Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27594 November 28, 1975 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch III, PARAAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C. TAMAYO, THE COMMISIONER OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents. G.R. No. L-28144 November 28, 1975 ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors-appellants. Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for The Director of Lands, etc. Jaime B. Lumasag Jr. and Jose J. Roy and Associates Law Office for Roman C. Tamayo. Nemesio P. Diaz and Celso B. Fernandez, Jr. for Alipio Alinsunurin, etc.

ANTONIO, J.: These cases are interrelated, and so are decided jointly. In his application originally filed on February 24, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less, situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay. 1 On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President. 2

On May 10, 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties, requesting that the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application. 3 The motion was granted by the lower court in its order dated June 10, 1966. 4 It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President. The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities. 5 Except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by homesteaders issued patents by the Director of Lands, there were no occupants on the land. 6 It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in 1944. On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land applied for, described in the technical description Plan II-6752, is adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor of (a) Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, a Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds (2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos per Joint Manifestation of Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion CaballeroAlinsunurin, Ariosto Santos and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation dated July 19, 1966 and marked as Exhibit "AA-4 " 7 and (b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property. On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to the Supreme Court, 8 copy of which notice was furnished counsel for the applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation; however, no copy was furnished to counsel for Roman C. Tamayo, to whom one-third (1/3) portion of the land was adjudicated. On January 18, 1967, within the extended period granted by the court, the oppositors-appellants filed the corresponding Record on Appeal, copy of which was duly served upon appellees Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo. By an order dated March 8, 1967, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings, within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. 9 On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies served upon the appellees. Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration. Both motions were opposed by the Government. On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land, one-third (1/3)pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in

favor of Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the appeal. On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration forthwith issued Decree No. 113485 pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15, 1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija. On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on Appeal which, together with the evidence and transcripts, was forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal. As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration, on May 29, 1967, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines instituted before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to nullify the order dated March 11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967) and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija, and to command the respondent court to certify the entire proceedings and to allow appeal to the Supreme Court from its decision in toto in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545. On June 5, 1967, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction as follows: NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You (respondent Judge) are hereby restrained from issuing a writ of possession in Land Registration Case No. N675, LRC Rec. No. 25545 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled "Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation versus Director of Lands, et al."; You (respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo), your agents or representatives are hereby restrained from taking possession and/or excercising acts of ownership, occupancy or possession over the property in question subject matter of Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545; and You (respondent Register of Deeds) are hereby restrained from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, under Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545. Accordingly, petitioners-appellants caused the entry of a notice of lis pendens to be duly inscribed in the primary entry book of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151. In due time, the respondents filed their answers to the petition for certiorari. The parties having filed their respective memoranda, the case is deemed submitted for decision. At the outset, We shall resolve the petition for certiorari and mandamus (L-27594). I Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the counsel for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on Appeal in

both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. 10 Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. 11 What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. 12 In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title. Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo. II In the instant case, as a precaution, oppositors-appellants caused notice of lis pendens to be duly inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of the appeal within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated. 13 Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final termination of the litigation. The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles subsequently issued, which will yield to the ultimate result of the appeal.14 During the pendency of the appeal, it appears that Honofre A. Andrada, et al., filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Branch I, not the land registration court), a complaint against the appellee Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, Rodolfo A. Cenidoza and Roman C. Tamayo, for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question (Civil Case No. 4696). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case despite the pendency of the appeal involving the same land, and decided the case in favor of plaintiffs. In violation of Our injunction adverted to above, Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation executed a subdivision plan of the original single parcel of land subject of the land registration proceedings covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151, and deeded over six (6) lots of the subdivision plan to plaintiffs Honofre A. Andrada and Nemesio P. Diaz. By an order dated September 23, 1968, entered in Civil Case No. 4696, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija was directed to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue new titles to the above-named transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances." Immediately, transfer certificates of title were issued to them and other transferees in which the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did not carry over the notice of lis pendens originally inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151. Subsequently, other transactions were entered into involving portions of the land reconveyed in Civil Case No. 4696, including a transfer of about 4,000 hectares to the Land Bank of the Philippines in consideration of P8,940,000.00. We find the order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 03151 and to issue subsequent titles free from all liens and encumbrances to be void ab initio.

Civil Case No. 4696 is an action in personam to which the appellants are not parties; its object was to decree reconveyance to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo in Land Registration Case No. N675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, which is subject to the outcome of the appeal. Such action is barred by the pendency of the appeal. In that case, the court is without jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances ." 15 Nor can such order be construed to authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens, which was not entered by virtue of the reconveyance case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty bound to carry over the said notice of lis pendens on all titles subsequently issued. But, in plain violation of lis pendens in said titles; such act constitutes misfeasance in the performance of his duties for which he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third parties, but cannot affect the petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of injunction and the notice of lis pendens inscribed in the original title. It must be remembered that Our injunction restrained the Register of Deeds "from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until the petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman C. Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation under section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. 25545." Its plain meaning is to enjoin registration of documents and transactions unless the notice of lis pendens is annotated and so subject the same to the outcome of the litigation. In such case, subsequent transferees cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. On the other hand, the lower court's order dated September 23, 1968, in Civil Case No. 4696, cannot overrule an injunction of this Court (in L-27594). As a result, We consider the notice of lis pendens entered in virtue of this litigation to remain in full force and effect, and affects all subsequent transferees of the title of the land subject of this appeal. At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim. 16 III We now consider the appeal on the merits. 1. To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. 17 Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 18 It is true that blueprints of two survey plans were presented before the trial court (both marked Exhibit "D"). The first blueprint copy of a plan of land as surveyed for Maria Padilla (Exhibit "D", p. 4, Exhibits of Applicant), was not formally offered in evidence. The second plan of the land, as surveyed for Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation (also marked as Exhibit "D", p. 3, Exhibits of Applicant) was submitted by the said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the Director of Lands. Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or verified the survey plan and the technical descriptions thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it has no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the

original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done. It is also asserted that a blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) was superimposed in the military plan of the reservation under Proclamation No. 237, which military plan was presented in evidence by the oppositors-appellants (Exhibit "6"), and it was agreed by the parties that the plan, Exhibit "D", superimposed in the plan of the area covered by the proclamation, is the plan of the land applied for (p. 15, Brief for Applicant-Appellee). Obviously, the superimposition of the copy of the survey plan of land as surveyed for applicant in the military map of the area under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole purpose of showing that the land applied for is situated within the area covered by the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay appropriately indicated in the perimeter map of said reservation (Exhibit "6"). But the applicant is not relieved from the original tracing cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands as required by law. One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute certainty of the identity of a registered land. Consequently the primary purpose of the aforesaid requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical descriptions. Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the original tracing cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands. It will be noticed that the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) does not bear the approval of any officer authorized by law. In similar manner, the surveyor's certificate, also required in original land registration proceedings, was not offered in evidence. 2. We next consider the question of whether the applicant has a registerable title to the land applied for. The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla (Exhibit "T" pp. 64-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the original of the said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in the circumstances surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of the said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the date when said informacion posesoria was issued. One copy showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895 (Exhibit "T") while the other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5, 1883 (Exhibit "2"). Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on the basis of the "List of Possessory Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the corresponding supporting documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla does not appear among those listed as holders ofinformacion posesoria titles as of the year 1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur) Nueva Ecija. According to said document, the name Melecio Padilla appears only in the list of holders of possessory information titles over lands situated in Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, but of a substantially smaller acreage. 19 Thus, the seven (7) parcels recorded in the name of Melecio Padilla covered only a total area of 49 hectares, 18 acres and 325 centares. 20 In addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now Laur), Nueva Ecija existing in the Division of Archives does not include the name of Melecio Padilla. 21 It is true that an alleged copy of an informacion posesoria in the name of Melecio Padilla, was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija could not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document does not exist in their records. 22 There is another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of the

applicant. The alleged informacion posesoria covers an area of "seis mil quiiones, poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in excess of one thousand (1,000) hectares. 23 Besides, the document described in Exhibit "H" is not the titulo de informacion posesoria, because it was merely a certification of possession of Melecio Padilla over the property, and was issued without prejudice to a third party or parties having a better right. 24 Thus, it states: "En su virtud habiendo examinado el Registro nuevamente formado por la perdida o destruccion del mismo y no hallando en ningun asiento contrario a lo relacionado reinscribe la posesion de la finca de este numero a favor de Don Melecio Padilla sin perjuicio de tercero que puede tener mejor derecho a la propiedad." Under Spanish law, in order that an informacion posesoria may be considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the holder thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally converted into a registration of ownership because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has been in open possession of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the date of such registration; that such conversion be announced by means of a proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the registration of possession into a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper record thereof in the Registry." 25 Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on April 17, 1895, the right to perfect possessory information title under the law expired. After that date, full property right of the land reverted to the government and the right of the cultivator and possessor to obtain gratuitous title was extinguished. 26 Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the "kaingin" system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. 27 During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land approximately in 1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled peace and order conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them was prevented by the Army. It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessors-ininterest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation" of the property in question, "under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title." 28 A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. 29 While grazing livestock over

land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. 30 The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 31 Apart from the aforesaid inconclusive evidence of possession to support the applicant's claim of title, it does not appear that the said property has ever been declared for taxation purposes by either applicant or applicant's predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the only tax declarations submitted were those of Mamerto Garcia and Honofre Andrada, et al. (Exhibit "G", Tax Declaration No. 5576, covering an area of 7,340 hectares) and Mamerto Garcia, et al. (Exhibit "H-1", Tax Declaration No. 5577, over an area of 9,547 hectares) but both were filed only in 1958. The latter declaration contains an annotation that the property described therein is an unidentified property, as the declarant failed to identify the same, and it "was only through his insistence" that it was assessed. Neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation nor its predecessor, Alipio Alinsunurin had submitted any tax declaration supporting its/his claim over the property. It is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property. It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing proof of actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the entire area in question during the period required by law. This is especially true in view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." 32 Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forest are excluded. 33 It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. 34 Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes the existence of private property within the military reservation. It is true that the proclamation states that the same is subject "to private rights, if any there be", but applicant must prove its private rights over the property, which said party failed to do. 35 For it is well-settled that, unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 36 WHEREFORE, decision in the above case is hereby rendered: (1) in G. R. No. L-27594, the petition for certiorari is granted; the order dated March 11, 1967 in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967), and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija are all declared void; the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija is ordered to recall and cancel all transfer certificates of title, including owners' duplicates and mortgagees' copies, if any, arising out of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151; the preliminary injunction issued on June 5, 1967 and the temporary restraining order issued on June 1, 1973 are made final and permanent, with costs against respondents (except respondent Judge); and

(2) in G. R. No. L-28144, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside, and judgment is rendered dismissing the application for registration. Costs against appellee. G.R. No. L-56613 March 14, 1988 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Cruz, Esguerra, Tafalla, Peren Castillo & Associates for respondents.

FERNAN, J.: A complaint often heard from parties-litigants is the delay in the resolution of their cases. This is one instance where the delay will perhaps be regarded, at least by one of the parties, as a welcome occurrence for had the case at bar been resolved earlier, the result obtained may have been diametrically and extremely different. This is one of the several cases * involving the qualification of private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a corporation sole, to have an alleged alienable piece of public land registered in its name under the 1973 Constitution. The antecedents are as follows: On November 28, 1973, private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo filed an application with the then Court of First Instance of Cavite for registration in its name of a parcel of land with an area of 379 square meters located at Poblacion, Municipality of Amadeo, Cavite. In said application, private respondent alleged inter alia that it was the owner in fee simple of the land afore-described, having acquired title thereto by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1947 by Aquelina de la Cruz in its favor and that applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession and occupation of said land in the concept of owner for more than thirty [30] years. Private respondent prayed that should the Land Registration Act not be applicable, the provisions of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 be applied as applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than thirty [30] years and had introduced improvements thereon, including the fencing thereof on all sides. 1 The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the following grounds: 1] the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest did not possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the parcel of land applied for; 2] neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question; and, 3] the subject parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. 2 After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite rendered judgment granting private respondent's application for registration of title. It found that private respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, open and adverse possession of the subject property in the concept of

owner for more than forty [40] years and that the land was not within any military and naval reservation, nor covered by any kind of public land application or patent, as it is within the proposed alienable or disposable block of the proposed LC Project No. 5-A of Amadeo, Cavite. 3 Believing that private respondent did not sufficiently Identify the land in question by reason of its failure to submit the original tracing cloth plan thereof and that private respondent was disqualified from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain under Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, the Director of Lands appealed the decision of the land registration court to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the assailed decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Director of Lands reiterating as basis therefor the two [2] issues previously raised before the appellate court. We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that Exhibit "O", the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the purpose of Identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was found by the appellate court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of the Land Registration Commission, and was reverified and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25,1974 pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration Commission the authority to approve original survey plans. It contained the following material data: the barrio [poblacion], municipality [Amadeo] and province [Cavite] where the subject land is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical Descriptions 4 signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information necessary for a proper and definite Identification of the land sought to be registered, thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract from the probative value thereof. As observed by the appellate court: Now, just because the law requires the filing of a tracing cloth of the plan, that We should be too technical about it that the submission of the certified copy of the white paper plan instead of the original of the tracing cloth of the plan would compel Us to deny the registration? The object of the law in requiring the submission of a tracing cloth of the plan duly approved by the Bureau of Lands is to establish the true identity the location of the land, in terms of degrees and minutes in order that there is an assurance that it does not overlap a land or portion of land already covered by a previous land registration, or that there will be no possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent survey of any adjoining land.
In the case at bar, such Identity can be well-established by the white paper plan. To Us, it would not matter if the plan introduced to establish the Identity of the land is made of cloth or is made of paper. For one thing, a tracing cloth of the plan is required to be submitted to the Bureau of Lands. It must have a file copy of the same. 5

Petitioner's heavy reliance on the case of Director of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, is misplaced. The original tracing cloth plan was deemed essential in that case as the lands involved were vast tracts of uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested lands which were necessarily difficult to Identify, unlike the land subject matter of the instant registration case which is more readily Identifiable by reason of its location, its comparatively smaller size of 379 square meters as well as the chapel constructed thereon by private respondent in 1968. Moreover, the documentary evidence presented therein consisting in the blue-prints of two [2] survey plans were not approved by the Director of Lands unlike Exhibit "O" which bore the approval of the Land Registration Commission at the time it was empowered by law to approve original survey plans and which was re- verified and

approved by the Bureau of Lands when the authority to approve original survey plans was withdrawn from the Land Registration Commission by P.D. No. 239. As observed at the outset, had this case been resolved immediately after it was submitted for decision, the result may have been quite adverse to private respondent. For the rule then prevailing under the case of Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome et al., 114 SCRA 799, reiterated in Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 as well as the other subsequent cases involving private respondent adverted to above', is that a juridical person, private respondent in particular, is disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from applying for registration in its name alienable public land, as such land ceases to be public land "only upon the issuance of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48[b]" of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. These are precisely the cases cited by petitioner in support of its theory of disqualification. Since then, however, this Court had occasion to re-examine the rulings in these cases vis-a-vis the earlier cases of Carino v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935, Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 and Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437, among others. Thus, in the recent case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509, We categorically stated that the majority ruling in Meralco is "no longer deemed to be binding precedent", and that "[T]he correct rule, ... is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period [30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended] is converted to private property by mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure." 6 We further reiterated therein the timehonored principle of non-impairment of vested rights. The crucial factor to be determined therefore is the length of time private respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question prior to the institution of the instant registration proceedings. The land under consideration was acquired by private respondent from Aquelina de la Cruz in 1947, who, in turn, acquired by same by purchase from the Ramos brothers and sisters, namely: Eusebia, Eulalia, Mercedes, Santos and Agapito, in 1936. Under section 48[b] of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, "those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure" may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act. Said paragraph [b] further provides that "these shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." Taking the year 1936 as the reckoning point, there being no showing as to when the Ramoses first took possession and occupation of the land in question, the 30-year period of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation required by law was completed in 1966. The completion by private respondent of this statutory 30-year period has dual significance in the light of Section 48[b] of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and prevailing jurisprudence: [1] at this point, the land in question ceased by operation of law to be part of the public domain; and [2] private respondent could have its title thereto confirmed through the appropriate proceedings as under the Constitution then in force, private corporations or associations were not prohibited from acquiring public lands, but merely prohibited from acquiring, holding or leasing such type of land in excess of 1,024 hectares. If in 1966, the land in question was converted ipso jure into private land, it remained so in 1974 when the registration proceedings were commenced. This being the case, the prohibition under the 1973 Constitution would have no application. Otherwise construed, if in 1966, private respondent could

have its title to the land confirmed, then it had acquired a vested right thereto, which the 1973 Constitution can neither impair nor defeat. 7 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63498-R is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. This decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70825 March 11, 1991 DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, respondents. Antonio A. Azana for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:p This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 66710 affirming in all respects the decision ** of the then Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch IV, dated January 30, 1978, ordering the registration, in the name of Isidro Espartinez of Lot 6783, Cad 239, Ligao Cadastre, located in Agul, formerly of Ligao, Albay, now Pioduran, Albay. The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172 square meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable. The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing (Exhibits "A" and "C") and posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the municipal building (Exhibit "B") having been complied with, and considering that only the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared, the lower court issued an order of general default with the exception of said government agencies. Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena appeared and, together with the fiscal, she was required to file an opposition to the application. Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the period set by the court, on December 12, 1972, it commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence. On the same day, however, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the government and at the same time, filed an opposition to the application for registration. He alleged therein that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land the same not having been acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws; that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application; that Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for

failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein; and that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and therefore, not subject to private appropriation. Thereafter, seventeen (17) oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers on the land, flied a motion to lift the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration. Espartinez filed a motion to dismiss the opposition contending that the private oppositors were, with one exception, mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No. 2976, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in CAR Case No. 523 wherein the Court of Agrarian Relations declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of Lot 6783 and the oppositors as her tenants. On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the following findings of facts: On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila: INTENDENCIA GENERAL DE HACIENDAS DE FILIPINAS Indice de las resoluciones definitivas adoptadas por esa Intendencia general desde el 16 al 28 del Febrero proximo pasado, que se publica en la Gaceta, con arreglo a lo mandado en Decreto de 28 de Octubre de 1869 . . . Feb. 24. Adjudicando a D. Faustino Llacer la extension de 80 hectares y 16 centiareas de terreno situado en el pueblo de Ligao, Provincia de Albay, en la cantidad de pfs. 10053. Manila de 28 de Marzo de 1885 . . . Luna. (Exhibit "L") The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then minor Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11, 1913 in Civil Case No. 422 entitled "Abintestato de los Finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibit "K"). Hence, the land which was earlier declared for taxation purposes in the name of "Los Herederos de los finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibits "P", "Q" and "R"), was so declared by Sotera Llacer in her own name (Exhibits "I", "S" and "T"). In CAR Case No. 523, Sotera Llacer and her husband, Bonifacio Viscaya were also declared by the Court of Agrarian Relations in Legazpi City as landholders of Lot 6783 (Exhibit "J"). On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the deed of absolute sale as containing an area of 1,036,172 square meters in consideration of the amount of P 8,500.00 (Exhibit "E"). So as to reflect the agreement that Espartinez would assume the responsibility and expenses in ejecting the occupants of the land pursuant to the decision in CAR Case No. 523, Espartinez and Sotera Llacer executed an amended deed of sale on June 11, 1970 (Exhibit "F"). Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit "G") and paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit "H"). Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit "M") and a technical description thereof (Exhibit "N") indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares. He planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and carabaos.

Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects. The appellate court considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held that Espartinez' possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his predecessors-ininterest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885 when it was adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the application for registration was filed. The Director of Land and Forestry Development, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari contending that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed errors of law in: (a) granting the application of confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding the fact that he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a registerable title to the property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower court's decision which directed the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of proof that the same is alienable and disposable and despite private respondent's failure to adduce in evidence certain required documents. A crucial point to resolve is whether the appellate court correctly considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Worth noting is the fact that said document is, as the said court itself describes it, "a copy of a certification issued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the Bureau of Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila of the year 1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain decree dated October 28, 1869." (Rollo, p. 29). The "excerpt of an entry" is the Spanish text quoted above. From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit "L" is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what reason such adjudication was made. Granting that there was indeed an "adjudication" or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit "L" not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez' predecessorsin-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No. 62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545). The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit "M", which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit "L", is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396). In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and 1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence (Director

of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 568, 571; Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705), in this case, the tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between the area of the land under Exhibit "L" and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there seems to be no tracing plan at all, notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the same was attached thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission (See: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61462, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners' repeated contention of the absence of the tracing cloth plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention. Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523, were not land registration cases and therefore, ownership of the property was not definitively passed upon. Espartinez' reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is also misplaced. That law is premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural land, The law states: Sec. 48 The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of title therefor, under the land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit "L" from which Espartinez' claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in theHeirs Amunategui case must be given strict application. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citing Adorable vs. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands vs. Abanzadao, L-

21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Regalado, J., Pro hac vice.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: The crucial issue in this case is private respondent Isidro Espartinez's entitlement to confirmation/registration of title to Lot No. 6783 of the cadastral survey of Ligao, with an area of 103.6172 hectares, more or less, under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Comm. Act No. 141). Both the former Court of First Instance of Albay and Intermediate Appellate Court held in the affirmative. The majority now reverses their rulings. I am constrained to dissent. Isidro Espartinez (hereinafter, the Applicant) should be held entitled to have his imperfect title confirmed in his favor, upon the following considerations: 1. Section 48(b) of Comm. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 and Rep. Act No. 3872 provides: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied). The majority opinion holds that said law is inapplicable on the ground that Applicant failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain. The ratiocination, however, loses sight of the fact that such a condition was made a statutory requirement only on 25 January 1977 by Pres. Decree No. 1073, or approximately five (5) years after Applicant filed his application on 17 May 1972. Said provision reads: Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. Under Comm. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 and Rep. Act No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time, however, the following were the only conditions necessary before confirmation of imperfect title could issue: 1. The possessor is a Filipino citizen (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 [1946]); 2. He has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain; 3. Such possession must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. That Applicant is a Filipino citizen is not disputed. That the land, subject of this litigation, is "agricultural land of the public domain" is presumed. 1 That presumption has not been overcome by petitioner officials who never presented proof that the land was of a different classification. Only recently, we have had occasion to hold that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippines are agricultural lands and the Courts have the right to presume that the lands are agricultural lands. 2 The case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 3 cited in the majority opinion (p. 10), does hold that the burden of proof in confirmation of imperfect title cases is upon applicant that he meets the requirements of the law, Comm. Act No. 141 as amended, and must overcome the presumption that land is part of the public domain. The land in that case, however, was classified as forest land and as such did not form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The rules on confirmation of imperfect title, therefore, could not apply. Moreover, in that case, the Director of Forestry had filed an opposition to the application for registration of title. Not so in this case, where neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry has filed any opposition below.

Besides, Applicant has presented evidence showing that the land has been utilized for agricultural purposes since he has planted it to coconuts, sugar cane and palay and a portion is used as pasture land. 4 Proof to the contrary, or that the subject land is within an unclassified region, is wanting in the records. Being neither timber nor mineral land, the subject property must necessarily be classified as agricultural. 5 2. Applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Tacking the number of years of possession of his predecessors-in-interest to his own, Applicant should be deemed to have possessed the land for eighty seven (87) years, reckoned from 1885 to the filing of the application in 1972, definitely more than sufficient to apply in his favor the conclusive presumption that he had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. In fact, open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years, in accordance with the Public Land Act, ipso jure converts the land to private property and entities the possessor thereof to confirmation of title in his name. 6 It may be that the entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila on 28 March 1885 (Exh. "L") adjudicating the property to Faustino Llacer is not in itself a title evidencing ownership. It may be that the judgment in Civil Case No. 422, dated 11 November 1913, declaring Sotera Llacer to have inherited said parcel in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Faustino Llacer (Exh. "K"), as well as the other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523 (Exh. "J"), all in Sotera Llacer's favor, were not land registration cases where ownership of the property was definitively passed upon. It may be that tax declarations or tax payments on property are neither conclusive evidence of ownership. But certainly, when they are coupled with open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner, they constitute evidence of great weight in support of an applicant's claim of acquisition or ownership. 3. Another major argument of the majority for the denial of the application is the fact that the tracing cloth plan, which could explain the discrepancy between the area of the subject property, as stated in Exhibit "L," and that claimed by Applicant, was not presented. It will be recalled that the area indicated in Exhibit "L" is "la extension de 80 hectareas y 16 centareas de terreno" while the survey plan of the land (Exh. "M") and the technical description thereof (Exh. "N") indicate that the actual area is one hundred three (103) hectares, sixty one (61) ares and seventy-two (72) centares. Considering, however, that the main purpose of the technical requirement is to identify with certainty the land applied for, and that Exhibits "M" and "N" were arrived at only after a cadastral survey had been undertaken between November, 1926 and November, 1931, they should be admissible as correctly delineating the metes and bounds of the subject property, After all, the Technical Description (Exh. "N") was certified correct, on 7 January 1971, for the Director of Lands by Amando A. Salvador, Chief, Surveys Division, and by Diosdado C. Dizon, Officer-in-Charge, Technical Standard Section of the Bureau of Lands. The Survey Plan (Exh. "M") in turn, was prepared on 27 October 1971, checked by Alberto H. Lingayo, Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, and certified to by Dionicio Noblejas, Geodetic Engineer of the same office, as correct and platted in accordance with the original field notes and computations of the Bureau of Lands, with the data of said field notes obtained from actual measurements. Significantly, when said Exhibits "M" and "N" were presented and offered in evidence, petitioners did not enter any objection regarding their admissibility or veracity. In the last analysis, the subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time Applicant's predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in

question. 7 And as has been held, a judicial confirmation proceeding should, at most, be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the character and length of time required by law as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. It is the dictum of the law itself that the possessor ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." 8 No proof is admissible to overcome that conclusive presumption. 9 In sum, legal and equity considerations demand that Applicant's possession, of the character and length of time required by statute, in this case, now over a century, be conclusively deemed to have earned for him the right to confirmation of his imperfect title. Hence, this vote to affirm the judgments of both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court.

Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: The crucial issue in this case is private respondent Isidro Espartinez's entitlement to confirmation/registration of title to Lot No. 6783 of the cadastral survey of Ligao, with an area of 103.6172 hectares, more or less, under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Comm. Act No. 141). Both the former Court of First Instance of Albay and Intermediate Appellate Court held in the affirmative. The majority now reverses their rulings. I am constrained to dissent. Isidro Espartinez (hereinafter, the Applicant) should be held entitled to have his imperfect title confirmed in his favor, upon the following considerations: 1. Section 48(b) of Comm. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 and Rep. Act No. 3872 provides: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).

The majority opinion holds that said law is inapplicable on the ground that Applicant failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain. The ratiocination, however, loses sight of the fact that such a condition was made a statutory requirement only on 25 January 1977 by Pres. Decree No. 1073, or approximately five (5) years after Applicant filed his application on 17 May 1972. Said provision reads: Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. Under Comm. Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 and Rep. Act No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time, however, the following were the only conditions necessary before confirmation of imperfect title could issue: 1. The possessor is a Filipino citizen (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 [1946]); 2. He has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain; 3. Such possession must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. That Applicant is a Filipino citizen is not disputed. That the land, subject of this litigation, is "agricultural land of the public domain" is presumed. 1 That presumption has not been overcome by petitioner officials who never presented proof that the land was of a different classification. Only recently, we have had occasion to hold that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippines are agricultural lands and the Courts have the right to presume that the lands are agricultural lands. 2 The case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 3 cited in the majority opinion (p. 10), does hold that the burden of proof in confirmation of imperfect title cases is upon applicant that he meets the requirements of the law, Comm. Act No. 141 as amended, and must overcome the presumption that land is part of the public domain. The land in that case, however, was classified as forest land and as such did not form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The rules on confirmation of imperfect title, therefore, could not apply. Moreover, in that case, the Director of Forestry had filed an opposition to the application for registration of title. Not so in this case, where neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry has filed any opposition below. Besides, Applicant has presented evidence showing that the land has been utilized for agricultural purposes since he has planted it to coconuts, sugar cane and palay and a portion is used as pasture land. 4 Proof to the contrary, or that the subject land is within an unclassified region, is wanting in the records. Being neither timber nor mineral land, the subject property must necessarily be classified as agricultural. 5 2. Applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Tacking the number of years of

possession of his predecessors-in-interest to his own, Applicant should be deemed to have possessed the land for eighty seven (87) years, reckoned from 1885 to the filing of the application in 1972, definitely more than sufficient to apply in his favor the conclusive presumption that he had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. In fact, open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years, in accordance with the Public Land Act, ipso jure converts the land to private property and entities the possessor thereof to confirmation of title in his name. 6 It may be that the entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila on 28 March 1885 (Exh. "L") adjudicating the property to Faustino Llacer is not in itself a title evidencing ownership. It may be that the judgment in Civil Case No. 422, dated 11 November 1913, declaring Sotera Llacer to have inherited said parcel in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Faustino Llacer (Exh. "K"), as well as the other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523 (Exh. "J"), all in Sotera Llacer's favor, were not land registration cases where ownership of the property was definitively passed upon. It may be that tax declarations or tax payments on property are neither conclusive evidence of ownership. But certainly, when they are coupled with open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner, they constitute evidence of great weight in support of an applicant's claim of acquisition or ownership. 3. Another major argument of the majority for the denial of the application is the fact that the tracing cloth plan, which could explain the discrepancy between the area of the subject property, as stated in Exhibit "L," and that claimed by Applicant, was not presented. It will be recalled that the area indicated in Exhibit "L" is "la extension de 80 hectareas y 16 centareas de terreno" while the survey plan of the land (Exh. "M") and the technical description thereof (Exh. "N") indicate that the actual area is one hundred three (103) hectares, sixty one (61) ares and seventy-two (72) centares. Considering, however, that the main purpose of the technical requirement is to identify with certainty the land applied for, and that Exhibits "M" and "N" were arrived at only after a cadastral survey had been undertaken between November, 1926 and November, 1931, they should be admissible as correctly delineating the metes and bounds of the subject property, After all, the Technical Description (Exh. "N") was certified correct, on 7 January 1971, for the Director of Lands by Amando A. Salvador, Chief, Surveys Division, and by Diosdado C. Dizon, Officer-in-Charge, Technical Standard Section of the Bureau of Lands. The Survey Plan (Exh. "M") in turn, was prepared on 27 October 1971, checked by Alberto H. Lingayo, Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, and certified to by Dionicio Noblejas, Geodetic Engineer of the same office, as correct and platted in accordance with the original field notes and computations of the Bureau of Lands, with the data of said field notes obtained from actual measurements. Significantly, when said Exhibits "M" and "N" were presented and offered in evidence, petitioners did not enter any objection regarding their admissibility or veracity. In the last analysis, the subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time Applicant's predecessors-in-interest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question. 7 And as has been held, a judicial confirmation proceeding should, at most, be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the character and length of time required by law as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. It is the dictum of the law itself that the possessor ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." 8 No proof is admissible to overcome that conclusive presumption. 9

In sum, legal and equity considerations demand that Applicant's possession, of the character and length of time required by statute, in this case, now over a century, be conclusively deemed to have earned for him the right to confirmation of his imperfect title. Hence, this vote to affirm the judgments of both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court.

G.R. No. L-62680 November 9, 1988 THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROMERICO CHAVEZ, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Sixto P. Demaisip for respondent Romerico Chavez.

CRUZ, J.: It is the policy of the State to encourage and promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the social justice Ideal enshrined in the Constitution. At the same time, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. This policy is involved in the case at bar, which deals with the confirmation of an imperfect title over a tract of land allegedly owned by the private respondent. The land is situated in Barrio San Miguel, Municipality of Jordan, Sub-province of Guimaras, in the Province of Iloilo, and consists of 181.4776 hectares. 1 On December 29, 1976, Romerico Chavez filed an application for its registration 2 with the Court of Fast Instance of Iloilo. 3 Only the Director of Lands opposed. After hearing, with the applicant as the lone witness, the application was granted. 4The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals 5 which affirmed the decision but reduced the area of the grant to 144 hectares as the maximum allowable. 6 Disagreeing, the petitioner has come to this Court in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Republic of the Philippines contends that: 1) the subject land was not sufficiently Identified with indubitable evidence; and 2) the nature and length of possession required by law had not been adequately established. On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, 7 where it was held that "the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the Identification of the land sought to be registered. As what was submitted in the case at bar to Identify the subject property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court should have rejected the same as insufficient. We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it observed that in that case the applicant in effect "had not submitted anything at all to Identify the subject property" because the blueprint presented lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast

In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement of the law as the subject property was sufficiently Identified with the presentation of blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this connection that the Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go with it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant has provided ample evidence to establish the Identity of the subject property. 8

Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 9 where we held that while the best evidence to Identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient Identification. This rule was bolstered only recently in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 10 where the Court declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan: We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that Exhibit "O", the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the purpose of Identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was found by the appellate court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of the Land Registration Commission, and was re-verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974 pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration Commission the authority to approve original survey plans. It contained the following material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality (Amadeo) and province (Cavite) where the subject land is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical Descriptions signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information necessary for a proper and definite Identification of the land sought to be registered, thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract from the probative value thereof. .... The second ground will require a review of the findings of fact of the trial court which, significantly, were not questioned in the Court of Appeals. The private respondent has raised the objection that such findings are as a rule not reviewable on appeal and more so, we might add, if as in the case at bar they were not disputed at all by the appellant. Considering, that we deal here with the alienation of public land, which must be permitted only after the most careful examination of the applicant's claim, the Court dispenses with the general rules above-cited. As an exception thereto, it will address itself to the evidence of the alleged possession of the subject property, reiterating that:
This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court. 11

and

... in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. 12

Testifying for himself, the private respondent declared that the land in dispute used to form part of a huge tract of land covered by Plan Psu-13870 and owned by Miguel Chavez, who was his greatgrandfather. It was inherited and held for 23 years by his grandfather, Hugo Chavez, who in 1941 passed it on to his father, Jose Chavez, from whom he and his two brothers and a sister acquired it by virtue of a "Deed of Definite Sale" on May 27, 1961. Thereafter, on September 24, 1975, he and the other vendees executed a "Subdivision Agreement" under which Lot 2755, the property now sought to be registered in his name, was assigned to him. 13 The private respondent further testified that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open possession of the land "since time immemorial" (being one of the multitude who favor this cliche). He added that he had been paying taxes on the property and had planted coconut and mango trees thereon although they were not yet fruit-bearing. He had no co-owners and there were no tenants on the land, which was also free of any lien or encumbrance. 14
<re||an1w>

The Court feels that the evidence presented on this requirement is not sufficient. The private respondent can trace his own possession of the land only to 1961, when he claims he (along with his brothers and sister) purchased the same from their father. Assuming the purchase to be true, he would have possessed the property only for 15 years at the time he applied for its registration in 1976. However, he would tack it to that of his predecessors' possession, but there is not enough evidence of this except his own unsupported declarations. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. The private respondent showed that he had been paying taxes on the land only from 1972 and up to 1977. There was no showing of tax payments made on the same land before 1972 by his predecessors-in-interest although they are supposed to have been in possession thereof "since time immemorial. Although he declared in 1977 that he had planted one thousand mango and five thousand coconut trees on the land, he added that they were not yet productive. It takes only ten years for mango trees and five years for coconut trees to begin bearing fruit, which can only mean that they had been planted in less than these numbers of years, or not earlier than 1967. This weakens his claim of possession which under P.D. Nos. 1073 and 1529, amending Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, must commence not later than June 12, 1945. Furthermore, if it is true that his predecessors-in-interest were in possession "since time immemorial," to use the tired phrase again, why had they not themselves introduced any improvement on the land? And considering that the private respondent had himself declared that there were no tenants on the land, it is also difficult to conceive how he could by himself alone have possessed such a vast tract of land consisting of more than 181 hectares. Finally, even assuming that he had really planted those trees, such an act will hardly suffice to prove possession as this would constitute what this Court has called "a mere casual cultivation" in a parcel of land of this vast area. As Justice Pacifico de Castro put it in Republic of the Philippines v. Vera: 15

... It is to be noted that in the instant case evidence for the respondents tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the state. It is worth noting that when the private respondent testified at the only two hearings on December 8, 1977, and on February 17, 1978, the counsel for the petitioner was not present. 16 While his absence did not vitiate the proceedings, they nevertheless became in effect ex parte and left the government without any representative to protect its interests. It is possible that if its counsel had been present, the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted by the applicant would have been more carefully examined. In any event, the Court finds that although the subject property was sufficiently Identified with the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the applicant has failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive, continuous, and open possession necessary to support his claim of ownership. For this reason, the registration sought should have been, as it is now, denied. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 1982 is REVERSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70594 October 10, 1986 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELICIANA RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines through the SolicitorGeneral, to set aside the decision dated March 29, 1985 of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision dated August 13, 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas confirming private respondent's title to four (4) parcels of land situated in Barrio Bolbok Municipality of Tuy province of Batangas. (Rollo, p. 22). An application for the registration in her name of four (4) parcels of land, all situated in Barrio Bolboc Municipality of Tuy Province of Batangas was filed by Feliciana Rodriguez, married to Bartolome Frontera and a resident of Ermita Street, Balayan, Batangas. After due publication and posting, the application was called for initial hearing. No one opposed the application except the Fiscal, representing the Bureau of Lands.

The evidence shows that subject lands originally belonged to spouses Fortunato Rodriguez and Rosa Verganza who had been in possession thereof since 1929. Said spouses subsequently died and were represented by their legitimate children Feliciana and Maria in Civil Case No. 114, "Andrea Rodriguez, et al., plaintiffs v. Nazaria Rodriguez, et al., defendants." Later Maria who also died, was represented by her heirs in said case. Thereafter, the parties entered into a compromise agreement and subject four (4) parcels of land with their corresponding sugar quotas were allocated to herein applicant in the court decision dated June 7, 1954. The applicant has possessed those parcels of land since then up to the present, devoting the same to sugar cane, palay and corn, with benefits directly accruing to the applicant. The possession of applicant tacked to that of her predecessors-ininterest, which have always been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner, is for more than fifty (50) years. It is also borne by the records that these parcels of land are declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicant and have not been mortgaged or encumbered nor delinquent in the payment of taxes. (Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 41-42). The lower court, finding that the foregoing facts were sufficiently established not only by the testimony of applicant but also of two disinterested witnesses, who were all cross-examined by the Fiscal, decreed the registration of aforesaid parcels of land in favor of applicant. (Decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII; Rollo, p. 38). On appeal by the Director of Lands, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 46). Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in confirming applicant's alleged title to the subject lands on the basis of mere blue print copies of the survey plans thereof, and thus were not indubitably Identified and that the Intermediate Appellate Court in confirming applicant's alleged title, misapprehended the facts, the latter not having met the legal requirements as to the nature of possession leading to a registerable title, and the length thereof. (Petition, Rollo, p. 26). Citing the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes (68 SCRA 188189, November 28, 1975) the SolicitorGeneral opines that the best evidence to Identify the lands in question would be the original copies of the duly approved tracing cloth plans thereof, no less. (Ibid., p. 27) It is noteworthy, however, that there is no analogy of facts in the aforesaid case and the case at bar. In the former, the subjects of registration were vast tracts of uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested lands admittedly within the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay. At the outset, there was no conclusive evidence showing that any original tracing cloth plan was ever submitted by the applicants. On the contrary, of the two blue prints of two survey plans supposedly presented by the applicants, one was not formally offered in evidence while the other, although submitted, lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. In the same manner, in the case of Aguillon v. Director of Lands, cited in aforesaid case, the plans were made long before the presentation of the petition for registration by private surveyors who had not been authorized by the Director of Lands or the Governor General to make surveys for the registration of property in the Land Court. (17 Phil. 507; December 16, 1910). On the other hand, in the case at bar, private respondent asserts in her comment (Rollo, p. 101) that it is not entirely correct for the petitioner to say that she merely presented the blue print copies of their tracing cloth plan because she in fact attached the original thereof in the application for registration as Annex "A" and is deemed part thereof. Such assertion was confirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court which ruled that although the blue print copies of the plan were the only

ones offered in evidence, the original tracing cloth plan was available to the Court for comparison and consideration. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 43). Furthermore, the lands applied for are covered by public land surveys that bear the approval and certification of the Director of Lands 'aside from the amplification of applicant's documentary exhibits by the testimonies of two witnesses as to the areas, location and boundaries thereof. (Ibid) The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison (Petition, Rollo, p. 29), should not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the descriptions and Identities of the parcels of land contained therein. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 43). It is therefore clearly evident that the rulings in the abovecited cases are not applicable to the case at bar. As to the second assignment of error, petitioner's contention, that the testimonies of private respondent and her witnesses that her possession and that of her late father were peaceful continuous, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner," are mere conclusions of law which do not meet the requirements of Section 48 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended), (Rollo, p. 32, is untenable. In its findings, the Court of Appeals correctly stated that: Again, we are constrained to pronounce said argument as without merit. It is admitted that the applicant and her predecessor-in-interest have been in possession of the subject parcels of land, only, it is alleged that it was not in the manner required under Section 49(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Suffice it to state that they took occupancy of the lands since the year 1925, developed and cultivated the and planted them to sugarcane, rice and corn. They enjoyed the fruits thereof, and used the lands. They declared them in their names for taxation purposes, and paid taxes therefor to the government. In other words, applicant's occupation, together with that of her predecessors, was not only continuous, open and exclusive, but was also accompanied with the exercise of dominical acts, such as, jus utendi,jus fruendi and jus possidendi. While it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, but when these are accompanied by actual possession, they became strong and convincing proofs of the desire and intention to own the land. We are more than convinced that the possession of the applicant and her predecessors was under abonafide claim of ownership. (Rollo, pp. 45-46). It is well settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) are conclusive on the parties and on this Court, unless they fall under any of the enumerated exceptions (Sakay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 66497-98, July 10, 1986). As this case does not fall under any of the exceptions, there appears to be no reason to disturb the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS GUINTO ALDANA

DECISION PERALTA, J.: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30, 2006 Decision[1] and the November 20, 2006 Resolution,[2] both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the July 10, 2003 judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration of title, whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. The facts follow. On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana[4] (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application for Registration of Title[5] over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Pias City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[6] measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively.[7] Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having acquired them by succession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired the property under a 1969 document denominated as Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration the respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado Guinto.[8] Respondents also alleged that until the

time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation.[9] In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[10] as well as copies of the technical descriptions of each lot,[11] a certification from the geodetic engineer[12] and the pertinent tax declarations,[13] together with the receipts of payment therefor. [14] Expressly, they averred that the propertys original tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255 (Las Pias RTC) in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128a previous registration case involving the subject property which, however, had been dismissed without prejudice.[15] The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance; hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication and notification requirements of the law.[16] Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, advanced that the lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept of owner.[17] At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her siblings, nephews and nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named in the application and the supporting documents attached to the application as well. She testified that the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineers technical description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Pias RTC in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-

128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection from the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the technical description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence.[18] Furthermore, Zenaida61 years old at the time of her testimonydeclared that she has known that the subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5 years old and from her earliest recollection, she narrated that her grandparents had lived in the subject lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons, caretakers supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime between 1980 and 1990. She remembered her grandmother having constructed a house on the property, but the same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970, her family built an adobe fence around the perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after an inundation caused by the flood.[19] She claimed that she and her father, Sergio, had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax declarations and tax receipts which she submitted to the court and which, following identification, were forthwith marked in evidence.[20] Zenaidas claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land was corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly declared that the subject lots were owned by Zenaidas parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she reached the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether there was anyone residing in the property and whether there were improvements made thereon, she said there was no one residing therein and that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. [21] At the close of Josefinas testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits without the oppositor placing any objection thereto.[22] After weighing the evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its Decision denying the application for registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted that the fact of adverse, continuous,

open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner has not been proved by the evidence as Zenaidas and Josefinas respective testimonies did not establish the nature of the possession of respondents predecessors.[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Application for Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED. ORDERED.[24]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED.[25]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[26] Hence, it filed the instant petition which attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial courts July 10, 2003 decision. Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory requirement in registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents admitted that the original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of the LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property registered, petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines,[27] believes that respondents, on that score alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could have easily retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court.[28] Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan submitted by respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the

aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that the blueprint in this case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of the Lands Management Bureau.[29] Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents claim of prior possession. It notes that there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.[30] Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioners arguments are mere reiterative theses on the issues that have already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised which have not yet been previously passed upon. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.[31] We find the petition to be unmeritorious. Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree of 1978, materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file, together with the application, all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands. The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.

The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the question in the instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for compliance with the requirement? In not so many cases,[32] it was held that the nonsubmission, for any reason, of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the registration application, since the same is mandatory in original registration of

title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court ruled that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing cloth plan is a mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by which to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that case was unable to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the applicants obligation to retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioners application for registration. Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. x x x[33]

Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered. Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[34] and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines[35] and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla,[36] that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. Pertinently, the Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. x x x[37]

In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs007601-000040-D, together with the technical description of the property, operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is shown to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas), attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the property was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR.[38] This, compounded by the accompanying technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and verified also by Roxas,[39] should substantially supply as it did the means by which the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained. Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that respondents were able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Also telling is the observation made by the Court of Appeals that there was no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were wellinformed of the present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the blueprint copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. J) and not the original tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted to the courta quo since they had previously submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration Authority. However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the

original tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. J) was offered in evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied admission that the original tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. J) are one and the same, free from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this regard x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. J), together with its technical descriptions (Exhs. K and L), is deemed tantamount to substantial compliance with the requirements of law.[40]

We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only were respondents unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims that they have no credible evidence tending to establish that for at least 30 years they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not agree. In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)[42] P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[43] He must prove that for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[45]

Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona

fide claim of ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily factual. From the records, it is clear that respondents possession through their predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaidas father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia).[46] Yet, it also can be safely inferred that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier because the 1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax number.[47] The property was again declared in 1979,[48] 1985[49] and 1994[50] by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo. Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the relevant portions of the tax records on file with it had been burned when the assessors office was razed by fire in 1997.[51] Of equal relevance is the fact that with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the named owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the payment in the 1994 receipts.[52] The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaidas testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondents predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good faith. Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary

declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to government revenuesan act that strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[53] Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of owneropen, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or from any private individualitself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection under the law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, areAFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997]

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs, instituted this petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development: Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented
[1]

before us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration. The facts of the case are narrated below:

On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon. Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following dispositive portion:
[2] [3] [4]

"WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands described in plan As-04-000108? Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and nature.

Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued. SO ORDERED."
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
[5]

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the latter's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the latter's cars.
[6]

The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged. Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged. A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery. Upon petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined by another expert from the National Bureau of Investigation The latter testified that the signatures
[7] [8] [9]

on the questioned and sample documents were not written by the same person. Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, 1992. Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that her application for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost . x x interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question."
[10] [11] [12]

In a decision dated December 8, 1994, respondent court denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith especially when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show, according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
[13] [14]

Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less thanP36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00. We find the petition for review impressed with merit. 1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree.
[15] [16]

However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
[17] [18]

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.
[19] [20]

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.
[21] [22]

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed. In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court." The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes, an intentional omission of fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
[23] [24] [25] [26]

In Ramirez v. CA, this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.
[27] [28] [29]

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner. Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following declaration appears:

"6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as follows: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna. Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)"
[30]

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Magesun Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.

[31]

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law. The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior
[32]

to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court. 2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner. Mention of the late President's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.
[33]

3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x" While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
[34]

4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case. A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.
[35]

In response to the questions fielded by the trial counsel and by counsel for petitioner, PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by "natural variation." He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes the personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting between letters the structural pattern of letters and other minute details x x x." Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00. Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded, and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
[36] [37] [38] [39]

There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. In it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.
[40]

Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject property? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not have offered them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject

property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge. From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof. Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
[41] [42]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents. DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory? Statement of the Case The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
[1] [2] [3] [4]

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence. Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
[5] [6]

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:

[7]

"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:
[8]

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
[9]

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
[10]

x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.
[11]

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
[12]

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:

[13]

x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:
[14]

x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Courts Ruling We find for petitioner. Newspaper Publication Mandatory The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1.

By publication. --

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
[15] [16]

reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
[17] [18]

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
[19]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration isDISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents. DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, granting the application for land registration of the respondents.
[1] [2]

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:
[3]

(a)

Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;
[4]

(b) (c)

The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;

[5]

Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;
[6]

(d) (e)

Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;
[7]

Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are

alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;
[8]

(f)

Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994; and
[9]

(g)

Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.
[10]

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.
[11]

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.
[12] [13] [14] [15] [16]

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
[17]

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.
[18]

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
[19]

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water. As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.
[20]

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments: First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol, where this Court
[21]

declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are coowners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I

Jurisdiction Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic. A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration.

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
[22]

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots. The Property Registration Decree recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered; and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province. The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.
[23] [24] [25]

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
[26] [27]

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court. B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.
[28] [29]

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

1.

By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
[30]

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in

its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
[31]

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II

Period of Possession Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land. Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.
[32]

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992. The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
[33]

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
[34] [35]

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
[36]

(1)

For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) (b) By judicial legalization; or By administrative legalization (free patent).

[37]

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode. Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
[38] [39]

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
[40]

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: (a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073]. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
[41]

The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents,

having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.
[42]

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
[43]

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
[44]

Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree. Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.
[45] [46]

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146527

January 31, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA PROPERTIES, INC., Represented by its President, JOSE TANYAO, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review1 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated 20 December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union ("trial court") dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352 ("LRC No. N-2352") approving the application of respondent Manna Properties, Inc. ("Manna Properties") for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union. Antecedent Facts As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case are as follows: On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title of two (2) parcels of land, specifically: a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union measuring around 1,480 square meters. Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo. Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and record were forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a quo on October 7, 1994. However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration Authority, the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot owners were not stated for notification purposes. As a result thereto, per Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to submit the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514 and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22, 1994 together with the notice of the Initial Hearing, which was reset to April 13, 1995. On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting of the initial hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a non-working day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety (90) days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail delays and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in the Official Gazette. The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a quo. On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995 from the LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be published in the Official Gazette for lack of material time

since the National Printing Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days before the date of the hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be moved to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353. Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18, 1995. The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public domain. Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing Office, the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette officially released on June 19, 1995. The same notice was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald. Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on the acquisition of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-owner of the subject property, who testified on the possession of the applicant-appellees predecessors-in-interest. The [documentary] evidence presented were: 1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006; 2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515; 3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006; 4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate; 5. Certificate of Latest Assessment; 6. Notice of Initial Hearing; 7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA; 8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National Printing Office; 9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald; 10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing; 11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995; 12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995; 13. Sheriffs Return of Posting; 14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.

Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996 granting the application. (sic)3 The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), promptly appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. On 20 December 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal. Hence, this petition. The Regional Trial Courts Ruling The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and competent evidence all its allegations in the application for original land registration. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA") did not present any evidence in opposition to the application. The trial court ruled in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the application, and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434 (Exh. "A" and the technical description described in Exhibit "B" and "B-1") shall be registered in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree in the name of the applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose [Tanyao], Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises, Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529.4 The Court of Appeals Ruling The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling and dismissed petitioners argument that the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529 5 ("PD 1529"). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the publication of the notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepea was not the sole basis for the trial courts finding that Manna Propertiess predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added that while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they are "the best indicia" of possession. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: 1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; and 2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD. The Ruling of the Court On Whether Manna Properties Failed to Comply with the Jurisdictional Requirements for Original Registration

Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between the court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. Petitioner points out that in this case, the trial court issued the order setting the date of the initial hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial court set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125 days in between the two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529. Thus, petitioner concludes "the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration." The petitioner is mistaken. The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads: Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. xxx The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation. Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant complied with the jurisdictional requirements. The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set beyond the 90day maximum period. The records show that the Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the initial hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing Office, which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law. We have held that "a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties."6 A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law. Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the application. Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing. Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases compliance with the publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.

On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently Established Possession of the Land For the Period Required by Law Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of the land for the period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their evaluation of the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties. The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law.7 This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in prior proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts. The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question of fact.8 It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances.9 We find one such circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public domain. On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already private land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest. The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141") otherwise known as the "Public Land Act." Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied) Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land.10 Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.11 Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC,12 Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.

We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and remains part of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.13 Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name. 14 Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of time.15 It is only when the applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141. The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepea ("Manuel"),16 transferees affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the land in question. We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.17 However, the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945,18 a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough. The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established. There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Properties must fail. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small annotation found at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will enable this Court or any interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed.19The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration. The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was "FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No. 7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads, "Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950" This means that the tax declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. Manna Properties gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of making it

appear that Manna Properties predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. The earliest of the "un-cancelled" tax declarations presented by Manna Properties is dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the transferees affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna Properties reliance on Manuels testimony is similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and self-serving on its own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on that piece of land.20
l^vvphi1.net

Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title over public land.21 Manna Properties evidence hardly constitutes the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141.22 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

JOSE R. MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,

G. R. No. 160895
Present:

- versus -

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: October 30, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.: The central issue presented in this Petition for Review is whether an order of general default issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the Republic of thePhilippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, from interposing an appeal from the trial courts subsequent decision in favor of the applicant. The antecedent facts follow.

On 24 February 1999, petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for the registration in his name of three (3) parcels of land included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots, individually identified as Lot No. 464-A, Lot No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively comprised around 3,700 square meters. Martinez alleged that he had purchased lots in 1952 from his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that Martinez had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots had remained unencumbered; and that they became private property through prescription pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to initiate the proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had failed to do so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur.[1] The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-30 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur, Branch 27. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set the case for hearing and directed the publication of the corresponding Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette. On 30 September 1999, the OSG, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellees possession was not in accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.

141; that his muniments of title were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject parcels; and that the properties formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to private appropriation.[2] Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even against the Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. This ensued when during the hearing of even date, no party appeared before the Court to oppose Martinezs petition.[3] Afterwards, the trial court proceeded to receive Martinezs oral and documentary evidence in support of his petition. On 1 August 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[4]concluding that Martinez and his predecessors-in-interest had been for over 100 years in possession characterized as continuous, open, public, and in the concept of an owner. The RTC thus decreed the registration of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez. From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal dated 28 August 2000, which was approved by the RTC. However, after the records had been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC received a letter dated 21 February 2001[6] from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) stating that only Lot Nos. 464A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the Official Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan for that property. Accordingly, the LRA manifested that this lot should not have been adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.[7]
[5]

On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision,[8] reversing the RTC and instead ordering the dismissal of the petition for registration. In light of the opposition filed by the OSG, the appellate court found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the registration of the subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral evidence presented by Martinez merely consisted of general declarations of ownership, without alluding to specific acts of ownership performed by him or his predecessors-ininterest. It likewise debunked the documentary evidence presented by Martinez,

adjudging the same as either inadmissible or ineffective to establish proof of ownership. No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of Appeals by Martinez, who instead directly assailed its Decision before this Court through the present petition. We cannot help but observe that the petition, eight (8) pages in all, was apparently prepared with all deliberate effort to attain nothing more but the perfunctory. The arguments raised center almost exclusively on the claim that the OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its allowance by the RTC, following the order of general default. Starkly put, the [OSG] has no personality to raise any issue at all under the circumstances pointed out hereinabove.[9] Otherwise, it is content in alleging that [Martinez] presented sufficient and persuasive proof to substantiate the fact that his title to Lot Nos. 464A and 464-B is worth the confirmation he seeks to be done in this registration case;[10] and that the RTC had since issued a new Order dated 1 September 2003, confirming Martinezs title over Lot No. 370. In its Comment dated 24 May 2004,[11] the OSG raises several substantial points, including the fact that it had duly opposed Martinezs application for registration before the RTC; that jurisprudence and the Rules of Court acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from appealing the unfavorable judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since its technical description was not published in the Official Gazette; and that as found by the Court of Appeals the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient for registering the lots in his name.[12] Despite an order from the Court requiring him to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel for Martinez declined to do so, explaining, among others, that he felt he would only be taxing the collective patience of this [Court] if he merely repeats x x x what petitioner had succinctly stated x x x on pages four (4) to seven (7) of his said petition. Counsel for petitioner was accordingly fined by the Court.[13] The Courts patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by insubstantial arguments. The inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal to the arguments of the OSG further debilitates what is an already weak petition.

The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have still appealed the RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG argues that a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,[14] and asserts that [t]he Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in default may appeal from the judgment rendered against him.[15] There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which does not deter from the ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a party declared in default is allowed to pose an appeal. Elaboration is in order. We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the RTC acted improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even though an opposition had been filed to Martinezs petition. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of default may be issued [i]f no person appears and answers within the time allowed. The RTC appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinezs petition long before the said hearing. As we held in Director of Lands v. Santiago:[16]
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing. The pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government's claim.[17]

Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order, whether in its appeal before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this Court. It would thus be improper for the Court to make a pronouncement on the validity of the default order since the same has not been put into issue. Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the OSG that the default order was proper or regular. The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes. The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas,[18] we declared that the defaulting defendant loses his standing in court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing.[19] These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[20] decided in 1948, where a divided Court pronounced that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court, except where a motion to set aside the order of default had been filed. This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no provision in the then Rules of Court or any law depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on appeal.[21] The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded the Lim Toco ruling. Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that [a] party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.[22] By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was available even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been filed, the then fresh Rules clearly rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot. Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of default acknowledged that a party declared in default shall not be entitled to

notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial.[23] Though it might be argued that appellate proceedings fall part of the trial since there is no final termination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to nonetheless allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from the trial court decision. Indeed, jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules was unhesitant to affirm a defaulted defendants right to appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2 of Rule 41, even as Lim Toco was not explicitly abandoned. In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,[24] the Court acknowledged that the prior necessity of a ruling setting aside the order of default however, was changed by the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 41, section 2, paragraph 3, a party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.[25] It was further qualified inMatute v. Court of Appeals[26] that the new availability of a defaulted defendants right to appeal did not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity.[27] In Tanhu v. Ramolete,[28] the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice Moran, expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing, although

[under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the merits.[29] Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41. The new provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) (d) An interlocutory order; An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and

(h)

An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was removed from Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an order of default:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial. (b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (c) Effect of partial default.When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded.A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. xxx

It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicated

in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been reinstated? If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Rules were taken as an indication, the answer should be in the negative. The right of a defaulted defendant to appeal remains extant. By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:[30]
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[31]

The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that provisions deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,[32] Tan v. Dumarpa,[33] and Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.[34] Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly acknowledge that even under the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the right

to appeal as previously confirmed under the old Section 2, Rule 41. In his textbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the question What are the remedies available to a defending party in default? with a reiteration of the Lina doctrine, including the remedy that a defaulted defendant may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him.[35] Justice Regalado also restates the Lina rule in his textbook on Civil Procedure, opining that the remedies enumerated therein, even if under the former Rules of Procedure, would hold true under the present amended Rules.[36] Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise reiterates the Lina doctrine, though with the caveat that an appeal from an order denying a petition for relief from judgment was no longer appealable under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules.[37] Herrera further adds:
Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which allows an appeal from a denial of a petition for relief, was deleted from the present Rule, and confined appeals to cases from a final judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein, when declared by these rules to be appealable. A judgment by default may be considered as one that completely disposes of the case.[38]

We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted defendant to appeal the judgment by default against him. Neither is there any provision under the 1997 Rules which expressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why the 1997 Rules deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41 (on subject of appeal), it is perhaps worth noting that its counterpart provision in the 1997 Rules, now Section 1, Rule 41, is different in orientation even as it also covers subject of appeal. Unlike in the old provision, the bulk of the new provision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which no appeal may be taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A declaration therein that a defaulted defendant may still appeal the judgment by default would have seemed out of place. Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists, applying the principle ofstare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has continued

to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise. In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[39] the Court, through Justice Callejo, Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared in default, which we adopt for purposes of this decision:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.[40]

If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day. Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Martinez failed to adduce the evidence needed to secure the registration of the subject lots in his name. It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals, did not introduce any new evidence, but simply pointed to the insufficiency of the evidence presented by Martinez before the trial court. The

Court of Appeals was careful to point out that the case against Martinez was established not by the OSGs evidence, but by petitioners own insufficient evidence. We adopt with approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals, thus:
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors by any of the means provided for the proper acquisition of public lands, the rule is settled that the property must be held to be a part of the public domain. The applicant must, therefore, present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. He may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, we find the evidence adduced by appellee, on the whole, insufficient to support the registration of the subject parcels in his name. To prove the provenance of the land, for one, all that appellee proffered by way of oral evidence is the following cursory testimony during his direct examination, viz: xxxx Q A You mentioned that you are the owner of these three (3) parcels of land. How did you begin the ownership of the same? I bought it from my uncles Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez. xxxx Q A Q A Q A Q A x x x x Who took possession of these parcels of land from then on? I took possession, sir As owner? Yes, as owner. Up to the present who is in possession as owner of these parcels of land? I took possession. Before Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez sold these parcels of land before you took possession who were the owners and in possession of these? Hilarion Martinez, the father of my predecessors-in-interest and also my grandfather. xxxx

Court: Q A Of your own knowledge[,] where [sic] did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez acquire these lands? According to my grandfather he bought that land from a certain Juan Casano in the year 1870s[,] I think. xxxx Q A Q By the way[,] when did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez die? Either in 1920 or 1921. Since you said your immediate predecessors-in-interest Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez inherited the same from your grandfather. Can you say it the same that your predecessors-in-interest were the owners and possessors of the same since 1921 up to the time they sold the land to you in 1952? Yes, sir. xxxx In the dreary tradition of most land registration cases, appellee has apparently taken the absence of representation for appellant at the hearing of his petition as license to be perfunctory in the presentation of his evidence. Actual possession of land, however, consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not enough for an applicant to declare himself or his predecessors-in-interest the possessors and owners of the land for which registration is sought. He must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The record shows that appellee did not fare any better with the documentary evidence he adduced before the trial court. The October 20, 1952 Deed of Sale by which appellee claims to have purchased the subject parcels from his uncle, Julian Martinez, was not translated from the vernacular in which it was executed and, by said token, was inadmissible in evidence. Having submitted a white print copy of the survey plan for Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B, appellee also submitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 370 which does not, however, appear to be approved by the Director of Lands. In much the same manner that the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory statutory requirement which cannot be waived, the rule is settled that a survey plan not approved by the Director of Lands is not admissible in evidence.
[41]

These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently extensive evaluation of the evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the RTC decision, encapsulated in a one-paragraph prcis of the factual allegations of Martinez concerning how he acquired possession of the subject properties. The Court of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a comparison between the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the RTC clearly demonstrates that it was the appellate court which reached a more thorough and considered evaluation of the evidence. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected of the petitioner in a land registration case has not been matched in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986 FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents. Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners. Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.

FERNAN, J.: Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs. Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows: On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows: [a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario; and, [c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South; bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.] Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon. On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land. On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding that: Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appelles appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely dissimilar. Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much less covers that of the property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who' has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]

Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified with that described in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads. Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine enunciated in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343. Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and residents of the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code]. Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter of Identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in relation not only to the properties adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted authority states: The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be considered holds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the Identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.] A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due course. Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo). On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the following: RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF

TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATAEXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo) On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the case was consider submitted for decision without the brief of private respondent. On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be included as coapplicant to the land sought to be registered. In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize it. Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar. It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim

may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize. The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case when the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana,supra.] There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor. With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names. While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed

against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281]. It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata. If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction? To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned. Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated. The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties. Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.