Administrative law: GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

Ruling: Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base Executive Secretary vs. Southwing area but valid insofar as it applies to the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Philippine territory outside the secured through Executive Secretary Alberto G. fenced-in former Subic Naval Base. Police Romulo, issued EO156, entitled power is inherent in a government to enact PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE laws, within constitutional limits, to INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR promote the order, safety, health, morals, THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT and general welfare of society. It is lodged PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING primarily with the legislature. By virtue of GUIDELINES. Article 2, Section 3.1 valid delegation, it may also be exercised prohibits the importation into the country, by the President and administrative inclusive of the Special Economic and boards, as well as the law making bodies Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport on all municipal levels, including the (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, barangay. Quasi-legislative power subject to a few exceptions. Respondents, authority delegated by the law-making Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. body to the administrative body to adopt (SOUTHWING), United Auctioneers, Inc. rules and regulations intended to carry out (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), Microvan, Inc. the provisions of the law and implement (MICROVAN), Subic Integrated Macro legislative policy. Requisites for valid Ventures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES), administrative issuance: Its promulgation and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of must be authorized by the legislature; This Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION), requisite was satisfied by EO156, which as filed actions for declaratory relief, praying both constitutional and statutory bases. that Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 be declared Sec. 28(2) of Art. VI of the Constitution unconstitutional because it was an provides that the Congress may, by law, unlawful usurpation of legislative power authorize the President to fix within vested by the Constitution with Congress specified limits, and subject to such it was decided in their favor. Hence, the limitation and restrictions as it may current petition questioning the decision. impose, tariff rates, import and export quot as, tonnage and wharfage dues, and Issue: Whether Article 2, Section 3.1 other duties or imposts within the of EO156 is a valid exercise of the framework of the national development Presidents quasi-legislative power. program of the Government. Tariff and Customs Code, EO226 (Omnibus Investment Code), RA880 (Safeguard

Measures Act; SMA) authorize the President, when general welfare and national security require, prohibiting imports of commodities. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; Difference between legislative rules and interpretative rules: Legislative rules subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation. Interpretative rules which give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. Notice and hearing is required when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed (legislative rules). EO156 is a legislative rule because it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. However, there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of EO156, presumption is that it duly complied with the procedure s and limitations imposed by law. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and The third requisite is not complied with as EO156 exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Free port (SBF), which RA7227 considers to some extent, a foreign

territory.> RA7227 provided for the conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations to a Subic Bay Freeport, wherein SBF enterprises may import and export freely. The subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry or the customs territory that is the portion of the Philippines outside the SBF. It must be reasonable. Issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. > The problem it seeks to solve is the deterioration of the local motor-manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles. However, it becomes unreasonable when such ban applied to the SBF. > As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented will not arise.

Lupangco vs. CA In October 1986 PRC issued Reso. No. 105 as part of the "Additional Instruction to Examinees" to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following provisions; "NO EXAMINEE SHALL ATTEND ANY REVIEW CLASSES, BRIEFING, CONFERENCE AND THE LIKE CONDUCTED BY OR SHALL RECEIVE HANDOUT FROM ANY COLLEGE REVIEW CENTERS...DURING THE LAST 3

DAYS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDDING EVERY EXAMINATION DAY". Petitioner (all reviewees preparing for the next licensure examinations in accountancy) filed on their own behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated with RTC a complaint for injunction with prayer for the writ of preliminary injunction against PRC to restrain the latter for enforcing the Resolution that is found to be unconstitutional. PRC filed a motion to dismiss with CA on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and enjoin the enforcement of its resolution because PRC and RTC is a co-equal body hence does not have any power to control each other or interfere with each others acts. PRC further invoke Sec 9 paragraph 3 of BP 129 saying that it is CA who has jurisdiction over the case not the RTC. Issues: 1. W/N RTC AND PRC is of the same category, where RTC cannot pass upon the validity of the Admin Acts of the latter and it is CA who has proper jurisdiction not RTC. 2. W/N the Resolution is constitutional? Ruling: 1.No, in order to invoke Sec 9 of BP 129, there has to be a final order or ruling that resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved quasi-judicial function. QUASI-JUDICIAL function refers to action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies required

to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings and draw conclusions from them as the basis for their action. This DOES NOT cover rules and regulations of general applIIcability issued by the Admin Body to implement purely administrative policies like Reso. No. 105. SC further held that orders and resolutions of PRC fall within the general jurisdiction of RTC because of the absence of a provision in the law creating the Commission that its orders and resolutions are only appealable in CA or SC. And since PRC is attached to the office of the President for general direction and coordination hence as settled in our jurisprudence, even the acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by RTC. 2. No, Reso No. 105 is held to be unconstitutional. It is an axiom in ADMIN LAW that administrative authorities should not act rbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations MUST BE REASONABLE and FAIRLY adapted to secure the end view. Res No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinee s right to liberty guaranteed in the constitution. It further violated the academic freedom of schools concerned Biak na Bato vs. Tanco During the mining boom in 1933, a group

of hopeful and enthusiastic individuals from the North, appeared to have located from November, 1933 to February, 1934 one hundred seventy (170) mining claims in hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountains in Sitios of Pasil and Balatoc, Municipality of Lubuagan, Mountain Province (now known as the Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao). The land covered by said 170 mining claims is adjacent and surrounds the mining properties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. On February 8, 1969, the petitioner Biakna-Bato Mining Co. was created as a partnership in accordance with law. And on November 19, 1969, the locators, namely: Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Cano and Salvador Ellone, each executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning, transferri ng and conveying to the petitioner the mining claims covered by the aforesaid de clarations of location On December 4,1969, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the application for lease and a petition for an order of lease survey of the aforementioned mining claims (Rollo,Ibid., p. 42). However, it received a notice of the letter of the Director of Mines refusing to issue the order of lease survey because the areas covered by the mining claims were allegedly in conflict with the four (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. (Rollo,Ibid.,

pp. 45-46). On January 12, 1970, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau of Mines against Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. In said protest, BiakNa-Bato Mining Company contests and disputes the right of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. to eleven (11) mining claims and the right of Mountain Mines, Inc. to another nine (9) mining claims (Rollo, Vol. I, Petition, p. 12). After the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Mines inspection team, a report was submitted with topographic map and pictures of the improvements. According to the report, the ground works improvements and other form of assessment works in the mining properties of said respondents were significant and extensive, all evaluated and assessed at P582,996.60 (Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 621-690). The Director of Mines promulgated its decision in both cases, holding that as against Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains, in Pasil, Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 134145). From the said decision of the Director of Mines, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, docketed as DANR Case No. 3613 entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs.

Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc." and DANR Case No. 3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Mountain Mines, Inc." (Rollo, Petition, p. 9). In its appeal, the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questioned the first ocular inspection report. The Secretary in the exercise of his appellate power and in justice to the petitioner ordered a second ocular inspection, after which the second inspection team submitted a report confirming the findings of the first ocular inspection team, and also reported that Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company despite opportunity afforded was not able to show its location in the area (Rollo, Vol. II, pp . 693-701). On September 17, 1971, the Secretary rendered his decision on the appeal, affirming the findings of facts of the Director of Mines and declaring BalatocLubuagan Mines, Inc. and Baguio Mines, Inc. s mining area not open for relocation in 19 67-1968 and therefore Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company s locations null and void. The Secretary also declared that its mining claims are table located, and therefore null and void, and that it had no legal personality to file the protest in the Bureau of Mines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ISSUE: W/N the contention of the petitioner is correct.

HELD: As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence (San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 261 [1989], Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enag e, 152 SCRA 80 [1987]) and are controlling on the reviewing authorities (Doruelo v. Ministry of National Defense, 169 SCRA 448 [1989]) because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are bound by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in this case at bar (Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 53 [1988]). There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined or construed to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Castro v. CA, 169 SCRA 383 [1989]; Bagsican v. CA, 141 SCRA 226 [1980]; Lustre v. CAR, 10 SCRA 659 [1964]). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby AFFIRMED. Euromed vs. Batangas Province of Batangas: defendant; respondent Euro-Med Laboratories: plaintiff; petitioner The Province of Batangas, through the various authorized representatives of the government hospitals by Euro-Med Laboratories, were identified to have purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) which were products of the petitioner. The respondent was found to have an unpaid balance of P487,662.80 which were evidenced by invoices received and signed by defendant s authorized representatives. Over the course of the trial where the petitioner s side concluded their presentation of evidence, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over the money claim is with the Commission on Audit (CO A).

Issue: Who has primary jurisdiction over the case: COA/RTC? Held: Merits of the case is well within the jurisdiction of COA. - Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had, even if the matter is within their proper jurisdiction. - Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, it is well within the s cope of COA s authority to take cases for liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices and such other papers within re ach of COA s jurisdiction. - Both parties agreed that the transactions were governed by the Local Government Code provisions on supply and property management in which its implementing rules and regulations are promulgated in COA s Code. "the authority and power of the commission [on audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to xxxx the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and in strumentalities. xxxx" - Such matters are found to be not within the usual area of knowledge, experienc e

and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants.

Among all these limitations, only the legal a right to participate in the exercise of the standing of the petitioners has been put at powers of that institution. issue. An act of the Executive which injures LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO versus Legal Standing of the Petitioners the institution of Congress causes a THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION derivative but nonetheless substantial OF 2010 (G.R. No. 192935; December The OSG attacks the legal personality injury, which can be questioned by a 7, 2010) of the petitioners-legislators to file their member of Congress. In such a case, any petition for failure to demonstrate their member of Congress can have a resort to REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. personal stake in the outcome of the case. the courts. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. It argues that the petitioners have not DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, shown that they have sustained or are in Indeed, legislators have a legal standing SR., versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY danger of sustaining any personal injury to see to it that the prerogative, powers PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not and privileges vested by the Constitution OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT claiming to be the subject of the in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. commissions investigations, petitioners are allowed to question the validity of any No. 193036; December 7, will not sustain injury in its creation or as official action which, to their mind, 2010) a result of its proceedings. infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. Like almost all powers conferred by The Court disagrees with the OSG in the Constitution, the power of judicial questioning the legal standing of the With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues review is subject to limitations, to wit: petitioners-legislators to assail Executive that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to (1) there must be an actual case or Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition question the creation of the PTC and the controversy calling for the exercise of primarily invokes usurpation of the budget for its operations. It emphasizes judicial power; (2) the person challenging power of the Congress as a body to which that the funds to be used for the the act must have the standing to they belong as members. This certainly creation and operation of the commission question the validity of the subject act or justifies their resolve to take the cudgels are to be taken from those funds already issuance; otherwise stated, he must have for Congress as an institution and present appropriated by Congress. Thus, the a personal and substantial interest in the the complaints on the usurpation of their allocation and disbursement of funds for case such that he has sustained, or will power and rights as members of the the commission will not entail sustain, direct injury as a result of its legislature before the Court. As held in congressional action but will simply be an enforcement; (3) the question of Philippine Constitution Association v. exercise of the Presidents power over constitutionality must be raised at the Enriquez, contingent funds. earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis To the extent the powers of Congress are As correctly pointed out by the OSG, mota of the case. impaired, so is the power of each Biraogo has not shown that he member thereof, since his office confers sustained, or is in danger of sustaining,

any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction Locus standi is defined as "a right of was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, appearance in a court of justice on a given where it was held that the plaintiff in a question." In private suits, standing is taxpayers suit is in a different category governed by the "real-parties-in interest" from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of former, the plaintiff is affected by the the 1997 expenditure of public funds, while in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It latter, he is but the mere instrument of provides that "every action must be the public concern. As held by the New prosecuted or defended in York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case the name of the real party in interest." v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is howeverthe people are the real "the party who stands to be benefited or partiesIt is at least the right, if not the injured by the judgment in the suit or duty, of every citizen to interfere and see the party entitled to the avails of the that a public offence be properly pursued suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs and punished, and that a public standing is based on his own right to the grievance be remedied." With respect to relief sought. taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to The difficulty of determining locus standi maintain an action in courts to restrain arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff the unlawful use of public funds to his who asserts a "public right" in assailing injury cannot be denied." an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. However, to prevent just about any He may be a person who is affected no person from seeking judicial interference differently from any other person. He in any official policy or act with which he could be suing as a "stranger," or in the disagreed with, and thus hinders the

activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and AntiChinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of

overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitionerslegislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive Power of the President to Create the branch of government. They maintain Truth Commission that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, of the Revised Administrative Code: Biraogo asserts that the Truth 1) does not permit the President to create Commission is a public office and not a public office, much less a truth merely an adjunct body of the Office of commission; 2) is limited to the the President. Thus, in order that the reorganization of the administrative The OSG claims that the determinants of President may create a public office he structure of the Office of the transcendental importance laid down in must be empowered by the Constitution, a President; 3) is limited to the CREBA v. ERC and Meralco are nonstatute or an authorization vested in him restructuring of the internal organs of the existent in this case. The Court, by law. According to petitioner, such Office of the President Proper, transfer of however, finds reason in Biraogos power cannot be presumed since there functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) assertion that the petition covers matters is no provision in the Constitution or any only to achieve simplicity, economy and of transcendental importance to justify specific law that authorizes the President efficiency. Such continuing authority of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. to create a truth commission. He adds the President to reorganize his office is There are constitutional issues in the that Section 31 of the Administrative limited, and by issuing Executive Order petition which deserve the attention of Code of 1987, granting the President No. 1, the President overstepped the this Court in view of their seriousness, the continuing authority to reorganize his limits of this delegated authority. novelty and weight as precedents. Where office, cannot serve as basis for the the issues are of transcendental and creation of a truth commission xxx paramount importance not only to the considering the aforesaid provision public but also to the Bench and the merely uses verbs such as The question, therefore, before the Court Bar, they should be resolved for the "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino "merge," and "abolish." Insofar as it within the ambit of the power to people are more than interested to vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31

know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.

of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place To say that the PTC is borne out of a when there is an alteration of the restructuring of the Office of the existing structure of government offices President under Section 31 is a misplaced or units therein, including the lines of supposition, even in the plainest meaning control, authority and responsibility attributable to the term "restructure" an between them. The EIIB is a bureau "alteration of an existing structure." attached to the Department of Finance. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the It falls under the Office of the President. structure of the Office of the President Hence, it is subject to the Presidents prior to the enactment of Executive Order continuing authority to reorganize. No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB [Emphasis Supplied] v. Hon. Executive Secretary,

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head Section 17. The President shall have of state as well as head of government control of all the executive departments, and whatever powers inhere in such bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that positions pertain to the office unless the the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis Constitution itself withholds it. supplied). Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws As correctly pointed out by the is only one of the powers of the respondents, the allocation of power in President. It also grants the President the three principal branches of other powers that do not involve the government is a grant of all powers execution of any provision of law, e.g., his inherent in them. The Presidents power to power over the country's foreign relations. WHEREAS, the transition towards the conduct investigations to aid him in parliamentary form of government will ensuring the faithful execution of laws On these premises, we hold the view necessitate flexibility in the organization of in this case, fundamental laws on that although the 1987 Constitution the national government. public accountability and transparency is imposes limitations on the exercise of inherent in the Presidents powers as the specific powers of the President, it Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of Chief Executive. That the authority of the maintains intact what is traditionally providing manageability and resiliency President to conduct investigations and considered as within the scope of during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as to create bodies to execute this power "executive power." Corollarily, the powers amended by P.D. No. 1772, became is not explicitly mentioned in the of the President cannot be said to be functus oficio upon the convening of the Constitution or in statutes does not mean limited only to the specific powers First Congress, as expressly provided in that he is bereft of such authority. As enumerated in the Constitution. In other Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 explained in the landmark case of Marcos words, executive power is more than the Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor v. Manglapus: sum of specific powers so enumerated. General agrees with this view. x x x x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, It has been advanced that whatever While the power to create a truth brought back the presidential system of power inherent in the government that is commission cannot pass muster on the government and restored the separation neither legislative nor judicial has to be basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by of legislative, executive and judicial executive. x x x. P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds powers by their actual distribution among justification under Section 17, Article VII of three distinct branches of government Indeed, the Executive is given much the Constitution, imposing upon the with provision for checks and balances. leeway in ensuring that our laws are President the duty to ensure that the faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to

laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters

which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General,

regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply "whatever funds the Congress has and to decide in accordance with the provided for the Office of the President will standards laid down by law itself in be the very source of the funds for the enforcing and administering the same commission." Moreover, since the amount law." In simpler terms, judicial that would be allocated to the PTC shall discretion is involved in the exercise of be subject to existing auditing rules and these quasi-judicial power, such that it is

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exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies. The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights. Thus: "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n

administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly resolved authoritatively, finally and understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, definitively, subject to appeals or modes judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule of review as may be provided by law. on, settle. The dictionary defines the term Even respondents themselves admit that as "to settle finally (the rights and the commission is bereft of any quasiduties of the parties to a court case) on judicial power. the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant If at all, the investigative function of the judicially in a case of controversy x x." commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: Solicitor General, the recommendation to "To settle in the exercise of judicial prosecute is but a consequence of the authority. To determine finally. overall task of the commission to Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest conduct a fact-finding investigation." The sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass actual prosecution of suspected offenders, on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or much less adjudication on the merits of to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a the charges against them, is certainly not judicial determination of a fact, and the a function given to the commission. The entry of a judgment." [Italics included. phrase, "when in the course of its Citations Omitted] investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to Fact-finding is not adjudication and it a contrary interpretation from that of the cannot be likened to the judicial function petitioners. The function of determining of a court of justice, or even a quasiprobable cause for the filing of the judicial agency or office. The function of appropriate complaints before the courts receiving evidence and ascertaining remains to be with the DOJ and the therefrom the facts of a controversy is not Ombudsman.

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At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, it was written: This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied] The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.

and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws

SC: Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Void (Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010) At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, The same holds true with respect to the accomplices and accessories during the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised and thereafter to submit its finding and contravene the power of the Ombudsman Administrative Code is by no means recommendations to the President, to investigate criminal cases under exclusive and, thus, can be shared with Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which a body likewise tasked to investigate the month after the issuance of EO No. 1, two states: commission of crimes. cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity and constitutionality of the (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 said EO. or on complaint by any person, any act or can it be inferred that the findings of the omission of any public officer or PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. The first case is a special civil action for employee, office or agency, when such Much like its predecessors, the Davide prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis act or omission appears to be illegal, Commission, the Feliciano Commission Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and

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taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.

the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or The OSG also cites the recent case of redundancy of functions. These point to Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that the situations where a body or an office is President has the power to reorganize the already existent but a modification or offices and agencies in the executive alteration thereof has to be effected. The department in line with his constitutionally creation of an office is nowhere granted power of control and by virtue of a mentioned, much less envisioned in said valid delegation of the legislative power to provision. Accordingly, the answer to the The second case is a special civil action for reorganize executive offices under existing question is in the negative. certiorari and prohibition filed by statutes. The OSG concludes that the petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. power of control necessarily includes the 2. May the President legally create Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and power to create offices. the Philippine Truth Commission Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) (PTC)? Is there a valid delegation of as incumbent members of the House of 1. Does the creation of the PTC fall power from Congress empowering the Representatives. Petitioners-Legislators within the ambit of the power to President to create a public office? argue that the said Order is reorganize as expressed in Section 31 unconstitutional because the creation of a of the Revised Administrative Code? Yes.The creation of the PTC finds public office lies within the province of justification under Section 17, Article VII of Congress and not with the executive SUGGESTED ANSWER: the Constitution, imposing upon the branch of government. President the duty to ensure that the laws No. The power to reorganize as expressed are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: The OSG counters that there is nothing in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative exclusively legislative about the creation Code? Section 31 contemplates Section 17. The President shall have by the President of a fact-finding body reorganization as limited by the control of all the executive departments, such as a truth commission. Pointing to following functional and structural lines: bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that numerous offices created by past (1) restructuring the internal organization the laws be faithfully executed. presidents, it argues that the authority of of the Office of the President Proper by the President to create public offices within abolishing, consolidating or merging units Indeed, the Executive is given much the Office of the President Proper has long thereof or transferring functions from one leeway in ensuring that our laws are been recognized. According to the OSG, unit to another; (2) transferring any faithfully executed. As stated above, the the Executive, just like the other two function under the Office of the President powers of the President are not limited to branches of government, possesses the to any other Department/Agency or vice those specific powers under the inherent authority to create fact-finding versa; or (3) transferring any agency under Constitution. One of the recognized powers

committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.

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of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.

and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, No. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it past and present, who may be cannot be likened to the judicial function of indictable. Are the petitioners a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial correct? On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 agency or office. Contrary to petitioners transgresses the power of Congress to apprehension, the PTC will not supplant Yes! Although the purpose of the Truth appropriate funds for the operation of a the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their Commission falls within the investigative public office, suffice it to say that there will respective powers. If at all, the power of the President, the Court finds be no appropriation but only an allotment investigative function of the commission difficulty in upholding the constitutionality or allocations of existing funds already will complement those of the two offices. of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its appropriated. Accordingly, there is no As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the apparent transgression of the equal usurpation on the part of the Executive of recommendation to prosecute is but a protection clause enshrined in Section 1, the power of Congress to appropriate consequence of the overall task of the Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 funds. Further, there is no need to specify commission to conduct a fact-finding Constitution. the amount to be earmarked for the investigation. operation of the commission because, in Such classification, however, to be valid the words of the Solicitor General, The actual prosecution of suspected must pass the test of reasonableness. The whatever funds the Congress has offenders, much less adjudication on the test has four requisites: (1) The provided for the Office of the President will merits of the charges against them, is classification rests on substantial be the very source of the funds for the certainly not a function given to the distinctions; (2) It is germane to the commission. Moreover, since the amount commission. The phrase, when in the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to that would be allocated to the PTC shall be course of its investigation, under Section existing conditions only; and (4) It applies subject to existing auditing rules and 2(g), highlights this fact and gives equally to all members of the same class. regulations, there is no impropriety in the credence to a contrary interpretation from Superficial differences do not make for a funding. that of the petitioners. The function of valid classification. determining probable cause for the filing of 3. According to petitioners, E.O. No. 1 the appropriate complaints before the Applying these precepts to this case, illegally amended the Constitution courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Executive Order No. 1 should be struck and pertinent statutes when it vested Ombudsman. down as violative of the equal protection the Truth Commission with quasiclause. The clear mandate of the judicial powers duplicating, if not 4. Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 envisioned truth commission is to superseding, those of the Office of violates the equal protection clause investigate and find out the truth the Ombudsman created under the as it selectively targets for concerning the reported cases of graft 1987 Constitution and the investigation and prosecution officials and corruption during the previous

Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987. Is this correct?

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administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

th e e c ffe t th t th a e Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew The exem ption from re l e te a sta In this regard, it must be borne in mind ta x g n d ra te to M IA A under that the Arroyo administration is but just a Section 21 o its C a f h rt e r. member of a class, that is, a class of past T u , M IA A paid some o th hs f e re l a administrations. It is not a class of its own. e te sta ta x a a yd e lre d u . Not to include past administrations In June 2001, i received t Final similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness N otices of Real Estate Tax which the equal protection clause cannot Delinquency from Paraa que fo r sanction. Such discriminating th e ta xab le ye ars 1992 to 2001 differentiation clearly reverberates to label e tim te s a d a P624 m n t illio . the commission as a vehicle for The City Treasurer of Paraaque vindictiveness and selective retribution. issued notices of levy and w arrants of levy on th e Though the OSG enumerates several A irport Lands and B uild gs. in I t differences between the Arroyo a lso th a n d re te e to s ll a e t administration and other past pb u lic a c n u tio th e Airp rt Lands o administrations, these distinctions are not and Buildings should M IA A fa il t o substantial enough to merit the restriction pay th e re l e te a sta ta x of the investigation to the previous d lin u n e qe c y . administration only. Later on, the O G C C issued Opinion No. 147 c rify g la in its e rlie a r o in n p io . O G C C o r r e c t e dt c i M IA A(P t io e ) e it n r v . CA & s sa in th t y g a Sec . 21 of th e M IA A P a r a n a q ua th ritie e u o s (R s .) ep C h a r t e ris th e p o ro f th t M IA Ai s a e empt f r o m r e a l e ta x s te ta . x M IA Ao p e r a t e sth e NAIA Complex i n Thus M I A A f i l e d a p e ti ti o n with th e Paraaque E O No. 903 (MIAA C A s e e k i n gto re tra s in th e C a r). h rte As ope rator , i t Paraaque from i m p o s i n g re l a a m iste d in rs th e la d n , e ta s te ta x o , le y g n v in a a st, g in improvements and equipm ent and a u c t i o n in fo p b g r u lic sa le within NAIA. th e a o irp rt la d n s and b u i l d i n g s , In March 1997, the Office of the b t th u is was dismissed fo r Government Corporate Counsel having been file d out of tim e. (OGCC) issued Opin ion No. 061 to H ence, this present p titio . e n

Paranaques Contention: Section 193 o f the Local Government Code expressly w ithdre w t h e tax exem ption p ile e riv g s o f government o w n e d and c o n t r o l l e d corp. upon. Resp onde nts also argu e th at a b sic ru a le o f sta to tu ry c n tru tio o s c n is th t a th e ep x re ss m ention of one p rso , e n th g in , o at ec ds r c x lu e a ll o e th rs. An in rn tio a te a n l a rp rt is n t among the i o o exceptions m entioned in Section 193 of the Local Governm e nt C ode T . hus, re sponde nts assert that M IA A cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exem pt from r a e t te el sa ta .M IA A s contention: x A ort irp Lands and B ilding u s are owned by th e R ub ep lic. The gove rnm ent cannot tax it e . s lf The reason for tax exem ption of public property is th t i s ta a n a t x tio would n o t in re to any p u b l i c advantage, u since in such a c as e th tax e de btor is a o th ta ls e x c d r re ito . Is u : s e W/N A o irp rt Lands and B ild g u in s of M IA A are exem pt from r a el et t sae t x a. H eld: Yes. R eal estate tax assessm ents issu ed by the City of Paraaque a re v id o . 1 M IA A is Not a Government-Owned .

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or Controlled C orporation M IA A is n t a government-owned o or controlled corporation b ut an in tru e ta s m n lity o th f e N tio a a n l Government and thus exem pt from lo a c l ta a n x tio . M IA A is n t a stock corporation o because i has no ca ita t p l sto ck d ivid ed in to sh r s a e . M IA A has no stockholders or voting s a s h re . M IA A is a o n t a non-stock ls o corporation because i has no t members. A non-stock corp oration must have members. M IA A is a government instrum enta lity vested w ith corporate powers to perform e ic nly ff ie t it s governmental fu c n n tio s. M IA Ai s lik e any o t h e r government instrum en t lit ; a y th e o ly d re c n iffe n e is th t M IA A a i s vested w ith co ora rp te p w rs. o e When th e law v s e ts in a government in stru e ta m n lity co o te rp ra p w r, o e th e in stru e n lity m ta d e o s n t o become a co o tio . rp ra n U nless the government in stru e ta m n lity is organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, i rem t ains a governm ent instrum en t lit a y exercising not only governm ental but also corporate pow ers. Thus, M IA A ex e is s rc e th e governmental powers of

em inent d om ain, police authority and th e levy ing of fe es and ch rg a es. At the same t i m e , M IA Ae x e r c i s e s all t h e pow ers of a co rp or a ti on under the Corporation Law, i n s o f a r as these pow ers a re n t in o siste t o c n n w ith th e p rovisio s n o th f is Executive Or d e r . 2 A o . irp rt Lands and B u i l d i n g s of M IA Aa r e owned by th e Republic a A o . irp rt Lands and Buildings are of Public Dom inion No one can d u isp te th t p p rtie a ro e s o f p b u lic dominion mentioned in A le rtic 420 of the C ivil C ode, like roads, c n ls aa , riv rs e , to n , rre ts p rts and bridges o constru cte d by the State, are owned by th e S te ta . The term ports in d s clu e sea o p rts and a p rts ir o . The M IA A A o irp rt Lands and B ild g u in s c n o stitu te a port co stru n cte d by th e St t . ae The A irport Lands and B ildings u are devote d to pu blic u . The se fa t th t t e MIAA c lle ts c a h o c te in l rm a fe s and oth e er ch arg es from th e pu blic d oes n ot remove the ch ra a cte r o f th e A o irp rt Lands and B ild g u in s a p p rtie s ro e s fo r p b u lic u . The ch a in se rg g o f fe s to th e e p b u lic d e o s n t o d te in e rm e th e ch ra a cte r o f th e p p rty ro e whe e th r i t i s

of public dom inion or not. The te in l rm a fe s M IA A e charges c nt u o s it te the bulk of the incom e that m aintains the operations of MIAA. b A o . irp rt Lands and B uildings are O utside the Commerce of Man The Court has also ruled that property of public dom inion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be th e su je b ct o an f a c n u tio , le y v , encumbrance o r d ps is o it ion th u h ro g p b u lic o r p riva te sale . Any encum brance, levy on e xe cu ti on o a ctio n sale r u o any p r o p e r t y of public f dominion is void fo be g r in contrary to public po y lic . c M IA A is a Mere T ste . ru e of the R epu blic - Only the President of the R epublic can sign such deed of conveyance. d T n fe . ra s r to M IA Aw a s meant to im plement Reorganization The tra s r n fe o th f e A o irp rt Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transport a n tio to M IA A was n ot meant to ta s r r n fe b n fic l e e ia ownership o th s f ee a s ts se fr m th o e R p b e u lic to MIAA. The purpose was m erely to reorganize a d isio iv n in th e Bureau of Air T n o tio ra sp rta n in to a se a te p ra and autonomous body. The Republic re m ains the ben eficial owner of the A ort irp

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Lands and B uild s. ing M IA A it e s lf is owned s le o ly by the R epu blic. e R a P p rty . el ro e Owned by the R public e is Not Taxable Sec 234 o th f e LG C p v e ro id s th t re l a a p p rty ro e owned by the Republic o th f e P il ippines h o any o it r f s p lit a o ic l subdivisions except when th e b n ficia e e l use th r eof e has been g n d ra te , fo r co sid ra n n e tio o o e ise r th rw , to a taxable person follow ing are exem pted from payment o th f e re l p p rty a ro e ta . x However, p ortion s of the A irpo rt Lands and B ild g u in s th t M IA A a le s s ae to p a riv te e titie n s a re n t exempt from o re l e ta a s te ta . For exam x ple, the land area occupi ed by h n ars a g th at M IA A le se a s to p a riv te co o tio s rp ra n is s b c u je t to re l e ta a s te ta . x GSIS ( e it n r P t io e ) v. s Tresurer of M anila (Respondents) City

A s it to n llify u u to th e assessm ent of real property taxes on ce tain prope s r rtie belon ging to p titio e e nr GSIS GSIS owns or used to own 2 parcels of land (Katigbak property and Concepcion-

Arr o ro ce s p p rty ro e ). T itle to th e Concepcion-Arroceros property was tra s rre n fe d to th is Cu o rt in 2005 pursuant to Proclam ation No. 835. Both th e GSIS and th e M T C of M anila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property while the Katigbak property was under le s . ae The City Treasurer of M anila addressed a le r tte to GSIS Presid t en and General M anager inform ing them of the u aid np real p erty rop taxes (from 1992 to 2002), brok en down a s fo w llo s: (a PhP 54,826,599.37 ) for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros p p rty ro e . They warned o th f e in sio clu n o f th e p p rtie ro e s in a public auction in M anila should the unpaid taxes rem ain u s ttle . ne d GSIS wrote back em phasizing the G SIS exemptio n from a ll k d in s o f ta e x s, in lu in c d g re lty a ta e x s, u d r R A 8291. 2 days at r n e f e, GSIS file d a p titio e n fo r c rtio ri e ra and p h itio ro ib n fo a r r sr i eta ning r lie. e f Hoping fo r th e n llific tio u a n of the assessm ents and t h a t re o d n sp n e t is perm anently enjoined from p r o c e e d i n g s against G SIS p r o p e r t . GSIS would y la e t r

amend its p titio e n to in lu e c d th e fa t th t: c a (a th ) e Katigbak property has been le se a d to and occupied by the M anila Hotel Corporation (MHC), which has contra c a tu lly bound it e s lf t o pay any re lty a ta e x s th t may a be imposed on th e su je b ct p p rty ro e ; and (b) the Concepcion-Arroceros property is partly occupied by GSIS and partly occu pied by th e M T C of M anila. RTC dism issed G SIS p t n e itio . Is u s s e: W/N GSIS i s exempt from re l p p rty a ro e ta a n x tio ; assum ing that i t i s so exempt, whether GSIS is lia le b fo r re l p p rty a ro e ta e x s fo r its p p rtie ro e s le s d ae t o a t x b a a le e t y n it ; and w e e h th r th e p p rtie ro e s o GSIS are exem f pt from le y v . H ld e : P titio e n is MERITOUS. Yes, GSIS is e e p x m t. GSIS is a government in tru e ta s m n lity . GSIS is n t a o stock corporation because i t has no ca ita p l sto ck d id d iv e in to sh re a s and no stockholders or voting s a s h re . GSIS is a o n t a non-stock ls o corporation because i has no t members. The Republic owns properties under GSISs name. GSIS is b t a u

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mere tru e ste o th f e p p rtie ro e s. T is p rtic la h a u r property arrangem ent is shown by th e fa t th t d o sal or c a isp conveyance of such are done th u h ro g th e a th rity u o o th f e P sid n re e t o th P ilip in s f e h p e. GSIS m anages the funds for the life in u n e s ra c , re m n tire e t, s rv o h , u iv rs ip and d a ility is b b n fits ee o a f ll government employees and th ir e b n ficia s. e e rie T is co st it t s h n ue an e s n l s e tia and v a it l function that the governm ent, through one o its ag n ie f ec s o r in stru e ta m n litie , s ought to perform . Thus t h e Republic guarantees th fu e lfillm n e t of th e o lig tio s b a n o th f e GSIS to it s members ( government employees and t h e i r b n fic rie ) e e ia s when theyre due. GSIS enjoys under it s c at r h re fu ll tax exem ption. As an i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of th e na n l tio a government, i i isl t s t ef nt o lia le b to pay r e a l estate taxes assessed by the City of M anila against its Katigbak and C o n c e p c i o n -Arroceros p p rtie . ro e s Following th e "b n fic l e e ia u " se ru , le how ever, accrued real property taxes are du e from the Katigbak property, leased as it is t o a ta a le xb e tity n . But th e

co rre sponding lia ilit b y fo th r e payment thereof devolves on the taxab le be ficial ne us e . The r Katigbak property cannot in any event be su je b ct o a pb f u lic a c n u tio sa , le notw ithstanding i s realty t tax d elin que ncy. This means that the City of M anila ha s to s tis a fy its ta x c im by la serving th e accru ed realty tax assessm t en on M H C as th e ta a le x b b n ficia e e l u r o th se f e Katigbak property and, in case of nonpaym en t through means , o e th r th n th a e sa le a p b t u lic a c no u tio f th e le se a d p p rty ro e . P titio e n is G R A N TED .The RTC M anila decisions are R EV ERS EDand SET ASIDE. Tax as sessm ents issued by the City of M anila are VOID, e ce t x p th t th a e re l p p rty a ro e tax assessm ent pertaining to the leased Katigbak property shall be v lid if s r e d on the a ev M anila H otel Corporation, as lessee that has a tu l c a and b eneficial u se of i . t

GSIS vs The City Treasurer of Manila

Facts

Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive,

Manila(Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (ConcepcionArroceros property). Title to theConcepcion-Arroceros property was transferred to this Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No. 835[3] dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the ConcepcionArroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease to Manila Hotel Corporation. the City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter ated September 13, 2002 to GSIS informing of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002, broken down as follows: (a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the ConcepcionArroceros property. The letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes remain unsettled before that date. On September 16, 2002, the City Treasurer of Manila issued separate Notices of Realty Tax Delinquency for the subject properties, with the usual warning of seizure and/or sale. On October 8, 2002, GSIS, through its legal

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counsel, wrote back emphasizing the GSIS exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA)8291.Two days after, GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition [7] with prayer for a restraining and injunctive relief before the Manila RTC.RTC ruled that the assessment of Manila was valid. ISSUES 1. Whether or not GSIS is exempt from the payment of real property taxes from 1992 to 2002;2. Whether GSIS is exempt from the payment of real property taxes on the property it leased to a taxable entity; and3. Whether GSISs real properties are exempt from warrants of levy and from tax sale for non-payment of real property taxes. Ruling 1. GSIS Exempt from Real Property Tax Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146 Revised Insurance Government Act RA 7160 lifted GSIS Tax Exemptions

Local Governement Code or RA 7160 was enacted in 1991. Sec 193 vis-avis Sec234. GSIS tax-exempt status withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997 by RA 8291 Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291 Under it, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a virtual replication of the earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146. Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads :SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien . It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times xxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds . These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid . Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or

jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. Real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS considered paid Sec. 39 which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act . If only to stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of said Sec. 39:SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien . x x x xxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds . These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid .

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GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government The Manila International Airport Authority Doctrine, which provides that, since MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having been organized either as a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as a non-stock corporation because it has no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence, outside the purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context that unless otherwise provided, local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities.

No. 6734 these 4 provinces became the ARMM. On the other hand, with respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote in favor of creating ARMM. Article XIX Sec RA 6724 provides;"THAT ONLY THE PROVINCES AND CITIES VOTING FAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITE SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM AND THE PROVINCES WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR THE INCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS". Pursuant to the authority granted by the above provision, then President QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS: Cory Aquino issued EO No. 429 "PROVIDING FOR THE Chiongbian vs. Orbos REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM" Pursuant to Article X Sec 18 of the where in t hose who are not in favor 1987 Constitution, Congress passed in creating the ARMM where RA No. 67 transferred (provinces of a certain 34 "The ORGANIC ACT for the region to another) some of which are; AUTONOMOUS REGION in MUSLIM a. Misamis Occidental, at present p MINDANAO" calling for a plebescite to art of Region X will become part of be held in 23 provinces. Region IX. b. General Santos, at 4 provinces voted in favor of creating present part of Region XI, will become the Autonomous region and these are part of Region IX. c. Transfered the LANAO regional center of Region IX from DEL SUR, MAGUINDANAO,SULU and Zamboanga City to Pagadian. TAWI-TAWI. Hence, in accordance to RA

Petitioners, protested and challenges the validity of EO 429 contending that there is not law which authorizes the President to make alterations on the existing structure of the governmental units in other words REORGANIZATION. And that the authority merge granted in RA 6724 does not include the authority to reorganize even if it does not affect the opportionment of the congressional representatives. In addition, they contend that Article XIX Sec 13 of RA 6724 is unconstitutional for 1) it is invalid delegation of power by the Legislative to the President 2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. Issues: 1. W/N Article XIX Sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express s tandard to guide the President s discretion and whether the power given fairly expressed in the title of the statute. 2. W/N the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganization of those who did not vote or not infavor to it.

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3. W/N the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga to Pagadian since it should be the acts of Congress.

legislation. And with respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, th e standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the Preside nt in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Exec Department to " Ruling: Promote simplicity, economy, and While the power to merge efficiency in the government to enable administrative regions is not expressly it to pursue programs consistent with provided for in the constitution, it is a national goals for accelerated social power which has traditionally been and economic development and to lodged with the President to facilitate improve the services in the transaction the exercise of the power of general of public business. supervision over local governments 2. No, while Article XIX Sec 13 (Article X sec 4 of the Constitution). provides that "THE PROVINCES AND The regions themselves are not CITIES WHICH DO NOT VOTE FOR territorial and political divisions like INCLUSION IN THE AUTONOMOUS provinces, cities, municipalities and REGION SHALL REMAIN IN THE THE barangays but are "mere groupings of EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS" contagouos provinces for This provision is subject to the administrative purposes. The power qualification that the PRESIDENT MAY conferred on the President is similar to BY ADMINISTRATIVE the power to DETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTING adjust municipal boundaries". REGIONS. 1. No, A legislative standard This means that while non-assenting need not to be expressed. It may provinces are to remain in the regions simply be gathered or implied. Nor aas designated upon the creation of need it be found in the law the Autonomous region, they may challenged because it may be nevertheless be regrouped with embodied in other statutes on the contiguous provinces forming other same subject as that of the challenged

regions as the exigency of administration may require. 3. Yes, for administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes hence are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and brgys. Therefore there is no basis that only Congress can determine the region center.
TAADA VS. TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where

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the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by ISSUES: law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to Whether the presidential decrees in question Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) be valid and enforceable, must be published in which contain special provisions as to the the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The date they are to take effect, publication in the FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity Official Gazette is not indispensable for their informed on matters of public concern, a right does not preclude their publication in the OG as effectivity? recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public RULING: to compel respondent public officials to publish, nature or of general applicability is a Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in and/or cause the publication in the Official requirement of due process. Before a person those cases where the legislation itself does not Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters may be bound by law, he must first be officially provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of of instructions, general orders, proclamations, informed of its contents. publication is material for determining its date of executive orders, letter of implementation and effectivity, which is the 15th day following its administrative orders. The respondents would publication, but not when the law itself provides Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and have this case dismissed on the ground that for the date when it goes into effect. petitioners have no legal personality to bring this issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of general application and provide for petition. Petitioners maintain that since the Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of subject of the petition concerns a public right and penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law its object is to compel public duty, they need not executive and legislative powers. The generality itself provides for the date of its effectivity. show any specific interest. Respondents further of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this contend that publication in the OG is not a sine The publication of all presidential issuances of a qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws case provides the publication constitutes the public nature or of general applicability is where the laws themselves provide for their own necessary constructive notice and is thus the mandated by law. Obviously, presidential cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will effectivity dates. decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or not even mitigate the crime. penalties for their violation or otherwise impose ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the burdens on the people, such as tax revenue Official Gazatte is an indispensable measures, fall within this category. Other SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, presidential issuances which apply only to V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the particular persons or class of persons such as COMMISSION (NTC) G.R. 151908, laws themselves provide for administrative and executive orders need not be their own effectivity dates. August 12, 2003 published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. RULING: Yes. It is the peoples right to be QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL informed on matters of public concern and POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF The Court therefore declares that presidential corollarily access to official records, and to ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF

issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

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PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to Facts: apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 enforcing and administering the same law. which promulgated rules and regulations In carrying out their quasi-judicial on the billing of telecommunications functions, the administrative officers or services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a bodies are required to investigate facts or petition to declare the circular as ascertain the existence of facts, hold unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was hearings, weigh evidence, and draw filed by the NTC on the ground of conclusions from them for their official petitioners to exhaust administrative action and exercise of discretion in a remedies. The RTC denied the motion to judicial. The determination of whether a dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed specific rule or set of rules issued by an RTC. administrative body contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial Issue: power as defined by the Constitution which is the duty of the Courts of justice to Whether or not the Billing circular 13- settle actual controversies involving rights 6-2000 issued by NTC which are legally demandable and unconstitutional. enforceable, and to determine whether or not there have been a grave abuse of Held: discretion amounting to lack or excess of Administrative bodies had (a) quasijurisdiction on the part of any branch or legislative or rule-making powers and (b) instrumentality of the Government. The quasi-judicial or administrative NTC circular was issued pursuant to its adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or quasi-legislative or rule-making power. rule-making power is the power to make Hence, the action must be filed directly rules and regulations which results in with the regular courts without requiring delegated legislation that is within the exhaustion of administrative remedies. confines of the granting statute and the Where the act of administrative agency doctrine of non-delegability and was performed pursuant to its quasiseparability of powers. To be valid, such judicial function, exhaustion of rules and regulations must conform to, and administrative remedy is required, before be consistent with, the provisions of going to court. The doctrine of primary enabling statute. Quasi-judicial or jurisdiction applies only where the administrative adjudicatory power is the administrative agency exercises its quasi-

judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

East Shipping Lines (ESL) vs CA 95 SCAD 349 291 SCRA 485 1998

Constitutionality of E.O. No. 1088 providing for uniform & adjusted rates for foreign and coasteise vessels in all Philippine Ports is assailed. FACTS: Davao Pilots Association (DPA) filed a compliant against ESL for non-payment of pilotage services. ESL assailed the constitutionality of EO 1088, upon which DPA bases its claim,because (1) its interpretation & application are left private respondent, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers. It insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the basis of the PPAs memorandum circulars. The PPA is the

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administrative body vested with the power to regulate & prescribe pilotage fees. ISSUES: 1. Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional. 2. Whether the PPA circulars are valid. HELD: 1. EO 1088 was upheld as valid & constitutional in Philippine Inter-island Shipping Association vs CA (78 SCAD 197, 266 SCRA 489 [1997]). It was held that what determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its natureThe power to fix the rates of charges for serviceshas always been regarded as legislative in character. EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the rationalization of pilotage service charges through the imposition if uniform and adjusted rates for foreign & coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. The PPA is duty-bound to comply with EO 1088. PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by EO 1088. 2. Since the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. Administrative/Executive acts, orders and regulations are only valid when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. As stated in LBP vs CA (64 SCAD 905, 249

SCRA 149 [1995]), the conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed/set aside by the judicial department if there is an Error of Law, a Grave Abuse of Power or Lack or Jurisdiction, or Grave Abuse of Discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law. An administrative agency has no discretion whether to implement a law or not. If there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, the latter prevails.

DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. Pursuant to the previous issuances, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars 2. Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are unconstitutional, unreasonable, unfair and oppressive Held: They are in accordance but legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Art 2 of CC, Art 5 of the Labor Code and Sec 3(1) and 4, Chap 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc., vs. Torres G.R. 101279, August 6, 1992 Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASIE) is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers, including domestic helpers. On June 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The

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1. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging as provided by Articles 15, 17 and 20 of the Labor Code. 2. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON.RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents. FACTS DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.
ISSUES(1) whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; (2) whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, areunreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and (3) whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the

Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with

HELDFIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society. THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and

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regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not there after be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).Prohibition granted.

Computerized Identification Reference System was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos and was published in four newspapers of general circulation. It aims to establish a decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers. There shall be a Population Reference Number (PRN) for each individual and all basic and social security transactions shall be regulated by the PRN with the use of Biometrics Technology. The funding shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies like GSIS, SSS, NSO and others.

to be let alone while respondents deny such allegation. ISSUES: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 encroaches on the law-making power of the legislative department; whether or not A.O. No. 308 infringes the peoples right of privacy. HELD:A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government, It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987 for the former establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Nor is it correct to argue that A.O. 308 is not a law for it confers no right, imposes no.duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under the assailed administrative order, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. Thus, without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

Petitioner Bias Ople assailed the Administrative Order and prayed for its nullification on two important constitutional grounds: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizens protected zone of privacy. The petitioner claims that AO No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the President has merely exercised his administrative power in implementing the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987 Ople vs Torres et.al.; G.R. No. 127685, and that A.O. No. 308 is not a law for it confers no right,imposes no duty, affords July23, 1998 no protection and creates no office. FACTS: Administrative Order No. 308 On the right of privacy, claims that A.O. entitled Adoption ot a National No. 308 will infringe on the peoples right

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Regarding the right of privacy, it is a right recognized and enshrined in the several provisions of our Constitution, and in our laws. Hence, it is the burden of government to show, that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. To note, what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the over breadth of A.O. No 308 which if implemented will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger.

FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does riot dismissal. For failure to heed the return-tostate what specific biological work order, eight teachers at the Ramon characteristics and what particular Magsaysay High School were biometrics technology shall be used to administratively charged, preventively identify people who will seek its coverage; suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, it does not state whether encoding of data P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An is limited to biological information alone investigation committee was consequently for identification purposes; and it does not formed to hear the charges. state in clear and categorical terms how When their motion for suspension was theses information gathered shall be denied by the Investigating Committee, handled. The A. 0. speaks of computer said teachers staged a walkout signifying linkage which will give other governmental their intent to boycott the entire agencies access to the information. Yet, proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino there are no controls to guard against decreed dismissal from service of Esber leakage of information. The possibilities of and the suspension for 9 months of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometric Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the and computer technology cannot be meantime, a case was filed with RTC, downplayed. raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, teachers submitted sworn statements to December 2, 1991 Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in

peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE: * Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be

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likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any

department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. and determine causes) as courts of justice, 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To for the discovery and collection of facts investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. concerning a certain matter or matters." Whether in the popular or the technical "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly sense, these terms have well understood understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, and quite distinct meanings. judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as Investigate vs. Adjudicate "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits "Investigate," commonly understood, of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: means to examine, explore, inquire or settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And delve or probe into, research on, study. "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon The dictionary definition of "investigate" is as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial "to observe or study closely: inquire into powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in systematically. "to search or inquire a case of controversy . . . ." into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To of investigation, of course, is to discover, settle in the exercise of judicial authority. to find out, to learn, obtain information. To determine finally. Synonymous with Nowhere included or intimated is the adjudge in its strictest sense;" and notion of settling, deciding or resolving a "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to controversy involved in the facts inquired decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or into by application of the law to the facts condemn. . . . Implies a judicial established by the inquiry. determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step Hence it is that the Commission on Human by step by patient inquiry or observation. Rights, having merely the power "to To trace or track; to search into; to investigate," cannot and should not "try examine and inquire into with care and and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the

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matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. DirectorGeneral of NEDA (G.R. No. 167798, 19 April 2006, penned by Justice Carpio) On 13 April 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420, directing all government agencies and government-owned and controlled Who has Power to Adjudicate? corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing These are matters within the original identification (ID) systems. The EO was jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being assailed as unconstitutional based on the within the scope of the disciplinary powers same grounds used in the earlier case of granted to him under the Civil Service Law, Ople vs. Torres EO 420 is a usurpation and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of legislative power by the President and of the CSC.

that it is an infringement on the citizens right to privacy. EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative power Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order. EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayors Office, LTO, PRC, and similar government entities. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

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A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420. EO 420 does not infringe on the right to privacy The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record

only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows. Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, certain safeguards are instituted. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. In contrast, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. The assailed executive issuance in

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Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before. KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et al. v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL of the NationalEconomic Development Authority, et al. G.R. No. 167798 and 167930, 19 April 2006, Carpio, J. (En Banc) Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self- executing and does not need any implementing legislation.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 (E.O. 420), which requires all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. E.O. 420 seeks to consolidate the existing identification systems of different government agencies into one multi- purpose I.D. thereby reducing inconvenience to the public in their transactions with the government. The proposed uniform I.D. requires the following specific data: (1)name; (2)home address; (3)sex; (4)picture; (5)signature; (6)date of birth; (7)place of birth; (8)marital status; (9)name of parents; (10)height; (11)weight; (12)two index fingerprints and two thumbmarks; (13)any prominent feature, like a mole; and (14)Tax Identification Number (TIN). These consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of E.O. 420 on the grounds that it is a usurpation of legislative powers by the President and it infringes on the citizens right to privacy. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not E.O. 420 is a usurpation of legislative powers by the President; and 2.) Whether or not E.O. 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy

HELD: The petitions are DISMISSED. E.O. 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department and also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. E.O. 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These entities are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs in order to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities. A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive

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department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, this is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, E.O. 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC. This only shows that E.O. 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. Sec. 17, Art. VII also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under E.O. 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in

issuing E.O. 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In issuing E.O. 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system: (1)when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose; (2)when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not; and (3)when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed. E.O. 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by it have the proper appropriation or funding. E.O. 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. E.O. 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities covered by E.O. 420 have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There is even less basis to complain against the unified ID system under E.O. 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system will be limited to only fourteen specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under E.O. 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to E.O. 420. E.O. 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that E.O. 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. The assailed executive issuance in that case sought to establish a National Computerized Identification

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Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before. ABAKADA GURO v EXEC. SEC. ERMITA GR No. 168207 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005 NATURE Petitions for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law. - NON-DELEGATION ISSUE: The new law in its Sections 4, 5 and 6 granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 and 4/5% or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 and 1/2%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, must submit such information to

the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must connote a mandatory order. Its use in a be imposed by the President effective statute denotes an imperative obligation January 1, 2006. and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. ISSUE - Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the WON the RA 9337's stand-by authority President to immediately impose the 12% to the Executive to increase the VAT rate upon the existence of any of the rate, especially on account of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a recommendatory power granted to duty, which cannot be evaded by the the Secretary of Finance, constitutes President. It is a clear directive to impose undue delegation of legislative power the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. HELD - In making his recommendation to the NO. President on the existence of either of the Ratio Congress does not abdicate its two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is functions or unduly delegate power when it not acting as the alter ego of the President describes what job must be done, who or even her subordinate. He is acting as must do it, and what is the scope of his the agent of the legislative department, to authority; in our complex economy that is determine and declare the event upon frequently the only way in which the which its expressed will is to take effect. legislative process can go forward. The Secretary of Finance becomes the Reasoning The case before the Court is means or tool by which legislative policy is not a delegation of legislative power. It is determined and implemented, considering simply a delegation of ascertainment of that he possesses all the facilities to facts upon which enforcement and gather data and information and has a administration of the increased rate under much broader perspective to properly the law is contingent. The legislature has evaluate them. His function is to gather made the operation of the 12% rate and collate statistical data and other effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon pertinent information and verify if any of a specified fact or condition. It leaves the the two conditions laid out by Congress is entire operation or non-operation of the present. 12% rate upon factual matters outside of - There is no undue delegation of the control of the executive. No discretion legislative power but only of the discretion would be exercised by the President. as to the execution of a law. This is Highlighting the absence of discretion is constitutionally permissible. Congress did the fact that the word shall is used in the not delegate the power to tax but the common proviso. The use of the word shall mere implementation of the law. The

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intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. Disposition Petition is DENIED.

disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. ISSUE: 2. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS: Was the OPs modification of the No. The final & executory character of the Fortich vs Corona Decision void or a valid exercise of its OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or 100 SCAD 781 powers and prerogatives? substantially modified. Res judicata has 298 SCRA 685 1. Whether the DARs late filing of the set in and the adjudicated affair should 1998 Motion for Reconsideration is forever be put to rest. excusable. Procedural rules should be treated The Office of the President modified its 2. Whether the respondents have with utmost respect and due regard decision which had already become final shown a justifiable reason for the since they are designed to facilitate the and executory. relaxation of rules. adjudication of cases to remedy the 3. Whether the issue is a question of worsening problem of delay in the FACTS: technicality. resolution of rival claims and in the On November 7, 1997, the Office of the HELD: administration of justice. The President (OP) issued a win-win 1. Constitution guarantees that all Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. persons shall have a right to the No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, speedy disposition of their cases substantially modified its March 29, 1996 dated February 12, 1987, mandates that before all judicial, quasi-judicial and Decision. The OP had long declared the decisions/resolutions/orders of the administrative bodies. said Decision final & executory after the Office of the President shallbecome While a litigation is not a game of DARs Motion for Reconsideration was final after the lapse of 15 days from technicalities, every case must be denied for having been filed beyond the receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a prosecuted in accordance with the 15-day reglementary period. Motion for Reconsideration thereof prescribed procedure to ensure an The SC then struck down as void the OPs is filed within such period. orderly & speedy administration of act, it being in gross disregard of the rules The respondents explanation that the justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of & basic legal precept that accord finality to DARs office procedure made it rules was never intended to forge a administrative determinations. impossibleto file its Motion for bastion for erring litigants to violate the The respondents contended in their instant Reconsideration on time since the said rules with impunity. motion that the win-win Resolution of decision had to be referred to its different A liberal interpretation & application November 7, 1997 is not void since it departments cannot be considered a valid of the rules of procedure can only be seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, justification. While there is nothing wrong resorted to in proper cases and under hence, the March 29, 1996 decision with such referral, the DAR must not justifiable causes and circumstances.

could not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable.

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3. No. It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature. When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962

THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents. CONCEPCION, J.: Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a lettercomplaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal

filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination. HELD: Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held

MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and

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to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk vs Lanzanas july 10, 2003

DOCTRINE The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No.1818) prohibited courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects FACTSOn 30 June 1997, Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance in favor of respondent National

Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared MinoloCove, a mangrovearea and breeding ground for bangus fry,an ecotourist zone. Petitioners, claiming to be fisher folks from Minolo, San Isidro,PuertoGalera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance.Director Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15 July1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of awrit of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial jurisdiction. ISSUE Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction is proper Held: The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No.1818) prohibited courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring

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facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA No. 8975), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation. Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving gan infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing theexecution or implementation of any

injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic

ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course without thepetitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC. HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was ruled to fail. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs Philippine Coconut Authority

BERNARDO vs. ABALOS G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001.SandovalGutierrez, J. FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and his son,Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998 elections. Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of the said city and who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was played all throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also made a n o f f e r and a promise then to increase such project, or the operation of such the allowances of the teachers. In public utility, or pursuing any lawful t h i s r e g a r d , petitioners filed a criminal activity necessary for such complaint with the COMELEC against execution,implementation or Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-buying, operation.Obviously, neither the Manila further alleging that they conspired RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC canissue with their co-respondents in violating an injunctive writ to stop the construction the Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the of the mooringfacility. Only this Court can recommendation of the Director of the Law do so under PD No. 1818 and later under Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC en RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari. over the complaint considering that its

PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by

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passing mark in the board examination forteachers. It was eventually revealed Phil. Sinter vs Cagayan Electric Light that Nery Remolonas namedid not appear and Power Company in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in Whether or not an injunction lies her report of rating belonged to a certain against the final and executory Marlou Madelo who got a rating of judgment of the Energy Regulatory 65%.EstelitoRemolona in his written Board? statement of facts said that he met a No. After a judgment has gained finality, it certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for becomes the ministerial duty of the court a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America however, to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented herrating report, so to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; Estelito went to Lucena to complain that hence, when facts and circumstances later America asked for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict checks at2,600pesos each plus bonus of may ask a competent court to stay its against the very nature of its creation. Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted that execution or prevent its enforcement. So, he was responsible for the fake eligibility also, a change in the situation of parties HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the and that his wife had no knowledge can warrant an injunctive relief. 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as thereof. On recommendation of Regional an economic principle. Although the present Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the ESTELITO V. REMOLONA vs. CIVIL Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, SERVICE COMMISSIONG.R. No. CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty it nonetheless reserves to the government the and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all 137473August 2, 2001PUNO, J.: power to intervene whenever necessary to its accessory penalties. On Motion for FACTS: Reconsideration, only Nery was Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of promote the general welfare. As such, free exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a enterprise does not call for the removal of teacher in Kiborosa Elementary School. On Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for protective regulations for the benefit of the review and denied the motion for January3, 1991, Francisco America, the general public. This is so because under Art 12, reconsideration and new trial. District Supervisor of Infanta inquired Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government about Nerys Civil Service eligibility who reserves the power to intervene whenever ISSUE: purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. necessary to promote the general welfare and Whether or not a civil service America also disclosed that he received when the public interest so requires. information that Nery was campaigning for employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a

law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

JUDICIAL REVIEW:

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which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. HELD: Yes. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he

enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. MOLLANEDA v UMACOB G.R. 140128, June 6, 2001 FACTS: Sometime Sept 7, 1994, Leonida Umacob, a public school, teacher went to the office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase to follow up her request for transfer to a different district. Therein, Arnold Mollaneda, school Division Superintendent, after entertaining her request hugged her, embraced her, kissed her nose and lip in a torrid manner, and mashed her breast. Mollaneda did these acts for several times then warned Umacob not to tell the incident to anybody.

A DECS investigating committee was formed, which later recommended to the DECS Regional Director "the dropping of the case" for lack of merit. Meanwhile, the case before the CSC was heard before Atty. Anacleto Buena, which hearing was attended by both parties and their counsel. CSC found Mollaneda guilty, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus Mollaneda elevated the case to the SC. Mollaneda alleges that 1) Umacob was guilty of forum shopping, 2) He was denied due process, and 3) witnesses' testimonies were hearsay. Pending the SC case, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed the case of acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Umacob was guilty of forum shopping 2) Whether or not Mollaneda was denied of due process 3) Whether or not court erred in giving weight to witnesses' testimonies Umacob reported the incident to the police 4) Whether or not dismissal of the case in the MTC merits dismissal of the CSC case station and filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness before the Municipal Trial HELD: Court. She also filed an administrative 1) No. With regard to the DECS and complaint as well with the Civil Service CSC, DECS was just furnished a copy of Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao the complaint - it was not filed before City (CSC-RO XI). She furnished the the DECS. The resolution of DECS was Department of Education, Culture and just a recommendatory resolution. With Sports - Regional Office XI, Davao City regard to the filing of the case both in (DECS-RO XI) a copy of her affidavitthe CSC and the court, the case filed complaint. before the CSC is an administrative case while that before the court is a

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criminal case, thus it does not constitute forum shopping.

2) No. During the hearing, Mollaneda actively participated in all proceedings and cross-examined all witnesses. The hearing of the case before a hearing officer rather than the commission itself is not a denial of due process. It is a well settled principle that administrative bodies may designate hearing and reception of evidence to a subordinate, on the basis of which evidence the body will decide the case. Due process in administrative proceedings merely requires that the tribunal or body or any of its judges Law on Public Officers: must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of PUBLIC OFFICE the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate. Flores v. Drilon (1993) 3) No. The witnesses' testimonies were offered not to prove its truth, but merely to prove that Umacob told the witnesses what transpired in the office. What was given more credence was the testimony of Umacob which was straight and replete with details consistent with human nature. 4) No. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not

foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the MTC is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused. However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, which the court finds in this case.

b) created prior to the legislators term incompatible; seat will be forfeited Practice of profession: not an absolute bar (they can appear as their own counsel) ELIGIBILITY, QUALIFICATIONS & DISQUALIFICATIONS DE FACTO OFFICERS

QF: Mayor Gordon was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority pursuant to Sec 13 (d) of RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Devt Act of 1992. Petitioners assail the statute for violating Sec7 of Art IX-B stating that no elective official shall be eligible to appointment or designation of any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. DOCTRINE: Sections 13 and 14 of Art VI For public office: a) created during the term of the legislator absolute bar from appointment

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