The Egalitarian Face of Islamic Orthodoxy: Support for Islamic Law and Economic Justice in Seven Muslim-Majority Nations

Author(s): Nancy J. Davis and Robert V. Robinson Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 167-190 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038984 Accessed: 16/12/2010 02:13
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The Egalitarian Faceof Islamic Orthodoxy: Supportfor Islamic Lawand EconomicJustice Nations in Seven Muslim-Majority
Nancy J. Davis DePauwUniversity RobertV Robinson IndianaUniversity

The authors test two theories linking religion and economic beliefs in predominantly Muslim nations using data from national surveys ofAlgeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Moral Cosmology theory posits that because the religiously orthodox are theologically communitarian in viewing individuals as subsumed by a larger community of believers subject to timeless laws and God's greater plan, they are disposed toward economic communitarianism, whereby the state should provide for the poor, reduce inequality, and meet community needs via economic intervention. Modernists are theologically individualistic in seeing individuals as having to make moral decisions in a temporal context and as responsible for their own destinies. As such, modernists are inclined to economic individualism, whereby the poor are responsible for theirfates, wider income differencespromote individual initiative, and government should not interfere in the economy. An alternate hypothesis, based on Islamic scripture 's discussion of economic matters, limits the effect of orthodoxy versus modernism to the one clear economic directive of Islam: the state's responsibility to care for the poor. The authorsfind that Islamic orthodoxy-measured as the desire to implement Islamic law (the shari'a)-is associated with the broad economic communitarianism expected by Moral Cosmology theory.

The role that Islam plays in the economic and circumstances developmentof Muslim nations has been the subject of intense debate among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. civilization," Western criticsof Islamor "Islamic such as Bernard Lewis (1990) and Samuel Huntington(1993), have decried its economic irrationality,incompatibilitywith democracy, and failureto separatereligion and state;while scholars such as EdwardSaid (2001:11) have denouncedsuch thinkingas Orientalistessentialism thatignores "theinternaldynamicsand

of plurality" Muslimnations.The debateis not just academic.Today,thereare over 1.3 billion Muslims in the world and more than 50 predominantlyMuslim nations. Some of the governments of these nations are meeting their citizens' economic needs, while many others are unable or unwilling to address them. The United Nations (2001) ranks countries on a Human Development Index (HDI), based on theirlife expectancy, literacyrate,school enrollments, and per capita gross domestic product nationsarerated (GDP). Five Muslim-majority

to Directcorrespondence RobertV Robinson, in Parisand Sydney,as well as colleaguesin the Departmentof Sociology, IndianaUniversity, Department Sociologyand SocialPolicyat the of of and and Hall of Ballantine 744, 1020EastKirkwood Avenue, University Sydney theSchool Sociology at Bloomington, 47405 (robinsor@indiana.edu). AnthropologytheUniversity NewSouth IN of Wales. Theauthors thank also are Michael An Mansoor Moaddel, Theauthors listedalphabetically. earlier verPowell, Brian sion of this paperwas presented the American Humphrey, Kenney, Jeff Brian Starks, at VanKrieken, Association meetings,SanFrancisco, Robert MelissaWilde,andthe ASR Sociological reviewers theirhelpful their for thank respective 2004.Theauthors universities editorand anonymous forfinancial support their during 2003/04sabbatical comments.
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2006, VOL.71 (April:I67-19o)

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as having "high"human development, 27 as "medium,"and 21 as "low."Even in Muslim of nationswith mediumstandards living, many citizens live in poverty:one-fifth to one-quarter of the populations of Algeria, Indonesia, and Egypt are poor, as defined by local standards.In the poorest Muslim nations,the bulk of the populationsuffersfromeconomic deprivation, the gap between rich and poor is wide, unemployment underemployment high, and are educationalopportunitiesare limited, and life expectancies are low (United Nations 2001; Banuri 1994:36). What to do about the depressed economic conditions in which many Muslims live is the subject of much private concern, public discussion, and movement activism throughout the Muslim world. Since the mid-nineteenth century,the debate and mobilization on economic issues often centeredon whethersocialwas ism or nationalism the solution.Islamist(or Islamicfundamentalist) movementsseekingthe of implementation Islamic law (the shari 'a) in an Islamic state as the solution to economic problemsbegan to form in the late 1920s, but public interestin such movementsdid not take putatively off untilmost secular, socialist,and/or nationalistregimes failed to solve these problems duringthe 1960s, 1970s,and 1980s.Today, Islamists vie with Islamic modernists (or reformists), who see the best hope for economic progressin keepingIslamout of legal codes and maintaining strict separation of mosque and state (Kepel 1994:13-23). In this article, we move away from the public discourseandskirmishesof movementleaders, academics, and media pundits to explore how moralcosmology-Islamic orthodoxyversus modernism-affects the economicbeliefs of ordinaryMuslims. Most scholarlyaccounts of religion and politics in predominantly Muslim countrieshavebeen historicalor observational, relying on carefulanalysesof the speeches and writings of leaders of Islamist and modernist movements, of archivalmaterials on the formation, political activities, and platforms of and, movementorganizations, in manycases, on the author'sdirectexperiencewith the Muslim world.While much has been learnedfrom this work, it is often not based on analysesof intersamplesof Muslims, views with representative and we therefore know relatively little about how ordinaryMuslim citizens make linkages

preferences theirfaithandeconomic between 2002;Inglehart Norris and (butsee,e.g.,Hassan 2003;Moaddel 2004, forthcoming). traditionalreligious Throughout world, the istsarecommonly as characterized beingto the Yet, politicalrightof modernists. despitethe wisdom, research theUnited conventional our in States,21 European and countries, Israelhas uncovered surprising relationship: many in a countries where Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, or Judaism, Protestantism predominate,the religiously orthodox to the right are of modernists cultural on issues of abortion, but and sexuality, family, gender, to the left of justice(Davis on modernists issuesof economic and Robinson 1996a, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, we 2001).In thisarticle, examine whether the less recognized elementof this pattern-the tendency thereligiously for orthodox bemore to thanmodernistseconomically progressive holds in countries where Islam, another Abrahamic tradition, predominates. faith national Weanalyze newlyavailable surveys of seven Muslim-majority nations(Algeria, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, and SaudiArabia) test two alternate arguto versusmodmentsto explainhow orthodoxy attitudes economic ernism affects toward justice amongMuslims.Ourown MoralCosmology theory (Davis and Robinson 1999b, 2001, 2005), which,we argue,appliesto all of the of regardless their Abrahamic traditions, faith specifictheological tenets,positsthatbecause are thereligiously orthodox theologically comin by munitarian seeing individuals subsumed as a larger and community believers as subject of planof God, to the timelesslaws andgreater economic toward communitheyaredisposed it tarianism, whereby is the society's responsibility to provide for those in need, reduce and inequality, intervenein the economyto because meet community needs.Modernists, individualisticthat theyaretheologically in they for themselves responsible as see individuals theirdestiniesand as havingto makemoral of are decisions thecontext thetimes, inclined in toward laissez-faire economicindividualism, for which sees the poor as responsible their differences prowider fates,supports income to initiative, wants government moteindividual and We to keepoutof the economy. testthistheoon ry,whichdoesnotdepend the specificcontent of faith traditions, against a logical

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based on whatIslamicscripture counter-thesis, says about economic matters, that limits the effect of Islamic orthodoxyversus modernism only to governmentresponsibilityfor the poor. We find that Islamic orthodoxy-measured as the desire to establish Islamic law-is associated in these countrieswith the broadeconomic communitarianism expected by Moral Cosmology theory. BACKGROUND THEORETICAL
MORAL COSMOLOGY THEORY

In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and his other works on religion, Weber was primarily concerned with differences among faithtraditions(e.g, Catholicism, Protestantism, ancientJudaism) theireffects and on economic beliefs and practices. OurMoral Cosmology theory, with its emphasis on differences withinfaith traditionsamong individuals holding different moral cosmologies, complements Weber's. Our argument is that cosmologicaldifferences betweenthe religiously orthodox and modernists that had only just begun to appear when Weber wrote The ProtestantEthic (1904-05) exist today within all of the Abrahamictraditionsand have similar effects, regardlessof the specific tenets of these traditions, on economic and cultural beliefs. Because differentiation between the orthodox modernist and cosmologiesis required for these cosmologies to affectpoliticalbeliefs, ourargument shouldhold only since modernist and orthodoxtheological strandsbecame separatewithineach of the religionsof the Bookthat is, the development of Reform Judaism, which grew out of Enlightenment ideas and was formalizedin documents the Pittsburgh like Platform of 1885; the rise of Islamic "modernism" in the late-nineteenth century; the appearance the turnof the twentiethcentury at of the "modernist" movement in Catholicism thatnearlycaused a schism in the Church;and the split between mainline and fundamentalist churchesin U.S. andBritishProtestantism the in early twentiethcentury. Indiscussing effectof moralcosmologyon the culturaland economic attitudes,we begin with Hunter's (1991:49)distinction betweentwo "fundamentally conceptions moralauthordifferent of ity." religiously The impulseviews God orthodox as the ultimatejudge of good and evil, regards

sacred texts as divinely revealed and hence and inerrant timeless,andsees the deityas playing an activerole in people's everydaylives. In contrast, modernist'impulseviews individthe ualsas having makemoraldecisionsin theconto textof thetimes,seesreligious textsandteachings thatshouldbe consideredin as humancreations cultural contextalongwith othermoralprecepts, and regardsindividualsas largely determining theirown fates.Note thatthe modernistimpulse encompassesbothbelieversandnonbelievers or secularists. Drawingout the theologicalandpoliticalorientationsof these ideal-typicalvisions of moral authority-or whatwe preferto call moralcosmologies, we argue that the religiously orthodox cosmology is theologicallycommunitarian in that it regardsindividualsas subsumedby a believerswho largercommunityof like-minded are all subject to the laws and greaterplan of God (Davis andRobinson 1999b, 2001). In the orthodoxcosmology, timeless religious truths, standards,and laws are seen as having been laid down once and for all by God-laws that the communitymust uphold and thateveryone is obliged to obey. The theological communitarianismof the orthodox, we argue, inclines themto an authoritarian strandof culturalcomin munitarianism, which the communitymust enforce divinely mandatedmoral standards on abortion, sexuality, family, and gender. Theological communitarianism, however,also inclines the orthodox to economic communitarianismor egalitarianism,whereby it is the state's responsibility to provide for those in need, reduce the gap between rich and poor, and intervenein the economy so that community needs are met. The communitarianism of orthodoxy entails watching over community members,giving it both a strictside and a caring one, and inclining its adherents towardculauthoritarianism and economic tural egalitarianism.2 1Weuse "modernist" thisidealtypebecause for it avoids political attached Hunter's to the connotation term a connotation wehaveshown "progressive," that for to be incorrect economic issues. 2RyleandRobinson's (2006)study Americans of the corroborates communitarianism orthodox. of the studyfindsthatorthodoxy themostimporis Their tantfactor promoting in feelings community. of This of a (neighsources applies across range communal

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Orthodoxy, we conceive it, does not refer as orthodoxy belief in the specific or to "doctrinal" tenets of a faith tradition(e.g., the existence of heavenand hell, the divinity of Jesus), but to a broadtheological orientationtowardthe locus of moralauthoritywith which the orthodoxof all of the Abrahamic faith traditions would agree.In otherwords,orthodoxCatholics,Jews (with a small "o"to distinguishtheir cosmology from formal membershipin the Orthodox branchof Judaism),Muslims, and Protestants adhere to different religious tenets, but they share the broad worldview that the locus of moral authority is God and that legal codes shouldreflectabsoluteandtimeless divine law. We arguethat modernists,in contrastto the orthodox, are theologically individualistic in thatthey see individualsas largelyresponsible for their own moral decisions and fates (Davis and Robinson 1999b, 2001). The modernist cosmology combines support for individual choice andfreedomwith an expectationof indiincliningits adherents vidualresponsibility,3 to or culturalindividualism libertarianism, whereby the resolution of a pregnancyis seen as a woman's freedomin privatedecision,individual sexual expressionis allowed,andhusbandsand wives should decide for themselves how to theirpartnership. divide theirlaboror structure The theological individualism of modernists also inclines them to laissez-faire economic wherebyindiindividualism inegalitarianism, or viduals are held responsiblefor their economic fortunes-good or bad-and the solution to povertyand inequalityis greatereffort and initiativeby the poor themselves ratherthan governmentefforts to improvetheir lot, equalize economic resourcesby incomes, or redistribute nationalizingbusinesses. Our argumentis, of course, probabilistic, not deterministic, and hold communitarian economic some modernists beliefs, such as socialism or communism.We argueandwill show thatthe individualismthat characterizesboth the modernist moral cosmology and laissez-faire economics inclines

modernists toward sucheconomicindividualism more than toward economic communitarianism (see also Jelen 1990; Regnerus,Smith,and Sikkink 1998; Tamney,Burton, and Johnson 1989). While orthodoxy and modernism are ideal types, representingpolar extremes, our Moral Cosmology theory treatscosmology as a matter of degree, with people's culturaland economic attitudes tendingto reflectwherethey are on the continuum of orthodoxy/modernism (Davis and Robinson 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). In this article, we focus on the economic consequences of the continuumof moralcosmology for Muslimsthe tendency for the Islamic orthodox to be more economically egalitarian than Islamic modernists.
THEORYTO APPLYINGMORAL COSMOLOGY

ISLAM

bors,friends, coworkers, fellowcongregants, fellow members). and students, ethnicgroup 3 Starks Robinson's and study (forthcoming) corof They roborates individualism modernists. find the thatmodernists theUnitedStates morelikely in are "think thanthe orthodox prefer children that for to themselves" rather "obey." than

Islam,a religionof the Book alongwith Judaism has and Christianity, a sacredtext that is taken The by Muslimsas divinerevelation. vastmajority of Muslims-some scholarswould say allthe regard Qur'anas divinelyrevealed,inerrant, and to be taken literally (Marty and Appleby 1992:138). In this sense, (nearly) all Muslims and are "orthodox," a question about the literal truth of the Qur'an, such as that which we used (Davis andRobinson 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1999b, 2001) to help distinguishthe orthodox from modernists among Catholics, Jews, and Protestants based on their beliefs about the Bible, probablywould not distinguish among Muslims.Yetone dimensionof orthodoxy/modernism that does differentiateamong Muslims is the extent to which they believe that the Qur'anand other sacredtexts of Islam should be the sole basis of the legal system and the state. The establishmentof Islamic law, which is based on sacred Islamic texts, would be the fulfillment of the orthodoxbelief that it is the responsibility the communityto upholdtimeof less divine law. OrthodoxMuslims differ from modernistMuslims in wanting Islamic law to constitutethe sole legal foundationof the state, andit is this distinction its consequencesfor and economic attitudesthat is our focus here. betweenMuslimswho would The distinction applyIslamiclaw in all realmsof life andthose who wouldnot is centralbothto divisionswith-

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in Muslim publics at large and to the agendas of many of the majorpolitical and intellectual movementsof Muslims of the last centuryand a quarter.Since the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna founded the Society of Muslim Brothers in 1928, the goal oflslamists has been the implementationof the shari 'a in all realmsof life as the sine qua non of an Islamic state (Ghadbian 2000:78; Husain2003:13). The primacyof this goal reflectsthe fact thatreligionand statewere once one in the first Islamicstateof the seventh century, where the Prophet Muhammadwas both the religious and political leader.While orthodox Muslims are not monolithic in their 2003:51), interpretation the shari 'a (Murphy of they sharethe desire to implementIslamic law as the sole legal foundation,ratherthan allow legal codes to emergethroughpluralisticpolitical negotiationandcompromisebetweencompeting interests,including secularones. The economic communitarianism Moral that Cosmology theory expects among the orthodox of all of the Abrahamic faith traditions manifesteditself historically still does today and in many Muslim countriesin practices of patrimonialism,wherebythe clan or triballeaders were/areresponsiblefor the well-being of the community's needy. It can also be seen in "Islamiceconomics,"which was developed in late-colonialIndiaof the 1940s by SayyidAbul A'la Mawdudi(1903-79), the Islamistfounder of Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam; Esposito riba (exces2003:142). Apartfromprohibiting sive interest) and collecting and distributing zakat (an obligatorycharitablecontributionto the poor), the details of Islamic economics are vague, althoughit appearsthat this would not involve as extensive controlof the economyby the stateas in socialistcommand economies,but would require a greater commitment-much of it voluntary the partof believers-to lookon ing out for the poor and to maintainingmore equitableeconomic dealingsthanis truein laissez-faire capitalism (Ibrahim 1982:122-23; Fuller 2003:26). as Islamic"modernism," the movementcame to be called,emergedduringthe late nineteenth century, especiallyin IndiaandEgypt(Moaddel andTalattof2000:1). The theological individualismthatMoralCosmologytheoryassumesof modernistsin all Abrahamictraditionscan be seen in an important theological distinction made by early Islamic modernists. Moulavi

ChiraghAli (1844-95), a noted Indian modernist, distinguishedbetween the revealed law whichis immutable timeless, and of the Qur'an, and the common law, which is the productof Muslim history and reflects the circumstances of each age. He arguedthat since Islamic law was, in part,a productof the times, it could not constitutea timeless moral code for Muslims, thus necessitatinga new legal frame in accord with the standardsof modernity (ChiraghAli 1883; MoaddelandTalattof2000:8-9; Ahmad 1967:54-58). A distinctionwith similarimplications was made by the Egyptianmodernist, Abduh(1849-1905), betweenibaMuhammad dat (acts of worship)andmu-amalat(commercial or civil acts related to the affairs of the world).Accordingto Abduh,while Islamictexts mandatedspecific rules regardingthe worship ofAllah, they includedonly broadprincipleson how humans should relate to each other,thus leaving it up to humansto apply these in speThis not only allowed but cific circumstances. also requiredthe applicationof ijtihad (independentreasoning)in the developmentof legal codes (Hourani1983:148; Moaddel2005:90). The distinction made by Chiragh Ali and in Abduhallowshumansmuchdiscretion organizing their affairs, including their economic structuresand individual economic behavior. An essay by an anonymousIndianmodernist, originallypublishedin 1877-80 andincludedin MoaddelandTalattof's(2000:123-35) anthology,argued Islamiclawsprohibiting takthat the discretion ing of interestandlimitingindividual in passingon estateswerebreeding"listlessness amongMuslimsin India,throwandinactivity" ing manyinto poverty.The solutionwas not for governmentto provide free education, which by weakonly "lower[s]ourcharacter rendering er the motives for the exercise of our energies and by diminishingour prudenceor responsibilityto ourselves," to understand "there that but eithernecessaryor is no connectionwhatsoever, even contingent,between Religion in its pure sense and civil and juridical laws." Only the separationof mosque and state would resultin "wider diffusion of habits of energy and patience, self-exertion and self-dependence." The essay concludes with an homage to the Indian modernist leader, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98), who sought to reconcile Enlightenment values and natural law with Islamicbelief throughthe application ijtihad of

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to sacredtexts, and who was a strongadvocate of laissez-fairecapitalismand a limited role of government(Malik 1980).4 Muslim moderniststoday seek a strictseparationof mosque and stateandresistthe implementationof Islamic law. Kurzman(1998:19, 1999) notes that such Muslims object to the implementation of the shari 'a on several grounds,includingthat "divinerevelationhas left the form of governmentfor human construction," that political power would corrupt religious rulers,and that "the Qur'anrefers to the shari 'a as a path,not as a ready-madesystem of law, waiting to be put in practice." While the writings of orthodox and modernistthinkersandthe politicalpositions of the movementsthey inspiredseem to be in accord with Moral Cosmology theory, whetherthese movements representthe sentiments of ordinaryMuslims is an empiricalquestionthatcan be resolved only with data for individuals.We have found, for example, that in the United States, where the most visible movementsand leaders appearingto representthe religiously orthodoxhavea conservative, laissez-faireeconomic agenda, the orthodox are to the left of modernists on economic issues in a General Social Survey (GSS) of Americans(Davis and Robinson1996a, 1996b, 1997).Thus,in accord with Moral Cosmology theory,which expects similareffects of orthodoxy/modernism ecoon nomic attitudes all of theAbrahamic faithtrain ditions, we test the following hypothesis on nationallyrepresentative samples of Muslims: Hypothesis1: Religiouslyorthodox Muslims,as indicated by their desire to implement Islamic law as the sole law of the land in their country,will be more economically communitarianor egalitarian than their modernist counterpartsin supporting(1) effortsto improve lot of the the government poor and needy, (2) greater equality of incomes, and (3) governmentnationalization of privatebusiness and industry.

AN ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS: ISLAMIC

SCRIPTURAL ON DIRECTIVES ECONOMIC MATTERS

MoralCosmology theory is not denominationspecific in that it does not depend on the content of religious texts. It assumes that the orthodoxof all of theAbrahamic faithtraditions differ from modernistsin their economic orientations, regardlessof the specific doctrinal positionson economicmattersin theirreligious texts. In ourearlieranalysesof Judeo-Christian traditions, we argued that the Torah and the Bible are ambiguousregardingeconomic matters(DavisandRobinson1996a, 1999b).Yetare there clear economic messages in Islam that might impel those who seek to build a state economic aroundit to endorsecommunitarian relations? We test Moral Cosmology theory that againstthe logical counter-thesis the tenets of Islam on economic matterscan explain any Islamicorthotendencyforthe moretext-bound dox to be more communitarianthan Islamic modernists. In contrastto the sacredtexts of Judaismand Christianity, Qur'anis very specific about the the obligation of every Muslim to give to the poor, orphaned,and widowed, "so that wealth may not merely make a circuit among the wealthy"(Qur'an59:7).The thirdof five pillars of the faith, zakat (purification), requires Muslims with the financial means to give at least 2.5 percent of their net assets (not just their income) annually to the needy (Husain 2003:10, Kuran 2004:19). The institution of zakat changed during Muhammad'slifetime fromvoluntaryprivatecharityin Mecca, where he and his followers were in a minority and powerless, to a compulsory obligation of the faith, with specific rates,collected and distribinstitutions,once Muhammad utedby state-run andhis followersmigrated Medinain 622 and to established the first Islamic state (al-Shiekh 1995:366-67). The Hadith (2:24:537), the sacred text that records the sayings of the as Prophet,reportsMuhammad saying, "Allah has made it obligatory for them to pay zakat from their property;it is to be taken from the with that 4Consistent ourexpectation modernism wealthy among them and given to the poor" individualism freewith is alsoassociated cultural or domof expression, modernist/reformist the activism (emphasis added). Among the countries consideredhere, zakat is collected and distributed of Islamic feministsin the Muslimworld often by the statein Pakistanand SaudiArabia;in the texts involves of to application ijtihad sacred inorder other countries,because they are largely secupatriarchal to challenge interpretations offeredby lar states, it is left to individualsto make con2002:1144). orthodox Muslims (Moghadam

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tributionsdirectlyto the needy or to organizations serving them (al-Shiekh 1995:366-67). While the Qur'anis clear in requiringthose with financial means to give to the poor and in providingmechanisms whereby the state will look out for the needy, it neither enjoins economic equalitynor questionsthe right of individuals to hold private property (Kamali 2002:136-38). State ownershipof propertyis not directly addressed; contemporaryproponents and opponentsof governmentownership to alike cite scripture support theirstances,suggesting that Islam takes no clear position on this (Kuran 2004:33, 111). In the Qur'an (20:131), differences in wealth and property are viewed as a test by Allah of the charitableness of the wealthy but as unimportantafter death. While there is a spiritual equality of believers before Allah, there is no assumption thatsuch equalitydoes or shouldhold in human societies (Kamali2002; Marlow1997).A wellto knownproverbattributed the Prophetstates, "Men are equals like the teeth of a comb; one only in well-being" has precedenceoveranother (quotedin Marlow 1997:18). Weconcludethatwhile Islamictextsmandate effortsto providefor those in need, they do not enjoin equalityof income or wealth, nor sanction violation of the privatepropertyof others, nor take a clear position on governmentownershipof industryas a means of meeting communityneeds. Thus, we test MoralCosmology
theory (HI), which posits broad egalitarian/com-

BELIEFS STANDARD LIVING OF ANDECONOMIC

Governmentsof Muslim-majority nations differin theirabilityorwillingnessto meetthe economic needs of their citizens. We expect that failureto meet material,educational, health and needs will increase popular demand for economic reform, while maintenance of a high standardof living will reduce the desire for such reform.Hashmi (2004), for example, has shown thatthe failureof Bangladesh's"socialgovernment durist-secular-Bengali-nationalist" ing the 1970s to bring about the promised socialist utopia increased the popularity of Islamist groups calling for social justice and economic reform.Thus we hypothesize, of Hypothesis3: The lowera country's standard living (life expectancy, literacy, school enrollments, and per capita GDP), the greater will be support for government efforts to improvethe lot of the poor and needy, reduce inequalityof incomes, and nationalizeprivatebusiness and industry. How strongan effect that supportfor implementationof Islamic law has on the desire for egalitarianeconomic reforms should depend on the country's standardof living. In countries where people's basic needs are not being met by the state, the desire to implementthe shari'a will be more strongly associated with egalitarianpositions than in countries where these needs arebeing met;the generalcondition of the populationin the formercountriesmore economic seriouslyfails to meet communitarian norms.Thus we hypothesize, Hypothesis 4: In countrieswith low standards of living (life expectancy,literacy,school enrollments,andper capitaGDP), support for implementing Islamiclaw will be more strongly associated with supportfor governmentefforts to improve the lot of the poor and needy, reduce inequality of incomes, and nationalizeprivatebusiness and industrythan in countrieswith higher of standards living.

effects of orthodoxyin all religions munitarian of the Book, against a hypothesisbased strictly on the economic directivesof Islamic texts, which limits the effect of orthodoxyvs. modernism to the one clear economic directive of Islam,which is the state'sresponsibilityto care for the needy: Hypothesis2: Religiouslyorthodox Muslims,as indicated by their desire to implement Islamic law as the sole law of the land in than theircountry,will be more supportive their modernist counterpartsof government efforts to care for the needy,but will in not differfrommodernists theirdesirefor more equal incomes or their willingness to nationalize private property or businesses.

RATIONALISM ECONOMICS" AND "ISLAMIC

Contrastingthe economic rationalityor selfinterest assumed by free market economists on with the voluntary communitarianism the

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part of Muslims of all classes assumed by Islamic economics, Kuran(2004:42) describes the task of Islamic economics as "to transform selfish and acquisitiveHomo economicus into a paragonof virtue,Homo Islamicus."Kuran's argument thatIslamiceconomics,not Islamic is on theology, assumes this communitarianism everyone's part; a classic study of the terms used in the Qur'anarguedthat Islamic theology is couched in the language of commerce, trade,and economic rationalism:"The mutual relationsbetween God and man are of a strictly commercial nature.Allah is the ideal merchant..... Life is a business,for gain or loss. He who does a good or an evil work("earns" good or evil), receives his pay for it, even in this life" (Torrey1892:48). We contrastthe assumptionin Islamic ecoby nomics of voluntarycommunitarianism all classes with a rationalchoice, "underdog principle"thatpositsthatthe advantaged be less will economically communitarianthan the disadvantaged, each class reflecting its economic (RobinsonandBell 1978). Sincewe self-interest see the assumptionof Islamic economics that advantagedMuslims will voluntarilysupport egalitarian economic arrangements ignoring as the effect of class on communitarianism, we hypothesize, Hypothesis 5: Muslims with more education, higherincome, or who arein the middle or upperclass will be less supportiveof government efforts to care for the needy, of efforts to equalize incomes, and of governmentnationalization businesses and of industrythanthose who are less educated, poorly paid, and in the working class or unemployed. If, however,there are no class differencesin Muslims' economic attitudesand if these attithis would support tudes are communitarian, the assumptionof Islamic economics that the advantagedcan be countedon in the establishment of a morejust Islamic state. THE SETTING:SEVENMUSLIMNATIONS MAJORITY The seven countriesexaminedhere are among the most populous and influential Muslim nations in the world. They include Indonesia, with the world's largest Muslim population,

Pakistan with the second largest, and Bangladesh, Egypt,andAlgeria,with the fourth, fifth and ninth largest Muslim populations. IncludingJordanand SaudiArabia,just under half of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims lives in thesecountries. Whiletherearereligiousminorities of Coptic Christiansin Egypt, Hindus in Bangladesh, and Christians, Hindus, and Buddhistsin Indonesia,these nationsare overwhelmingly Muslim, ranging from 88 percent in Bangladesh to 99 percent in Algeria and SaudiArabia(see AppendixTableAl). Most of thesepopulations predominantly are Sunni,with Shi'a makingup about20 percentof Pakistanis and 15 percent of Saudi citizens (CIA World Factbook [online] 2004; SBS World Guide 2003:644). Standardsof living in these countriesrange from low to moderate. The United Nations' (2001) HDI rangesfrom .47 in Bangladesh(the sameas Haiti,thepoorestcountryin theWestern Hemisphere)to .75 in SaudiArabia (the same as Brazil;see AppendixTableAl). Fourof these countries-Algeria, Egypt,Indonesia, Saudi and Arabia-are what Mahdavi(1970) calls "rentier states,"whose governmentand economy rentsfromoil andhydrodependon substantial carbonsales (SaudiArabiaand Algeria), transit charges (Egypt, from the Suez Canal), or revenue from tourism (Bali in Indonesia, and, to a lesser extent,Egypt).In rentierstates,only a smallproportion the populationis involved of in the enterprisescreatingmost of the nation's wealth, making most people's income less dependenton their own efforts and skills than on who they know (personalrelationshipsand crony capitalism),their ethnicity,or their citizenship (Moaddel2002:376-78). Islamis the statereligionof SaudiArabia,and this is nominally the case in Algeria, Bangladesh, Jordan, and Pakistan. The legal systemsof these countriesgenerallyincorporate Islamiclaw in some form;the only exceptionis Bangladesh,whichhas no shari 'a courts.Saudi Arabiahas had the shari 'a as the sole basis of its legal code andthe Qur'anas its constitution since its founding in 1932. In the remaining five nations,the shari 'a is appliedonly to family matters(e.g., divorce, marriage,child custody, inheritance);criminal and civil law are based on non-Islamiclegal codes (CIA World Factbook [online] 2004; SBS World Guide 2003).

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Whetherthe shari 'a shouldbe the sole basis of all law,shouldapplyto specific realmsof life, or should not apply at all is a matterof intense discussion and activism in all seven countries. Islamist movements seeking to implement Islamic law in all realms of life and condemning the current,more limited applicationsof this-ranging from those endorsing violence to those workingwithin the political system to effect gradual change-exist in each of the here.Among the more sevennationsconsidered prominentIslamistmovementsare the Society of Muslim Brothersin Egypt and Jordan,the IslamicSalvationFront(FIS) in Algeria,Laksar Jihad (Holy War Brigade) in Indonesia, and Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Islamists in Saudi Arabia challenge both the monarchyand the religious establishmentthat supportsit, seekingto ridthe kingdom'slaws of anythingthat they consider to be inconsistent with the shari'a and thus establish a truly Islamic state (Fandy 1999:50-60). Modernist thinkers and movements, including Muhammadiyah Indonesia,resist the agenin da of the Islamists in each of these societies (Fuad2002; Hatina2000; Kurzman1998;Nash 1991). do Politicaldemocracies not exist or arehighly compromised in these countries. Freedom House (2001, Table1), which ratesthe political climate of countries,5reportsthat in 2000-01, denial of political freedoms and civil liberties varied from moderate in countries like Bangladeshand Indonesia(3.5 on a scale of 1 to 7, where7 representsfew politicalrightsand freedoms) to extremely high (7.0) in Saudi Arabia(see AppendixTableAl). DATA AND METHODS
DATA

The datawith which we test ourhypothesesare from the fourth wave of the World Values Surveys(WVS), conductedfrom 1999 to 2003, which surveyed81 societies. Our sample consists of Muslimsliving in seven Muslim-majority countries: Algeria(surveyedby MarkTessler andRonaldInglehart), Bangladesh by (surveyed

Q. K. Ahmad and Nilufar Banu), Egypt (surveyed by Mansoor Moaddel), Indonesia (surveyed by Nadra Muhamad Hosen), Jordan (surveyed by Mansoor Moaddel and Mustafa Hamarneh), Pakistan (surveyed by Farooq Tanwir), and Saudi Arabia (surveyed by MansoorMoaddel).The yearsandsamplesizes Al. of the surveysarein theAppendixTable The surveysof six otherMuslim-majority nationsin the WVS (Albania, Azerbaijan, BosniaHerzegovina,Iran, Morocco, and Turkey)did variable-supnot includeourkey independent for Islamic law. Analyses are limited to port respondentsages 18 years and older who selfidentifyas Muslim.InAlgeria,which is 99 perreligion was not cent Muslim, the respondent's asked; thus we include every respondent. In some of our analyses, we pool the samples for all seven countriesinto a single sample,weighting each sampleproportional the size of the to country'sMuslim population. The surveysof the seven nationsconsidered here are among the first to assess public opinMuslim countries.Some ion in predominantly of the surveys were conductedunder difficult circumstances,including the temporaryfiring of Mustafa Hamarneh by the University of Jordan (personal communication fromMansoor Moaddel, 9/12/04). Did the politically represaffectthe sive climatein some of these countries answeredquescandorwith which respondents tions? While it undoubtedly did affect some respondents, Inglehart Norris(2003) found and in thatrespondents Muslimnationssurveyedin the WVS were no differentfromrespondents in Westernnations in theirwillingness to express support for democracy. To partly take into accountthe possibility thatpolitical repression in a countryaffected respondents'willingness of to voice opinionson the establishment Islamic law and economic matters, we control for (describedin the next section) in "repression" analyses of the pooled sample. MEASURES
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
THE SHARI'A. To SUPPORTFOR IMPLEMENTING

rights 5Theindexcombines scoreson 10political and15 civilliberties (www.freedomhouse.org).

measurethe orthodoxy/modernism continuum among Muslims we use a question on support for establishingIslamic law as the sole basis of jurisprudence:

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I wouldlike to knowyourviews abouta good government. Whichof these traitsis (1) very (3) imporimportant, important, somewhat (2) or for tant,(4) leastimportant, (5) notimportant a goodgovernment have? to only Itshould implement thelawsof theshari 'a. Werecoderesponsesso thathigh valuesindifor cate support implementing shari 'a while the low values indicate opposition to this (1 = 5, 2 = 4, 4 = 2, 5 = 1). The response categories, because they differ from the standardLikert scale (i.e., stronglyagree,somewhatagree,neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, stronglydisagree), may have resultedin some acquiescence bias, although other surveys of using Likertscales, some of the same countries, found similarhigh levels of supportfor implementingIslamic law as we find (Hassan2002; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2003). Because popular discourse and Islamistmovementsin each of these countries center on whether the shari 'a should be the sole basis of all law, shouldbe limited to famor ily matters, shouldhaveno influenceon legal codes, the question should be easily interto of as pretable referring the application Islamic law in all realms of life. Using the degree of supportfor implementing the shari'a to measure Islamic orthois with the orthodox doxy/modernism consistent desire to establishand upholdwhat they see as divinely ordainedeternallaws that apply to all membersof the community,and with the contrarymodernistbelief that legal codes should reflect the times and draw upon multiple sources,includingsecularones. In ourresearch on Judeo-Christian nations,we used agreement with the statement"Right and wrong should be based on God'slaws,"amongotheritems, to distinguish orthodox the (Davis frommodernists and Robinson 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). While implementation of the shari'a has both religious and political implications, this is not surprising in the case of Islam since Muhammadunified religion and the statein the first Islamic stateof the seventh century.Nonetheless, underthe possibility that the most politicized Muslims might be both more supportive of establishing Islamic law solely for political motives (Woltering 2002:1134) and more favorable toward economically progressivepolicies, we control for "When discussespolitics, basedon the question:

you get togetherwith your friends,would you say you discuss political matters(3) frequently, (2) occasionally,or (1) never?"We use this level ofpolitito indicatethe most rudimentary cization-debating political issues with others-in the absenceof measuresof higherlevels of political involvement(e.g., membershipin participation protest). politicalorganizations, in for the If support implementing shari 'a is merely capturingpoliticization, then inclusion of this variableshould reduce its effects on economic attitudes. It could also be arguedthatany effect of support for implementingthe shari 'a on economic attitudes may be due to an underlying nationalismor rejectionof the West (including Westernjurisprudence,foreign dominationof the economy, debt dependency on the West, requiredby neoliberal economic restructuring the IMF or World Bank, and globalization), which could produce egalitarian economic stances. Thus, we control for national pride, the best indicatorof nationalisticvalues in the WVS, and stronglylinked,in a recentsurveyof nationalism in Iraq, to oppositional attitudes towardforeignoccupation(Moaddel,Inglehart, and Tessler 2005). Respondents were asked, and "How proud are you to be [nationality]," responsesare coded (1) not at all proud,(2) not very proud,(3) quite proud,or (4) very proud.
SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES. also test We

whetheradvantagedMuslims are less egalitarian thandisadvantaged Muslims, as (Hs) posits following the underdogprinciple, or whether Muslimsof all classesareequallywillingto supas economic arrangements, the portegalitarian voluntary communitarianism assumed by Islamiceconomics implies. In ourmodels, education is in eight ordered categories ranging from (1) no formaleducationto (8) universitywith degree.Householdincome level education, before taxes, countingall wages, salaries,pensions, and otherincome, is coded in deciles by the local investigators each country-with (1) in as the lowest decile and (10) as the highest. Occupation/employment statusis a dummyvariable series identifyingowner/manager, professional, white collar, blue collar, army,student, housewife/retired, and unemployed(reference category).

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Mosque attendance is CONTROL VARIABLES.

ATTITUDES ECONOMIC DEPENDENT VARIABLES:

how often, apartfrom weddings and funerals, the respondentattendsreligious services, and rangesfrom(1) neveror practicallyneverto (7) morethanonce a week. We makeno prediction for the effect of mosque attendancesince it is an indicatorof orthopraxy (engaging in the rituals and practices of a faith tradition)rather the While thanof orthodoxy, focus of ourtheory. for Muslims,orthopraxy at least as important is as orthodoxy(Halliday2003:58; Kuran1997), we latershowthatit is generally contactwith not fellow worshipersin itself but whetherthe individual holds the orthodox moral cosmology thatleads to communitarian economic stances. Nonetheless, following Brooks (2002), we test with an interactionterm whether support for Islamic law, coupled with frequent mosque attendance, leads to exceptionally high economic communitarianism because exposureto clergy,sacredtexts, and fellow worshipersmay intensify the effects of the respondent'smoral and cosmology(see also Starks Robinson2005). The highestcorrelation betweensupportfor the shari'a and mosque attendance is .261 in in Algeria,butto reducemulticollinearity analyses includingthe interactionof these, we centered each of them on its countrymean (or the pooled meanfor analysesof the pooled sample) the beforecreating interactions (AikenandWest 1991:35). We also control for age coded in years;gender coded as (1) male and(0) female; maritalstatus, coded as (1) single and (0) maror ried,widowed, divorced; urban,measured and as size of town in eight categories from (1) under2,000 to (8) 500,000 or more. In analyses of the pooled sample of seven countries,we test for the additiveeffect of standard of living (under H3) and the interactive for effect of thiswithsupport Islamiclaw (under H4).The UnitedNation's(2001) HDI is used as a measureof standard living.We also control of for repression, measured as the country's 2000-01 ratingby FreedomHouse. To test for the interactive effects of support for Islamic law with HDI andrepression,we include interactions of these variables,computedaftercenteringeach variable. While the Gini coefficient, a measureof economicinequality, mightalso be expected to affect economic attitudes,this is unavailablefor Saudi Arabia and has far less effect on economic attitudesthan HDI in the remainingcountries.

Weanalyzethe effectof moralcosmologyand socioeconomic characteristics on three economic attitudesthat contrast communitarian/ egalitarianeconomic policies with individualistic policies. Both our Moral Cosmology theory (H1),which appliesto all of the Abrahamic traditions, and the alternate hypothesis (H2), which is based specifically on the tenets of Islam,lead us to expect an associationbetween cosmology and supportfor governmentefforts to care for the needy.Everyoneprovidedfor is the respondent'sself-placement on a 1 to 10 scale, where (1) indicatescomplete agreement that"peopleshouldtakemore responsibilityto provide for themselves" and (10) complete agreement that "the government should take more responsibilityto ensure that everyone is providedfor." Moral Cosmology theory (H1) posits that supportfor the shari 'a shouldalso be positively associated with a desire for greaterincome equality. Because Islamic texts do not enjoin economic equality, the alternate hypothesis, (H2),posits no effect of supportfor the shari 'a on the belief thatincomes shouldbe equalized. We test these hypotheses using the variable more equal incomes, where (1) is complete agreementthat "we need largerincome differences as incentives for individualeffort" and (10) that"incomesshouldbe mademoreequal." Finally, while Moral Cosmology theory expects supportfor Islamic law also to be positively associatedwith a desire for government of nationalization businessesas a meansto meet community needs (H1), Islamic sacred texts appearto regardprivatepropertyas inviolable andtakeno clearposition on governmentownunderthe alterership,leadingus to hypothesize nate hypothesis, (H2), that orthodox Muslims will not differ from modernist Muslims on nationalization of businesses. We test these ownership, hypothesesusing moregovernment where (1) indicates complete agreement that "privateownership of business and industry should be increased" and (10) that "governmentownership businessandindustry of should be increased." Because MoralCosmology thehypothesisdifferon which ory andthe alternate economic attitudesare linked with supportfor Islamic law, we analyze these attitudes separately.

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Implementation the Shari'a amongMuslimsin SevenMuslim-Majority of Table 1. Attitudes Countries Toward implement only the laws of the shari'a." "should A good government (HDI) Country (.47) Bangladesh Pakistan (.49) Egypt(.64) Indonesia (.68) Algeria(.69) (.71) Jordan SaudiArabia(.75) PooledSample Very Important Important 21.7 23.6 36.4 25.1 48.0 34.0 37.6 15.0 34.9 36.7 26.2 53.7 14.7 73.8 29.1 30.5 Somewhat Least Not Important Important Important 23.8 30.9 9.4 25.8 15.5 13.2 7.3 23.5 21.8 6.3 7.8 12.3 7.3 3.3 2.6 11.2 9.2 1.2 0.9 9.3 5.5 3.6 1.7 5.6 % 100.1 99.9 100.1 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9 Total N 1,120 1,949 2,800 875 1,177 1,121 880 9,847

Development Index;N = number cases.Source:World Note:HDI= Human ValuesSurveys,2000-2003. of

ANALYSIS STATISTICAL We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the effect of support for Islamic

and law,socioeconomiccharacteristics, control

variables on economic attitudes in each coun-

try. Since directionis predictedfor most independent variables (positive for shari'a and negative for socioeconomic variables and HDI),

we use one-tailedtests of significancefor these

variables and two-tailed tests when direction is

not predicted(mosqueattendance, age, gender,

marital status, and urban). In our analyses of the pooled sample of all countries, we cannot use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to estimate the effects of individual-level vs. country-level variables on economic attitudes, because the small number of countries precludes this. In our OLS analyses of the pooled samples, we include the additive effects of HDI and repression and the interactive effects of each of these with support for the shari 'a. RESULTS FOR THE SUPPORT IMPLEMENTING SHARI'A ATTITUDES ANDECONOMIC

there are almost no secularistsor nonbelievers in the samples. The desireto implementIslamiclaw is widely held among Muslims in the seven Muslimmajority nations considered here.6 There is, however, considerablevariation across counshowingthe strongest tries,with SaudiArabians supportandIndonesiansthe least. Popularsupportfor implementingIslamiclaw in all realms to of life is loosely connected whichdomainsthe shari'a currently covers in each country. In SaudiArabia,wherethe shari 'a is the sole basis of the legalcode,nearlythree-fourths thepopof ulation (73.8 percent)regardsimplementation of this as "very important"to good government. In countries where Islamic law applies only to family matters,lower levels of support are found for institutingthe shari 'a as a total system of law (53.7 percentin Jordan, 48.0 percent in Egypt,36.7 percentin Algeria,36.4 percent in Pakistan, 15.0 percentin Indonesia). and In Bangladesh,where Islamic law has no role in the legal system, 21.7 percentregardestablishing the shari 'a in all realmsof life as "very important." strongpopularsupportin Saudi The

Table1 showsthe distribution countryof supby Islamiclaw.We orderthe portfor implementing

countries from low to high on the HDI since we expect this to be the key country-level variable

Egypt, of (2002)surveys Pakistan, 6 In Hassan's most agreed "Muslim andIndonesia, respondents that on must based theQur'an Shariah be law" society and in that (93 percent each),andfew agreed "Itis not
practicalor realisticto base a complex modem society on the Shariahlaw"(17 percent, 10 percent,and 21 percent, respectively). In a survey by the Pew

economicpoliaffectingsupportfor egalitarian
cies (H3) and how this support relates to support for Islamic law (H4). Note that because we limit our analyses to self-identified Muslims and in

Research for and Center thePeople thePress (2003), (73 Jordanians percent), many (74 Bangladeshis percent), Indonesians(82 percent), and Pakistanis(86 percent)believed thatIslam should play a "very"or "fairly"large role in political life.

no countrydo morethan0.7 percentof respondents report that they do not believe in God,

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Arabia,Jordan, Egyptfor implementing and theshari'asuggests werethesecountries to that becomelessrepressive, democracies the estabwhatWestern lishedmightnot resemble promoters democracy theMuslim of world would in say envision. Whileveryfew respondents that of implementation the shari'a is "notimporin this disinterest implementing is hightant," est in Bangladesh Indonesia and9.3 and (9.2 perhaps to theprespercent, respectively), due enceandinfluence Hindus theformer in and of of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists thelatin and syncretic nature Islam ter,andtheresulting of (Nash1991:715; World SBS in thesecountries Guide2003:64,347). The distinctionamongMuslimsin these equal-sized of nations notbetween is groups the As religiouslyorthodoxand modernists. we found in our analyses of predominantly and populations Christian Jewish rarely nations, fall into polarized campsalongcosmological of there lines.Instead, is a continuum belief,and the is in some countries distribution skewed the pole,in others is approxit toward orthodox normal, whilein stillothers is skewed it imately toward modernist (Davis Robinson the pole and 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, cosmology a matter degree, is 2001).Moral of andwe will showthatthe strongest advocates of theshari'aaremorecommunitariantheir in economicpositionsthanthose who are less or enthusiastic, notat all, aboutimplementing this. InTable we showthemeans country by 2, on considered here. the threeeconomicattitudes Recallthatresponses rangefrom(1) economi-

callyindividualistic (10)economically comto munitarian, 5.5. making midpoint Among the Muslims thesecountries, is in popular support moreresponsitaking greatest government for that is bilityto ensure everyone provided as for, opposedto individuals takingmoreresponsibilityforthemselves (6.06 in thepooledsammore incomes ple).Preferences between making incomedifferences an as equalandincreasing effort toward latto incentive individual lean the ter (4.24 in the pooled sample).The relative disinterest in equalizing incomes may be doesnot enjoineconomic becausethe Qur'an equalitybut does mandate zakatto care for Yet since thoseinneed. surprisingly, theQur'an also appears holdprivate as property invioto lableandtakesno clearpositionon nationalization of businesses, Muslims support government of ownership economincreasing ic resources (5.64)almost muchastheysupas government portincreasing effortsto carefor the needy.Muslimsliving in countries with higher livingstandards to be less supporttend ive of increasing to efforts carefor government is the poor(thecorrelation -.21) andequalizingincomes (H3), (-.45), as expected under but government of moresupportive increasing ownership(.34). We explorethese relationships analysesof the pooled throughmultivariate sample. Toputthe economicstancesof Muslims in a global context, Norris and Inglehart that (2004:171,Table7.4) report residents of in surveyed the nations Muslim predominantly WVS are more likely thanresidentsof preCatholic,EasternOrthodox,or dominantly

Deviationsof Economic Table2. MeansandStandard Attitudes amongMuslimsin SevenMuslim-Majority Countries Everyone Provided For Country (HDI) Bangladesh (.47) (.49) Pakistan Egypt(.64) (.68) Indonesia Algeria(.69) Jordan (.71) SaudiArabia(.75) PooledSample Mean 5.55 7.13 6.61 5.97 6.11 6.96 5.19 6.06 SD 3.45 1.92 2.76 3.13 3.01 2.87 2.58 2.98 N 1,294 1,647 2,830 895 1,252 1,099 999 9,854 MoreEqualIncomes Mean 3.40 7.17 2.77 3.84 2.91 3.56 4.19 4.24 SD 2.82 2.15 2.06 2.34 2.57 2.72 2.37 2.83 N 1,293 1,461 2,830 883 1,261 1,107 999 9,566 More Ownership Government Mean 5.28 5.11 6.70 5.86 5.06 5.83 5.58 5.64 SD 3.38 1.65 2.86 2.66 3.19 2.98 2.48 2.79 N 1,291 1,259 2,830 885 1,192 1,040 983 9,268

deviation; = number cases.Source:World of Index;SD = standard Note: HDI= Human Development Values N Surveys,2000-2003.

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Eastern (Asian) nations, but not Protestant responnations,to favorincreasedgovernment sibility for everyone, more likely to support greater governmentownership than the resiand dentsof all exceptEastern Orthodox Eastern nations, but less likely to favor equalizing incomes than residents of all except Eastern Orthodoxnations.
ATTITUDES ECONOMIC EXPLAINING

of Webegin ouranalysesof the determinants economic attitudesby showing the zero-order associations between support for implementin ing Islamiclaw andeconomic egalitarianism Table3, Model 1. Fromour MoralCosmology theory (Hi), we expect supportfor implementing the shari'a, as an indicator of religious orthodoxy among Muslims, to be associated with communitarian economicattitudes, including support for the governmenttaking more responsibility to provide for everyone, for a and moreequalincome distribution, for greater government ownership businessesandindusof tries.The alternate hypothesis(H2),basedon the specific economic tenets of Islam,posits a narrowereffect of orthodoxy,only on supportfor increasedgovernmentresponsibilityfor everyone. We find strongconfirmationin the bivariate associations for the broad communitarian effects expected underMoral Cosmology theory.The desireto implementIslamiclaw as the sole legal foundationof the state is positively and significantly associated with support for greatergovernmenteffortto providefor everyone in six of the seven countries(the exception being SaudiArabia),with wantingto equalize incomesin threecountries(Pakistan, Indonesia, and Algeria), and with support for increased government ownership in six countries (the exceptionbeingIndonesia). effectsof orthoThe doxy on supportfor greatergovernmenteffort to care for the needy could be explained by both hypotheses, but the totality of effects, including those on support for equalizing incomes and greatergovernmentownershipof businesses, can be explained only by Moral Cosmology theory. The effects of support for Islamic law on economic attitudes are remarkablyrobust as successive sets of controlsareaddedin Models 2 through4. In Model 2, we add controls for gender, age, marital status, urban residence,

and mosque attendance;only three of the 15 effects of supportfor Islamic law become nonsignificant.Adding furthercontrols for educain tion,income,andoccupation Model3 reduces none of the effects of supportfor Islamiclaw to nonsignificance, indicating that not much of the economic communitarianism supporters of of the shari 'a is due to a tendency for them to be less economicallyadvantaged. The addition of politicizationand nationalpride in Model 4 also has no effect on the significanceof support for Islamiclaw,suggestingthatanytendencyfor to such supporters be morepoliticizedor nationalistic is not responsible for their progressive stances on economic justice. Effects of support for Islamic law on the desire for increasedgovernmentresponsibility for all and nationalization of businesses are strongerin countrieswith low standards livof ing (especially Bangladesh)than in those with higher living standards (Saudi Arabia and Jordan); the correlations of HDI with these coefficients acrosscountriesare-.49 and-.32, respectively. HDI has littleeffect on the strength of the relationship between support for the shari'a and equalizing incomes (.13). We explore these relationshipsfurtherin analyses of the pooled sample. The proportionsof varianceexplained(R2s) in the three economic attitudes by the independent variables in Model 4 are modest, as earlieranalyses of similareconomic beliefs in the UnitedStates,Europe,andIsraelhavefound (e.g., Davis and Robinson 1996a, 1999b;Form and Hanson 1985; Knoke, Raffalovich, and Erskine 1987). Nonetheless, the overallF-tests for Model 4 aresignificantin every case except for everyoneprovidedfor in SaudiArabiaand moregovernmentownershipin Indonesia,and the patternof positiveeffects of religiousorthodoxy on communitarian economic attitudesis all controls, 12 out of the 21 possiclear.With for of ble associations support Islamiclaw as the ecosole legal basis of the statewith egalitarian attitudesaresignificant.We estimatethe nomic probabilityof obtainingthis numberof significantcoefficients by chancevery conservatively at .0000176.7 Had we posited an opposite

7Weassume threedependent the (ecovariables

nomic attitudes)areperfectlycorrelated(1.000) and estimate the probabilityof obtaining 12 of 21 (or 4

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Table3. OLSRegression for Coefficientsof Support Implementing Shari'ain ModelsExplaining the amongMuslimsin SevenMuslim-Majority Economic Attitudes Countries and Country Model(HDI) (.47) Bangladesh 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance 3. +Education, Income,Occupation 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride
R2

Everyone Provided For .648* .683* .641* .635*

.150

MoreEqual Incomes -.012 .059 .006 .029

.128

MoreGovernment Ownership .512* .591* .574* .628*

.125

N Pakistan (.49) 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance Income,Occupation 3. +Education, 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride R2 N Egypt(.64) 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance 3. +Education, Income,Occupation 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride R2 N (.68) Indonesia 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance 3. +Education, Income,Occupation 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride R2 N Algeria(.69) 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance Income,Occupation 3. +Education, 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride R2 N (.71) Jordan 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance Income,Occupation 3. +Education, 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride R2 N SaudiArabia(.75) 1. No Controls 2. +Male,Age, Single,Urban, MosqueAttendance Income,Occupation 3. +Education, 4. +DiscussesPolitics,NationalPride R2 N

1040 .302* .182* .180* .193* .216 1610 .249* .235* .188* .206* .072 2678 .549* .536* .524* .453* .086 834 .238* .262* .224* .222* .062 1098 .161* .138 .116 .113 .026 1072 .134 .139 .152 .164 .015 868

1047 .230* .067 .065 .075 .205 1425 -.013 -.016 -.023 -.029 .018 2678 .146* .211* .198* .192* .085 826 .176* .190* .152* .152* .071 1105 .104 .121 .072 .074 .050 1072 -.005 -.001 -.003 -.007 .021 866

1042 .082* .038 .039 .047 .096 1229 .155* .141* .098* .103* .054 2678 .048 .037 .016 .010 .031 823 .228* .221* .226* .221* .040 1056 .277* .313* .278* .281* .051 1020 .271* .281* .299* .278* .089 853

Note: OLS= ordinary Development of HDI= Human leastsquare; Index;N = number cases.Source:World ValuesSurveys,2000-2003. *p < .05.

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effect of orthodoxyamongMuslims,we would have found no support for this in any of the seven nations. We conclude from these analyses of each countrythatthereis strongsupport for the broadeffects of religious orthodoxyon egalitarian economic beliefs that our Moral Cosmology theory posits. To examine furtherthe economic effects of support for Islamic law and how these vary dependingon country-levelfactors (e.g., standard of living, political repression), we conductOLS analyseson the pooled samplefor the seven countries.These analyses are shown in Table4. Supportfor establishingthe shari 'a is positively associated in the pooled sample with wanting greatergovernmentresponsibilityfor everyone, more equal incomes, and increased government ownership businessesandindusof tries. The effects of supportfor Islamic law on greatergovernmentresponsibilityand greater government ownership are robust when successive sets of controls are added in Models 2 through5. While the effect of supportfor the shari 'a on equalizingincomesdisappears when controlsforHDI,repression, the interactions and with supportfor the shari 'a areaddedin Model 5, the interaction of support for Islamic law with mosque attendanceis significant. Thus, of supporters Islamiclaw who go to the mosque frequentlyare especially likely to favor equalizing incomes,perhapsbecausethey arereceiving reinforcement for their communitarian beliefs fromlike-minded clergyandfellow worshipers(see Brooks2002; StarksandRobinson 2005). With all controls added (Model 5), the standardized coefficients (not shown) indicate that supportfor establishingIslamic law is the single-most important factor in support for greater governmentresponsibilityto care for everyone and the third-mostimportantfactor (after education and HDI) in support for increasedgovernment of ownership businesses. We made no prediction as to the effect of mosque attendanceon economic communitar-

itemsareassumed be perfectto of 7 sincethethree ly correlated) outcomes .05probability 7!/(4! with as

3!) X (.05)4(.95)3= 1.76 X 10-5.Yet,the highestcor-

any relation attitudes only between twoeconomic is .123.If we instead assume theseareindependthat is ent (i.e., theircorrelation 0), the probability is
21!/(12! 9!) X (.05)12(.95)9= 4.52 X 10-11.

ianism.The inconsistent effectsof mosqueattendance-positive on equalizingincomesbutnegative on greatergovernmentownership(Model 5)--may arisefora number reasons.Mosques of to differ in type from government-controlled independent, in theological orientation, in whethera political message is delivered,and in the content of that message. Attendance may occur for nonreligious reasons (e.g., out of a desire to appearfaithfulor socially acceptable to others, to make business or political contacts, or for purely social reasons). Nonattendance need not indicatea lack of religious commitment;it can arise fromdistrustof the religious leadership,for example, because this is appointedby, accommodatesto, or colludes with a largely secular and/or corrupt regime. Most important,while the communitarianism orthodoxy a broadworldviewthat is of is not limited in its implicationsto the narrow communityof fellow worshipers,the sense of communitycreatedthroughmosqueattendance may be limitedto the specific congregation.In a U.S. study,Ryle and Robinson (2006) found thatthe orthodoxcosmology was the strongest predictorof a sense of communitywith neighbors, friends, fellow congregants, co-workers/fellowstudents,andethnicgroupmembers, while frequentattendanceat religious services hadno effect in promotingsuchfeelingsbeyond to attachment fellow congregants. The Islamisteconomic programof "Islamic economics" assumes that even advantaged Muslimswill voluntarilyopt for more egalitarian economic relations (Kuran 1997, 2004). From the underdog principle (Robinson and Bell 1978), we hypothesized (H5) to the contrary,that class mattersin economic attitudes; advantaged Muslims will be less supportiveof effortsto carefor the needy,equalgovernment ize incomes, and nationalize businesses. The economic self-interestexpected by the underdog principle is evident in these models, with highly educated people and those with high household incomes being less supportive of progressiveeconomicreforms,with one exception, which we later discuss. Contraryto this principle,unemployedpeople are less supportive of increasinggovernmentresponsibilityfor everyone and equalizing incomes than almost any otheroccupationalcategory,althoughotherwise there is no systematiceffect of occupation (e.g., between owners/managers and

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PooledSampleof Muslimsin Seven Table4. OLSRegression Economic Attitudes, ModelsExplaining Muslim-Majority Countries Models and Variables Models Provided (N = 9,006) Everyone for Model 1 Shari'a Model2 Mosqueattendance Model3 Education Household income Owner/manager Professional Whitecollar Blue collar Army Student Housewife/retired Model4 Discussespolitics Nationalpride Model5 HDI Repression Shari'a x attendance Shari'ax HDI Shari'a x repression Constant R2 MoreEqualIncomes(N = 8,746) Model 1 Shari'a Model2 Mosqueattendance Model3 Education Household income Owner/manager Professional Whitecollar Blue collar Army Student Housewife/retired Model4 Discussespolitics Nationalpride Model5 HDI Repression Shari'a x attendance Shari'ax HDI Shari'a x repression Constant R2 1 2 3 4 5

.558*

.548* .021*

.486* .032*
-.156* -.112* .532

.489* .030 -.172* -.113* .519 .219 .524 .467 .894 .122 .562 -.191*
-.252*

.421* -.003 -.121* -.083* .455 .164 .552 .457 .740 .084 .458 -.230*
-.367* -1.971* .325* .017

-.208
.536 .448 .884 .129 .534

-1.380*
-210*

4.021 .050

3.987 .051

4.732 .082

6.119 .086

6.534 .106

.166*

.146* .193*

.064* .213*
-.194* -.190* .561 .290 .805 .453 1.456

.065* .216* -.186* -.188* .552 .272 .799 .429 1.447 .659 .946 .212* .021

.029 .148* -.052* -.126* .555 .339 1.068 .663 1.441 .696 .759 .171* -.283*
-7.994*

.670
.966

---

.568*
.055* -1.505* -.065*

3.705 .005

2.923 .021

3.813 .089

3.232 5.848 .091 .181 on (Continued nextpage)

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AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table4. (continued) Models Variables Models and MoreGovernment Ownership = 8,442) (N Model 1 Shari'a Model2 Mosqueattendance Model3 Education income Household Owner/manager
Professional

.201* -

.230* -.125*

.216* -.121* -.105* .073 -.045

.274

.217* -.124* -.116* .072 -.051

.284

.204* -.108* -.163* .060 -.126

.119

Whitecollar Blue collar Army Student Housewife/retired Model4 Discussespolitics Nationalpride Model5 HDI Repression Shari'a x attendance Shari'ax HDI Shari'a x repression Constant R2

---4.971 .008

.640 .214 .285 .451 .215 5.933 .035

.634 .229 .292 .445 .232 -.163* -.155* 6.896 .037

.417 .013 .114 .374 .256 -.181* -.078 4.006* -.006 .000 -1.332* -.022 5.247 .056

6.049 .024

Note:Model2 also includesage, gender, marital least square; status,andurban residence.OLS= ordinary HDI= of Human Development Index;N = number cases.Source:World ValuesSurveys,2000-2003 test and repression, shari'a x repression). for *p < .05, one-tailed (two-tailed mosqueattendance,

blue-collar workers) on economic attitudes. Overall,there is more supportfor the rational choice, underdog principlethanfor the assumption of Islamic economics that advantaged Muslims can be counted on to supportcomeconomic arrangements. munitarian Discussing politics frequently or having a strong sense of nationalpride, when added in Model 4, do not diminishthe effects of support Muslims for Islamiclaw on economicattitudes. are who discusspolitics frequently less likely to want greatergovernmentresponsibilityfor the needy and greatergovernmentownershipbut An morelikelyto wantincomesto be equalized. term,testingthe possibilitythatsupinteraction portersof Islamic law who are politicized are exceptionallyegalitarian,is not significant for any of the economic attitudes(detailsavailable on request). arethe effectsof orthodoxy due Nor to any tendencyfor nationalisticMuslimsto be both more supportiveof Islamic law out of an

anti-West sentiment, and more egalitarianor anti-capitalist theireconomicviews. Muslims in with strongpride in their country are actually less favorable toward increasing government responsibility for everyone and equalizing incomes. As we hypothesizedunder (H3), high standardsof living (HDI) are negatively relatedto supportfor governmenttaking more responsibility for everyoneand for equalizingincomes, reflecting the feeling that when the apparently country as a whole is doing reasonably well economically, therearefewerneedy to takecare of (or that they are less deserving of help) and less necessity for governmentto support the poor or equalize incomes. Interestingly, with a two-tailedtest, HDI is positively relatedto support for increased government ownership of businesses, suggesting that Muslims in highHDI countries may feel that state ownership ensures prosperity. High income and white-

ISLAMAND ECONOMICJUSTICE

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collaroccupation alsopositively are associated for withsupport government ownership we (had support This usedtwo-tailed tests). mayindicate amonghigh-status groupsfor the cronycapitalismandfamily systems charthat patronage the economies someof the acterize rentier of Egypt,Indonesia, Saudi and nations(Algeria, Arabia) ourstudy. in off Thosewho arebetter from in suchstates likelyto benefitdirectly are statecontrolof productive resources through their with association government (Fandy elites 2002:377). 1999:34-36; Moaddel Totestwhether support Islamiclawhas for effecton economic egalitarianism a stronger in countries lowerstandards living,as we with of interactions hypothesized (H4), include under we of support the shari'awithHDIin Model for of 5. Thesignificant effects theseinternegative the that, the indicate as expected, lower actions country's standard living, the greaterthe of effectthatsupport Islamiclaw has on all for threeeconomicattitudes. Failingto meet the needs of the citizenrystrengthens effects of Islamic orthodoxy thedesireforegalitarian on economic reform. repression, Political whichis onlymodestly with correlated HDI(-.079), is associated with responsibility a desirefor greater government possibly and foreveryone moreequalincomes, because repressive governments less likely are the to lookoutforthosein need.Interestingly, morerepressive government, less effect the the that supportfor the shari'a has on wanting greater government responsibility everyone for represandmoreequalincomes. politically In who arethe Muslims, sive regimes,orthodox in objectsof government repression some of these countries, maypreferthatIslamicnonthan rather governmental (NGOs), organizations As thestate, for provide thepoorandneedy. we later discuss, this is the strategythat most movements adopted whenfaced have Islamist repressionand corruption with government (Carapico 2000).

all of the Abrahamic faith traditions. comSpecifically, argue thetheological we that of munitarianism the religiously orthodox themto favor inclines communitarian/egalitarianeconomic (and arrangements communitarian/authoritarian policiesthatseek to cultural stanwhat theysee as divinely ordained impose on and dards abortion, sexuality, family, gender). In contrast, theologicalindividualism the of themtoward individualisdisposes modernists (and tic, laissez-faire economicarrangements culturalpolicies). individualistic/libertarian While Moral Cosmology theory does not dependon the specific contentof Islam,the alternate hypothesis, basedon tenetsof Islam with regardto economicmatters,limits the effectof orthodoxy to government to aid only by is piltheneedy, which supported theIslamic larofzakat,andpositsno effectson equalizing of ownership busiincomes or government nesses. We foundthatin all sevennations,orthodoxy-measuredas support theimplemenfor tationof Islamiclaw (theshari'a) as the sole legalfoundation thestate-is associated of with for ecosupport one or moreof the following responsigreater government nomicreforms: equalization bilityto provide everyone, of for government of or incomes, increased ownership is That business. orthodoxy linked thesecounin pronot tries, onlywithsupport government for for vision for thosein need,butwith support economicpolicies thatare otherprogressive not enjoinedby Islamictexts, supportsour Moral to linking orthodoxy Cosmology theory communitarian economic policiesin all of the traditions. additional In Abrahamic analyses not reportedin this articlebut availableon request, we tested the argumentof Moral that is theory orthodoxy associated Cosmology withcultural communitarianismauthoritaror for ianism,andfoundthatsupport the impleof mentation Islamic is significantly law related to in eachof thesevencountries twoormoreof that (1) the following: agreement "menmake betterpoliticalleadersthanwomendo,"(2) DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS agreement abortion never (3) that is justifiable, Through of that analyses sevenMuslim-majori- agreement homosexuality never justifiis ty nations, testedtwo alternate we hypotheses able,and(4)agreement divorce never jusis that orthodoxy modernism Islam with tifiable. in linking vs. attitudes. Moral economic Our Thus,the linkbetween theCosmology religiousorthodoxy that oryassumes effectsof moralcosmolo- andeconomic communitarianism we found similar attitudes gy on economic (andcultural) within earlier in societies that are predominantly

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Protestant (Norway, United States), mixed Protestant and Catholic (West Germany), Catholic (Austria, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal), Eastern Orthodox (Bulgaria, Romania), and Jewish (Israel; Davis and Robinson 1996a, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001) Muslim societies holds in seven predominantly as well-18 societies in all. We caution, however, that economic conditions or unique historicalcircumstances may affectwhetherMoral Cosmology theory holds in a specific context. As we found for the seven Muslim-majority nations considered here, depressed economic conditions may strengthen the link between orthodoxy and economic communitarianism, while bettereconomic conditionsweakenthis. Historical contingencies may also matter. In our earlieranalyses of Europeancountries,we found thatmodernistsin Franceare actuallyto the left of the orthodoxon economic issuesthe reverse of the expected pattern(Davis and Robinson 1999b:1647). In explainingthis, we noted Percheron's (1982:8) observation that "leftandrightin Francetodaycoincide in large part with the 'red' and 'white' of the Revolution,"the red referring to anticlerical revolutionary Republicans and the white to Catholic loyalists. While we found evidence of economic communitarianism among ordinary orthodox Muslims, is there also evidence of this in Islamist movements in Muslim-majority nations? We noted above that in politically repressivesocieties, supportfor Islamic law is less stronglyrelatedto a desire for greatergovernmentresponsibilityfor everyoneand equalizing incomes, andwe suggestedthatorthodox Muslims may, in such states, prefer that economic needs of the citizenry be addressedby Islamic NGOs rather than the secular state (Carapico 2000). In highly repressive Egypt of the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhoodbegan to establish a broad networkof welfare agencies, clinics, factoriesofferinggood wages and benefits, daycarecenters, youth clubs, unemploymentagencies, and so forth.Afterthe 1992 Cairo earthquake,it was the Brotherhood, not that the government, steppedin to providemedical assistance, shelter, food, and clothing for the victims (Walsh2003:34). This "statewithin a state" (Esposito 2003:71), while not the first choice of Islamistsseeking to establishan Islamic state, became a model for "re-

Islamizationfrombelow"(Kepel 1994:33) that has been widely adopted throughout the Muslim world. Eschewing governmentfunds and drawingon zakat contributions(as would an Islamic state), these welfare networks demonstrate that Islamist organizations can outperformsecular governmentsin providing social services to citizens (Fuller 2003:27; Ghadbian 2000:80; Marty and Appleby 1992:150; Woltering2002:1134).8 The cosmological and class differencesthat we found among Muslims in supportfor comeconomic measuressuggest thatan munitarian Islamist call for progressiveeconomic change would draw support from orthodox Muslims and andfromthose at the bottomof educational hierarchies.One of the attractionsof income Islamistmovementsarguablyis theiremphasis on economic reform (Husain 2003:42) and theireffortsto address,with varyingdegreesof success,9 human needs that established governments have been unwilling or unable to meet (Fuller 2003:27). The landslide victory in the 2005 Iranian presidential election of Islamist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad overAkbarHasmeniRafsanjani, a reformist/modernist, stunned Western observers,who had assumed that culturalliberties initiatedby outgoingreformistpresident, Muhammad Khatami, would continue. In a country where the official jobless rate is 11 percentand inflation 14 percent,Ahmadinejad promisedto put the poor at the top of his agenthe da, pledgedto renationalize oil industryand redistribute its wealth, and condemned the reformists'reintroduction privatebanks and of privatization of state-owned industries for increasingthe gap betweenrich andpoor (Reed

8 Not all "welfare Islam" been initiated has by The moveorthodox movements. Muhammadiyah thoughit scrupulously avoids mentin Indonesia, to politics,is modernist its opposition theimplein of mentation theshari'a.Yet,it establishedwelfare a that network schoolsystem servesneedsunmet and by thestate(Nash1991;Fuad2002). found Jordan, Yemen and themto be moreeffective employment themanyunemployed in providing for
professionals (doctors, nurses, and underemployed social workers) and building ties among middleclass service providersand clients than in addressing the needs of the poor (Clark2004). 9 An ethnography of Islamic NGOs in Egypt,

ISLAMAND ECONOMICJUSTICE

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and Pirouz 2005, Economist 2005). The New

Times(Slackman2005) reportedthat, York often "while[Ahmadinejad] invoked Godand his faith,he hasusuallydoneso in thecontext of populistproposalsto lowerprices, raise jobs."Ahmadinejad's crisalaries,andcreate rentiqueof corruption cronyism Iran's in and tier economy and his social conservatism contrasted withRafsanjani's neolibersharply subsidies bread, andutilalism(ending gas, for privatization; encouraging ities; and accelerating investment) cultural foreign and progressivism (Pirouzand Reed 2005). While some might as viewAhmadinejad's instrupopulism strictly mental,he garnered percentof the vote, 62 drawingespeciallyon the orthodoxMuslim
poor and unemployed (Economist 2005). Yet

to to Islamper se, butrather the economiccomthat munitarianism we haveargued characterizes the orthodoxof all of the Abrahamicfaith traimpulseof ditions.The culturallyauthoritarian orthodox Islam regarding the position of sexuality,andfamilyhasbeen women,abortion, well documented otherscholars(e.g., Hassan by 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Moaddel 1998), but as we have shown, among Muslims who wantreligion to be at the core of the state, thereis an economicallyegalitarian as well. face
Nancy J. Davis is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Departmentof Sociology & Anthropologyat DePauw University. She is continuing work with RobertRobinsonon the connectionsbetweenmoral cosmology and social action in the Muslim Brotherhood,Comunionee Liberazione,Shas, and the SalvationArmyas well as on the effect of moral cosmology on political activism among Muslims in nations.She recentlypublishedan Muslim-majority article on teaching about sexuality, culture, and power in TeachingSociology, where she is also on the editorial board. Robert V.Robinson is Chancellor'sProfessor and Chair of the Department of Sociology at Indiana He University. recentlycompleted studiesof theeffect of moralcosmology onAmericans'sense of community(in City& Community withRobynRyle)and valuesfor children(in Social ForceswithBrianStarks). He is continuing work with Nancy Davis on relimovements Egypt, giouslyorthodox communitarian in Italy, Israel, and the United States, on President Bush 's democracy doctrinefor the Muslim world, and on moral cosmology and political activism among Muslims.

victorymaybe encouraging Ahmadinejad's as world, throughout Muslim the the forIslamists to weaker commitment economic communitarand that ianism we found well-educated among for highlypaid Muslimssuggestsa problem "Islamic economics," assume who proponents of thatan Islamicstatecouldrelyon advantaged classesto willinglybuildan economically just society. We conclude whilezakat,the pillarof that for requiring to Islam Muslims provide thosein the need,mayreinforce tendency Muslims for who support implementation theshari'ain of of allrealms life to be moreeconomically egalitarian, tendency suchMuslimsto go the for beyondthe tenetsof theirfaithin supporting of of equalization incomesor nationalization
businesses and industriescannotbe attributed

APPENDIX TableAl. of Nations Characteristics the SurveysandPopulations SevenMuslim-Majority of SurveyCharacteristics Country Bangladesh Pakistan Egypt Indonesia Algeria Jordan SaudiArabia Year 2000 2002 2001 2001 2002 2001 2003 N 1,499 2,000 3,000 1,004 1,282 1,233 1,014*" Muslim,% 88 97 94 92 99 96 99 Characteristics Population HDI .47 .49 .64 .68 .69 .71 .75 PoliticalRepression 3.5 5.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 4.0 7.0

Factbook Note:Percent Muslimis fromCIAWorld (2004). HDI is fromUnitedNations(2001). Politicalrepression in points,whichrangesfrom 1 (low) to 7 (high),is fromFreedom House(2001, Table1). HDI= Human Development Index;N = number cases. of *ForSaudicitizensonly.

188

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