Metaphysics types notes 13/10/11 Exam (info about to be typed on blackboard) only 7 questions of choice no essay on truth material

questions on time universals and modality. Trans world identity but first day re modality modality doesn't just encompass de dicto modality (propositions idea that you can classify propositions as necessary contingent and impossible) Day re modality has to do with properties of individuals/things (re means thing) previously josh example humanity property of Josh arguably an essential property of what it is to be josh hence argument for necessary property in this case. What is being said to be necessary is the connection between humanity and josh (de re) tighter connection than instantiation more like necessary instantiation note still say that Josh's existence is a contingent fact if we said that josh's humanity was simply necessary his existence would also have to be necessary which is not the case. De re dits into possible worlds theory not denying that in other possible worlds josh might not have humanity property josh might be robot in World 2. We are not worrying about whether there is just this world, we are worried whether the individual Josh in actual world has a relationship with josh in any possible world. trans world identity. Can identity hold between actual worlds and possible worlds

species essentialist would say that identity doesn't hold anti species essentialist would argue that the identity does hold. 2 ways of using the word identity qualitative identity A+B a qualitatively identical iff they have all the same properties/they are like/they resemble each other directly. Numerical identity A+B are identical iff they are one and the same thing Bob Dylan and Robert Zimmerman analogy we are after this sense of identity species essentialist would advocate numerical identity. Basically talk of essential properties interesting point if you advocate modal realism then there can be no trans world identity. Have to advocate ersatz - ism what does it take for something to be the same between possible worlds and the actual world so under what circumstances is x@w1 one and the same as y@w2 spectrum at one end world bound individuals every individual (also things) exists in exactly one world (model realists because each world is concrete and spacio temporally separate possible worlds don't overlap can't be anything that is in more than one world otherwise they aren't isolated. No trans world identity on this view ultimate essentialist so Lewis and Leibniz other end of the spectrum haecceitism - every indivual (also things) has a non qualitative thisness which makes it the thing it is. Thisniss = property that is unique that each indidual alone has also non qualitative. Doesn't confer anything transworld identity becomes a question of what thisniss is. So no barrier for anything having thisniss

anyway of putting thisniss with individuals there's a world that does this. No metaphysical restriction on what can have thisniss. Ultimate anti essentialist Rodrick Chisholm and in the middle of the spectrum there must be some qualitative properties that are restricted there must be some essential properties (not quite iether) Qualitative essentialism I have some essential properties that makes me who I am and not someone else these properties are qualitative. So what are those properties? Looking for criterion Kripke Another argument for being world bound Liebniz's law: if x is numerically identical to Y, then whatever can be truly said if x can be truly said of y something you can't say of Josh in Wa that you can't say of Josh in W2 in this case sand castle distance example - just something you can say of Josh in WA hat you can't say of Josh in W3 meaning a lack numerical identity objection actuality necessarily makes the actual world non numerically identical to possible worlds second objection identity over time I can't be the same person as I was x ago. I can't be identical to me in the past. Third objection ultimate essentialism is true which is crazy denies contingency as everything essential solutions to the problem Chisholm we should think of accidental propertied as relations to worlds example the property of hair colour (Josh's) - to have black hair is to have black hair in the actual

world Josh leaves out the specification in what world is meant to have josh with black hair. Objection David Lewis accidental properties are intrinsic not a matter of how you are related to anything else. Chisolm what it is to be intrinsic is to be a relation to worlds nothing else. Lewis' solution thinks that everything is world bound but that does not entail essentialism. counter part theory theory about de re modality. Gives us a different possible worlds analysis of de re modality Josh might have had red hair de re possibility as in not essential. What it takes for that to be true is that there would be a possible world where josh has red hair Lewis says differently. What it takes is that there has to be some counter part of josh that has red hair. Counter parts can exist in possible worlds. To see that Josh's counterpart is a counterpart is to say that he is similarly enough to josh and also the most similar thing in his world to Josh. Everything can be the same exceot for select properties. E.G. only difference is that Josh* (in W3) has red hair. All it takes are counterparts