Professional Documents
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Crim - Part I-III Cases
Crim - Part I-III Cases
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984 ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents. AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1 At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another. Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu tenwheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination. They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the AntiCattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144). Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1). The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.) The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.) Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular. That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the
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EN BANC G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents. ESCOLIN, J.: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 18131817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847. b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501,
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EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant. MAKASIAR, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following pronouncement: Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
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G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983 ISIDRO BERNARDO and CAYETANO BERNARDO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. RELOVA, J.: FIRST DIVISION Petitioner Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan
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EN BANC G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969 ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitionerappellee, vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants. FERNANDO, J.: The broad, all-embracing sweep of the selfincrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution. 2 Bermudez v. Castillo , 3 decided in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4 Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan , 5 where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the AntiGraft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondentappellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
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FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged: That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, and confederating with one another with Anecito Ellevera who is at large, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot with firearms one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital parts of the body thereby inflicting mortal wounds, causing the direct and instantaneous death of the said Julius Cagampang. CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed.
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G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent. SARMIENTO, J.: This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
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(Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the following questions and answers: xxx xxx xxx Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the incident you are referring? A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person whom I can recognize by face if seen again embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the area. That this person without much ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other and immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long hair, dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or less 5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person fled the area I immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may companion (Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any words to me for he was in serious condition and few minutes later, he expired. Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.? A-15. He was alone Sir. Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question? A-16. Yes, Sir, Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were
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due to his physical appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson. During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was confiscated in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson positively Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim. Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used said knife for slicing mangoes. 11 xxx xxx xxx We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger. In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him. The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect. 12 The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one eyewitness,
(Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as that embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio. xxx xxx xxx From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter Trade, wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was arrested in connection with the above stated incident. That this Officer and companions arrested this person Usman
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Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage the Identification of the accused. As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted. Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially. Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned, his statement was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendorfrom whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbingwas investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime, was not also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the killing or of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23 Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it would have revealed whether or not the knife in question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife could
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EN BANC G.R. No. 5272 March 19, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendant-appellant. CARSON, J.: The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place
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EN BANC G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants. MORAN, J.: Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment. In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the abovequoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina , he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see
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EN BANC
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PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 8610126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country. Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint). The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the
Japanese Yen Swiss Franc Australian Dollar Singapore Dollar Deutsche Marck Canadian Dollar Hongkong Dollar HFL Guilder French Franc US Dollar English Pound Malaysian Dollar (in checks)
Y 32,800,000.00 SW. FR 6,9000.00 A$ 17,425.00 S$ 9,945.00 DM 18,595.00 CS 13,330.00 HK$ 15,630.00 HFL 430.00 F/6,860.00 US$ 73,950.00 5,318.00 M$. 14,760.00
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THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-75390 March 25, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO VALDEZ and SINIPLICIO ORODIO alias "Kamlon", appellants. FELICIANO, J.: This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, convicting the accused-appellants Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to death. The accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio were charged in an information which read as follows: That on or about the 7th day of June, 1977, in the Municipality of Santol, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with a fire arm, with treachery and evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shoot Eleno Maquiling inflicting upon him a gunshot wound which caused the victim's instantaneous death. That the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was present in the commission of the crime. Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. After arraignment and trial, the trial court rendered in due course, on 27 June 1986, a decision finding both of the accused guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
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moved by any improper motive to accuse falsely the accused-appellant one a relative and the other an old acquaintance of so grave a crime as murder. The circumstance that Esmenia waited for thirteen (13) days after her son's assassination before reporting the Identities of the accused to the authorities, was not unnatural in itself. She explained the delay by saying that she was afraid to talk about the killing and that she had seen the accused loitering frequently around the Maquilings' house, carrying a gun, after the burial of her son. 10 The trial court observed that Esmenia's fear was not imaginary because the night that she reported the Identities of the accused their house was stoned by unidentified persons. The delay was satisfactorily explained. In People vs. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260, it was held that delay of witness for several months, because of fear, in reporting the incident to the police does not affect credibility. "Fear of likely retaliation by the several accused who were still at large has been considered as a justified reason for the witnesses' delay in coming forward with their testimony' (People vs. Sampang, 16 SCRA 531; People vs. Equal, 14 SCRA 89). 11 This explanation does not appear incredible in itself and certainly such a delay of thirteen(13)days, under the circumstances of this case, does not warrant a conclusion that her testimony as to the Identities of the killers of her son was false. In People v. Martinez, 12 the Court held that the failure of a witness to reveal immediately the Identities of the accused does not militate against his credibility. Both Esmenia Maquiling and Dionisio Maquiling did not testify that they had actually seen either Danilo Valdez or Simplicio Orodio shooting at the deceased victim. The principal evidence against the accused is, therefore, circumstantial in character. The trial court recognized this and was careful to analyze the chain of circumstantial evidence on the basis of which the trial court concluded that the two (2) accused had killed Eleno Maquiling: While the prosecution failed to present an eye witness to the actual shooting by the accused of deceased Eleno, the chain of circumstances, prior and subsequent to the killing, leaves no room for doubt that accused are the guilty persons. The rule is that before conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the authors of the crime. (People vs. Pamintuan, 127 SCRA 820). In this case, this requisite has been fully met.
Esmenia's testimony was corroborated by the equally definite testimony of Dionisio Maquiling, who declared that: Q. Where were you at the time your brother was shot to death? A. I was in our kitchen eating. Q. Where was your brother then at the time he was shot in relation to your house? A. He was west of our kitchen. Q. In what particular part of your house, inside or outside? A. Outside of our house. Q. What time was your brother shot to death? A. More or less 8 o'clock in the evening. Q. You said you were in the kitchen of your house eating and you Pointed to Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias "Kamlon" as the persons who shot your brother. How were you able to see Simplicio Orodio and Danilo Valdez shoot your brother? A. I saw them. Q. Will you relate how were you able to see Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias Kamlon shoot your brother Eleno Maquiling? A. When I was eating facing westward I heard a gunshot and when I looked through the north I saw Danilo Valdez running being followed by Simplicio Orodio. Q. When you looked northward and you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio running, did you see anything in their possession? A. A gun. (Witness showing a length of about half a meter). Q. Who of the two, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio was hiding the gun? A. Danilo Valdez.
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The trial court found the testimony of witnesses Esmenia and Dionisio as positive, credible and reliable. We find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court. It is commonplace that "the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses are to be given great weight and a high degree of respect by the appellate court". 9 There is nothing in the record to show that the prosecution witnesses were
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SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. 111294-95 September 7, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. WALTER NACIONAL alias "KA DENNIS," ABSALON MILLAMINA alias "KA ALVIN," EFREN MUSA, RUDY LUCES, JAVIER MIRABETE alias "COMMANDER," and ZACARIAS MILITANTE alias "CARE, " accused. JAVIER MIRABETE alias "COMMANDER," accused-appellant. PUNO, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City in Criminal Cases Nos. 4854-4855. On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis," Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier Mirabete alias "Commander, " and Zacarias Militante alias "Care" were charged with murder in two separate informations. The first information reads as follows: That on or about the 21st day of February 1985 at Brgy. Salvacion, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court , the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and
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SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.EMELIANO TRINIDAD, accused-appellant. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: On the sole issue that the adduced evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of Murder and one of Frustrated Murder with which he has been charged, accused Emeliano Trinidad appeals from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. From the testimony of the principal witness, Ricardo TAN, the prosecution presents the following factual version:
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SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-31922 October 29, 1976 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. RICARDO VELASCO Y ABENOJAR, defendant-appellant. FERNANDO, J.: This Court has not been hesitant in the choice of words appropriate for expressing its disapproval of the act of utilizing force to compel a woman to submit to a man's lust. So it should be, but never was the condemnation more vehement than when the victim was a young and helpless child of tender years, in which case the law has wisely seen to it that the mere fact of her being below the statutory age suffices to affix the stamp of criminality on the deed. 1 For her, it would be a traumatic experience likely to cast a blight on the years that lie ahead. Equally so for the parents, it brings untold grief and suffering. As the offended party in this case was only five years of age. when the offense of rape for which the accused was indicted and convicted took place, the only question before this Court on appeal is whether there was proof sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Precisely because of the sense of pity and sympathy aroused by the misfortune that befell the poor child, this Court scrutinized the records much more carefully. The conclusion reached is that the appealed decision is in conformity with law and that the appellant should be made to expiate for his crime by serving the sentence of reclusion perpetua. It is a little unusual to notice that counsel for the appellant explicitly stated that he was "quoting the pertinent narration of facts of the trial court in its decision of February 18, 1970, to be [his] statement of facts." 2 Earlier, though, he did assert: "At most, on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, subjected to the above tests, the fact of the commission of the crime might have been proven, but certainly, we submit not the commission of the crime by the accused." 3 The fact as noted by the trial judge, the Honorable Gregorio T. Lantin, now retired, follow: "It appears that at about 5:30 in the afternoon of the 2nd day of November, 1967, the offended party, Estelita Lopez, a child, five years old, accompanied by her cousin Nenita Lopez, another child, four years old, were at the North Cemetery, Manila. The defendant, Ricardo Velasco y Abenojar, called them, gave Nenita a five-centavo coin and asked her to buy cigarettes for him. After she left, the accused held Estelita by the hand and brought her to an alley. Once in a hidden place between the
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