Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 LORENZO M.

TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents. RESOLUTION CRUZ, J.: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that 1 decision. Specifically, they ask the following questions: 1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3. What is meant by "publication"? 4. Where is the publication to be made? 5. When is the publication to be made? Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the 2 publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not 4 binding. This elicited a Reply refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
3

internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this 5 Court. The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief 6 Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. " It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general 7 applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law. Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in 8 the Official Gazette and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the 9 10 people were sufficiently informed. One reserved his vote and another merely acknowledged the need 11 for due publication without indicating where it should be made. It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote. There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published. At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time. Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment. The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions FERNAN, J., concurring: While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the lawmaking power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern. FELICIANO, J., concurring: I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying. A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people. At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium. Separate Opinions FERNAN, J., concurring: While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the lawmaking power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern. FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying. A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people. At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant. Prudencio de Guzman for appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee. MONTEMAYOR, J.: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no

force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing. However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says: El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52). In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof. But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial

court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below. In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954 AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

MANUEL LARA, ET vs. PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee. Manansala and Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee. MONTEMAYOR, J.: Manansala

for

appellants.

In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after finding only questions of law are involved, certified the case to us. The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation based on the hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were paid on the commission basis, that is to say, each driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. Plaintiffs claim that as a rule, each drive operated a taxi 12 hours a day with gross earnings ranging from P20 to P25, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20 per cent share ranging from P4 to P5, and that in some cases, especially during Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays when a driver worked 24 hours a day he grossed from P40 to P50, thereby receiving a share of from P8 to P10 for the period of twenty-four hours.

The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant being engaged in the taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by the EightHour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 per cent of their gross earnings "their situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers and hence, outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce." For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, namely, sections 1 to 4. SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him. SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or impending emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon, earthquakes, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case of urgent work to be performed on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature; but in all cases the laborers and the employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional. In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to be paid the laborers. SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of work shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication. Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could have his chauffeurs work on Sundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at least 25 per cent of their regular remuneration: but that with reference only to work performed on Sundays and holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8 hours a day, then the Eight-Hour Labor Law would operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came under section 2 of the said law. So that the question to be decided here is whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays included. It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the same act excludes application thereof laborers who preferred to be on piece work basis. This connotes that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving as compensation from his employer uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of employment of the plaintiffs. A driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one day could operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less

than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even 24 hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire, inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could drive continuously or intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feels strong, active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence and industry and makes considerable gross returns and receives as much as his 20 per cent commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wants to rest between trips and works for less number of hours, his gross returns are less and so is his commission. In other words, his compensation for the day depends upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed. In short, he has no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the learned trial court presided by Judge Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings and observations of this point. . . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form of commission based on the gross receipts of the day. Their participation in most cases depended upon their own industry. So much so that the more hours they stayed on the road, the greater the gross returns and the higher their commissions. They have no fixed hours of labor. They can retire at pleasure, they not being paid a fixed salary on the hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis. It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi drivers were entirely characterized by its irregularity, as distinguished from the specific regular remuneration predicated on specific and regular hours of work of factories and commercial employees. In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed income for each given day. . . .. In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940, dated June 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who "observed in a loose way certain working hours daily," and "the time they report for work as well as the time they leave work was left to their discretion.," receiving no fixed salary but only 20 per cent of their gross earnings, may be considered as piece workers and therefore not covered by the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law. The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 dated May 28, 1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3 thereof entitled Coverage, says: The provisions of this bulletin on overtime compensation shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, nonagricultural laborers or employees who are paid on piece work, contract, pakiao, task or commission basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him. From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support. As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving

10

a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. 1, 4th edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable to employees without fixed salary. We quote Employees not entitled to indemnity. This article refers only to those who are engaged under salary basis, and not to those who only receive compensation equivalent to whatever service they may render. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals on Commercial Matters.) In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur. Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

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Tanada vs. Tuvera No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 Ponente: Justice Cruz Facts: The petitioners sought the disclosure of a number ofpresi denti al decrees, which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The governments contention that the phrase otherwise provided means that a decree will become effective immediately after their approval. The trial court affirmed the decision of having the necessity for the publication of the said decrees. The petitioners now sought for the reconsideration or clarification of the said decision. The prayer constitutes of ordering the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all the unpublished Presidential decrees of general application and unless published they shall not be binding. Issue: Whether or not the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity of laws or to the requirement of publication. Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted.Publ i cati on is indispensable in every case, but the legislature in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The omission of the said publication would run against the due process clause and would deny the public knowledge of the laws. The court held that all statutes, including those of local application andprivate laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. The publication must be in full sin ce its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) TAADA 136 FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the SCRA 27 VS. (April 24, TUVERA 1985)

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law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA 146 FACTS: SCRA 446

VS. (December 29,

TUVERA 1986)

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. Laws should refer to all laws and not onl y to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the

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wisdom The J.

of

law must

or be

to

repeal

or

modify or at

it

if least

it as

finds soon

it as

impractical. possible. Cruz:

publication

made

forthwith,

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

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