MOORE, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE SCEPTIC

Torben Schwartz

Throughout the course of philosophy "the Sceptic" has played his hand well: he has kept philosophers engaged in a battle over our claims to "know" things about the world. Plato began the tradition by telling us all claims about the empirical world are just opinions; knowledge (and certainty) is reserved for the immutable, a priori realm of the Forms. For Descartes certainty was found only in clear and distinct ideas, the evil demon being his Sceptic. Hume found certainty in sense-data, but felt sceptical about our knowledge of the external world. The list goes on. Most philosophers have drawn a sharp line between what can and can't be doubted, what is or isn't certain, what we can or can't know, motivated by the Sceptics challenge: to win back human knowledge. So now would probably not be the best time to realise the Sceptic has, unbeknownst even to him, been sitting on a throne of cards all along... In "A Defence of Common Sense" G.E. Moore argued that it was self-refuting for sceptical philosophers to regard certain beliefs as "common sense" while at the same time claim that we cannot know them. Moore listed a group of propositions (I will refer to them as Moore's truisms) which he claims comprise a common body of knowledge. This is of critical importance, as Moores claim underpins this essay. Amongst them were propositions such as:

"There exists at present a living human body, which is my body" "I have had feelings of many different kinds The earth had existed also for many years before my body was born There have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions (G.E. Moore, A Defence of Common Sense 1)

Essentially Moore listed propositions which are the foundation of our thought; as I shall explain, this is very important. Moore admits that he is very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions [Moores truisms] is (4) and that he is certain that no-one has provided a correct analysis so far. Moores paper was well received by his Cambridge successor, Ludwig Wittgenstein. He sought to resolve the issue of Moores truisms place and offer his analysis. Wittgenstein disagreed with Moores truisms being a foundation for knowledge but agreed that there was hitherto no correct explanation of Moores truisms. Are they to be seen as propositions of philosophy which are called upon in argument only (as Moore implies)? Or is there some other explanation? Wittgensteins later method involved dissolving philosophical problems by clarifying how we use language; in On Certainty (hereafter OC) Wittgenstein seeks to dissolve scepticism by focusing on non-philosophical usage of the word know. His idea of language-games is integral to his analysis. Language-games are the conventions or rules we follow when using language: they are learnt as we learn to speak and the rules determine how we are to speak. For Wittgenstein philosophical problems arise when

language goes on holiday (Philosophical Investigations 38). That is to say, the issues we suffer from are a result of taking language out of its rightful place in the relevant language-game. Incidentally Wittgenstein did not believe all language-games even had expressible rules; it may just be that we recognise incorrect usage when it occurs. Language has developed as a tool, and it is when we are not using language in practice that philosophy becomes nonsensical. Interested by the peculiarity of Moores truisms, Wittgenstein set about finding the rule for the usage of I know. Firstly, claims to knowledge require justification. If I correctly say I know X then there should always be an explanation of how I know X which involves evidence more certain than the statement itself. Wittgenstein develops this: But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes (OC 243). For example I could not say whether seeing two hands in front of me is evidence for trusting my vision or whether that I see two hands is evidence for there being two hands: For why shouldn't I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? (OC 125) It is this rule which alienates Moores truisms as the majority of them are unsupported by evidence: they are the propositions which become evidence for other assertions. To every I know there must be an answer to the question How? For Moores truisms there is no answer. Wittgenstein treats evidence here at the foundation as impossible: for the difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. (OC 166) Consequently Moores truisms cannot be knowledge: so why do they seem certain? Wittgenstein is rather disparaging about the conventional use of doubt as a Cartesian tool (If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a halfwit. OC 257) and sees it as a case of language on holiday. Doubt, as a tool, becomes harmful if we do not realise its limit: theoretical doubt is unimportant, what is important is what we can and do doubt. Of course knowledge requires conviction, so doubt must be absent from such claims. Wittgenstein emphasises that there are certain beliefs that are so fundamental to our way of life that they cannot be questioned if language is to function. Moores truisms are like hinges (If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put OC 343): if we actually refuse to treat these foundations as certain we cannot formulate argument at all, for if you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either (OC 114) which would be paradoxical. In fact, Wittgenstein sees these foundations as the rules of our language-games. Rules cannot be challenged for language to work but we cannot say we know them to be true. In fact, all indubitable propositions are rules of language. This controversially means logical and mathematical propositions cannot be known: we do not know 2+2=4 it is in fact a rule which it is incomprehensible to disobey. This entails that it must be conceivable to really doubt anything we claim to know or else it is improper use of the word. Rules, the river-bed of thoughts, can also change, making different claims true or false. We do not have knowledge of the foundation, it is the inherited background against which [we] distinguish between true and false (OC 94) Wittgenstein sees rules as different tools, each serving a practical function: if the functions change so will the rules. Furthermore, Wittgenstein sees no need for our claims to knowledge to be true: for it "would be wrong to say that I can only say "I know that there is a chair there" when there is a chair there. Of course he says, it isn't true unless there is, but I have a right to say this if I am sure there is a chair there, even if I am wrong. (OC 549) This is possibly the most important claim in On Certainty as it shows the final blow to the philosophical house-of-cards that is knowledge: actually there is no such thing as knowledge (the noun implies an entity which exists) but merely acceptable uses of the word know. The rules prescriptive in normal use are sufficient for us to say I know and yet do not entail truth (it is possible that the evidence is wrong and our certainty misplaced). Wittgensteins lack of interest in the notion of truth seems most evident here: it is only meaningful to enquire about the truth of individual utterances, not

truth itself. Truth is the same as knowledge for Wittgenstein: we use the words to express our justified convictions, but to take them on holiday yields only nonsense. Through language games Wittgenstein shows the Sceptic to be sitting in a house of cards without even knowing it: scepticism is essentially language on holiday. The rules of the nonphilosophical use of know show clearly that the elusive philosophical knowledge cannot exist. Moores truisms are rules: they are not a body of knowledge but they determine truth in normal discourse. The conditions for ascribing knowledge to others are slightly more complex. For example, if I say he knows X I must also not doubt X for it makes no sense to say He knows X but it is false. These further conditions follow naturally if we accept Wittgensteins view of philosophy as an investigation that destroys the buildings of conventional philosophy, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble. Although in actual fact

what we are destroying are only houses of cards, and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stood." (Philosophical Investigations, 118)

With this realisation, I believe the Sceptics threat has dissolved.

Bibliography Hans D. Sluga, D. G. (Ed.). (1996). The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press. Moore, G. E. (1959). A Defence of Common Sense. In Philosophical Papers. Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L. (2006). Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.