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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENERGY CONVERSION, VOL. 22, NO.

1, MARCH 2007

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Large-Scale Integration of Wind Generation Including Network Temporal Security Analysis


Santiago Grijalva, Member, IEEE, Scott R. Dahman, Member, IEEE, Kollin J. Patten, Member, IEEE, and Anthony M. Visnesky, Jr.

AbstractThis paper presents a methodology to assess largescale wind generation projects that considers their effect on network security. The proposed method is based on contingency analysis, including temporal study. Inputs to the simulation are grid model, forecasted load, conventional generation proles, and wind variability of proposed projects. A time-step simulation is run for the time horizon to produce benet indices for every location (bus) in the system. The congested transmission elements that require expansion are identied and ranked as part of the simulation. Each wind project in the proposed portfolio can result in benets or costs for grid security. Policy makers can then use the method to design policies that ensure preservation of long-term system security. Developers could use the tool to identify security effects and assess their wind portfolios. Measuring network security and determining benets of large-scale wind projects is a complex planning task that involves several aspects: temporal wind variability, spatial distribution of ows, multiple load and generation proles, and numerous possible contingencies. All these wind project development aspects must be isolated to identify and correctly assign security costs and benets. Index TermsGeneration planning, transmission loading relief (TLR), wind integration, wind variability.

I. INTRODUCTION ind power is playing an increasingly important role in modern electric power systems. Wind projects today are large enough to have a signicant effect on transmission network security, operation, and planning. Worldwide, rapid installation growth, increased turbine size, and large-scale wind farm development demand an integration of large-scale wind projects with generation and transmission planning, to ensure generation adequacy and secure grid operation. This has created several engineering challenges not encountered in conventional generation planning [1], [2]. Large-scale wind projects usually consist of a rather large number of turbines arranged in a wind farm. The power produced by the farm is usually gathered by a lower voltage collector system of transmission elements and then interconnected to an existing high voltage substation. In most instances, this substation was not originally designed for this purpose and usually had to be expanded. Often, a completely new high-voltage

substation and long transmission lines are needed to inject wind power [3]. There is an increasing need for systematic, integrated planning processes that ensure energy adequacy and identify wind resources broader impact on grid security [4], [5]. Utilities could consider system security goals, strategically site wind generation, and allow the grid to move toward healthier operating conditions. An adequate level of security is critical to power systems operation. For example, in systems operated under competitive market regimes, poor transmission planning creates long-term congestion, price volatility, and opportunities for the exercise of market power. This paper proposes a novel methodology to assess generation impacts on system reliability and locational value representations for strategic siting, portfolio evaluation, and policy design. Integration of a large-scale wind project depends on different elements that may be observed as dimensions of a planning problem: 1) The location of the wind generation project and its point or points of connection (spatial dimension). 2) The size of the project and the variability of wind output across time (temporal dimension). 3) The different events that result in overloaded elements requiring transmission system expansion (contingency dimension). To capture these multidimensional aspects, a set of security metrics is designed and used to assess new projects effect on security. Starting with a given system security level, the new projects generation output and its designed transmission expansion result in a measurable change to system security that can be represented as project cost/benet. We start by dening and measuring grid security for a single point in time in Section II. Temporal analysis and the determination of security costs are introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we extend temporal analysis to wind generation portfolio evaluation. A small system is used to demonstrate the details of the calculations. A large-scale realistic system example is also presented. II. MEASURING SECURITY

Manuscript received July 12, 2006; revised October 16, 2006. This work was supported in part by the California Energy Commission. Paper no. TEC-003032006. S. Grijalva, S. R. Dahman, and K. J. Patten are with PowerWorld Corporation, Champaign, IL 61820 USA (e-mail: santiago@powerworld.com; scott@ powerworld.com; kollin@powerworld.com). A. M. Visnesky, Jr. is with Anthony Engineering Associates, Pompano Beach, FL 33069 USA, and also with Trexco LLC, Indianapolis, IN 46204 USA. Digital Object Identier 10.1109/TEC.2006.889617

A. Aggregate Contingency Overload From a steady-state viewpoint, network security considers: no loss of load, bus voltages within power quality bounds, transmission element ows within thermal limits, and system operation away from the static voltage collapse point [6], [7]. Contingency analysis drives the design of system expansion that determines quasi-optimal network congurations and

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injections of power into the system. The North American Electric Reliability Council has recommended that systems be designed and operated to withstand N 1 and N 2 contingencies. Nevertheless, most realistic systems are not compliant with N 1 criteria during periods of high demand. Operators use remedial action schemes to correct postcontingency violations. Contingency analysis can also rank transmission elements by their relative weakness. Weakness of a transmission element is hereby understood as the need to apply system upgrades or to design system expansion to avoid thermal overloads. We dene the active power aggregate contingency overload, PACO , as the sum of all overload ow present on a transmission element during a processed set of contingencies. This quantity is expressed in megawatts (MW) and is usually calculated as the millivoltampere (MVA) rating of the element multiplied by the sum of the percent overload detected under each contingency: PACO, BRANCH j k = MVARatingBRANCH jk
Contingencies that overloaded branch jk

A wind power injection will simultaneously affect several branches to varying degrees under different contingency conditions. An equivalent TLR (ETLR) sensitivity can be obtained to capture the overall change of contingency ows due to the injection ETLRBUS i = jk Overloaded
Elements Contingencies that overloaded branch jk

TLRBUS i, BRANCH jk CONT c.

(5) However, to take into account the severity of the contingency overloads, we weight the TLRs by the PACO . This WTLR can be computed using postcontingency TLR values or approximated using base-case TLR values as follows: CODirBRANCH jk N TLRBUS i,BRANCH jk WTLRBUS i = CONT SYS PACO PACO,BRANCH jk jkBranches (6) where NCONT is the number of contingencies and the TLR SYS weight is given byPACO, BRANCH jk/PACO . CODir is the overload direction dened as 1 if the line is overloaded in the forward direction during all the contingencies that overloaded that line, 1 if it is always overloaded in the reverse direction during all contingencies, and 0 otherwise. The ETLR sensitivity represents the total expected MW contingency overload reduction, in all branches and under all contingencies, if 1 MW is injected at that particular bus. Negative values of ETLR and WTLR indicate that new generation will tend to reduce overloads and increase overall system security. Positive values mean the opposite. C. Temporal Analysis of Security We have seen how instantaneous system security can be meaSYS sured through the PACO metric. As system demand changes following daily, weekly, and seasonal cycles, the ows in transmission elements will vary accordingly and overloads will in general be reduced compared to peak demand. Contingency analysis can be run for each hour of demand input values, and PACO values can be obtained for each transmission element and for each hour. If we integrate the PACO values of a transmission element across time (e.g., one year), we will obtain the aggregate contingency overload energy of that element. Approximating this as the sum of PACO values for each timepoint, we have
T

(%Overload 100).

(1) Since the PACO can be computed for every branch in the SYS system, a system aggregate contingency overload metric PACO can be dened as the sum of the PACO of each branch PACO =
Branches jk SYS

PACO,BRANCH jk .

(2)

B. Weak Element Ranking and Weighted Transmission Loading Relief (WTLR) Sensitivities [8] If we run contingency analysis (i.e., N 1) for any realistic power system during peak load, we will identify several elements that present thermal violations. These elements can be ranked based on their PACO value. Elements that were not overloaded during any contingency will have zero PACO . When a wind project is installed at a certain location (bus) in the system, the injection will presumably replace generation at some conventional units. This represents a transfer from the wind location to a multiple-point sink. As the output of the wind unit (the transfer) increases, the ows in the transmission elements will change. TLR sensitivities can be calculated to assess branch ow change with respect to wind output during normal operation MWFlowBRANCH jk . (3) TLRBUS i, BRANCH jk = MWInjectionBUS i For contingency conditions, it is necessary to calculate postcontingency TLR sensitivities, dened as the branch postcontingency ow change with respect to the injection at a certain bus assuming a transfer sink TLRBUS i, BRANCH jk CONT c PostContMWFlowBRANCH jk CONT c = . MWInjectionBUS i (4)

EACO,BRANCH jk =
t=1

PACO,BRANCH jk, t.

(7)

A metric could be obtained to measure overall system security for the time horizon considered
T SYS EACO = t=1 SYS PACO, t = Branches jk

EACO,BRANCH jk,t .

(8)

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TABLE I WEAK ELEMENT PACO FOR THE SEVEN-BUS SYSTEM

Fig. 1.

Seven-bus system. Base case and weak lines based on their EACO.

The determination of security metrics such as PACO and EACO is a key aspect within integrated planning and operation. Elements that are consistently overloaded under contingencies (congested elements) will have high values of EACO , affecting overall system security. a) Planning can use the metrics to identify and rank weak elements and design transmission expansion alternatives. b) Operators can get a better feel for real-time operation when SYS the PACO reaches high levels or experiences unexpected excursions. SYS c) Regulators can use the EACO to determine how the overall system security evolves year after year, and propose policies and regulations to try to maintain adequate levels. D. Security Evaluation Example Consider the seven-bus case shown in Fig. 1, which has four existing generators at buses 1, 4, 6 and 7. Three different wind projects of 50 MW each have been proposed at buses 2, 3 and 6. These new generators are initially disconnected and appear grayed-out. We want to analyze the security of this system and assess the new wind generations effect, using a temporal simulation. Only peak hours (ninth hour to the twentieth hour) of a typical day are simulated, since it is known that new projects will not cause overloads during nonpeak hours. Thus, 12 time points are simulated to capture relevant information regarding temporal system variations and to determine the EACO metrics. Generators are dispatched based on participation factors [9]. Fig. 1 shows the normal operation solution for an assumed 300 MW demand. The line arrows indicate normal operation active ows and the pie charts show the line percentage loading. The visualization represents the weak element ranking, as determined by the branch EACO values shown in the last row of Table I, which shows the results of the temporal simulation, driven by changes in system demand shown in the second column.

The temporal simulation does the following: for each time point do set load demand values solve power flow run contingency analysis determine branch PACO end The system demand is distributed proportionally to each load. To meet the load and losses, generators move according to their participation factors. The power ow solution is a full AC algorithm and considers all device control, voltage regulation, etc. Contingency analysis takes place using full AC power ow as well. SYS For each hour, a PACO value can be determined. This is shown in the last column of Table I. For each branch, an EACO value is computed. This is shown in the last row. The cell in the bottom SYS right of the table corresponds to the EACO , i.e., the security of the system. We will call this system solution without new wind generation or transmission expansion, the base case. E. Injection Sensitivity Example Sensitivity information about the effect of new generation in the system can be obtained by computing ETLR and WTLR values for each bus. To do this, a transfer is dened from the wind generator to the distributed sink, which is assumed to be provided by the existing generators at buses 1, 4, 6, and 7, based on their participation factors. TLRs are computed for all system branches using the peak hour (sixteenth hour). Then, ETLR and WTLRs are determined using (5) and (6). The results shown in Table II indicate that buses 14 would be benecial for system security, since injections at these buses have negative ETLR, which would decrease the overloads. However, new generation at buses 57 would increase the ows, worsening contingency overloads. The proposed generation at bus 6 would therefore require transmission expansion to maintain the same level of security. Fig. 2 shows a visualization of the ETLR values in the second column of Table II. By comparing Fig. 2 with Fig. 1, we note

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TABLE II INJECTION SENSITIVITIES FOR THE SEVEN-BUS SYSTEM, BASE CASE

Fig. 3. Effect on system security with different wind projects: The larger the areas below the curve, the less secure the system.

project. In a similar manner, some project implementations may SYS actually reduce the value of EACO , providing extra benet for the system. B. Preserving System Security We continue our seven-bus case example with temporal analysis. The simulation developed for the base case is repeated, but now with wind. We increase 50 MW at each of the wind project locations, one at a time. Wind generation will be kept xed at this level and the varying system demand will be balanced by conventional units. SYS Fig. 3 shows the values of PACO for the base case and for each of the three wind projects: G2, G3, and G6. G2 and G3 clearly SYS reduce the PACO ; G6 increases it signicantly. Note that this is consistent with the expected response of the system provided by the TLR sensitivities. While the security of the system in SYS the base case was equal to EACO = 414.53 MWh, this metric is improved to 150.54 MWh with G2 and to 120.4 MWh with G3. G6, however, worsens the system security resulting in a value SYS of EACO = 782.0 MWh. Let us assume that due to technical, geographic, and other aspects, G6 is a very attractive wind project, despite the fact that the project worsens system security. Policy makers should design policies to determine the course of action in this case. Suppose that the planning policy is to at least maintain the curSYS rent level of security, equal to EACO = 414.53 MWh. Transmission expansion is then proposed to counterbalance the increase in overloads produced by the 50 MW of new wind power provided by G6. The temporal simulation reveals that most of the SYS EACO increase is due to increased overload in line 6 to 2. Three expansion alternatives have been proposed a) Build an identical second circuit from 6 to 2. b) Reconductor circuit 1 of line 6 to 2 to increase its capacity from 100 MVA to 150 MVA. c) Reconductor circuit 1 of line 6 to 2 to increase its capacity from 100 MVA to 120 MVA. The proposed expansion alternatives are implemented in the system and simulated using the temporal analysis. Fig. 4

Fig. 2. ETLR visualization: Lighter regions represent locations where new generation would be benecial for system security.

that positive ELTR values are at the sending end of the weak elements, while negative ETLR locations are at the receiving end of the weak elements. This is consistent with transmission system congestion: in a market environment, prices will be higher at the receiving end, providing a signal for investment at those locations. III. DETERMINING WIND SECURITY EFFECTS A. Temporal Analysis Connecting new (wind) generation to the network will change SYS the value of EACO . If the change is positive, it means that the new project causes more overloads in the system, i.e., the system is less secure due to increased branch overload. If the change is negative, the project increases system security. SYS The value of EACO can be maintained by implementing transmission expansion to remove overloads caused or worsened by the new project. The strategy should be to add enough transmisSYS sion expansion so that the change in EACO is close to zero or negative (improvement of security). A method to evaluate the cost of system security consists in determining the cost of the transmission expansion or the cost of the generation redispatch that are needed to maintain the original level of security. Since transmission expansion is usually bundled, this will often result in extra benet for the

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Fig. 5. Regional wind production capacities. Values shown are from the 2006 power ow case used in the simulation.

Fig. 4. Effect on system security with different transmission expansion alternatives for wind project G6.

shows the results of the impact of transmission expansion. Implementation of the second circuit corresponds to the smaller curve in the graph. This represents a substantial improvement of SYS the security of the system, reducing EACO to 44.76 MWh. However, the cost of building a second circuit is considerable. If the developer builds this transmission line, it should be recognized by the International Organization for Standardization, since it will improve system security beyond the original level without the wind project. Upgrading the circuit to 150 MVA results in SYS EACO = 271.53 MWh, and reconductoring to 120 MVA results SYS in EACO = 439.63 MWh, compared to the base-case level of SYS EACO = 414.53 MWh. Since the system security obtained with the 120 MVA transmission upgrade alternative is only slightly over the original level of security, planners may decide this level of transmission expansion to be adequate. The developer of the wind project G6 must include the cost of reconductoring line 6 to 2 to a 120 MVA level in the wind project budget. Note that if projects G2 or G3 are pursued, then the corresponding developers should be recognized for enhancing system security. The security benets derived from those wind projects should be assessed and considered as benets of the project. IV. INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF WIND PORTFOLIOS A. Wind Production Intermittency The difculty in forecasting wind availability requires the transmission network to support a wide range of wind output. Simulation scenarios can be based on planned resources and historically observed patterns of wind availability [9], [10]. The objective is to determine which statistically plausible generation patterns could cause transmission overloads, and the severity and duration of those overloads. Wind capacity can be divided into geographic regions based on spatial correlation analysis. Temporal analysis can be segmented by season and load conditions considering representative days and hours. Simulation data can be developed using historically observed wind production capacity factors by re-

gion, season, and time of day. This method captures the hourly volatility, the periodic variation due to season and time of day, and the correlation of capacity factors between regions. These observed parameters are applied to the planned installed wind capacity for each studied time period. Variable wind generation is displaced by peaking resources. Temporal contingency analysis simulations are used to vary wind generation for each hourly sample and to record the line loading as a percentage of rating. Contingency analysis is performed to develop the EACO gures. To simplify contingency analysis, only contingencies at higher voltages (100 kV and above) are considered for the large-scale system. Only transmission elements within the control area are monitored for overloads. Representative hours of the day and of each season are evaluated to make the simulation statistically sound. To isolate the effects of time-varying wind production, load is held constant at the associated seasonal and time-of-day levels. B. Example To demonstrate the methodology, a realistic California system was utilized to determine wind effect during peak summer conditions. Intermittency impacts were examined for the existing 2000 MW California wind capacity on the 2006 system. The locations of the modeled wind capacity are shown in Fig. 5. The hourly summer peak capacity factors recorded by wind region in the 2004 data were applied to a 2006 peak summer case. Representative loadings on three transmission lines are shown in the time plot in Fig. 6 and the corresponding duration curves are shown in Fig. 7. Most transmission facilities remained within their thermal limits for all conditions. Most could also be characterized according to average loading, loading volatility, shape of the loading duration curve, or correlation of loading with regional wind production. Some transmission facilities became overloaded during specic wind production patterns, but otherwise exhibited normal operation. Such lines are good candidates for upgrades or operational schemes to relieve congestion. Several lines in southern California, including many 66-kV Tehachapi collector lines, tended to overload during periods of high Tehachapi production.

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Fig. 6.

Transmission line loadings for 2006 hourly intermittency simulation. Fig. 8.

PACO duration curve.

SYS

if more capacity is installed at Altamont or Solano. If the mean production level increases sufciently, the maximum loadings will exceed ratings. C. Example: Contingency Operation Contingency analysis was performed on the 2006 Summer Peak case to determine the impact of the intermittent wind reSYS SYS sources on PACO . The total simulated EACO over 336 summer SYS peak hours was 5575 GWh, with an average PACO of 16 591 MW. SYS The PACO duration curve is shown in Fig. 8. SYS PACO exceeded 18 000 MW for 2.1% of the simulated hours. No single regions wind production was strongly correlated with SYS SYS high system PACO , though the hours that produced PACO greater than 18 000 MW occurred during either high production at Tehachapi (over 600 MW), or low production at San Gorgonio (below 30 MW). These conditions are depicted in the steeply sloping left-hand portion of the plot in Fig. 8. The contour plot of Fig. 9 shows the EACO for each line that exhibited contingency overloads during the temporal simulation. Fig. 10 shows a contour of each transmission elements EACO relative to the EACO that would result if wind production SYS remained constant at the level exhibited during the medianPACO hour (Fig. 8). It is a measure of how much the temporal wind output causes variation in hourly PACO . Contours reveal transmission lines that experience greater average overloads across SYS all hours than they did during the median PACO hour. As with the precontingent transmission line loadings, the time-varying PACO results exhibited different characteristic shapes and volatility. Some lines were adversely impacted by wind production levels in certain regions. Fig. 11 represents the PACO over time of two transmission lines. The PACO of the heavy line was positively correlated with wind production at Altamont and Solano, while that of the light line was negatively correlated. Several lines in Southern California exhibited high PACO during high Tehachapi production. As discussed earlier, it is

Fig. 7. Transmission line loading duration for 2006 hourly intermittency simulation.

Congestion generally occurred for Tehachapi production over 600 MW, observed during 3% of the simulated peak summer hours. The loading patterns are exemplied by the heaviest line in Figs. 6 and 7. It is anticipated that this congestion will be reduced by the planned upgrade of the Tehachapi transmission to 230 kV. A group of 115-kV transmission lines in southern California was adversely impacted by low wind production in San Gorgonio. Lines in this group were typically overloaded during about 25% of the peak hours and experienced signicant variability depending on wind conditions. The high dependence of line loading on the wind output suggests that such lines are good candidates for upgrade. This loading pattern is illustrated by the medium gray line in Figs. 6 and 7. Another notable loading pattern was observed on several 60-kV Altamont collector lines, as shown by the light gray line in Figs. 6 and 7. These lines exhibited low mean loading, but high volatility. The loading correlated positively with wind production at Altamont and Solano. Though none of the lines became loaded beyond 80% of its rating during the simulation, the high volatility suggests that several may require upgrading

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Fig. 11.

Hourly PACO .

V. IMPACT ON PROPOSED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM WITH PROPOSED INSTALLED WIND CAPACITY In a next phase of the study, intermittency impacts will be examined for the planned 2010 and 2015 installed wind capacities, system loads, and transmission topologies. Known transmission upgrades will be incorporated into each seasonal study case. SYS The comparison of hourly PACO in 2006 and future study years will yield an illustration of how system security changes with increasing load and wind capacity. It is anticipated that the SYS 2010 and 2015 cases will exhibit increasing EACO and increasSYS ing variability of PACO . However, known transmission upgrades such as the Tehachapi 500-kV expansion may mitigate the trend. By examining the results, we may be able to recommend additional transmission upgrades and strategic expansion of other renewable resources to maintain given levels of security over time. VI. CONCLUSION A model to measure electricity system security and to assess large-scale wind integration projects including system security has been described. Effective security metrics can be derived from temporal contingency analysis simulations that capture wind variability. Benecial locations for wind generation based on grid security can be identied using ETLR and WTLR sensitivities. The proposed methodology allows determination of the effect of new wind project on system security, including proposed transmission expansion alternatives. The security benets can be identied and incorporated into an integrated economic spatial model to determine viable renewable and distributed generation projects that provide economic benets. Security metrics developed in this paper can be utilized by planners and regulators to assess wind projects benets, and to determine policies that promote long-term power system security. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to thank the California Energy Commission for providing data for the large-scale example.

Fig. 9.

EACO contour plot: Darker lines are week elements in California.

Fig. 10.

EACO relative to the median hour.

anticipated that such congestion will be mitigated by planned Tehachapi transmission upgrades. The independent recognition of this need by the operators of the California transmission system is consistent with the conclusions produced by the temporal security analysis presented herein.

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[1] P. B. Eriksen, T. Ackermann, H. Abildgaard, P. Smith, W. Winter, and J. M. Rodriguez Garcia, System operation with high wind penetration, IEEE Power Energy Mag., vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 6574, Nov.Dec. 2005. [2] R. E. Brown, Modeling the reliability impact of distributed generation, in Proc. IEEE Power Eng. Soc. Summer Meeting, Jul. 2125, 2002, vol. 1, pp. 442446. [3] R. Piwko, N. Miller, J. Sanchez-Gasca, Y. Xiaoming, D. Renchang, and J. Lyons, Integrating large wind farms into weak power grids with long transmission lines, in Proc. IEEE PES T&D Conf. Exhib.: Asia Pac., Aug. 1518, 2005, pp. 17. [4] J. W. Smith, J. A. Taylor, D. L. Brooks, and R. C. Dugan, Interconnection studies for wind generation, in Proc. Rural Elect. Power Conf., May 23 25, 2004, pp. C3-1C3-8. [5] R. C. Dugan, T. E. McDermott, and G. J. Ball, Planning for distributed generation, IEEE Ind. Appl. Mag., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 8088, Mar.Apr. 2001. [6] N. W. Miller, Generation uncertainty in long range transmission planning, in Proc. IEEE-PES Gen. Meeting, Jul. 2125, 2002, vol. 3, pp. 10381040. [7] R. Nadira, R. R. Austria, C. A. Dortolina, and F. Lecaros, Transmission planning in the presence of uncertainties, in Proc. IEEE PES Gen. Meeting, Jul. 1317, 2003, vol. 1, pp. 289294. [8] S. Grijalva and A. M. Visnesky, The effect of generation on network security: Spatial representation, metrics, and policy, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 13881395, Aug. 2006. [9] L. Furong and B. Kuri, Generation scheduling in a system with wind power, in Proc. IEEE PES T&D Conf. Exhib.: Asia Pac., Aug. 1518, 2005, pp. 16. [10] E. A. DeMeo, W. Grant, M. R. Milligan, and M. J. Schuerger, wind plant integration, IEEE Power Energy Mag., vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 3846, Nov.Dec. 2005.

Scott R. Dahman (S91M95) received the B.S. degree in electrical engineering and M.B.A. degree from Washington University, St. Louis, MO in 1993 and 1994, respectively. He received the M.S. degree in electrical engineering from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 2003. From 1994 through 1999, he was with the Material Procurement Department, Emerson Electric Company, St. Louis, MO, directing the development of business applications software and managing strategic supply agreements for engineered products. From 1999 through 2003, he was a Project Manager at Zurheide-Herrmann, Inc., Champaign, IL, where he directed the delivery of construction documents and consulting engineering services for the building, transportation, insurance, and electric power industries. Currently, he is Director of Business Development at PowerWorld Corporation, where he coordinates marketing efforts and power system studies. Mr. Dahman is a Registered Professional Engineer in Illinois.

Kollin J. Patten (S97A98M03) received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in electrical engineering from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in 1997 and 1998, respectively. In 1995, he gained industrial experience in telecommunications planning and system measurements at American Electric Power in Columbus, OH. Since 1996, he has been with PowerWorld Corporation, Champaign, IL, where he is now the Director of Engineering. His current research interests include power system stability and security, electricity markets, and real-time system visualization.

Santiago Grijalva (S00A02M03) received the electrical engineering degree from EPN-Ecuador Quito, Ecuador, in 1994, the M.S. certicate in information systems from ESPE-Ecuador Sangolqu, Ecuador, in 1997, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 1999 and 2002, respectively. He completed the Postdoctoral program in power and energy systems at the University of Illinois in 2004. From 1995 to 1997, he was with the Ecuadorian National Center for Energy Control (CENACE) Quito, Ecuador as EMS Engineer and Head of the Software Department. Since 2001, he has been a Senior Consultant with PowerWorld Corporation, where he is engaged in the development of advanced optimization and visualization applications. His current research interests include EMS systems, power system computational algorithms, and electricity markets.

Anthony M. Visnesky, Jr. received the B.S. degree in electrical engineering from Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN in 1969 and completed the M.S.I.A. program from the Krannert Graduate School of Industrial Administration, West Lafayette in 1971. From 1972 to 1974, he participated in the Ph.D. program at the Krannert Graduate School of Industrial Administration and Purdue University School of Electrical Engineering, West Lafayette. From 1974 to 1988, he was with Central Illinois Public Service (AmerenCIPS) in different technical and managerial positions. From 1988 to 1998, he was with The Illinois Commerce Commission, Springeld, as Manager of the Energy Programs Division. He has been Co-Chairman of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioner (NARUC), Washington, DC, and Regulatory Representative to EPRIs Advisory Committee for Electric Generation & Transmission Research. Since 1998, he directs Anthony Engineering Associates, Pompano Beach, FL, an independent research and consulting rm. He is also the Chief Technology Ofcer of Trexco LLC, Indianapolis, IN, a company specializing in power transformer cooling technology. His current research interests include power system analysis and planning, electric power policy, and energy regulation.