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Enrile NATURE: Petition for Habeas Corpus FACTS: 63 jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers Jan 28 85 64 petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC 65 all petitioners released on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended 66 urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 85 On Feb. 7 or 9 85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds BUT 67 Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 85 o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al. 68 Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows: o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons another phone call subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal complainants affidavits had not yet been received o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al had been officially received informed that said charges were never coursed through the Records Office o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a matter of Constitutional right appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsels request that they be given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients no such requirement required under the rules 69 Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on orders of then Pres.Marcos release narrated in Courts resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al: o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released four on Feb15 85 and one on Feb.8 85 o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition. 70 Hence, this petition. o Brocka, et al contend: 1. bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution 2. second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is ISSUE: WON criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined YES RATIO: GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final EXCEPTIONS:

To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation When double jeopardy is clearly apparent When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground had been denied 11. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners HERE, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state officials in bad faith: 1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from detention BUT This PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85 upon receipt of TCs order of release violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in MM or 48 hours outside MM (Ilagan v Enrile) Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox copy of it violates Court pronouncement that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile) 2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information [instead of a petition for HC] Court Held: such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing: 1. spurious and inoperational PDA 2. sham and hasty PI clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew IF-THEN RULE: If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined. xx Petition granted. TC permanently enjoined from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition.

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Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File the Petition Petitioner attacks respondents legal standing to file the Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court, maintaining that only the public prosecutor or the solicitor general may challenge the assailed Order. He [16] invokes People v. Dacudao, which ruled: "x x x A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the Governments counsel, the Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or incidents before the Supreme Court. At the very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the Solicitor General, should have raised the issue (of whether or not the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process on account of the grant of bail to the accused without any hearing on the motion for bail) before us, instead of the private prosecutor with the conformity of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu." He also cites Republic v. Partisala

which held as follows: Sda adsc

"We make it known that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Henceforth actions filed in the name of the Republic of the Philippines if not initiated by the Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed." Missdaa Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, doctrines in this manner:

however, provided an exception to the above

"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adaos order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioners) father. "In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus: Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved by petitioner judges ruling on his nondisqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently, in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, as against the literal interpretation of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband." (Id., p. 699) The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate courts ruling on this point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice. Xlaw To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law. Moreover, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that "it is too late in the day for the petitioner to challenge the legal personality of private respondent considering that it was never disputed by [him] during the preliminary investigation of the case, in his appeal to the Department of Justice and during the [20] reinvestigation of the case." Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner submits that even if the exception were made to apply, private respondent is not an "offended party" who is granted the right to challenge the assailed RTC Order. He maintains that only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the accused himself and his minor child, may file the instant action. We disagree. Sclex It should be remembered that the crime charged against the private respondent is parricide; hence, the accused cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Hence, we rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is akin to the "offended party," she being a close relative of the deceased. There is no closer kin who may be expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the deceased. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.



The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the same having been denied, he went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft League filed a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed. On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000. On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971. Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:


The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21 For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.

RODRIGUEZ vs. Gadiane

Thomasita Rodriguez (petitioner) was the private complainant in a criminal case filed against Rolando Gadiane and Ricardo Rafols, Jr. (respondents), for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22). The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) hearing the complaint had suspended the criminal proceeding on the ground that a prejudicial question was posed in a separate civil case then pending. On 28 February 2001, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, seeking to set aside the MTC order of suspension. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-26195. HELD: is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.1



Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically provides that "all criminal action either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." In Alberto vs. de la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406, the Court held that "a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegation thereof. Although this power and prerogative of the fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor. There is no question that the prosecuting fiscal has the right to conduct his own investigation. As early as 1938, it has been the ruling that after a criminal case has been forwarded by the inferior court to the trial court which has jurisdiction to try it on the merits, and before the fiscal has filed the necessary information, the latter not only has the power but also the duty to investigate the facts upon which the complaint filed in inferior court was based, to examine the evidence submitted and such other evidence as the parties may deem proper to submit on their own free will or on demand of the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether there is at least prima facie evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. If after he has done all these and considering an the circumstances of the case, the fiscal believes that the evidence is not sufficient to establish prima facie the guilt of the accused he should submit to the court before which the case is pending the corresponding motion for dismissal. (People vs. Ovilla, 65 Phil. 722). Further, in Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Judge Ambrocio T. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914, the court very clearly said that "because of the right of a prosecuting attorney to conduct his own investigation of a criminal case elevated to him from the justice of the peace, naturally, there is corresponding duty or obligation of the prosecuting witness, especially the offended parties, to submit to said investigation. Consequently, said offended parties and their legal counsel, the private prosecutor, are not justified in refusing to submit to the same and to give their testimonies ... It is rather embarrassing for a prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion he does not have the necessary evidence to secure conviction or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. If the prosecuting attorney fails or refuses to file said information within a reasonable time, then either the offended parties or the court could invoked Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code so that the Department of Justice could designate one to act as Provincial Fiscal and file the corresponding complaint or information. "Finally, in Salcedo vs. Suarez, 80 SCRA 237, We held that "[u]pon receipt of the record in the court of first instance from the municipal court, it is well settled as reaffirmed in Talusan vs, Ofiana that the Provincial fiscal (or his assistant) has the power to conduct his own investigation or reinvestigation of a case already elevated to the Court of First Instance by a Municipal Judge or justice of the peace who conducted a preliminary investigation thereon, in order to determine his own course of action as prosecuting officer', and thereafter he may either move to dismiss the case or file the corresponding information."But then, let's say that the fiscal simply refuses to institute a case against a respondent even if the evidence is sufficient to warrant the filing of an information. As stated above, the remedy is appeal to the Ministry of Justice (then Department of Justice) and, if there is evidence, administrative complaint against the prosecuting officer for ignorance of the law, neglect of duty, partiality and/or bribery.

Crespo vs. Mogul HELD: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.


Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221). The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds

of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasidelict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

People vs. Gamba,

On the first assignment of error, the appellant claims that he was charged, arraigned, tried and convicted for the crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority but the facts show that the crime committed was different-robbery with homicide. Hence his conviction for murder with assault should be set aside. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General claims that there is no disparity between the offense charged and that which was preyed during the trial. He insists that the charge in the information spells the crime of murder, not robbery with homicide; and the evidence shows that the former, not the latter was committed. The first claim is partly correct; the second claim is completely wrong. A careful scrutiny of the information will readily reveal that the charge against the appellant is robbery with homicide. This is manifest from the phrase, while the latter (the deceased) was responding to a robbery-snatching case. In fact, the appellants brief makes the same conclusion; it says, a close scrutiny of the same information reveals that the crime committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. (Brief, p. 4) And it should be borned in mind in this connection that the label or caption in the information in respect of the crime committed is not controlling what matters are the material allegations in the information. Also to be noted is the correct observation by the court a

quo that the evidence proved that the crime committed was robbery with homicide and that there can be such a crime albeit the person killed was not the robbery victim. Since the charge in the information is robbery with homicide and the evidence is to the same effect, the mistake in designating the crime both in the information and in the judgment is not fata