The constitutional as well as human right to travel,

129 SCRA

Fr. Robert reyes vs CA & Sec. Raul Gonzales, GR no. 182161, December 3, 2009 Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel. In their Comment, both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998, and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007, which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo. The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo. The petition must fail. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, thus: x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as follows: To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied) Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise: While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual. The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. x

xx Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al. thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus: A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion. Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al., this Court ruled that: This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads: Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 073126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO. We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter: The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra). Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario, thus: Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, nger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes). WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED. FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211, September 15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989 right to travel; liberty of abode and "right to return" En banc This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme Court to Order the respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so "within the limits prescribed by law". Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Thus: Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY. Likewise, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides: Art. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, they argue that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights, citing Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted in the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The sub-issues, which could help in the determination of the main issue, are: 1. Does the President have the power to bar the Marcoses to return to the Philippines? a. Is this a political question? 2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former Pres. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, has the President made a finding that the return of the petitioners to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public welfare or public health. And if she has made that finding, have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding? Has there been prior notice to the petitioners? Held: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel connote. Essentially, the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from, though related to the right to travel. Thus, even the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state, the right to leave a country and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELLCONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people. The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged by the insurgency, separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, etc. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically. Lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, judicial power now includes the duty to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." NOTE: The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (CJ Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING the petition. Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento). Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting. With all due respect for the majority in the Court that the main issue in this case is not one of power but one on RIGHTS. If he comes home, the government has the power to arrest and punish him but does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die among familiar surroundings? x x x The government has more than ample powers under existing laws to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. BUT THE DENIAL OF TRAVEL PAPERS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE POWERS BECAUSE THE BILL OF RIGHTS SAY SO. THERE IS NO LAW PRESCRIBING EXILE IN FOREIGN LAND AS THE PENALTY FOR HURTING THE NATION. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after the hearing. Silverio vs. CA, April 8, 1991 Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court. Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court. Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel ProcessingCenter, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121). Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. Kwong vs. PCGG, December 7,l987 FACTS: Petitioners prayed that respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG, for Short) be commanded to lift without delay the Hold-Orders issued against them by the said entity for being in violation of their right to travel and for having been issued in grave abuse of authority since they are in no way involved in ill-gotten wealth nor in transactions connected therewith. Petitioners were foreign nationals who are the representative of the Hongkong-Chinese investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in two domestic garment corporations namely, De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation, and American Inter-Fashion Manufacturing Corporation, which firms were ordered sequestered by the PCGG on 25 March 1986 on the thesis that the Marcoses, through nominess and dummies, appear to control 67% of the firms shareholdings. HELD: The Hold-Orders against petitioners preventing them from leaving the country cannot be prolonged indefinitely. The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitutionand the Universal declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory. That right extends to all residents regardless of nationality. And everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law. While such right is not absolute but must yield to the States inherent police power upon which the Hold-Orders were premised, no good reasons have been advanced which could justify the continued enforcement of the Hold-Order. II. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) : Date of UN Adoption: December 16, 1966; Date of signature: December 19, 1966 ; Date of ratification: February 28, 1986 NOTE: Civil and political rights are the rights which the laws will enforce at the instance of individuals without discrimination for the enjoyment of their lives, liberty and means of happiness. Traditionally, this group of rights is deemed fully enforceable and judicially demandable often described as the first generation rights. Some of the following cases will however show that despite having the recognition of being first-tiered rights, civil and political rights are not always absolute or non-derogable. Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149 1. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. In said cases he was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. He is also involved in a case pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2. The SEC requested the Commissioner on Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure pending disposition of the case involving him. The same was granted by the Commissioner. 3. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled "motion for permission to leave the country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities". 4. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which also denied the same. Petitioner brings the matter to the S.C. claiming his constitutional right to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty. HELD: Petition denied. a. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. b. "x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction."(People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (l935) c. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason would place him beyond the reach of the courts. d. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, Feb. 13, 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. The S.C. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. Unlike the Shepherd case, petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel. e. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. He must however convince the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, and that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel. Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date. Issue:Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis. Held:The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode."Ours is a government of laws and not of men. Roan vs. Gonzales, supra.

F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guarantee. Salonga vs. Hermoso, 97 SCRA 121 Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to compel Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center to issue a certificate of eligibility totravel to Salonga. This is not however the first time that Salonga filed such a complaint and this issue is considered moot and academic. The Soc-Gen, in his reply, has already indicated that the certificate was indeed issued and that there should be no cause of action. The issuance of the certificate is in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel.The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid such similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time. Read also the Ferdinand Marcos Cases of August & October, 1989 Ferdinand Marcos, et. al. vs. Honorable Raul Manglapus G.R. No. 88211; 15 September 1989 FACTS: After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile. Now in his deathbed, the former President has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on the return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. ISSUE: Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated under scope of the Executive are concerned. RULING: Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of the executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Having sword to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for common good. The State, through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Hazelin Antolin vs. Atty. Abelardo Domondon, et. al. GR no. 165036, July 5, 2010 Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the Board of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was shown her answer sheets but since these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of the grading system (collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found in the grading. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all documents that would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA. Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She amended her Petition a second time to

implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA examination did not render the petition moot because the relief and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as Certified Public Accountant was deleted from the original petition. As regards whether she had the constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the parties first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered the PRC to preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioners answer sheets, and the answer keys for the October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam. When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTCs decision and ordered the dismissal of the case because: (1) the petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and access to government documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the re-correction of her examination; (2)Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies; (3) Whether or not the case was mooted by petitioners passing the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4) Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to have access to the Examination Papers. Held: (1) Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioners 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. In AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989 (Minute Resolution)], where therespondent Judge was questioned for dismissing therein petitioners mandamus action to compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission to re-correct their ratings, the Supreme Court held that (t)he function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of thewrit of mandamus. For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be equally clear. No such clarity exists here. And despite petitioners assertion that she did not demand re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that respondents make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination belied this claim. (2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioners remedy from the Boardsrefusal to release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional Boards, including the results of their licensure examinations, and the decisions of the Boards on administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the PRC within 30 days from promulgation. Contrarys to petitioners claim, this power is not limited to administrative investigations but encompassesrequests for documents. And since the PRC itself issued the resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is thewell-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other departments. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved. Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to demand access to the Examination Papers was one such question of law which cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. (3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioners belated passing of the CPA Board Exams did not automatically mean that her interest in the Examination Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case would be repeated, warranted review. (4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law (Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the States policy of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the meanings of public interest and public concern which embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, and which are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC, however, had not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Papers confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Province of North Cotabato vs. Gov. of the republic of the Philippines Peace Panel (The Memorandum on Ancestral Domain Case) Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court? Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law. Akbayan vs. Thomas Aquino, July 16, 2008 (the JPEPA case) Facts:Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the J a p a n P h i l i p p i n e s E c o n o m i c P a r t n e r s h i p A g r e e m e n t ( J P E P A ) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during thenegotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexesthereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement tobe entered into by the Philippines with another country in the eventthe Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topicswhich includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,p a p e r l e s s t r a d i n g , t r a d e i n s e r v i c e s , i n v e s t m e n t , i n t e l l e c t u a l property rights, government procurement, movement of naturalpersons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition,dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the businessenvironment, and general and final provisions. Issues: a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.b. Whether the executive privilege claimed b y the respondentsapplies only at certain stages of the negotiation process.c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claimof privilege.d. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege ontime. Ruling: Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:1. To be covered by the right to information, the information soughtmust meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of publicconcern.In determining whether or not a particular information is of publicconcern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concernlike public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Bothterms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public maywant to know, either because these directly affect their lives, orsimply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n . I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , i t i s f o r t h e c o u r t s t o determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement,it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submittedduring the negotiations towards its execution are matters of publicconcern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim thatdiplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executiveprivilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to informationand the policy of full public disclosure. Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an informationis covered by the right to information, a specific showing of needf o r s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b u t o n l y whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however,t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a s c l a i m e d e x e c u t i v e p r i v i l e g e , a n d i t h a s established that the information is indeed covered by the same,then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, musts h o w t h a t t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s v i t a l , n o t s i m p l y f o r t h e satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.2. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to informationincludes official information on on-going negotiations before a finalc o n t r a c t . T h e i n f o r m a t i o n , h o w e v e r , m u s t c o n s t i t u t e d e f i n i t e propositions by the government and should not cover recognizedexceptions like privileged information, military and diplomaticsecrets and similar matters affecting national security and publicorder.3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and canb e o v e r c o m e b y a s u f f i c i e n t s h o w i n g o f n e e d . T h i s n e e d determination is to be made flexibly on a caseby-case, ad hocbasis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is assertedt h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t m u s t u n d e r t a k e a f r e s h b a l a n c i n g o f t h e competing interests," taking into account factors such as "therelevance o f the evidence," "the availability of other evidence,""the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government,"and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strongand sufficient showing of need. The arguments t hey proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the decided cases. There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it isa matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as aninternational trade agreement.Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitionershave failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-makingunless the initial offers are also published.4. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean thatthe claim of privilege should not be credited.R e s p o n d e n t s f a i l u r e t o c l a i m t h e p r i v i l e g e d u r i n g t h e H o u s e Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiverthereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received fromthe House Committee and petitionerCongressman Aguja weremere requests for information. The House Committee refrainedfrom pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena ducest e c u m o n a c c o u n t o f t h e n S p e a k e r J o s e d e V e n e c i a s a l l e g e d request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold thesame in abeyance.While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain fromissuing subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for theiroffice until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains thatsuch requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests,they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege. RE: Request for a copy of the 2008 Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Personal Data Sheet of justices of the Supreme Court, AM 0986 SC, June 13, 2012

CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704 The Facts: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read: WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous years mere P106 thousand; WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT; WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004; WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted. On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained. Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340. I S S U E S: Is the refusal of the petitioners to testify in Congress by virtue of EO No. 1, Section 4 [b] violates the constitutional provision on information on matters of public concern? H E L D: Yes. Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 which was invoked by the petitioners in support of their refusal to testify in the Senate limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Such provision of EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provision ensuring the peoples access to information on matters of public BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. COMELEC, MAY 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1 Facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9)ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14)AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionallyguaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Issues: (1)Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and (2) Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. Held: The petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly denied insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate

in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof Note:The petitioner requested the COMELEC to publish the individual nominees of all the party-list groups in order that they will be guided on what party-list group shall be supported by them. The COMELEC held that under the Party-list Act, such list of nominees is confidential and should not be published. Held: The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list groups. This is in accordance with the right to information on matters of public concern which shall be accorded to every citizen. VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE, GR NO. 74930, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 in relation to the Right to Privacy Facts: 1. On June 4, 1986, petitioner Valmonte wrote the respondent asking the latter to furnish him copies of former members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS prior to the February 7, 1986 elections; 2. On June 17, 1986, respondent through counsel refused to give the petitioner a list of said lawmakers who obtained "clean loans" from the GSIS on the ground that there is a confidential relationship between the GSIS and its borrowers and it would be proper for them to preserve the same; 3. On July 19, 1986, the petitioners filed this instant petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought in accordance with their constitutional right to information? Held: 1. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. In the case at bar, the decision of the General Manager of the GSIS is appealable/reviewable by the GSIS Board of Trustees. Petitioners did not ask the Board of Trustees to review the decision of the respondent. However, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when only questions of law is involved. (Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466; Aguilar vs. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359. This is not the first time that the court is confronted with a case involving the right to information. In Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, we upheld the citizen's right to information as well as in Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 and ordered the government officers involved to act as prayed for by the petitioners. The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 7, Art. III which provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions x x x shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided for by law. The postulate of public office is a public trust as institutionalized in the Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. XI) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be empty words if access to information of public concern is denied except under limitations prescribed by law. Petitioners are members of the media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of the information they disseminate x x x The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of "full public disclosure" and "honesty in the public service". Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. It is subject to limitations provided for by law and the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern". Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest" and subject to "reasonable conditions prescribed by law." The information sought to be obtained by the petitioners affect public interest since the GSIS is the trustee of contributions from the government and its employees. The funds of the GSIS assume a public character and that its obligations are guaranteed by the government. The petitioners are entitled to access to documents sought subject to reasonable regulations that the respondent may impose relating to manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi vs. CSC, supra; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383] The petitioners, however, are not entitled to be furnished copies of list of alleged members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure clean loans through the intercessions of Pres. Marcos and the First Lady. This is so because access to public records does not include the right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. The respondent is therefore ordered to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to members of the Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable rules and regulations as the GSIS may deem necessary. Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar. Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.

Brilliantes vs. Chang, Aug. 14, 1990 BRILLANTES vs. YORAC 192 SCRA 358, 1990 Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that (I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative expediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make. Canlas vs. Vasquez, July 3, 1990 Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Manuel Morato, November 13, 1991 Petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. Her request was denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions partake the nature of conscience votes and are private and personal. (MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTCRB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents. G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991) Petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. Her request was denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions partake the nature of conscience votes and are private and personal. A board resolution was also issued declaring as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. The Court found the respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. FACTS: At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution.In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance fromrespondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied. Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records.On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting,seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later,i .e ., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial." Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board).After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already)reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2)MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27,1989) declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the

decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film. RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.SO ORDERED.As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra. ) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions.MTRCB,pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest";whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006 The Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order: 1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; 2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; 1. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; 2. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and 3. Such other officers as may be determined by the President. I S S U E S: 1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and H E L D: E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 44 FACTS: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement. RULING: Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. Publication is, therefore, mandatory. Bantay Republika vs. COMELEC 523 SCRA 1 FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos. In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to. In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections. ISSUE: 1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. 2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and 3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, 1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. ) 2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and

intelligent casting of the votes in an election 3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas,charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint,stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request. The undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community and the preservation of our democratic principles. The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and (cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent. Ruling: WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. The publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. it has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significancethe Court finds that the respondent has not committed any abuse of authority. there is no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the respondent.The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision.Complainant admitted that he was aware of the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent when he went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his communication Lantaco vs. Lllamas, 108 SCRA 502 Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 FACTS: Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the RD. He was denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for mandamus. HELD: Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze. Gonzales vs. Narvasa 337 SCRA 733 FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers. Freedom of Association, 100 SCRA 100 The fundamental right of self-organization,108 SCRA 390 The right of self-organization of managerial employees,47 SCRA 434 In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554 Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governorsunanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the correspondingdues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization towhich he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Courtbut is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues? Held: It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he ishereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Ratio Decidendi: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-definedb u t u n o r g a n i z e d a n d i n c o h e s i v e g r o u p o f w h i c h e v e r y l a w y e r i s a r e a d y a m e m b e r . B a r integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as hechooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. TheSupreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashionbe shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty topromulgate rules concernin g the admission to the practice of law and the integration of thePhilippine Bar (Article X , Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of aprivileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeedimposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives andpurposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under thenecessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation andinquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penaltydesigned to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is notvoid as unreasonable or arbitrary. NOTE: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringethe constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon wasstricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar. Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93 The crux of the matter in this proceeding for certiorari with preliminary injunction is whether or not probationary employees are entitled to vote in the election of officers and board members of a labor union. Respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel 1 at first ruled that they could not, apparently relying on the applicable provision of the Labor Code, which reads thus: "Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, with at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union., 2 When, however, a motion for reconsideration was filed, he granted it and allowed the votes to be counted. Hence this suit for certiorari. In the election of union officers on October 23, 1977, there were two strong contenders, petitioner Arthur Ternate and respondent Lucerio Fajardo. Petitioner received 308 votes and respondent 285 votes. Forty (40) ballots cast by employees who classified as second helpers were challenged. They were included in the list of qualified voters upon the motion of the Fajardo faction and over the opposition of the Ternate group. It was imposed as a condition that the challenged ballots would be segregated and would be counted only after passing upon the question of membership of the such second helpers. The Ternate group finally agreed to allow them to participate in the election. On October 27, 1977, after the decision, the Fajardo group moved to have the challenged votes opened. The Med-Arbiter granted the prayer. Respondent Director Noriel in the order now challenged in this petition, as noted earlier, decided otherwise in a motion for reconsideration. The Solicitor General 3 when asked to comment, after stressing the constitutional right to form associations, a corollary of which in the case of labor is the right to self-organization, pointed to Article 3 of the New Labor Code in sustaining the power of respondent Director to issue the assailed order. Thus: "These constitutional mandates are recognized in Article 3 of the New Labor Code. Further, Article 244 thereof is of the same tenor: ... All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious, medical or educational institutions operating for profit, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargain. 4 Reference to the constitutional right to freedom of association is not without relevance. The more decisive question, however, is the force and effect of the Labor Code provision as to when a probationary employee could in the language thereof "be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union." The answer arrived at by this Court after due consideration of all factors bearing on such issue, is that the condition thus imposed in the Labor Code requiring "at least one year of service" calls for application. Petitioner, therefore, must prevail. 1. The reliance of petitioner on the applicable Labor Code provision is not in vain. It is definite and clear. At least one year of service is required for an employee to enjoy the benefits "of membership in any labor union." There is no ambiguity. Its validity has not been challenged. It, therefore, calls for application in the precise terms it was enacted. As was pointed out in Gonzaga Court of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect. 6 There is thus no statutory support for the challenged order of respondent Noriel. 2. In reaching such a conclusion, this Court is not unaware of the implication for freedom of association. 7 There is plausibility on its face to the contention of the Solicitor General that to bar the probationary employees from voting for union officials would run counter to such constitutional right. Nor should it be forgotten that in U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union vs. Noriel, 8 it was stressed that "freedom of association is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. 9 A more realistic appraisal, however, of the labor situation would serve to clarify matters. (The right to join a labor union remains undisputed. In the meanwhile however, for purposes of electing the union officers, assuming it would be chosen as the sole bargaining unit in the negotiation for a collective bargaining contract, the right of probationary employees could be thus restricted as provided for in the Labor Code. The justification lies in the fact that management could, by the simple device of appointing probationary employees in the labor union expected to prevail in the choice of the sole collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would serve best its interests, not necessarily that of labor). It must have been such a purpose that inspired a provision on this character. At any rate, there being no attack on its validity, it must be given full force and effect.

3. The delay in the decision of this case is due to the fact that the required number of votes for this conclusion could not be obtained until the last deliberation. Precisely to some of its members the argument based on freedom of association weighed heavily. At any rate, before the next election takes place, matters hopefully have been clarified by this decision. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the election of petitioner Arthur Ternate is upheld. The restraining order issued on November 27, 1978 is lifted Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. Noriel, 108 SCRA 381 Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983 Facts:Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly registeredlabor organization which, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees inprivate respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (Company). The Company and theAmigo Employees Union -PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last 60 daysof the CBA, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company,including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n w i t h M O L E . T h e p e t i t i o n w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e P h i l i p p i n e Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom the Amigo Employees Unionwas at that time affiliated. The same employees who had signed the petition filedby FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU. Petitioner Dolores Villar,representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo EmployeesU n i o n , f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n i n t h e C o m p a n y . T h e A m i g o Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n f i l e d b y D o l o r e s V i l l a r , o n t h e g r o u n d , a m o n g o t h e r s t h a t D o l o r e s V i l l a r h a d n o l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y t o s i g n t h e p e t i t i o n s i n c e s h e w a s n o t a n officer of the union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was theauthorized representative of the local union. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filedb y V i l l a r , w h i c h d i s m i s s a l i s s t i l l p e n d i n g a p p e a l b e f o r e B L R . A m i g o E m p l o y e e s Union-PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution wast h e r e b y u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d w h i c h c a l l e d f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n b y t h e P A F L U n a t i o n a l p r e s i d e n t , o f a l l o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a n d o n e F e l i p e M a n l a p a o , f o r continuously maligning the union spreading false propaganda that the union officerswere merely appointees of the management; and for causing divisiveness in the u n i o n . P A F L U f o r m e d a T r i a l C o m m i t t e e t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e l o c a l u n i o n ' s c h a r g e s against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. P AFLU and the Compa ny concluded an e w C B A w h i c h a l s o r e i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e s a m e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e e x i s t i n g C B A , including the union security clause. PAFLU President rendered a decision finding thepetitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU demanded the Company to terminate theemployment of the petitioners pursuant to the security clause of the CBA. Acting onP A F L U ' s d e m a n d , t h e C o m p a n y i n f o r m e d P A F L U t h a t i t w i l l f i r s t s e c u r e t h e necessar y clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company top u t p e t i t i o n e r s u n d e r p r e v e n t i v e s u s p e n s i o n p e n d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r s a i d c l e a r a n c e s t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p e t i t i o n e r s . T h e C o m p a n y f i l e d t h e r e q u e s t f o r clearance to terminate the petitioners before DO L E w h i c h w a s g r a n t e d . D O L E Secretary Inciong denied the appeal, hence, this petition for review.Issue: WON DOLE Secretary erred in affirming the grant of clearance of terminationof petitioners.Ruling:It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It isimplicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Con stitution. But the Courthas laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restrictionof the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. In the case at bench, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU enteredinto a CBA with a union security clause which is a reiteration of the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal. Petitioners theory thatt h e i r e x p u l s i o n w a s n o t v a l i d u p o n t h e g r o u n d s i s u n t e n a b l e . P A F L U h a d t h e authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in thelocal union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of t h e P A F L U t o w h i c h t h e l o c a l union was affiliated. And pursuant to the securityclause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause in t h e o l d C B A , P A F L U w a s justified in applying said security clause. R ecognized and salutary is the principlethat when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by thelaws and regulations of the parent organization. It is undisputable that oppositors were members of the Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union affiliatedw i t h P A F L U ; h e n c e , o p p o s i t o r s a r e b o u n d b y t h e l a w s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s o f P A F L U . Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self p r e s e r v a t i o n . W h e n m e m b e r s o f a l a b o r u n i o n s e e k t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d destruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rightst o r e m a i n a s m e m b e r s o f t h e u n i o n w h i c h t h e y s e e k t o d e s t r o y . P r u d e n c e a n d equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate theadoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial measures, in keepingwith its laws and regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest byits folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.Decision appealed from is affirmed People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 People vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting opinion of Justice FERNANDO in both cases) Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the

judge 2.)Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished.Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT. The inherent power of eminent domain,93 SCRA 663 Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83 BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE BACALLA,354 SCRA 562 THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444 SCRA 269 FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo on March 7, 2001 enacted regulation ordinance granting umbrella authority to then Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, located at barangay Sto. Nio Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City. On March 14, 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, administration of the estate, making formal offer to purchase the property for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless resident of the city. With apparent refusal to sell the property, the city represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas filed an expropriation case based on the Power of State on Eminent Domain. Upon the strict compliance to the governing rules on expropriation, the city of Iloilo argued that it is entitled to an immediate issuance of a writ of possession. ISSUES:1. When does a court order become final and executory? 2. What is the legal basis of the Local Government Unit to exercise power of eminent domain? 3. What are the requisites in issuance of Writ of Possession? RULING: A. Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that noorder dictated in open court had no juridical existence before it is set in writing, signed, promulgated and served on the parties. Since the order orally pronounced in court had no juridical existence yet, the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration cannot be reckoned therefrom, but from the time the same was received in writing. Petitioner had fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the written order within which to file a motion for reconsideration. B. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being a local government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit: Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. C. For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 provides that the local government unit may take immediate possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on

its current tax declaration. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petition is hereby GRANTED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474 Facts: In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612 that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) as well as the amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and public policy. On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420), the Supreme Court held that: This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. THE COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS INVESTORS. On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the amount of P3.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value of the terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the government to take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. It held that it is the ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation. However, on January 4, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order supplementing the December 21, 2004 Order. It pointed out that the earlier orders to the amount to be deposited by the government was based on Section 2, Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the amount of US$62,343,175.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the amount in the December 21, 2004 Order. On January 7, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the appointment of three (3) Commissioners to determine just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: 1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974? 2. If RA 8974 will be used, may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to determine just compensation. HELD: 1. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that for the government to take over the said NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. If Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving the just compensation even if the government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities. It would violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the facilities. So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974 be used? In all National government projects or national infrastructure projects, like those covered by the Build-Operate-Transfer, RA 8974 shall be followed. The rest, Rule 67 shall apply. Differences between the two laws on expropriation: a. Under Rule 67, the government merely deposits the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA 8974, the scheme of immediate payment (100%) shall be followed. b. Under Rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not received a single centavo while under RA 8974, as in this case, Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor of the government UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the preferred value of just compensation. Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however, it could already exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA 3 facilities. The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the finality of the decision based on Section 4, RA 8974. 2. Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not provide for such procedure. Just Compensation; Amount to be deposited in court before a Writ of Possession may be issued by the court in favor of the government; When to apply Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. 8974; Who owns the interest of the initial amount deposited for the purpose of issuing writ of possession REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008 THE FACTS: On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners. On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC. The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRBs advance deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued thereon. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the respondent but on Motion for Reconsideration of the TRB, it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the determination of just compensation.

The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest by way of accession. Hence, this petition of the government before the Supreme Court. I S S U E: Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner? HELD: The petition is without merit. The TRB claims that there are two stages in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. The TRB argues that it is only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to interest, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco and National Power Corporation v. Angas. The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to respondent. The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held: There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. xxxx Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic. The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property: Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized representative. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC: When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and indisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited. Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount, then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon. The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR, to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon: It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of immediate payment in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. The intention of the TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to HTRDCs Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof. A close scrutiny of TRBs arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of Appeals determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less. We agree in TRBs statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law.

Since the respondent is the owner of P22,968,000.00, it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only. We are not persuaded by TRBs citation of National Power Corporation v. Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only. We find that neither case is applicable herein. The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation. The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment) As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDCs withdrawal of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latters compliance therewith. Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its Orderdated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA 637 FACTS: Private respondents Eastern Plywood Corporation and Benigno Lim as officer of the corporation, had an AND/OR joint account with Commercial Bank and Trust Co (CBTC), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands. Lim withdraw funds from such account and used it to open a joint checking account (an AND account) with Mariano Velasco. When Velasco died in 1977, said joint checking account had P662,522.87. By virtue of an Indemnity Undertaking executed by Lim and as President and General Manager of Eastern withdrew one half of this amount and deposited it to one of the accounts of Eastern with CBTC. Eastern obtained a loan of P73,000.00 from CBTC which was not secured. However, Eastern and CBTC executed a Holdout Agreement providing that the loan was secured by the Holdout of the C/A No. 2310-001-42 referring to the joint checking account of Velasco and Lim. Meanwhile, a judicial settlement of the estate of Velasco ordered the withdrawal of the balance of the account of Velasco and Lim. Asserting that the Holdout Agreement provides for the security of the loan obtained by Eastern and that it is the duty of CBTC to debit the account of respondents to set off the amount of P73,000 covered by the promissory note, BPI filed the instant petition for recovery. Private respondents Eastern and Lim, however, assert that the amount deposited in the joint account of Velasco and Lim came from Eastern and therefore rightfully belong to Eastern and/or Lim. Since the Holdout Agreement covers the loan of P73,000, then petitioner can only hold that amount against the joint checking account and must return the rest. ISSUE: Whether BPI can demand the payment of the loan despite the existence of the Holdout Agreement and whether BPI is still liable to the private respondents on the account subject of the withdrawal by the heirs of Velasco. RULING: Yes, for both issues. Regarding the first, the Holdout Agreement conferred on CBTC the power, not the duty, to set off the loan from the account subject of the Agreement. When BPI demanded payment of the loan from Eastern, it exercised its right to collect payment based on the promissory note, and disregarded its option under the Holdout Agreement. Therefore, its demand was in the correct order. Regarding the second issue, BPI was the debtor and Eastern was the creditor with respect to the joint checking account. Therefore, BPI was obliged to return the amount of the said account only to the creditor. When it allowed the withdrawal of the balance of the account by the heirs of Velasco, it made the payment to the wrong party. The law provides that payment made by the debtor to the wrong party does not extinguish its obligation to the creditor who is without fault or negligence. Therefore, BPI was still liable to the true creditor, Eastern.

GABATIN VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 444 SCRA 176 What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the agrarian reform program of the government. Held: The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the just compensation, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which should be taken into consideration. Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarrian Reform Council, GR no. 171101, April 24, 2012 I. THE FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names. The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. II. THE ISSUES: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? (3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac

Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP? (4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP? (5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? III. THE RULIN: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.] 1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. [The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.] 2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. [The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.] 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP. [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657. However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.] 4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP. [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.] 5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.] 6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered. [The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101

shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

City of Iloilo vs. Judge Sesana, GR no. 168967, February 12, 2010 Napocor vs. Bernal, December 15, 2010 NPC vs. Jocson, February 25, 1992 Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easementover portions of the parcels of land described in the complaints forits Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod- Tomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values were fixed on thebasis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitionermay derive. Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Judge increasedvalue without hearing and directing the defendants to manifestwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting and withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values,deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as "final and fullsatisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic); " Judgedeclared the provisional values as the final values and directing therelease of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to thedefendants even if not all of them made the manifestation; andsuspended the issuance of the writ of possession until after thesuspending the amounts shall have been released to and receivedby defendants.Issue: WON Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction. YES. Municipality of Bian vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al: thereare two (2) stages in every action of expropriation: The firstis concerned with the determination of the authority of theplaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and thepropriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involvedin the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of theaction, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,upon the payment of just compensation to be determined asof the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leavesnothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,would an order of condemnation be a final one, forthereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedingsbefore the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of theright of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall befiled or heard." The second phase of the eminent domainaction is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not morethan three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the justcompensation on the basis of the evidence before, andfindings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It wouldfinally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leavenothing more to be done by the Court regarding theissue. . . . However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any timethereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter uponthe possession of the property involved upon compliancewith P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after duenotice to the defendant, to deposit with the PhilippineNational Bank in its main office or any of its branches oragencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed valueis that indicated in the tax declaration. P.D. No. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rulesof Court and of any other existing law contrary to orinconsistent" with it. Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67 insofar as the determination of the provisionalvalue, the form of payment and the agency with which thedeposit shall be made, are concerned. Said section reads infull as follows: Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositingvalue with National or Provisional Treasurer. Upon thefiling of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with theNational or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionallyand promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurersubject to the orders and final disposition of the court. Suchdeposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the courtauthorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of adepository of the Republic of the Philippines payable ondemand to the National or Provincial Treasurer, as the casemay be, in the amount directed by the court to bedeposited. After such deposit is made the court shall orderthe sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place theplaintiff in possession of the property involved. It will be noted that under the aforequoted section, the courthas the discretion to determine the provisional value whichmust be deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to take orenter upon the possession of the property." Notice to theparties is not indispensable. In interpreting a similarprovision of Act No. 1592, this Court, in the 1915 case of Manila Railroad Company, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 45 held: The statute directs that, at the very outset, "whencondemnation proceedings are brought by any railwaycorporation" the amount of the deposit is to be"provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by thecourt." It is very clear that it was not the intention of the legislator that before the order fixing the amount of thedeposit could lawfully be entered the court should finallyand definitely determine who are the true owners of theland; and after doing so, give them a hearing as to its value,and assess the true value of the land accordingly. In effect,that would amount to a denial of the right of possession of the lands involved until the conclusion of the proceedings,when there would no need for the filing of the deposit. Of course, there is nothing in the statute which denies the rightof the judge to hear all persons claiming an interest in theland, and courts should ordinarily give all such persons anopportunity to be heard if that be practicable, and will causeno delay in the prompt and provisional ascertainment of thevalue of the land. But the scope and extent of the inquiry isleft wholly in the discretion of the court, and a failure tohear the owners and claimants of the land, who may or maynot be known at the time of the entry of the order, in nowise effects the validity of the order. . . . however, effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the provisional value. What is to bedeposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value fortaxation purpose. No hearing is required for that purpose.All that is needed is notice to the owner of the propertysought to be condemned. Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge either deliberatelydisregarded P.D. No. 42 or was totally unaware of itsexistence and the cases applying the same. In any event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixedby the court. As a matter of right, it was entitled to beplaced in possession of the property involved in thecomplaints at once, pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67and P.D. No. 42. Respondent Court had the correspondingduty to order the sheriff or any other proper officer toforthwith place the petitioner in such possession. Instead of complying with the clear mandate of the law, respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. Moreover, uponseparate motions for reconsideration filed by the defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939, he issued a new Orderincreasing the provisional values of the properties involvedtherein. No hearing was held on the motions. As a matter of fact, as the records show, the motion for reconsiderationfiled by defendants Jesus Gonzaga, et al. in Civil Case No.5938 is dated 11 July 1990 while the Order granting bothmotions was issued the next day, 12 July 1990. The motionfor reconsideration in Civil Case No. 5938 does not evencontain a notice of hearing. It is then a mere scrap of paper;it presents no question which merits the attention andconsideration of the court. It is not even a mere motion for itdoes not comply with the rules, more particularly Sections 4and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; the Clerk of Court thenhad no right to receive it. 50 There was, moreover, a much stronger reason why therespondent Court should not have issued the 12 July 1990Order increasing the provisional values of the Gonzaga lotsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939. After having fixed theseprovisional values, albeit erroneously, and upon deposit bypetitioner of the said amounts, respondent Judge lost, aswas held in Manila Railroad Company vs. Paredes, "plenarycontrol over the order fixing the amount of the deposit, andhas no power to annul, amend or modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnationproceedings." The reason for this is that a contrary rulingwould defeat the very purpose of the law which is to providea speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceablepossession of the property subject of the expropriationproceedings "may be secured without the delays incident toprolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownershipand value of such lands, which should not be permitted todelay the progress of the work." Compounding the above error and the capriciousness withwhich it was committed is respondent Judge's refusal toplace the petitioner in possession of the property or issuethe writ of possession despite the fact that the latter hadlikewise deposited the additional amount called for by the12 July 1990 Order. Instead, respondent Judge issued the 16 July 1990 Order directing the defendants to state in writingwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they wouldaccept and withdraw the amounts deposited by thepetitioner for each of them " as final and full

satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic) affected by theexpropriation" and stating at the same time that the writ willbe issued after such manifestation and acceptance andreceipt of the amounts. The above Order has absolutely nolegal basis even as it also unjustly, oppressively and capriciously compels the petitioner to accept the respondent Judge's determination of the provisional value as the justcompensation after the defendants shall have manifestedtheir conformity thereto. He thus subordinated his own judgment to that of the defendants' because he made thelatter the final authority to determine such justcompensation. This Court ruled in Export Processing ZoneAuthority vs. Dulay, et al. 52 that the determination of justcompensation in eminent domain cases is a judicialfunction; accordingly, We declared as unconstitutional andvoid, for being, inter alia, impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court inutilein a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to itfor final determination, the method of ascertaining justcompensation prescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533,to wit: the market value as declared by the owner oradministrator or such market value as determined by theassessor, whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees,and the value declared by the owner or administrator oranyone having legal interest in the property or the value asdetermined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendationor decision of the appropriate Government office to acquirethe property, in the last mentioned decree. If the legislatureor the executive department cannot even impose upon thecourt how just compensation should be determined, it wouldbe far more objectionable and impermissible for respondent Judge to grant the defendants in an eminent domain casesuch power and authority. Without perhaps intending it to be so, there is not only aclear case of abdication of judicial prerogative, but also acomplete disregard by respondent Judge of the provisions of Rule 67 as to the procedure to be followed after thepetitioner has deposited the provisional value of theproperty. It must be recalled that three (3) sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Section 3,Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; Section 4 of the same ruleprovides that the court must rule on them and in the eventthat it overrules the motions or, when any party fails topresent a defense as required in Section 3, it should enteran order of condemnation declaring that the petitioner has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. As may be gleaned from the 25 June 1990 Order, therespondent Judge found that the petitioner has that rightand that "there will be a (sic) paramount public interest tobe served by the expropriation of the defendants'properties." Accordingly, considering that the partiessubmitted neither a compromise agreement as to the justcompensation nor a stipulation to dispense with theappointment of commissioners and to leave thedetermination of just compensation to the court on the basisof certain criteria, respondent Judge was duty bound to setin motion Section 5 of Rule 67; said section directs the courtto appoint not more than three (3) competent anddisinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain andreport to it regarding the just compensation for the propertysought to be taken. Such commissioners shall perform theirduties in the manner provided for in Section 6; upon thefiling of their report, the court may, after a period of ten (10)days which it must grant to the parties in order that thelatter may file their objections to such report, and afterhearing pursuant to Section 8, accept and render judgmentin accordance therewith or, for cause shown, recommit thesame to the commissioners for further report of facts. Thecourt may also set aside the report and appoint newcommissioners, or it may accept the report in part andreject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the petitioner the propertyessential to the exercise of its right of condemnation, and tothe defendant just compensation for the property so taken. Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law andinsisting upon his own procedure, respondent Judgedeclared in his Order of 18 July 1990 that the provisionalamounts he fixed, later increased with respect to theproperties of the Gonzagas, shall be considered as the fullpayment of the value of the properties after the defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938, 5939, 5940, 5942 and 5943 shallhave filed their manifestations; he also ruled that the writ of possession will be issued only after the latter shall havereceived the said amounts. This Order and the recordsbefore this Court do not disclose that the defendants in CivilCases Nos. 5941 and 5944 filed any manifestation; yet, inthe Order, respondent Judge whimsically and arbitrarilyconsidered the so-called provisional values fixed therein as the final values. By such Order, the case was in factterminated and the writ of execution then became a mereincident of an execution of a judgment. The right of thepetitioner to take or enter into possession of the propertyupon the filing of the complaint granted by Section 2 of Rule67 and P.D. No. 42 was totally negated despite compliancewith the deposit requirement under the latter law. City Government of Toledo City vs. Fernandos, et al: doesnot apply to the instant petition because at the pre-trialconference held therein, the petitioner submitted to thediscretion of the court as to the correct valuation, privaterespondents stated that they have no objections and are inconformity with the price of P30.00 per square meter asreasonable compensation for their land and the CityAssessor informed the court of the current market andappraisal values of the properties in the area and the factorsto be considered in the determination of such. The partiespresented their documentary exhibits. In effect, therefore,the parties themselves agreed to submit to a judicialdetermination on the matter of just compensation and that judgment be rendered based thereon. In the instant case,no pre-trial was conducted; the proceedings were still atthat state where the provisional value was yet to bedetermined; and the parties made no agreement on justcompensation. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3, 1990 NATURE: Petition to review Commission on Audit decision FACTS: - Petitioners, Spouses Ansaldo, owned two parcels of land which were taken by thegovernment and used to widen what is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue in 1947.However, it was only in 1973 or 26 years later that the spouses claimed for compensation. The Secretary of Justice in due course rendered an opinion that justcompensation be paid in accordance with PD No. 76. This decree provided that basisfor the payment should be the current and fair market value as declared by the owner or such value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. (It shouldbe noted however that at the time the decision was made by the SC, this provisionon payment was already declared unconstitutional in 1988 in the Export Processingvs Dulay case where said mode was said to be an impermissible encroachment onthe judicial prerogative to resolve the compensation issue in an appropriateproceeding of eminent domain)- Pursuant to the opinion of the Justice Secretary, the auditor of the Bureau of PublicHighways recommended to the auditor General that payment be made on the basisof the current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time theproperty was in fact expropriated. The Commission on Audit declined the saidrecommendation and instead ruled that the amount of compensation should bed e t e r m i n e d a s o f t h e t i m e o f t a k i n g o f t h e p a r c e l s o f l a n d . T h e m o t i o n f o r reconsideration filed by the spouses Arsaldo was denied.- Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON the fixing of compensation should be at the time of the taking of the property HELD: Yes. Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedesthe taking of the property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of thetime of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court, theassumption of possession b y the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on itsdeposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property asprovisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Thereare instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the propertyprior to the expropriation suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the case at bar isquite extraordinary in that possession was taken by the expropriator more than 40y e a r s p r i o r t o s u i t . I n t h e s e i n s t a n c e s , t h i s C o u r t h a s r u l e d t h a t t h e j u s t compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.- The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,16 is that"x x (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnationproceedings,the value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it istaken;the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated itsvalue thereby;or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of theproperty from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what heactually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyondhisloss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his propertyat the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paidcan be truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,but to the public, which is to pay for it.'"- Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of theyear 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the

way, still has to be done. It is as of that time thatthe real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shallearn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with otherprinciples laid down by case law. Disposition:Petition DENIED Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review. Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution. Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Republic vs. IAC, 185 SCRA 572 Mun. of Talisay vs. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 NPC vs. CA, 129 SCRA 665 Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281 Meaning of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings, 29 SCRA 868 NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245 BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 14, 1992 Cruz, J. Facts: 1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then President of Apolinario Apacible School of Fisheries, a government institution in Nasugbu, Batangas, sent the petitioner a written offer to buy the property of the latter with an area of 10,640 square meters for its 5-year expansion program; 2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50.00 per square meter in its reply; 3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at P32.00 per square meter; 4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's property at P32.00 per square meter. The petitioner, however, stuck to its original valuation. Later on, it said that its property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter; 5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for the expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the amount of P32.00. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the property upon deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with PD 48; 6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the "underappraisal" of the subject land; 7. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule 67, ection 5, of the Rules of Court, to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land;

8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and pegged the market value at P85.00 per square meter; 9. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of sale executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of only P19.18 per square meter; 10. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive additional evidence. However, in its second report dated April 1, 1987, the panel reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq. m. or a total of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. The trial court acting on this recommendation rendered judgment requiring the Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated; 11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION and declaring that the fair market value which should be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the government to the petitioner shall be P19.18, the market value according set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it executed in favor of three (3) different individuals; 12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that P19.18 per square meter should be the basis of the computation for the just compensation of its property because: a. Viray even offered the amount of P32.00 per squaremeter as the fair market value; b. that P32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas; and c. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.00 per square meter. Issue: WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION: P32.00/SQ. M. IN ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR; P100.00/SQ.M. AS CLAIMED BY THE OWNER; P85.00/SQ. M. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME, OR P19.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT SOLD BY THE PETITIONER TO THREE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. Held. The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19.18 per square meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals. This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the land. To all appearances, they were ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes only and not for the public purpose invoked by the government. The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the three other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually undervalue the selling price of the property to lower the expenses they would have to pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an admission that it did not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made to appear that the price per square meter was only P19.18. If this was the purpose of the petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale, then IT IS SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND RIGHTLY SO, FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON WITH THE BUYERS. The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from the republic, which needs the land for a public purpose, when it was willing to accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their private interests to serve. The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per square meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject of this case, it impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the same as the former. This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying, surely not unknown to the petitioner, THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR THE GANDER. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. he compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are: 1. cost of acquisition; 2. the current value of like proerties; 3. its actual or potential uses; 4. particular case of lands; 5. their size, shape, location; and 6. the tax declarations thereon. Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING. Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987 EPZA vs. Dulay, April 29,l987 Lagunzad vs. CA, 154 SCRA 199 (When it is considered for "public use") Sumulong vs. Guererro, 154 SCRA 461 Republic vs. CA, 154 SCRA 428 Cosculluela vs. CA, 164 SCRA 393 Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 Requisites of taking: a.the expropriator must enter the property; b.the entrance must not be for just a momentary period; c.the entry must be under warrant of color or title;

d.the property must be devoted for public use; and e.the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land. Ignacio vs. Guererro, 150 SCRA 369 Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 597 City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349 ( A private property which is devoted to public use may not be expropriated for another public purpose.) De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February 12, 1989 Expropriation: Gancayco, J. Facts: 1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the Philippines initiated an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets, among them Cristina de Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. 7001-P; 2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint; that on June 14, 1979, the Lower Court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a committee to determine just compensation; 3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14, 1979 order of the lower court; 4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing that the Order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P; 5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001- moved for the dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court is already final; 6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to the enactment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. On the same date, the Court dismissed the case. The defendants moved for a reconsideration which the Court denied; 7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals who on December 28, 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval; 8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private respondents despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is arbitrary? Held: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. However, it is equally true that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just compensation. When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area have been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of the area to be expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings considering the supervening events after the decision was rendered. BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF ENACTING BP 340. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT. Cruz, J., concurring Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's decision to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute. If we are sustaining the legislation, it is not because we concede that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. It is simply because we ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary. I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE KNECHT CASE, WHICH WAS DECIDED UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February 12, 1989 Limitations of the power of expropriation, 3 SCRA 706 City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144 Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 620 Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503 Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 Arce vs. Genito, Feb. 27, 1976 Guido vs. RPA, 84 Phil. 847

Rep. vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461 Mataas na Lupa vs. Dimayuga, 130 SCRA 30 San Diego vs. Valdellon, 80 SCRA 305 Haguisan vs. Emilia, 131 SCRA 517 Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 Commissioner vs. Burgos, March 31,1980 Republic vs. Juan, 92 SCRA 29 Mactan-Cebu international Airport Authority vs. Lozada, Jr., GR No. 176625, February 25, 2010 De Oano vs. Republic, GR no. 168770, February 9, 2011 Kabiling, et al., vs. NHA, December 18,l987 Clements vs. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702 Co vs. PNB, 114 SCRA 842 Lozano vs. Martinez,146 SCRA 323 Rutter vs. Esteban,93 Phil. 68 Ilusorio vs. CAR, 17 SCRA 25 Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533 Ganzon vs. Insierto, 123 SCRA 713 Del Rosario vs. De los Santos, March 21, 1968 Abella vs. NLRC, 152 SCRA 140 PVBEU vs. PVB, 189 SCRA 14 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAHINAY, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010 Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision. The Facts: In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will. On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following: In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors. At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.

The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads: hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape. The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated. HELD: Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a bantay bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a Bantay Bayan Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus: Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x. [But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied) Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP. Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level. The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community. This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Voluntary and spontaneous confession of a suspect who is already under custody of the police is admissible in evidence even in the absence of counsel. People vs. Felixminia, March 20, 2002 People vs. Figueroa, 335 SRA 349 People vs. Duenas, 426 SCRA 666 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al., 475 SCRA 248 Facts: For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), the accused-appellants were charged of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents as defined and penalized under Arts. 217 and 171 [8] in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, all accused were convicted by the Sandiganbayan. While the Information charged the accused of willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the Decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence. Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based on his alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an NPC personnel and the report of the NBI. He maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine heart center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his

constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. He likewise claimed that his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process were violated. Held: 1. Even if the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. (Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118). This was the doctrine laid down in the case of Samson vs. Court of appeals, 103 Phil. 277. 2. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights is not tenable. The investigation under said provision refers to custodial investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular person as a suspect (People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the accused are not available BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE PICTURE. The protective mantle of section 12, article III does not apply to administrative investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216); confession to a private individual (Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53); verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673); or even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity (People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In fact, even a videotaped interview where the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the said provision though the trial courts were warned by the supreme Court to take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television (People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307). Clearly, the confession of the accused was obtained during an administrative investigation by NPC and therefore, the same was not covered by Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution. (NOTE: In People vs. Andam, the confession made before a Municipal Mayor was held admissible as evidence). PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R. NO. 128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31, 2000 People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53 People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673 People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307 PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341 SCRA 600 PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1, 2000 PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R. NO. 135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA 413 PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284 SCRA 199 Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 US 478 Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 People vs. Matos-Viduya, Sept. 11, 1990 People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 People vs. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100 People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312