G.R. No.

L-2044: Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan

1st Emergency Power Cases

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of CA No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased. HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. Eulogio Rodriguez , SR., ETC., ET AL., petitionersv. Vicente Gella , ETC., ET AL., respondents (92 PHIL. 603 [Feb. 2, 1953]) Ponente: Paras, C.J.: Facts: Petitioners herein seek to invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, drought, earthquakes and other calamities. E.O.s were issued by virtue of C.A. No. 671 The Emergency Powers Act. Issue: WON E.O.s Nos. 545 and 546 are valid? Held: NO. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, x x x to prescribe/promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. The said powers are limited in the prescribed period. It cannot be exercised at any time as the President may want to be SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V.CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATIONOF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. 158540, AUG. 3,2005

e x c i t i n g s u b j e c t f o r litigation. Still, the parties in this case h a v e done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s , t h r o w i n g i n e v e r y t h i n g i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o v e r b i a l k i t c h e n sink. At present, the burden of pass ion, if notp r o o f , h a s s h i f t e d t o p u b l i c r e s p o n d e n t s D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y (DTI) andp r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t P h i l i p p i n e C e m e n t Manufacturers Corporatio n ( P h i l c e m c o r ) , [ 1 ] who now seek recons ideration of our Decisiondated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted thepetition of petitioner Southern Cross CementCorporation (Southern Cross). This case, of course, is ultimately not just aboutc e m e n t . F o r r e s p o n d e n t s , i t i s a b o u t l o v e o f country and the future of the domestic industryi n t h e f a c e o f f o r e i g n c o m p e t i t i o n . F o r t h i s C o u r t , i t i s a b o u t e l e m e n t a r y s t a t u t o r y construction, constitutional l imitations on theexecutive power to impos e tariffs and similarm e a s u r e s , a n d o b e d i e n c e t o t h e l a w . J u s t a s m u c h w a s a s s e r t e d i n t h e D e c i s i o n , a n d t h e same holds true with this present Resolution. POWER OF PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TARIFFRATES:

Cement

is

hardly

an

Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h h a s n o a u t h o r i t y t o i m p o s e tariffs and other similar tax levies involving thei m p o r t a t i o n o f f o r e i g n g o o d s . A s s u m i n g t h a t S e c t i o n 2 8 ( 2 ) A r t i c l e V I d i d n o t e x i s t , t h e e n a c t m e n t o f t h e S M A b y C o n g r e s s w o u l d b e voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The cons titutional provision s hields suchd e l e g a t i o n f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i r m i t y , a n d s hould be recognized as an exceptional grant o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r t o t h e P r e s i d e n t , r a t h e r than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. QUALIFIERS: This being the case, the qualifiersm a n d a t e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o n t h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y a t t a i n p r i m o r d i a l consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2)t h e r e m u s t b e s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s ; a n d ( 3 ) C o n g r e s s m a y i m p o s e l i m i t a t i o n s a n d restrictions on this presidential authority. POWER EXERCISED BY ALTER EGOS OF PRES: T h e C o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y delegated to the President under Section 28(2),Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with l e g i s l a t i v e s a n c t i o n , b y t h e a l t e r e g o s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t , s u c h a s d e p a r t m e n t s e c r e t a r i e s . Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise o f p o w e r t o i m p o s e t a r i f f s u n d e r A r t i c l e V I , Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. T h e S M A p r o v i d e s a n e x c e p t i o n a l i n s t a n c e w h e r e i n i t i s t h e D T I o r A g r i c u l t u r e S e c r e t a r y who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no i n h e r e n t p o w e r , e v e n a s a l t e r e g o o f t h e President, to levy tariffs and imports. T A R I F F C O M M I S S I O N A N D D T I S E C A R E AGENTS: Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and p a r c e l o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e d e l e g a t i o n o f i t s inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations andr e s t r i c t i o n s . I n t h a t r e g a r d , b o t h t h e T a r i f f C o m m i s s i o n a n d t h e D T I S e c r e t a r y m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s a g e n t s o f C o n g r e s s w i t h i n t h e i r l imited respective s pheres, as ordained in the S M A , i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s a i d l a w which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, e v e n t h e P r e s i d e n t m a y b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a n agent of Congress for the purpose of impos ing s a f e g u a r d m e a s u r e s . I t i s C o n g r e s s , n o t t h e Pres ident, which possesses inherent powers to impos e tariffs and impos ts. Without legislative a u t h o r i z a t i o n t h r o u g h s t a t u t e , t h e P r e s i d e n t has no power, authority or right to impose such s a f e g u a r d m e a s u r e s b e c a u s e t a x a t i o n i s inherently legislative, not executive. When Congress tasks the Pres ident or his /her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherentl y belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is bas ic agency law that the agent may no tact beyond the specifically delegated powers or d i s r e g a r d t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d b y t h e principal . In short, Congress may establis h thep r o c e d u r a l f r a m e w o r k u n d e r w h i c h s u c h s a f e g u a r d m e a s u r e s m a y b e i m p o s e d , a n d a s s i g n t h e v a r i o u s o f f i c e s i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the i m p o s i t i o n o f s u c h m e a s u r e s , t h e t a s k assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exis ts tow a r r a n t s u c h i m p o s i t i o n s . U n d e r t h e S M A , Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions in the legislatures scheme of things. There is only one viable ground for challenging the legal ity of the limitations and restrictionsi m p o s e d b y C o n g r e s s u n d e r S e c t i o n 2 8 ( 2 ) A r t i c l e V I , a n d t h a t i s s u c h l i m i t a t i o n s a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e t h e m s e l v e s v i o l a t i v e o f t h e Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful ornoxious these l imitations and restrictions may s e e m , t h e C o u r t h a s n o c h o i c e b u t t o u p h o l d their validity unless their constitutional infirmitycan be demonstrated. What are these limitations and restrictions that a r e m a t e r i a l t o t h e present case? The entireSMA provides for a limited framework underw h i c h t h e P r e s i d e n t , t h r o u g h t h e D T I a n d Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguardm e a s u r e s i n t h e f o r m o f t a r i f f s a n d s i m i l a r imposts.P O W E R B E L O N G S T O C O N G R E S S : t h e c i t e d passage from Fr. Bernas actually states, Sincet h e C o n s t i t u t i o n h a s g i v e n t h e P r e s i d e n t t h e p o w e r o f c o n t r o l , w i t h a l l i t s a w e s o m e implications, it is the Cons titution alone whichc a n c u r t a i l s u c h p o w e r . D o e s t h e P r e s i d e n t have such tariff powers under the Constitutionin the first place which may be curtailed by thee x e c u t i v e p o w e r o f c o n t r o l ? A t t h e r i s k o f redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: T h e C o n g r e s s m a y , b y l a w , a u t h o r i z e t h e P r e s i d e n t t o f i x w i t h i n s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s , a n d subject to such limitations and restrictions as itm a y i m p o s e , t a r i f f r a t e s , i m p o r t a n d e x p o r t quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and otherduties or impos ts within the framework of then a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m o f t h e Government. Clearly the p o w e r t o i m p o s e t a r i f f s b e l o n g s t o C o n g r e s s a n d n o t t o t h e President. YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR. NO. 130584; JUNE 27, 2006 FACTS:

The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is the government agency tasked with the administration of the PAG-IBIG[2][2] Fund (Fund) created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1530, signed into law on June 11, 1978. The Fund has been intended for housing purposes to be sourced from voluntary contributions from its members. On December 14, 1980, P.D. No. 1530 was amended by P.D. No. 1752 providing that membership in the Fund is mandatory for all gainfully-employed Filipinos. On June 17, 1994, P.D. No. 1752 was amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7742 which took effect on January 1, 1995. Under the new law, the coverage of the Fund extends to all members of the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System, as well as their employers. However, membership is voluntary for employees earning less than P4,000.00 a month. Employees who are non-members of the employers private plan at the time of the certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage is granted shall continue to be mandatorily covered by the Fund and their employer is required to set aside and remit to the Fund the employee contributions together with the employer contributions. Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc., petitioner herein, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, applied for and was granted by the HDMF a waiver from the Fund coverage for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1995. The HDMF found that petitioners retirement plan for its employees is superior to that offered by the Fund. Such waiver or suspension may be granted by the Fund on the basis of actual certification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any collective bargaining agreement, any other existing agreement or clearly spelled out management policy and that features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund and continue to be so. Provided further, That the application must be endorsed by the labor union representing a majority of the employees or in the absence thereof by at least a majority vote for all the employees in the said establishment in a meeting specifically called for the purpose; Provided furthermore, That such a meeting be held or conducted under the supervision of an authorized representative from the Fund. The certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage issued herein shall only be for a period of one (1) year effective upon issuance thereof. No certificate of waiver issued by the President of the Fund shall have retroactive effect. Application for renewal must be filed within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the existing waiver or suspension and such application for renewal shall only be granted based on the same conditions and requirements under which the original application was approved. ISSUE: Whether the HDMF exceeded its authority when it amended its original Rules and Regulations. HELD: No. The legislative power is granted pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: SEC. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. The authority to amend, change, or modify a law is thus part of such legislative power. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society. However, the legislature cannot foresee every contingency involved in a particular problem that it seeks to address. Thus, it has become customary for it to delegate to instrumentalities of the executive department, known as administrative agencies, the power to make rules and regulations. This is because statutes are generally couched in general terms which express the policies, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and manner of carrying out the law are left to the administrative agency charged with its implementation. In this sense, rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative agency are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.[3] [9] Hence, in general, rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by law, have the force and effect, or partake of the nature, of a statute. The law delegated to the HDMF the rule-making power since this is necessary for the proper exercise of its authority to administer the Fund. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, this grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. 10AUG PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR GENERAL Facts: In 1964, the president, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 for the creation of 33 municipalities. Vice president Pelaez instituted a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restraint the auditor general as well as his representatives and agents from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive order and for any disbursement by said municipality by alleging that the executive order is null and void for it was impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and constitute undue delegation of power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of RA 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3: All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof. Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

The petitioner argues that if the president cannot create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipality. Respondent on the other hand argue that a municipality can be created without creating a new barrios by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of municipality. Issue (1): Whether or not the President has the power to create municipalities. NO Held: Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power. Such claim is untenable. When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power". Issue (2): Whether or not the executive orders are valid. NO Held: According to the SC, under RA 2370, barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names be changed except by act of congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. The SC further said that the authority to create municipal corporation is legislative in nature. WHEREFORE, the EOs in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. MENDEZ Facts: President C. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon. By virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was then attacked of its validity. The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists. YES Held: The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. Camid v. Office of the President, et,al. (January 17,2005) by Bon FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur

This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considerd null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as a private citizen and taxpayer) Camid contends/argues the following: o Municipality of Andong evolved into a full blown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and sevices, it has ist own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office etc. and 17 baranggays with chairman) He noted agencies and private grous recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong

In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalties including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO107 arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.Mendez, the court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order. Thus this petition.

ISSUE/S AND RULING: May the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation? NO Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by the other instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislatures action.

May the any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to Camids prayer? - NO. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? - No. for the following reasons: o There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment. Andong did not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442(d) regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It says:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality. The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House of Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong.

Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated municipalities are now considered existing? No there was none. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the 1987 Constitution validates them. The fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the legislation recreating these municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong. SC DECISION: DISMISSED for lack of Merit.

RELEVANCE: Note the following Sections with regards to juridical personality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatment with Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil Code, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions and Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. These two are governed by the law creating them. Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not a recognized political subdivision, it is not also considered a juridical person. Note: What happened with the people from Andong? The constituent barrios of the voided town returns to its original municipalities (Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are recognized and still existing. The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not judicial confirmation of void title.

SEMA vs. COMELEC Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created underRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989. There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). Sema, who was a candidate in the 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress. Issue: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional. NO Held: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid. In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter. The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution (Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than twohundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self- evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers within its territorial jurisdiction.

Benamira v. Garrucho

Facts: In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism, the petitioner assumed office on on April 7, 1986.

On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager, approved by the President on the same date.

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.

On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.

On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating him concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent. Issue: Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation. Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority

Held: Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400) Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, as also happened in the case at bar.

With these rulings, the petitioners claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).itc-asl In either case, the petitioners claim of security of tenure must be rejected.

The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.

The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner Llamas vs orbos Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice-governor of Tarlac, and on march 1, 1991, he assumed office by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship. Private Respondent Mariano Ocampo III is the incumbent governor and was suspended from office due to having been found guilty of having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the petition, and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor thus, putting him back to his position as the governor of tarlac. Petitioner contends that executive clemency could only be granted to criminal cases and not administrative cases; that there has been no final judgement of the private respondent's motion for reconsideration; and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated. Issue: WON the president has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. WON there has been a final judgement. WON the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated 1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The petitioner's contention that the president may only grant executive clemency to criminal cases based on said provision is untenable because the Constitution does not distinguish between cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. Ubi lex non distinguit, necnos distinguire debemos. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution. 2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon the acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. 3. No. the petitioner's constitutional rights to due process was not violated because his being not notified of the subject of pardon is based on the fact that pardon is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, said notice is unnecessary.

Lina v. Purisima

Philippine Bar Association (PBA) vs. COMELEC Philippine 140 January Bar Association SCRA 7, vs. COMELEC 455 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president. APCD v. PHILCOA PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93. ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation. HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.