Lawrence BonJour, Stanford entry on the Epistemological Problems of Perception http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/perception-episprob/ (See the Moodle site for further online resources)

Tutorial discussion topics What is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities for Locke? To what extent is this grounded in a commitment to corpuscularian science? What are Lockes arguments for this distinction? Are they sound? (NB: note that how many arguments you find is a matter of textual interpretation look at the text closely and make up your own mind.) Does the distinction between primary and secondary qualities map on to one clear distinction, or does it conflate a number of distinctions? What is Molyneuxs question? Does Locke provide an adequate answer? Why does solidity raise problems for Locke? What is an indirect realist theory of perception? Why might Locke be thought to advocate one? What is the veil of perception doctrine? Is Bennett correct to charge Locke with being committed to this? How plausible is Lowes adverbialist reading of Locke?