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PROPERTY OF V. LADA-MOCARSKI

46 William Street New York, N. Y.

LAST DA^S OF MUSSOLINI AND BIS MINISTERS (Aprii 25th through 28th 1945)

PREFACE;

Objects and methods of th investigatici! resulting in th present report. Difficulties encountered in obtaining authentic Information freni eyewitnesses of various events.

Mussolini and Claretta Petacci, his mistress, were eaptured by th Italian Partisans on Friday, Aprii 27, 1945 &t Bongo, Province of Como. They were shot th next day on a deserted country road leading from Bonzanigo di Mezzegra to Azaano. Iheir bodies, as veli as those of several ministers and other prominent Fascista, who were executed on th sarne day at Congo, were taken . to Milan later in th evening. The next morning, Sunday, Aprii 29th, a delirious and frenzied crovid hung th bodies by their feet in th public square th Piazza Loretto. A few hours later, th bodies were taken down and placed in a morgue by order of th Committee of National Liberation, who represented th Italian goverament in Milen, which had just been liberated from th Axis troops and was not yet occupied by the-Allles, These Italian authorities had attempted to prevent th hanging but failed because they had had insufficient police forces at their disposai. During this attempt, fire hoses were turned on th crowd, but they also proved ineffective. The population of Milan h&d been tyrannized and abused for many long months by Mussolini and bis regime of oppression and torture, Only a short time before, 15 members of th Besistance were shot on this very Piazza - which today bears th name Piace of th 15 Martyrs". It is therefore under-

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standable that th people of Milan were taking their pound of flesh. * #

*
Ct Sunday, Aprii 29th, I was in Como and th folio-Ring morning in Milan. Both tovms were stili feverish with th excitement of their newly won freedom and th dramatie events which had just taken piace. Despite th fact that only 24 hours had elapsed freni th time of Mussolinifs execution, I was unable to obtain, in Como, authentic reports as to th circumstances surrounding his captare and xecutionj nor could I find, either in Como or Milan, any eyewitnesses of both events. This was due to th fact that Mussolini was captured in a small town on th western shore of Lake Como, hidden in th hills by th partisans1, and executed within 24 hours of his capture. Even th locai population was kept away frorn most of th happenlngs. It is possible that not a single performer in th drama witnessed th entire sequence of events and is today alive to teli th story. The following narrative shows how small in numbers these perfcrmers v/ere. The execution of Mussolini and Petacci, for instance, was carried out and witnessed only by three or maximum four perseli One of these met with a fatai "accident" a few days laterj another dsappeared under strange circumstances and his fate is not known. The remaining two are keeping fron; view and despite several attempts I failed to find them.

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*

From my very first endeavors to secure any information about Mussolini's last days, I was struck not only by th difficulties of finding eyewitnesses but also by th bias evident in th second-hand

-3accounts depending on th background and politicai credo of th souree. Partisans with communist 'aff iliations were depicting Mussolini as a coward who died 'ignominously, while others, belonging to th more conservative "element were deploring th "brutal" action taken by his exeeutioners,? f'rom where there was only a short step to making him a martyr.' The romantic 'element %as much impressed perhaps rightly so - with Clare'tta Petacei's sacrificing ber life to follow II Duce to th bitter end. Against this generai background any kind of legend could easily' spring up. Finding nyself so dose to th se events, I was determined to obtain, from eyewitnesses, an unbiased and factual account which would form a reliable source for th future.

The investigation started on Aprii 29th'and, with several interruptions, continued for th following six weeks. During this periodi I nave spoken with Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan, in whose palace th meeting between Mussolini and th National Committee of Liberation took piace on Aprii 25th. The account of this historic meeting forms th opening chapter of this report. I spoke several times with General Cadorna, C -in- C of th "Corpo Volontari della Libert", th underground Army of th CLNAI, which carried th brunt of military operations behind th lines of th Axis troops in Northern Italy, and nvhich is generally referred to as th "Partisans. Countless other military and civilin' leader s> who v/ere directly or indirectly connected with th capture and'' execution of Mussolini, related to me th parts they played in th events. In order to fili

some gaps in th continui ty of th narrative, it was neeessary to

-4interrogate several important Fascist officials and their relatives, some of whom were by then in prison, awaiting trial. Partlcular care was taken in checking their statements, one against th other, and against those of th anti-Fascist w^to.esse s. Any discrepancies were gone over in subsequent interrogations. A total of some forty persone were questione^, several as mach as six or seven times. Their testimony was immediately recorded and resulted in about 30 separate reports which, correlated, formed th basis for th present narrative. Every piace connected with these events was visited by me, always accompanied by someonw who took part in th episode being investigated. Several of th scenes were roughly reenacted by th originai performers. Photographs were secured and gone over with eyewitnesses. 4 With th'exeeption of th part of this report covering some ten minutes time which elapsed from th moment of Colonel Valerio*s taking Mussolini and Petacci from th house in Bonzanigo di Mezzegra to their being shot on th road outside of that village, th entire account may be considered reliable. For th short period in question, Col. Valerio's own statement, made to th Commxmist newspaper "L'Unita", 24 hours after th execution, may on th whole be taken as correct inasmuch as it has received direct or indlrect corrbboration by others.

In th course of this investigation two important aspects were particularly difficult to elucidate. The first of these dealt with ascertaining what Mussolini s plans and intentions were in undertaking his flight to Como and lanaggio as well as MS subsequent attempi to reach th regions northeast of Lake Como. The second dealt with
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th origin of th authority on which Col. Valerio's bold action, cuiminating in th execution of Mussolini and his ministerswas based. No conclusive evidence regarding Mussolini's plans and intentions v.'as obtained during th investigation perhaps no one definite pian had existed. It is fairly obvious that II JDuce's moveaents were a result cf improvisations, arrived at as conditions ch&nged. His flight from Milan became a necessity after he learned, at th meeting at Cardinal Schuster's palace, that th Germana were negotiating their proaapt surrender. Conditions in th city had definitely taken a turn kgainst th neo-F&scists a generai strike was spreading, and th partisans were growing bolder every minute. Wlth th Allied Armies rapidly advancing from th south, Como seemed th safest piace to go to, and it was on th way to Valtellina..
*

As far back as Novem-

ber or Decembr 1944 Porta had told his henchman, Castelli of a pian to withdr&w th Jascist troops and th government to th Valley of Valltelina in case of a sudden break-through of th front by th Allied Forces. Furthermore, Pavolin had just spent some time in that vslley, directing "niopping-upn operations again&t th Partisans. Once in Como, Mussolini tried to rally his Army and th Black Shirts for a last stand at Valltelina to gain time until th arrivai of th Allied Forces to whom he would then surrender. Shirts reached Menaggio, th next point in his flight. some other pian had to be devised. / i . There is evidence to show that one more half-hearted attempt was made by his ministers to galn admittance to Switzerland much against II Duce's wishes. This attempt made at Porlezsa, during II Duce's stay in Menaggio, was unsuccessful. An inquiry to Swiss authori ties in Bern could reveal th circumstances of this attempt, if made at This pian failed Therefore, as, according to 11 Duce, Marshal Oraziani betrayed him. No Black

-6all, At Menaggio, th situation became hopeless it was then that th pian to hide II Duce in a German convoy retreating towards Austria, was formed. It was a measure of desperation, but it might ha ve succeeded and resuted in a different end for II Duce and his ministers. However, a handful of ^artisans who somewhat accidentali/ found themselves barring th way of th German convoy in which he was hidden, altered th course of hi story.

As regards Valerio's authority to summarily execute Mussolini and his ministers, th findings are reasonably clear. In one pi" its first meetings, after th liberation of Milan, th * CLNAI decided that, if captured, Mussolini should be shot at once. This decision was somewhat informai and no particular fornialities vsere observed in reaching it someho"v th eventuality of II Duce's capture seezaed remote at that time. Just th same>Leo Valeani, a laember of th Coromittee, was instructed to advise Gen. Cadorna, C-in-C of th Hartisans, of th Committee's decision. This he did in th early morning of Aprii 27th, sever&l hours before Mussolini 's capture in far-off Congo. Frora then on there is no evidence to indicate that th Committee considered this problem anew upon learning of Mussolini s capture. If anything, there is some evidence to th contrary. As late as
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9th, 11 days after th execution, Gen. Cadorna frankly stat4 to He added that th generai policy

ne that ali th details, which I was investiga ting, were not by any means known to th CLNAI or to hinu

MS t!not to look into ali th eircumstances too closely. He did refer, however, to Valeani s conversation with him about th originai

-7dgciaion of th Committee. He also said that Col. Valerio had formai orders to proceed with th execution when he left for Dongo. From th emphatic statement of th Partisan Comrnander Pedro in whose custody th prisoners were, and from other evidence, it is clear that Valerio had no specific written orders and that he did not even know ex&ctly whom th partisans had captured, when he arrived in Dongo. Juciging from Valerio1s attitude when he first came to Como on his way to Dongo, it would seem eertain that his originai orders did not include th authority for immediate execution. It is only after * receiving a telephone cali from Milan, described in detail in th report, that his inission toccarne that of an executioner. The question arises as to who was behind Valerio's new instructions. It is reasonable to assume that Gen. Cadorna was at least one of th persons in1 volved. It was his name that Valerio used in his deslings with th Como Committee. Furthermore, he used th name of th "Corpo Volontari della Libert", whose C-in-C was Cadorna, in reading th death sentence to II Duce. There is an additional factor to consider. Surlng th fight for liberation, Valerio was a liaison officer between th Communist Party and Gen. Cadorna. Even after th execution of Mussolini, he represented that Party at one of th meetings of th high-rantcing Partisan officers, which was presided over by Gen. Cadorna. It is posslble that this affiliation and perhaps even instructions from th Party played an importent role in deciding upon th course of action % he followed... This, of course, is a mere conjecture.

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There is every reason to believe that further evidence will decerne available in th future, which will throw additional light on th events descrlbed in this report. This applies particularly to th motives and intentions which may have guided both Mussolini and those who resisted him and contributed to his downfall. However, most of th factual data set forth in th present report are believed to be authentic and irrefutable.